The Pennsylvania Origins of Popular Sovereignty

The introduction of the Wilmot Proviso in 1846, perhaps more than any other single action, broke the uneasy sectional truce regarding slavery and began the process of party and sectional realignments which culminated in the Civil War. As the proviso's basic principle of free soil became the dominant issue of the campaign of 1848, national politicians were forced to come to grips with this question in a variety of ways.*

Popular Sovereignty, the Democratic Party's solution to these issues in 1848, had its origins as an acceptable political concept in Vice President George M. Dallas' Great Speech . . . Upon the Leading Topics of the Day, which he gave in Pittsburgh on September 18, 1847. Although Congressmen Caleb B. Smith of Indiana and Shelton F. Leake of Virginia had made earlier vague references to the people of a territory governing themselves, Dallas was the first major political figure to call for popular sovereignty.1 He had been a prominent figure in the Democratic Party in Pennsylvania and the nation since Andrew Jackson's first bid for the presidency. He had served as Mayor of Philadelphia (1828-1829), Federal District Attorney (1829-1831), United States Senator (1831-1833), Attorney General of Pennsylvania (1833-1835), Minister to Russia (1837-1839), and as Vice President under James K. Polk. Clearly his endorsement of popular sovereignty was an important political sign.

It appears to be more than coincidental that the Proviso and two of the three leading solutions to the problem of slavery in the territories—extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean and popular sovereignty—originated within the Keystone State. Pennsylvania was truly a microcosm of the Union and proved

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1 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 124, 444.
to be the testing ground for the acceptability and appeal of the efforts intended once again to remove the questions of slavery and the extension of slavery from the national political scene. That was clearly Dallas' intention. As Vice President he knew the disruptive potential of the Wilmot Proviso and free soil, and he sought to articulate a solution which would maintain the Constitution and the Union and provide satisfaction to both North and South. However, historians have failed to give him proper credit for his role. With Lewis Cass the party's nominee in 1848, Cass, not Dallas, became synonymous with popular sovereignty.2

The Pennsylvania origins of popular sovereignty have generally been ignored or summarily passed over by historians. Philip S. Klein, in his biography of James Buchanan, incorrectly argues "the popular sovereignty idea was peculiarly western in its inception and appeal."3 Charles McCool Snyder, in his history of the state in the Jacksonian period, relegates Dallas' Pittsburgh speech to a footnote and fails even to see it as an expression of popular sovereignty.4 Chaplain Morrison and Joseph G. Rayback, two recent historians of free soil, have seen Dallas speech as a major expression of popular sovereignty but move so quickly over it that other issues mute the significance of their views.5

When Congressman David Wilmot first introduced his amendment to President James K. Polk's request for two million dollars to facilitate treaty negotiations with Mexico and to "pay a fair equivalent for any [boundary] concessions which may be made by Mexico," he did so more from pique with the progress and conduct of the Polk administration than from antislavery convictions. Wilmot shared a growing northern Democratic frustration, bitterness, and resentment over the broad tariff reductions, the compromise settlement in Oregon, the veto of the "pork barrel" Rivers and

Harbors Bill, and the increasingly expansionist course of the Mexican War. The proviso offered a northern test of southern Democratic expansionism: was it pure or was it tainted with the desire to extend the institution of slavery? By prohibiting slavery from any territory acquired from Mexico, the proviso placed southern expansionist desires on the line. The amended bill passed the House with relative ease and little debate on August 6, 1847.

The bill, with the proviso, reached the Senate floor two days later, less than one hour before adjournment of the session. John W. Davis of Massachusetts, an antislavery Whig, filibustered against deleting the proviso until the House had adjourned. The Two Million Bill never came to a vote in the Senate.

The Proviso and its implications failed to attract much attention or debate between congressional sessions. Electioneering in the fall of 1846 focused on the war and the tariff as politicians avoided injecting this new, unmeasured issue into politics. It would take the congressional debates of the 1846-1847 session to arouse the populace to the implications of the issue.

Prior to reintroducing his diplomatic appropriation request, President Polk met separately with his cabinet, John C. Calhoun, David Wilmot, and Lewis Cass in an attempt to prevent the Proviso from being added to the new, larger request. His efforts were futile. Despite Democratic reluctance to reopen the issue, free soilers placed it before the House even before Polk's bill was intro-

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7 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 1218; Going, Wilmot, 101-105. The House vote was 85 to 79.

