WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE.

BY HON. HAMPTON L. CARSON.

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Mr. President and Fellow Members of The Sons of The Revolution, Ladies and Gentlemen:

You have just returned from a visit to holy ground. You are still under the spell of the brilliant orator of the day. No words of mine can emphasize the significance of the lessons which he pointed. I can merely attempt in a very general and unstudied way to indicate to you somewhat of the significance of Valley Forge. Of course, no place, no period of time is unrelated to other things. There are no accidents under the Providence of God, and if only we can obtain a view in perspective of the crisis of the situation which was reached when Washington camped upon those frozen hills which a few hours ago you saw clothed with the livery of spring, it may perhaps serve to give a setting to the story which can be narrated, as you will presently see, by the very best and most authentic witness of what occurred there, a witness whose testimony needs no corroboration and whose words are the most impressive that have been written. We all remember that, so far as
the military situation is concerned, the Revolution first started in the neighborhood of Boston, Massachusetts. You recall Lexington, Concord Bridge, Bunker Hill and the Siege of Boston, but it is quite clear that no matter what disaster to American arms might have happened or what success the British might have won in that region, it would not have closed the struggle, because strategically the New England States were too far to the northeast to settle anything. The consequence was that when Washington, having with complete mastery of the tactics of the situation, placed his cannon upon Dorchester Heights and commanded the town of Boston, the British were compelled to evacuate. They withdrew to the neighborhood of New York. They effected a landing on Long Island. The Battle of Long Island was fought. Washington was driven into the hills and took up his position in Forts Washington and Lee on opposite banks of the Hudson, but the British at once realized that they were still too far distant from the heart of the Colonies to have achieved a permanent success. Anybody looking at the military history of the Revolution will perceive this cardinal fact, that during those eight long years of war, it was for the possession of the Delaware that the British struggled, because the possession of Pennsylvania and of Philadelphia, the Colonial Capital, if held and held successfully, meant the severance of the New England and Middle Colonies from the South. If Virginia, Georgia and the Carolinas and Maryland could be separated by the possession of New Jersey, Delaware and Pennsylvania, from New York and the New England States, Lord Howe and his sub-chiefs, Cornwallis and Sir Henry Clinton, would hold the situation in the hollow of their hands, and every manoeuvre that was subsequently made by the British armies and all the tactics and strategy which Washington employed in meeting those plans, was to prevent the accomplishment of such a design as that.
The first movement which Sir William Howe attempted in the direction of Philadelphia after the battle of Long Island, was the march across the State of New Jersey, and you recollect it occurred during the very darkest period of the Revolution. The Declaration of Independence had been passed in the month of July 1776. It was in September of that year that the British took possession of New York. It was in the early part of December that they began to move forward across New Jersey. The enlistments of the various state contingents were expiring. Washington's army was dwindling and dwindling away. From 11,000 it came down to 3,000, the men ploughing through the heavy sands of New Jersey and sinking exhausted by the wayside. The British, flushed with success, still pressed on, and then happily a re-enforcement of 1500 men arrived from Pennsylvania. Washington halted on the banks of the Delaware, threw his army to the west bank and watched Cornwallis hesitate. He did not know what Washington meant by such a halt. On a winter night when the Delaware was choked with ice, Washington, finding that the British rear, consisting of Hessians in the town of Trenton, was exposed, boldly re-crossed the Delaware, fought the battle of Trenton and subsequently the battle of Princeton, and the British were driven back to New York, and during the winter of 1776 and 1777 Washington watched the British army from the heights around Morristown, New Jersey. The effort to reach Philadelphia by way of New Jersey had failed.

