The label “Era of Good Feelings” has been frequently affixed to the political climate of the administrations of James Monroe. Historians have shown that this was certainly not the case in Pennsylvania where the factional struggle for power among Democratic-Republicans was long and bitter. The entrance of Andrew Jackson into national politics in 1824 only served to heighten state tensions as various Keystone cliques tried to claim the Tennessean.

The “original Jacksonians” were the small editors and rural politicians who provided the initial grass roots support. Their organization was poor, however, and their power base limited. A second group was composed of old Federalists and conservative Democratic-Republicans (labelled “Independent Republicans”) who called themselves Amalgamators. Henry Baldwin and Isaac Barnard provided the nucleus of leadership for this faction which hoped to use a Jacksonian victory to save the old Federalists and to regain control of state politics. A third Jackson group was the so-called “Family Party,” a Philadelphia-Pittsburgh alliance connected by marital ties and led by George M. Dallas, Thomas Sergeant, Richard Bache, Samuel Ingham and William Wilkins. This element had been the touchstone for John C. Calhoun’s Presidential hopes, but expediency had forced their temporary abandonment of the South Carolinian in 1824. Their reversal earned them the sobriquet of “Eleventh Hour Men.” It was assumed that they favored the one-term election of Old Hickory as a necessary preliminary to the accession of Calhoun in 1828. Although the Democratic factions differed in their motives for supporting the General, they united at the polls to give him an easy victory over John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and William Crawford in November, 1824.

While the state effort to elect Jackson produced a resounding victory, the national contest was thrown into the House of Repre-
sentatives where Adams, with Clay's support, was selected President. Following this, the battle for control of the new Jacksonian party on both state and national levels raged for four years with Family men and Amalgamators duelling in Pennsylvania.

Jackson's overwhelming triumph in 1828 signalled the competition for division of the spoils. Through swift and sagacious political maneuvering, the Family Party members won numerous high posts in state and national government in the first Jackson administration. They held these posts until Old Hickory purged his administration of Calhoun supporters in the spring of 1831. The dismissal of Secretary of the Treasury Samuel Ingham was the watershed of Pennsylvania influence in Washington political circles and of Family Party power in Pennsylvania. Jackson's heir apparent, Martin Van Buren of New York, quickly moved to crush his old enemies and insure that the Empire State would be the new locus of power.

By 1832 the Pennsylvania Democracy was on the defensive. Although its two Senators, George M. Dallas of Philadelphia (elected after the resignation of Isaac Barnard in 1831) and William Wilkins of Pittsburgh, and the Governor, George Wolf, were avowed Jacksonians, the party was scarred by its former Federalist-Calhoun ties of the previous decade. Political attacks by Van Buren and the rising Anti-Masonic Party forced the Democrats to unite to survive. In an effort to break this unity Van Buren, the "Little Magician," urged Jackson to give the Russian mission to Amalgamator James Buchanan in January, 1832. With Dallas and Wilkins in Washington, the New Yorker wanted to build his own coalition out of the leaderless remnants of the Amalgamators and the Family Party. The two Senators hoped to frustrate this maneuver through political and social ingratiations with Jackson. Unfortunately for the Pennsylvanians, the "Bank War" of January-July, 1832, would totally smash their state's influence and damage their own careers for more than a decade.¹

Dallas journeyed to the Capital almost immediately after his election in December, 1831. He arrived in time to eat Christmas

dinner with his “quondam favorite” John C. Calhoun. Dallas informed his wife, Sophy, that the outer show of civility that passed between the two men would have amused her. They talked of everything but politics or the past. Dallas still held the Vice-President in high regard: “He is a noble fellow, and deserves a better fate than the one which his headstrong friends and lofty faults have prepared for him.” For the next few weeks the new Senator visited the appropriate people in Washington, making fresh contacts and renewing old ones. He barely had time to complete these formalities before the heavy burden of the Bank Memorial for a recharter was placed in his inexperienced hands.

