BOOK REVIEWS


It is quite appropriate that Mr. Burt's book takes us, according to the index, from the book illustrator Edwin Abbey to the music patron Mary Louise Curtis Bok Zimbalist—with, be it added, one whole index column of Biddies in between. Mr. Burt is a novelist and poet, as well as a composer, associated with the Westminster Choir College at Princeton, New Jersey. The author's synoptic view of the history of Philadelphia music from the Hermits of the Wissahickon to Chubby Checker is excellent. So is his leisurely appraisal of the city's other cultural activities: literature, the theater, the dance and the fine arts. He has a feel for the Finer Things, as he would upper-casedly put it. He also has an ability to write perceptively and pungently, frequently with a well-turned phrase, often with gentle wit.

But it is difficult to write about Philadelphia from the outside. It is significant that Sidney George Fisher, whose diary Mr. Burt uses with telling effect, and the novelists from Francis Biddle and William Bullitt to Richard Powell and Livingston Biddle, were all steeped in Philadelphia, from its foursquare streets to its rambling suburbs. What they said had a certain vitality, like it or like it not. Something, however, happens to a city, a milieu, a society, or even Society, when it is looked at through a telescope as far away as Princeton, fitted with an editorial filter made in Boston. The image does not remain true. At one point the trees are out of focus and the forest is a blur; elsewhere we are shown nothing but the leaves. And what is most confusing, we are never quite sure whether we are in yesterday or today.

In art this might be called impressionistic, and it is in giving impressions that Mr. Burt has succeeded—the background of plain (Quaker) and fancy (Episcopalian), the paradox of the liberal-conservative and the conservative-liberal (Nicholas Biddle and Joseph Sill Clark), the city roots and the country blossoms, and the solidity of Family (so poignantly like The Forsyte Saga, with its builders, maintainers, ornaments, wastrels and rebels), despite the rise and fall of family fortunes. When you stand away from the picture it does, indeed, look like Philadelphia. There is the almost imperial purple of colonial Philadelphia, the second city of the British Empire, heightened by the Revolution and the Federal era, when Philadelphia was the first city of the United States. There is the gleaming white of
the Second Bank of the United States and of the pages of Carey & Lea's latest publication, all too soon smudged by the commercial rise of New York and the intellectual hegemony of New England. Then, there are the contrasting fire-reds and blacks of iron and coal giving color and contrast to the glorious decades before and after the turn of the century, when the University of Pennsylvania produced both all-American football players and all-American scholars, when Drexel was the peer of Morgan, and the Pennsylvania Railroad without peer. We see over all the grays and browns of the decline into shabby gentility (corrupt but contented), and flickering around the edges the rays of the mid-twentieth-century renaissance. It is an impressive picture, and, at a distance, from Boston, where the book was published, it may look like Philadelphia.

Yet, when we look closer, we are put off by the brush strokes, by the details which have been imposed so meticulously on an impressionistic study. The preciousness of capitalization looks ridiculous on a large canvas (and 625 pages, including bibliography and index, is a large canvas). Also, too cute by far are such neologisms as “Sidney Fishery,” and such corruptions as “architected” and—heaven protect us from the wrath of Dr. James Rush—“codiciled.” Intermingled with clear-cut epigrammatic statements is too much of what might be termed the greenery-yallery of a woman's-page writer. It is a shame, because it is obvious that Mr. Burt does not need the crutch of coyness.

Viewing Mr. Burt's picture from another angle, we are not quite sure what he painted. His subtitle would lead us to believe that he intended a sociological study, yet much of the material is historical. Part of the time we get the feeling that the specimen being dissected has long been dead; other times it seems that the lifeless object of our scrutiny has been whisked away and another, quite frisky, placed in its stead. There is some discrepancy, for example, between the statements concerning Society Hill, that "Actually only a few old houses in the area have been bought and restored thus far" by a "stalwart advance guard of Old Philadelphia pioneers" (pp. 365-366), and that "Literally hundreds of houses in this most venerable of Philadelphia's once fashionable neighborhoods have now been bought and remodeled, a few of them by Old Philadelphians" (p. 539). In the areas of medicine and law, for example, we find that Mr. Burt's telescope focused most clearly as the years receded in the past. Or to cite another field, banking after 1900 is blurred. To talk of Biddle and the Bank of the United States on the one hand, and Effingham B. Morris and the Girard Trust on the other, without differentiation, is to equate apples and pears. Commercial banking, the kind that puts the blood of money into the veins of industry, was something very different, indeed, from running a trust company, or it was until banks recently became all things to all men. The big bank of the last fifty years was the Philadelphia National, and the best and most imaginative banker Joseph Wayne (not mentioned by Mr. Burt). At the time quarterly statements are issued, the Philadelphia National is now
sometimes bigger than the First Pennsylvania Company (not mentioned by Mr. Burt, although by descent "First & Oldest"), and sometimes it is the other way round.

One is not quite sure whether Mr. Burt's thesis is that, in spite of the passage of years, change, and progress, Old Philadelphia controls pretty much of everything and that pretty much of everything is pretty much on its last legs, or, that, because of the passage of years, change, and progress, the controlling "Web" has been broken and things may get better. One may not be sure what Mr. Burt thinks, but the hard facts are that things are not what they used to be when Sidney George Fisher looked down his nose at his acquaintances, and they did run the city.

Philadelphia is a canvas far larger than the one Mr. Burt has painted, and we do not know what was pruned from the original manuscript, so it is unfair to complain about things left out. Yet, one can wonder if the selection (Mr. Burt's or his editor's) was the most revealing one. To dwell upon the unusual goings-on of the Rabbit, the State in Schuylkill, the Assembly and the City Troop is in the mid-twentieth-century to be somewhat precious. An examination of the rosters of their members would reveal that today only a small minority plays any major role in business, commerce, government, or culture. Mr. Burt forgets that, in an era of managerial power, boardsmanship has become more ornamental than influential. To say that the Gentry is still "the real owner and ruler of the city" is to be ridiculously anachronistic.

It is pedantic to complain about details in an impressionistic study, but one cannot help feeling that the detail work was careless and slipshod. In a book as expensive as this, it might have been expected that the author and/or the publisher would have taken the trouble to have the text properly edited. Mr. Burt should have been aware of the importance of this, since (p. 391) he writes: "Old Philadelphians are inclined to sniff at Kitty Foyle, as indeed they are apt to sniff at any book about Philadelphia, as the work of an outsider, or one who 'didn't know.' " Despite this insight, the book is replete with annoying, unnecessary errors.