Then through the treasonable thoughts of Charles Lee, who had been taken prisoner, the suggestion was made to Howe that he should approach Philadelphia from the South. Washington had to watch him to see whether he would enter Delaware Bay or whether he would enter the Chesapeake. Howe preferred the Chesapeake because he knew the Delaware was heavily
fortified. There were Red Bank and Fort Mifflin strongly held by the military, and there was a chain across the river and there were various forts on the Delaware and New Jersey shores lower down, but the great bay of the Chesapeake, with its unfortified shores and long reaches of water, stretched up through the heart of Maryland into the very heart of Pennsylvania, affording a tempting line of approach. The British came that way. Washington halted sufficiently long to enable him to determine the line of the British advance, found that they had landed near the head of Elk in Maryland, and thought he would have to fight a battle at Pipe Clay Creek in the State of Delaware, but the real battle took place on the banks of the Brandywine. Now, it was for the possession of the Delaware River territory that the British and Continental armies were contending. This was the heart of the disputed region, and hence it is that without any disparagement of the fame of famous fields elsewhere on the soil of other States, it is the privilege of Philadelphians, of Pennsylvanians, of New Jersey men and Delawareans, within a three hours' easy ride in an automobile from this as a centre, to visit thirteen battlefields of the Revolution, Brandywine, Paoli, White Horse Tavern, Germantown, Camp Hill, Edge Hill, Crooked Billet, Barren Hill, Monmouth, Princeton, Trenton, Red Bank and Fort Mifflin.

The battle of Brandywine was not a defeat of Washington although it was a severe reverse, but Lord Howe failed to capture or to cripple or to destroy Washington's army. Washington fell back in the direction of Chester, and then finding himself in a dangerous position there, because he could be cut off by the occupation of the Brandywine and Christiana Creeks, leaving the upper part of Philadelphia open to approach, he remarched through Chester, left Philadelphia by the Lancaster Pike, took his position in the neighborhood of White Horse Tavern, and was about to attack Howe
when a great storm came on about the equinoctial season of the year, wetting the powder of his men and making a battle impossible. In the meantime, through the treachery of a farmer in Chester County, General Wayne, encamped at Paoli, was surprised. It was not a massacre. It is frequently spoken of as the Paoli Massacre. That is a misnomer. It was a surprise, but Wayne was able to carry off his artillery and all his camp baggage. He promptly demanded a court martial to inquire into his conduct and was amply vindicated. Anthony Wayne was never successfully surprised. Then came the well planned attack on Germantown, and a better piece of tactics on the part of a military commander could hardly be devised. It shows that the striking power of Washington's army had been in no way affected, because although Lord Howe had some 13,000 British Regulars, the best soldiers that England had (they were Clive's men, the men who had conquered India), and they were facing ragged Continentals and irregular State Militia without organization, without pay, in many cases without proper officers, men accustomed to fight Indians and shoot squirrels or hunt in the bushes, but not drilled in the sense of an army. Washington distributed his forces, with Armstrong on the right wing moving down the Ridge Road toward Wissahickon Creek, with the centre moving from Chestnut Hill down the Germantown Road, and with the left wing approaching by the Church Road and the Limekiln Pike, so as to unite in the Market Square of Germantown and overpower Lord Howe. Unfortunately a morning fog arose and created a panic. The soldiers advancing down the Germantown Road mistook Greene's appearance on the left for the enemy, and then a reverse took place which compelled retirement. Washington then manoeuvred (all this for the purpose of keeping the British out of Philadelphia) along the line of hills in the region of Old York Road, and the
Bethlehem Pike along Camp Hill and Edge Hill. The British moved out towards Chestnut Hill and the battle of Edge Hill was fought, and the battle of the Crooked Billet in the neighborhood of Hatboro and there were other manoeuvres and a camp at Pennypacker's Mills, at Schwenksville, but winter was coming on and the British held possession of Philadelphia.

The problem was, where should Washington station his army during the winter?—when so much hung upon critical events which trembled in the balance so that no man could determine which way the scales would tip. Washington has been severely criticised for putting his men out on those cold, bleak hills to endure the horrors of that winter. Critics have said "Why did he not put them in towns, some in Reading, some in Allentown and some in Lancaster, where they would have been comfortably housed?" I wish to read you a few of Washington's letters and it is at this point that I intend to let the story of Valley Forge with all its tragic meaning be told by the witness who knew most about it and can tell it in his own words. In other words I summon George Washington to the witness stand, in all reverence. I shall treat him as if here and ask him if he made memoranda at the time of his impressions and ask him to read them.

On the 14th of December, 1777, Washington wrote to General Gates as follows:

"We have not yet determined upon a position for the army during the winter. That situation will undoubtedly be most eligible, which will afford best cover to the troops, and will at the same time cut off the enemy from resources of provision, which they may probably stand in need of, when the navigation of the Delaware is obstructed by the ice."

