Numerous books and articles have been written about the Quakers' venture in Pennsylvania politics. Starting with Robert Proud, historians have tried to describe the efforts of a despised group of dissenters who went out to teach the world that friendly and pacifistic ideals could be made the guidelines and maxims for civil affairs. These historians—often like Proud, Bowden, Sharpless, Tolles, and Bronner themselves members of the Society of Friends—have narrated the efforts of Quaker politicians mainly in terms of positive or negative accomplishments. In their histories they were primarily concerned with the success or failure of the "Holy Experiment," of which probably the most conspicuous feature was the peace testimony of the Quakers. These historians had a

*I want to acknowledge the helpful criticism of Professor Edmund S. Morgan, James H. Hutson, and Richard Warch.


2 This holds true though with a variant degree of prominence which the peace testimony plays in the different authors' conceptions about the Quakers' political ideas for Charles P.
particular conception of the Quakers’ pacifistic principles in mind. It is the purpose of this article to ask, whether the historians’ understanding of the peace testimony, as the Quakers themselves called their pacifistic principles, is identical with the one held by Pennsylvania Quakers between 1681 and 1748. Upon the answer to this problem will depend the answer to a more far-reaching question: whether the acts and deeds of the Quaker politicians have been interpreted by their historians in terms congenial to conceptions held by these politicians in the first half of the eighteenth century.

According to Isaac Sharpless, the accepted authority on the history of the Pennsylvania Quakers, Quakers “refused all participation direct or, so far as they could, indirect in any war or warlike measures.” This phrase serves in almost all other books and articles as the satisfactory description of the peace testimony of the Quakers. Judging from the general frame of interpretation and reference, Sharpless and his disciples held that the Quakers unequivocally refused to fight. In the light of this position these historians then viewed the actions of the Pennsylvania Assembly as noble or stubborn resistance against endeavours of the various governors who wanted to induce Quaker legislators to adopt military measures.

Sharpless reports that in 1689 the Quaker members of the Provincial Council bravely rejected Governor Blackwell’s plea on behalf of the Crown for a militia. Four years later, in 1693, the Assembly voted funds only after the representative of the Crown (who tempo-


3 Sharpless, 14, 191.

4 Jenkins, I, 326, 360; Root, 225–226; Keith, I, 286, II, 491, 503–504; Davidson, 12; Bronner, 258; Tolles, 16–21; Boorstin, 48–50.

5 Besides the older authors this trend is especially obvious in Boorstin, chapter 8.
rarily had taken the government out of Penn's hands) assured it that "your money shall not be dipt in blood." Essentially the story remains the same for the next fifteen years: military measures were rejected or successfully converted to peaceful purposes in 1696, 1701, and during Governor John Evans' administration between 1704 and 1708.

In much the same manner, Isaac Sharpless interpreted the way the Assembly handled the Crown's request for Pennsylvania's contributions to the Canadian expeditions in 1709 and 1711. In 1709 "the assembly took effective measures," so Sharpless concluded his review of those proceedings, "to maintain their position with perfect consistency." After he had narrated the proceedings which led to the Assembly's vote of £2,000 provincial currency "for the Queen's use" in 1711, he hastened to add that "this money never aided any military expedition." Again the Assembly had been saved from disgraceful compromise.

This could not be said, so Sharpless felt, for the Assembly's actions in the fourth decade. After 1742, following the formidable battle with Governor George Thomas over the peace testimony, the Quaker representatives' "evasion was rather a bald one" in voting money freely to the King's use though they knew that it would be "dipt in blood," to use Governor Fletcher's words once more.

Sharpless offered two sets of explanations for the course of the Assembly in this decade. In the first place, the Quakers were, after all, only human beings, fond of power and pragmatic in their outlook. In addition, Sharpless felt that the political situation in the forties was indeed difficult and the pressures on the assemblymen heavy. Secondly, the author blamed a threefold split within the Society of Friends into "disciples of James Logan," whom he accused of undemocratic and militaristic tendencies; "men of spiritual power, whose voices exercised the prevailing influence in the meetings for business"; and, finally, "the 'Quaker governing class' who controlled the assembly and who, while admitting and commending the

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7 Ibid., 202.
8 Ibid., 206, 212; Colonial Records of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1851–1853), I, 400, herein-after cited as Col. Recs.
9 Sharpless, 204–206.
10 Ibid., 49, 231, 242.
peaceable doctrines of Friends, considered their own duty accomplished when they kept aloof from personal participation and supplied the means by which others carried on the war."\textsuperscript{11} Sharpless concluded his history of what he thought to be the end of the Quakers’ participation in Pennsylvania politics by arguing that in 1756 the sober part of the Society got the upper hand and showed the Quaker representatives the inconsistency of their actions—money voted for military purposes—with the peace testimony. “Spiritual power” combined with pressure exercised by the English government and the London Quakers in 1756 induced the faithful Quaker representatives “to resign their places [in the Assembly] as a consequence.”\textsuperscript{12}

This interpretation of the Pennsylvania Quakers’ politics has been more or less accepted by other historians. Particularly, they are agreed that the political role of the Society of Friends was terminated in 1756. Only recently, historians like Ralph L. Ketcham and Dietmar Rothermund have indicated their belief that the resignation of some Quakers from the Assembly in June and October, 1756, probably ought to be seen as an effort by the Quakers to retain ultimate control of the political situation.\textsuperscript{13} Both authors, however, accepted Sharpless’ classification of Quaker politicians into good and bad and retained this as their interpretative frame for the crucial events of 1756.

This interpretation of the Quakers’ political role in Pennsylvania raises a number of important problems. Is it, for example, safe to assume that Quaker politicians could abandon acknowledged testimonies without drawing upon themselves the severe censure of the church? Would not a split like the one seen by Isaac Sharpless have resulted in the fourth decade in severe tensions within the Society of Friends? How can it be explained that in the Epistles from the English Society of Friends and from the London Meeting for Suffer-

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 242–243.


ings these tensions and the deviation of a number of prominent Quakers were not mentioned, though these letters are quite outspoken about other matters? How, finally, can it be explained that the most prominent members of what Sharpless called the “Quaker governing class” were allowed to compromise one of the most important principles of the church and still fulfill functions within the meetings? For the fact has never been disputed that John Kinsey, for example, served the Assembly as speaker while he was the clerk of the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Furthermore, neither Isaac Sharpless nor any of the other authors has as yet produced any evidence besides the Logan letter of 1741 to support the theory that the Quaker politicians were split into opposing parties in the forties. These politicians were in that decade engaged in a bitter controversy with the proprietary party. Is it not likely that a split like this would have been exploited to the utmost by the Quakers’ political opponents? And yet there is little evidence that this was done. There is general agreement among historians that the Quakers constituted a minority of one third to one fifth in the colony in the fourth decade and that the political success of the Quaker Assemblymen at the polls was mainly due to a superb political machinery. Is it plausible that a religious group with divergent politico-religious opinions could sustain the pressure from within and without and still carry one election after another? There are so many inconsistencies in the interpretation hitherto accepted that a new approach to Pennsylvania’s history, particularly before 1750, becomes imperative.

The interpretation of Isaac Sharpless rests foremost on a specific definition of the peace testimony and, for the forties, on the interpretation and significance attached to James Logan’s letter to Robert

14 The implied statements are based on a careful search of the Yearly Meeting Minutes for Pennsylvania and New Jersey (hereinafter cited as PYM), vols. I-II, Department of Records of the Religious Society of Friends, Philadelphia; the collection of letters and epistles which were exchanged between Pennsylvania and London Quakers before 1756 and are copied into the letterbooks Epistles Sent, vols. I-III, and Epistles Received, vols. I-III, Friends Reference Library, London, hereinafter cited as FRLL; likewise no pertinent evidence could be found in the London Meeting for Sufferings Minutes, vols. VI-XXX (FRLL), nor in vol. I of Epistles from the Yearly Meeting of Friends Held in London, To the Quarterly and Monthly Meetings in Great Britain, Ireland, and Elsewhere, from 1681 to 1857: With an Historical Introduction and a Chapter Comprising Some of the Early Epistles and Records of the Yearly Meeting (London, 1858).

15 For the evidence available see below.
“Jordam and the Others, the Friends of the Yearly Meeting . . . of 1741.” This “split-theory,” as I choose to call it, however, is again based on Sharpless’ definition of the peace testimony. It therefore seems appropriate to re-examine the Quakers’ peace testimony and its relationship to their political activities before 1750.

In the time of Charles II the Quakers were in an extremely awkward position. Deprived of fundamental civil rights, not to speak of religious ones, they were hunted down by informers who had an eye on the prizes fixed by the Cavalier Parliament for each jailed and convicted dissenter.

