Joseph Galloway’s Military Advice:  
A Loyalist’s View of the Revolution

Near the end of the American Revolution Edmund Burke remarked that it “was our friends in America that had done us all the mischief. Every calamity of the war had arisen from our friends...” Colonel Isaac Barré went even further during a debate in the House of Commons and suggested that Britain “had no friends in America.” All that existed were the “lying reports” of a few refugees. It was to “their misinformation [that] we might chiefly attribute our disasters in America.” Few historians have been inclined to challenge those contemporary assessments. “It is no exaggeration,” a scholar concluded recently, to say that the Loyalists were the “linchpin” in helping to “determine British plans,” and that it was adherence to those military plans which “led directly to the disaster at Yorktown.” British policy was “based on [the] illusion” that a “meager concession, coupled with a vigorous use of force, would . . . lead the great bulk of the population to repudiate a radical leadership which, in any case, was only precariously maintained.” The Loyalists were culpable because they “reported . . . what [the administration] most wanted to believe” and what “it had previously resolved to pursue.”

2 Ibid., XXII, 1043.
One means of testing the verity of these conclusions is to investigate the reports of an important Loyalist. By examining the information provided by Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania, perhaps the most prolific civilian intelligence supplier among the Loyalists, this paper will attempt to discover the nature and quality of the advice proffered by antirevolutionary colonists. In short, it will seek to answer whether the ministry would have been wise to recognize early that the Loyalists were "too much under the impulse of Passion & Prejudice to be relied on for Information," or, as it was subsequently lamented, whether the implementation of their recommendations would have "retrieve[d] every thing but the lives of our martyrs."  

Joseph Galloway, born in Maryland about 1731, moved to Philadelphia in the late 1740s. A thriving law practice and careful marriage quickly transformed him into one of the colony's most affluent citizens. In 1756 he was elected to the Assembly and his talents, as well as the influence of his mentor Benjamin Franklin, rapidly moved him to the highest councils of the Quaker Party. Galloway became a spokesman for moderation when Anglo-American relations grew strained after 1765, and at the First Continental Congress he unsuccessfully sought a compromise solution for imperial problems. When hostilities flared he retired from public life, but in December of 1776, either from conviction or opportunism, he cast his lot with Great Britain and joined the army of Sir William Howe in New Jersey. Thereafter, he served Howe as an intelligence official in the campaign of 1777 and as police commissioner of occupied Philadelphia. When the British evacuated Philadelphia Galloway fled to London. He remained in Britain following the Revolution and died in London in 1803.


Even before the occurrence of hostilities Galloway argued that Great Britain could win any war with America. The colonists "may as well attempt to scale the moon, and wrench her from her orbit as withstand the powers of Britain," he maintained. Once fighting began his position changed only in that he suggested that Britain was invincible so long as the conflict was properly waged.

The greatest advantage the British possessed, he contended, was numerical superiority, for not only did Britain have a greater population than the American colonies, but a majority of the colonials were Loyalists. Galloway's estimate of the number of those Loyalists, however, varied considerably. In January of 1778 he advised British authorities that five-sixths of the colonists remained loyal, and six months later he reported that nine-tenths of the population was Loyalist. On other occasions he suggested that approximately eighty per cent of the colonists were loyal. At still another time he insisted that "two thirds of the people at least are our friends." Sometimes he vaguely alluded to the "tens of thousands [who] are at this moment willing and desirous to assist Government in suppressing the Rebellion." He declared that in some states fewer than one in every 150 inhabitants had supported the new state constitutions.