Just a week later, some one implored Washington to protect New Jersey against British ravages, to pro-
tect Wilmington, and the Brandywine-Christiana region, Delaware, against similar ravages. Washington replied in a letter to Congress, dated December 22nd 1777.

“It would give me infinite pleasure to afford protection to every individual and to every spot of ground in the whole United States. Nothing is more my wish, but this is not possible with our present force. In all wars from the nature of things individuals and particular places must be exposed to danger.

“I assure you, Sir, no circumstance in the course of the present contest, or in my whole life, has employed more of my reflection or consideration, than in what manner to effect this, and to dispose of the army during the winter. Viewing the subject in any point of light, there was a choice of difficulties. If keeping the field was thought of,—the naked condition of the troops and the feelings of humanity opposed the measure; if returning to the towns in the interior parts of the State, which consistently with the preservation of the troops, from their necessitous circumstances, might have been justifiable,—the measure was found inexpedient, because it would have exposed and left uncovered a large extent of country.”

In other words, this great region lying around about us, some of which you saw this morning, that great valley of Chester, so rich and fertile, those great grass lands and cattle raising lands in Bucks County and in Delaware County, would have all been a granary for the occupation of the British.

The letter continues:

“If cantoning the troops in several places, divided and distant from each other,—then there was a probability of their being cut off, and but little prospect of their giving security to any part.
Under these embarrassments, I determined to take post near this place,—he is writing from Valley Forge—"as the best calculated in my judgment to secure the army, to protect our stores, and cover the country; and for this purpose we are beginning to hut, and shall endeavor to accomplish it as expeditiously as possible."

And the axes were heard on those hill slopes, now denuded of forests, but at that time covered with primeval trees.

"As to Jersey, I am sensible of her sufferings and exertions in the present contest, and there is no State to which I would more willingly extend protection; but, as I have observed, it is not in my power to give it, in that degree, which seems to be wished and expected. I cannot divide the army into detachments, contrary to every military principle, and to our own experience of the dangers that would attend it. If this is done, I cannot be answerable for the consequences."

There are the words of the Commander of the Continental army, making no complaints but simply announcing what his own military sagacity pronounced to be wise, and stating that if he was interfered with he would not be responsible for the consequences. Fortunately Congress held their hands off. Washington finding that he was getting into camp and that his men were building huts, immediately went to work to study the situation from the economic point of view. You have heard a great deal about the suffering at Valley Forge, but let me read you George Washington's own words:

"22 December 1777.

To the President of Congress.

It is with infinite pain and concern, that I transmit to Congress the enclosed copies of sundry let-
ters respecting the state of the commissary’s department. In these, matters are not exaggerated. I do not know from what cause this alarming deficiency, or rather total failure of supplies, arises; but, unless more vigorous exertions and better regulations take place in that line immediately, this army must dissolve. I have done all in my power, by remonstrating, by writing, by ordering the commissaries on this head, from time to time; but without any good effect, or obtaining more than a present scanty relief. Owing to this, the march of the army has been delayed, upon more than one interesting occasion, in the course of the present campaign; and had a body of the enemy crossed the Schuylkill this morning, as I had reason to expect, from the intelligence I received at four o’clock last night, the divisions which I ordered to be in readiness to march and meet them could not have moved.’’

The crisis was so great that on the very next day he wrote a second letter to the Continental Congress. Remember, Valley Forge was only 23 miles away from the British army. Congress was not in Philadelphia. Congress was at York, or Yorktown as they then called it, near the banks of the Susquehanna in York County, Penna.

“Yesterday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy in force had left the city, and were advancing towards Derby with the apparent design to forage, and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give every opposition in my power; when, behold, to my great mortification, I was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on account of lack of provisions, and that a dangerous mutiny, begun the night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by the
spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended for want of these articles. This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this camp; and, with him, this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter, and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour. From hence form an opinion of our situation when I add, that he could not tell when to expect any.