8 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 1st Session, 1220-1221, 2nd Session, 509. The House clock was seven minutes faster than the Senate clock. The Proviso was the first significant issue to be killed by a filibuster.

9 Polk to Calhoun, Dec. 19, 1846, Calhoun Papers, Library of Congress (LC); Milo Quaife, ed., The Diary of James K. Polk During his Presidency, 1845-1849 (Chicago, 1910), II, 283-284, 287, 289-292; David Wilmot's account of his interview with Polk is in Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, 139.
duced. When the administration’s Three Million Bill reached the House floor in mid-February the Wilmot Proviso was quickly appended to it. After one week of debate the bill, with the Proviso attached, passed the House. Northern free soil sentiment was reinforced by legislative resolutions endorsing the Proviso in Vermont, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Ohio, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Michigan, Maine, and Massachusetts.

Senator John C. Calhoun articulated the southern response to the Wilmot Proviso with a series of resolutions introduced into the Senate on February 19, 1847. They held the territories to be the “joint and common property” of the states and denied any congressional power to restrict any citizens “from emigrating with their property,” into the territories or to prevent the citizens of the territories from being able to decide on slavery for themselves. Calhoun’s concepts, which came to be known as the Doctrine of Congressional Noninterference, provided the basis for the southern argument in 1847–1848.

Senate efforts to amend the Three Million Bill with the Proviso failed; it passed unencumbered. The House then accepted the Senate’s unencumbered version and adjourned its session.

In the next few months Calhoun traveled and spoke throughout the South to alert the section to the Proviso’s threat, to galvanize political opinion, and to unite the South in defense of southern rights and slavery. The safety of the South, as he foresaw it, lay in strict adherence to the Constitution and in sectional unanimity in the coming presidential election. The Democratic Party would have to select a candidate who was “beyond the taint of suspicion on slavery.” As Calhoun’s campaign to create a separate southern

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11 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 303, 352, 425; Going, Wilmot, 161–163.
12 The resolutions are most conveniently found in the Congressional Globe, 30th Congress, 1st Session, Appendix, 680.
13 Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2nd Session, 455.
14 Ibid., 555, 573.
15 Calhoun’s sentiments were summed up best in his Mar. 9, 1847, speech in Charleston, S. C., in Richard K. Crallé, ed., Works of John C. Calhoun (New York, 1854–1855), IV, 382–396; Charleston Mercury, Mar. 9, 1847; Niles Register, LXXII (Apr. 3, 1847), 73–74.
party faltered, southern discontent and fear focused more and more on the issues of the Wilmot Proviso and party regularity. State after state in the South went on record against the Proviso (just as their northern counterparts had done a few months before in favor of the Proviso) and any presidential candidate who, in the wording of the Alabama Platform, "shall not, previous to the election, distinctly, unequivocally, and publicly avow his opposition" to federal interference with slavery in the territories.16 Clearly Calhoun and the South had raised an issue which the leading Democratic presidential contenders would have to answer.

President Polk's goodwill tour through the northeastern states in June and July of 1847 was intended, in part, to counter the growing pro-Proviso, antislavery sentiments in that section. Although he never referred to the territorial issue specifically, his deprecation of sectionalism, and his pleas for mutual regard, mutual concession, and continued constitutional adherence clearly indicated the tour's purpose.17

Governor Silas Wright of New York, the leading presidential hope of the Barnburner-Van Burenite faction, became the first northern presidential hopeful to speak out on the extension of slavery into the territories. In a letter to Senator John A. Dix of New York he came out unequivocally against slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico. Wright's sudden death in August, however, deprived the Barnburners of their leading spokesman and presidential prospect.18

By late August party regulars began cautiously to approach the

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subject. Secretary of State James Buchanan came out openly for the extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean in a letter to the Harvest Home celebration of the Democratic Party of Berks County, Pennsylvania. Such an extension would continue the spirit of mutual concession and harmonious compromise begun when 36°30' was first proposed to save the Union from "threatened convulsions" in 1820. Buchanan reassured his fellow Pennsylvanians that "Slavery in that region south of 36°30' can never become a question of any real importance from the character of the country." His moderate stance indicated an attempt to win southern support for his presidential ambitions and reflected the movement within the Democratic Party in Pennsylvania away from the Proviso.