In the first two years after 1660 the situation was made particularly hazardous by two uprisings of the Fifth Monarchy Men. During this period the “Publishers of Truth,” the leading Quakers in that period, turned to ways and means to alleviate the burden and lot of their suffering brethren. Under the circumstances two measures were an absolute necessity. First, they had to prove to the world and to the English government that Quakers were loyal and peaceful subjects. Between 1660 and 1665, George Fox issued the most forceful testimonies about the pacifistic principles of the Quakers. As Alan Cole showed some years ago, these statements mark the beginning of the overall acceptance of the peace testimony of the Quakers.

Second, the Quakers had to convince the government, particularly its representatives on the local level, that the Quakers’ refusal to swear did not mean that they refused to acknowledge and support the state. They therefore repeatedly assured the public in printed

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16 James Logan, To Robert Jordan and the Others, the Friends of the Yearly Meeting for Business, dated Stenton, September 22, 1741. I have used the printed copy in the Pemberton Papers, III, 48, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, hereinafter cited as HSP. Sharpless, 227-230; Frederick B. Tolles, James Logan and the Culture of Provincial America (Boston, 1957), 154-156.

and spoken word that they were willing to serve the government—provided their consciences were not violated. They minced no words in stating the King's rights over his subjects.\textsuperscript{18}

In later years, the full meaning of the peace testimony with its implications and limitations became clear. The most important implications were that the Quakers \textit{personally} refused to take up and use arms or fight even without arms, but that they were nevertheless willing to perform duties of a semimilitaristic nature. For example, the unarmed Quakers in Barbados stood watch against the French and Spanish enemies. This was expressly approved by the London Six Weeks Meeting and by George Fox. On this occasion the Six Weeks Meeting wrote Friends in Barbados:

\begin{quote}
For if any should come to burn your houses, or rob you, or come to ravish your wives or daughters or a company should come to fire a city or town, or come to kill people, don't you watch against such actions? And won't you watch against such evil things in the power of God in your own way? You cannot but discover such things to the magistrates, who are to punish such things, and therefore the watch is kept and set to discover such to the magistrate, that they may be punished; and if he does not, he bears his sword in vain.
\end{quote}

Some years later, the Meeting and Fox supported the opinion of older Quakers against younger ones in Antigua as to the permissibility of fortifying places against enemy attacks.\textsuperscript{19}

In addition, while Quakers refused to pay the church tax, they did pay taxes levied for the support of military operations. This position was stated in very strong terms by the English Yearly Meeting in 1693 and was repeated the following year by the Pennsylvania Yearly Meeting. George Fox himself gave the following advice to Friends:

\begin{quote}
To the earthly we give the earthly: that is, to Caesar we give unto him his things, and to God we give unto Him his things. And so in the other Power's days we did not forget on our parts, though they did fail on their's . . . Which, if Friends should not do and had not done—give Caesar his due, and custom and tribute to them that look for it, which are for the punish-
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{19} Braithwaite, \textit{The Second Period of Quakerism}, 611, 620.
ment of evil-doers—then might they say and plead against us; How can we defend you against foreign enemies and protect everyone in their estates and keep down thieves and murderers?  

Moreover, the Quakers did not even in theory—as the quotation above indicates—deny the right of the state to defend itself against enemy attacks. Robert Barclay made the position of the church quite clear. In his famous book An Apology for the true christian divinity, as the same is held forth, and preached by the people, called in scorn Quakers, he envisaged a future state, in which princes would cease to have recourse to arms as a means to settle conflicts. In Barclay’s opinion there was, however, no doubt that this state would mark the beginning of the Endzeit (last days). It would only be reached if all the world embodied the true Christian principles, which were those of the Quakers, of course. At the same time, Barclay pointed out that, since this Endzeit was not yet come, it was permissible for governments not converted to the true belief to resort to arms. It is remarkable that John Smith, in his answer to Gilbert Tennent in 1748, stated that England’s war against France was approved by God because England was a God-fearing country. Smith’s pamphlet was approved by the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting. Finally, it was repeatedly stressed by George Fox and his fellow believers that it was the duty of the state to protect its subjects against “evil-doers,” lest the magistrate “bears the sword in vain.”

The peace testimony was linked, as the summary of its meaning indicates, to the Quakers’ testimony on government, their so-called “testimony concerning temporal government.” On the one side they perceived the government as installed by God; Fox more than once reminded Cromwell, and later Charles II, that it was God who had made them rulers. On the other hand, in accordance with St. Paul’s

20 Quoted in ibid., 601; the epistle of the English Yearly Meeting of 1693 is printed in Epistles from the Yearly Meeting of Friends Held in London, To the Quarterly and Monthly Meetings in Great Britain, Ireland, and Elsewhere, from 1681 to 1857, I, 72.
21 Printed in 1678.
Letter to the Romans, Fox and others proclaimed the sacred duty of the subjects to pay obedience to the government. Again and again, Fox and other leading Quakers stressed this necessity as a commandment of God. Yet he did not imply that the government could expect obedience under all circumstances. God himself was to be obeyed above men even if these had been given power by God. Again, after 1660, this was not to be taken as a permission to resist the government actively with force even if it had overstepped its powers and rights. The only way in which the citizen could properly safeguard his liberties against an encroaching power was to resist passively: a government which violated God's commandments and thus the citizens' rights was God's punishment for evil and sin. On the other hand, the Quakers kept reminding the King and his ministers that the sole justification of their actions lay in the furthering of God's kingdom on earth. In practical terms this meant the suppression of vice and crime, the punishment of the evildoers, and the encouragement of the virtuous. Penn was partly to incorporate this line of Quaker thought in his political theory under the term of "general religion." 24

This brief summary clarifies two important facets of the Quakers' relationship to the state. First, they did not bind the government to their pacifistic principles. While the peace testimony assured the government that no danger was to be expected from the Quakers, it contrasted on the other hand with the Quakers' demand for protection from the state. Second, the government in Fox's opinion never completely lost its character as an institution sanctioned by God. In a positive sense, the government was an agency of God, preparing the way for the expansion of His kingdom on earth. In a negative sense, the government could act as a harsh reminder of what hell would be. In the same sense that the devil was a dependent feature of the heavenly universe, the government castigated people by God's permission for their deviation from the right path.

24 The Journal of George Fox, II, 52-55. Fox criticized the Fifth Monarchy Men's assumption that resistance against a government which acted against God's commandments was justified by God, ibid., II, 12. His views on the government's obligations are expressed in his "Paper of G: fs to O.G. concerninge his makeinge people suffer for not takeinge ye oath of abjuration 1655," ibid., I, 192-194, and in "gff to olefer croumull 1654," ibid., 161-162. In his journal are printed numerous statements which reiterate this point. Barclay, Apology, 338, 346-349, 388-389. For Penn's theory see footnote 27.
It is obvious that the peace testimony of the Quakers, as described above, varies from the one used by Isaac Sharpless. He and the other authors who followed him overlooked the close relationship of the peace testimony with the Quakers' testimony on government. These historians did not realize that the peace testimony was restricted to the refusal to use arms or fight without them, and that it did not extend to measures which were indirectly linked to militaristic affairs like paying taxes in time of war or providing transport for an army. Following instead a conception of the peace testimony which was much broader and very much akin to present day conceptions of pacifism, they pleaded on behalf of the Quakers of the eighteenth century in nineteenth- and twentieth-century terms. In view of these facts the necessity becomes obvious to review prevailing interpretations of various events in which Quakers were involved. In the following pages an attempt will be made to examine the behavior of the Quaker Assembly of Pennsylvania during King William's, Queen Anne's, and King George's wars and measure its actions with the peace testimony as it was then accepted by the Society of Friends.

At the time the peace testimony was formulated, the Quakers had no thoughts of emigrating en masse or even of founding a state or a colony. To them it was not a contradiction on the one hand to refuse the use of arms for themselves and on the other hand to oblige the state to give them protection against enemies and evildoers. But the very moment the Quakers founded Pennsylvania, this contradiction put them in a rather difficult position: they rejected the use of arms; and yet as the keepers of a government they were, by their own theory, obliged to protect the citizens. Only so long as the one testimony clearly referred to the citizen and the other to a non-Quaker government did adherence to both pose no problems. The moment that both rulers and subjects were represented by Quakers conflict would inevitably result.

This conflict was sharpened by the provisions of section XVI in Penn's charter of 1681, and to some extent by Penn's political theory. Section XVI gave Penn the well-known powers to raise an army, exercise the powers of an army general, and declare war or conclude peace. Penn was doubtless obliged to accept this part of the charter simply because a refusal would have meant the loss of his
colony. But there is also the possibility that he made a sharp distinction between the private man, William Penn—who was bound by God's commandment to desist from using force—and the Governor in Chief of Pennsylvania, who was bound by God and the King to protect his subjects.  

In his political theory, and most particularly in his writings on liberty of conscience, Penn made a clear distinction between the religious and the political man. The one lived in obedience to the commandments of a higher Being, the other was subject to a ruler on earth. In this second capacity Penn insisted that ruler and ruled were bound by mutual agreement. This guaranteed rights and obligations to both parties and left the subject a certain amount of freedom and the rightful obligation to co-operate in and share responsibility with the government in some of the most important functions of a state. Penn based this system on his theory of a social contract.