This is no place to attempt a catalogue of them, but a few should be mentioned to illustrate the point. Much (too much?) is said about Biddies and Cadwaladers, but not always accurately. Clement Biddle was not Washington's aide-de-camp (p. 46); Anthony Biddle was never Deputy General of Pennsylvania (p. 55), whatever that is; General John Cadwalader was not Dr. Thomas Cadwalader's second son (p. 111). In his description of the old insurance companies, the account of the Contributionship dinners (p. 146) is archaic as of today, and the statement that the Mutual Assurance favors charitable institutions as risks (p. 148) just the reverse of the fact. The statement that banking did not make Effingham Morris and Benjamin Rush significant (p. 214) is, however, perfectly true; Rush was not a banker.
Errors of a different kind involve his moving the Falls of the Schuylkill several miles downstream to Fairmount Dam (p. 200); his twisting the statue of William Penn on its City Hall base (p. 361); his taking the center city bells from one building and putting them in City Hall tower (p. 388); his placing Girard College on Girard Avenue (p. 228), and the Ridgeway (not Ridgeway, Mr. Burt) Library at Broad and Catharine (p. 244). If Mr. Burt knows that no divorced person is present at the Assembly, he does not know its rules. Surely, the Schuylkill Expressway is not known as “Surehill” (p. 560), but as the Surekill Crawlway. Members of the Old Philadelphia elite, of whom he writes, may be surprised to learn that the most Social country clubs are the Merion, Philadelphia, and Germantown Cricket Clubs (p. 513), and not those which they believed were, Sunnybrook and Gulph Mills. They may also recall at least three other cabinet posts filled by Philadelphians in addition to the two to which Mr. Burt said they limited themselves (p. 129). One could go on and on. To conclude, Carpenters’ Hall is certainly not a labor union (p. 258), and neither is the Carpenters’ Company.

What we have been presented with is a picture of Philadelphia which has elements of truth and flashes of perception, made less valid because it was written on different planes of time, and too often vitiated by gossip as a substitute for history and by an overgenerous seasoning of errors of fact. Mr. Burt’s book will circulate widely because it is an appealing book and an attractive one. Why, oh, why, was it not more carefully edited and proofread? Surely, someone should have caught the twice-repeated error that the illustrated bust by William Rush was of Dr. Benjamin West; it was, of course, of Dr. Benjamin Rush.

The Library Company of Philadelphia

EDWIN WOLF 2ND


The author of this book is a naval architect who completed designs for the Mayflower II in 1956. He spent six years in research in order to make the replica of the Mayflower of 1620 a genuine reproduction of the vessel of the Pilgrims. In an earlier book, The New Mayflower, he told the story of his search for accuracy to conform to sixteenth-century construction standards, and of the actual building of the replica at Brixham, England. The vessel he designed proved her seagoing qualities by crossing the Atlantic under her own sail power.

This book is based on some of the incidental knowledge acquired by Mr. Baker in his painstaking study of the early maritime history of the colonies. He traces the naval architecture of the seventeenth century, especially the
earliest portion of the colonial period. He explains that the classification of vessels by sailing rig did not come into use until the middle of the eighteenth century.

As every reader of this magazine knows, the colonies had a well-developed merchant marine by the beginning of the American Revolution. For some years prior to 1775, colonial building yards had turned out well-designed ships, barks, barkentines, brigs, brigantines, schooners, and sloops. These classifications, based on the sailing rig of the vessels, had only been in general use for about a quarter of a century before the Revolution. In this volume, the emphasis is on four other types of sailing vessels which were first built and used in New England and elsewhere more than a century earlier: pinnaces, shallops, barks, and ketches. Although the word “bark” appears in both these lists, it had two different meanings in colonial times.

A shallop was brought to Plymouth in the Mayflower in 1620, in sections, stowed between decks. Apparently, the carpenter needed sixteen or seventeen days to put this shallop together and make necessary repairs after reaching Plymouth. The journal of Governor Bradford indicates that foul weather during the crossing of the Atlantic “bruised and shattered” the four quarters of the shallop. Some of the passengers may have slept on the sections, and their weight may have made repairs necessary. In 1624, a ship carpenter sent out from London built two “good and strong shallops” at Plymouth. A shallop, also brought out in sections, was used by Captain John Smith. There was nothing approaching uniformity in the building of shallops, and they varied greatly. They were work vessels, with one or perhaps two masts, simple sails, and they had no deck. Too large to be hoisted aboard the vessels of the period, some of the larger shallops had their own small boats.

Because of the hazard of an open vessel in relatively long voyages, the colonists at Plymouth converted a large shallop into a pinnace in 1626. They cut the shallop in two, lengthened her by adding a new section about six feet long in the middle, and decked her over. Thus, the pinnace had a deck which protected crew and cargo from the weather, and was narrower for her length than other types of vessels.

From the fifteenth century onward, the term “bark” defined a sailing rig in Europe: a three-masted vessel, with square sails on fore and mainmasts, and a fore-and-aft sail on the mizzen or aftermost mast. The colonial barks of the seventeenth century were classed by their hull form. The word “bark” was so used to denote a vessel, and was derived from the Latin barca, and barque. Folding plans for a 1640 bark are included in the book.

Another type of vessel called a “snow” had two masts square-rigged and a fore-and-aft sail on a third mast stepped about one foot abaft the mainmast.

In the journal of Governor Bradford he refers to a “catch,” later spelled “ketch.” By 1697, there were sixty fishing ketches operating from Salem, Massachusetts. They were small, decked vessels, with a relatively tall
mainmast nearly amidships, and a smaller mast aft. Generally, they were roomy vessels with good cargo space, and a flush deck.

This book should interest almost everyone who has a liking for sail or for colonial history.

Naval Historical Foundation
Washington, D. C.

John B. Heffernan


On page 6 of his book, Noël Hume states that "the techniques of archaeology can be usefully practiced on any site, no matter how recent it may be, if by digging something up we can hope to learn more than is to be discovered from written sources." In the succeeding pages of his book, he demonstrates this thesis with rare scholarship and exceptional humor.

Noël Hume brings to his task a background in history and archaeology that is unusual in this country where, almost to a man, professional historic sites archaeologists have been recruited from the field of anthropology. The opening chapter of Here Lies Virginia is as clear a statement of the whys, wherefores, and hows of historic archaeology as I have seen. Historians who still tend to be skeptical about the utility of archaeology in the study of history would do well to read Chapter I carefully.

Succeeding chapters consider the history-archaeology of Roanoke Island, Jamestown, Williamsburg, and Yorktown; the great Virginia mansions of Rosewell, Corotoman, and Greenspring; the less grand, but no less important, sites of a plantation at Tutter's Neck, Raleigh Tavern, the Williamsburg theater and jail, and churches at Jamestown and Williamsburg. Chapters VIII and IX consider colonial glassmakers, iron furnaces, pewterers, potters, silversmiths, cabinetmakers, and printers.

Chapter X is a study of the most characteristic artifacts recovered in colonial sites—clay tobacco pipes, glass bottles, drinking glasses, and pottery—and an illuminating explanation of the uses to which they are put in archaeological research. Here is no apology for the archaeologist's well-known, and often derided, concern with artifacts, but a clear and concise exposition of the value of these cast-off bits of trash in historical study.

The book concludes with a list of sources and an index. The illustrations, chosen with care, add immeasurably to the reader's enjoyment.

