It was the celebrated Virginian, General Dabney H. Maury, who wrote that Pennsylvania and Virginia had furnished more famous soldiers than any other states of the Union. For Pennsylvania, a commonwealth dedicated to peace, this has been an outcome as paradoxical as the location within its borders of the capital of the Revolution, of important battlefields of that war, of the most famous military camp in the world and of the greatest battle of the Civil War.

Major General John Gibbon was one of that long list of Union Generals who came from South Eastern Pennsylvania. He was born in Philadelphia. His "Personal Recollections of the Civil War" with an introduction by Brigadier General C. A. Woodruff, United States Army, are now published in a volume of 426 pages by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. They were written in the 80's of the last century. Civil War history and public opinion would have taken a different slant if the publication of these Recollections and such books as the Letters of General Meade and the Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman had not been deferred to so late a date. The propaganda that shapes the history of a war is hardly less than the propaganda that precedes the war. While this delay is to be regretted, nevertheless these Recollections, with their intimate knowledge of the period and their sanity, come now at an opportune moment as a corrective of much present day writing such as the extravagant assertions of Tate's "Stonewall Jackson" which will be considered later.
A graduate of the West Point Military Academy, serving in the Seminole War in Florida and in the Mexican War, Gibbon was at Camp Floyd, Utah, in the spring of 1861 where he was in command of an artillery battery. He made the overland march of 74 days, reaching Fort Leavenworth October 8th, and went to Washington from St. Joseph by rail. Transferred to the infantry, he rose to the command of a brigade, a division and a corps by virtue of ability displayed in the great campaigns and battles of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, and at the end of the war he was the senior of the three Union Generals who arranged with the Confederate Brigadier General Pendleton the terms in detail of the surrender of Lee's army.

Although Philadelphia was Gibbon's birthplace, he had been appointed from North Carolina to the Military Academy, and from that state his three brothers entered the Confederate Army. His early years in the south and his family associations gave him understanding of the southern people and of the conditions of a society built upon slave labor, and this understanding was increased by his service in Virginia after the war was over. It was with this understanding that he concluded his Recollections, and clearly defined the issue, by writing, "Secession was revolution, and against revolution every government has the right to protect itself by the highest of all laws."

In command of a brigade with the 40,000 troops under McDowell at Fredericksburg, detained there and held back from McClellan then in front of Richmond by authority of President Lincoln, General Gibbon wrote that McDowell apparently was nothing more than a tool to carry into effect wild orders sent to him from higher authority and that the movements of these forces in consequence presented one of the most singular spectacles ever exhibited in war. He wrote that at Warrentown in August 1862 just before General Pope's
overwhelming defeat at the second battle of Bull Run, Meade, then a Brigadier, said to General Pope, "What are you doing out here? This is no place for this army. It should at once fall back so as to meet the Army of the Potomac coming up, and by superior forces overwhelm Lee." This enunciation of a sound strategic principle was met by Pope with the remark that he had orders from Washington to hold the Rappahannock as long as possible, and Gibbon adds that the pernicious practice was still kept up in Washington of attempting to command an army in the field far from the scenes of its operations. Even Pope's defeat in 1862 did not break up the practice which was not discontinued until 1864.

Throughout these pages there is much confirmatory evidence in justification of protests made against the present day trend of not well informed writers of books, magazine papers and reviews treating this epoch, and there is also a considerable amount of new evidence presented by this thoroughly equipped witness of, and participant in, the events narrated. His personal contact with famous Union Generals lightens the narrative with interesting anecdotes and reports of conversations. In the disastrous second battle of Bull Run, General Phil Kearny said to him:

"Reno is keeping up the fight. He is not stampeded. I am not stampeded. You are not stampeded. That is about all, sir. My God, that's about all."

Two days later Kearny was killed, and of that death George H. Boker wrote his most widely known poem.

Then Lincoln had to restore McClellan to command. Lee, after his victory over Pope had taken his army into Maryland, and threatened to move on to Pennsylvania. In McClellan's tent on the outskirts of Frederick, Gibbon heard McClellan calmly give decisive orders or analyze reports coming to him. Gibbon rode back to his troops in better spirits than for a month,
feeling confident that the army had at its head a General who knew his business.