This distinction would not imply that Penn justified or approved war. It is only valid in so far that he would have recognized it as his duty as Governor in Chief to protect his subjects. As a case like this never arose it is difficult to predict whether Penn indeed would have acted in such a way. A position like this would, however, help to explain a number of inconsistencies in Penn's behaviour which have been often pointed out by other authors. Penn was, so Edward Corby Beatty, William Penn as a Social Philosopher (New York, 1939), points out, an imperialist who "contemplated the conquest from the French of an imperial domain" (98); he devised or contributed to the formulation of a plan for the defence of the colonies (91–93); in 1694, Penn declared in writing the Lords of Trade his willingness to provide for the security of his colony (Col. Recs., I, 474); and in 1700 he asked the Assembly of Pennsylvania to consider the demands of the Crown for military assistance to New York.


Penn's political theory can be traced in his pamphlets The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience Debated and Defended by the Authority of Reason, Scripture and Antiquity (1670), printed in A Collection of the Works of William Penn. In two volumes. To which is Prefixed a Journal of His Life. With many Original Letters and Papers not before Published (London, 1726), I, 443–467; England's Present Interest Considered, with Honour to the Prince, and Safety to the People (1679), ibid., I, 672–705; An Address to Protestants of all Perswasions; more especially to the Magistracy and Clergy, for the Promotion of Virtue and Charity. In Two Parts (1679), ibid., I, 717–818; England's Great Interest, in the Choice of a New Parliament: Dedicated to all Her Freeholders and Electors (1679), ibid., II, 678–682; One Project for the Good of England: That is, Our Civil Union is Our Civil Safety (1679), ibid., II, 682–693; An Essay towards
Penn's distinction between the religious and the political man had a serious implication which he probably never realized: it implied the rejection of the Quakers' testimony on government because Penn restricted the governmental sphere solely to "earthly" matters. He postulated the directing of governmental affairs according to principles derived from human behavior and not—as the accepted Quaker doctrine and particularly the peace testimony and the testimony on government required—according to the dictates of the Inner Light. This distinction has likewise to account for Penn's promise to the Privy Council that Pennsylvania would give its contribution for the defence of the empire.

As mentioned above, Penn linked religion and state under the term "general religion." This somewhat syncretistic conception was aimed at the bettering of the public morale which was, in Penn's opinion, the necessary precondition to human happiness.  

A substantial part of Penn's political thinking was embodied in his first Frame of Government for Pennsylvania. Most important was his provision for liberty of conscience and with it the separation of church and state. Yet his endeavours were complicated because he as well as his brethren were obviously not prepared to run Pennsylvania on the accepted principles of the time. Particularly, the Anglican church emphatically rejected the peace testimony as a political principle because it referred in their opinion (to say it with the words of the Board of Trade in 1742), to "matters of Religion not to Affairs of Government."  

Time and again, the Quakers were

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the Present and Future Peace of Europe, by the Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament, or Estates (1695), ibid., II, 838-848.

The important point in question is Penn's insistence as a theologian that all laws derive their justification from God (cf. his preface to his first Frame of Government, printed in Votes, I, xlvi-xlvi) and his consistent argument as a politician and philosopher that "Men should hold their Liberty by true Obedience to Rules of their own Making," as he framed it in his Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe, II, 840.


28 The Frame has been often printed. I have used the version given in Votes, I, xlvi-lxiv. The question of authorship is fully discussed by Nash, 33-40. Nash does not suggest that either the preface or the provision for liberty of conscience were not written by Penn. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the province was rent in disputes over the peace testimony of the Quakers and over the question of whether the Quakers were allowed to
told that the denial of military installations to the province meant an invasion of the liberty of conscience of those who felt bound by God’s commandments (particularly in the Old Testament) to defend their lives.

The dilemma of the Quakers in 1681 was thus twofold. First, they faced their own contradicting testimonies. They had pledged themselves to peaceful means and yet were obliged to protect the citizens. Second, they were willing to extend liberty of conscience to all and were bound by Penn to keep church and state separate. Yet the most important principle of the Quakers as politicians, the peace testimony, was regarded by their political foes as essentially interfering with their liberty of conscience. In other words, the attempt of the Quaker politicians to rule the colony in accordance with religious principles defeated Penn’s desire to separate church and state. Finally, a third difficulty must be mentioned: Pennsylvania was a part of the British Empire and could therefore not completely ignore demands stemming from the imperial policy of the English government.

The succession of crises in the relationship between the colony and the Crown centered largely around the political consequences of the peace testimony. The royal demands for military assistance in men and/or money for campaigns against the Indians and the French in 1693, 1709, and 1711, as well as those later during King George’s War, touched off—as will be shown for all five occasions—the most serious attacks on the peace testimony. They also served Quaker politicians as occasions for developing the political meaning of the peace testimony and the tactics which were employed to preserve its content.

The imperial context of Pennsylvania had, however, in two other ways important influences on the province. The first stemmed from the attitude of the English Parliaments toward grants demanded from the Crown. Before the Act of Settlement and before the passing of the first Civil List, the responsibility for the use of money once

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29 Beatty, 83-85, shows that Penn was aware of this fact and of its possible repercussions on the peace testimony.
voted by Parliament lay with the Crown only and not with the Commons as was afterwards the case. This earlier practice was followed by the colonies until around 1700. The colony was, secondly, a subordinate and dependent body of the Crown and, as the charter of Charles II added, the Houses of Parliament. This was to play an important element in the political tactics the Quaker politicians devised in the first three crises (1693, 1709, and 1711) for upholding the peace testimony.

The task of reconciling the two conflicting testimonies of the Quakers was indeed complicated. Two measures proved valuable remedies for awhile: the establishment of a good relationship with the Indians and, more lastingly, the literal acceptance of the sword for the magistrate. Crime was punished and the criminal was hanged if necessary. George Keith, missionary of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and former prominent Quaker, found this a strange way for a peaceful people. Yet his statement did not really disquiet the minds of the Quakers because in 1705 Keith had already been declared an apostate.30

It was within the framework of imperial relations that the political significance of the peace testimony was first developed. After the Glorious Revolution, William Penn was a suspected traitor to the Protestant cause. Word reached Pennsylvania that his property had been taken away and that the Crown had at least temporarily appointed Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York in his place. As one of the principal reasons for this change the Crown cited in Fletcher’s commission, dated October 21, 1692, the necessity of “better defence and security of our Subjects Inhabiting those parts During this time of Warr.”31 In accordance with this directive, immediately upon his arrival in Philadelphia Fletcher demanded Pennsylvania’s military assistance against the restless Indians on the borders of New York colony in “men or money,” as the words of the royal instruction of October 11, 1692, read. In his speech to

30 George Keith, *A Journal of Travels from New Hampshire to Caratuck on the Continent of North America* (London, 1706), 38–39. Gov. John Evans asked the Quaker Assemblymen a little later: “If then we find it our Duty in Government to suppress a private or particular Force, by all the Means necessary to it, how much more incumbent is it upon us, as a Government, to suppress that Force which is destructive to the Whole?” *Votes*, II, 804–805.

31 *Col. Recs.*, I, 355.
the Assembly he added, however, the assurance that money thus
given would “not be dipt in blood,” but would be used to defray
expenses like “officers Sallaries & other Charges.”

Immediately after Fletcher’s speech, the Assembly, as it appears,
rather hastily passed a number of resolutions, one of which referred
to the military part of the Governor’s speech: “That in the Address,
we may give the Governor the utmost Assurance we are capable of,
in the present Circumstance we are under, to answer the Queen’s
Letter, and the Governor’s desire.”

In the following days the Assembly devoted much of its time to
the method of raising money. First the House agreed upon a tax on
beer, ale, deerskins, by the poll, and on land, which was, however,
later revised to a tax of “a Penny per Pound [on] every Man’s real
estate”; some days later the Assembly added that persons without
real property should be taxed six shillings per person. At the same
time the House deliberated and passed the first and second readings
of “Bill, Number 32, concerning the Militia,” the text of which is
unfortunately not preserved. This was the only time before 1755
that the Assembly ever concerned itself with such a law. It was
defeated in the third reading.

Obviously aware of its tactically advantageous position, the House
now resorted to withholding passage of the support bill from Fletcher
in hopes of inducing him to make some concessions. Most important
was the Assembly’s unsuccessful effort to gain the right to appro-
priate money to particular purposes. The tactical maneuvering
brought from Fletcher the remark “that he saw nothing could do,
but an Annexation to New York.” Fletcher was by then clearly
furious about the delaying tactics of the House. On May 31, 1693,
he sent the House an angry message inquiring “whether in Compli-
ance with their Majesties Commands for the Assistance of New
York, they have resolved upon a Quota of Men or Money, or both?”
To this the Assembly reacted with a very mild and meek petition

32 Ibid., 400; abstract of the royal instruction in J. W. Fortescue, ed., Calendar of State
Papers, Colonial Series. America and West Indies, 1689-1692 (London, 1901), 718.
33 Votes, I, 130; for the address, ibid., 133.
34 Ibid., 137–138, 140.
36 Ibid., 174, 177.
to Fletcher in which, however, it demanded information whether the Governor was willing to consent to the bills the House had sent him. (Fletcher had demanded a complete revision of the laws passed in the colony between 1682 and 1692; the House's reference was to these revised laws.) Then, without awaiting an answer, the representatives voted that the supply bill ought to be laid before Fletcher immediately for his approval.  

