Alexander Schimmelfennig

A German-American Campaigner in the Civil War

Alexander Schimmelfennig was one of the more than two hundred thousand German-born citizens who served the Union in the Civil War. Though he rose to the rank of brigadier general, commanded a brigade at the Second Battle of Bull Run and at Chancellorsville and a division in the first day's fighting at Gettysburg, the historical accounts of the war scarcely mention his name. The few biographical sketches that have appeared are sparse in details and often inaccurate.

One can find several reasons which help to account for the neglect of this experienced soldier and refugee from the German revolution of 1848. Schimmelfennig was not the type of man who would impress either soldiers or historians. He was small in stature and of slender build, and generally dressed in old uniforms with no concern for his appearance. His disposition, probably related to his chronic dyspepsia, was cross and somewhat asocial. He cared little for the company of his officers, speaking to them only to give orders.¹

There was, moreover, considerable prejudice in the Army against foreign-born soldiers. They were frequently ridiculed because of their unfamiliar names and mannerisms, were often considered unworthy of command, and in several instances served conveniently as scapegoats for their commanders' errors. Schimmelfennig experienced all the frustrations of this group, and his name has shared the cloud of controversy that has continued to hang over these troops.²

² That there was an often-expressed prejudice against foreign-born soldiers, particularly Germans, in the Union Army can easily be documented. For an excellent review of this subject, see Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy (Baton Rouge, La., 1951), 586-596. That this prejudice was directly responsible for the poor reputation as fighters often given to the German units by Civil War writers is, of course, more controversial.
But Schimmelfennig, like most of his fellow German-Americans, was a firm believer in the principles of republican government. His life was a record of devotion to the defense of these ideals both in his homeland and in his adopted country. The story of his career, then, does not deserve the neglect it has received.

The details of Schimmelfennig's life before the Civil War are limited. He was born on July 20, 1824, in the Prussian province of Lithuania into what was described as a "favored" family. His education was primarily military. At the age of sixteen, he entered the Prussian army as an ensign and was trained at its staff school in Berlin, where he specialized in the study of outpost duty and skirmishing. By 1842, he had risen to the rank of lieutenant.³

During the 1840's, Germany, then made up of independent states, was seething with the spirit of nationalism. Since 1810, liberals throughout the states had been clamoring for constitutional reform and a republic. When the news reached Germany that the French had driven out the despot Louis Phillipe and had proclaimed a republic, these liberals became greatly encouraged. They made demands upon their ruling princes for constitutional reforms, and obtained some concessions. About this time, the predominantly German population of the small duchies of Schleswig and Holstein rose in revolt against Denmark and petitioned the German Confederation to come to their aid. The plight of Schleswig and Holstein stirred the German people and served to crystallize their growing nationalism. Volunteer troops were raised, and the Confederation empowered the armies of Prussia and Hanover to go to the aid of the two duchies.⁴

Schimmelfennig, as an officer in the Prussian army, distinguished himself in the fighting and received a captaincy for his service. Much to the indignation of the German people, an armistice was concluded with Denmark in August, 1848, which called for the retirement of

³ Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 16, 1865; Resolution passed at a Testimonial Dinner for Schimmelfennig in New York City, Sept. 24, 1865, National Archives and Reference Service, Records of the War Department, Record Group 94, Officers' File: S-1396-CB-1863, hereinafter cited as Nat. Arch.; Samuel P. Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-$ (Harrisburg, 1869), II, 893. Schimmelfennig was born Alexander von Schimmelpfennig, but dropped the "von" and "p" upon his arrival in America.

Prussian troops from Schleswig and Holstein. The effect on the German liberal movement was disillusioning, for it had sanctioned the uprising, welcomed the deputies from the two duchies, and considered itself allied with their cause. The Prussians, however, concluded the truce without consulting the liberal leaders. It was obvious that the liberals were more dependent on the German princes than the princes were on them.\(^5\)

The leaders of the liberal movement appealed to the governments and people of the various German states to stand up for their constitutional gains and defend them by arms if necessary. With the exception of the Bavarian Palatinate and Baden, however, the resistance to the powerful princes was feeble.\(^6\)

Captain Schimmelfennig had been infected by the spirit of nationalism and had served its cause enthusiastically in the Schleswig-Holstein war. Its betrayal embittered him, but it also confirmed him in his decision to fight for his ideals. He left Prussia and joined the revolutionary army of the Palatinate. Joining with him were other men who, thirteen years later, would fight together again to preserve a republic rather than create one. Among them were Louis Blenker, Carl Schurz, and Franz Sigel.\(^7\)

The task of mobilizing the army of the Palatinate was not easy. Most of the local officers had been sent out of the state before the revolution, and former Prussian officers, like Schimmelfennig, who had joined their cause were viewed by the civilians with distrust. The command was given, finally, to a military commission which included Schimmelfennig, whose task it was to organize and equip the army for the field. On June 12, 1849, the Prussian army invaded the Palatinate and the revolutionary army retreated. Five days later, the border of Baden was reached, and the Palatinate was abandoned by its army without a shot being fired.\(^8\)

The Baden army was located in the north, opposing troops from Württemberg and Hesse. On the 20th, Prussian troops maneuvered to

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\(^5\) Ibid., 100; Schurz, I, 141-142; Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 16, 1865; Berks and Schuylkill Journal (Reading, Pa.), Sept. 16, 1865; W. E. Mosse, The European Powers and the German Question, 1848-71 (Cambridge, 1958), 19.

\(^6\) Schurz, I, 167-168.

\(^7\) Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 16, 1865; Berks and Schuylkill Journal, Sept. 16, 1865; Schurz, I, 187-189.

\(^8\) Veit Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution von 1848-49 (Berlin, 1931), II, 527; Schurz, I, 187, 196-198.
a position in the rear of the Baden army, pinning it between them and the Württemberg and Hessian forces. The Baden army managed to escape the trap, however, and set up communications with the Palatinate army moving up from the south. Four days later, the Baden and Palatinate armies consolidated their strength and made their stand. On June 30, their line was broken and the major part of the army, including Schimmelfennig, was forced south to the Swiss border. There Schimmelfennig and many others crossed into Switzerland. The revolution was over and the dream of German unification denied until Bismarck’s day, twenty years later. After the Prussian victory, the government of the Palatinate brought charges of armed rebellion and high treason against three hundred and thirty-three persons. Schimmelfennig was among those tried in absentia and sentenced to death. German borders were now closed to him. A life of exile began.  

