

## NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

### *An Unpublished Washington Document from the Bouquet Papers*

Historians of the French and Indian War have intermittently used the Bouquet Papers of the British Museum. This collection, presented in 1857 along with the papers of General Haldimand, executor of Colonel Bouquet's estate and preserver of his effects, was transcribed in full for the Canadian Archives, at Mr. Douglas Brymner's direction, beginning in 1873; the Archivist's *Report* for 1889 published a calendar of the thirty volumes which make up the Bouquet Papers. Within recent years the Library of Congress has obtained photostats of the volumes bearing upon the history of the Middle States. At this date, therefore, the presence of "undiscovered" Washingtoniana among these papers has somewhat the unexpectedness, if not the pecuniary savor, of an 1827 *Tamerlane and Other Poems* in the ten-cent counter of a Boston bookstore.

One of the volumes<sup>1</sup> is labeled "Correspondence with General Washington"; its bulk is twenty-six letters by Washington, all but one to Bouquet, and all lying within the period of the Forbes Expedition against Fort Duquesne (1758). These have been printed in the Bicentennial edition of Washington's writings.<sup>2</sup> But in the "scrap-bag" volume<sup>3</sup> of the Bouquet Papers—a welter of disparate items which escaped the sometimes orderly sequence of the other volumes, and which are further obscured by calendaring of a marvelous slovenliness—are six Washington holographs.

Five of these<sup>4</sup>—or rather four, excluding a duplicate—are remnants of the Forbes Expedition: a table of distances from Fort Cumberland to Carlisle, and from Fort Cumberland to Fort Frederick; a rather elaborate "Calculation to show the Difference of Expence and of time, in Conveying provisions to Fort Cumberland by Water, and by Waggon"; a memorandum written at Conococheague on June 13, 1758 (the only item in the group bearing a date, and the only one signed), of "Sundry Matters in which Colo. Bouquets directions is desir'd" in connection with the transfer of the two Vir-


<sup>1</sup> British Museum Additional Manuscripts 21641.

<sup>2</sup> John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources* (Washington, 1931—), *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> British Museum Additional Manuscripts 21658.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, folios 13, 127, 128, 129.

It is to be supposed that with ~~any~~ small ~~kind of~~ <sup>kind of</sup> ~~army~~ <sup>artillery</sup>, and three thousand men well appointed, ~~just~~ <sup>will</sup> make yourself Master of Fort du Lac & ~~thence~~ <sup>thence</sup> the Cause of our great misfortunes: But in case Artillery & other Regiments for the Reduction of the Place is not to be got. — It is then most advisable to build strong works on the River & above them, to cut off the Communication to the Lakes & ~~thence~~ <sup>thence</sup> their Convoys & destroy them in all possible manner. —

Whilst these troops are employed in one thing, there may be an advance to the Ohio on the other. It would be adviseable to march about 500 men towards the Mouth of the Great Convey, where they are to fortify themselves and make an Establishment in that part of the Ohio. — This Body might ~~very~~ <sup>might</sup> attack the Shawanese Delawar towns near to that Place, if they should find it practicable; But at any Rate, a Motion of Troops on that Quarters, and ~~making~~ <sup>making</sup> a Fort there would occasion the Shawanese of Delaware to remove to a greater distance, would awe the hostile Indians & prevent their finding any Success to du Lac, & if our troops should <sup>be able to</sup> fall upon their Towns & destroy their Wives and Children ~~in the mean time~~. —  This ~~also~~ <sup>also</sup> would likewise fix the wavering Indians in our interest, and prevent our Enemies finding

ginia regiments from Winchester, their original rendezvous, to Fort Cumberland; and a map, "Frontiers of Virginia," sketched by Washington as a guide for this march, showing alternate routes and the natural obstacles to be traversed.

The remaining item<sup>5</sup> is of four pages, without date, address, title, signature, or conclusion; obviously a subsequent page or so has disappeared.

