Henry C. Carey 
and the Republican Tariff

The Republican Party did not begin as a protectionist party. It was organized in 1854 out of the popular reaction to the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and probably contained as many free traders within its ranks as tariff supporters. All issues other than slavery were deliberately avoided in order to bring together men of a variety of political faiths. There is no discernible pattern of economic foundations in the earliest organization of the party, no assurance of what direction later developments would take—practically no evidence of economic purpose or intent at all.

In the national platform of 1856 rivers and harbors improvements and a Pacific railroad were supported as relatively safe economic measures, but no mention was made of the controversial question of a protective tariff. Throughout the campaign Republican dedication to a single issue remained almost unbroken. In the words of the Bangor Whig and Courier, "The present is a crisis so momentous, that all other issues—State and national—should be suspended—all old prejudices forgotten." The National Era warned, "On former questions, of bank or no bank, tariff or no tariff, appropriations or not for internal improvements, and similar ones of utility, real or fancied, there might be opposite views entertained."

If anyone tried to add something of an economic nature to the main crusade, he was met with disapproval. George W. Julian wanted to give homesteads a play, and he thought he could persuade Greeley—one of the noisiest land reformers of the day—to go along

2 New York Evening Post, June 18, 1856.
3 Bangor Whig and Courier, July 9, 1856.
4 National Era, Nov. 13, 1856.
with him. Greeley merely read back to Julian the party line. "We are becoming too earnest on the Slavery question to be able to [find] any votes [securing] attention to any other." The great majority of public speakers, newspaper editors, and candidates for office held forth with loud and righteous acclaim for the one cause they had in common. Even Henry C. Carey, ardent Pennsylvania protectionist, labored throughout the campaign to enlist manufacturers and their money without raising his cherished tariff banner. For Carey this was remarkable, especially when Philadelphia businessmen remained unimpressed with anything else the Republicans had to offer.

When the Republicans lost the Presidential election of 1856, they might have been expected to examine their noncommittal attitude toward other public issues as one of the possible reasons for their defeat. This they almost unanimously refused to do. Post-mortems on election results pointedly ignored any suggestion that the party had been too narrow in its bid for popular support. If anything, the wisdom of that policy seemed, to most observers, to have been confirmed. The Bangor Whig and Courier declared: "The Republican party is to-day in a better position for future success than any party has heretofore been in this country. It has taken the right side . . . of the only question which can constitute a political issue for years to come." The New Hampshire Statesman simply urged the faithful to work for victory the next time, adding, "An immortal principle is [the Republicans'] cohesive power, and they can abandon it only to their perpetual disgrace." When the National Committee was called on to issue a statement, nothing that even hinted of a desire to alter the pattern of party strategy was suggested. That strategy, it was asserted, had "laid the foundation for a party that will defeat [Buchanan's] re-election or the election of anybody like him."

While these statements, opinions, and admonitions were being distributed to the party faithful, there was at least one determined voice of protest coming from a Republican who had had enough.

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5 Greeley to Julian, Aug. 27, 1856, Giddings-Julian Papers, Library of Congress (LC).
7 Bangor Whig and Courier, Nov. 8, 1856.
8 New Hampshire Statesman, Nov. 8, 1856.
9 E. D. Morgan to Gideon Welles, Nov. 6, 1856, Welles Papers, LC.
Henry C. Carey, evangelist for a better world through economic action, more particularly for a system of economic nationalism built around the idea of a protective tariff, could not agree to leave the purpose of the party unchanged. He had given his services to the Republican movement with as much loyalty to the party’s single principle as anyone else, but he thought it was time to change the principle, or at least to enlarge upon it. In his opinion the Republicans should abandon their narrow platform of antislavery extension and become an outright protectionist party.

Carey was a paradox in a way, an economic theorist mapping out plans for an ideal society on the one hand, and on the other a Cato hammering on his one theme. He was a crusader, described as a man who “saw no one thing closely, but [who] saw more things” than most of his associates. What he saw in 1856 was a need for the Republicans to reach out and grasp a broader vision. It was his own vision, of course, and one which seems painfully limited sometimes to an ordinary protective tariff, yet to him it was the key to prosperity and national greatness.

Carey’s relentless, emphatic insistence upon a protective tariff had a decided influence upon the development of Republican economic policies. He wrote numerous books, pamphlets, and newspaper articles, carried on a voluminous correspondence in his almost undecipherable handwriting, and cultivated the friendship of nearly every important public figure of his day—always with the one thought uppermost of advancing the cause of protection. Between 1849 and 1857 he was virtually the economic editor of the New York Tribune, as well as a publisher of considerable influence in his own right.

In his writings Carey refers to almost every economic question in terms of another argument for a protective tariff. See particularly The Past, the Present, and the Future (Philadelphia, 1869), and The Harmony of Interests, Agricultural, Manufacturing, and Commercial (Philadelphia, 1872). Both these works were originally published before the Republican Party was formed.

Charles A. Dana of the New York Tribune had written to Carey immediately after the election asking him to help organize a Frémont and Davenport party for 1860, “a principle alone not being sufficient.” Dana to Carey, Nov. 6, 1856, Carey Papers. Carey evidently wrote back that a protection party should be organized instead, for in a second letter Dana protested that “I do not feel like breaking off political connections, which I think are useful to the country, in the hopeless effort to build up a new Protection party.” Dana to Carey, Nov. 16, 1856, ibid.


Carey's contribution to American economic thought is well known. But his greatest success may well have been in directing the tariff policy of the Republican Party.