Schimmelfennig settled in Zurich, Switzerland, among a group of fellow refugees. Many of them still firmly believed that a new revolt would occur in the German states, and they met frequently to discuss and plan the part each would play in the coming event. In addition to these political activities, Schimmelfennig learned engineering and drafting, by which he supported his family when he reached the United States. He also spent considerable time with Carl Schurz, to whom he was teaching military tactics and strategy.  

In the autumn of 1851, Schimmelfennig arrived in England and settled with a group of refugees in the London suburb of St. John’s Wood. There he married his German fiancée, Sophie von Glümer. Despite the stimulation of their discussions, the hopeful attitude of the refugees began to change. Realizing that their dream of a speedy return to the fatherland was futile, the exiles began to look in other directions for a future. Their eyes naturally turned to America, for the new republic offered them a world in which men were “hopefully struggling for full realizations” of their ideals. Eager to participate in this struggle, Schimmelfennig and his wife emigrated to America in 1853.  

They went first to Philadelphia, joining Carl Schurz, who

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9 Ibid., I, 199-203, 211; Valentin, II, 540.  
10 Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 16, 1865; Schurz, I, 243-245; Fritsch, 28.  
had preceded them by six months. Later, Schimmelfennig moved to
Washington, D. C., where he was employed as a military engineer
in the War Department.\textsuperscript{12}

Shortly after his arrival in America, Schimmelfennig's career took
a literary turn. In 1854, he brought out an interesting little book
entitled \textit{The War between Turkey and Russia: A Military Sketch}. It
is a well-written piece, careful study of which reveals a meshing of
Schimmelfennig's skill in tactics and strategy with his republican
ideals. The book is an analysis of the political, geographical, and
military factors which led to the Crimean War. Most interesting,
perhaps, is Schimmelfennig's purpose in writing it—to demonstrate
his unfailing belief in the downfall of European monarchies and the
ultimate triumph of the republican movement. To him, the conflict
between Russia and Turkey was hastening this victory.\textsuperscript{13}

His belief in America was clearly expressed. He saw the United
States as "making converts by their free and glorious existence," and
as the strongest example of a democratic stronghold standing op-
posed to Russia, the power to which Europe's monarchies looked for
support. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Republic's
existence was threatened from within its own boundaries, Schimmel-
fennig went immediately to its defense.\textsuperscript{14}

In the spring of 1861, Schimmelfennig was working for the army
engineers in Washington. Four days after President Lincoln's call for
75,000 volunteers, there appeared in a German newspaper published
in Baltimore a call for enlistment signed by Alexander Schimmel-
fennig. The German-American communities responded with great
enthusiasm to the emergency. Since the raising of volunteers was a
local matter, these groups were eager to form regiments and elect
their own heroes as colonels.

In Pittsburgh, one committee raised eight companies of trained
German soldiers. The sponsors of these troops searched for a man to
whom they could offer the colonelcy, a man who would be entirely
free of politics and interested only in serving his country. They made
the offer to Schimmelfennig, and he accepted.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Schurz's Deposition, \textit{Vet. Rec.; Reading Gazette and Democrat}, Sept. 16, 1865.
\textsuperscript{13} Alexander Schimmelfennig, \textit{The War between Turkey and Russia: A Military Sketch}
(Philadelphia, 1854), 15 ff.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{15} Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 16, 1865; A. E. Zucker, ed., \textit{The Forty-Eighters:
Schimmelfennig spent the summer of 1861 recruiting, organizing, and drilling his regiment, and by the end of the summer had it quite proficient in drill and discipline. On July 23, he was mustered into the service for a three-year term. On September 14, his regiment was mustered in as the 35th Pennsylvania Volunteers. Five days later, it left Pittsburgh for Philadelphia, where it joined two local companies that had been assigned to it.\textsuperscript{16}

The War Department, meanwhile, was trying to fill out the Army of the Potomac and wanted to complete a German division under General Louis Blenker. On September 23, the 35th Pennsylvania Volunteers were ordered to Washington. While passing through Philadelphia, Schimmelfennig's horse fell and the colonel badly injured his right ankle and was forced to remain behind for treatment. There he contracted smallpox and was hospitalized for several weeks. The regiment joined Blenker's division in its winter quarters at Hunter's Chapel, Virginia. Schimmelfennig returned to his outfit as soon as he was released from the hospital, and immediately began the strenuous task of readying his command for battle. Among other activities, he organized a school for his officers, instructing them in his specialty, outpost duty and skirmishing. Unfortunately, his active routine aggravated his ankle injury and in mid-November he had to go on sick leave. He returned home to recuperate, but complications apparently set in. Colonel Schimmelfennig remained on sick leave until July, 1862.\textsuperscript{17}

When Schimmelfennig rejoined his regiment, he found it renamed the 74th Pennsylvania and part of the Army of Virginia commanded by General John Pope. The 74th Pennsylvania had been placed in a brigade commanded by Colonel Henry Bohlen, in the division commanded by Schimmelfennig's old friend and student, Carl Schurz. The division, in turn, was part of the First Corps, commanded by


\textsuperscript{17} U.S. War Department, \textit{War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies} (Washington, D. C., 1892-1901), Ser. III, I, 534, hereinafter cited as \textit{O.R.}, with all subsequent references being to Series I; Dr. Pillichady's Deposition, Nov. 6, 1865, \textit{Vet. Rec.} (Dr. Pillichady was regimental surgeon of the 74th Pennsylvania Volunteers); Bates, II, 893; Dr. T. Hansmann's Certificate, Jan. 6, 1862, \textit{Nat. Arch.} (Dr. Hansmann was Schimmelfennig's family physician); Schimmelfennig's letter to Col. Bohlen, Jan. 6, 1862, \textit{ibid.}; 74th Pennsylvania Volunteers Muster Rolls for January, February, March, April, May, June, 1862, \textit{ibid.}
another old comrade-in-arms, Franz Sigel. The colonel busied himself getting his regiment in fighting order. On August 8, the orders arrived which began the movement that would be climaxed by the Second Battle of Bull Run.18

On August 22, 1862, Sigel’s corps was at Freeman’s Ford, Virginia, on the Rappahannock River. Schurz was ordered to send a regiment across the river on reconnaissance, and he gave the assignment to the 74th Pennsylvania. Schimmelfennig crossed the river and observed an enemy wagon train moving slowly northward. It was part of the rear of Stonewall Jackson’s corps and apparently had been left unguarded. His men attacked and captured eleven heavily loaded mules and several soldiers. Schimmelfennig sent the prisoners and mules back to Schurz along with a request that the two remaining regiments in Bohlen’s brigade be brought up to support him so that he might capture more supplies.19