There was no question about how the people of Pennsylvania viewed the Second Bank of the United States. The Philadelphia-based institution was Pennsylvanian by interest, location, and legislative initiative. Although it was chartered by the Democratic-Republicans, men of all factions came in time to respect it. The chief issue in 1832 was whether the National Republicans or the Jacksonians were the stauncher friends of the Bank. The President’s followers responded vociferously when the opposition accused Jackson of hostility to a recharter movement. In late December, 1831, the state legislature passed a resolution in support of the Bank’s renewal by an overwhelming majority. Such an endorsement by his state should have made Dallas’ posture on the question easy to foresee. However, rumors were common that the President viewed the Bank and the recharter movement as a personal and political challenge in an election year. These rumors placed the young Senator on the horns of a dilemma.

The plan for rechartering the Bank had been carefully conceived by leading Bank officials and politicians in December and early January. The only problem was when it would be put into operation. Bank President Nicholas Biddle had considered conflicting pro-

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2 Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Dec. 25, 1831, Dallas Papers, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP). Unless otherwise specified, all Dallas manuscripts cited are from this collection.  
3 Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Jan. 5, 1832.  
cedural advice when Jackson's cabinet members urged waiting until the next session of Congress, while Congressmen and lobbyists, on the other hand, advised immediate action. He agreed with the latter group. Representative George McDuffie, a Democrat from South Carolina and an old Calhounite, was chosen to present the petition in the House, but determination of a Senate leader was a more difficult decision. Although General Samuel Smith, a Maryland Democrat and Chairman of the Finance Committee, was the first choice, he objected to raising the issue at that session. It would be made a "Jackson, anti-Jackson vote" and few men would convince the President that they favored the Bank and were not hostile to him. Smith urged the recharter leaders to wait until the following winter. He felt the Bank would lose at least ten friendly votes, including those of Dallas and Wilkins, if its sponsors pursued their present course.

On December 20 Thomas Cadwalader, the Bank's lobbyist in Washington, called on the two Pennsylvania Senators to determine their sentiments. Cadwalader gained the impression that Dallas would aid him in any possible way, although the Senator, like Smith, opposed renewal for that session and anticipated a Presidential veto unless a two-thirds majority could be gained in support of the institution. Dallas said that Wilkins would also be doubtful in giving support to the Bank. In an interview one week later, the agent learned that both men still were torn by contending calculations and, knowing they would urge postponement, Cadwalader did not ask their advice. At that time Wilkins indicated a warmer feeling for the renewal than Dallas, apparently because the former was "more linked in the great points of state interest—to which as he admits the extinction of the Bank would carry a death blow." Dallas, however, because of financial interests, family background (his father had been instrumental in chartering the Bank), and personal ambition emerged as the choice of the Bank men. On January 6 he received a note from Biddle advising him of his selection as the institution's champion.5

5 Thomas Cadwalader to Biddle, Dec. 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 1831, Reginald C. McGrane, ed., The Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle (Boston, 1919), 147-152; Biddle to McDuffie, Jan. 6, 1832, Biddle MSS; Biddle to Dallas, Jan. 6, 1832, ibid.; Jean A. Wilburn, Biddle's Bank: The Crucial Years (New York, 1967), 33.
Dallas was fully aware of his awkward predicament. He knew that the President and all his friends opposed the recharter and would consider it a political attack. Consequently, the Senator feared introducing the Memorial, an action which on any other occasion he would have been delighted to do. Yet when it was presented to him, as a representative from Pennsylvania—and Philadelphia—he could hardly refuse the application. In spite of his legislature's endorsement, Dallas ran the constant risk of political harassment from acquaintances he was hoping to cultivate. The fear of being misrepresented and misunderstood throughout the entire country haunted him. Dallas had said many times, and would say again, that he opposed renewal activities before the election of 1832. "To bring it forward is certainly contrary to my judgment—but if they will advance, can I refuse to be their organ—because of my residence, because of the paternity of the bank, and because of my avowed politics. . . ."6

Dallas reiterated this theme when he presented the Bank Memorial to the Senate on January 9, 1832. He spoke of his reluctance to admit the petition in that session, for he felt "deep solicitude and apprehension, lest, in the progress of inquiry and in the development of views, under present circumstances, it might be drawn into real or imagined conflict with some higher, some more favorite, some more immediate wish or purpose of the American people."7