Buchanan's longtime archrival in Pennsylvania politics, Vice President George M. Dallas, responded quickly to offset the high ground taken by the Secretary of State in his Harvest Home letter. Dallas' solution of popular sovereignty became the party's official position in the campaign of 1848. Even before Buchanan's letter was read to the Berks County gathering, Dallas was organizing a tour of western Pennsylvania to spotlight both his presidential ambitions and his solution to the questions raised by the Proviso. Following letters from Dallas, the leaders of his "Family" faction of the Democratic Party in Pittsburgh arranged rallies there, and in Green, Westmoreland, Beaver and Fayette counties and sent formal invitations to address the rallies to the Vice President.

When Dallas, from the St. Charles Hotel, appeared before a welcoming crowd on September 9, he commented upon Pittsburgh's growth and prosperity since his last visit thirty years earlier. He attributed this progress to the stimulation of trade and manufac-

19 Buchanan to the Democrats of Berks County, Aug. 25, 1847, Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP); Quaife, ed., Polk Diary, III, 142-143; Pennsylvanian, Aug. 30, 1847.

20 Jonathan B. Guthrie to Dallas, Aug. 28, 1847; Democrats of Westmoreland County to Dallas, Sept. 11, 1847; Dallas to Democrats of Westmoreland County, Sept. 11, 1847; L. Harper & M. Post to Dallas, Sept. 12, 1847; Thomas Morgan to Dallas, Sept. 15, 1847, George M. Dallas Papers, HSP. The Family faction had been active in Pennsylvania Democratic politics since the 1820s. It derived its name from the fact that most of its early leaders and organizers, Samuel D. Ingham, Dallas, Thomas J. Rogers, Thomas Sergeant, Richard Bache and William Wilkins, were related by marriage. See Bruce I. Ambacher, "George M. Dallas: Leader of the 'Family' Party" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Temple University, 1971).
turing resulting from the annexation of Texas and the Tariff of 1846, two measures with which Dallas was closely identified.\textsuperscript{21}

The highlight of his western tour was his \textit{Great Speech . . . Upon the Leading Topics of the Day. Delivered at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania}, on September 18, 1847. This "political errand" was the focus of his trip and the forum for obtaining Pennsylvania’s support for his presidential bid. Dallas defended the administration (and himself) on all the "leading topics," including the tariff, the sub-treasury, Oregon and the war. To emphasize his firmness and fidelity to the party, the Vice President indicated that it had been his intention to use his tie-breaking vote for any and all of these measures if necessary.

The Philadelphian then turned to "another question before the people, of great moment, and which excites a great deal of attention, that is intimately connected with this war." This was the Wilmot Proviso and its free soil campaign to prevent the establishment of slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico. Dallas, like Calhoun, believed that the Congress had no jurisdiction over this issue; the Constitution reserved this power to the states or to the people.

He criticized his Democratic rival’s Missouri Compromise extension proposal as "calculated to undermine the Constitution." "We hear, in some quarters, much talk of what is called \textit{compromise}," he went on. "But I am of that old school of Democrats who will never compromise the Constitution of my country. This is one of the words not to be found in that instrument."

Instead, the Vice President insisted that "the very best thing which can be done . . . will be to let it alone entirely—leaving to the people of the territory to be acquired the business of settling the matter for themselves . . . they have the right, alone, to determine their own institutions."\textsuperscript{22} This right of self-government or self-determination in the territories was the very heart of the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

In his speech at Hollidaysburg on his journey home, Dallas criticized the Wilmot Proviso even more harshly. He called it "a

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Pennsylvaniaian}, Sept. 13, 1847.

dark and threatening cloud, rapidly rising and spreading; and the bolt is forming, if not launching, which aimed at the domestic institutions and equal rights of our Southern sister states, must penetrate the mere parchment of our Constitution and shake the confederacy into fragments.” He repeated his belief that the question of slavery was one which was never intended to be submitted to the decision of a congressional majority. Such congressional powers as called for by the Proviso and Buchanan’s compromise suggestions would alter the whole character of the Constitution and self-government. He believed “the power to dispose of and to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory, or other property belonging to the United States” was a power of Congress. But he maintained this clause bore “solely upon property, upon naked land,” and not upon any inhabitants of the territory, especially if they already had “civil institutions and their domestic relations.” Dallas closed this speech by reminding his audience that if a broad construction of congressional authority was accepted “we might, one of these days, be shocked by an act of Congress establishing slavery among a people who disclaimed and excluded it . . . if this clause . . . impart any power to prohibit, it equally imparts the power to originate and legalize.”