The 61st Ohio and the 8th West Virginia were immediately dispatched. Schimmelfennig skillfully deployed the troops and again attacked the wagon train, whereupon General Isaac Trimble’s brigade guarding Jackson’s rear attacked his right flank. The 61st Ohio and 8th West Virginia met the attack, but the West Virginians broke and ran. Meanwhile, the vanguard of General James Longstreet’s corps approached, attacked Schimmelfennig’s left flank and threatened his rear. With only the 74th Pennsylvania and 61st Ohio remaining firmly in the field, Schurz ordered a bayonet charge. Led by Schimmelfennig, the charge checked the enemy’s advance and created the impression that the two regiments were supported by a large force. With the Confederates momentarily checked, the two regiments retreated from the woods and raced for the river. The Confederate troops, recovering from their confusion, rushed after them, but were stopped at the edge of the woods by fire from the artillery that Schurz had placed on the hills overlooking the river. Safe on the other side, Schimmelfennig surveyed the damages to his regiment: he had lost 68 men—12 killed, 37 wounded, 3 drowned, and 16 missing. Also killed in the action was the brigade commander, Colonel Bohlen, who was shot through the heart as he sat on his horse at the river’s edge encouraging his men. Schurz sent Schimmel-

18 Ibid., July, August, 1862, Nat. Arch.; Schurz, II, 347-351; Dyer, 349; Bates, II, 894.
fennig word of Bohlen's death and asked him to take over command of the brigade.\textsuperscript{20}

The fight at Freeman's Ford was not a significant engagement in the Bull Run campaign. Pope did not follow up the attack on Jackson's rear, nor did Jackson stop his movement northward. It was, however, an important event for Schimmelfennig. It marked his first experience in battle leading Union troops, and though it could not be called a victory, he did display skill and courage. Moreover, because of Bohlen's death, he took command of the brigade in time to lead it into the disastrous Second Battle of Bull Run.

Pope was determined to trap Jackson, but was having difficulty finding him. On August 28, he finally located Jackson's three divisions west of the Bull Run and north of the Gainsville-Centreville Turnpike, where they awaited the arrival of Longstreet's three divisions. Pope drew up his army to face Jackson, his strategy being to hit Jackson before Longstreet came up to strengthen him. Sigel's First Corps lined up alongside the Bull Run south of the Turnpike. General John Reynolds' division was near Groveton just south of the Turnpike. Sigel's two divisions under Schurz and General Robert C. Schenck, with the independent brigade of General Robert Milroy, were farther eastward near the crossing of the Sudley Springs Road. Sigel's corps was to be the right wing of the army, Schurz's division the right wing of the corps, and Schimmelfennig's brigade the right wing of the division. Schimmelfennig's brigade, then, bore the responsibility of being the first line of defense of the right wing of the army.\textsuperscript{21}

Orders to advance were received at sunrise and Schimmelfennig led his brigade to its position. Advancing slowly, the brigade forded Young's Branch and reached a forest, where it suddenly came upon a small body of enemy troops. A hot exchange followed. Schimmelfennig's men captured several prisoners from whom he learned that Jackson was in front with two divisions, expecting Longstreet's arrival momentarily. He sent the prisoners to Schurz with the message, "All right so far but the devil to pay ahead. . . ."\textsuperscript{22}

About ten o'clock, Schimmelfennig was ordered to shorten his line to allow General Philip Kearny of the Army of the Potomac, who

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.; Bates, II, 894; Dyer, 349.
\textsuperscript{21} Schurz, II, 359 ff; Ropes, 102.
\textsuperscript{22} Schurz, II, 362–363.
had just arrived, to place his division on the right. Schimmelfennig quickly gave the orders to relinquish the strategic right flank. Soon after the new position was consolidated, the rebels made their first strong assault on the advancing column. They hit the center of Schurz’s line and three regiments reeled back in confusion. The brigade on Schimmelfennig’s left, under Colonel Wladimir Krzyzanowski, gave a little, but his own men held firmly during the attack. Schurz ordered the artillery to open fire, and with this support his infantry attacked and regained their previous positions.23

Sigel, meanwhile, sensing that Longstreet had not yet arrived, requested Kearny to attack Jackson from the flank position. Schurz’s line kept up the pressure on Jackson’s front. The enemy moved back to an old railroad embankment which ran parallel to the advancing Union line. Using the embankment as a breastwork, they poured a tremendous fire at the advancing columns. Schimmelfennig ordered his brigade to charge. It gained the embankment and advanced beyond it until caught in a deadly cross fire of artillery and musketry. Forced to fall back to the railroad embankment, it held there firmly against repeated attacks and charges by the enemy. Schurz, feeling himself too weak to pursue the advantage that Schimmelfennig had gained, held his division at the embankment. By two o’clock, the fighting had been reduced to skirmishing, and Sigel ordered the exhausted division to a reserve position. It had been in the attack almost eight hours. Although the battle continued, night found the armies just about where they had begun the day. Jackson had now been joined by Longstreet, and Pope’s strategy had failed.24

On the morning of August 30, the battle resumed. About nine o’clock, Schimmelfennig’s brigade was moved to the rear of Schenck’s division near Groveton to act as a reserve. Pope, believing that Jackson had suffered a defeat on the previous day, ordered a general advance with General Fitz-John Porter's troops in the lead. About two o’clock that afternoon, however, Porter was caught in a cross fire of artillery and infantry and was sent reeling back. Schenck, under heavy fire, moved up under the cover of Schimmelfennig’s guns to a stronger position in the next range of low hills.25

23 Ibid., 364–366.
24 Ibid., 366–368; Ropes, 103–104.
The battle was still raging on the left when Schimmelfennig was ordered to bring his brigade to Milroy’s support. But Milroy’s troops had become scattered, and Schimmelfennig therefore placed his men to the right of two other divisions and served with them until dark brought an end to the fighting. Word was now received that Pope had ordered a general retreat. Around eight o’clock, Schimmelfennig was ordered back to his division, where his brigade furnished guards and pickets for the entire corps. Around midnight the order came to march to Centreville. Schimmelfennig was assigned rear guard duty and was ordered to destroy the stone bridge over the Bull Run after all troops had crossed. His brigade, then, had the honor of being the last unit to leave the battlefield of the Second Bull Run.