In a letter dated September 16th, Gibbon wrote that McClellan was overwhelmed by the ladies, as he passed through Frederick, throwing their arms around his horse's neck and committing all sorts of extravagances, and that such a scene hadn't been witnessed since Washington's time. Subsequent to Antietam there was an alarming epidemic among the horses of the army which Gibbon says caused the horn of the hoof to drop off, a physical answer to Lincoln's question addressed to McClellan asking what the army horses had been doing to make them unserviceable. Shoes and other supplies for the men were not forthcoming, and undoubtedly there were political and army influences at work in Washington bent on bringing about McClellan's discomfiture, his removal from command soon following. McClellan, says Gibbon, possessed the confidence of his men and excited their enthusiasm in a higher degree than any commander the Army ever had. On the day after McClellan was relieved from command, in a letter Gibbon wrote that among the troops there was but one opinion which was that the government had gone mad, and he added, "It is the worst possible thing that could have been done, and it will be worth as much to the south as a victory. Every one feels gloomy and sad that a man who has done so much for his country should be treated in this manner." In his Recollections written a score of years later he wrote:

"The whole army was in the midst of a movement, regularly and systematically conducted, the object of which began to dawn upon the men themselves."

Lee's army was divided, most of it west of the Blue Ridge, McClellan's flank was protected by the mountains and he held the gaps. His advance was already in touch with that portion of Lee's troops east of the
mountains when the order came placing the incompetent Burnside in command, an even weaker appointment than that of Pope, previously, or Hooker subsequently, for Hooker had shown that he could command a corps while Burnside failed wherever he was placed. As McClellan rode through the camps there were cries from the troops, "Lead us to Washington, General. We will follow you there." McClellan checked imprudent expression and according to Gibbon in these pages and previous writers acted "coolly and nobly through it all, giving Burnside all the information possible and begging all his friends to aid him."

The disaster at Fredericksburg under Burnside's leadership soon followed. Hooker succeeded Burnside and in the spring at Chancellorsville did even worse than Burnside. Gibbon lost all confidence in Hooker. On June 17, 1863, as the Gettysburg campaign was about to begin, a courier arrived with despatches to General Hancock, the corps commander, who called General Gibbon aside. A dispatch announced the death of Gibbon's child. Starting at once for Baltimore and spending most of the time on the journey, General Gibbon was back with the army on the night of the 19th. Here is his account of his receipt of important news:

"On the march that day (June 28th, near Frederick, Md.) I met an officer who said, 'Well, Hooker is relieved from the command of the Army.' Almost breathlessly I asked, 'Who is in command?' and gave a sigh of relief when he answered, 'General Meade.'"

Hancock and Gibbon went to see Meade at headquarters on the night of the 28th. Presumably this visit took place on the Hyndman farm near Frederick, on the spot which is to be marked by Pennsylvania, the site of Hooker's tent where Meade took command. Meade, Gibbon says, was cheered by the assurances he received of the confidence felt in his ability by the army, and he adds that with the self-reliance born of natural ability
and the habit of command Meade at once put his army in motion.

The readers of Meade's letters to his wife were surprised upon encountering the fact that Meade had hard work to retain Sedgwick as a corps commander when Meade reorganized the Army of the Potomac in 1864 and the First and Second corps were abolished, the troops being placed in other corps. Previously Sedgwick had been considered for the command of the Army. In Meade's temporary absence he actually had commanded and had been ordered from Washington to make a reconnoissance in force. This he did and discovered that but for the unwise Washington order Lee's army at the proper time might have been taken at a disadvantage. The Reconnoissance merely gave Lee warning of what was possible. Rendering fine service in a long list of battles, wounded seriously at Antietam, without a single leave of absence in three years, always at the front, and always dependable, one of the best of corps commanders, the War Department in 1864 did not want Meade to give him command of the Sixth Corps. Why? Sedgwick had had no social intimacy with McClellan, but continued to have, as he wrote in one of his letters published in book form in 1903, the greatest regard and admiration for his former commander. Also he had declined to consider for himself the command of an army in the field, manipulated from distant Washington in a way showing again and again that the authorities there had slight conception of military principles. In addition Hooker had vainly tried to transfer to Sedgwick the blame for his own defeat at Chancellorsville, and Hooker had strong political backing at Washington. So Stanton told Meade that Sedgwick must be relieved. Gibbon spent the night of April 2nd, 1864, at Meade's headquarters where Meade told him of Stanton's demand, of Meade's objections and a final compromise between the two that
Sedgwick was to have an independent command in the Shenandoah Valley.