In 1856 he was knocking against a stone wall, a friendly stone wall, perhaps, but stubbornly unyielding. When he sought to join the cause of protection with Republicanism, even his influence, important as it was, was not enough to break down the central idea upon which the party was put together and still operating. Greeley's biographer says that the Tribune was trying the same thing, with Greeley seeking to broaden the base of Republicanism to include a protective tariff as well as free homesteads, internal improvements, and increased immigration. But the fact is that Carey did not have even the Tribune's support in 1856. Dana told him that "It is my conviction that to attempt to put Protection into the platform of any party to-day would be equivalent to political suicide. . . . I do not feel like breaking off political connections, which I think are useful to the country, in the hopeless effort to build up a new Protection party."

Carey's first efforts to commit the party to protectionism were in the Tariff of 1857. Republicans controlled the House of Representatives, and Lewis D. Campbell of Ohio, an old friend of Carey's, was chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. James Campbell of Pennsylvania, one of Carey's most loyal disciples, kept in constant touch with him while the Ways and Means Committee worked on the draft of the original bill. Carey himself may even have supplied part of that draft; in one of Campbell's letters the Pennsylvania Congressman wrote: "The free list and report have made their appearance, and created quite a sensation— . . . It is wondered who wrote it!" Parts of the committee's report were taken word for word from Carey's Harmony of Interests. And as the bill was being assembled the committee chairman, Lewis D. Campbell, sent parts of it to Carey for approval. In one letter he says: "Enclosed you will find a copy of the list of articles which our Committee will probably add to

15 Dana to Carey, Nov. 16, 1856, Carey Papers.
16 James Campbell to Carey, Mar. 1, Aug. 1, 12, 1856, ibid.
17 Campbell to Carey, Aug. 12, 1856, ibid.
18 House Reports, No. 342, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., 80; Carey, The Harmony of Interests, 6, 52.
This work was copyrighted in 1852.
the free list. . . . Of course you will regard the communication as confidential, and will return me the list at your earliest convenience and with such suggestions as you may regard proper.”

When the bill was reported, the entire report from the Ways and Means Committee was a blistering attack upon the Administration’s request for a mere revenue tariff and a vigorous defense of protection for industry. “In the forty years of controversy, to which the principle of protection has been subjected in this country, the opposing theory has never obtained a victory, or a concession, which can in any way entitle its advocates to claim possession of the field.” The worst depression the country had ever suffered was laid at the door of the revenue tariff of 1833. Fifty thousand copies of this report were ordered printed.

Lewis D. Campbell was quite frank in explaining to the House that the bill was protectionist in principle: “We do not set up any man of straw with reference to this proposed revision of the tariff. . . . We have proposed a free list . . . to give incidentally protection to the various branches of American industry by taking off the duty on raw materials not produced in this country that enter into those branches of industry.” Carey’s confidential representative, James Campbell of Pennsylvania, was even more outspoken:

The Committee on Ways and Means . . . do not propose to reduce the duty on any article of American growth or manufacture which requires protection. . . . And for this course their reasons are two-fold; first, we were in favor of protection; and next, we were opposed to an increase of revenue. . . . We have had enough of free trade. Let us become more Americanized and protect our own people, our productions, fabrics, and industrial pursuits.

Critics of the bill denounced it as “essentially a manufacturers’ bill, and the principle upon which it was founded would not bear the test of scrutiny.” Letcher of Virginia protested heatedly that the government had no right to lay duties for the protection of one class

19 Lewis D. Campbell to Carey, July 9, 1856, Carey Papers.
20 House Reports, No. 342, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., 2.
21 Ibid., 3.
22 Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., 2158.
23 Ibid., 3 Sess., 320.
24 Ibid., 744.
25 Benjamin Stanton of Ohio, in ibid., 589.
against the interests of another, that it should confine its action strictly to revenue measures, and that this was nothing but a "thorough manufacturers' bill."26 Greeley treated it favorably, although, steadfast in his determination to keep economic issues out of the party, he made no mention of its protectionist principle.27

However, Carey and company worked against odds too great to make much headway in either securing a real protective tariff or committing their party to its principle at that time. When Congress met in December, 1856, James Campbell was discouraged28:

We are in more danger respecting the iron interests of Pa at this time than we were in the last session. Some of our old friends say that Penna having decided in favour of free trade democracy, must have it carried out in practice. Then the large bal. in the treasury, and the reserve derived from existing duties, makes our position an embarrassing one. The true remedy of increasing the rates in order to diminish the reserve, would not have the remotest chance of success. We must look at what can be done sometimes, rather than at what we should do.

But the frustrations of the Carey faction reflected more than resentment over the results of the Pennsylvania election. Republicans simply were not as interested in promoting protection as they were in attacking slavery extension and southern attitudes. When debate began in the House in January, 1857, days on end were given over to nothing but recriminations on both sides, churning around the slavery question. When the merits of the bill occasionally were discussed, they almost invariably hinged upon the need to reduce the revenue. Justin S. Morrill made one of the few Republican speeches dealing with more than this immediate objective, and he merely criticized the treasury surplus because it encouraged extravagance. Reduce the revenue by reducing the tariff and the government would have to be more economical, with fewer opportunities for corruption.29

After a month of this the House passed its bill, with nothing in the debates or in the vote to indicate that it was a party test of any kind.30

26 Ibid., 1 Sess., 589.
28 James Campbell to Carey, Dec. 4, 1856, Carey Papers.
29 Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appendix, 225.
A majority of Republicans gave it their support, but twelve voted against it.\textsuperscript{31}