The same day a Select Committee to study the Memorial was established. It was composed of Dallas, Daniel Webster, Thomas Ewing, Josiah Johnston and Robert Hayne. All except Hayne were avowed friends of the Bank. The reaction of the administration to the petition was predictable. The *Washington Globe*, Jackson's organ, made no mention of Dallas, but immediately identified the movement with Henry Clay and his political interests. "The design is to forestall the election of the President, and to extort, from the circumstance of its pendancy [sic], submission on the part of the

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6 Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Jan. 6, 7, 1832; Dallas to Henry Gilpin, Jan. 8, 1832.
7 Niles Register, Jan. 14, 1832; National Intelligencer, Jan. 10, 1832; Thomas P. Govan, *Nicholas Biddle* (Chicago, 1959), 173-174; Wilburn, 123n. Van Buren in his autobiography reflected that Dallas was "doubtless a sincere friend of the President, wanted his success, but felt obliged to his state." It seems unlikely the "Little Magician" reported such sentiments to Jackson in 1832. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren*, American Historical Association Annual Report for 1918, II (Washington, 1920), 622.
President and his friends, to the demands of the Stockholders of the Bank." Dallas, recognizing that his presence was unpalatable to many Jacksonians, refrained from attending the festivities held in honor of the President in mid-January.8

Dallas never doubted that the Bank’s strategy was dangerous and imprudent. He quickly advised Biddle that someone with veteran ability was needed to manage the institution’s campaign, since he was “legislatively inexperienced and in entire ignorance of the strategy so often successful.” Biddle responded that he could not personally come to the capital, but that Horace Binney would be sent as his liaison man. Binney arrived within a few days and promptly met with McDuffie, rather than Dallas, about an officially planned strategy for the Bank War.9 The Senator, meanwhile, discounted rumors that his Committee would send back a report urging postponement of the Memorial. His colleagues were eager to have it forwarded and he conjectured they would concede “any reasonable and not injurious modifications” to accomplish this.10

The battle over these modifications was fought not only in the Committee, but on the floor of the Senate as well. Dallas spoke on three occasions in behalf of the Bank, usually in response to attacks by Senator Thomas Hart Benton, the spokesman for the administration. The Pennsylvanian first defended the institution on January 20:

To me the Bank of the United States is nothing but a bank—a mere bank—enacted under the influence of the purest motives, for admirable purposes. If it shall have prostituted its faculties by embarking in the contests of political party, it will find me ... an implacable opponent; but if, as I unhesitatingly avow my expectations, it shall appear uprightly and impartially and efficiently to have achieved its great public duties, and to promise still further usefulness to the country, I must, and will, wish it to have justice, stability, and success.

Although this typified Dallas’ speeches on the subject, there is little reason to believe that he was naive enough to assume the Bank

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8 Washington Globe, Jan. 10, 1832; Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Jan. 10, 1832.
9 Dallas to Biddle, Jan. 9, 1832, Biddle MSS; Biddle to Dallas, Jan. 11, 1832, ibid. Horace Binney (1780–1875) was a Philadelphia-born lawyer and politician. He was a Bank Director and served one term in Congress (1833–1834) as a Whig, but is best known for his fine multi-volume work on Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions.
10 Biddle to Binney, Jan. 25, 1832, Biddle MSS; Dallas to Gilpin, Jan. 15, 28, 1832.
question could or would be isolated from politics. Dallas knew the political importance of the issue and thus felt the Senate would vote to postpone it. This would mean defeat as far as the Bank was concerned and its representatives were becoming increasingly disgruntled with Dallas' attitude and actions. He moved too slowly and spoke too infrequently to suit their tastes. In an effort to stimulate his campaign the Bank officials unwisely began to pressure the Senator.\textsuperscript{11}

By the first week of February Biddle had resolved in his own mind that the situation had reached a crisis for the Bank and the administration. He developed a plan to be implemented by Dallas that would work for the benefit of the government, the institution, and the Senator. Biddle realized that Dallas had strong ambitions to contest the vice-presidency with Van Buren in the state convention in March, 1832. Agents of the Bank were instructed to tell Dallas that his chances would improve immeasurably for the nomination if he would stand up for the interests of Pennsylvania, especially those to which the "Little Magician" was hostile.