Galloway never wavered in his belief that the number of Loyalists increased without abatement. Before hostilities commenced, he predicted that the violence of radical protests would cause most Americans—even those who sympathized with the protesters—to desert the dissenters. In early 1775, before Lexington-Concord, he wrote that a majority of colonists had finally perceived that continued agitation would ultimately lead to an attempt to secure

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8 [Joseph Galloway], *A Reply to an Address, to the Author of a Pamphlet* (New York, 1775), 42.
11 [Joseph Galloway], *Fabricus, or Letters to the People of Great Britain* (London, 1782), 74.
12 Galloway, *Plain Truth*, 16.
13 [Joseph Galloway], *Letters to a Nobleman, on the Conduct of the War in the Middle Colonies* (London, 1779), 20.
independence, and that radicalism would be rejected in order to prevent war.\textsuperscript{15} Even the military disaster at Saratoga did not alter Galloway's optimism. "The People... ardently wish to be restored to their former Condition" in the Empire, he reported a few weeks after the battle. The "Tyranny and Cruelties" of the Continental Army had convinced many of the undesirability of perpetuating the rebellion. Some were converted to loyalty because of colonial currency depreciation, indebtedness, and heavy taxes, while others lamented the loss of the "Necessaries and Conveniences of Life" or the "Burthens, Difficulties and Calamities of War." "Mankind in general do not Reason but from their Feelings," he advised, and "when they reason from them they reason to solid and lasting Conviction, which no Argument can set aside."\textsuperscript{16}

Galloway also supplied intelligence regarding American troop strength, although, as in the reports on Loyalist numbers, his estimates varied. A few weeks after Saratoga he reported to a British adjutant that General Washington had approximately 10,000 troops under his command.\textsuperscript{17} At the same time he advised the Ministry that Washington's force numbered 12,000.\textsuperscript{18} One month later, in January, 1778, he reported that Washington's strength had declined to 6,000 men.\textsuperscript{19} Early in March he calculated that the American army had dwindled to 5,000 and later that month—and again in June—he observed that Washington possessed just 4,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{20}

Galloway's reports, in addition, stressed the difficulties which confronted the Americans. Approximately 2,500 of Washington's army died in the bitter winter of 1776–1777, he confided. While acting on behalf of the British army in 1777, Galloway reported

\textsuperscript{15} Galloway, \textit{A Reply}, 3-4.

\textsuperscript{16} Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, Stevens, \textit{Facsimiles}, XXIV, No. 2069; Galloway to Dartmouth, Jan. 23, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2078; Joseph Galloway, "A View of the Present Strength of America in Respect to Her Number of Fighting Men," 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2098.

\textsuperscript{17} Galloway to Ambrose Serle, Dec. 15, 1777, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2074.

\textsuperscript{18} Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2069.

\textsuperscript{19} Galloway to Dartmouth, Jan. 20, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2078.

\textsuperscript{20} Galloway to Dartmouth, Mar. 4, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2090; Galloway to Dartmouth, Mar. 24, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2092; Galloway to Dartmouth, June 17, 1778, \textit{ibid.}, XXIV, No. 2095.
that thirty to forty colonists were dying daily of starvation or illness in rebel-controlled Philadelphia. Before Howe commenced operations in 1778, Galloway reported that all of Washington's horses had perished at Valley Forge. The troops under Washington were "sickly and destitute of Cloathing, without Medicine, without Salt or Salt Meat or a possibility of possessing those." The troops were in "very uncomfortable Lodgings" and were "in a manner naked."

Privation, Galloway reported, had reduced the Continental Army to a "miscreant Troop . . . [which] is mouldering and must moulder to nothing before the Spring of 1778." Recruits could be attained only upon threat of fine, imprisonment, or execution. Desperate to avoid serving, he charged, "whole counties" withstood induction, and it was not uncommon for farmers to resist recruitment officials with pitchforks and clubs. Desertion further exacerbated Washington's problems as seen by Galloway who, for instance, advised that nearly 1,500 Americans had deserted to Philadelphia by March of 1778. As police commissioner of that city he reported as many as forty-nine desertions in a single day in 1778.