In the Senate William H. Seward provided Republican leadership and urged passage of the House bill. But he, too, insisted that the tariff question at that time was simply a practical question of reducing government revenues and not one of partisan considerations involving economic theory or protection for special interests. He would not consider it on any other basis.\textsuperscript{32} The Democratic majority, on the other hand, while agreeing with the purpose of reducing the revenues, were not altogether satisfied with the way it was being done. Carey's handiwork may have been a little too much for them. At any rate, Hunter of Virginia substituted a bill of his own lowering the duties a little more, and after two days—only one of which was spent in debate—it was passed by a vote of 33 to 8.\textsuperscript{33}

Although Solomon Foot and Ben Wade were the only Republican Senators who voted against Hunter's bill, there were others who did not like it, especially Seward.\textsuperscript{34} Greeley, writing in the \textit{Tribune}, was quite unhappy, stating flatly, "No bill at all would be better than this, and we hope the House will stick to its own measure."\textsuperscript{35} When it went to the House an attack led by James Campbell and John Covode of Pennsylvania almost resulted in its defeat.\textsuperscript{36}

Actually the Senate bill did not differ as much from the one originally passed by the House as this would seem to indicate; lowering the tariff duties would still be done in a manner almost as painless to industry.\textsuperscript{37} But the measure had been given a protectionist identity by its authors in the House which it no longer possessed coming from the hands of a free trade Democrat in the Senate. If Republicans were even vaguely interested in making an issue of protection, they had their chance, and they almost seemed on the point of taking it. Then moderation prevailed. Lewis D. Campbell from the House and Seward from the Senate were both on the conference committee given the task of accepting or rejecting the Senate bill. The confer-

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Congressional Globe}, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 970.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, Appendix, 344.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, 1062.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{New York Tribune}, Mar. 2, 1857.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}, Feb. 28, 1857.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Congressional Globe}, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 788.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid.}, Appendix, 329.
ence committee accepted it, and under Seward's and Campbell's leadership—particularly Campbell's in the House—most dissatisfied Republicans were persuaded to go along with the compromise. Only James Campbell, Covode, and Morrill refused, while four other Republicans, including Sherman who had previously opposed the House measure, now supported the bill as it came from the Senate.  

By this time, and to some extent all through the proceedings, many Republicans did not even know what it was all about. And in spite of the influence of Carey, little was done to straighten them out. The emergence of a tariff policy in the party could hardly be detected yet. This was still 1856 and 1857, and the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the way the bill was finally accepted is that Republicans could not yet become very excited about a tariff question. Greeley recovered from his earlier reaction and agreed that, although he did not entirely approve of the Senate substitute, "we are not prepared to say that what has been done so hastily has been done badly." The New York *Evening Post*, ordinarily poles apart from the *Tribune* on the tariff, had already given its mild—if temporary—approval. "It might be much improved, but . . . may be made the basis for future improvements." Under circumstances like these, economic issues simply went begging among Republicans until something jarred them out of their prevailing enchantment with the single question of slavery.

The event that jarred them was not long in coming. On August 24, 1857, the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company closed its doors with liabilities of five to seven million dollars. Public attention was suddenly riveted upon the fearful spectacle of business firms and banking houses cascading one after another into bankruptcy in the wake of Ohio Life and Trust. The Panic of 1857 was on.

Republicans now began to take a new interest in economic affairs. The *Pittsburgh Gazette*, an old advocate of the tariff but as silent on that subject in recent years as any other Republican paper, returned to protectionism as the only relief from the panic. This is especially interesting when we find the Pennsylvania Iron Masters Association

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38 Ibid., 790.
39 Ibid., 788-790.
42 *Pittsburgh Gazette*, Sept. 28, 1857.
as late as August 27 of that year asking for nothing more from the Federal government than contracts to enlarge their market.\textsuperscript{43} The assumption too often made that pressure from this and similar groups determined Republican decisions to adopt protection as a party principle\textsuperscript{44} receives little support here, especially when we know that Carey had been trying to make it a party principle on his own responsibility for the past year. From now on he was joined by an increasing number of his fellow Republicans.

Greeley, too, now ran up his tattered old protectionist banner again. "We believe a Protective Tariff to be the true National remedy for our commercial ills," he said.\textsuperscript{45} In another issue of the paper he stated categorically that "a Protective Tariff would end the panic in two months time."\textsuperscript{46} Another former Whig newspaper stated the case with complete frankness\textsuperscript{47}:

Many stable doors are closed and locked after the horses are stolen, and so many people are now expressing the conviction that the old Protection Doctrine, to which the Whigs adhered, is what is needed for the permanent safety of the country. . . . The warehouses of the Atlantic cities groan with merchandise from Europe, very large portions of which are necessary neither for our comfort or convenience; bankruptcy is spreading wider and wider in the commercial marts; the spindles are still; many of the furnace fires have gone out; business in all the larger cities is in any other than a hopeful condition. . . .

Sooner or later, we shall, as a nation, be under the necessity of taking a back track. The homely old Whig doctrines above spoken of, distribution and a protective tariff, if the policy of the country the last dozen years, would have averted these financial troubles.