Since the fight at Freeman’s Ford, Colonel Schimmelfennig had been in command of a brigade, but no steps had been taken to recognize his new responsibilities with the appropriate commission. Two months after Bull Run, seventy-seven officers in his brigade sent a petition to President Lincoln requesting that he be granted permanent command and the rank of brigadier general. On November 28, 1862, General Sigel sent a message to the War Department in which he made several recommendations for promotions. Among the men recommended for brigadier general were Schimmelfennig and his fellow officer, Colonel Krzyzanowski. Nothing came of this nomination, however, and Schimmelfennig had to be renominated. On January 5, 1863, Schurz wrote a letter to Robert McKnight, an important member of the Pennsylvania congressional delegation, praising Schimmelfennig and requesting his promotion. McKnight took Schurz’s request under immediate consideration, and a recommendation signed by eighteen members of the Pennsylvania delegation was sent to Lincoln.

Lincoln acted upon these recommendations, and, in a consultation with Secretary of War Stanton over the general problems of promotions, showed a curious concern for Schimmelfennig’s cause. "The only point I make is, there has got to be something done that will be unquestionably in the interest of the Dutch, and to that end I want

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26 Ibid., 375-377; Ropes, 140-141.
27 Petition from officers, n.d., Nat. Arch.; Sigel to War Department, Nov. 11, 1862, ibid.; Reading Gazette and Democrat, Sept. 9, 1865; Schurz to McKnight, Jan. 5, 1863, Nat. Arch.; McKnight to Lincoln, Jan. 5, 1863, ibid.
Schimmelfennig appointed.' 'Mr. President, perhaps this Schimmel-
what’s-his-name is not as highly recommended as some other German
officers.' 'No matter about that. His name will make up for any
difference there may be, and I'll take the risk of his coming out all
right.' Then, with a laugh he spoke each syllable of the name dis-
distinctly, accenting the last: 'Schim-mel-fen-nig must be appointed."

Schimmelfennig’s nomination was sent to the Senate in March and
confirmed on April 4. The commission was back-dated to November
29, 1862, the date on which Sigel’s original recommendation was
received by the War Department. Colonel Krzyzanowski was not as
fortunate. President Lincoln had also sent his nomination to the
Senate, but it failed to confirm him. Rumor was that no one could
pronounce his name.\(^{29}\)

During the months between the end of Pope’s campaign and the
beginning of the Chancellorsville campaign, Schimmelfennig’s bri-
gade was inactive. The First Corps was transferred to the Army of
the Potomac and renumbered the Eleventh Corps. During the Battle
of Antietam, the predominantly German corps was assigned to duty
within the fortification of Washington. When Burnside led the army
against Fredericksburg, Schimmelfennig, with the rest of the Elev-
enth Corps, was held in reserve and saw no action.\(^{30}\)

On April 29, 1863, the Eleventh Corps, now commanded by
General Oliver O. Howard, moved south to the Rapidan River as the
Chancellorsville campaign got underway. Lee was still strongly en-
trenched in the heights on the right and left of Fredericksburg, south
of the Rappahannock River. General Joseph Hooker had taken over
the command of the Army of the Potomac, and his plan was to have
the Sixth Corps make a feint in front of and below the city while
the remainder of the army quietly crossed the upper Rappahannock,
moved west, and gained Lee’s rear. By the afternoon of April 30,
the Eleventh Corps reached camp about two miles west of Chancel-
lorsville. The Second, Fifth, and Twelfth Corps had also arrived in
the vicinity. The flanking movement had been carried out as planned.
Hooker, his generals, and his troops were all confident of success.\(^{31}\)

\(^{29}\) *Reading Gazette and Democrat*, Sept. 9, 1865; 74th Pennsylvania Volunteers Muster Roll,
That night, General Howard received orders to cover the right wing of the army which was located along the old Turnpike and Plank roads. These roads ran together west from Fredericksburg about six miles to the Tabernacle Church. There they separated, each proceeding west about six miles to Chancellorsville. Two miles west of Chancellorsville, the roads again separated.

Howard placed his First Division (General Charles Devens) west of the latter junction and north of the Turnpike. All Devens' regiments faced south except two which faced northwest at an angle to the Turnpike as protection against any flanking movement. Schurz's Third Division connected with Devens'. Schimmelfennig placed his regiments facing south near the junction of the two roads. The line continued east with Krzyzanowski's brigade extending Schimmelfennig's left, and with Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck's brigade of the Second Division (General Adolph von Steinwehr) connecting with Krzyzanowski. All these units, too, faced south.

On the morning of May 1, Hooker began his advance toward Fredericksburg with high hopes of closing his trap on Lee. But Lee had guessed his plans and engaged the Union lead divisions. Hooker lost his nerve, withdrew his army back to its previous positions, and went on the defensive. During the evening, Lee was informed of the exposed position of Howard's right flank and decided to attack it. He split his remaining army into halves and ordered Jackson to proceed in a circuit of fifteen miles, southwest, then north, to a point two miles west of Howard's unguarded right flank. Jackson began his day-long movement about eight o'clock in the morning of May 2.

General Schimmelfennig had set up his headquarters in an ambulance on the edge of the woods north of the Turnpike. Early on the morning of May 2, his aide, Lieutenant Otto von Fritsch, went on reconnaissance and observed Jackson's columns moving west. He reported this information to Schimmelfennig, who walked a little south of the Turnpike, studied the terrain through his field glasses and commented: "I think that we will advance soon, . . . and I will

32 O.R., XXV, Pt. I, 627-628; Fritsch, 35; Schurz, II, 412-413.
33 O.R., XXV, Pt. I, 628; Schurz, II, 411; Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command (New York, 1943), II, 524-542. Lee had earlier split off Early's division from the main army and had left it entrenched at Fredericksburg.
be glad if we do, as, if they should come in on our flank we will be in a hell of a fix..."

At that moment, General Hooker appeared on the Turnpike with General Howard and several staff officers to inspect the lines. Schimmelfennig approached the two generals, but neither one took any notice of him. Hooker rode back to his headquarters convinced that the whole line, including the Eleventh Corps' position, was strong. He made no changes to provide any defense against an enemy coming in from the northwest.

During the early afternoon, Schimmelfennig received an order from Schurz to send two or three companies south of the Plank Road to dislodge two small enemy gains. He sent Fritsch with two companies of infantry to observe what he could of Lee's movements. On the way back, Fritsch had a conversation with an officer on the picket line who had heard enough to convince him that the enemy was moving toward the flank of the Eleventh Corps. Fritsch reported these facts to Schimmelfennig, who also became convinced that Lee was planning a flank attack. The General then sent Fritsch and his adjutant on two reconnaissance patrols. About three o'clock, both scouts returned with the same story: they had seen the enemy, heard orders shouted by their officers, and had been shot at. They were positive that the enemy would come in from the west; and all Union troops in the vicinity were facing south.