Since the “bill for the support of Government,” as it was called, served as a precedent for all similar demands from the Crown, this measure deserves very careful examination. The text of the law, which was printed by William Bradford in New York the same year, provided that the money was given to William and Mary as a “free Gift . . . as a Testimony of our dutiful Affections towards them,” and “that the King and the Queen would be graciously pleased to give and allow” one half of the money to Benjamin Fletcher as a salary.  

It is important to stress that neither the text of the law nor the proceedings in the house warrant the conclusion that the Assembly had power or was willing to try to tie the money granted to nonmilitary purposes, because this would have been in direct contradiction to the prevailing constitutional practice in England and in the other colonies. Governor Fletcher’s assurance in his opening speech ought to be balanced against his message to the house on May 31, 1693. His words “the money should not be dipt in blood” then should be taken for what they were: a conciliatory and political gesture in order to assure the swift passage of the supply bill he wanted most.

Two things are obvious: first, that the Quakers did not see a way open to avoid at least a show of good will; second, that they knew that the money would be used for military purposes. Was this measure not a break of the peace testimony? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that the Assembly levied a tax on the inhabitants in order to raise the necessary funds. This bill

37 Ibid., 149-151.
38 Anno Regni Gulielmi & Mariae Regis & Reginae. An Act for granting to King William and Queen Mary the Rate of One Penny per Pound upon the clear Value of all the Real and Personal Estates, and Six Shillings per Head upon such as are not otherwise rated by this Act. To be employed by the Governor of this Province of Pennsylvania and Territories thereof, for the Time being, towards the Support of this Government. New York, Printed by William Bradford, 1693, 1.
thus resembles two of the most important features of the much contested Assembly bill of November, 1755, in which the house voted £55,000 for defence purposes.

As the peace testimony has been defined above, this bill was obviously in accordance with Quaker doctrine. The taking up of arms had been avoided; the Assembly simply consented to a "bill for the support of Government" in much the same way English Quakers did by paying taxes in wartime. It was not the Assembly's responsibility and legally could not be if the money was used for purposes inconsistent with private beliefs. In strict theoretical terms, the Assembly acted upon the basis of the Quakers' testimony that the government had to be supported. And, besides that, nothing was found wrong with England's defending herself against an enemy. This was, after all, her duty and right.

The same reasons apply to the money appropriations of 1709 and 1711 in Governor Charles Gookin's time. By then, however, the Assembly had won the right to bind money to specific purposes—a major accomplishment in Pennsylvania's constitutional development.\textsuperscript{39} This extension of the Assembly's rights had its pitfalls as far as compliance with the peace testimony—as it was defined by some Quakers after 1755—was concerned. In 1761, for example, the Pennsylvania Meeting for Sufferings bluntly told its brethren in the Assembly that the appropriation of funds to specific military purposes necessarily implied that the representatives had to accept the responsibility for these purposes as well. It is almost needless to add that the members of the Meeting for Sufferings considered these grants flagrant violations of the peace testimony.\textsuperscript{40}

In the period from 1695, when Penn resumed the government of the colony, to 1708, the Assembly made the most important inroads on the Proprietor's rights. William Markham's Frame of Government of 1696 conceded formally to the Assembly the right of debate and of adjournment; these were confirmed in Penn's Charter of

\textsuperscript{39} Votes, I, 192. The support was granted to Lt. Gov. William Markham not, as had been done under Fletcher, as "support of government," but "for the Indians residing near Albany." From this time, 1696, onward the Assemblies were careful not to omit in their money bills the use the money had to be put to; the exceptions are those bills in which money was "given to the Queen's/King's Use" before 1742.

\textsuperscript{40} Pennsylvania Meeting for Sufferings Minutes, I, 177-181, Department of Records of the Religious Society of Friends, Philadelphia.
Liberty of 1701. In this Charter the Council was—though only indirectly—stripped of its legislative functions. This stipulation in conjunction with a controversy over a judicatory bill tipped off one of the fiercest battles between the Governor and the House between 1705 and 1708. Governor John Evans incurred the heavy displeasure of the House because he insisted strictly on the prerogative of the chief executive. In addition to this, his rather immoral life—at least when measured with Quaker standards—made him obnoxious to the people and to Penn, who recalled him in 1708.

The political atmosphere in Pennsylvania was tense and explosive when the new Governor, Charles Gookin, met the Assembly for the first time on October 14, 1708. He had to encounter representatives still exasperated with the behavior of the former Governor and the obstinate—so it looked to the leader of the house, David Lloyd—and unconstitutional practices of James Logan, secretary of the colony.\(^1\)

After a brief journey to New York, Gookin returned to Philadelphia on May 28, 1709, with instructions of Queen Anne to Colonel Samuel Vetch about the projected expedition to Canada and with a circular letter from the Crown to all the northern governors. In the instruction to the Colonel, the contribution of Pennsylvania to the ill-fated expedition against New France was fixed at 150 men to be ready “by the middle of May at farthest.”\(^2\) On June 2, 1709, he laid the circular letter before the Assembly and told it about what was to be expected of the House: either provide 150 men or, in lieu of that, £4,000 which would be enough for him to raise and equip the required number of men.\(^3\) After intensive consultations amongst themselves, the most influential Quaker members of the House and the Council advised the Assembly “that the House ought not to raise Money for the said Expedition to Canada, but might very well make a Present at this Juncture, of a Sum of Money, to the Queen.”\(^4\) After some further delay, the House finally agreed upon a present of £500 to which later some £300 were added. Before the money could, however, be used by the Governor, the Assembly

\(^3\) *Votes*, II, 857-858.
had it “safely lodged here till the Queen shall be pleased to order the Disposal of it.”

Although Charles Gookin was furious about this measure of the Assembly, he was helpless and had to be content with what he or rather the Queen had received. It seems that the Queen never bothered too much about the Assembly’s action, probably because the expedition had been a sad failure and because Penn’s offer at that time to the Crown to sell his colony opened the prospect for sweeping changes in Pennsylvania.

In 1711, the Assembly was called on for another grant, again for an expedition against Canada. This event was preceded by a sweeping victory of Penn’s political friends under James Logan’s guidance. Logan had successfully enlisted the support of the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey for the election of October 1, 1710. Just one week before election day the Yearly Meeting issued to all the meetings a strongly worded circular letter in which factions and unruly spirits were unequivocally denounced as enemies to the “profession” and not fit for such a high and important political office as membership in the Assembly. At the polls the Assembly was changed one hundred per cent.

On June 23, 1711, Charles Gookin informed the Council that a new expedition against Canada was planned by the Crown. After a brief trip to New York for a conference with Colonel Francis Nicholson he transmitted his instructions for this particular occasion to the Assembly. Pennsylvania was expected “to be aiding and assisting to carrying on the said expedition.”

After spending a day in consultation as a committee of the whole house, the Assembly agreed upon a grant of “Two Thousand Pounds for the Queen’s Use,” which was to be raised by a tax of “Five-pence per Pound on the estates of the Inhabitants of this Province and Twenty-two Shillings per Head on single Freemen,” as well as by an impost on all European goods which were imported by people other than Pennsylvania merchants.

46 Lokken, 185-187; PYM, I, 133; Votes, II, 911, 937.
47 Col. Recs., II, 532, 534; Votes, II, 986-988.
48 Votes, II, 991.
According to these resolves a bill was drawn up, passed by the House, and transmitted to Gookin. The next day, however, the Governor returned it together with a message that the grant be paid to him to be used for what purposes he thought necessary in connection with the expedition, or, at least, that that part of the sum which was to be appropriated for the expedition ought to be deducted from the bill beforehand. After some dispute over the Governor's demand, the House finally altered the bill in such a way that half of the money could be sent immediately to Governor Robert Hunter in New York to be used for purposes in connection with the expedition, and that the rest could be laid out in provisions to be bought for the expedition. 49

When the bill was passed by the House its members were aware that the money would be used for military purposes. This was, however, interpreted by only a very few people as a breach of the peace testimony. Thomas Maule published in 1712 the only pamphlet against the bill under the somewhat ambiguous title *Tribute to Caesar, now paid by the best Christians, and to what purpose. With some remarks on the late vigorous expedition against Canada. Of civil Government, how inconsistent it is with the Government of Christ in his Church, compared with the ancient, just and righteous principles of the Quakers, and their modern practice and doctrine. With some notes upon the discipline of their Church in this province, especially