This was of course a vindication of Henry C. Carey, if not partially the result of Carey's labors. Dana had even predicted the way it would happen, that it would take a crash to get some "economical wisdom into this government."\textsuperscript{48} And now that the crash had come, Carey's influence became increasingly effective for the simple reason

\textsuperscript{43} John Mumper to Jeremiah S. Black, Aug. 27, 1857; Mumper to Jacob Thomas, Aug. 27, 1857, Jeremiah S. Black Papers, LC.
\textsuperscript{44} Charles A. Beard, \textit{The American Party Battle} (New York, 1928), 81-82; Louis M. Hacker, \textit{The Triumph of American Capitalism} (New York, 1946), 309.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, Oct. 5, 1857.
\textsuperscript{48} Charles A. Dana to Carey, Dec. 4, 1856, Carey Papers.
that people were interested in economic problems. A good example of this new interest was David Wilmot. An old free trade Democrat, Wilmot was one of Carey's numerous prospects for conversion. Carey had given him all his protectionist arguments when Wilmot was running for the Senate that year.\(^4^9\) Before the panic Wilmot admitted that he had never really studied the subject, but that he had been brought up in the classical economics school of free trade and had no inclination to change his mind about it. "I would not deal so dishonestly with myself, or with the public, as to profess a change I do not feel."\(^5^0\) But he added that he would be willing to admit his error if proved wrong, and if it became necessary he would make a study of the whole subject. Carey's labor bore fruit after the onset of the panic, for by October Wilmot was a confirmed protectionist.\(^5^1\)

By 1860 the tariff was again a major issue in Pennsylvania as it had been before the prosperity of the early fifties. Protection was the central theme of the Republican convention which met at Harrisburg on Washington's Birthday that year, and also the main test of party loyalty.\(^5^2\) Simon Cameron was the leading contender for the state's endorsement for the Presidency, partly because he had maneuvered himself so well into the spotlight of protectionism. Nor was the importance of the tariff in carrying Pennsylvania lost upon Republican leaders in other states.\(^5^3\) Pennsylvania protectionists, for their part, especially Carey, encouraged such concern by promoting the idea of Pennsylvania as an indispensable state hinging upon an indispensable issue. Carey wrote in a series of public letters to William Cullen Bryant, carried in the *New York Tribune* and several other northern newspapers, that "In this state and New Jersey, [the tariff] is the one, and almost the only question."\(^5^4\) Bryant, to be sure, attacked the idea that the Republican Party had to bow down to Pennsylvania in order to win the election, denied that protection determined elections in


\(^5^0\) Wilmot to Carey, Apr. 2, 1857, Carey Papers.

\(^5^1\) Wilmot to D. S. Brown, printed in the *Pittsburgh Gazette*, Oct. 3, 1857.


any state. But he recognized the efforts being made to spread such impressions.56

It did begin to seem that the Republican Party was beginning to assume the character that Carey had wanted. Attention shifted away from slavery in some localities to such an extent that Democratic newspapers referred to protection as “free soilism in disguise,”56 which suited Carey and his disciples perfectly. “This is what is wanted to make a protective party en bloc of the Republican.”57 Those were dreams in 1859, of course, not reality. Republicans in the West were badly divided on the tariff.58 State conventions in 1860 in Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin did not give it their endorsement.59 A friend of Salmon P. Chase's, James Walker, once told Henry S. Lane in Indiana, “If you old Whigs are bent upon tariffs as the real issue—the sooner we separate the better.”60 Almost everywhere except in Pennsylvania the reluctance to risk party harmony with anything more than the slavery question was still evident, and becoming more so as the Presidential election approached. Henry Wilson of Massachusetts had pledged New England's support to Pennsylvania on the tariff in 1858,61 but wrote to Carey urging moderation in 1860.62

A tariff plank was written into the national platform when the Republicans met in Chicago in May, but it was hardly a commitment to anything in particular. Gustave Koerner, a member of the platform committee, wrote: “We did not consider the tariff question at this particular time as one of primary importance.”63 According to him it was Greeley who insisted upon a strong protective plank, and Koerner added: “We humored him by declaring that ‘while providing revenue for the support of the general government by duties upon imports, sound policy requires such an adjustment as to encourage

56 New York Evening Post, Mar. 1, 1860.
56 E. Peshine Smith to Carey, Feb. 6, 1859, Carey Papers, referring to some upstate New York papers.
57 Ibid.
60 Walker to Chase, Oct. 3, 1859, Salmon P. Chase Papers, LC.
61 Wilson to Carey, Oct. 18, 1858, Carey Papers.
62 Wilson to Carey, Apr. 16, 1860, ibid.
63 Gustave Koerner, Memoirs of Gustave Koerner (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1909), II, 86.
the development of the industrial interests of the whole country.' This amounted to no more than the establishment of a revenue tariff bill with incidental protection."

William Cullen Bryant, especially anxious for the party to avoid protection, was quick to notice the same thing Koerner pointed out. Bryant even insisted that what had been drafted was a free trade plank. "Not a word about heavier duties," he said, "they are too heavy already; not a syllable in commendation of the principle of taxing the farmers, as Randolph used to say, to help his neighbor wet up a spinning-jenny." And yet Bryant was not too sure. "This is the interpretation we put upon the resolution adopted at Chicago." If any other construction was intended, then "we do not belong to the party by which the resolution is adopted."

Pennsylvania was probably more responsible than Greeley for getting a tariff plank written into the platform. Its delegates, already pledged to secure that objective above all others, made it their main business from the first day of the convention. Judge Jessup, a Pennsylvanian, was chairman of the platform committee. One of Henry C. Carey's biographers suggests that Carey himself may have written the tariff plank, adding that at least "it was a pithy summary of Carey's economic philosophy." Be that as it may—and it seems a bit doubtful—when the platform was read, "Pennsylvania went into spasms of joy over the 'Tariff Plank,' her whole delegation rising and swinging hats and canes." It would almost seem that the Pennsylvanians were afraid they were not going to get anything at all. They rejoiced over a statement, adopted in the exact words quoted by Koerner above, which did not once mention the word protection.