Identification of the handwriting offers a superficial difficulty. Three of the memoranda just mentioned are in a scrupulously formal hand, the elegance a bit marred by the broad lines which Washington had ruled on the paper to keep his pen unflagging. For the forty-seven pages of the "Memorial"<sup>6</sup> addressed to Lord Loudoun in January, 1757 (with which this document will be found linked in time and content), the young petitioner restrained the fervor of his material from pushing his writing askew. Careful attention to penmanship was part of Washington's incessant regard that outer appearances comport with inner dignity; by about 1761 he had disciplined himself into the fluent, unhurried hand one associates as characteristically Washington's. But the present document is an unusual instance of his "undress" writing. With the hazardous course of its lines, the occasional hesitation over an insignificant word, it is the chirographic Portrait of a Man Talking to Himself. The "Note Book" memoranda of 1757, discovered by Mr. Victor Hugo Paltsits and published in 1920, offer a parallel in points of form.<sup>7</sup>

#### WASHINGTON'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN AGAINST FORT DUQUESNE, 1757

1. One thousand men to be at Fort Cumberland by the first of April; or as soon afterwards as possible—

Two hundred of these to garrison Fort Cumb<sup>a</sup>. Eight hundred to Advance to the Little Meadows, or thereabouts; and raise a Redoubt or some Works according to the Nature of the ground, for the Reception of Stores, for the benefit of Convoys, & to help keep the Communication open after we have got more to the Westward; And in the mean time; Whilst the rest of the troops were assembling; and this work Carrying on—The Carriage Horses & Waggons to make Several trips, from Cumberld to the meadows, which would throw in a very Considerable quantity of Stores & provisions at that place before the

<sup>5</sup> *British Museum Additional Manuscripts* 21658, folios 47-48.

<sup>6</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, II. 6-19.

<sup>7</sup> Victor Hugo Paltsits, ed., "Washington's Note Book," *Bulletin of the New York Public Library*, XXIV (August, 1920).

Work of defence was absolutely Completed, and the Main Body ready to join them.

2. The Place of Defence at the Little meadow being finished, and a Reception made for the Stores & provisions, [one word illegible], It is be Supposed that you are joined by 400 more men—When you are to march about 1,000 to the great Crossing,<sup>8</sup> and there Raise a Redoubt or Some Sort of Works to answer the same End with those at the Little meadows

A Sufficient Number of men being left in the mean time at the Little Meadows to garrison that place & Escort the Convoys to the Crossing, for you are to keep the Carriage horses & Wagons employd without interruption—and by the time that you have the place of defence finished at the Great Crossing, It is to be Expected that you have as great a Stock of provisions &ct at that place, as you had, when you left Little Meadows. It is now to be Observed, that you will not find it necessary to Carry Salt provisions further than the great Crossing, as Beef will begin to be in Season.

N. B. To forward the Execution of this plan it is necessary to be Supplyd with great plenty of Arms, if that the Drafts from Farfax, Prince William, & Culpepper be ordered out immediatly after the Report, that all sorts of necessary tools be prepar'd before hand.

Supposing we marched from Cumberland about the first of April, and had been joined by the 400 men above mentiond It is reasonable to Expect we Should have finished the Works at the Crossing, and lodg'd a Large Quantity of Flour etc. at that place by the close of May and be ready to March to Gist's plantation—or any other place where it should Seem necessary to erect any works to the Westward of Youghgeni

It is now to be observed, that you should, by the first of May, and before you march from the Great Crossing be joined by your many Body, or a Force which you judge Sufficient to oppose any Attempt of the Enemy, who by this time are not only informd of y<sup>r</sup> designs, but like wise have had time [to] Assemble all the Force they can Expect to oppose you.

You are at the Same time to remark, that they will not wait any considerable time after they are reinforced, before they come to to Attack you; because they cannot be supplyd w<sup>t</sup> provisions at Du Quesne without consuming the pork necessary for that Garrison.

You Being now joined by yr Main Body; you are to advance in this Regular manner, Erecting Works for the Safety of yr Convoys, & to secure yr Retreat if necessary, at proper places & distances [as you go on] until you arrive at Du Quesne. If by certain intelligence of its strength you imagine your self able to Reduce it; or take possession of some Convenient place Near to it, where you are to fortify your Selves Strongly, distress the Enemy, and act according to yr intelligence, and as Circumstance will permit advise.