"Now," said Stanton, "whom do you want to command the 6th corps?" Meade named Gibbon: Stanton approved and the order was to be issued the next day. But that night the President's order placed General Sigel in command in the Valley, a weak selection, but Sedgwick was retained at the head of the Sixth corps. Gibbon did not get a corps command until after another summer of bloody battles, and Sedgwick was killed before the summer had fairly begun.

The campaign of 1864 opened with Lieutenant General Grant in command of all the armies and present with Meade's army. Gibbon substantiates one of Grant's initial remarks to Meade as follows:

"I want it distinctly understood beforehand that after we cross the river there is to be no manoeuvring with this army for position."

In quoting this to Gibbon, Meade said he could not help feeling a curiosity to see how the operations were to be carried on, and Gibbon adds that the result justified his curiosity. Of course the next year produced a long succession of manoeuvres.

When the '64 campaign began in May Gibbon's division numbered 6,799 officers and men. By May 31 of that force he had lost 3,196, or nearly one half. The depleted ranks were filled, but by the end of June Gibbon's division had lost in killed, wounded and missing 7,970. Up to July 31st, 17 of his Brigade commanders and 40 of his regimental commanders were killed or wounded. It had become a recognized fact amongst the privates that when the enemy had occupied a position eight or ten hours ahead of the attackers it was useless to attempt to take it. By May 31st, within a month, he wrote, it had been clearly demonstrated that 'We had never succeeded in forcing Lee by battle from any position he assumed, nor had he succeeded in forcing us
from any." By loss of many of the best officers and men the army steadily deteriorated in fighting qualities, a deterioration hastened by the presence of large numbers of drafted men, who instead of entering the army previous to the campaign, and being then subjected to drill and discipline, and who thus might have become useful soldiers, were thrown into the ranks in the height of the campaign and thus hastened the deterioration.

On June 1, 1864, from Meade came a note giving the information that Gibbon had been confirmed by the Senate as a Major General of Volunteers to fill the vacancy caused by the mustering out of General Don Carlos Buell, as to which Gibbon wrote that the government lost more than it gained. There came to him indirectly from General Tyler one of the Commission responsible for Buell's replacement, that the government would not consent to be thwarted by officers of the Regular Army who were indifferent to politics. The real purpose of the war Gibbon wrote was not the abolition of slavery, nor was it so considered by President Lincoln. The politicians in the army were rare, he declares, and the few who were politicians were looked on with suspicion.

The strain of the '64 campaign, the desperate fighting, the enormous losses, the failure to gain results wore down the nerves of officers and men. Out of this strain arose the personal differences between Meade and Warren and between Gibbon and his corps commander, Hancock. Meade, Hancock and Gibbon had been seriously wounded previous to the 1864 campaign, and physical suffering from these injuries was added to the strain of responsibility and mental and bodily fatigue.

The demoralization of the army and the consequences to officers of high rank are shown by the willingness of these officers to leave the Army of the Potomac in the
late summer of 1864. They had grown up with, and had won their high rank and great reputation in its campaigns and battles. It had been at the beginning of 1864 the best officered, organized and disciplined of the Union armies. But it had come to be recognized by many officers that the principal part of the credit of their work which did not go to General Grant was being bestowed by him on his favorite General Sheridan. When Grant told Meade he was going to give him an independent command in the Shenandoah Valley after Early's brilliant raid into Maryland and to the lines of Washington, Meade welcomed the proposition. Gibbon writes that Meade's command of the army in Grant's presence was well-nigh intolerable. The situation was another illustration of the axiom that one poor army commander is better than two good ones. So Meade was willing enough to depart for another field of action, where he would have twice as many troops as Early had, where the military problem was comparatively simple, and the results certain, and where the successful commander would have opportunity to increase a separate military renown. But Grant with a curious military indirectness gave this opportunity to Sheridan. An instance of General Grant's accomplishing an object indirectly, a trait in his make up not pointed out by his biographers is given by Dr. John H. Brinton in his Recollections of service with Grant at Fort Donelson and elsewhere. Dr. Brinton's little known book gives a quite charming picture of General Grant and records incidents not elsewhere printed. After Shiloh the relations between General Buell and General Grant were none too cordial. Buell had been ordered to send troops to Grant to participate in the movement against Fort Donelson. Just after the fort fell Grant met these troops on the river. He had no sooner identified them than he exclaimed with emphasis "I have it," and he ordered the troops to report to Buell at Nash-
ville. The point was that Buell's army was not in Nashville, but opposite it, unable to cross the river, and Grant thus adroitly captured Nashville with Buell's troops.