The "force of an army does not consist in numbers, so much as in military appointments and discipline," Galloway once reflected, and in this respect, too, Washington's army was woefully inadequate. The British officers were experienced professionals and the enlisted men were "high spirited and perfectly disciplined" veterans. But the American officers were "badly appointed" and "unskilled in military knowledge," while the "panic-stricken" troops were of

22 Galloway to Dartmouth, Mar. 24, 1778, Stevens, *Facsimiles*, XXIV, No. 2092.
23 Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, ibid., XXIV, No. 2069.
24 Galloway to Dartmouth, Mar. 4, 1778, ibid., XXIV, No. 2090. See also Galloway Examination, 29; Tatum, *Journal*, 178.
26 Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, ibid., XXIV, No. 2069.
the “lower Class of Mankind” and were better suited for the “mechanic arts or the plow.” Moreover, Britain’s superior soldiers were assisted by a first-rate intelligence network, according to Galloway, while the colonists muddled along with a primitive apparatus. Late in the war Galloway told a British audience that Washington’s intelligence service was so poor that the American commander frequently presumed he was in enemy territory when he was, in fact, on safe terrain. In Galloway’s view, Washington was often without the necessary implements of war. Either the limited number of manufacturing concerns could not produce the amount necessary for Washington’s needs, or his supplies were destroyed by Loyalist saboteurs. Many Americans “broke their wheels and disabled their wagons,” he stated, in order to keep these articles out of the hands of Washington. The British, in addition, were “attended by the ablest surgeons and physicians,” while the colonists experienced untold suffering. His reports were filled with accounts of maladies which resulted from some “putrid epidemical Fever.” He often related how the Americans had “melancholy Apprehensions of a Pestilence” in the wake of some nearby battle. In addition to disease, he reported the “Waste and Desolation daily made by both Armies [gives one] every Reason to expect a speedy Famine.”

Galloway scoffed at the Congressional estimate of America’s potential manpower. The population of the colonies was 2,430,678, not 3,000,000 as claimed by Congress. Moreover, when allowances were made for the large number of slaves, free Negroes, women, children and Loyalists, the rebels could draw on fewer than 150,000 men capable of soldiering. Some of these were unhealthy—many had previously been wounded—and others were needed on the home front for economic reasons or to guard against slave insurrections. The “Strength of America,” therefore, “must be . . . nearly exhausted,” he reported in 1778.

30 Galloway Examination, 70n; Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 34-35; Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, Stevens, Facsimiles, XXIV, No. 2069.
31 Galloway Examination, 28.
32 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 34-35; Galloway Examination, 29.
33 Tatum, Journal, 182, 192, 196.
34 Galloway, Plain Truth, 16.
Galloway held inflexibly to the conviction—even after numerous setbacks—that the rebellion could be crushed if only the proper strategy was pursued. Implementation of the proper strategy, in his estimation, was to begin with British utilization of the Loyalists. In view of their “matchless sacrifices,” he could not understand the “wilfull neglect” manifested toward the Loyalists who had been subjected to “unparalleled sufferings.” Some had been “reduced to live in garrets, others to be banished into the country, unattended by a single object to relieve their melancholy and distressing contemplations, and the best of them, not much better than unnoticed vagabonds. Such an extreme transition is too painful, too severe....” Unless Britain quickly made use of the Loyalists, Galloway admonished, the services of this important group might be permanently withheld. “Such men,” he said, are unlikely to make “exertions in favour of government” once they have experienced the “tormenting sting of neglect.” However, as late as 1780 he maintained that “their loyalty has sustained the fiery trial, and remains inviolate at this moment.”

Since the Loyalists included “men of the first weight and influence,” Galloway recommended that use be made of them as sources of intelligence, as propagandists, and as commanding officers. His own success in quickly raising a Loyalist regiment in occupied Philadelphia convinced him of the willingness of these people to serve. He recommended that some of them be used behind American lines as saboteurs; specifically, he argued that rebel ships in port could be destroyed, and he even concocted plans for the abduction of the Governor of New Jersey and—in a dramatic flight of fantasy—for the kidnapping of the entire Continental Congress. In addition, Galloway counseled Britain on the need for retaining the loyalty of large numbers of colonists if the empire was to be reconstructed.