Besides its obvious value as a sound scientific record of archaeological labors in Virginia, this book is a constant delight to the reader. It is replete with tales both strange and amusing. For example, there is the discovery of foundations of the original church in Bruton Parish through the efforts of an unusual lady in search of "the key to the authorship of Shakespeare's plays
as well as proof of Francis Bacon’s right to the throne of England.” Noël Hume’s story of his discovery, first in London and later in Jamestown, of bottle seals belonging to the same person is unusual enough, but add to that the fact that these bottles may be the oldest English wine bottles yet identified, and you have an improbability of the first water.

Noël Hume, understandably, gives a great deal of credit to Colonial Williamsburg for the development of historic sites archaeology, but I suspect some of the less creditable actions and attitudes of that organization have been glossed over. His own unquestionable integrity, ability, and scientific method have done more to elevate the status of archaeology in Williamsburg research than did all the “historians, architects, draftsmen, engineers, and building foremen” who, along with one Egyptologist, served before him as “archaeological directors.”

I, understandably, would question his somewhat severe criticism of the National Park Service for sending pre-historians to work in historic sites. Historic sites archaeologists are few and far between, as Noël Hume himself notes, and even the National Park Service cannot always lay hands on a sufficient number. No bumbling bureaucracy is involved—it is a matter of using available resources to do what must be done.

Those of us who have labored long in the cellars and gardens of our ancestors owe Noël Hume a vote of thanks for his beautiful exposition of our science. This book belongs on the desk of every student of colonial history or archaeology, and it will prove fascinating to any reader with a general interest in our past.

National Park Service
Washington, D. C.

B. Bruce Powell


In a Boston newspaper in 1722 a sixteen-year-old boy—Silence Dogood, he called himself—poked fun at Harvard College. It was, said he, a pretentious “Temple of Learning,” where young blockheads learned “to carry themselves handsomely, and enter a Room genteely,” but graduated “as great Blockheads as ever.” Thirty years later, in 1753, that college granted him an honorary degree, saying in its academic Latin: “Philosophiam locupletavit, unde apud Doctos non in Britannia solum verum etiam in Gallia Fama Eius percrebuit, et Ipse de Orbe litterato optime meruit . . . (He has enriched philosophy, whereby his fame has increased among the learned, not in Britain only but also in France, and he himself has deserved very well of the world of letters . . .). These five volumes of the superbly edited,
magnificently printed Papers of Benjamin Franklin tell the story of his rise to provincial and international fame. Later, Franklin would retell this story in the mellow light of memory in his Autobiography. (Soon, we are told, we shall have from New Haven an edition, separately printed, of that fine essay in reminiscence.) But here we have the story as it unfolded, with all the helter-skelter urgency and immediacy of a man living at once the lives of a printer, a politician, a postmaster, a military man, a natural scientist, an almanac writer, a newspaper editor, and a civic reformer.

It is, of course, a great story, and somehow it becomes even greater than one had imagined when one reads all these original documents. We have always known that Franklin led many different lives, but when one reads his papers in their chronological order, one realizes that he lived all those lives simultaneously. Take the last six months of 1754. He wrote out the final draft of the Albany Plan of Union, he commented to Peter Collinson in England on Giambatista Beccaria's book on electricity, he wrote to Jacques de Romas, a French physicist, on lightning, he dealt with William Strahan of London about printing equipment which had not arrived, he signed the deed of trust for the Loganian Library, he was managing the first lottery for the Academy of Philadelphia, he wrote to Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts about the Albany Plan, he sent James Bowdoin of Boston a "philosophical pacquet," he wrote out a plan for settling two colonies in the Ohio Valley, and he told Collinson that all the colonial assemblies had seen the Albany Plan, but that as to "the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are presently distracted." The best Franklin biographer, even Carl Van Doren, just cannot give one the sense one gets from reading the papers in their chronological order of the almost kaleidoscopic multiplicity of his life.

In July, 1756, Franklin wrote to George Whitefield that he was in "the last Act" of his life. Actually, he was then barely halfway through his long career. Six volumes contain the papers of his first fifty years. If the editors contrive to limit this series to forty volumes (I doubt that they will be able to do it), the papers of his remaining forty-four years will occupy thirty-four volumes! Nevertheless, the five volumes here reviewed contain an amazing number of his best-known writings. Here are his "Drinker's Dictionary," his "Proposal for Promoting Useful Knowledge," his account of the "Franklin stove," "The Speech of Miss Polly Baker," his "Plain Truth," his "Advice to a Young Tradesman," his "Proposals Relating to the Education of Youth in Pennsylvania," his "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind," the "Albany Plan of Union," "A Parable against Persecution," many papers on electricity. And hundreds of letters, written by an incomparable letter writer. Having read more than 3,000 pages of Franklin's papers, I am almost persuaded that he could never write a dull word.

As one who has written hundreds, and read thousands, of footnotes, I should like to digress briefly on that form of literary composition. I know of no college or university that offers a course on the writing of footnotes.
Yet it is distinctly an art. I, for one, am always disappointed when I look down to the bottom of a page and find there nothing but *ibid.* I am annoyed, on the other hand, when I start reading a footnote and find that it goes on for several pages, occupying space that ought to be given to the text. A footnote should tell you something that you want or need to know. I seldom want to know *ibid.* Or, for that matter, *op. cit.* Neither do I want, in the middle of an interesting text, to take time out to read a little essay on some subject which the author or editor wishes to pursue; such essays should be abbreviated or consigned to an appendix or printed separately or kept in the editor's box of notes.

This little essay (too long for a footnote) is designed to lead up to the statement that Dr. Labaree and his assistants are masters of the art of footnote writing. They know when a footnote is necessary. They know how to pack the relevant information into a brief note. They know what kind of information should go into the explanatory headnote before the document. And they know how to write. Their footnotes are both helpful and interesting. I suppose their editorial labors are chiefly of three kinds: rounding up the documents, printed and manuscript, establishing and transcribing the accurate texts, and providing a full annotation. It almost goes without saying that they have carried out the first two assignments with superb skill and patience. I should like to say that they have done the third job with surpassing excellence. Ever and again, after reading one of their masterly footnotes, I have said to myself: "I wish I had written that." This may not sound like high praise, but that is what it is intended to be.

Throughout the first five volumes one detects the fine scholarly hand of Dr. Whitfield Bell. He has now come back to Philadelphia, to Franklin's American Philosophical Society. But obviously he has in Mr. Ketcham a worthy successor, working under the wise direction of Dr. Labaree.

*Swarthmore College*  
**FREDERICK B. TOLLES**


This volume collects the chief documents dealing with the political and governmental causes for the American Revolution. Fully rational in approach, this work brings together between the covers of one volume most of the documents, British and American, which illuminate the causes lying behind the movement for independence. The debates of the British Parliament, the speeches in the several American provincial assemblies, the adoption of the Stamp Act and other ordinances, all are here brought together in exact quotation from the documents, with appropriate comment by the author. Here we have a work which treats the American Revolution
as a change in human ideas and as such it can document one aspect of the causes which led to it.