In the campaign which followed, Pennsylvania Republicans put protection before everything else. Tariff documents were turned out

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64 Ibid., 87.
65 New York Evening Post, May 18, 1860.
67 R. Hosea to Salmon P. Chase, May 16, 1860, Chase Papers, LC.
69 Halstead, Caucuses of 1860 (Columbus, Ohio, 1860), 135.
70 Nevins, II, 253, says that when the Pennsylvania delegates got to the convention and found various leaders convinced that party harmony demanded caution they were depressed.
71 Halstead, 139; also the May 16–18, 1860, issues of Republican newspapers.
in huge quantities, and were in great demand by candidates running for every office in the state.\textsuperscript{72} Henry Carey was again the most active member of the Republican State Committee, and he organized a crusade for protection.\textsuperscript{73} When Republicans carried the state in the October elections, there was a general feeling that the tariff had done it.\textsuperscript{74}

Outside Pennsylvania the tariff issue was used wherever it might get votes, and was ignored by Republicans who could not profit by it. No one knew what policy might be followed after the election. Lincoln was an old Whig, but he had no real concept of economic matters.\textsuperscript{75} Reinhard Luthin, in his study of Lincoln's tariff views, cites evidence to show that Lincoln was a reader of Carey's works\textsuperscript{76}; but either he did not pursue them very seriously or he was unnecessarily modest with his conclusions. On his way to Washington the following February he confessed to a Pittsburgh audience that he did not know much about the subject, but he promised that “I will give it my closest attention, and endeavor to comprehend it more fully.”\textsuperscript{77}

Under these circumstances the Administration's tariff policy could be expected to come from, or at least be greatly influenced by, the Cabinet. And for this Lincoln planned to have four former Democrats and three former Whigs. The Secretary of the Treasury was the key spot, and this was to go to a former Democrat. Salmon P. Chase, an old free trader, was the most likely choice. The only hope tariff men seemed to have was Simon Cameron, to whom Lincoln's managers had promised the Treasury Department in return for Pennsylvania's support in the convention. But Cameron, an old professional politician, was looked upon by some of his associates, in the words of Thaddeus Stevens, as “a man destitute of honor and honesty.”\textsuperscript{78}

Both men had friends in high places who had been bringing pressure on the President-elect for months before the Inauguration.

\textsuperscript{72} George W. Scranton to Carey, Sept. 13, 25, 1860, Carey Papers.
\textsuperscript{73} Richard Nelson Current, \textit{Old Thad Stevens, A Story of Ambition} (Madison, Wis., 1942), 129.
\textsuperscript{75} James G. Randall, \textit{Lincoln the President, Springfield to Gettysburg} (New York, 1945), I, 230.
\textsuperscript{76} Luthin, “Lincoln and the Tariff,” 626–627.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Pittsburgh Gazette}, Feb. 16, 1861.
\textsuperscript{78} Thaddeus Stevens to E. B. Washburne, Jan. 19, 1861, in David C. Mearns, \textit{The Lincoln Papers} (New York, 1948), II, 411.
Lincoln had never expected this kind of an uproar. He remained partial to Chase during the whole affair, but his commitment to Cameron was a constant embarrassment. He was also concerned about the political effect in Pennsylvania if he should appoint Chase. One of his closest advisers had warned him: “If you should select Chase . . . there will be a howl.”

Under the circumstances Lincoln sought the advice of the two men in Pennsylvania who should be in a position to know—Alexander McClure, chairman of the Republican State Committee, and Henry C. Carey.

McClure was an old enemy of Cameron’s, and when the state chairman hastened to Springfield Cameron’s supporters knew what he would say. With pens scratching furiously they dispatched letters to Lincoln to warn him of McClure, who, one said, was on his way “to resist the appointment of General Cameron as a member of your Cabinet.”

McClure, they said, did not represent the party at all; Pennsylvania was all for Cameron. Actually the state was a hotbed of warring factions, without any neat cleavage between major groups. Cameron and McClure each led a faction, but Thaddeus Stevens had a following which overlapped both of theirs. Stevens himself had support for the Treasury position.

Division in Pennsylvania reduced the political risk if Lincoln should pass over Cameron, but there was still the issue of protection. How did Carey stand? Carey had no private grudges against Cameron like McClure or Stevens, and had in fact worked closely with him in the great cause which meant everything to the Philadelphia economist. At a grand reception given for Carey in 1859 at the La Pierre House by some of the businessmen of Philadelphia, Cameron had been one of the principal speakers. Carey had recognized him as the leading political champion of protection in the recent political campaign. It was natural to expect that in the Treasury battle Carey would throw his influence behind Cameron and protection, and against their common antagonist, William Cullen Bryant of the New York Evening Post who was backing Chase.

79 Leonard Swett to Lincoln, Jan. 4, 1861, in ibid., II, 376.
80 Samuel Lloyd to Lincoln, Jan. 4, 1861, in ibid., II, 375.
82 Elder, 24.
83 Carey to Cameron, Nov. 7, 1860, Carey Papers.
This Carey did not do, even though he felt that Republican economic policy was at stake in the struggle over the Treasury. But economic policy could be safely entrusted only to a man with integrity, and the arguments against Cameron were such that a man so completely dedicated to a single cause would hesitate to endanger that cause by recommending him. At any rate, in Carey’s reply to Lincoln he said:

Having learned from Mr. [Thomas H.] Dudley that you desire to hear from me in relation to the appointment of Gen. Cameron to a place in your Cabinet, I am about to give you my views thereon, but first desire to say that between him and myself there has never, until the present year, existed the slightest cause for difference—our ways in life having been so much apart as to [largely avoid] each other. In both private & public life he has been a politician, intent upon the accumulation of fortune, & upon the attainment of place & power; whereas most of my time, for many years past, has been given to the effort to persuade my fellow citizens to a correct understanding of the measures needed for promoting their growth in prosperity & happiness.