Until Philadelphia was abandoned in 1778, Galloway remained hopeful that the rebellion would soon be crushed. He had thought

it “fortunate” that the colonists had “rebelled at this early Period of Existence, because... had the Rebellion been postponed until her Resources and Strength had been increased, her Scheme of Independence would, in great Probability, have succeeded.” He also rejoiced that all “Proposals of Accommodation” had been rejected. These had been “calculated only to effect a temporary Settlement of the Difference,” whereas Galloway believed “Nothing short of [America’s] Reduction” would enable the construction of a permanent empire.\(^{37}\) At the beginning of 1777 he reported that “another Campaign will, in all Probability, put an End to the Rebellion.”\(^{38}\) Even though Britain failed to crush the revolt in the ensuing campaign, he maintained at the end of the year that “the Rebellion in the middle Colonies is in its last languishing Stage.”\(^{39}\) He began the new year with the forecast that the “only Means by which this Rebellion has been or can be much longer supported is failing with a Rapid progress... for Want of a Resource of Money.”\(^{40}\) On the eve of hostilities in 1778 he reported that the “Rebellion will soon be happily ended by the Force already here and what is intended by Parliament to be sent here.”\(^{41}\)

Although Galloway grew more bitter following Britain’s retreat from Philadelphia, he continued to believe the war could be won. He was convinced that British strategy had been sound until mid-1778, but he thought the implementation of that strategy had been woeful. Much of the reason for British failure, he stated, could be attributed to inapt generalship. America was still fighting “because our generals would not, and not because they could not, reduce her.” He contended that the British commanders had manifested an image of “indolence and misconduct.” Galloway termed the generals “wiseacres” and referred to their “disgraceful effeminacy, and fondness for dissipation.” Their “mode of carrying on the war, [was] more cruel to friends than foes,” he argued. He thought the generals had either practiced “the most consummate ignorance in the art of war, or the most dastardly cowardice...”\(^{42}\)

\(^{38}\) Galloway to Jackson, Mar. 20, 1777, *ibid.*, XXIV, No. 2051.
\(^{39}\) Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, *ibid.*, XXIV, No. 2069.
\(^{40}\) Galloway to Dartmouth, Jan. 23, 1778, *ibid.*, XXIV, No. 2078.
\(^{41}\) Galloway to Dartmouth, Mar. 4, 1778, *ibid.*, XXIV, No. 2069.
Galloway was baffled by the lack of “vigour and exertion in the execution” of well-laid British plans. After the battle of Princeton the bedraggled army of Washington was able to escape because the British pursuers took seven hours to march twelve miles. Galloway congratulated General Howe on his success in “calculating with great accuracy, the exact time necessary for his enemy to escape.” When Howe decided to take Philadelphia he “Idly and wantonly wasted twelve weeks” in New York before beginning his movements. On another occasion a beleaguered Washington escaped when Howe refused to confront his adversary in a rainstorm. Clearly, Galloway commented, “rain was in favour of disciplined troops, who would take more care of their ammunition from knowledge and experience, than undisciplined” warriors. During the terrible winter of 1777–1778 Washington was permitted to remain unmolested at Valley Forge, when a British blow might have ended the rebellion. In fact, Galloway added, Washington was not only untouched but was allowed to destroy British stores of food, forage in the nearby countryside, and to terrorize the local Loyalists.43 Attack and pursuit, he asserted, were particularly vital components of strategy when fighting an army like Washington’s. Because America had no garrisons “the country itself is conquered” when the army is beaten. “Under a conduct so erroneous,” Galloway asked, “what avail superior numbers, discipline, or appointments? Force, however great, is useless unless exerted, and victory is Vain unless pursued.”44

If Galloway found the lack of vigor reprehensible, he was mortified at the “ignorance and folly” which resulted when the generals decided to fight. The debacle of 1777 was a case in point. When Howe moved his army from New York to Philadelphia he made an unnecessary 600 mile transit by sea—he sailed south to the Chesapeake Bay and then northward to the Maryland coast—when a relatively safe sixty mile overland route across New Jersey would