Seen in this light, this work will serve a useful purpose. It will document the expression of the revolutionary spirit in America and of the opposing mood in Britain with careful and accurate diligence. This by no means treats of the causes of the Revolution. Governmental ideas are reflections of, not stimuli to, revolt. The real causes for the American Revolution lie much deeper in the human spirit. These this work does not document, although, we believe, the source materials for these moods are available.

Therefore, much has been overlooked. There is in this volume precious little from the contemporary newspapers, either British or American, and the Gentleman's Magazine, with its unusually full reports of parliamentary and American affairs, has been missed. Moreover, the balladry and poetical literature has been completely ignored, although these mirror the revolutionary spirit far better than parliamentary debates. Then, too, the sermonic materials, which for that period are especially germane, were also ignored—preachments of men like the Reverend Zubly of South Carolina and the Reverend Mr. Duché of Philadelphia. The so-called Mecklenberg Declaration of the settlers in western North Carolina also does not appear. On the whole, this is another of the rational interpretations of the American Revolution which bring less light on the subject than we might desire.

One more note. The mechanical production of this book leaves much to be desired.

Haverford College

JOHN JOSEPH STOUDT


Mrs. Treacy has written an excellent account of the campaign in which the army commanded by General Greene frustrated the efforts made by a British army commanded by Lord Cornwallis to restore "the King's peace" in North Carolina. The story of the campaign has already been told, however, in such fine books as Professor Theodore Thayer's Nathanael Greene, Strategist of the American Revolution (1960), and Professor Don Higginbotham's Daniel Morgan, Revolutionary Rifleman (1961). Mrs. Treacy has not been able to add many details to the information which Professors Thayer and Higginbotham have already brought to light. She has written a well-organized and eminently readable account, however, and has formulated an interesting and rather convincing explanation of Greene's inability to win battles or to inspire his soldiers in the manner which worked so well for Daniel Morgan at the battle of Cowpens.

The title of Mrs. Treacy's book arouses the reader's hopes for an explanation of the way in which Greene's campaign prepared the way for Corn-
wallis’ downfall at Yorktown. But the author has given no explanation of Cornwallis’ decision to march into Virginia, other than her statement (p. 202) that the earl “had had enough of Greene and the Carolinas.” His lordship had been ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to make sure that his bases in South Carolina were safe. Mrs. Treacy owes it to her readers to give some explanation, other than a general weariness of facing Greene and of campaigning in the Carolinas, of Cornwallis’ decision to march into Virginia with his entire army at a time when Greene had commenced the piecemeal reduction of the British posts in South Carolina.

Mrs. Treacy’s narrative ends abruptly in April, 1781. Cornwallis had just completed his retreat to Wilmington, North Carolina, at that time, and Greene had just commenced his invasion of South Carolina. Why did the author bring her account of the campaign to an end at such a moment of decision? It would have been logical for her to have continued her story of Greene’s campaign through the battles of Hóbkirk’s Hill and Eutaw Springs, and the sieges of British Forts Watson, Motte, and Granby, and the forts at Augusta and Ninety-Six. It would have been logical, too, for the author to have continued her account of Cornwallis’ fortunes and misfortunes until he had led his army from North Carolina to the shores of Chesapeake Bay.

Prelude to Yorktown is well-organized and well-written, and is based on painstaking research in the Clinton Papers and the Greene Papers in the Clements Library at the University of Michigan. Its author would have been able to shed more light on Greene’s campaign as a “prelude to Yorktown” if she had carried her story of Cornwallis’ activities at least as far as May, 1781 (when the earl’s army arrived in Virginia) and her narrative of Greene’s campaign down to the battle at Eutaw Springs in September of the same year.

Lehigh University

George W. Kyte


This work illustrates what may happen when an old problem meets a new technique. The problem is that anathema of biographers and compilers, the barren period from which few personal papers have survived; the technique is the publish-it-all policy made famous by Julian Boyd with Jefferson material and now being carried forward in a dozen compilation projects.

Mr. Hemphill has met the problem forthrightly. He asserts that since Calhoun was “personally responsible for every one” of the official transactions of the War Department at this time, “every record of the Depart-
ment's business during those years is a 'paper of John C. Calhoun,' regardless of all questions whether he ever wrote it, signed it, received it, read it, or even knew or suspected its existence." Under this generous doctrine, which seems to the reviewer to have fearsome implications for the history profession and its practitioners, Mr. Hemphill has selected and published, usually in abstract form, some three thousand letters and papers that came to or went from the War Department in this period, of which three thousand papers "fewer than a dozen" were written and signed by Calhoun personally. These few, along with others the editor feels are important or interesting, are reproduced verbatim. The result of this procedure is a sample documentary of the first thirty-five weeks of Calhoun's incumbency of the office of Secretary of War, specifically from December 8, 1817, to July 31, 1818.

The scholar doing research in Indian or army history will find much here, and the dogged pursuer of some minor figure, some petty agent or functionary, may catch his name amid the "welter of official routine." For the rest, the book relentlessly reproduces the daily correspondence through which one department of an early nineteenth-century democracy strove to administer an imperial semiwilderness. Papers stream to and from the Secretary's office on Indian, quartermaster, or ordnance problems. They teem with personal entreaties, advice, reports, rumors, complaints, official rulings, personal charges, technical specifications, appointments, discharges, and directives on everything from the conduct of military campaigns to the color of uniform belts.

Occasionally, a thread can be followed: the reorganization of the army staff (a solid Calhoun achievement), the Seminole campaign (incidentally illustrating Jackson's tinderbox personality and the administration's placatory, if not very clear, attitude), or the querulous determination behind the Indian removal policy (in which a pair of Calhoun letters illustrate his cast-iron but not disinterested intellect at its condescending worst). The origin of the Calhoun-Jackson imbroglio over the Florida invasion remains obscure. What little emerges in oblique references reflects an administration eager to close the war at whatever cost, but usefully, perhaps purposely, vague as to details. The crucial Cabinet discussions are not supplemented or illuminated.

Mr. Hemphill's eighty-three pages of preface and introduction form both a useful background to the papers and an interesting commentary on Calhoun. The editor discusses the neglect of this period of Calhoun's life by various biographers and presents his own estimate of the importance of these seven months. He deals with the background of the Cabinet appointment, the operational patterns of Cabinet and War Department, Indian affairs, the Seminole War, and with Calhoun as an administrator. The editorial work throughout is as meticulous and professional as one would expect from this experienced scholar. Herein the book is a worthy successor to the late Professor Meriwether's first volume.
As to its contribution, the book, as the author admits, is obviously more valuable for the history of the first Monroe administration than for a Calhoun biography. About the man himself, little emerges that is new. Inferentially from these papers and letters, Calhoun's early nationalism may be confirmed, his passion for orderliness and system illustrated, his confidence in the intellectual approach to public life underlined. The image of the young man with more head than heart is not changed, and if he is not, as Mr. Hemphill insists, a "young man in a hurry," he is at least not yet a patient elder statesman.

Not much more can even be inferred. This is a well-edited documentary of early governmental operations, but while it may show what occupied Calhoun's many hard administrative hours, it cannot show how he thought or why he behaved as he did. The routine correspondence of his clerks is no mirror of the statesman.