Hancock, who reasonably enough had expected to succeed Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac thought that with Meade had been the decision to go or stay, which was not the case, and Hancock in the fall of 1864 left the Army of the Potomas not to return. When Hancock left, and Humphreys, Meade's chief of staff, of whom Gibbon writes that he was one of the most accomplished soldiers and highest toned gentlemen in the army, was placed in temporary command of the 2nd corps in which Gibbon commanded a division, Gibbon's turn then came to desire to be relieved. His request was dated November 26. On January 13th Meade informed Gibbon that he had been assigned to the command of the 24th corps, where he was second in command of the Army of the James.

On March 26th, President Lincoln reviewed Gibbon's corps, and Gibbon who rode beside him on horseback wrote that he was the homeliest man he ever saw, especially when he laughed, and he noticed his silent abstract manner and sad, careworn face. Other persons who knew Lincoln have recorded their belief that if he had not been assassinated he would not long have survived the war. Few of the higher army officers outliving the war, survived to advanced years.

In March, 1865, Lee's line of entrenchments was 37 miles long. There were 124,000 men operating against 57,000. On April 2nd, the 6th corps of Meade's army, the corps commanded by Wright, carried Lee's works. The end had come. Lee's flight ended in his surrender a week later, and it fell to Gibbon to arrange with the Confederates the details of Grant's terms.

Not the least interesting of General Gibbon's chapters is the one narrating his experiences with the ne-
groes and the planters in some seven counties of Virginia during the rest of the year, including a story of a tournament to which the Southerners in charge of it would not invite Union officers, but tried to borrow the officers' horses for the event. Gibbon met the situation properly and the tournament was called off. Gibbon quotes the sentence, "The war is over, but the fighting has just begun," but seems not to have known that it was General Hancock who wrote this of the post-war controversies among military men. The concluding retrospective chapter on the blunders of political and civilian interference with the armies should be taken to heart by Americans. The distance of the World War restrained the activities of the politicians and civilians at home. But they would break out again in a war nearer at home.

On page 70 the initials of General Isaac I. Stevens, killed at Chantilly are given as "I. J." It may be noted that the war time novel "Miss Ravenel's Conversion," which General Gibbon commends without remembering the author's name, was written by J. W. DeForrest and that William D. Howells and Colonel John P. Nicholson thought it the best of all Civil War stories.

John Chipman Gray and John Codman Ropes, between whom during the years from 1862 to 1865 were exchanged the Civil War letters now published in a volume of 500 pages (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York), subsequent to the war were partners in a leading law firm of Boston. Outside of that city, Ropes became the more widely known of the two men because of his books on Waterloo and the Civil War. He was physically disqualified for military service, but possibly, partly in consequence of that disqualification, was one of a considerable number of civilians, like the Philadelphia lawyer, the late George Tucker Bispham,
also a sufferer from a lifelong impediment to an active physical life, who have found fascination in a close study of the war game.

The war experience of the other member of the Boston law firm was a curious one. There was a regiment in Lee's army at Gettysburg, which after the first of the three days battling never fired a shot. John Chipman Gray from the autumn of 1862 to the summer of 1865, an aide de camp and then a Judge Advocate, had meted out to him the fate to be a soldier always on the outskirts of war but never really in it. His command reached the field of Antietam after the battle. It missed the great Virginia battles by being transferred to the coast. Subsequently Gray's military life was spent in such comparatively quiet places as the Carolina coast and Florida, and then by the way of the Gulf to New Orleans and up the Mississippi and White Rivers, from which the scene of important warfare had been transferred. Back to the Carolina coast again he witnessed a slight affair as Sherman marched from Savannah northward. Once he wrote that he hadn't been on horseback for nine months, and then bearing a message to Sherman he rode some 60 miles in a few hours. If he did not hear bullets fly until the very end of the war he had the good fortune to meet Sherman and to breakfast with Grant at City Point.