49 Ibid., 990-1000, esp. 998-999. Sharpless, 202, bases his statement that the second appropriation of 1711 "never aided any military expedition" on the Assembly's message to Gov. Thomas of Sept. 19, 1739, in which the representatives informed Thomas that the money was "being applied by a succeeding Governor to his own particular use" (Col. Recs. IV, 374). In this message the Assembly alludes of course to the money given to John Evans, who was indeed accused by the Assembly of misapplication of funds. Ibid., II, 464. Unfortunately the text of the law for granting £2,000 to the "Queen's Use" has not been found. However, in the *Act for Reviving, Explaining and continuing several laws in this Act mentioned*, which was passed by the Assembly and the Governor on Mar. 27, 1713, the provisions of the original act of 1711 relating to the regulations of the tax for raising the sum of £2,000 are repeated. The *Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania Collected into one Volume by Order of the Governor and Assembly of the said Province. Printed and sold by Andrew Bradford in Philadelphia 1714*, 168-173. It is worthy of notice that the commissioners named in this act "to put the Act in Execution" were with very few exceptions all Quakers of excellent reputation: Richard Hill, Thomas Masters, Edward Farmar, Nathan Stanbury, Rowland Ellis for Philadelphia; Caleb Pusey, Nicholas Pyle, Henry Pierce, Isaac Taylor, William Davis for Chester County; Joseph Kirkbride, Thomas Stevenson, Thomas Watson, John Rowland, Jeremiah Langhorne for Bucks County. Ibid., 170.
Maule named Thomas Story, a very prominent Quaker and politician, as the chief public supporter of the bill. Story, so Maule related, justified the grant of the Assembly as "Tribute to Caesar." Evidently, the overwhelming majority of the Society of Friends accepted this explanation. Though it was, at least according to Maule, common knowledge that the money was used solely for military purposes, this was felt by the Quakers to be a necessary evil, justified by the Biblical commandment to support the government.

The money grants of the Assembly of 1693, 1709, and 1711 are of considerable interest because they represent the Quaker politicians' translation of their religious testimonies into political terms. They followed the assumption which guided money votes of the House of Commons before the Act of Settlement and before the passing of the first Civil List, namely that the responsibility for the use of the money once voted lay with the Crown only and not with the Commons. In 1693 this was still accepted constitutional practice in England. However, in 1709 and 1711 this practice had not only been changed in England, with the Commons acquiring the sole right of appropriation as well as control of the money voted on the Civil List, but in the same way this right had been successfully claimed by the Pennsylvania Assembly. Now the Quaker politicians successfully exploited the constitutional advantages offered by the position of the colony as a subordinate and dependent body of the Crown and Parliament. Though the Assembly clearly felt responsible for money voted for purposes within the colony, it maintained that it could not for constitutional reasons be concerned with what the superior power would do with money which was due as a token of loyalty. In return the Quakers expected that the Crown would defend the colonies against any enemy.

In order to understand the crises in the fourth and fifth decades, it is extremely important to realize that the political conception of the peace testimony was intimately linked to and affected by these constitutional problems, for a change in the latter would certainly result in alterations of the former. It is also important to stress that the Quaker politicians were restricted or guided not only by the

50 Printed by Jacob Taylor (Philadelphia, 1712?).
peace testimony but by their testimony on government. For political reasons it was wise not to ignore totally the demands of the Crown. Moreover, it was a religious doctrine “to pay tribute to Caesar.” And although there is ample proof that Quaker politicians were as willing as those of the other colonies to evade compliance with demands of the Crown as much as they could, there is no justification for the belief that they would have been willing to defy it wholeheartedly. These politicians were certainly realistic enough to respond to severe pressures from London and here their testimony on government gave them a ready handle to justify their actions, or vice versa. Taken in which order one prefers, the important fact remains that Quaker politicians simply could not afford to ignore the existence of either testimony. It was this lesson which David Lloyd had to learn at the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 1710. It had been the intention of the English Yearly Meeting in 1693 and 1694 to proclaim the validity of this doctrine.

The reactions of the Assembly to the military requests of the Crown ought, therefore, to be viewed and interpreted as movements in a political arena limited by essentially unpolitical principles—the religious testimonies of the Society of Friends. As long as these two principles were in balance, no severe repercussions were to follow. As will be shown, the offsetting of this balance resulted in immediate and increasingly violent reactions from within the Society of Friends or from the English government.

In 1739 the political situation in Pennsylvania had materially changed; altered conditions were responsible for a different initial reaction of Quaker politicians that year to the demands resulting from the English declaration of war against Spain. In the fifteen years before the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, the balance between the two testimonies became increasingly unstable. Consensus on religious tenets, combined with the absence of direct threat of a military invasion or conflict within Pennsylvania, were the most

51 The political climate changed so abruptly between 1739 and 1740 that it is justifiable to divide the colonial history of Pennsylvania into the two periods 1681–1739 and 1740–1776. The latter period is well treated by Thayer in his Pennsylvania Politics.

52 This statement does not ignore the fact that there indeed existed some tensions within the Society of Friends above and besides the crisis over the Keith separation. These tensions centered, however, mostly around the problem of slavery and never reached serious levels.
conspicuous factors providing room for Quaker politicians to maneuver within the space limited by the two testimonies before 1711. Furthermore, the communication process within the Society of Friends in Pennsylvania, and within the international church body (including England, the other colonies, and the West Indies), worked both ways from the highest meeting to the lowest, because class structure did not yet, especially within Pennsylvania, influence the structure of church leadership. The free exchange of opinion in the first decades of the colony as well as the sharing of church leadership with Quakers of all ranks and from rural as well as urban meetings had been substituted by 1740 by a clear monopolization of the church leadership by wealthy Philadelphia Quakers. They also handled all the official correspondence with the English Society of Friends.

One political condition was that in earlier times Quaker politicians were aware of the close link to the English government and possible imperial repercussions arising from a confrontation. Such was the case in 1693, in 1709, and in 1711. Between 1739 and 1741 that condition failed to be a prominent factor in the calculation of men like John Kinsey, Israel Pemberton, Sr., John Wright, and Joseph Kirkbride, to name a few leading Quaker politicians. 53

A second condition which changed the political climate radically after 1739 emerged with a drastic change of the character and composition of the proprietary party. In the first decade of the colony this party was represented by a faction within the Society of Friends. Its leaders were Richard Hill, Thomas Story, James Logan and Isaac Norris I. In the years after 1739, politicians hostile to the Quakers took the lead of this party. Foremost were William Allen, Richard Peters, Jonathan Robinson, and William Plumstead. These men started a campaign against the Quakers. Their attacks were particularly focused on the peace testimony.

That the government had an obligation to protect the colonists was a third condition brought home to the Quakers by James Logan. 54 This obligation had been accepted in a very broad sense

54 See note 16 above.
before 1711. At that time, however, it did not involve any actual threat to Pennsylvania and thus necessitated no military measures within the colony. This state of affairs changed after 1739 when French and Spanish privateers captured trading vessels going to and leaving from Philadelphia. Even the lives of inhabitants on the coast were at times exposed to physical danger.

As has been pointed out, the obligation to provide protection to the citizens had been accepted in theory by the Quakers in 1680. Within the boundaries of Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were protected against civil disorder. From the very beginning, however, the Quakers were not willing to "put the colony in a posture of defence." Frequently they informed the Governor that they thought it the Crown's duty and obligation to protect the lives of the settlers and the ships of Pennsylvania merchants—a vivid comment on Barclay's and the early Quakers' view of the obligations of government. 55 This position, however, strongly contradicted the sense of obligation the assemblymen felt in all other cases for the inhabitants of the colony. While other colonists agreed with Pennsylvania's Quakers that the Crown was pledged to protect the ships of colonial merchants at sea, they realized it as part of their duty as elected representatives to care for the physical welfare of the citizens within the colony. The constitutional principle involved, on which the Quakers rested their case in all disputes with the Governor and the Crown, was that only the representatives could decide on matters relating to affairs within the colony. If the Quaker representatives had extended their demand for defence by the Crown to the area of Pennsylvania, then this would surely have affected the validity of their claim to speak and decide on provincial matters.

Until 1739 the Quakers as members of a church had been able to avoid deciding whether they would extend their testimony concerning temporal government so far as to clear the way for active military measures within Pennsylvania. This would certainly have implied that the peace testimony would have again become a private matter for each individual. At the same time, a military measure of the Assembly would, of course, have evoked the harshest reaction from within the church body.

In September, 1739, the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey approved a circular letter to all the meetings which

55 Votes, I, 807-808; Col. Recs., IV, 371-375, and Votes, IV-VI passim.
demanded strict adherence to the peace testimony. This stand was then adopted by the Quaker Assembly elected on October 1, 1739. Governor George Thomas had to hear with mounting anger that Quaker politicians would respond neither to sound reasoning nor to open threat. It is notable that between 1739 and 1741, the Quakers refused to grant any money to the "King's Use." Here for the first time the balance had turned in favor of the peace testimony; its importance, though its definition remained unchanged, was now rated higher than that of the testimony on government. Yet two years later, the Assembly suddenly changed its policy and voted, immediately after the new House had been convened, the sum of £4,000 for the "King's Use."