On February 3 the legislature of the state passed a new set of resolutions in support of the Bank. Biddle's plan called for Dallas to approach the President with these resolutions and, after warning about irritating a state so loyal to him, offer to act as an intermediary between the Bank and the government. With Dallas as the liaison modifications suitable to both parties could be agreed upon. The Bank would be rechartered as an administration measure, increasing the President's support in Pennsylvania, and the Senator would win national consideration for his distinguished contribution. Biddle instructed Horace Binney to relay this scheme to Dallas and added, "if in half an hour afterwards he is not on his way to the President, why then the stars have conjoined for him in vain."\textsuperscript{12}

But the cautious Senator was becoming more agitated each day over the Bank question. He exploded to his Philadelphia colleague Henry Gilpin:

\textsuperscript{11} Binney to Biddle, Jan. 23, 1832, Biddle MSS; U. S., \textit{Register of Debates in Congress}, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, 1832, VIII, Part I, Jan. 20, 1832, 150; Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Jan. 25, 1832. Another exchange between Benton and Dallas occurred on February 8 over the legality of Bank drafts.

\textsuperscript{12} Govan, 181; Biddle to Binney, Feb. 6, 1832, Biddle MSS; Biddle to Charles J. Ingersoll, Feb. 6, 1832, \textit{ibid}.
What in the name of all that is reasonable do the bank sages want? Are they disposed to see me degenerate into a heated partisan? If so, they mistake me, and are blind to their own policy and interest. I can do the institution no service, the instant I become as headstrong and headlong as themselves. Do they really imagine that I can or ought to forget that I am a Senator, in order to become an advocate?²¹

A strong advocate was almost exactly what the Bank wanted and desperately needed. For the next month, until the Bill was reported out of Committee on March 13, the Bank’s agents exerted a steady, daily pressure on Dallas to promote more actively their institution. The more pressure they applied, the more they alienated the Senator. They tried to “rouse him to a proper sense of his situation,” which they deemed “no easy matter,” by pointing out his father’s example and memory and the votes of the state legislature. Charles J. Ingersoll, a former Congressman and old family friend, attempted to inspire Dallas. On February 6 Ingersoll advised Biddle that they must be “patient and constant” with Dallas. “The affair cannot be hastened.” But the Bank men were beginning to panic. In the House the recharter petition was languishing in the hands of McDuffie, a Calhoun follower. It was vital that Dallas, who was recognized as a loyal Jacksonian, assume the initiative. After a frustrating week of attempting to move the Senator off dead center, Ingersoll, on February 15, told Biddle in despair, “the fact is that Mr. Dallas is always selfish and never cordial, and will require all your superintendence . . . request Mr. Binney to be in constant urgency of him.”¹⁴ Ingersoll reported he tried to approach Dallas, “but he is so cold, selfish, wary and solicitous of office . . . that I must be very circumspect.” As an additional weapon, Wilkins was recruited to talk over the matter with his relative. Biddle understood what his men were experiencing in Washington and urged them to keep reminding Dallas that he was serving his father’s memory, the state, and himself. The Senator had been insensible to these appeals in the past, however, and Biddle expected that any future progress would have to be made through influencing the President rather than Dallas.¹⁶

¹³ Dallas to Gilpin, Feb. 5, 1832.
¹⁴ Ingersoll to Biddle, Feb. 6, 9, 12, 1832, Biddle MSS.
¹⁵ Biddle to Ingersoll, Feb. 13, 1832; Ingersoll to Biddle, Feb. 15, 1832, ibid.
The Bank agents did not quickly surrender their struggle with Dallas, but their renewed efforts brought no results. Biddle remarked to Ingersoll that "it requires a strong blower to ignite this block of granite." To which Ingersoll replied that to inspire Dallas was "impossible." By the end of February the close contact the lobbyists had with Wilkins was beginning to show results of an unexpected kind. While the western Senator was unable to move his brother-in-law, he revealed to the agents that he was warm to the Bank and had ambitions of his own. He, too, had visions of the vice-presidency and was willing, unlike Dallas, to identify solidly with the institution. On March 7 Ingersoll approached Wilkins with almost exactly the same speech he had presented to Dallas a month earlier. A golden opportunity was waiting, Ingersoll said, if only Wilkins would seize the prospect his colleague had declined. Wilkins, on the eve of receiving Pennsylvania's favorite son nomination for the second slot, eagerly assented and promised he would talk with the President at once. On March 11 Ingersoll and Wilkins discussed the latter's future. While he agreed to pursue the proposed plan, it was "not so heartily as before." It can be assumed that Wilkins, who had been selected on March 10 as his state's vice-presidential choice, suddenly realized the predicament in which he had placed himself. Not only was he opposing Van Buren, but he was acting as a mediator for the Bank as well. The only indication of Wilkins' obvious failure to convert Jackson to the Bank is in a letter of March 22 from Dallas to his wife. He pointed out that in a recent brief absence from Washington he had "escaped one question . . . the only one on which I should differ with Wilkins. I did not wish to be a participant. It was a matter of secret business." By openly confronting the President, Wilkins' ignominious reward would be the Russian mission in 1834.