Both he and Ropes were active minded men. The one had light military duties: the other at the time the lightest of law practices, and they had ample time to write to each other long letters discussing the war, the generals, the campaigns, the President and the politicians. As was said of President Roosevelt that one who talked so much could not fail to be right sometimes and wrong very often, so these two correspondents sometimes hit upon a fact or a truth. But both Boston and Hilton Head were remote from active military operations of the first importance. The facts acquired
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by the writers were few; the speculations were large; the predictions usually went astray.

At this time Ropes conceived the idea of writing a history of the war not actually attempted until years later, and then carried forward until his death with more information, and with much of the same mental habit that characterize his letters of earlier years. He visited the Army of the Potomac and talked with Meade, Sedgwick, Humphreys and other officers of high rank. Still his report of what Meade said to him about Sickles's insubordinate and disastrous advance at Gettysburg, or at least that portion of it which undertakes to repeat Meade's conversation with Sickles, is not in accord with what actually occurred. When Sickles was asked by Meade what his troops were doing out on the advanced salient, Sickles, who was polite and deferential, said he would retire them, Meade exclaimed, "I wish to God you could, but the enemy won't let you!" and hurried off to order up reinforcements. Sickles then came back, pell mell, driven by Longstreet, who for all Lee's apologists say of him, came nearer than anybody else to winning a Confederate victory at Gettysburg and held a sounder view as to what should be done and not done on the next day. Ropes's report of the conversation varies from what took place.

Bertrand Russell has somewhere written with a degree of truth, undermining the method and conclusion of much present day historical writing, that the statements of credible contemporary participants in occurrences are more likely to be correct than the interpretations drawn by posterity from such records as minutes or other official entries, since in the latter case there is first the chance of error by the person writing the minutes or records, followed by a second liability to err in the historian who undertakes to read conclusions from such records. There is an obvious error in
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Ropes's letter to Gray with the chance of further error by the historian attempting to draw conclusions from it.

Gray's letters to Ropes have little of the springliness of the letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman of Boston written from Meade's headquarters in 1863, '64, and '65, published in book form in Boston in 1922. He did not have Lyman's gift, humor, or opportunity for hitting off the characters and conduct of leading military chieftains, and his letters do not display a faculty of analysis similar to Lyman's due in the case of Meade's aide de camp to nature, to a wide experience with men and events, and partly due, very likely, to the fact that Lyman was a scientist before he was a capable soldier. The only praise Lyman ever got from Meade came to him indirectly in the repetition by a third person of Meade's remark that Lyman was a very intelligent man. Now, Sherman said that Gray was an intelligent officer, but Gray's contact with Sherman was so brief that the General had forgotten the intelligent officer's name.

Gray gives a description in some detail of the personality of Sherman. It accords with other descriptions, but for the historian is less useful than the diary and letters of Major Henry Hitchcock of Sherman's staff. Hitchcock, like Gray, was a lawyer and Judge Advocate. Of his breakfast with General Grant at City Point Gray wrote that the General was silent, but that he looked more like a gentleman than he had expected to see. Grant's manner and appearance often made a less favorable impression upon strangers. The memoirs of one of the English nobility says of General and Mrs. Grant at an affair given in the General's honor in London that "a more commonplace looking couple he had never seen." Meade wrote of the same impression Grant made upon men who did not know him, and added "They say he can't talk. He can talk
and talk well. I only fear he talks too much.” But this was to military men with whom Grant felt at home, and in whom he had confidence.