43 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 26, 49, 74, 76, 87. Galloway urged that an attack be made on Washington at Valley Forge. If Washington’s “Army should ever be dispersed,” he reported, “as it was twelve Months since, which I imagine it may well be by Vigorous and steady pursuit, I think . . . the Congress in the present State of their Affairs and in the present Disposition and Temper of the People, will not be able to raise another of any kind of Consequence.” See Galloway to Dartmouth, Dec. 3, 1777, Stevens, Facsimilies, XXIV, No. 2069.
44 Galloway, Plain Truth, 19; Galloway Examination, 70n.
have been satisfactory. Howe undertook the voyage during the hottest season of the year, an unfortunate decision since the resulting shortages of water debilitated the cargo of men and horses. Moreover, Howe was accompanied by 20,000 troops, whereas General Burgoyne, who was invading New York from Canada at that moment, was left with an undermanned army to campaign in America’s “most disaffected area.” Burgoyne, according to Galloway, might have saved the expedition had he not unwisely diverted a portion of his troops into the ambush at Bennington on the eve of the battle at Saratoga. Burgoyne’s defeat, therefore, was “melancholy proof” of his military inadequacy.45

Most of Galloway’s venom was directed against army commanders, but he sometimes lashed out at the navy. With its immense numerical superiority, as well as its advantages accruing from experience, Galloway was bewildered at what he regarded as the navy’s minimal success. He believed that Britain’s numerical advantages increased each year. By the end of 1777 Britain had nearly seventy more warships afloat than her adversaries. Furthermore, the English fleet consisted of vessels of “every size” while the colonials used ships “of the smaller size, and none exceeding 32 guns.” A fleet of the British magnitude could “line the whole American coast, from Boston to . . . Savannah, when stationed within sight of one another.” Yet, the British blockade, Galloway contended, was largely a failure. Not only did America continue to import foreign goods, but the intercolonial coastal trade flourished as well. Washington’s army at Valley Forge “was saved from famine” because it received salt and pork funneled northward from the Carolinas. Galloway argued that Howe required only half his fleet for establishing a blockade sufficient to destroy an already ill-provisioned army. Since an effective blockade would have destroyed the colonial naval force, the colonial population—dependent of foreign imports for most of its goods—would have been further demoralized. Moreover, before 1778 American ports were “naked, without fortification or cannon,” yet Howe neither made serious raids nor utilized neighboring Loyalists for the destruction of the colonial fleet. Just “two of your larger and two of your middle-

45 Galloway to General John Burgoyne, c. 1780, Galloway Papers.
sized vessels," he admonished the Admiral, would have eradicated the American fleet before it sailed. Instead, the colonial vessels were saved by British incompetence and ultimately armed with French cannon. These same American vessels, said Galloway, were later employed with great success as privateers against Howe's fleet.

British strategy, if not its implementation, was not criticized by Galloway before 1778. Then, when the British announced plans to abandon Philadelphia, Galloway fired off his initial note of protest. He argued that its central location and excellent harbor made Philadelphia the "most important place to either contending party . . . in all America." The manufacturing establishments of the city were too valuable to be relinquished, while possession of the shipyards would enable the rebels to construct their own fleet. The region about the city contained enough fertile land to provide food for Washington for years. Finally, he argued, British occupation of Philadelphia had a jolting psychological impact on America. As long as the city remained in British hands the rebels were dispirited. Prolonged occupation would convert many revolutionaries into Loyalists. Only those inhabitants who had been "elevated from Dunghil in their present Power and Wealth are determined to keep the Bull to the last Extremity."

From 1778 until 1782, when the House of Commons expressed its displeasure of Loyalist criticism, Galloway publicly and privately attacked the military strategy pursued by Britain. Galloway was careful, however, not to indict the administration which appointed the commanders of the armed services. The government still believed the rebellion could be crushed. Consequently, he remarked that "the exertions of the Ministry in preparing for the suppression of the Rebellion have been truly great and noble, and more than equal to the end."

To crush a civil rebellion, Galloway insisted, Britain must redesign its military strategy. A domestic upheaval would quickly collapse when confronted by "quick, sudden, rapid" measures and

46 Galloway, A Letter to the Right Honorable, 14-37.
47 Galloway, Plain Truth, 17; Galloway, "Reasons against abandoning the city of Philadelphia . . .," Stevens, Facsimiles, XXIV, No. 2096.
48 See Parl. Hist., XXII, 1089, 1101.
49 Galloway, Plain Truth, 11-12.
when "every Advantage" was pursued by the constituted authorities. A rebellion’s "conscious Guilt, its Fears of punishment render it cowardly, and easily suppressed by Vigorous Measures." However, a government which was lax in subduing rebels was soon in difficulty. As rebellions were easily crushed, they were easily generated. "A little Success mixed with Enthusiasm," he asserted, "will induce Cowards to turn out."  