Schimmelfennig mounted his horse and rode to see Schurz. But Schurz was at Howard's headquarters. Schimmelfennig, not wanting to be too far from his brigade, sent his report to corps headquarters with one of Schurz's aides. At headquarters, Schurz was having a difficult time impressing upon the corps commander the seriousness of the situation. Howard clung to Hooker's opinion that Lee was in full retreat.

After sending in his report to Schurz, Schimmelfennig returned to his brigade. The troops, not expecting any action until the next day, had stacked their arms along the Turnpike and had begun to prepare their evening meal. No changes had been made in the brigade line,

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34 Fritsch, 35-41.
36 Fritsch, 41-44.
37 Ibid.; Schurz, II, 415-418.
but Schimmelfennig rode out and spoke to each of his regimental commanders. He informed them that if an attack should be made from the flank, they were to fall back to the crossroads and, if pressed hard, to a point farther east near the Wilderness Church. Then he returned to his ambulance headquarters and rested. A few hours before the attack, Schimmelfennig’s adjutant went to Howard’s headquarters to report the flanking movement again. He was met with an incredulous smile and was directed to tell General Schimmelfennig to stop reconnoitering and remain in the position assigned to him.\textsuperscript{38}

A little after five o’clock in the evening the storm broke. Howard had taken General Francis Barlow’s brigade to support General Daniel Sickles farther down the line; Schurz was at corps headquarters; Schimmelfennig was resting in his ambulance; the troops were at mess. Devens’ division was suddenly attacked from the woods to its right. Startled rabbits and deer bounding out of the woods gave the only warning. Then came a crash of artillery, a burst of musketry, and the penetrating shriek of the rebel yell.\textsuperscript{39}

General Schimmelfennig mounted his horse, raced to the crossroads, and sent orders to his regimental commanders along the Pike to change their fronts and form a battle line north of the Plank Road east of the junction. But such a sudden change was difficult to accomplish. The cry “Fall In” caused great commotion and took time to obey. Then, just as order was being established, the remnants of Devens’ division came down the Turnpike in complete disorder. Wagons, ambulances, and cut-loose artillery horses ran through the lines of the 74th Pennsylvania and the 61st Ohio, Schimmelfennig’s two most westwardly placed regiments. Soon the men of Devens’ division came pouring through. The 74th Pennsylvania was thrown into disorder, and the 61st Ohio was badly broken into three fragments. General Schimmelfennig continued shouting for his brigade to form the line, but the confusion made it impossible.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Fritsch, 45-47; Bates, II, 895.
\textsuperscript{39} Fritsch, 47; Schurz, II, 419, 421-422; J. S. Applegate, Reminiscences and Letters of George Arrowsmith of New Jersey, Late Lt. Col. of 157th New York State Militia (Red Bank, N. J., 1893), 199; Freeman, II, 558-562.
\textsuperscript{40} Fritsch, 48-49; Schurz, II, 422-423; O.R., XXV, Pt. I, 664-665; Frederick Stephen Wallace, The Sixty-First Ohio Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Marysville, Ohio, 1900), 14.
Schurz joined Schimmelfennig at the crossroads. With great difficulty they succeeded in changing the fronts of a few regiments to form a line facing the onrushing Confederates. The right of the line, however, began to crumble, and Schimmelfennig ordered his men to fall back to a new position near the Wilderness Church, where they were able to fire several rounds before the enemy turned their flanks. The line then fell back to some shallow rifle pits which had been set up earlier. These pits, which ran north-south, were manned by Buschbeck’s brigade of Steinwehr’s Second Division. Buschbeck, being on the extreme left of the corps, had had enough time to change his front, and had mustered his men in perfect order in the entrenchments.41

As the men fell back, they passed General Howard standing about fifty paces in front of the rifle pits. He had finally arrived on the scene, after being with the Third Corps, and was trying desperately to establish a line. Schurz and Schimmelfennig tried in vain to aid Howard in organizing the troops along the line that Buschbeck held, but to bring order out of the confused mass being steadily pressed back was a hopeless task. All the while, the enemy advanced. The rifle pits next had to be abandoned, the troops retreating with more confusion to the woods. There they met an artillery section supported by two companies of infantry. Using grape and canister, the artillery checked the enemy momentarily, and the retreat ceased. It was now seven o’clock.42

The Eleventh Corps had been engaged for almost two hours without the aid of any supporting force. Now, General Hiram Berry’s division of the Third Corps arrived and formed a line across Plank Road. Other divisions came up to help check the enemy. More decisive, perhaps, than these reinforcements was an event within the Confederate lines: at a little after nine o’clock, Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded by fire from his own men. The rout was over.43

During the next week, an atmosphere of gloom hung over the camp of the Eleventh Corps. Many in the army who understood the situation knew that the corps had done all that could have been

43 Schurz, II, 427; Abner Doubleday, Chancellorsville and Gettysburg (New York, 1882), 33-34; Freeman, II, 564-583.
expected. But an unnecessary defeat had been experienced, a scapegoat was needed, and the “foreign” Eleventh Corps was handy. It was not long before the nation was told by the newspaper correspondents in camp how the “cowardly Dutchmen” had thrown down their guns and fled at the first fire, that the defeat was due primarily to their cowardice.  

General Schimmelfennig keenly felt the sting of these accusations. After the battle, he had retired to his tent and did not come out for several days. Most of the time he remained in bed and would respond crossly whenever anyone reported for orders. One day, his aide, Fritsch, thinking him to be sick, approached his tent. He began by reporting that he had been inspecting the picket line every night and had found it in good order. The General did not respond. His aide then expressed concern for the General’s health and asked if there was anything he could do for him. This provoked a vigorous “NO!” Again Fritsch tried. “‘When you are ready to make your report, sir, I have drawn some plans of our position.’ No answer. ‘Have you read the Herald, sir? They state that the German troops behaved in a most cowardly manner, that we were the cause of the late disaster.’ ‘Just what I expected,’ he said. ‘Am I mentioned?’ ‘No, sir, but General Schurz is, and often, too.’ ‘Bring all the papers tomorrow,’ he said; ‘I have a headache now.’”