Gray records that Henry Rawle, who was widely known as one of the leaders of the Philadelphia bar, visited the Army at Hilton Head in 1865, and Gray gave him shelter for two or three days, Rawle having nowhere to lay his head. Of Rawle Gray wrote, “He is a perfect Philadelphian, and the youngest looking man of his age (over forty) that I ever saw. He is quite agreeable and I enjoyed his stay extremely. He has now gone to Charleston.” A looker on would have enjoyed even more the meeting of the “perfect Philadelphian” and the perfect Bostonian which Gray’s letters reveal him to have been. Many things outside of his youthful environment in Boston came to Gray as novelties, the beauty of Maryland and Virginia scenery, the good manners of the Southern men, the fact that along the Mississippi River the people were not as undeveloped socially as he had expected to find them. After a visit to Gettysburg Ropes wrote to him of the beauty of the scenery in South Eastern Pennsylvania, and the two Bostonians discuss the subject in their letters, and almost wonder how it could be so.

If the speculations upon almost every conceivable side of the great civil war subject exchanged between these two young Bostonians do not prove to be of the first importance to students of the war they are of interest and value as revealing the activity of the American mind, even if it is a restless activity, and a nation wide tendency to arrive at judgments and conclusions upon a very meagre array of fact. A German with a more scientific habit can be conceived as thinking, “I really do not know much about all this yet,” or an Englishman as accepting some simple formula as sufficient for him, or a Frenchman as pinning his faith upon an emblem. But the two young Bostonians were
typical of thousands of other Americans of the period and many more thousands of other Americans of today, all of them eager to arrive at and express views and solutions of their own on the most involved matters of the widest importance. Charles Francis Adams portrayed this common American habit when he wrote of himself that Harvard did not give him the kind of training he stood in need of, a training that would have restrained his natural tendency to reach conclusions too hastily. Self confidence, audacity, and courage of youth in both the individual and nation are thus indicated and these qualities may go far temporarily. For a long run something more may be needed.

The Southern side of the conflict is represented by two recently published books, "A Soldier of the South: General Pickett's War Letters to His Wife," edited by Arthur Crew Inman (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York), and "Stonewall Jackson, the Good Soldier" by Allen Tate (Minton, Balch and Co., New York) both illustrated.

General Pickett's name is known to many Americans because of the last assault ordered by General Lee at Gettysburg, an assault commonly and incorrectly called Pickett's charge. These letters have already been given to the public in a magazine and in book form. They were written to the soldier's fiancee, their marriage taking place in September 1863, and subsequently to the young wife. They breathe the devotion of lover and husband. There is evidence that the letters are not printed altogether as they were written and that they have been pieced together. For instance under date of July 15, 1862 a letter describes Pickett's regret at the killing of the Union General, Phil Kearny. But Kearny was not killed until two weeks later. It was perhaps to be expected that this "soldier of the South"
writing fondly to his beloved would not dwell upon such matters as the fact that he himself did not cross the Emmettsburg road when his troops with other divisions under other commanders made what is called "Pickett's charge." He wrote of leading his troops. Technically he did by giving them the order which Longstreet through Alexander and Lee through Longstreet, passed along. But his leadership was not that of his brigade commander, Armistead, who died at the stone wall marking the Union line.

His letter describing the battle of Five Forks in 1865 is a curious one, or at least the printing of it is curious. No reader of it would imagine that Pickett did not know that the battle was going on and did not get back to his command until the fight and his defeat were practically over. General Lee had laid much stress upon the importance of holding Five Forks. When he learned that Pickett had been absent he ordered his trial by court martial. In the confusion of the Confederate retreat the trial did not take place. Seeing Pickett on horseback Lee exclaimed "Is that man with the army yet?"

Of the three divisions, Pettigrew's, Trimble's, and Pickett's, participating in that climax of the battle of Gettysburg with such support as Wilcox's brigade of Anderson's division gave, it is difficult to test the truth of Pettigrew's North Carolinian assertion that Pickett's division of dead men drew more rations after "Pickett's charge" than any division in Lee's army. Pickett's division had not been engaged previously. The casualties in the divisions of Pettigrew and Trimble were not separated in the returns from the casualties of the previous days. But it is an established fact that the Tennessee brigade in Pettigrew's division furnished the only organized regiments making the first breach in the Union line. The 26th North Carolina regiment went into the assault with only 216 men, of whom only 84 retired to the Confederate line. In
their brigade alone the losses in the assault have been placed at 528, of which 300 were in Killed and Wounded. In Pickett’s division 1524 were returned as missing, nearly three times as many as in Pettigrew’s division for the entire battle and about four times as many as in Trimble’s division for a like longer period. In Pettigrew’s division for that period 411 were killed, 1904 wounded and 534 were missing. Pickett’s losses in the assault were 232 killed, 1157 wounded and 1524 missing. These two divisions were each about 5000 strong, and the proportion of losses to the numbers engaged probably did not vary much in the two divisions. These facts serve to draw attention to the common error in attributing to Pickett’s division alone participation in a hopeless assault which Longstreet with sound military judgment disapproved of before it was attempted.