Between March 13, when the recharter Bill was reported out of Committee, and June 11, when it was voted on, Dallas and the representatives of the Bank became more estranged. The Senator was

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16 Biddle to Ingersoll, Feb. 20, 1832; Biddle to Dallas, Mar. 10, 1832; Ingersoll to Biddle, Feb. 23, 1832; Ingersoll to Biddle, Mar. 7, 1832, ibid. Biddle continued to remind Dallas of his opportunities and obligations, however, almost to the day the bill was reported out of Committee.

17 Ingersoll to Biddle, Mar. 11, 1832, ibid.; Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Mar. 22, 1832.
nervous over rumors he heard from friends reporting the Bank was bribing certain New York editors with loans to gain their support. He confided in Sophy, "I expect the Bank to make me sick. The reports are distressing and dirty beyond measure." Dallas felt the Bank directors now realized their folly in pursuing the early renewal. If Biddle was guilty of bribery or regretted the Bank's course, he did not indicate it to the Senator. In fact, when Biddle visited the Capitol in April for a strategy session, he did not even see Dallas. Wilkins felt this oversight was an unpardonable affront to senatorial dignity, but Dallas was "rather pleased than otherwise."

As the month of May passed, Dallas seemed increasingly eager to settle the issue. On the 23rd he made another major speech in behalf of the Bank, describing the fine work it had done. He also praised the Committee's bill, although he felt that many of the modifications were either injurious or unnecessary, but were made in the spirit of compromise and conciliation. Dallas favored the present long charter of fifteen to twenty years so that Congress could not interfere with its activities, nor recreate the warm excitement of a bank fight every few years. He emphasized that the proposed charter contained every restriction necessary for preventing any mischief by the Bank. Dallas still did not consider himself an advocate of the institution, but a man discharging a public duty. By the end of May there was no question in his mind that the bill would pass the Senate. The ordeal ended on June 11 when both Pennsylvanians voted with the 28–20 majority to approve the recharter.

On July 3 the Bank bill passed the House of Representatives by a 107–86 margin. The Pennsylvania delegation voted 24–1 (with Henry Muhlenberg not voting) in favor of the measure. Most of these men were strong Jacksonians who were unwilling to speak out

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18 *Niles Register*, Mar. 17, 1832. This contains the full context of the Committee Report including the modifications. Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Apr. 2, 10, 12, 1832; Dallas to Gilpin, Apr. 9, 1832.

19 *Debates in Congress*, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, VIII, part 1, May 23, 1832, 943-950; June 2, 1832, 1014-1016; June 11, 1832, 1073; Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, May 28, 1832, June 6, 1832. Immediately after the Bank vote was taken Dallas revealed that he had been a stockholder in the institution until January, 1832. At that time he sold his shares to avoid possible conflict of interest charges.
for the Bank, but who held firm in their ballots. Without regard for the comfortable majorities the bill had received in both Houses and the overwhelming support of the Keystone State, Jackson sent his veto message back to Congress on July 10. Dallas felt that the President viewed the Bank as unconstitutional and no longer expedient. He regretted that the veto was "dreadfully and unmercifully handled," and feared its impact on his state. But Dallas did not change his vote, joining the losing side on July 14 in an unsuccessful 22-19 attempt to override the President's veto. Personally, the Senator was not shattered by Jackson's action. He was far more concerned with the political, rather than the economic aspects of the move. He did not like Biddle personally and opposed his strategy in the Bank War. As for the institution, he advised Gilpin to "let that go—we ought to have it, but we can do without it." That same July Dallas told a Philadelphia gathering (which later adopted resolutions approving the veto) that the President was more important than the Bank. In 1834 when Jackson removed the government deposits, Dallas commented to Governor Wolf, "I mourn over its [the Bank's] downfall as over the offspring of my father—but I think I can perceive that its directors have insured its destruction by perverting its principles, and by shamelessly as well as unwisely throwing away the very grappling irons which my father had given them to hold on to popular favor and good will."