The usefulness of Dallas’ position on popular sovereignty lay in its ambiguity. Was he merely reaffirming accepted Democratic principles that the people of a territory could decide on slavery when they were admitted as a state? Or was he suggesting that the decision could be made when the territorial government was formed? The latter concept would effectively exclude slavery from any territory acquired from Mexico, because existing Mexican laws prohibited slavery and the probable majority of American emigrants would not bring slaves after the area became American territory.

After his return to Philadelphia, he reaffirmed his commitment to popular sovereignty and his opposition to extending the Missouri Compromise line in an exchange of letters with Judge Ellis Lewis of the Commonwealth Supreme Court, his predecessor as Attorney General of Pennsylvania in 1833. Dallas reiterated that “as soon as the soil becomes the property of the American People . . . the men

upon it [are] a part of the American People, in whom certain inalienable rights and reserved rights exist.” He did not believe Congress had the constitutional power to “destroy arbitrarily the local and domestic rights and relations . . . of the American People.” The Vice President just as firmly repeated his objections to compromise which he labeled “in one aspect, is encroachment: in another aspect, it is base and unfaithful surrender: in no aspect is it constitutional.”

The South interpreted Dallas’ position on the constitutional limits of congressional authority in the territories as an affirmation of Calhoun’s position. The Richmond Enquirer compared his language with that “employed by Mr. Calhoun and the most zealous advocates of Southern rights.” Both the Enquirer and the Charleston Mercury compared Dallas’ speech most favorably with Buchanan’s. Indeed, the Mercury refused to place the two in the same class: “Mr. Dallas[’] . . . firm and independent address . . . should not be associated with the ambiguous and temporizing address of the Secretary of State.” It reminded its readers of their debt to the Vice President for his stand on Texas, the tariff, and the protection of slavery as a domestic institution not subject to congressional will.

Northern editorial comment, however, focused on the free soil implications of Dallas’ insistence that the people of the territory decide the question for themselves. Various Barnburner elements preferred his solutions to those of Buchanan. The Chicago Democrat, edited by John Wentworth, considered Dallas to be a fit successor to Silas Wright as head of the Barnburner-Van Burenite faction of the party. Even John W. Forney, editor of the Pennsylvanian and a staunch Buchanan supporter, could not deny the impact of Dallas’ speech. Forney acknowledged to Buchanan that Dallas had

“labored hard in the West[ern part of Pennsylvania], and I fear with some effect.”\(^{26}\)

In an effort to further publicize his position in favor of popular sovereignty, Dallas distributed nearly 300,000 copies of his Pittsburgh speech throughout the North. He also distributed William Hickey’s book, *The Constitution* (dedicated to Dallas), to interior Pennsylvania editors and politicians to reinforce his stand for the Constitution and against compromise.\(^{27}\)

Senator Daniel S. Dickinson of New York, perceiving the widespread support for Dallas’ solution, introduced a popular sovereignty resolution into the Senate when it assembled in December, 1847. It called for the “principle of self-government” in organizing a territorial government by “leaving all questions concerning the domestic policies therein to the legislatures chosen by the people thereof.”\(^{28}\) Adoption of the resolution, would, in effect, commit the Union to popular sovereignty.