<sup>8</sup> The Little Meadows and the Great Crossing are easily located (as the fourth and seventh campsites of Braddock's expedition from Fort Cumberland) in the frontispiece map to John Kennedy Lacock, "Braddock Road," *PENNSYLVANIA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY*, XXXVIII (1914). 1-38.

It is to be Supposed that with a [very] Small Train of Artillery, and three thousand men well appointed, you will make yourself Master of Fort du Quesne & Remove the Cause of our great misfortunes: But in case Artillery & other Requisites for the Reduction of the place, is not to be got. It is then most adviseable to build Strong works on the River above them, to Cut off their Communication to the Lakes, Intercept their Convoys & distress them in all possible manner.

Whilst these troops are employd in making those regular advances to the Ohio on this Quarter, it would be adviseable to march about 500 men towards the Mouth of the Convaiv [Kanawha], where they are to fortify themselves and make an Establishmn<sup>t</sup> on that part of the Ohio. This Body might attack the Shanoë and Delaware towns near to that place; if they Should find it practicable; But at any Rate, a Motion of Troops in that Quarter, and Erecting a Fort thereabouts would occasion the Shanoës & Delawares to Remove to a greater distance, would awe the Hostile Indians & prevent their sending any Succour to DuQuesne, lest Our troops should in the meantime fall upon their Towns, & destroy their Wives and Children.

This Step would likewise fix the wavering Indians in our interest, and prevent our Enmies Sending

The possibility that the matter may not be Washington's, but perhaps a transcription of a speech or conversation, deserves examination. Obviously a Virginian, one well acquainted with the course of Braddock's Expedition, is the author; for one point, a Marylander or Pennsylvanian would not likely toss off casual references to Virginia counties. The diction is consonant with Washington's. "Fix the wavering Indians in our interest" has its analogy in the Memorial, "... (The French getting between us and our Indian allies,) they fixed those in their interests, who were wavering"; the French possession of Fort Duquesne as "the cause of our great misfortunes" has its paraphrase in the same paragraph of the Memorial.<sup>9</sup> The listing of "Farfax, Prince William, & Culpepper" is in the sequence Washington invariably employed; Governor Dinwiddie, it may be noticed, used a reverse pattern.<sup>10</sup> The only officers beside Washington who *might* have conceived this vigorous plan of campaign—Andrew Lewis, George Mercer, Adam Stephen—gave no evidence in their careers of such creative generalship; they were all loyal subordinates of Washington; and their commander, more of a martinet in the French and Indian than in the Revolutionary War,

<sup>9</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, II. 7.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 329, 345; R. A. Brock, ed., *The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie*, 2 v. (Richmond, 1884), II. 236, 506.

was not the one to transfix on paper the ambitious wisps of an inferior officer. Although Dinwiddie wrote, November 16, 1756, "I have repeatedly wrote L'd Loudoun of the Necessity of an Offensive War and an Expedit'n to the Ohio with the Assist'ce of our neighbouring Colonies, but no Answer,"<sup>11</sup> it is evident from his published correspondence that his notes to Loudoun on the subject were gads rather than schedules. External circumstances join with internal evidence to enforce the probability that this plan of campaign was wholly of Washington's authorship, and to set the occasion and time of its drafting.