Galloway recommended that greater use be made of the Indian allies and that less reliance be placed on the mercenary Hessians. He did not believe the Indians should be "let loose to perpetrate acts of cruelty," but he did advocate using the natives on the frontier to destroy the "plantations which served to shelter, protect, and furnish the enemy." Many Indians remained neutral in the struggle because of prior cavalier treatment at the hands of British officials. A wise Indian policy would have forestalled French intervention, he maintained, for the French would have been reluctant to combat their old allies. He regarded the German mercenaries as undependable troops, prone to desert when tantalized by the lure of the American bounty. He thought it a policy of "unparalleled absurdity" to entrust strategic bases—such as Trenton had been in late 1776—to the guardianship of mercenaries. Germanic brutality often alienated potential colonial allies. To most colonists the Hessians were characterized by "rapine and disgraceful plunder." With such friends Britain would not be regarded as "ENEMY," but as the "OPPRESSORS AND PLUNDERERS."  

Galloway criticized the British command for remaining committed to the European manner of warfare. British armies routinely awaited summer weather before operations were launched, a policy which robbed Britain of several critical weeks of campaigning. Roads in America, he argued, were generally passable by early April, and, if the early spring weather occasionally was adverse, these factors should have been more detrimental to an untrained militia than to a professional army. In addition, Washington’s troops were normally at their weakest ebb in early spring following a long, debilitating winter.

50 Galloway to Dartmouth, Jan. 20, 1778, Stevens, Facsimilies, XXIV, No. 2078.  
51 Galloway to Burgoyne, c. 1780, Galloway Papers.  
52 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 51, 57; Galloway, Fabricus, 7–8.  
58 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 36–37.
The argument—often voiced by the political opposition in Britain—that the assets of British military experience and numerical superiority were negated by the uniqueness of American conditions, was simply unpalatable to Galloway. To the “Ancients, or to Britons till lately, such a sentiment was unknown.” He observed that America had no hedges or dykes. Its fences were wooden and certainly not insurmountable. He asked where were the hills on Long Island, or between New York and Trenton, or between Head of Elk and Philadelphia. Most areas where battles had flared had no mountains and its hills were “little more than mole-hills.” If ambushes against Howe, Clinton, or Burgoyne were possible, such attacks had been perpetrated—with little success—against Amherst, Forbes, and Bouquet. To Galloway the entire argument was a dodge. “I have no idea,” he remarked, “of any country being impartial in respect to military operations.”

It was not the terrain in Galloway’s opinion, but incompetence which caused the army to be “wasted in wild and fruitless marches... without taking a single step to secure any part” of the conquered region. The southern strategy adopted in 1779 was a perfect example, he charged. General Cornwallis trooped about the southern colonies “as if he thought he had been hunting a fox.” The General proceeded for 1,500 miles “never looking behind, nor considering that the country, he had so rapidly passed over, was neither secured nor reduced, until he had wasted his pack, and totally lost his game.” Only Charleston had been secured, and it was “a place near 1000 miles distant from the only proper scene of action.”

In the early days of the war Galloway hoped the English efforts would be characterized “by a moderate & charitable Conduct” toward her enemies. As the war progressed he came to believe the “low minded and relentless Enemies” did not deserve lenient treatment. Galloway scoffed at Burgoyne’s assumption that although unsuccessful in battle, he, happily, had not resorted to terror

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55 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 2-5; Galloway, A Reply to the Observations, 11-12.