Rice University

William Masterson


Despite the work of the Handlins, Louis Hartz, and others, there exists a continuing need to direct the attention of American historians to the close relationship existing between government and economic development during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Nathan Miller has succeeded admirably in analyzing certain aspects of the economic growth of New York State during the Canal Age, as he has sought "to investigate some of the ways by which the state of New York furthered economic development within its borders between 1792 and 1838." Emphasis, understandably, is placed on the development of the Erie and Champlain canals because of the "useful and workable record" made available by these projects, and because the scale of these ventures "marked a turning point in the tradition of state intervention."

Especially important is Miller's emphasis on the use of the Canal Fund. He points to the tendency of historians to overlook the Fund in favor of more spectacular developments, but he leaves no doubt of how deeply involved the Canal Fund was in the economic development of the entire state. Indeed, to this reviewer, the most impressive portions of this volume are those sections (the third and the fourth) wherein is discussed the major role played by the Fund, a role required to a large degree by the shortage
of capital in an underdeveloped economy and one producing the interesting situation (not unlike some in our own times) of canal commissioners "who were first and foremost politicians"—"as reluctant a group of bankers as the world had ever seen"—becoming "burdened with large economic responsibilities." Thus, quite obviously, this study goes significantly beyond the usual treatment of canal building in New York, to analyze not only the failure of both private development of such enterprises and of federal assistance, but especially to demonstrate the great extent to which canal development became a major source of capital in the remarkable growth of the state after 1815, whether through loans and deposits for state banks, through helping to counteract the contraction of 1834, through meeting the relief and reconstruction needs of New York City following the great fire of 1835, or through lending the credit of the Canal Fund in the financial crisis following the Panic of 1837.

Miller's thoroughly researched study has many strong points, and it is a model of effective organization. Were it not for the extensive footnoting and the extensive bibliography, the smoothness of the presentation might obscure the hard work which the study certainly required. Effective, too, is attention directed at the pragmatic nature of many of the policies which were developed. It is true, thanks to the persistence of the mercantilistic tradition, that "The public works program that the state inaugurated in 1817 represented ... an enlargement rather than a departure from its customary activities." And throughout it is stressed that "the fact that ascribing economic functions to state governments was widely acceptable." But the essential point is that the state moved into the canal building business when other possibilities had faded and, further, that the Canal Fund in fact became a development bank for the state because the critical shortage of capital in the state required it. Notable, too, is Miller's observation that "the record indicates that the large part that the state played in the economy was compatible with a concurrent development involving the extension and strengthening of institutions of democracy."

In summarizing the basic meaning of the New York experience, Miller concludes: "The ultimate objective for making use of the state in order to advance economic development was to create a more favorable economic environment for inhabitants of the state." And the very modern nature of the experience is suggested in the final sentence: "If, however, the state could mitigate some of the larger and more persistent difficulties of economic development, citizens of New York saw no reason why their government should not assist them in the effort."

This study is a valuable addition to those others which seek to clarify the continuing problem of the nature of the relationship between government and the American economy.

*Muhlenberg College*  
*John J. Reed*

When David Kaser published Messrs. Carey & Lea of Philadelphia in 1957, he promised an edition of the cost book in lieu of an appendix. He has made good his promise. Reproduced verbatim from the disorderly looking manuscript preserved in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, the documentary record gives us the skeletal facts—down to the tiniest bones, or, to abandon the metaphor, the half-cents—upon which much of the earlier history of the publishing firm had been constructed.

Without attempting a résumé of that history, it should be pointed out that Carey & Lea (first H. C. Carey and I. Lea, then Carey, Lea and Carey, for a while Carey & Lea, and finally Carey, Lea & Blanchard) during its career from 1822 to 1838 was, under the imaginative and energetic direction of Henry C. Carey, the largest, most important publishing house in the United States. The Cost Book records the technical and financial details of the major portion of that period of supremacy, the beginning of the rough-and-tough, cutthroat competition for best sellers in this country. True, the drama of the race among American publishers for the first copy of the latest novel by Sir Walter Scott cannot be read into the statistics of production, but the amazing success of The Pickwick Papers, for instance, needs little further commentary as we see the increase in the size of the printings of successive parts and the staccato entries of new editions of those previously issued.

Reprints of English books were inexpensive to issue, for no royalties were paid in this era before an international copyright agreement. An exception, however, should be noted: Scott was paid £295 ($1,475) for the copy of his Life of Napoleon. Yet, this was but a small fraction of the total cost ($20,767) of the edition of 12,250 copies, which was calculated to net the firm a profit of a little more than a dollar a copy, if all were sold. The works of most of the now famous English authors whom Carey & Lea were the first to introduce to an American audience were more modestly produced. The seven hundred and fifty copies of Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice cost $351.48.

On the other hand, the books of the two American giants, Washington Irving and James Fenimore Cooper, were a greater risk. Cooper received $5,000 for The Red Rover and the firm figured it would just about break even on the first printing of 5,000 copies, although subsequent printings would bring in a profit. Irving was paid $4,750 for the rights to The Conquest of Granada, a substantial part of the cost of the first edition ($7,607.97). Here, in the raw dollars-and-cents of cost, is a chapter of the history of American literature.

Other miscellaneous facts emerge. Carey & Lea was the chief source of medical texts in the country, and the most prominent Philadelphia physi-
rians—William E. Horner, John R. Coxe, William P. Dewees, Caspar Wistar, William Gibson, and Robley Dunglison—wrote and edited books year after year, receiving up to $1,000 a volume for their work. Of the seven hundred and fifty copies of the third edition of the American Atlas, three hundred copies were destined for sale overseas, two hundred for Miller in London, and one hundred for Bossange in Paris, which exports were expected to recover all but $235 of the $4,052 cost. The single most expensive item in the production of Lucien Bonaparte's American Ornithology was the coloring of the plates: $1,125 of a total cost of $4,278.50 for the first volume, and only slightly varying proportions of the total for the other three volumes. The markup was high: the 11,000 copies of Albert Gallatin's Considerations on the Currency and Banking System cost about ten cents apiece, and were sold wholesale, presumably to Nicholas Biddle, for twenty-five cents apiece. The first work of Dickens' issued by the firm was Watkins Tottle, and the second, The Tuggs's at Ramsgate, both parts of Sketches by Boz. Fanny Kemble was paid $2,200 for her "scandalous" Journal, first printed in an edition of 8,000 copies; George Tucker got $2,000 for his Lift of Jefferson printed in an edition of 2,000; and Robert Montgomery Bird and John Treat Irving for Nick of the Woods and The Hawk Chief, in editions of 3,000 and 1,500 respectively, received no advances.