Colonel Washington in the autumn of 1756 was a harassed commandant: "My orders are dark, doubtful and uncertain; *to-day approved, to-morrow condemned*. Left to act and proceed at hazard, accountable for the consequence, and blamed without benefit of defence!"<sup>12</sup> Word that the Commander in Chief of the forces in North America, Lord Loudoun, would soon be in Virginia, gave the frontier Colonel an immediate direction toward an old goal—rapid advancement, by the Commander's preference, to a rank above petty vexations and dubious responsibility. Dinwiddie wrote Washington, November 16, "I hope to see him [Loudoun] this winter." By mid-December the word was around that the Earl would visit the Governor at Williamsburg; and Dinwiddie granted Washington's request for leave to appear at the Virginia capital "when his L'ds. arrives, as You will be able to give him a good Acc't of our back Country. . . ."<sup>13</sup> Washington's anticipation of his services to Lord Loudoun were not as humble as Dinwiddie presumed. On November 9 he wrote earnestly to John Robinson, Speaker of the House of Burgesses, foreshadowing his plan of campaign: "Had we strength enough to invade their [the savages'] lands, and assault their Towns. . . . In short cou'd Pennsylvania and Maryland be induced to join us in an expedition of this nature; and to petition His Excellency Lord Loudoun, for a small train of Artillery, with some Engineers. We shou'd then be able in all human probability to subdue the terror of Fort DuQuesne; retrieve our character with the Indians. . . ."<sup>14</sup> A month later, writing again to Robinson, Washington hinted his

<sup>11</sup> Brock, *op. cit.*, II. 552.

<sup>12</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, I. 528.

<sup>13</sup> Brock, *op. cit.*, II. 552, 565, 573.

<sup>14</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, I. 502-503.

determination to beard the lion: "I am determined to bear up under the embarrassments some time longer, in hope of better regulation on the arrival of Lord Loudoun, to whom I look for the future fate of Virginia."<sup>15</sup>

But Loudoun's own plans for consultation with the colonial governors were shortly made more explicit. Sharpe of Maryland, Dobbs of North Carolina, Lyttleton of South Carolina, Denny of Pennsylvania, and Dinwiddie, were advised, by letters written January 8, 1757, that the Commander proposed, after a conference in Boston with the governors of the four New England colonies, "going to Philadelphia, in order to meet with you . . . to concert a proper Plan, to be carryed on there, for . . . mutual Security and Defence, and such other things as may appear necessary, in the present Situation of Affairs." He set February 17 for the convening.<sup>16</sup>

Washington forthwith pressed for permission to attend the Philadelphia conference. Dinwiddie's consent was so markedly petulant that one surmises an idea of Washington's intent, the desire of an older egotist to take a younger statesman down a peg: "I cannot conceive what service you can be in going there, as the plan concerted will in course be communicated to you and the other officers. However. . . ."<sup>17</sup>

Four governors (all save Lyttleton) were at Philadelphia by February 23—cooling their heels, waiting for the belated Loudoun. The conference got under way on March 15, and by several adjournments was protracted to March 23.<sup>18</sup>

Meeting the requirements of Washington's temperament and of the situation,<sup>19</sup> the document with which this note deals becomes recognizable as Washington's outline of the program he bespoke before Loudoun and the four governors. He was not yet twenty-five at the time of its writing; but his youth had never been a curb upon

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 528-529.

<sup>16</sup> Brock, *op. cit.*, I. 587; William Hand Browne, ed., *Correspondence of Governor Horatio Sharpe. Archives of Maryland* (Baltimore, 1888), I. 518, 519.

<sup>17</sup> S. M. Hamilton, *Letters to Washington, and Accompanying Papers*, 4 v. (Boston and New York, 1898-1902), II. 51.

<sup>18</sup> Browne, *op. cit.*, I. 528.

<sup>19</sup> The test of "negative corroboration" finds no other period between the autumn of 1755 and the spring of 1758 in which the document is adjustable to Washington's correspondence or activities.

his confidence in himself, nor a rein upon his abilities. At least one friend, Joseph Chew, expected Washington to make a bold address: he wrote from New York on March 14 that, hearing Washington was then in Philadelphia, "I hope and Flatter my Self my Lord Loudoun will Concert such Plans as will effectually Secure our Frontiers and distress the Enemy, and that he will do that for you which you have so justly merited and let your Command be equal to your deserts."<sup>20</sup>