"All I could do, under these circumstances was to send out a few light parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were instantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiery. But will this answer? No, Sir; three or four days of bad weather would prove our destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter? And if we are so often without provisions now, what is to become of us in the spring, when our force will be collected, with the aid perhaps of militia to take advantage of an early campaign, before the enemy can be reinforced? These are considerations of great magnitude, meriting the closest attention; and they will, when my own reputation is so intimately connected with the event and to be affected by it, justify my saying, that the present commissaries are by no means equal to the execution of the office, or that the disaffection of the people is past all belief. The misfortune, however, does in my opinion proceed from both causes; and, though I have been tender heretofore of giving my opinion, or lodging complaints, as the change in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and the consequences thereof were predicted; yet, finding that the inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other essentials, is charged to
my account, not only by the common vulgar, but by those in power, it is time to speak plain in exculpa-
tion of myself."

I have often marvelled that people in studying either the life of Washington or the history of the Revolution, do not read Washington's letters. He was the best letter writer, I think, that we have in the historical literature relating to the period of the Revolution. Nothing can be stronger or clearer, coming from a source of knowledge. Why paraphrase what he said? Let his letters speak for themselves. Think of his situ-
tation; I like to think in his own words.

"With truth, then, I can declare, that no man in my opinion ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of the army."

There are always critics, every hour a critic. If you look at Sir Thomas More's Utopia you will find that he says "There never will be a time lacking when a critic is found ready to teach Hannibal the art of war."

Listen to Washington on his critics:

"We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the City of Philadel-
phia, and to cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania and New Jersey. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocu-
lar demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which, by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's campaign, and the coverings of these States from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business.'

Now listen to this:

"I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul, I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to relieve or prevent."

Does not the voice of George Washington pierce your very souls, and do you not see virtually his situation?

"It is for these reasons, therefore, that I have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose myself to detraction and calumny."

Washington found that he could get no official action from Congress. It was not because Congress was unpatriotic; not at all, but we had no government. Congress was a mere assemblage of committees from various States, without power. They could not levy a tax.
They could not borrow a dollar. They could not arm a soldier. They could not build a ship. They could not equip a sailor. All that they could do was to pass various resolutions allotting the quota of men and supplies required to different States, to Massachusetts so much, to New Jersey so much, to Pennsylvania so much, to Virginia so much, and then before those resolutions could be made effective they had to be subjected to the disastrous delay of debate in thirteen separate state legislatures, and until nine of them concurred there was no power behind Washington to enforce what was so exigent a necessity. We had no government. The Continental Congress was not a government. It had eyes, it had ears, but it had no hands, and we did not get a government until later, when under God’s guidance and under Washington, as the presiding officer of the Federal Convention, the Constitution of the United States was framed and gave us a government.

Think of the sublime self-possession of the man who refrained, even under those circumstances, from offending the sense of liberty of the people. He was tender about exercising military power and he expressed his views in this way. He wrote to the president of Congress:

"I confess I have felt myself greatly embarrassed with respect to a vigorous exercise of military power. An ill-placed humanity perhaps, and a reluctance to give distress, may have restrained me too far; but these were not all. I have been well aware of the prevalent jealousy of military power; and this has been considered as an evil, much to be apprehended, even by the best and most sensible among us. Under this idea I have been cautious, and wished to avoid as much as possible any act that might increase it.

"The people at large are governed much by custom. To acts of legislation or civil authority they
have ever been taught to yield a willing obedience, without reasoning about their propriety; on those of military power, whether immediate or derived originally from another source, they have looked with a jealous and suspicious eye."

Therefore he refrained until the stress became too great. Despairing of efficient action on the part of Congress, he then on the 9th of February, 1778, sent this order to Anthony Wayne:

"I authorize and empower you and command you forthwith"—when Washington used the word "forthwith" it indicated a necessity—"to take, carry off and secure all such horses as are suitable for cavalry or for draft, and all cattle and sheep fit for slaughter, together with every kind of forage for the use of this army, that may be found in the possession of any of the inhabitants"—here came his sense of justice—"causing certificates to be given to each person for the number, value and quantity of the horses, sheep, cattle and provisions so taken. Notice will be given to the holders of such certificates by the commissary and quarter master general when and where they may apply for payment, that they may not be disappointed in receiving their money."