Kaser's volume, in addition to a complete transcript of the entries in the main cost book, contains a supplement of other books issued by the firm which they bought as packages from printers or other publishers; separate cost records of the gift book, The Atlantic Souvenir—the pioneer fancy annual of America—and three periodicals; and a list of the printers employed by Carey & Lea. For the bold outlines of the story, see the author's earlier volume; for the details, frequently fascinating, use the Cost Book. In 1827, Carey, Lea & Carey printed seven hundred and fifty copies of a translation of Martinet's Manual of Pathology, a 324-page volume which cost $303.01 for the edition, bound. They expected to sell the book for sixty-seven cents and net just under $200 on their investment. The present valuable book, of approximately the same size but admittedly of more difficult composition, is reproduced by photo-offset from a typescript and sells in that economy format for $10.00. Sic transit aestimatio pecuniae!

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EDWIN WOLF 2ND


The Coming Fury, the first volume of The Centennial History of the Civil War, described the forces and people which split the country and brought the Confederacy ephemeral victory at Bull Run. This second
volume carries the history forward to 1863. In it, Bruce Catton centers his well-written account on two themes—the shift from limited to massive warfare, and the addition of freedom as a purpose of the conflict.

Before and after Bull Run the contestants fought a series of little wars in border areas. In these, the North won Missouri, Kentucky, and forty-five counties of Virginia, while the South retained the southern Appalachian Mountains, a region inhabited mainly by Unionists. Northern territorial gains prevented stalemate, thereby moving the little war a step toward big war. For months after Bull Run, Northern energy was spent in rededication, in organizing armies, in amassing matériel. Then the Union struck at the weakness of the Confederacy, a territory so vast that it could not be defended everywhere with the manpower and supplies at the South’s disposal. By putting pressure on many places, the federal forces punctured a country unable to meet all its vital commitments. Forts Henry and Donelson fell, coastal points in North and South Carolina were taken, and all but a few miles of the Mississippi River were conquered. At Shiloh the South made a supreme effort to recoup the losses sustained in Kentucky and Tennessee. It failed, and after failure the Confederacy fought to hold part of the Mississippi Valley, the region essential to victory. Grant unleashed in the West and an audacious commander in the East might have ended the war, and the Union would have been restored with its old institutions intact. But an overcautious general curbed Grant, and McClellan was checked because he underestimated his forces and overestimated those of Joseph E. Johnston and Robert E. Lee. The Confederacy was given time to reorganize, to ignore its basic doctrine of states’ rights and embrace the centralism it was fighting to avoid. As a result, the short, little war became a gigantic conflict.

By taking Richmond, McClellan, who detested abolitionists, could have defeated the scheme of radicals to make freedom a purpose of the war. Originally, the permanency of the Union was the sole justification for fighting. Throughout his administrations, Lincoln subordinated all other aims to this fundamental desire. In July, 1861, Congress gave overwhelming support to the Crittenden-Johnson Resolutions which blamed Southerners for starting the war and declared the national intent “to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired. . . .” The following month, John C. Frémont freed all slaves belonging to Missourians in rebellion. Lincoln countermanded the order, but neither he nor conservative congressmen could still for long the cry of freedom. The Committee on the Conduct of the War pilloried General Charles P. Stone for returning escaped slaves to Maryland owners rather than for his military incompetency. Thaddeus Stevens begged his colleagues not to rivet the chains of slavery but to inspire mankind with the ideas of liberty, equality, and the rights of man. Repeatedly, Lincoln suggested compensated emancipation in the border states, and repeatedly, the dull-witted owners of hu-
mans rejected his overtures. In July, 1862, Congress accepted a form of emancipation in the Second Confiscation Act. During the same month, the President asked Cabinet members to comment on a draft of an emancipation proclamation. For a time, he toyed with the impractical idea of colonizing freedmen. Then he issued the Emancipation Proclamation. With its promulgation, the war for union also became a great revolutionary movement involving the dignity, equality, and rights of man as well as of states.

Catton seldom wanders from his principal themes; economic and social affairs are virtually ignored. Briefly, he describes and admires the work of Stephen R. Mallory, the Confederate naval secretary; inconsistently, he censures Benjamin and Memminger while admitting that their failures were caused by the limited resources of the Confederacy. He spices his writing with excerpts from letters, pithy characterizations, and dramatic events. The result is interesting reading, a fresh account of the war presented by an artist in words and a historian willing to express opinion.

University of Florida

Rembert W. Patrick


To anyone who has followed, even in a general way, the writing of American political history over the last three decades, it is apparent that the literature now available is superior to the best product of the older masters. This impression is confirmed in reading the most recent contribution of Roy F. Nichols. It should be added at once that Professor Nichols has been one of the most important leaders in bringing to political history a keenness of analysis and sophistication, together with an adept use of the concepts of the behavioral sciences, that largely explain the advances for which we have reason to be grateful.

Building on his extensive and intensive researches in the history of the pre-Civil War decades which led to the tragic division of the Republic, Professor Nichols has given us in Blueprints for Leviathan: American Style a long-range historical perspective reaching back into English history. Moreover, his newest book succeeds, without any explicit admonitions, in suggesting the relevance of the story he tells and the analysis he makes to many contemporary issues, national and international.

This well-documented and engagingly written book is exceptional among the many volumes that have been appearing in these centennial years of the Civil War in having value and interest for both scholars and the general reader. Briefly, its thesis is that the Americans have shown a remarkable
penchant for reconciling liberty and order, and for meeting new situations by an ingenious resort to the legislative process of making written blue-
prints for the mechanism of the state which, borrowing from Hobbes, Professor Nichols terms "Leviathan." Building on the British experience of anticipating needs by drafting blueprints for commercial ventures and for political crises, the Americans have to an even greater extent, in their search for precision, made extensive and effective use of document-making when the alternative of force or intelligent compromise and adjustment presented itself. This is evidenced again and again in the colonial period, in the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitu-
tion, the Northwest Ordinance, the compromises of 1820 and 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Confederate constitution, and the revamped federal Constitution in the years following Appomatox. With clarity, the essential features of these instruments for meeting problems—territorial, political, and cultural—are set forth.

If much of this part of the book is familiar, something new and important has also been added. This can be summed up, I think, in Professor Nichols’ mastery of the underlying dynamics of the events which many historians have been satisfied to describe and narrate. He finds as the dynamics for the blueprints for Leviathan the fact of a population expanding into new areas; the cultural differences among the peoples in the several regions composing the Republic; and the conflict between intelligent desires to solve problems of order and liberty on the one hand rationally, and, on the other, through the irrational and emotional forces rooted in human nature. Within the broad context of dynamics, he brings to bear his knowledge of the relevant contributions of the behavioral sciences. No less important, Professor Nichols makes skillful use of a down-to-earth understanding of changes in the power-status of regions, the prevailing romantic and religious preoccu-
pations of the American people in the mid-nineteenth century, and the manipulation of rules, patronage, filibusters, and disciplined party organization in the state, nonetheless, of party flux. And lest one imagine that everything that was done was deliberately conscious, the analysis indicates how important unconscious factors proved to be.

Despite the complexity of the actuality, Professor Nichols succeeds, without any simplification, in presenting his findings and reflections in a lucid way.