The Memorial to Lord Loudoun—with its text a recapitulation of Washington's dislike of the cautious, expensive policy of a chain of forts along the frontier line; of the ineptness of the militia laws; and with three paragraphs taken bodily from a letter of Washington's written on November 9—was evidently written at least a month earlier than the date of its accompanying letter (January 28). But this letter, to Captain James Cunningham, the Earl's aide-de-camp, is of a different flame; Washington writes, "That an offensive Scheme of Action is necessary if it can be Executed, is quite obvious. . . . I am firmly persuaded that 3000 Men under good regulation (and surely the 3 Middle Colonies could easily raise, and support that Number)"<sup>21</sup>—and there follows a capsule condensation of the plan presented in our document. The tacit acceptance of Fort Cumberland—a post Washington thought ineffectual and a nuisance, but one whose garrisoning Loudoun insisted upon—allows corroborative inference for placing the drafting of the plan of campaign in January; for as late as December 19 Washington was writing to a friend about the matter, that he hoped upon meeting Loudoun to correct his Lordship's "impressions tending to prejudice."<sup>22</sup> In yielding the point before he met the General, Washington was presaging his experience next year in the Forbes Expedition, in tactically "forgetting" his earnest preference for the Braddock Road when that desire seemed likely to restrain his chances of greater usefulness and responsibility.

The young Virginian's brashly direct approach to Lord Loudoun, and the presentation of his large ambitions, followed his course with Loudoun's predecessors Braddock and Shirley, and with his successor Forbes. The insistence on a vigorous offensive was characteristically

<sup>20</sup> Hamilton, *op. cit.*, II. 49-51.

<sup>21</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, II. 4-6.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, I. 529; Brock, *op. cit.*, II. 525, 559-560.



Washington's belief that (as put in the Memorial) "it would require fewer men to remove the cause, than to prevent the effects." The reiterated attention, in the plan of campaign, to convoys, provisioning, communications, is significantly at variance with Bouquet's adverse mention of July 31, 1758, that "The majority of these gentlemen [Washington and other Virginia officers] do not know the difference between a party and an army."<sup>23</sup> The plan's virtues include opportunism and flexibility. The anticipated means of persuading the savages away from Fort Duquesne ("lest Our troops should in the meantime fall upon their Towns, & destroy their Wives and Children") was a casual part of martial technic on the eighteenth-century frontier that should not distress civilized readers nor diminish the merits of Washington's general plan.

The delayed convening of the Philadelphia conference made Washington's date for launching the campaign—the first of April—of course impossible, even if the first thousand men in the field were to be all Virginians. But it is doubtful that he modified his plan greatly. Even in mid-April he was cherishing the argument that now, "while the Enemy's troops are doubtless drawn off to the Northward to defend themselves at home against the more formidable attacks of Lord Loudoun,"<sup>24</sup> was the opportune time for the Middle Colonies to topple Fort Duquesne.

What opportunity there may have been for Washington to carry his project, against intercolonial jealousy, the lackadaisical attitude of the governor of his own colony, the peril of the plan's duplicating Braddock's expedition in effect as it did in geography, was lost—by an infection more common to governors and generals than to frontier colonels: fear. The letters of the absent Lyttleton, and the arguments at Philadelphia of Governor Dobbs, that there was acute danger of the enemy's attacking South Carolina "either by Sea from St. Domingo, or from the Alabama Fort in the Creek Indians, or the head of the Mobile," were effective; Loudoun decided upon the concentration of royal and provincial troops in South Carolina and the continuance of a merely defensive policy on the frontier.<sup>25</sup> The test-

<sup>23</sup> Bouquet to Forbes. British Museum Additional Manuscripts 21640, folio 165.

<sup>24</sup> Fitzpatrick, *op. cit.*, II. 22.

<sup>25</sup> Hamilton, *op. cit.*, II. 51-53; British Museum Additional Manuscripts 21632, 106-109 in Canadian Archives transcripts; Stanley M. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun in North America* (New Haven, 1933), 219.

ing of Washington's executive talents in a vigorous, sustained campaign was postponed, but only for a year. That the Forbes Expedition took possession of the Forks of the Ohio in November, 1758, rather than some time after the spring of 1759, was perhaps the answer to that test.

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