Fritsch collected all the papers he could and on the next morning, May 9, left them near the entrance of Schimmelfennig’s tent. Schimmelfennig read them aloud to himself. He worked slowly through each paper, “swearing like an old trooper.” Then, for the first time in several days, he left his tent and rode first to Schurz’s headquarters and then to Howard’s. There is no record of what he said to these generals, but he returned still in an angry mood. That night he called his staff to his tent and vented his feelings. His aide reported that the General made “an astonishing good oratorical effort, which ended in a scorching denunciation of the press.” He then ordered his staff members to hand in their reports on the battle. As soon as he received them, Schimmelfennig began his own report

44 Doubleday, 29–30; Applegate, 205; Schurz, II, 432–433; Augustus Choate Hamlin, The Battle of Chancellorsville (Bangor, Maine, 1896), 154–162; Regis DeTrobiand, Four Years with the Army of the Potomac (Boston, 1889), 472.

45 Fritsch, 67–68.
to Schurz. He spent the entire night working on it, for he had many feelings to express.  

GENERAL: The officers and men of this brigade of your division, filled with indignation, come to me, with newspapers in their hands, and ask if such be the reward they may expect for the sufferings they have endured and the bravery they have displayed. . . . It would seem as if a nest of vipers had but waited for an auspicious moment to spit out their poisonous slanders upon this heretofore honored corps. Little would I heed were these reports but emanations from the prurient imaginations of those who live by dipping their pens in the blood of the slain, instead of standing up for the country, sword and musket in hand; but they are dated, "Headquarters of General Hooker," and they are signed by responsible names. . . .

He went on to describe the part his brigade had played in the fighting and pointed out that it was Devens' predominantly non-German division that had crumbled under the force of Jackson's flanking attack. He concluded:

General, I am an old soldier. To this hour I have been proud to command the brave men in this brigade; but I am sure that unless these infamous falsehoods be retracted and reparation made, their good-will and soldierly spirits will be broken, and I shall no longer be at the head of the same brave men whom I have heretofore had the honor to lead. In the name of truth and common honesty, in the name of the good cause of our country, I ask, therefore, for satisfaction. If our superior officers be not sufficiently in possession of the facts, I demand an investigation; if they are, I demand that the miserable penny-a-liners who have slandered the division, be excluded, by a public order, from our lines, and that the names of the originators of these slanders be made known to me and my brigade, that they may be held responsible for their acts.

Upon finishing the report, General Schimmelfennig handed it to his aide to forward to headquarters, and went out for a ride.

The justice and satisfaction that Schimmelfennig demanded were not granted; and in the condition he described, the Eleventh Corps moved toward Gettysburg and the fate he predicted.

At seven o'clock in the morning of July 1, 1863, the Eleventh Corps began its march toward Gettysburg, aware only of the fact that the First Corps under Reynolds was ahead of it. Around noon,
Schurz, riding on ahead of his column, met Howard at Cemetery Hill, southeast of town. He learned that the First Corps had engaged a large enemy force northwest of Gettysburg; Reynolds had been killed and Howard, as senior officer, had taken over command of the field. Schurz was instructed to assume command of the Eleventh Corps and turn over the Third Division to Schimmelfennig, who, in addition to his own brigade now led by Colonel George von Amsburg, had Krzyzanowski’s brigade under his command.

Howard’s first decision was to hold Cemetery Hill as a reserve rallying point with his Second Division (Steinwehr) and reserve artillery. Schurz was ordered to move the Third Division (Schimmelfennig) and First Division (Barlow) through Gettysburg to the fields northwest of the town to join the right flank of the First Corps, now commanded by General Abner Doubleday. Schimmelfennig arrived in town sometime between noon and one o’clock, and was ordered to proceed immediately to extend the line of the First Corps north to Oak Hill.

The Third Division pushed out slowly through the field bounded by the Mummasburg and Carlisle roads. At first, only enemy sharpshooters disturbed its march, but soon the fire became heavier as Confederate artillery was added to the musketry. The men were forced to halt their advance and seek shelter behind fences. General Robert Rodes’s Division of General Richard Ewell’s Second Corps had occupied the area around Oak Hill, and a battery on the hill opened up on the Union line. Schimmelfennig’s artillery replied and soon silenced it. It was obvious, however, that the Oak Hill area was occupied by a strong enemy force and the original deployment plan would have to be abandoned.

Schimmelfennig was forced to place his division, faced north, at an angle to the line of the First Corps. His line began with von Amsburg’s brigade on the left at the Mummasburg Road. On von


52 Scott, 280; *New York at Gettysburg*, 15-21, 378-381; DeParis, 110.
Amsburg's right was Krzyzanowski's brigade which stretched to a point east of the Carlisle Road. Barlow's First Division joined Krzyzanowski's right just east of the Carlisle Road and extended northeastward in a crescent shape to the Rock Creek, where it turned southward along the banks of the creek.⁵³

There were three major difficulties with the field positions of the two divisions. First, all regiments had been reduced below what was considered to be a normal complement. Schimmelfennig's line in some parts was extended so thinly that it was more like a skirmish than a battle line. Second, Schimmelfennig's extreme left was not able to make contact with the right flank of the First Corps. A deadly quarter-mile gap separated the two lines, making it possible for the enemy to move between the two corps, flanking each of them. Finally, the two divisions were facing a Confederate army of overwhelmingly superior numbers.⁶⁴

By two-thirty on the afternoon of July 1, units of Ewell's and General Ambrose Hill's Corps were in striking distance of the Union lines, and their advance began. Rodes's division of Ewell's Corps moved first and headed straight for the gap between the flanks of the First and Eleventh Corps. As soon as Rodes's guns echoed across the field, Hill sent two divisions crashing against the left flank of the First Corps.⁶⁵

Schimmelfennig's division was facing General George Doles's Georgia brigade. As Doles moved toward the gap between the First and Eleventh Corps, Schimmelfennig rushed forward with Von Amsburg's brigade to gain his rear. Doles quickly changed front and pushed von Amsburg back on Krzyzanowski's brigade, which managed to hold its position.⁶⁶

Barlow, whose division was on Schimmelfennig's right, saw that Doles's left flank was in the air and could not resist the temptation to advance and take the enemy brigade in reverse. He advanced his division to attack Doles's flank and lost contact with Schimmelfennig's right.⁶⁷

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⁵³ Schurz, III, 7; New York at Gettysburg, 15, map 2; Hassler, 270.
⁵⁴ Bates, II, 896; Scott, 283; New York at Gettysburg, 16; Hassler, 270–271.
⁵⁶ New York at Gettysburg, 21; Tucker, 155; DeParis, 114.
⁵⁷ Tucker, 155; DeParis, 114; Schurz, III, 9.
At this point, Early's division appeared on the field and moved rapidly against Barlow's rear and right flank. The First Division was now in serious trouble with its other flank threatened by Doles, who was moving into the new gap in the line between Barlow's left and Schimmelfennig's right. Schurz quickly ordered Schimmelfennig to send Krzyzanowski's brigade to re-establish the connection. Schimmelfennig, with his division already thinly deployed, was forced to stretch it even further.  