Carey was decidedly opposed to Cameron’s appointment to the Treasury Department. Eighteen separate reasons were given, which amounted to an opinion that Cameron could not be trusted. There was a general belief in Pennsylvania, Carey said, that Cameron’s fortune had been acquired through questionable means, and that he was the first choice of only “the political gamblers of the state.” In another letter Carey added that among Cameron’s supporters “it is easy to recognize the names of several of the persons who have been most instrumental in bringing about the existing corruption & demoralization of this & other states,” and that Cameron was opposed “by all who desire to see a return to something like honor & honesty in the management of our public affairs.”

In turning against Cameron, of course, Carey knew that he was supporting Chase, and he was concerned about Chase’s economic principles. So he wrote to the Ohio Senator for a statement of his views, especially on the tariff. He said he had no doubt that Chase would “as fully & cordially sustain [the tariff] plank in the Chicago platform as any other,” but that efforts were being made to mis-

84 Carey to Lincoln, Jan. 7, 1861, *ibid.*
85 Carey to Lincoln, Jan. 22, 1861, *ibid.*
represent him as a free trader. In what was probably collaboration, Carey's Washington correspondent, James E. Harvey, wrote an almost identical letter to Chase on the same day. When they failed to get an answer, Carey wrote again at greater length, and this time he began to use his famous powers of persuasion. He knew of Chase's reputation as a free trader, but to suggest that Chase was simply being misrepresented was an effective device of the Philadelphia economist's. Part of Carey's genius lay in the very thing he was doing here—disregarding the previous opinions men held and setting out to persuade them to see the tariff his way.

Chase did not give Carey the satisfaction of knowing whether the effort was worth while. He wrote instead to Charles A. Dana of the New York Tribune saying that he could not reply to Carey lest it appear that he was seeking the Treasury post. Perhaps this was better than a direct reply, for Chase's habit of appearing very correct stood in refreshing contrast to Cameron's behavior. In the meantime, Carey went right ahead and contributed his influence in Chase's behalf, working closely with McClure and the anti-Cameron faction of the Pennsylvania Republicans.

After weeks of uncertainty, and not until the Inauguration was over did Lincoln finally appoint Chase Secretary of the Treasury. Carey lost no time in acting upon the assumption that he could influence a man like Chase more than he could depend on Cameron. A full treatment of his persuasive arguments, going into all the historical and philosophical details of national prosperity and international trade, began to pour from Philadelphia to Washington. By the end of the summer Chase was asking Carey's advice on such things as taxation and financial matters in general, and Carey was giving it generously.

86 Carey to Chase, Jan. 16, 1861, Chase Papers, HSP.
87 Harvey to Chase, Jan. 16, 1861, ibid.
88 Carey to Chase, Jan. 22, 1861, Carey Papers.
89 In 1855 Charles A. Dana had written to him complaining of Henry Wilson's attitude toward the tariff, commenting, "Wilson is under the control of Chase who is originally a States Rights Dem. & Fr. Trader. So goes the world." Dana to Carey, Feb. 23, 1855, ibid.
90 Dana copied the letter and sent it to Carey. Dana to Carey, Jan. 22, 1861, ibid.
91 Carey to Chase, Mar. 28, June 19, 1861, Chase Papers, HSP.
92 Chase to Carey, Aug. 21, 1861, Carey Papers.
93 Carey to Chase, Aug. 26, 1861, ibid.
In the area of practical politics, Carey's strategy was to plant his own men in key positions where the new Administration's tariff policy could be influenced. James E. Harvey was Carey's chief agent in arranging conferences with Chase for the appointment of Carey's friends, a number of whom thus secured important positions.²⁴ Chase may have felt under some obligation to Carey for the latter's aid in the Treasury contest. At any rate, Carey the philosopher was as capable of direct action here as he was behind the scenes in Congress.

Dr. William Elder, of all Carey's ardent disciples the closest and most faithful, was sent to the Treasury Department, where Chase was persuaded to use his services. When Elder arrived he says he found Chase worn and harried from working half the night before. Chase begged Elder to postpone conversation until he had a little leisure time, and then according to Elder, "directed the Assist. Secy. to take me to the clerk's room having the tariff in hand and put the whole force under my direction. The order delivered was as full as a power of attorney has it, and accordingly I have been busy during as many working hours as I can stand."²⁵

Elder, who added that "the hardest of the fight is before us," was full of his mission, not merely to draft tariff legislation, but to sell the public the whole "political economy, facts, figures and philosophy" of protection. The position at first was only temporary, but Carey urged Chase to make it permanent,²⁶ and Chase agreed. He gave Elder a position in the "Tariff region of the Department," which Elder said was "fair treatment towards the protectionist interest and I am bound to understand it as so intended. He seems willing that our idea should be represented here."²⁷ From that time on, Elder became the direct pipeline for Carey's influence in the Republican Administration, and Carey was kept informed of every detail of what went on.²⁸

Chase himself was not a sapling bending to any breeze, and he gave up his old habits of thought reluctantly even under the kind of