56 Galloway, Fabricus, 65-63.

57 Galloway to Grace Galloway, Mar. 21, 1777, Galloway Papers.

58 Galloway to Burgoyne, [1780?], ibid.
tactics. Burgoyne maintained that British officers were to act as soldiers, not as executioners. Galloway attacked these "romantic sentiments" and advised the General that the lofty ideals had "not paid the texture of your mind any great compliment." Terror was "a settled & established rule of conduct" for militarists. If a general was unfamiliar with the uses of terror he was to be pitied, but if a general was familiar with terrorism and shrank from its application he deserved only contempt. Failure to utilize every means of warfare only caused the rebellion to be protracted. It was "almost impossible" to show too much zeal against the colonists "considering the matchless ingratitude, injustice and cruelty of the rebels...." The military man must be a "soldier-executioner." A general's duty was "to distress the enemy by wasting their country, if necessary to obtain a conquest, and . . . otherwise to harangue them." It was preferable that "all America . . . be laid waste, than annexed to, & joined with France, in order to annihilate this Empire." Propaganda, he counseled Burgoyne, might prevent revolutions, but it was clear by 1780 that "words [could] not finish the war; and therefore of necessity, severity was the only alternative."59

Finally, Galloway believed the Empire required enlightened reform, which, if implemented, would assist in quelling the rebellion. Prior to the upheaval, the Loyalist maintained with candor, the colonists had "lost the enjoyments of . . . the . . . great right of English freedom, a participation of the supreme authority, and all the other rights of Englishmen."60 Galloway, therefore, urged that Britain sanction the establishment of a bicameral American congress to serve as the "fourth branch of the British Legislature," and that all previous parliamentary acts "inconsistent with the Principles of this Union" be repealed.61 He hoped the mercantilistic trade and currency restrictions would be removed, or at least relaxed, and he

59 Galloway to Grace Galloway, Aug. 9 [1778?], ibid.
proposed sweeping changes for the provincial governments. He advocated, for instance, that all governors be appointed by the Crown and that the lower houses of assembly be elected for three-year terms by colonial property owners. If these alterations were made in the Anglo-American constitution, he prophesied, the civil war would end and the colonists would "adhere to the State, attend her faithfully, in all her wars and distresses, fight her battles, and expire with her."

What conclusions can be reached regarding Galloway's reports and advice? His reports in 1777-1778 concerning the strength of the insurrectionaries were reasonably accurate. Although he erred slightly in reporting too few troops under Washington early in 1778, he had overestimated the number of troops under the American commander at Valley Forge. Later, with the popularity of the war decreasing in Britain, Galloway's reports became less reliable. He maintained in 1779 that Washington's forces had declined to 4,000, when in fact the American general possessed nearly 11,000 soldiers and hoped to have 25,000 men under his command before the end of that summer.

Even though Galloway exaggerated Washington's recruitment problems, his reports concerning the difficulties confronting the Americans during the winters of 1776-1777 and 1777-1778 were generally correct. Washington estimated that 1,100 men deserted or refused to re-enlist in early 1777, and he wondered "How we shall be able to rub along till the new army is raised. . . ." The following winter the American commander reported that 4,000 of his soldiers were "unfit for duty because they were bare foot and otherwise naked." Like Galloway, Washington reported that "unless

62 Galloway, A Reply to an Address, 7; Galloway to Benjamin Franklin, Nov. 16-28, 1765, Papers, XII, 375; Galloway to Franklin, Jan. 13, 1766, ibid., XIII, 36-37; Galloway to Franklin, June 21, 1770, Jared Sparks, ed., The Works of Benjamin Franklin (Boston, 1856), VII, 482; Galloway Plan of Union, 1788, printed in Boyd, Anglo-American Union, 175.
63 Galloway to Jenkinson, c. 1780, in Boyd, Anglo-American Union, 147-149; Galloway Plan of Union, c. 1785, ibid., 163-164.
64 Galloway, Plain Truth, 48-49.
66 Galloway Examination, 30; Freeman, George Washington, V, 110, 137.
67 Freeman, George Washington, IV, 338n, 382.
some great and capital change suddenly takes place . . . this Army must inevitably be reduced to one or another of three things: Starve, dissolve or disperse...." Furthermore, while Galloway underestimated the number of potential American soldiers, his estimate of the total colonial population was more accurate than the guess made by Congress. Recent scholarly studies placed the colonial population at 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1763 and at 2,500,000 in 1776, whereas Galloway estimated just over 2,400,000 and Congress thought 3,000,000 people lived in the colonies.  