Then he wrote to Governor George Clinton, appealing to him as the governor of a neighboring state; on the 16th of February, 1778, he said:

"It is with great reluctance I trouble you on a subject, which does not properly fall within your province; but it is a subject that occasions me more distress, than I have felt since the commencement of the war; and which loudly demands the most zealous exertions of every person of weight and authority, who is interested in the success of our affairs; I mean the present dreadful situation of the army for want of provisions, and the miserable
Washington at Valley Forge.

prospects before us with respect to futurity. It is more alarming, than you will probably conceive; for, to form a just idea of it, it were necessary to be on the spot. For some days past, there has been little less than a famine in camp. A part of the army has been a week without any kind of flesh, and the rest three or four days. Naked and starving as they are, we cannot enough admire the incomparable patience and fidelity of the soldiery, that they have not been ere this excited by their suffering to a general mutiny and dispersion. Strong symptoms, however, of discontent have appeared in particular instances; and nothing but the most active efforts everywhere can long avert so shocking a catastrophe.

"Our present sufferings are not all. There is no foundation laid for any adequate relief hereafter. All the magazines provided in the States of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, and all the immediate additional supplies they seem capable of affording, will not be sufficient to support the army more than a month longer, if so long. Very little has been done at the eastward."

New England was too far away. Recollect, there were no railroads, no roads, no lines of communication at all. The marvel is that Washington, without a government at his back, held his army together for eight long years and finally triumphed.

"And as little to the southward; and whatever we have a right to expect from those quarters must necessarily be very remote, and is, indeed, more precarious than could be wished. When the before-mentioned supplies are exhausted, what a terrible crisis must ensue, unless all the energy of the continent shall be exerted to provide a timely remedy."

You need no comment on letters such as that.
I cannot take time to dwell on the other incidental troubles of that camp, the conflicts between Congress and the States as to officers and their relative rank. You know the Continental soldier claimed he was in the Continental service and that he outranked a State officer of similar dignity who happened to be on the ground. There was no national sovereignty. The State sovereignty was supreme. That point was disputed. The quarrels and jealousies which took place between State and Continental officers and between the Continental officers themselves, form a most distressing chapter in a volume relating to the history of Valley Forge. Then came courts martial: Washington had to appoint numbers of men to sit in judgment on their fellows. Then came the Conway Cabal and the Duché letter and the exchange of prisoners. Let me remind you that the exchange of prisoners was a very distressing thing. Recollect, Washington during this time had on his hands the whole of Burgoyne’s army, which had been captured at Saratoga, and was attempting to negotiate an equal exchange of prisoners in order that we might get back equally valuable officers. Then came the danger, which he protested against, of enlisting deserters from the British army, because he said he could not trust them. Then came the correspondence, and it is a long one, with General Putnam and General MacDougall with regard to the defenses of the Hudson, the selection of West Point and the building of forts there on the heights. Then came the infesting of the camp with spies. Finally, I come to peace propaganda. There was an officious man, a friend, a son of the Earl of Fairfax, for whom Washington, you remember, had acted as surveyor in the early days when he had surveyed the lands of Lord Fairfax in Virginia, who undertook to write Washington on the subject and to act as a negotiator for peace. This is the way Washington wrote him on the 1st of March, 1778.
"Your hope of being instrumental in restoring peace would prove as unsubstantial, as mist before the noon-day's sun, and would as soon be dispelled; for, believe me, Sir, Great Britain understood herself perfectly well in this dispute, but did not comprehend America. She meant, as Lord Camden, in his late speech in Parliament, clearly and explicitly declared, to drive America into rebellion, that her own purposes might be more fully answered by it; but take this along with it, that this plan originated in a firm belief, founded on misinformation, that no effectual opposition would or could be made. They little dreamt of what has happened, and are disappointed in their views. . . . . If not, upon what principles, I say, does Administration act? They must either be wantonly wicked and cruel, or (which is only another mode of describing the same thing), under false colors, are now endeavoring to deceive the great body of the people, by industriously propagating a belief, that Great Britain is willing to offer any terms, and that we will accept of none; thereby hoping to poison and disaffect the minds of those who wish for peace, and to create feuds and dissensions among ourselves. In a word, having less dependence now on their arms than their arts, they are practicing such low and despicable tricks, that men of sentiment and honor must blush at their fall. Among other manoeuvres in this way, they are forging letters, and publishing them as intercepted ones of mine, to prove that I am an enemy to the present measures, and have been led into them step by step, still hoping that Congress would recede from their claims."