²⁴ See, for instance, Harvey to Carey, Apr. 10, 1861, ibid.
²⁵ Elder to Carey, Mar. 21, 1861, ibid.
²⁶ Carey to Chase, Mar. 28, 1861, Chase Papers, HSP.
²⁷ Elder to Carey, June 20, 1861, Carey Papers.
²⁸ Elder to Carey, July 1, 10, 22, Aug. 12, Sept. 17, Nov. 15, Dec. 11, 1861, and on through Chase's entire administration, ibid.
incessant persuasion that he was now subject to. Yet he had been in office only four months when Justin S. Morrill was able to report that the Secretary was being won over. "I have had a full and free conference with Secretary Chase. His Philosophy is Free trade or ad valorem, but he confessed that in his present agony for money the latter failed. He suggested something like the Tariff of 1846. I told him it could not get 20 votes of the Republican party in the House."\textsuperscript{99} Morrill continued to argue his case, gradually gaining ground. Finally, he says, Chase "was willing to yield on all save three or four points. On the whole he is willing to throw his theories to the dogs." It would still take time and effort, Morrill pointed out, but the friends of protection were succeeding. "All this, of course, you must regard as confidential," he told Carey, "and if you find a little not quite satisfactory you may thank your stars and possibly your humble servant that it was not worse. I think Chase considering his antecedents should receive generous treatment by all our friends. He is doing the best he can practically."\textsuperscript{100}

It was the Morrill Tariff of 1861 which established protectionism as the tariff policy of the Republican Party. Even before Congress was organized in January, 1860, Carey had turned his persuasive powers on John Sherman, the Republicans' first choice for Speaker of the House and eventually the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee.\textsuperscript{101} James H. Campbell again acted as Carey's personal representative in the House, and he considered Sherman one of the inner circle of Carey disciples.\textsuperscript{102} George W. Scranton, another Pennsylvania Representative, acted as distributing agent, placing Carey's books in the hands of all new members of Congress.\textsuperscript{103} When the debates began, Carey himself went to Washington to take over personal direction of the protectionist forces.\textsuperscript{104}

Even if we did not have this evidence of Carey's direct participation in the Morrill Tariff, a look at the Republican speeches would leave no doubt that he was the source from which most of them came. Pennsylvanians especially repeated whole passages from

\textsuperscript{99} Morrill to Carey, July 6, 1861, ibid.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{101} Carey to Sherman, Jan. 8, 1860, Sherman Papers, LC.

\textsuperscript{102} Campbell to Carey, June 13, 1860, Carey Papers.

\textsuperscript{103} Scranton to Carey, Mar. 21, 1860, ibid.

\textsuperscript{104} Scranton to Carey, Apr. 10, 30, 1860, ibid.
Carey's works as the basis for their arguments.\(^{105}\) Morrill himself borrowed heavily from Carey in describing his concept of economic philosophy, using numerous expressions directly from *The Harmony of Interests*, and *The Past, the Present, and the Future*.\(^{106}\)

When the bill passed the House in the spring of 1860, Morrill told Carey it would be difficult to get it through the Senate, not just because of Democratic opposition, but because "all of our men are not regular but rather raw recruits."\(^{107}\) He suggested that by December an empty treasury might persuade them. "If we can preserve our Tariff army whole till then, we will likely win the day." In December, however, it was not that simple. Sherman reported from Washington that "the excitement here in regard to secession is now so intense that but little thought is given to anything else."\(^{108}\)

Republicans who really wanted a tariff redoubled their efforts. Sherman, although still in the House, promised to do all he could.\(^{109}\) Morrill had already assured Carey, "I should be willing to wait and work in maturing a bill even through Dog Days."\(^{110}\) He could be counted on for assistance. Carey's own forces were ready.\(^{111}\) Even Chase, still a free trader at this time, mending his political fences for appointment to the Treasury post, gave his support.\(^{112}\)

It is generally agreed that final passage of the Morrill Bill in the Senate was made possible only through the withdrawal of Southern Democrats in the winter of 1860–1861. But there was no certainty at all that the Republican majority that emerged early in February would pass the bill. Opposition within the party was strong, particularly in New York and New England. The New York *Evening Post* led a spirited attack with a steady stream of blistering editorials while Senate debate was under way.\(^{113}\) The *Springfield Republican* reported strenuous opposition from many sides, "especially from the

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\(^{105}\) Congressional Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 1844 ff., 1852, Appendix, 252 ff., 345.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 1830 ff.

\(^{107}\) Morrill to Carey, June 21, 1860, Carey Papers.

\(^{108}\) Sherman to Carey, Dec. 9, 1860, ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid.

\(^{110}\) Morrill to Carey, June 21, 1860, ibid.

\(^{111}\) Carey to Sherman, Nov. 31, 1860, Sherman Papers, LC.


\(^{113}\) New York *Evening Post*, Feb. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 20, 1861.
importing interest." The New York Chamber of Commerce drew up a memorial protesting the proposed tariff in emphatic terms, and Morrill wrote to Carey that "all New York is emptied to make Seward yield and I fear he will yield to some of their demands." With considerable uncertainty and some misgivings, the Senate passed Morrill's bill, but only after whittling away part of its protectionism in one hundred fifty-six amendments. Supporters of the bill referred to it only as a revenue measure, and any reference to this being a protective tariff was looked upon as an indiscretion. But even with the Senate amendments it did raise rates above what they had been before, and Carey urged the House to accept it without further struggle. The Pennsylvania Representatives met in Covode's room the evening before the House voted, and agreed to go along with the compromise. The result was the Morrill Tariff of 1861.