Without minimizing the originality and ingenuity of Americans in making and adjusting blueprints to meet stiff and complex issues, Professor Nichols conveys the human and, in the case of the Civil War, the tragic failures. Yet balance is so nicely preserved that anyone reading Blueprints for Leviathan must take pride in the achievements of the American people and their leaders while at the same time appreciating the need in our own time of preserving and even improving on a great heritage.

**University of Wisconsin**

**Merle Curti**

We historians are notoriously unwilling to discuss the aims and methods of our mysterious craft. History is among the oldest of the liberal arts and yet perhaps the most poorly defined. At annual banquets of historical associations the audience characteristically shudders whenever the presidential orator attempts to elucidate the spirit of Clio. Accounts of historical methodology are few in number, and amateurish and superficial in content. Among American academics who see History as more of a science than an art, this situation is distressing. The Social Science Research Council has published two well-known bulletins (#54 and #64) in an effort to clarify historical working techniques. Now, in a third volume, the SSRC's Committee on Historical Analysis offers twelve essays on a crucial methodological problem, the historian's competence to generalize, "to derive concepts that are neither so limited in scope as to be trivial nor so comprehensive as to be meaningless."

Individual essays in this collection are full of interest and insight, yet taken collectively they demonstrate once again the unsystematic character of the historical discipline. All of the essayists agree that the historian can and must make limited assumptions and judgments, i.e., generalizations. They maintain that it is impossible to assemble historical evidence without making such assumptions and judgments, which should be as conscious and explicit as possible. On the other hand, they all strongly object to the pat simplicity of textbook generalizations, and they find Toynbee's grandiose generalizations to be pretentious and sterile. The cross section of scholars represented in this volume accurately reflects the American professional historian's search for a middle ground of limited syntheses and modest theorizing rising directly from close examination of the evidence.

But these essays also show how each historical field of specialization has its own peculiar methodological tricks of the trade; for instance, Classical historians, Chinese historians, and American Civil War historians have characteristically different notions of the term "generalization." Chester G. Starr expresses the Classical historian's highly restricted attitude. His preoccupation with factual accuracy and caution about explicit judgments reflect the strongly traditional, nineteenth-century German "scientific" scholarly heritage of Greek and Roman specialists. At the opposite extreme, Arthur F. Wright and Derk Bodde, both Chinese specialists, talk in very broad terms—frightening to a Western historian—of cycles, laws, and unifying principles. Roy F. Nichols, as a Civil War specialist, equates generalization with interpretation, and this reflects the bizarre state of Civil War studies in which Northern and Southern exponents are still reliving the conflict a century after the guns stopped firing.
It is, perhaps, not very surprising to find that only specialists in relatively recent historical fields, particularly twentieth-century American history, make much effort to adopt social science techniques when tackling the problem of generalization. But surely it is ironic to find Robert R. Palmer, in his scholarly writings the most ambitious and successful generalizer among the contributors to this volume, openly criticizing the SSRC committee's earnest effort to formulate techniques for historical generalization. Palmer teases the committee by claiming that the generalizations expressed in La Rochefoucauld’s *Maxims* “are as valid, useful and illuminating as any we are likely to get in social science, and as capable of empirical verification and scientific method.”

Louis Gottschalk had the unenviable task of editing this diverse volume, and he ties the proceedings together as neatly as possible with some concluding generalizations on generalization. Three of the twelve essays struck this reviewer as particularly valuable: M. I. Finley’s “Generalizations in Ancient History,” Walter P. Metzger’s “Generalizations about National Character,” and William O. Aydelotte’s “Notes on the Problem of Historical Generalization.” These gentlemen do not settle the issue of generalization, but they beautifully expose the flabbiness of most current efforts at historical synthesis and theorizing. Their essays should be required reading for every historical scholar and student.

*University of Pennsylvania*  

**Richard S. Dunn**


In 1940, the five-volume *A Dictionary of American History* was published under the general editorship of James Truslow Adams. Containing 6,425 articles, and accompanied by a good index, the publication was immediately recognized as an outstanding reference authority in American history. Although a “dictionary” rather than an encyclopedia, it included many relatively large “covering articles.” These offered fairly broad treatments of subjects, many details of which were elaborated upon in other articles to which the reader was directed by *quod vide* symbols. This system, combining the virtues of continuity and magnification of detail, along with bibliographical references, made possible the achievement of a comprehensiveness that was remarkable in a reference work.

After several years, obsolescence inevitably caught up with the *Dictionary*, and the publishers, in an effort to correct this, issued a sixth volume, or Supplement One, in 1961. The object was not only to include events which had occurred between 1940 and 1960, but to rewrite and extend old articles in the light of new research and from new points of view. The intention was laudable, but the results were not particularly satisfactory. The sixth
volume, in actual use, became an adjunct to rather than an integral part of a unified body of information, and the project as a whole suffered in a loss of compactness and unity. In general, the effect was one of improvisation born of expediency. If Supplement One were to have been followed by others, the fault of unwieldiness would have been seriously compounded. Whether or not the publishers recognized this difficulty, they soon decided to reproduce the entire work in an abridged form. The result is the Concise Dictionary of American History.

The task which faced the editors of the Concise Dictionary was a formidable one. Their objective, with the aid of one hundred and nine scholars, was to condense and make more readily usable the six-volume work in such a way as to retain its comprehensiveness, depth of treatment, and interpretative quality. When finished they had reduced approximately 7,000 topics to about 2,200. The operative criterion of selection was a determination of which articles were essential or basic for the general reader. With this guideline in mind, they eliminated many topics, condensed or extended some, regrouped others under more comprehensive headings, and reprinted still others without change.

After comparing the multivolume work with the concise version, one must happily conclude that the condensation, timely and eminently desirable, is generally successful. This is not to say that no one could quarrel with the space allotted to certain subjects or to the omission of others. For example, anyone who wants to read about the Anti-Horse Thief Association will have to refer to the original work. Although this omission may not call for a letter to the editors, it should be noted that the Anti-Federalists do not appear either, except in a secondary reference in the index. It might be argued that the revival of interest in that group, as attested by the increased number of scholarly works on them, would justify the inclusion of a separate article. Bathtubs, which warranted a half column in 1940, have suffered a clean sweep in the new version. Basketball, incidentally, has shrunk to one third its former size, while baseball has gained a whole column. One might go on almost indefinitely with comparisons of this nature, but to no good end. The editors themselves might find it hard to justify degrees of emphasis and the allocation of space in all cases, but the balance they attained is a reasonable one.

It is not to be expected that a condensation of this magnitude and complexity would equal the original in depth and variety of coverage; in this respect, the old work is by no means superseded. It is still a valuable reference authority, outdated as it is in several areas—but the general reader would do well to consult the concise version first. Although the student regretfully notes the omission of the quod vide guides and the bibliographical references, so helpful in the six-volume work, he must be grateful for a revision that is so well organized, indexed, modern in its interpretation and eminently useful.