The reaction of the Pennsylvania Democratic press was similar to Dallas'. The Bank was a popular institution in the state, especially in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, where many residents supported its renewal. Yet if the President said it was unconstitutional they would accept this argument and support him in 1832—"Bank or no Bank." The veto message might even be well received, some editors guessed, by the faithful yeomanry outside the two cities.

20 Debates in Congress, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, VIII, Part 3, July 3, 1832, 3852; Govan, 199; Snyder, 24. Adam King of York County voted no.
21 Dallas to Gilpin, July 10, 1832; Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, July 11, 1832; Debates in Congress, 22nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, July 14, 1832.
22 Dallas to Gilpin, July 13, 1832; Wilburn, 15; Biddle to Richard Rush, Sept. 20, 1831, Biddle MSS. This letter indicates that Biddle was strongly Anti-Mason, in contrast to Dallas, a dedicated Mason. Dallas to George Wolf, Mar. 2, 1834, Wolf Papers, HSP. Dallas indicated at this time he favored a large state bank. Malcolm Eiselen, The Rise of Pennsylvania Protectionism (Philadelphia, 1932), 196.
Unfortunately for the Keystone Democracy, the people were not as understanding as the press had hoped. The President’s veto, combined with his attitudes toward the state party and internal improvements, would have a serious impact upon him and his followers in the coming months.23

There is no question that the people of Pennsylvania were disappointed with Jackson by the fall of 1832. He had alienated the western half of the state with his anti-internal improvements Maysville Road veto in May, 1830. The eastern half became equally dismayed following the Bank veto in July, 1832. These, added to the President’s failure to choose a Pennsylvanian for his Vice-President, threatened to turn the state into a political vassal of the Albany Regency. While Jackson’s personal popularity did not suffer enough to destroy him, he ruined the spirit and credibility of his party in the state. The vote in 1832 reflected the division and disgruntlement within the local Democracy. The President defeated a slate of anti-Jackson electors by 91,000 to 66,700 margin. This represented a decline from 1828 of 10,000 votes for Jackson and an increase of 16,000 for the opposition. Philadelphia City and County, which he had carried by a solid two-to-one majority in the previous election, he lost in 1832 by 10,000 to 12,000. Nor did “Old Hickory” help in state races torn by local issues. Governor Wolf was re-elected by a slim 3,000 votes over Anti-Mason Joseph Ritner, in contrast to his 25,000 vote margin in 1829 over the same candidate.24

The Keystone Democracy still supported Jackson, but its enjoyment had vanished from the “game.” The President no longer liked or trusted the Pennsylvanians. Ingham, who favored the Bank and Calhoun, was dismissed from the Treasury in 1831; Wilkins, who was both pro-Bank and anti-Van Buren, had made himself unacceptable; Dallas had the Calhoun stain and was the sponsor of the Bank bill; and Buchanan, because of his old Federalist ties, his alleged connection with the “corrupt bargain” of 1825, and his personality had already been sent into diplomatic exile in Russia. Thus, when it became obvious in 1832 that Pennsylvania deserved a cabinet post for its election support, and the Treasury was avail-

23 Harrisburg Chronicle, July 9, 16, 30, 1832; Pennsylvania Reporter, July 20, 27, 1832.
24 Wilkins was the Pennsylvania Democracy’s choice for Vice-President and was selected in March, 1832, by the party as a favorite son, challenging the President’s handpicked heir, Van Buren.
able, Jackson had great difficulty in finding someone he considered suitable. Finally, William J. Duane of Philadelphia, a Van Buren man who was not deeply involved in state politics, was chosen.\(^{23}\)