Feelings within the party over the outcome were mixed. Thaddeus Stevens was bitter. "The bill is now changed, and it is no longer a protective tariff. I am obliged to swallow this bill just as it is, or I know it will not be swallowed at all." Bryant was just as bitter on the other side. "The new Tariff bill effects a complete revolution in our commercial system, returning by one huge step, backward to the old doctrine of protection." While he was not exactly correct in 1861, his observation was more justified than that of Stevens. The door was opened. Whatever compromise had been necessary, there was more cause for satisfaction among protectionists than for disappointment.

With Carey already bringing his influence to bear on Lincoln's Administration, the future tariff policy of the Republican Party was assured. The next year a more satisfactory measure was drafted, with preliminary drafts, suggestions, and criticisms exchanged directly between Morrill and Carey. It was driven through Congress with such ramrod efficiency that opponents were left literally speech-

114 *Springfield Republican*, Feb. 8, 1861.
115 *Senate Miscellaneous Documents*, No. 18, 36 Cong., 2 Sess.
116 Morrill to Carey, Feb. 6, 1861, Carey Papers.
118 Carey to Sherman, Feb. 20, 1861, Sherman Papers, LC.
120 *Congressional Globe*, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 1189.
122 Morrill to Carey, Mar. 18, 1862, Carey Papers.
The bill of 1862 was labeled "temporary," but even that was dispensed with later. The Republicans had been steered onto the high road of protectionism from which they would not descend for a long, long time, and then only with great difficulty.

Curiously enough, Henry C. Carey, who had so much to do with Republican tariff policy, always insisted that free trade, not protection, was his ultimate goal. Protection was the means to that end, a means not necessarily desirable but one he considered indispensable. "War is an evil, and so are tariffs of protection: yet both may be necessary, and both are sometimes necessary." This was not just a deception; it came from Carey's deep-seated Anglophobia, one of the dominant motivations in his thinking. Protection was necessary to break the power of England over world trade and industry. With that accomplished, "every obstacle to the establishment of perfect freedom will disappear, and the tariff will pass out of existence. Its enactment would be a declaration of war for the establishment of peace and free trade."

The idea of protection as an avenue to free trade may not have been taken very seriously by the practical politicians in the Republican Party. Nevertheless, in their wholesale quoting from the gospel according to Carey, it sometimes crept into their speeches. If the idea seems curious that leading champions of a protective tariff should have been preaching the doctrine of free trade, the difficulty lies in supposing that free trade ideals could only be projected as international liberalism. For Carey, passionate, intense nationalism dominated his entire thinking. An intensely nationalistic spirit is reflected in everything he ever wrote until it appears as the foundation upon which he rests all his ideas and all his arguments, no matter how strange they might sound by themselves. He considered the achievements of the United States superior to anything else anywhere or at any time. This nationalism is the one thing that gives consistency to the system he tried to visualize.

123 Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., 2936, 2937, 2979.
124 Taussig, 168.
125 Carey, Past, Present, and Future, 302.
126 Ibid., 471.
127 Congressional Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 1847, 1852, Appendix, 252.
128 Carey, Past, Present, and Future, 426.
The practical nature of Carey's economic nationalism did not differ from that of Alexander Hamilton or Henry Clay, and it was this which made it so attractive to Republicans of the old Whig school. The central theme in his *Harmony of Interests* was a protective tariff, with an emphasis upon reward to labor. The tariff was also a panacea to cure all the ills of the nation: the trouble over slavery, the difficulties between North and South, the friction between capital and labor, and even the argument between advocates and opponents of internal improvements.

Another feature of Carey's philosophy which appealed to Republicans was his emphasis upon individualism, a kind of co-operating individualism fostered by government action but opposed to restrictions, which he called his theory of "association." Carey disliked intensely all forms of economic restriction. A perfect harmony of interests would be "to have all unite in the removal of restrictions that tend to expel capital by rendering it unproductive; and to expel labour, to be employed elsewhere less productively than it might be employed at home, if aided by that capital." Removing restrictions in this sense began with removing the British world monopoly over manufacturing. In other words, free trade under existing conditions was a restriction in itself upon American enterprise. To remove that restriction called for "a tariff whose direct object shall be that of establishing the right of every man to determine for himself where he will live, and how he will employ his labour, or his capital, or both." "The highest civilization," Carey said, "is marked by the most perfect individuality and the greatest tendency to union, whether of men or of nations." This might sound paradoxical, but it meant the "voluntary cooperation of producers associated in a geographic sense, and well integrated in their economic activities."

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131 Smith, 15.
133 Ibid., 469.
134 Ibid., 416.
135 Smith, 20.
Altogether, Carey’s theory of “association,” stressing government-supported individualism, was the bridge between government aid and laissez-faire, a combination with which the Republican Party became so closely identified later. In theory Carey was just as opposed to the restrictions of private monopoly as to state monopoly.136 But the gap between Carey’s theory and its practical application was never quite closed by the party with which he worked. His system and its misuse were the differences between theory and practice in Republican economic policy throughout the rest of the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth. In 1860 the differences were in detail, and raised no serious obstacle to the concerted purpose of securing a higher tariff then and there.

It was Carey’s willingness to submerge differences in detail to gain advantage for the central purpose that was such a strong factor in his political influence. At any rate, the Morrill Tariff cannot be understood as simply the product of a Vermont businessman, or of economic pressure by manufacturers, or even of the political expediency of winning Pennsylvania’s votes in the election. It was compounded of several ingredients, not the least of which came from the philosopher-politician of Philadelphia.

136 Ibid., 17.