If the Pickett letters do not disclose many facts of military importance, they do reveal a warmhearted, even a romantic nature. Of General McClellan, against whom he had been fighting he wrote in June, 1862, “I have heard that my dear old friend McClellan is lying ill about ten miles from here... He was, he is, and he will always be, even were his pistol pointed at my heart, my dear, loved friend. May God bless him and spare his life.” Six months later he wrote, “I loved little Mac, and it was a godsend to the Confederacy that he was relieved.”

War did not destroy the affections of officers for others in the opposing army. In 1864 when Pickett’s son was born and his troops built bonfires in celebration of the event, his old friends in the Union army also built bonfires, and Grant and Ingalls sent through the lines a message of congratulations, and later sent the child a piece of silverware. If this had leaked to the civilian population in the North no doubt it would have created a furore and not improbably a demand for the
punishment of the officers participating. Hate of the foe in war time invariably is greater among civilians than among those who are bearing the brunt of the battle.

Allen Tate’s “Stonewall Jackson” (Minton, Balch and Co., New York) has been written apparently for the great-granddaughters of the Confederacy with the purpose of giving a fresh start to expiring Southern romances once sectionally accepted below the Mason and Dixon line. The assertions that the Southern people were the Unionists and Constitutionalists and the Northern people Revolutionists: that Lincoln was a man of one idea whose character was superior to his mentality, is a return to a form of arrogance indulged in by representatives of the South at Washington before the Civil War, which was inevitably resented by leaders and people of the North, and which in considerable measure was responsible for arousing hostile sentiment and for the harshness of the methods of the Reconstruction period.

The opening chapter is constructed on the theory and practice adopted by a number of young writers of the present day to meet the supposed incapacity of American readers to be interested in a straightforward statement of facts, and that these therefore must be administered in sweetened dosages. The reader is here introduced to the boy Thomas J. Jackson, with the omission of the middle initial which “Stonewall” used in his signature, living at the rural home of an uncle. It is not explained until the second chapter that the boy was an orphan. It is to be inferred that this is a method of narrative used by the author in the belief that it creates mystery and arouses curiosity, when in fact it merely causes irritation in the reader’s mind. The best that can be said for Stonewall Jackson has been said in the best way by his English biographer,
Colonel Henderson. That book was taken into the hearts of a number of the military pundits of England and at the same time it brought a scattering fire of opposition from other military writers in that country. What is new in Mr. Tate’s volume is to a large extent erroneous, and has the appearance of newness chiefly because his exaggerated statements of the superiority in numbers of the Union forces opposed to Jackson and Lee conform more or less with Southern claims made so long ago that they have been forgotten.

Mr. Tate formulates again the assertion that the Southern people were not fighting for slavery, but for State Rights. Such a claim, of course, ignores the constitution of the Southern Confederacy which prohibited any state in it from interfering with slavery, and consequently prevented the states acting under it from having any State Rights in the matter. Under it a Confederate state could not exercise the state right to abolish slavery even if it wanted to do so.