On the 21st of April 1778, he wrote to John Bannister, a delegate in Congress. Listen to these words, and if you will forget the date and forget the man to whom
they are addressed, you will see how closely they fit our present situation.

"The enemy are beginning to play a game more dangerous than their efforts by arms (though these will not be remitted in the smallest degree), which threatens a fatal blow to the independence of America, and of course to her liberties. They are endeavoring to ensnare the people by specious allurements of peace. It is not improbable they have had such abundant cause to be tired of the war, that they may be sincere in the terms they offer, which, though far short of our pretensions, will be extremely flattering to minds that do not penetrate far into political consequences; but, whether they are sincere or not, they may be equally destructive; for, to discerning men nothing can be more evident, than that a peace on the principles of dependence, however limited, after what has happened, would be to the last degree dishonorable and ruinous."

Then he added that sentence which Mr. Beck quoted this morning, and which struck you like the snap of a whip, "Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A peace on other terms would, if I may be allowed the expression, be a peace of war."

Ah! grandly persistent purpose! Oh, nobly regnant soul, which like the peak of Teneriffe amidst the raving of the sea, maintained its divine serenity, its unflinching courage, its persistent belief in the righteousness of the cause of liberty.

The winter was wearing away. Light gradually broke as the days lengthened. Steuben came and drilled the army. Spring came and on the 4th of May the news of the French Alliance. On the 4th of May Washington wrote to the President of Congress as follows:

"Last night at eleven o'clock I was honored with your despatches of the 3d. The contents afford me
the most sensible pleasure. Mr. Silas Deane had informed me by a line from Bethlehem, that he was the bearer of the Articles of Alliance between France and the States. I shall defer celebrating this happy event in a suitable manner, until I have liberty from Congress to announce it publicly. I will only say, that the army are anxious to manifest their joy upon the occasion.'

I will now read you an extract from his Orderly Book on the morning of the 6th of May. Mark how the language is almost that of a Thanksgiving proclamation.

"It having pleased the Almighty Ruler of the Universe to defend the cause of the United American States, and finally to raise us up a powerful friend among the princes of the earth, to establish our liberty and independency upon a lasting foundation; it becomes us to set apart a day for gratefully acknowledging the divine goodness, and celebrating the important event, which we owe to His Divine interposition. The several brigades are to be assembled for this purpose at nine o'clock tomorrow morning. . . . . . Upon a signal given, the whole army will huzza, 'Long live the King of France;' the artillery then begins again and fires thirteen rounds; this will be succeeded by a second general discharge of the musketry in a running fire and huzza, 'Long live the friendly European Powers.' The last discharge of thirteen pieces of artillery will be given, followed by a general running fire, and huzza, 'The American States.'"

Now and here, after a lapse of a little more than one hundred and forty years, under the mysterious dispensation of Providence, the debt that we owe to France is being paid by us. General Pershing said a few months ago, at the tomb of the hero, "Lafayette, we are here." Old Mother England, with all our past differences forgotten, recognizes now that we stand to-
gether heart and soul in defense, to the desperate end, of that Anglo-Saxon American Liberty which has become the most precious political creed that the world ever knew. Every little struggling nation, little Belgium and Servia and Poland, and even awakened Austria-Hungary and gigantic Russia will learn that we, having lifted our eyes to the glories of those empurpled heights which glow with the inspiration of civil and religious liberty, are now awake, and that this stupendous activity about us, these hammers ringing on rivets in shipyards, these cranes lifting heavy beams into place, these glowing furnaces from Bethlehem to Pittsburgh, these fifty miles of shipyards on both sides of the Delaware, these millions of patriotic citizens, men and women, toiling for wages and subscribing to Liberty Bonds, these 25,000 women marching in the streets of Philadelphia today, all proclaim that America has Resolved that her arms, her voice, her influence, her love of Liberty and her sense of justice shall make themselves potential and victorious in the great issues of the world.