Krzyzanowski's brigade advanced a half-mile in the direction of Barlow's division. Barlow's entire front, however, had begun to crumble under the impact of Early's division and his troops were thrown out of position. Early now turned to meet Krzyzanowski's onrushing brigade, which engaged the Confederates and for a while held its own. But the enemy's advantage was too great and the whole Eleventh Corps line moved back five hundred yards to a position near the almshouse building.  

Realizing that the situation was critical, Schurz sent aide after aide to Howard requesting reinforcements. Howard finally dispatched Colonel Charles Coster's brigade of the Second Division (Steinwehr). But by the time it arrived north of town, the issue was no longer in doubt. Barlow's division was retiring toward Gettysburg, and the Confederate forces had turned on the right of Schimmelfennig's division and had begun to roll it back.  

The First Corps, on the left, was also in trouble, and Doubleday requested reinforcements from Schurz. But Schurz had none to send. In addition to the collapse of his right flank, he saw that the enemy had successfully driven into the gap between the two corps: the Third Division was in danger of being flanked on its left as well as its right. At this point, Howard sent an order to retreat south through the town and re-form near Cemetery Hill. Schurz immediately ordered his divisions to leave the field. The time was around four o'clock.  

The Third Division was still hotly engaged on both its flanks when Schimmelfennig received the retreat order. The regiments began to

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58 Ibid.
59 O.R., XXVII, Pt. I, 745; Schurz, III, 10; Hassler, 271.
60 Schurz, III, 10; Applegate, 215; New York at Gettysburg, 22.
withdraw in an orderly manner, firing at the enemy units which followed them cautiously. Schimmelfennig succeeded in setting up a line north of the town to cover the retreat. He placed a section of artillery at the point where the Mummasburg Road entered Gettysburg at Washington Street. A part of Coster's brigade moved up and joined parts of two of Schimmelfennig's regiments that he had rallied behind the artillery. Together, they confronted two enemy brigades which were pressing the retreating troops. The line put up a gallant fight and managed to check the enemy long enough for many of the men to enter the town relatively unmolested.\(^{62}\)

General Schimmelfennig remained in the rear, attempting to direct the protective cover for the retiring troops. By the time he entered the vicinity of Chambersburg Street, confusion was rampant. Horses, artillery, vehicles, disorganized men filled the streets in hopeless entanglements. He managed to work himself south to Baltimore Street where

\[\ldots\] he was crowded into a blind lane, and suddenly ran against a high fence, barring his progress, while some rebel infantrymen, in hot pursuit, were yelling close behind him. To clear the tall fence on horseback was impossible. He therefore dismounted and climbed over it. While he was on the top rail, his pursuers came up to him, and one of them knocked him on the head with the butt of his gun. The blow did not hurt him much, but he let himself drop on the other side of the fence as if he were dead, or at least stunned. Fortunately, he wore an ordinary cavalry overcoat over his general's uniform, so that no sign of his rank was visible. The rebel soldiers, thus taking him for a mere private, then passed him by. After a little while he cautiously raised his head and discovered \ldots a small stable or shed that might serve him as a temporary shelter. He crawled into it, and found a litter of straw on the ground, as well as some bread crumbs and other refuse, which seemed to have been intended for pigs. Soon he heard voices all around him, and from the talk \ldots he concluded that the rebels had taken possession of the town. \ldots There he lay, then, in his pig-sty, alone and helpless, surrounded on all sides by enemies who might have discovered him at any minute. \ldots He had nothing to eat except the nauseous scraps he found on the ground, and nothing to drink except the few drops that were left in his field flask. And in this condition he lay from the afternoon of the 1st of July until the early morning of the 4th. \ldots\(^{63}\)


The character of this retreat, like that of many of the Eleventh Corps' actions, has been described in a variety of ways. For a particularly disparaging account, see DeParis, 115.

\(^{63}\) Schurz, Reminiscences, III, 35–37.
As he lay there for two and a half days, General Schimmelfennig was tortured by hunger, thirst, and anxiety over the course of the battle. Night came and went, and he heard the roar of cannons and the musketry fire, and then silence. Night came and went again, and again the sounds of battle echoed from different points and at different times, neither advancing nor retreating. Silence—and then a mighty "Union cheer." 64

... Still, he was disquieted again by the continued presence of the rebel infantry around him, until late in the night he heard something like the passing around of an order among them in a low voice, whereupon they seemed quietly to slink away. Then perfect stillness. At the break of day he ventured his head out of the pig-sty, and finding the kitchen garden completely deserted, he went into the house, the inhabitants of which greeted him first with apprehension, but then, upon better knowledge of the situation, with great glee. 65

Thus did General Schimmelfennig spend the last two days of the most celebrated battle of the war. Circumstances had placed him once more in an unheroic situation, and the opportunity to remove the stigma of Chancellorsville passed by.

When the battle at Gettysburg was over, the Eleventh Corps again was to serve as scapegoat. This time, even its strongest supporters felt it would be best if it were dissolved. Two months later, it was transferred away from the Army of the Potomac to the Department of the Cumberland. Many of the brigadiers, although admitting the necessity of breaking up the corps, requested to remain with Howard. General Schimmelfennig, however, had had enough of the corps and its commander and asked to be transferred to some other active operation. Instead, on August 6, 1863, he was ordered to relatively inactive duty with the army besieging the rebel stronghold of Charleston, South Carolina. 66

Schimmelfennig reported to General Quincey A. Gillmore and was assigned to a brigade command on Folly Island, one of several sand-strip islands which framed the well-protected Charleston Harbor. At this time, the major Confederate defenses in the area

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 O.R., XXVII, Pt. III, 778-779, 785-786; Dyer, 318; Lonn, 197.
were concentrated in Fort Sumter and on James Island, both in Charleston Harbor. James Island, seven miles long, extended outward to the ocean south of the city. It consisted mostly of swamps and marshes interrupted by sand strips. In its interior, the Confederates had set up their defenses. Folly Island, Schimmelfennig's first assignment, was the longest of these sand strips and lay along the shore, separated from James Island proper by two miles of impassable marshes. Just north of it was another long, narrow sandy beach, called Morris Island, which extended four miles into the harbor itself. Its location made it of great strategic value to the Union army's siege operation in support of the naval blockade.67