Not all the motives of this change are readily discernible. Two reasons, however, certainly influenced the politicians. One was the very critical reaction of English officials to the Quakers' cause, which had been reported by the London Meeting for Sufferings and by the colony's agent, Richard Partridge. Apprehensions about the home government were heightened by the knowledge that the Quakers' most influential political foes in Pennsylvania, the leaders of the proprietary party, had petitioned the King to deprive the Quakers of their share in government. Surely, the Quakers needed something to prove their loyalty and good will to George II, and money had always been an acceptable token.

A second reason for this change of policy may probably be found in mounting pressure and criticism within the Quaker church against what in some quarters was looked upon as the stubborn and provoking attitude of Kinsey and his followers toward Governor Thomas. Logan's influence was certainly the least important of the new factors because he had by then sided too openly with the proprietary party. For this reason his influence with leading Quaker politicians was at its lowest ebb in the fourth decade. There was, however, according

50 PYM, I, 416. The dispute between the Assembly and Gov. Thomas started immediately at the opening of the session. Votes, III, 2529-2531, 2540-2545, and passim.

57 Votes, IV, 2709; Norris Letterbook, 1719-1756, 11, HSP; Col. Recs., IV, 511, 547.


59 In September, 1741, Logan published in co-operation with Conrad Weiser an election pamphlet against the Quaker party, which Weiser translated into German under the title Ein Wohl gemeindter und Ernstlicher Rath an unsere Lands Leute, die Teutschen. The authorship of Logan is revealed by Richard Peters in his letter to John Penn on Oct. 20, 1741, Richard Peters Letterbooks, 1737-1750, HSP.
to Richard Peters, some willingness among influential ministering Friends in Chester and Bucks counties to exchange some of the radical members in the Assembly for more moderate men. Although the minutes of the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey do not, as usual, report such criticism, John Kinsey may well have sensed that he had gone a bit too far.

The bickerings between Governor Thomas and the Assembly continued for the whole session. Yet, in August, or at the latest in October, 1742, it became evident that the Quakers were prepared to give in, that is, to follow the examples set by their fathers in 1693, 1709, and 1711. Again this decision was partly the result of pressure exercised by the British government.

When in the last days of February, 1741/42, the previously mentioned proprietary party petition reached the Board of Trade after a very long journey, that body acted with unheard of swiftness. Despite repeated objections by the Pennsylvania committee of the London Meeting for Sufferings, the Board approved a report within a little more than four months. In it, the Lords of Trade and Plantations poured some of their harshest and most biting criticism on the Pennsylvania Assembly. One day after the report had been signed, the canny Richard Partridge managed to obtain a copy which he immediately sent to John Kinsey.

The effect of this report on Kinsey and his allies must have been wonderful in Governor Thomas' eyes. Though at the opening of the session the grievances of the Assembly were still the same, though in Philadelphia the election day had been immortalized by a bitter

60 Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, Aug. 25, 1742, and the same to the Proprietors on Nov. 17, 1742, both in Richard Peters Letterbooks, 1737-1750. These tensions developed very probably in the autumn of 1741, because Peters reported that these Quakers (he mentions Joseph Kirkbride and Jane Hoskins among others) were at that time (late summer 1742) agitating for a changed election ticket in Chester and Bucks counties. According to Peters the dissenting Quakers were brought back into line during the Yearly Meeting 1742.

61 Another reason might have been the agitation referred to in the preceding note.

62 Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations from January 1741/2 to December 1749 (London, 1931), 10-11, 20-27; Root, 284-286; the Board of Trade signed the report on July 8, 1742, and Partridge dated his letter to John Kinsey, in which he reported about the negotiations and sent a copy of the report, July 9, 1742. Pemberton Papers, III, 55. The London Meeting for Sufferings, of which Partridge was a member, had vigorously backed the colonial agent before the Board of Trade and finally succeeded in the following year with the Privy Council to get the worst parts of the report—yet not those about the peace testimony quoted above—struck out. London Meeting for Sufferings Minutes, XXVII, 251, 253-255, 271-273, 280-281, and 347.
riot at least partially instigated by friends of William Allen, the Quakers expressed in their first message to Governor Thomas a unique willingness for co-operation. Soon, the contested money bill, together with the salary of the Governor, were traded for the latter’s approval of a naturalization bill, which the Quakers had been trying in vain to force upon the Governor in the last two sessions.63

In the following sessions the Governor kept pressure on the Assembly by insisting on some kind of military measure. He served them with instructions from the Crown demanding defence installations and the mobilization of the (nonexistent) militia.64 Finally, Governor Thomas sent the House the circular instruction of the Duke of Newcastle dated January 3, 1744/45, which demanded Pennsylvania’s contribution for Colonel Peter Warren’s force for the protection of Nova Scotia.65 The assemblymen responded with a vote of £4,000 provincial currency “for the King’s Use.” In the resolve the money was directed to be given to John Mifflin and John Pole, both Quaker merchants, to be laid out by them for “Bread, Beef, Pork, Flour, Wheat or other Grain . . . within this province.” The Governor was then asked by the House to get these provisions shipped to New England, a favor which he acknowledged in a sarcastic message.66

It is owing to Benjamin Franklin that this particular resolve is cited in most modern accounts of colonial Pennsylvania. Franklin wrote in his Autobiography that Governor Thomas interpreted the appropriation clause “or other Grain” to mean “gun-powder” and accordingly bought some with the money. The fact, however, is that Thomas saw none of the money and therefore could not make use of this witty interpretation.67

63 Votes, IV, 2829–2866. The change of policy was certainly not due to a suddenly peaceable mood of John Kinsey, as Thayer, 19, supposes, nor was it a result of the “apathy of the home Government,” as Wolff, 100, has suggested. Considering the usual pace of the Board of Trade at that time, its proceedings in 1742 were unusually swift.

64 Col. Recs., IV, 689–697, 737–742.

65 Ibid., 765–766.

66 Ibid., 768–769; Votes, IV, 3017–3043. The assemblymen explained their position in their message of July 24, 1745, in which they informed the Governor about their money vote: “alco’ the peaceable Principles by divers Members of the present Assembly do not permit them to join in raising of Men or providing Arms and Ammunition, yet we have ever held it our Duty to render Tribute to Caesar. . . .” Col. Recs., IV, 769.

67 Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (New Haven, 1964), 189. Franklin’s comment is not mentioned by Thayer, 20; it is mentioned with great reservation by Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, 23–24; and it is fully endorsed by Boorstin,
Now the balance of the two testimonies, already shaken by the bills of 1742 and the resolve of 1745, shifted even more to the testimony on government. In June, 1746, the money voted for military purposes (raising troops and buying provisions and clothes for them) was given by the Assembly directly to the Governor. In the preamble to the law, the House justified this bill with its desire "of demonstrating our Obedience to our present Sovereign King George the Second, by yielding a ready and cheerful Compliance with His Commands, so far as our religious Principles will admit; and willing to give ample Testimony of the Loyalty and sincere Affection of his loving Subjects within this Province."\(^{68}\)

It was, however, not before 1748 that the balance shifted completely to the testimony on government. At the same time it became all too evident that the members of the Society of Friends were themselves divided over the real meaning of the peace testimony, though very much on different lines than those described by Isaac Sharpless. A number of other reasons then helped to prepare the way for the first open clash between an influential ministering friend and the Quaker Assemblymen.

The development so far described was not only the result of changed political conditions. Of equal importance were changes whose origins dated back to the seventeenth century within the Society of Friends.

By 1670 English Quakers were not only "outwardly" but "inwardly" sailing in quieter waters. The church entered a new period characterized by the dogmatization of the testimonies and the grad-

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\(^{68}\) *Votes*, IV, 3093–3110. The money was raised for the intended expedition against Canada. Circular letter of the Duke of Newcastle dated Whitehall, Apr. 9, 1746, *Col. Recs.*, V, 37–39. The text of the law is printed in *Anno Regni Georgii II. Regis Magnae Britannieae, Franciae, & Hiberniae Decimo Nono. At a General Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania, begun and holden at Philadelphia, the Fourteenth Day of October, Anno Dom. 1745. . . .* and from thence continued by Adjournments to the Ninth Day of June 1746 (Philadelphia, 1746), 61–65. In the law the appropriation clause simply stated that the money was to be paid to the Governor "to be by him applied for the King's Use." *Ibid.*, 64. In the message to Gov. Thomas the Assembly again justified this measure with their desire to evade measures "inconsistent with the peaceable Principles we profess," by demonstrating their "Loyalty and hearty Affection to the Crown, by giving a Sum of Money to the King's Use." *Votes*, IV, 3109.
ual shift of emphasis from inner experience to mere repetition and tradition of the testimonies. This period saw the beginning of the first proper books of discipline as well as the perfecting of the church organization. Now, strict compliance to preformulated “ancient testimonies” gained precedence over new insights. Thus, when the Quakers set sail in 1681 for Pennsylvania, they cherished a number of well-defined, inflexible testimonies which, taken together, were the credo of the Quaker church.69