John C. Calhoun, also harboring presidential ambitions for 1848, found the Dickinson resolutions more “pernicious” than the Wilmot Proviso itself because it, in effect, duped southerners into believing it could be used to achieve the extension of slavery into the territories. Calhoun introduced counter-resolutions the following day and indicated he would “denounce” Dickinson’s resolutions “in the most emphatic manner” if they were called up from the table.\(^{29}\)

Henry S. Foote, to whom Calhoun had confided this intention, and Lewis Cass, the only leading Democratic contender who had not

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\(^{26}\) “Vice President Dallas and the Missouri Compromise,” *Albany Evening Atlas*, Sept. 29, 1847; “Mr. Dallas on the Slavery Question,” *New York Evening Post*, Nov. 18, 1847; James Taylor to John Van Buren, Apr. 18, 1847, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Montgomery Moses to Dallas, Oct. 23, 1847, John Marshall to Dallas, Oct. 30, 1847, Dallas Papers; *Chicago Democrat*, Oct. 26, 1847; John Forney to James Buchanan, Sept. 30, Nov. 9, 1847, Buchanan Papers.

\(^{27}\) John Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 9, 1847, John Van Dyke to Buchanan, Dec. 2, 1847, Buchanan Papers. The estimate of 300,000 copies is found in Van Dyke to Buchanan and may be exaggerated. It is a conceivable figure since it approximates the number of Democratic voters in Pennsylvania.

\(^{28}\) *Congressional Globe*, 30th Congress, 1st Session, 21; see also John R. Dickinson, ed., *Speeches, Correspondence, etc. of the Late Daniel S. Dickinson* (New York, 1867), I, 228.

yet offered a solution to the question of the extension of slavery into the territories, dissuaded Dickinson from calling up his resolutions for a vote in the interests of party unity and national harmony.\(^{30}\)

Late in December, 1847, Cass made the most publicized endorsement of popular sovereignty as the solution to the issue raised by the Wilmot Proviso. His letter to A. O. P. Nicholson of Tennessee followed Dallas' position in limiting congressional authority in the territories to “making rules and regulations for the disposition and management of property,” to “the creation of proper governments for new countries acquired or settled, and to the necessary provision for their eventual admission into the Union.” The people of the territories were to “regulate it themselves, under the general principles of the constitution.” He clearly implied they could prohibit slavery before statehood, but “how” was not mentioned. Cass admitted his growing anti-Proviso position was prompted by the shift in the public mind and his own fears that the proviso would upset the national tranquility. A nationwide retreat to strict construction on the issue of the proviso, slavery, and popular sovereignty would be “the road of peace and safety. Leave to the people, who will be affected by this question, to adjust it upon their own responsibility, and in their own manner, and we shall render another tribute to the original principles of our government, and furnish another guaranty for its permanence and prosperity.”\(^{31}\)

Cass's arguments and views, although somewhat different from Dallas', were just as equivocal. Both men recognized the basic differences between territories and states on the question of sovereignty. Both left the decision on domestic institutions to the people of the territories. Both made subtle concessions to free soil. Dallas certainly viewed Cass's letter as a reiteration of his own position: “Genl. Cass, in a letter... wheels into the track of the Vice President’s autumn speeches at Pittsburgh and Hollidaysburg on the Wilmot Proviso.”\(^{32}\)

Response to this third statement of popular sovereignty was

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\(^{30}\) Foote, *War of the Rebellion*, 74; Morrison, *Democratic Politics and Sectionalism*, 89.


\(^{32}\) Dallas to John K. Kane, Dec. 31, 1847, Kane Papers, American Philosophical Society.
quite favorable and placed Cass’s name before party members as they headed into their state conventions to elect and instruct delegates to the Democratic National Convention at Baltimore in June, 1848. Even in the South, popular sovereignty was widely viewed as an acceptable alternative to the Wilmot Proviso.

When the Democrats of Pennsylvania assembled in state convention at Harrisburg on March 4, 1848, to elect and instruct delegates to the Baltimore convention, they selected James Buchanan over George M. Dallas as the state’s presidential nominee, but failed to approve a resolution endorsing Buchanan’s Harvest Home letter extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean. Instead, the convention adopted a “sort of Cass and Dallas resolution” commending their position on popular sovereignty. This substitute resolution showed that Buchanan did not represent all of the state’s Democrats, revealed Pennsylvania’s ultimate support for Cass, and virtually destroyed Buchanan’s prospects for support beyond Pennsylvania because of the lack of unity for him. Even the state delegation to the national convention in Baltimore was not firmly under Buchanan’s control. Of the twenty-six delegates, there were only fifteen firm and two probable Buchanan men. The minority were Cass-Dallas men.33