The Pennsylvania Democrats of the 1830's were astute politicians, and it did not require deep thought on their part to recognize how Jackson regarded their organization. Wilkins and Dallas in particular were aware they were in trouble. Both men had voted pro-American System and anti-Jackson on many of the major issues of the day. Wolf had been elected by a narrow plurality over Ritner and could not afford to lose the administration's confidence by backing either of the Senators. This situation was especially damaging to Dallas whose short-term seat was up for re-election in 1833. As the problems mounted for the Senator in Washington, so did his disaffection with his situation. By June, 1832, he was telling Sophy, "Every hour of my present existence is a drag. My days are wearisome and my nights are wretched . . . I can endure a great deal in discharge of duties, but such a life as this I would not endure long if I could." Dallas wrote he had no appetite and no real spirit. He felt like a "lifeless body" and "everything seemed artificial." When he learned that the Senate session would last into mid-July, he moaned, "I shall tear my eyes out and eat my heart up. This is tenfold more than I bargained for."\(^{26}\)

With this combination of personal unhappiness and political exclusion it is not surprising that Dallas chose not to run for re-election. As early as December, 1832, the Senator told his supporters of his decision. In addition he wrote to General Samuel McKean, a member of the Governor's cabinet and Wolf's choice to succeed Dallas, expressing his desire for his success. Dallas undoubtedly knew he was *persona non grata* in Washington and thus resisted requests for a change of position before the spring election. His refusal threw the state Democrats into a frenzy. Many of them had probably felt

\(^{23}\) Klein, 96–97; Louis McLane to Van Buren, Nov. 26, 1832, Fitzpatrick, ed., *Van Buren Autobiography*, 597. Dallas admired the President throughout his career. In December, 1832, he told Gilpin, "He [Jackson] is a much abler man than I thought him: one of those naturally great minds which seem ordinary, except when the fitting emergency arises." Dallas to Gilpin, Dec. 1, 1832.

\(^{26}\) All of Dallas' "whiggish" votes from January–June, 1832, are recorded in *Niles' Register*, June 22, 1844. Dallas to Mrs. Dallas, Mar. 28, May 29, June 5, 1832. Mrs. Dallas remained in Philadelphia with the children throughout Dallas' senatorial term. She visited Washington periodically but did not care for the city, referring to it as "a despicable place." Mrs. Dallas to Dallas, undated (1832?).
Dallas' statements were mere rhetoric. When he stood by them, the Democracy fell into factional disarray. McKean could not be elected without the support of the Buchanan clique whose leader was in Russia. Therefore, the legislature adjourned after numerous unsuccessful ballots to reconvene in December, 1833.

Buchanan returned to the United States on November 24, 1833. He hurried to Washington where a bargain was made with the President to defeat the Dallas clique and the Anti-Masons. Instead of running for the Senate himself, Buchanan supported Wolf's man, McKean, who won handily on December 7. The following year, when the session of Congress ended in June, William Wilkins learned that he had been named to replace Buchanan in St. Petersburg. This, of course, left Wilkins' Senate seat open for Buchanan. A Wolf-Buchanan alliance would be more amenable to Jackson's desires and would be more willing to support Van Buren in 1836. In December, 1834, the election to replace Wilkins was held. The Anti-Masons, newly formed "Whigs" (old National Republicans), and Dallas faction each ran a candidate against "Old Buck." Their opposition was futile, however, since Wolf's backing of Buchanan was enough for victory. In a gesture to everyone the Dallas men refused to vote for the victor, even when his majority was assured.

The Family was gone from national politics, its leaders disgraced. The Buchanan faction would now face the problems of Dallas and Wilkins: how to maintain the President's favor and follow the wishes of Pennsylvania at the same time. Such concerns, however, would not be the official responsibility of George M. Dallas. For the next ten years he would hold a number of offices deliberately calculated to remove him from arenas of political controversy. Many people, including Dallas himself, quite reasonably thought his public career had reached its peak and he would now quietly retire into private life. No one realized that it was only the beginning, and that in little more than a decade he would be Vice-President of the United States.  

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