The process of dogmatization was furthered in Pennsylvania by the need to make a living. Very quickly the Quakers became more concerned about their cattle or merchandise than about the teachings of the Inner Light.70 While before 1710 this process was somewhat unnoticed because of the fact that the church leaders were still recruited out of all ranks and areas, after 1710 it was helped and gradually brought to sight by the fact that church offices more and more became the monopoly of the Philadelphia Quaker merchants. In the fourth decade all of the important church offices were held by Philadelphia Quakers who belonged to the same aristocratic class. Thus the communication between church leaders and Quakers of lower ranks became increasingly strained.71 This difficulty was probably increased by a decidedly biased economic policy of the Assembly, biased to an astonishing degree in favor of the mercantile interest.72

69 Richard K. Ullmann, Between God and History; the Human Situation Exemplified in Quaker Thought and Practice (New York, 1959), 64–65; this development has been sharply criticized by Braithwaite, Second Period of Quakerism, chapters XII, XVIII. The changing emphasis around 1670 is very well illustrated by the “Epistle of Friends of the General Meeting Held in London the 31st of Third Month 1672,” printed in Epistles of the English Yearly Meeting of Friends, Held in London, To the Quarterly and Monthly Meetings in Great Britain, Ireland, and Elsewhere, from 1681 to 1857, I, xliii.

70 This development has been excellently described for Philadelphia by Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House.

71 This general statement is based on chapters 6 and 7 of my doctoral thesis “Glaube und Politik: Die Wandlungen des Peace Testimony und der Obrigkeitsdoktrin der Quaeker in Pennsylvania, 1681–1776” (Cologne, 1968, unpublished).

72 See chapter 4 of my thesis (note 71) in which I have examined the economic policy of the Assembly for the period 1710 to 1740 in some detail. For the economic expansion of Philadelphia see James G. Lydon, “Philadelphia’s Commercial Expansion, 1720–1739,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XCI (1967), 401–418. For a partial illustration of the economic gap between the city and the rural counties see tax list for 1733, Votes, III, 218o. The principal argument about the origins of this economic development centers around the
Additionally it must be pointed out that the same persons who managed the Assembly business ran the church business as well: John Kinsey was speaker of the Assembly and clerk of the Yearly Meeting for Pennsylvania and New Jersey; Israel Pemberton, Sr., was a member of the Assembly of long standing and clerk of the most influential Philadelphia Quarterly Meeting, which fulfilled functions akin to those of the London Meeting for Sufferings before 1756, and the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting. At times Pemberton acted also as clerk of the Meeting for Ministers and Elders, both on the quarterly and on the monthly level. Samuel Preston and Thomas Lightfoot were very prominent ministering friends, rich Quaker merchants both of whom served the province as provincial treasurer. The same kind of comparisons could be made about the position of the Kirkbrides, the Chapmans, the Ashbridges and some other Quaker families who served in the Assembly for long periods (these families had a tremendous influence in the counties at the same time) and usually held positions as clerks in their monthly or quarterly meetings. They, too, belonged to the same social strata as the Philadelphia merchants. With this in mind it is not surprising that in 1742 and in 1748 resistance within the Quaker church to Kinsey’s policies grew up outside the established Quaker circles and primarily in rural areas.

Here a word of caution ought to be added: it is extremely doubtful that the country Quakers were more qualified to watch over the pureness of the testimonies because they were living a life more in accordance with the “dictations of truth.” It probably comes much closer to reality to say that they simply could not afford silverware and “plain cloth but from the best.” The crusade of a few country Quakers in the fifth decade, quickly joined by some prominent Philadelphia Quakers, probably gained impetus from the social and eco-


73 See note 71.
74 Sharpless, 42, and somewhat modified by Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, 81-82, 141-142.
nomic gap between the counties and the metropolis and from the rural opposition to the liberal attitude of the Philadelphia Quakers. And, of course, the monopolization of offices in Philadelphia became annoying to the third generation of Quakers born between 1700 and 1715. Quakers of this generation fought over the meaning of the peace testimony after 1755, and it was one of them, John Churchman, who warned the Quaker Assembly in June, 1748, not to deviate from the "ancient and memorable testimony of our forefathers against all fighting."

In the last days of May, 1747, Governor George Thomas bade farewell to Pennsylvania and returned to England in order to restore his health. As the oldest member of the Provincial Council, Anthony Palmer now acted as President of that body and as executive head. England was still waging a war with France and Spain, though preliminary peace negotiations were well under way. Before the war was brought to an inconclusive end by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, however, Pennsylvania had to suffer some of its horrors. Spanish and French privateers and ships of war had finally picked out Philadelphia as the harbor of many lucrative prizes. Having whetted their appetite once in the spring of 1748, they ventured far up Delaware Bay. Anthony Palmer, himself a wealthy West India trader, sent message after message to the Assembly urging it to raise money so that the government could adopt defence measures.

Responding to the urgent need for defence installations and preparations, Benjamin Franklin published in the late autumn of 1747 a pamphlet entitled Plain Truth. In this he publicly described for the first time his plan for a militia on a voluntary basis, which he called a "Voluntary Association." This step not only marked Franklin's spectacular entrance into the political arena and led to the organization of a successful military machinery, but it also put the Assembly on the defence. Thus the stage was set for the Quaker politicians' most serious crisis.

75 See note 81 below.
Franklin's Association prompted Gilbert Tennent, the leading Presbyterian minister of the city, to write a pamphlet on the "rightfulness of lawful defence," which decidedly embarrassed Quaker politicians and their brethren. While the literary defence of the Society of Friends was ably managed by Samuel and John Smith—though the latter's defence was the most remarkable proof of Quaker insecurity about the real meaning of the peace testimony—Quaker politicians in May and June, 1748, were finally forced to face the issue whether they meant to stick to the peace testimony, and thus hinder the defence of the colony against marauding privateers, or whether they would take refuge instead in their testimony concerning temporal government and thus allow military measures to be adopted. The Quaker politicians' answer, so it turned out, pleased the Council and grieved some prominent ministering friends.

In April and May, 1748, Anthony Palmer received frequent communications about the maneuvering of enemy ships. More and more citizens of Philadelphia were convinced that it was only a matter of days until the city itself would be attacked. Finally, on May 26, the Council was informed that a "Spanish Privateer of fourteen Carriage Guns" manned with 160 men was lying "against Elsenborough," some miles below New Castle. The Council was in an awkward position as the only English man-of-war available was not fit to leave the harbor. Negotiations with the owners of a Pennsylvania privateer failed to bring satisfactory results. In their desperation the Council sent for the speaker of the Assembly, John Kinsey, and for the justices of the Supreme Court.

After much consultation, this august body resolved upon a number of defence measures, having been assured by John Kinsey: "That if the President & Council . . . in discharge of what they conceive to be their Duty, were put to an Expense, tho' it might happen in such an Instance as the Assembly wou'd not have advised, yet he believed, that the Regard the Council might shew for the Good of

77 Gilbert Tennent, The Late Association for Defence Encourag'd or the Lawfullness of a Defensive War, in a Sermon Preached at Philadelphia December 24, 1747 (Philadelphia [1748]); [Samuel Smith], Necessary Truth, Or Seasonable Considerations for the Inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia and Province of Pennsylvania in Relation to the Pamphlet call'd Plain Truth and two Other Writers in the Newspapers. Philadelphia 1748; [John Smith], The Doctrine of Christianity. . . . Vindicated, 32.

78 Col. Recs., V, 248-250.
the Province would ever be considered by the Assembly, and an adequate Provision made in the Support of Government.” The minutes of the Council expressly state Kinsey’s approbation “of the above regulations,” which were all of a military nature.79

Five days later, on May 31, 1748, John Smith started, on his own initiative, a subscription list which was signed by James Pemberton, among others. The money raised, so John Smith recorded in his diary, was to be handed over to the President of the Council to be applied by him to whatever uses the executive thought warranted in “emergency situations.” This action he thought justified by Kinsey’s declaration before the Provincial Council and by his desire to stop “the clamours” against the Society of Friends. Though Smith abandoned his plan within an hour on the advice of “elderly friends,” this incident serves as a further indication of the shaken position of the Quakers with regard to their peace testimony.80

It was by now obvious what the solution of the leading Quakers to the intriguing conflict between their testimony on government and the peace testimony would be—they had decided to support the government.

It would be erroneous to believe that this was only the position of John Smith, John Kinsey, and James Pemberton. William Logan, for example, unlike his father an active and well-respected member of the Society of Friends, consented as a member of the Provincial Council to the resolves of that body. All these Quakers belonged to the inner circle of the church and certainly exercised great influence over their brethren.