The climate of the islands was anything but healthful. Brackish drinking water made dysentery a common occurrence. The swamps were infested with insects, and malaria was prevalent. During the fall and winter, the weather would be warm by day, but at night the winds, wet with ocean spray, would whip across the islands, soaking the troops and chilling them to the bone. In summer, the heat was unbearable. Cases of colds, pneumonia, consumption, dysentery, malaria, and sunstroke swelled the sick lists.68

Schimmelfennig remained in the Charleston area until the spring of 1865. His command moved him from one island to another. His tasks were tedious, his tactics insignificant; and his health was slowly deteriorating. His reports were a record of quiet frustration: patrols were sent out to neighboring islands; slaves came into the Union lines; enemy blockade runners ran aground and were destroyed by Union guns; enemy deserters were interviewed; two Negro regiments from Massachusetts had not been paid for more than a year and were becoming restless; the firing on enemy positions continued.69

69 Muster Roll, Department of South, First Separate Brigade, Apr. 30, 1865, Nat. Arch.; O.R., XXXV, Pt. I, 52–76.
Schimmelfennig's military tactics were generally those of harassment and involved two diversionary actions. On February 7, 1864, he was ordered to take 4,000 men and make a strong reconnaissance on James Island in such a way as to alarm the enemy and draw its attention away from a more important expedition being made against Jacksonville, Florida. Schimmelfennig carried out his assignment, but was not given precise instructions as to when his demonstration was to be made, how long it was to last, or the exact character of the main operation his movement was designed to aid. Hence, his attack was made too early to be of any use to the Florida drive.70

On July 1, 1864, Schimmelfennig organized another expedition against James Island. This time, his attack was supposed to draw the enemy defenders away from two prominent batteries, Fort Johnson and Battery Simkins, which controlled a harbor channel into Charleston. A second force was then to attack the batteries by boat. Schimmelfennig succeeded in diverting the enemy from its batteries, but the boat party did not attack in force because the officers in charge failed to act decisively.71

In one of his official reports in 1864, Schimmelfennig summarized the nature of his operations and at the same time revealed something of his own frustration:

Ever since I have taken permanent command of this district it has been my aim to force the enemy to keep a larger force than my own on my front, this being my only means of co-operating with the more important movements of our armies in Virginia. By minor operations, heretofore reported, and as stated hereafter, I have succeeded in this. . . .72

A brief moment of triumph came, however, on February 18, 1865. The Confederate army in Charleston, fearing the approaching columns of Sherman's army, evacuated the city. General Schimmelfennig entered the city from his base on the islands and accepted its surrender.73

70 Ibid., 31, 469-470; McGrath, 91; Luis F. Emilio, History of the 54th Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1863–1865 (Boston, 1894), 157.
72 Ibid., 57.
73 Ibid., XLVII, Pt. II, 483–484.
Schimmelfennig remained in command of Charleston for only a few months. The South Carolina climate to which he had been exposed for almost two years had undermined his health. As early as November, 1863, two months after his first arrival, he had contracted chronic diarrhea and had to take a two-month sick leave. In August, 1864, he was again forced on sick leave. Then, weakened by the diarrhea he never overcame, he contracted tuberculosis. Although he returned to his command in time to enter Charleston, his health continued to decline, and on April 9, the day of surrender at Appomattox, General Schimmelfennig left South Carolina in a desperate attempt to recover his health.\(^4\)

With his wife and three children, he retired to Dr. Smith’s Living Water Cure Establishment in Wernersville, Pennsylvania, nine miles southwest of Reading. His physical condition was his primary concern, but there was another, related matter which greatly disturbed him. In those days, army pensions were given only to widows whose husbands had died on active duty. Since Schimmelfennig was his family’s sole means of support, they would be destitute if he should die after he was mustered out. With the volunteer army being rapidly demobilized, this was a real possibility. Fortunately for his peace of mind, Carl Schurz, his friend and former commander, was able to obtain a promise from Grant not to discharge Schimmelfennig “until he regained his health.”\(^5\)

On August 25, however, the blow fell. Whether Grant did or did not remember his promise to Schurz is not clear, but Schimmelfennig was mustered out of the service.\(^6\)

Two weeks later, on September 7, 1865, Alexander Schimmelfennig was sitting in a chair talking with his wife. Despite the depressing news they had received two weeks before, his mood was cheerful. In the middle of their conversation, he paused to take a drink of

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\(^4\) Dr. Pillichady’s Deposition, Nov. 6, 1865, *Nat. Arch.*; Schimmelfennig to Gordon, Nov. 25, 1863, *ibid.*; Dr. Pillichady’s Deposition, Nov. 24, 1863, *ibid.*; Muster Roll, First Separate Brigade, April, 1865, *ibid.*; O.R., XXV, Pt. II, 264-265; Muster Roll, First Brigade, Gordon’s Division, Department of South, November and December, 1863; January, 1864; Muster Roll, Northern District, Department of South, September, 1864, *Nat. Arch.*


\(^6\) F. Kapp to War Department, Oct. 31, 1865, *ibid.*
water. As he returned the glass to the table, he slumped forward in his chair and died. Two days later, the forty-one-year-old general was buried in the Charles Evans Cemetery in Reading, Pennsylvania.\footnote{Berks and Schuylkill Journal, Sept. 16, 1865; Schimmelfennig's Certificate of Death, Oct. 11, 1865, Nat. Arch. Several sources give short biographies of Schimmelfennig: Hermann J. Ruetenik, \textit{Beruehmte deutsche Vorkaempfer} (Cleveland, Ohio, 1888), 351; \textit{Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography} (New York, 1900), V, 419-420; John Howard Brown, ed., \textit{Lamb's Biographical Dictionary of the United States} (Boston, 1900-1903), VI, 635; William Kaufmann, \textit{Die Deutschen im amerikanischen Burgerkriege} (Munich, 1911), 549-550; Zucker, 337. These sources all incorrectly state his place of death as Minersville, Pa. The error can probably be traced to the Ruetenik account which has been the major source for the later writings. Actually, Minersville, about thirty miles north of Wernersville, is a mining town with no particular attraction for persons desiring a recuperative atmosphere. The only explanation we have for the error is that on Schimmelfennig's death certificate the "W" and "rn" in Wernersville are written similar to an "M" and "n," allowing the word to be easily read as Minersville by someone only vaguely familiar with Pennsylvania geography.}