The most serious error made by Galloway was his continued assurance that large numbers of Americans were Loyalists. Recent studies—which disclosed that at most one-third of the colonists remained loyal—signify that he erred on the side of generosity. Even so, Galloway was accountable only for Pennsylvania, a state that contained an unusually high number of Loyalists. Moreover, as a new study has indicated, the number of British-sympathizers—never a stable and uniform aggregate—tended to increase markedly in regions where fighting occurred. Most of Galloway's reports were issued in the period when Pennsylvania was under siege.

Unanimity hardly persisted within the imperial command as to the proper strategy to pursue, and historians have long been at odds in their assessment of British policy. No definitive appraisal is likely. Nevertheless, it seems certain that much of the criticism by Galloway was unwarranted. For example, his suggestion that the American terrain and weather should have been no hindrance to British armies revealed a lack of military knowledge. Movement by a large army along muddy, rain-soaked roads was a near impossibility. The nature and scope of the continent often negated prompt communication and concerted action among commanders. If, as Galloway suggested, British officers had succeeded on American soil in earlier wars, their major enemy had been other European—

68 Ibid., IV, 568; Peckham, The War for Independence, 82.
not native American—soldiers. In addition, Galloway regarded the southern strategy as foolish, yet the strategy was based, in large part, on the assumption—fostered by Loyalists—that thousands of southern Loyalists would arise to assist the English troops. Neither Galloway nor the generals he criticized fully appreciated the American forces. Part of the British failure was due to the effective campaigning waged by the colonists. Washington demonstrated that a small force, when properly used, could harass and stalemate a larger, better-trained army. The American commander's actions further demonstrated that British numerical superiority, of which Galloway wrote at such length, was often ineffective against colonial hit-and-run warfare. In fact, the British forces were probably too small to achieve the ends desired by the administration.72

It is questionable, moreover, whether the tactics proposed by Galloway would have produced a colonial defeat or led to costly British victories similar to that at Bunker Hill. And his contention that Britain's attitude toward the Indians was supercilious was strangely ill-informed. Great Britain received considerable assistance from numerous tribes. Furthermore, many of his suggestions were contradictory. He recommended constant pursuit and strikes at the enemy, yet he criticized British generals for not leaving an occupation force in previously subdued territory. He called for a more ruthless British attitude, yet he charged that the pitiless actions of the Hessians resulted in colonial malevolence.

Nevertheless, some of Galloway's criticism was valid. General Howe was extremely reluctant to fight Washington. In the winter Howe blamed the cold for his inaction; in the summer he argued it was too hot for combat. Howe often lacked the resources he desired, but he was always better equipped than his adversary. Galloway's criticism of Howe for beginning his campaigns too late and completing them too early was not unrealistic. Howe, for example, did not begin his 1777 offensive until late August and he completed that campaign in early November. In Washington's estimation, as

in the opinion of Galloway, Howe was unwise not to have attacked
the ragged Americans in winter quarters at Valley Forge. Furthermore,
the wisdom underlying Howe’s method of invading Pennsylvania in 1777—a sea invasion which took his army more than two
months to gain an objective less than 100 miles away—can be
seriously questioned. Even Washington would have agreed with
many of Galloway’s objections. “With a little enterprise and in-
dustry,” the American commander wrote after the war, the British,
on more than one occasion, could have crushed the rebellion.73 Or,
as Galloway lectured General Howe, “superior skill, force and
exertion alone, can ensure victory and success.”74

Based on the experience of Joseph Galloway, an assessment which
reproves the Loyalists for the British military failure is unfairly
harsh. The Loyalists were self-serving and their reports were occa-
sionally inaccurate, but the task of the strategic planners in London
was to sift through the advice proffered by numerous officials and
devise an enlightened plan for the conduct of the war. If the Ameri-
can Revolution was a disastrous military experience for Great
Britain, blame for the failure should be attributed to those who
made policy, not to those in America whose reports were generally
realistic and whose recommendations were normally edifying.

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73 Quoted in Maldwyn Jones, “Sir William Howe: Conventional Strategist,” in Billias,
George Washington’s Opponents, 56. See also Robson, The American Revolution, 160.
74 Galloway, Letters to a Nobleman, 5.