The South’s continued concern over the real intent of popular sovereignty, party condemnation of the Wilmot Proviso, and the right to take slavery into the Mexican cession territories led to efforts by southerners, such as William L. Yancey, to elicit fresh statements from all the leading presidential contenders just prior to the national convention. Yancey queried each man as to his position on the Alabama Platform. Dallas, after due consideration, decided at first not to answer, but was persuaded by Dixon H. Lewis to change his mind. Dallas then referred Yancey to his Pittsburgh and Hollidaysburg speeches, but made no new statement regarding the views contained in the platform itself. Cass likewise referred Yancey

33 This account of the convention is based on W. B. Sterigene to Buchanan, Mar. 11, 1848, John W. Forney to Buchanan, Mar. 7, 12, 1848, Albert C. Ramsey to Buchanan, Mar. 13, 1848, Edward Hutter to Buchanan, Mar. 5, 6, 1848, John Bradford to Buchanan, Mar. 9, 1848, Buchanan Papers; Klein, Buchanan, 200; Morrison, Democratic Politics and sectionalism, 100-102; Snyder, Jacksonian Heritage, 213; Rayback, Free Soil, 131-135; Pennsylvanian, Mar. 6, 7, 8, 9, 1848; Dallas to John K. Kane, Mar. 8, 1848, Kane Papers.
to his earlier statement. Buchanan reiterated his stance in favor of extending the Missouri Compromise line and denied any congressional role in the territories. Levi Woodbury remained silent.  

The Democratic National Convention nominated Cass on the fourth ballot. It also adopted a resolution condemning efforts "to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation thereto," as actions which could have "the most alarming and dangerous consequences." William L. Yancey's efforts to have the convention adopt a resolution containing the core of the Alabama Platform—"non-interference with the rights of property of any portion of the people of this confederation"—were overwhelmingly rejected. The convention also made no direct reference to popular sovereignty. Instead the views of the party were to be found "in the avowed opinions of their nominee." Quite clearly those opinions were in favor of popular sovereignty.  

The question of the extension of slavery in the territories became the prevailing issue in the campaign of 1848. On the surface it appears that the voters rejected popular sovereignty when they elected Zachary Taylor president over Lewis Cass; that is not so. Actually the voters rejected the extreme solutions of both the Wilmot Proviso and Calhoun's Doctrine of Congressional Non-interference in favor of a more moderate solution which would not disrupt the parties or the nation. They voted for moderation but failed to define clearly which proposal they preferred. That task was given to the President-elect and the Thirty-first Congress.  

The Compromise of 1850 attempted to blend popular sovereignty with other moderate proposals by organizing the Mexican cession territories without reference to slavery and by postponing any decision on slavery until the territories were admitted as states. Although this concept did not satisfy everyone, the majority of voters and politicians, George M. Dallas and Lewis Cass among them, supported such moderation in the "finality" election of

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34 William L. Yancey to Dallas, May 2, 1848, Dallas Papers; William L. Yancey to Buchanan, May 2, 1848, Buchanan Papers; Dallas to John K. Kane, May 18, 1848, Kane Papers.

35 Washington Union, May 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 1848; Woodford, Lewis Cass, 256; Klein, Buchanan, 204; Wiltse, Calhoun: Sectionalist, 362-363; Morrison, Democratic Politics and Sectionalism, 119-120; Rayback, Free Soil, 187-194.
Although the Compromise permitted freemen and slaveholders to enter the new territories on an equal basis, there was no positive encouragement for slaveholders to emigrate with their "peculiar institution." 37

The northern attitude that popular sovereignty meant no further extension of slavery became readily apparent when Stephen A. Douglas introduced the Nebraska Bill in 1854 and reopened the entire question of popular sovereignty, free soil, and the extension of slavery.

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36 Dallas presented the resolutions and gave the address at Philadelphia's "Great Union and Constitution Meeting to Ratify the Compromise of 1850," on Nov. 20, 1850. Draft of his speech is in the Dallas Papers. See also Dallas to the Citizens of Penfield, Ga., Nov. 19, 1850, and "Letter of Mr. Dallas to Mr. Bryan of Texas," July 25, 1851, ibid.