Mr. Tate’s battle strength statistics are an outstanding feature of his volume. He seems to have drawn them from the air, as the magician seems to perform his wonders. Certainly he does not draw them from the authorities. At the first battle of Bull Run he assigns to McDowell 40,000 and to Beauregard 20,000, whereas McDowell had in round numbers 29,000 effectives and Beauregard 22,000, increased by Jackson’s arrival on the field to 32,000. At Kernstown in the Shenandoah Valley when Jackson was defeated by Shields’ troops he assigns to Jackson 2,000 infantry, when according to Jackson himself he had a force of 3,000, and to Shields’ forces 9,000, whereas Jackson was defeated by one division of three brigades of infantry with a few squadrons of cavalry and batteries of artillery. Kimball was in command in the fight, General Shields having been wounded previously and he was not on the field.
Mr. Tate overestimates the importance of Jackson’s attack on Kernstown, which took place on March 23rd, 1862, by asserting that it caused Lincoln to withhold McDowell’s troops from McClellan whereas on May 24th, two months after the Kernstown affair Mr. Lincoln assured McClellan that McDowell would be sent to him. He asserts that there were nearly 80,000 Union troops available for operations in the Valley, a sweeping generalization which has almost no geographical limit from within which such a force could be drawn. Actually the scattered force under Fremont, Banks, Shields and Saxton, at Harpers Ferry, totalled less than 40,000, a greater superiority of force than even Sheridan had over Early in the Valley in 1864 as Jackson’s force was about 16,000. Jackson’s successful utilization of the unmilitary division of the Union forces done from Washington was skillful enough not to require exaggeration of the available force that could have opposed him under better management. But Mr. Tate carries his habit of exaggeration much of the way throughout his volume.

In the Peninsular Campaign of 1862 he attributes to McClellan a force of 110,000 and to the Confederate, Johnston, 50,000. Livermore, a better authority, gives McClellan, June 29–July 1, an effective force of 91,169 and the Confederates about 88,000. Tate starts Lee’s campaign against Pope by assigning to Lee 55,000 and to Pope a possible 150,000. Actually in the battling at Second Bull Run August 27–September 2, 1862, Pope’s forces were about 76,000 and Lee 49,000. On the way to Antietam Mr. Tate writes that McClellan advanced upon Turners Pass in the South Mountain range with 70,000 men, and sent 20,000 more under Franklin to Crampton’s Pass, and that Lee’s forces all told were 40,000. Livermore places Lee’s effective force on the day before the battle of Antietam at 59,284.

In common with a number of writers who have re-
counted the events of this campaign, not from the Southern point of view as the present author does, but from the Northern aspect, Mr. Tate wonders why McClellan should have been held for a time in front of South Mountain. One of the Confederate Generals provided a sufficient answer to so idle a query when he wrote that Lee’s “lost order,” which speedily came into McClellan’s possession, placed a considerable Confederate force on the mountain, and that it was incumbent upon the Union commander to dispose of an opposing force holding a position which controlled the winding mountain passes where a smaller force could effectually retard an advance. There were about 18,000 Confederates at South Mountain, and the position was abandoned by them in consequence of the successful flank movement of the Pennsylvania Reserves, as the Confederate General D. H. Hill declared.

It is noticeable that in his list of authorities Mr. Tate does not refer to Major John Bigelow’s “Chancellorsville,” a work illustrated with half hourly, even quarter hourly, maps, and by far the most thoroughgoing and best book ever published upon a single campaign in the Civil War.

For all his exaggeration, Mr. Tate is correct in dwelling on the scattering of the Union troops in the Valley as the source of the opportunity seized and ably utilized by Jackson. It might have been more fully explained that the commanders of these scattered forces Banks, Fremont, Shields were among Lincoln’s political appointments to high command, and were failures here as elsewhere. But if the North scattered its troops, the South did the same thing in trying vainly to hold possession of unmilitary territory. The Confederate armies at their apogee numbered nearly a half a million men. Applying Mr. Tate’s argument to the other side of the problem it would appear that by concentration of force the two great menaces to the
Confederacy, Grant's army in the West or the Army of the Potomac in the East, could have been overwhelmed during the first half of the war. Longstreet advocated such a movement against Grant. In a small way it was attempted with success against Rosecrans at Chickamauga. Both sides of the conflict scattered military forces in the attempt to hold widely distributed territory. At Antietam Lee was on the defense in an offensive campaign. Most of his battles were defensive battles. In Gettysburg where his strategy and tactics were both offensive he lacked the preponderance of weight to make his attempt successful. The North could afford a policy of distribution not strictly military better than the South could afford one. As both adopted this Democratic and political policy, and the North was not opposed by a Frederick the Great or Napoleon, the result was the preservation of the Union and the abolishment of the African slavery which the Confederate Constitution declared should not be disturbed by any Confederate state.