Temple University

Harry M. Tinkcom

"It’s a shameful mess and Mitchell Palmer got us into it." The quotation has nothing to do with the Red Scare. It has no bearing on alien property. William F. McCombs, Woodrow Wilson's pre-convention manager and convention leader in 1912, later remembered making the statement in Baltimore at a critical moment when it was touch and go whether Wilson, Champ Clark, or somebody else would win the Democratic presidential nomination.

Palmer of Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D. C., was a controversial figure during most of his public life. Prominent in local politics, a three-term congressman in the time of Taft and in the days of the New Freedom, unsuccessful aspirant in 1914 for a seat in the United States Senate, he received 267½ votes for the first place on the Democratic ticket at the 1920 convention in San Francisco. Palmer is chiefly known, however, as a symbol of the "Great Red Scare." If persons other than experts in the period remember him for anything else, it is for his record as Alien Property Custodian and for secondary aspects of his twenty-four-month service as Attorney General in the second Wilson administration.

Mr. Coben entitles two chapters of this biography "The Red Scare" and "The Palmer Raids." As might be anticipated, these topics are treated in detail, the author declaring that "Palmer’s name is indelibly associated with violations of civil liberties, and to a great extent his reputation is deserved." But it is refreshing to note the strong effort to avoid stereotypes, to deal with less familiar aspects of Palmer’s career, and to do justice to gray and white zones of avowal and achievement as well as to those areas of action, language, and feeling for which the Pennsylvania Democrat has been repeatedly condemned.

The author, for example, underscores the legislation which Palmer advocated in the House of Representatives; much of it is usually found under labels marked "Liberal" and "Progressive." Palmer was mentioned as a presidential prospect before Wilson’s defeat of Clark in 1912, and there is a possibility that Palmer would have become the Democrats’ standard bearer that year if he had heeded the pleas of sanguine advisers. While it has long been known that the President-elect tendered the War Department portfolio to the Pennsylvania Quaker before offering it to Lindley M. Garrison, the nuances of the incident are sketched with particular skill. There is a contribution, too, in the account of Palmer’s roles on the Democratic National Committee and as distributor of federal patronage in his state. Thus, he was an important cog, and more than a cog, in the partisan political machinery of the Pennsylvania minority and of the country as a whole. If he was hurt by enmities like the one involving Colonel E. M. House, conversely he benefited from such warm friendships as those of Joseph P. Tumulty and Vance McCormick.

Mr. Coben does little if any ducking or dodging when confronted by what
is probably the most difficult question biographers face—the ever-recurring "Why?" Boldly, and perhaps too boldly, he deals with matters of motivation, expressing opinions with courage but (in the reviewer's judgment) not always with sufficient evidence. Does Coben know that ambition to occupy the White House was the reason, or the principal reason, for the switch in Palmer's attitude toward radicalism and civil liberties? Is Coben certain that, in an assertion connected with the alien property custodianship, "Palmer told this outright lie with great sincerity" (p. 145)? Can a biographer be so sure of his subject's motivation in instance after instance? Should a statement concerning sincerity and insincerity be so unconditional?

Such critical reservations are offered despite the fact that, in general, daring on the part of an author of such a study is vastly preferable to the mealy-mouthed performances of too many of the breed. Definitely to his credit, no one can fairly say of Mr. Coben that his scholarship is deficient in effort or in range. On the whole, his is a decidedly commendable volume, filling a gap in biographical literature and vividly re-creating significant segments of the twentieth century's stirring first quarter.

University of Kentucky

HOLMAN HAMILTON


One of the most fascinating chapters of American history is that dealing with the Indians and their fight for survival against the encroaching white man. These stories of heroism, of bloodshed, and of wild adventure have been grist for the historian, painter, poet, and novelist for many decades past. In this slim volume, Fairfax Downey, with the view of the historian and the romance of the novelist, has attempted to capsulize the major Indian wars from the opening of the American Revolution through the Civil War.

Beginning Cooper-like in upper New York State with his first adventure, Downey traces the labyrinthine paths of Indian-white difficulties through woodland and plain and, finally, into the region of the Rockies. In doing so, he leans heavily upon the methods of warfare engaged in by both sides, but only lightly touches the significant backgrounds of the conflicts he so vividly describes. While admittedly this makes for lively reading, it means that each episode leaves one with a sense of incompleteness. True, to have filled this gap completely would have meant composing a series of scholarly tomes. Yet one cannot help but feel that a short, accurate introduction to each action would not have been out of place.

The episodes themselves vary considerably in value of content and clarity of presentation. On the other hand, all of them suffer from lack of depth, or overgeneralization, or both. Unfortunately, Mr. Downey feels that some of his subject matter is so dull or his historical research so elusive
that he spices his narratives with quotations from the poetry of Robert Burns, reflections on Homer, and a mixing of contemporary servicemen's slang against a background of past military events. Too, he makes assumptions which are misleading as well as false: e.g., "Yet after he [Tecumseh] succeeded to the chieftainship of the Shawnees" (p. 83); the only chieftainship of Tecumseh was self-assumed.

The parts of the volume devoted to the Indian wars in the Old Northwest (with which this reviewer is most familiar) are so full of error and overgeneralization as to make the whole book suspect. Comments on the building and battle of Fort Recovery give an entire misconception of the true picture and importance of the events (pp. 64–65). Later the author refers to British Fort Miamis (which he incorrectly spells Miami) as on the site of present Toledo (it is in Maumee, Ohio). Likewise, he says that Wayne's night camps were entrenched. They were not; only redoubts and abatis were thrown up. Still, once more (p. 66), he speaks of Wayne being bothered by an old Yorktown wound, which is not so. The commander's "indisposition" resulted from being crushed by a falling beech tree during the construction of Fort Adams. (He later died from complications resulting from this accident.) Too, over and over again, the author fails to distinguish between cavalry and mounted infantry and, in scores of other ways, displays his lack of a firm grasp of either military tactics or historical facts. His comment that the Treaty of Greenville (misspelled Greenville) ceded all the tribal lands in Ohio to the United States is an example of a false and misleading generalization which exhibits a lack of even cursory research.

This reviewer's copy is literally and liberally sprinkled with marginal notes which, taken in toto, add up to what must be the volume's major criticism. The author has depended far too much, as the bibliography shows, upon secondary materials and has lacked a selectivity of these. His source materials constitute a poor minority and he has by-passed even such readily available standards as the American State Papers, the Annals of Congress, the Wayne Papers, the printed edition of the St. Clair Papers, the Jefferson Papers, the Harrison Papers, etc., all of which are to be preferred over secondary accounts. Moreover, he has failed to judge—or has not had sufficient depth of understanding to judge—the relative merits of his materials, primary or secondary, in order that his account may be both accurate and interesting.

Indian Wars of the U. S. Army, then, in this reviewer's eyes, can be considered as little more than a series of tales told traditionally; that is, a group of stories related without serious reference to historical fact and balance. True, even as they are, they are good stories, but, had they been told accurately and from a depth of understanding, they would be real contributions to our heritage of American frontier and military history as well as literal "hair-raisers." The job Mr. Downey has set out to do has yet to be done.

Kent State University

Richard C. Knopf
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