There was, however, at least one well-reputed minister of the Society of Friends dissenting from the opinion of Kinsey and the others. During the days when the Council deliberated military measures and John Smith started his subscription, John Churchman of East Nottingham, Chester County, was in Philadelphia where he visited Quaker families. He heard the reports about the privateer and was probably informed about the consultations of the Provincial Council and the resolutions that board had agreed upon. He knew that the President of the Council was to ask the Assembly to grant money for a ship of war. He saw “many, even of our society, declar-

79 Ibid., 250.
ing their willingness that a sum of money should be given to the
King, to shew our loyalty to him, and that they were willing to part
with their substance for his use, tho' as a people, we had a testimony
to bear against all outward wars and fighting." Thus, after some
deliberation, he decided against the counsel of other Quakers and,
against the objections of John Kinsey, to speak his mind to the
Assembly.

In his speech, which he must have delivered one or two days
before the Assembly agreed to a declaration similar to the one Kinsey
presented to the Provincial Council, he offered a radically different
conception of government. In Churchman's view the government
had "to act singly for him [God] that ordained the power, and
permitted them to be stationed therein, that they should be his
ministers." If the representatives would act upon other principles
than those derived from their station as ministers of God, should
they rather forsake God's protection "by carnal weapons and forti-
fications," then it was a clear and necessary consequence to Church-
man that "he who is superintendent, by withdrawing his arm of
his power, may permit those evils they feared to come suddenly
upon them and that," he added, "in his heavy displeasure."

Churchman was aware that since 1681 other religious groups had
settled in the colony with different views on war. Yet he discarded
the obvious logical consequence of this fact with the remark that
those immigrants knew "the Charter framed and the peaceable
Constitution" of the original settlers. He ended his speech with a
rather feeble assurance that "it is not from disrespect to the King or
Government that I speak after this manner."

Two reasons make this speech an important document. First,
Churchman viewed the state in purely theocratic terms, a concep-
tion which had been given up by William Penn. Second, this minister
quite obviously thought the peace testimony of such prime impor-
tance that obligations to the British government and to other reli-
gious sects were so negligible as to be discounted. Clearly, Church-

81 An Account of the Gospel Labours and Christian Experiences of a Faithful Minister of
Christ, John Churchman, late of Nottingham in Pennsylvania, Deceased (Philadelphia 1779),
68–69.
82 Ibid., 70.
83 Ibid., 71–73.
man's ideas and those of the Quaker assemblymen were miles apart.

One or two days later, on June 11, 1748, the Assembly unanimously approved a declaration in which they informed the Provincial Council: "And whenever those in whose Hands the Executive Powers of Government have been or now are in discharge of what they conceive to be their Duty, are or shall on any Emergency be put to an Expense for the Good of the Province which the Assembly have or hereafter will judge reasonable, as we remember no Instances past, so we believe not any such will hereafter happen wherein a suitable Provision will not be made in the support of Government."

And in the immediately preceeding paragraph of this message, they denied the charge "of having refused to grant Money for the Protection of the People and the Trade of this Province" as "too generally expressed."

Kinsey's as well as the Assembly's declaration deserve close examination, because both signify a major change of policy. Both declarations were based on the theoretical supposition that there existed certain duties—among them that of protecting the colony—in the executive branch, which were not duties of the Assembly. The representatives made this quite clear in their declaration: "That Government ought to be honourably supported, & that we ought to contribute towards it proportionately to our Circumstances, have been both our Sentiments & Practice; And the 'protection of the People & the Trade of the Province' we look upon as principal Parts of the Duty of those by whom this Support is received." As this statement was addressed to the Council it contrasts sharply with earlier ones of the Assembly, in which it was always stated as its opinion that it was not the colony's but the Crown's duty and obligation to protect the inhabitants and the trade. In contrast, however, to the former "position," the Assembly's declaration of June 11 was warranted by section XVI of Penn's Charter, which hitherto had been overlooked by the Assembly.

Does this declaration likewise imply that the Quaker representatives accepted it as their duty to find ways and means for the protection of their frightened constituents? Though this would have

84 Votes, IV, 3188–3190, for the whole declaration.
been the logical conclusion, and the one which was drawn in 1755, the words in 1748 do not justify a positive answer. First of all, the representatives had rather carefully described the situation, immediate danger to the province, in which expenses for military measures—it ought to be noted that the Assembly avoided this term—would be honored by the representatives. Second, the representatives had refrained from passing any military law and they did not vote money for permanent defence installations. Moreover, in the same message they again rejected the Council's demand for a colony-owned man-of-war. Yet, in justification they did not quote religious scruples, but simply stated that the heavy expenses of such a ship would far exceed the good resulting from owning one.

Again, it has to be emphasized that both declarations do not imply a breach of the peace testimony as it was then defined by the Society of Friends. It was, however, realized that an extremely critical stage had been reached. Between 1742 and 1748 the meaning of the peace testimony had been gradually narrowed down to its original meaning of circa 1711: semimilitaristic actions were allowed as a means of supporting the government. The taking up of arms was forbidden. The two declarations had now carried the Assembly this far, and any step further might, in fact, mean the sanctioning of a military measure within the colony by the Assembly itself. John Churchman's speech indicates, as does implicitly John Smith's pamphlet of January, 1748, that there was a growing group within the Quaker church which shared the feeling that such a point had already been reached.

The two declarations raise a further interesting problem. As has already been noted, both were based on the theory that only the executive had the obligation to protect the colony and its trade. Before 1748 the Assembly had always contended that it was the Crown's duty to provide protection for the colony. The whole theory on which money grants to "the King's Use" rested was based in fact on the distinction between the sovereign (Crown) and subordinate power (colony). The Quaker politicians used this hierarchical pattern (as, incidentally, all other colonies did) very successfully in order to solve their dilemma arising from their two conflicting testimonies. In the declaration of June 11, 1748, the governor was now elevated to the position formerly assigned to the Crown: the distri-
The Assembly realized, of course, that this would involve the granting of money to the governor. The representatives therefore declared their willingness to grant the necessary funds, but only after they had been expended by the executive in an emergency situation. Particularly in this connection, the Assembly’s declaration mentions its right to examine the purposes the money had been used for. On the other hand, however, the Assembly clearly wanted to avoid being responsible for the uses of the money and therefore labeled the money vote “to the support of Government.” This term was always understood to imply that, once the money was voted, its use was not within the scope of the Assembly’s responsibility. The contradiction is obvious: the Assembly in its declaration insisted on its right to examine the way money was expended and yet disclaimed responsibility for its use. This position, though it meant only the application of the theory on which money voted to the “King’s Use” was based, was full of inconsistencies. Whenever the Assembly should be forced to formulate more explicitly its right of sole appropriation, as happened in the dispute with Governor Morris seven years later, this theory was bound to collapse. This was exactly the point on which a group of Quakers, opposed to the actions of the Assembly under the guidance of the English ministering Friend Samuel Fothergill and the prominent Philadelphia Quaker and merchant Israel Pemberton, Jr., during the Seven Years’ War concentrated its attacks. Only then did the implications of the constitutional right to appropriate money become clear. By insisting on the right of appropriation, the Assembly had to accept responsibility for the ends to which the money was directed as well.

Some of Thomas Maule’s objections to the bill of 1711, the criticism of John Churchman, some parts of John Smith’s pamphlet, as well as the agitation of a minority group within the church against the Quaker representatives after 1755, rested on a peace testimony definition which was not the same as that accepted by the Society of Friends. This, however, became clear only after 1755. As long as the church thought it the government’s duty to protect the citizen, and as long as the peace testimony meant the nonuse of arms in its
literal sense, the Quaker politicians' actions were consistent with the acknowledged principles of the Society of Friends. The importance, then, of the money votes in 1693, 1709, 1711, and that of the declarations of 1748 lies in the fact that they illustrate the skillful maneuvering of the Quakers within the limits set by the Quakers' testimony on government and the peace testimony. Likewise, they are excellent examples of the application of religious doctrines in concrete political situations. These situations posed different kinds of demands which again restricted in another way the freedom of the politicians. Furthermore, long range developments like that of the Assembly's right of sole money appropriation, or the effects of its economic policy on the colony, might implicitly or explicitly change the real meaning of tactics devised in completely different situations or for different purposes, as is illustrated by the implications of the Assembly's declaration of June 11, 1748.

The study of these Assembly actions in the last decade of the seventeenth and in the first and fourth decades of the eighteenth century, then, ought to be of the utmost importance for the interpretation of the events during the Seven Years' War. It ought again to focus historians' attention on the peace testimony as the most contested, yet likewise most important political doctrine of the Quakers. It ought to provide a framework for a fresh evaluation of the events after 1755. The issue which divided the Society of Friends in 1755, and in the years following, was not that a number of Quakers gave up the peace testimony, an old and important doctrine of the church. There was no substantial group within the church which could be charged with such a deviation. The division of the Society of Friends was rather caused by agitators for a provoking and stimulating new conception of the peace testimony—much broader in its scope—who clashed with the advocates of the old conception of the peace testimony. The crisis broke out over the question whether the Quakers would change their peace testimony to such an extent as to destroy the basis for future political activities.

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