An Immigrant Family & Industrial Enterprise:
Sevill Schofield & The Philadelphia Textile Manufacture, 1845-1900

In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Philadelphia matured into a vast manufacturing metropolis. The thousands of craftshops and scores of “great works” active in the 1840s multiplied steadily, their diverse products and skilled workmen boosted nationally in Edwin Freedley’s Philadelphia and Its Manufactures (1857). In the 1860s, the city became a center of wartime production, involving government contracts as well as two busy Federal Arsenals. Despite the Seventies’ depression, Philadelphia continued to expand its industrial base, and by 1880 the Federal Census of Manufactures showed nine thousand firms in place, engaging the labors of nearly 200,000 workers. Incensed by what they considered a radical undercount, city proprietors pressed Mayor Samuel King, a retired brush-manufacturer, for a local recount. Completed in 1882 by the indefatigable statistician, Lorin Blodget, the city industrial census added three thousand firms and 40,000 workers to the earlier totals.¹ No American city

Note: This essay represents an application of a research approach often called the “new social history”, in order to reconstruct the life of a manufacturer for whom no direct records (diaries, firm accounts, etc.) have been archivally preserved. Unlike the Crozers and duPont kin so richly evoked in Rockdale, Sevill Schofield’s career was traced through the sifting of census records, biographical albums, newspapers, city directories and other indirect sources. For their considerable assistance in this work, I must express my appreciation to the Center for Philadelphia Studies, University of Pennsylvania, Judy Goldberg, Morris Vogel, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, whose research support during 1980-81 made this project possible.

¹ Lorin Blodget, Industrial Census of Philadelphia, (Philadelphia, 1882), 129-131, 191-195. The old rivalry with New York surfaces in this document. Though Philadelphia had long lost the banking and import contest with its northern neighbor, Blodget’s revised figures show Philadelphia’s total industrial workforce 15,000 above that reported for New York. One might expect the New York total to rise were a recount undertaken there, but Blodget gamely argues that its original figures had been inflated.
other than New York had even a third of this enormous productive capacity.

Locally, memories of the manufacturing city have centered on its giant firms: Wanamaker (clothing), Cramp (ships), Baldwin Locomotive, Midvale Steel and the like. Yet little has been remarked concerning textiles, the largest of the manufacturing sectors. In 1850, Philadelphia held as many textile workers as did Lowell (about 12,000). By 1882, that force had multiplied five-fold, to nearly a thousand firms, with close to 60,000 workers generating a dazzling array of woven and knit goods, representing the greatest concentration of textile production in the nation. Long respected for its “Germantown knits”, Philadelphia had become as well a center for carpet and wool work, specialized goods (e.g., braids), fine yarns and skillful dyeing. A quarter of the city’s manufacturing jobs lay in textile firms, heavily clustered in Kensington/Frankford, Manayunk, Spring Garden and Germantown, while present to some degree in other quarters.

For all its aggregate massiveness, the Philadelphia textile manufacture was characterized by “small business” operations, a thorough contrast to the major mill cities of New England. Though by the 1880s, a handful of huge firms had developed, run by families whose names still echo through the neighborhoods (Dobson, Dolan, the Bromleys), the overwhelming bulk of textile production took place in shops and mills with from half a dozen to several hundred workers. From the tiniest to the largest, Philadelphia firms usually were family run proprietorships and partnerships, capable of specialized and flexible output, functioning in a context quite distinct from the corporate-supervised, bulk staple operations generally visible at Lowell, Lawrence and Manchester. While no comprehensive review of this industrial complex may be undertaken here, we may gain some appreciation of the Philadelphia pattern through a close examination of the career of Sevill Schofield, an immigrant Manayunk woolen producer whose experiences spanned generations during which the textile trades bloomed in the Quaker City.

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2 Ibid., 158.

3 A book-length study, now being revised for publication, has been completed by this writer. Tentatively titled, Separate Establishments: The Development of Textile Capitalism in Philadelphia 1800-1885, it chronicles the nineteenth-century emergence of the city’s complex textile industry and contrasts the pattern of that development with the more familiar Lowell motif.
Schofield should be regarded as an exemplary rather than typical textile manufacturer. Given the tremendous variety of mill products, the range of operative scales, and the wide variations among the factory districts, no individual or single firm may stand for the whole. Indeed, the "typical" entrepreneur in Philadelphia textiles probably sank in the waves of competition, leaving few traces, while Schofield possessed a sizeable operating concern at his death, after forty years or more in mill and counting room. Nonetheless, Schofield's example offers a glimpse of the resources and strategies, crises and successes which constituted the environment for production and accumulation in the industrial city from the 1850s through the 1880s. Insofar as hundreds of his colleagues shared this context and sought to chart similar trajectories, Schofield's career illustrates much that was more widely common in Philadelphia's factory textile manufacture.

In 1832, Sevill Schofield was born in Lees, near Oldham, the third son of a Lancashire textile district family. In his early teens, and at the tail-end of the depression of the early Forties, Joseph and Malley Schofield and their six children emigrated to the United States. The father was then about forty-five years old and his wife was pregnant with yet another child. After disembarking at New York, they "proceeded directly to Manayunk, Philadelphia," where Joseph undertook the business of "contracting to furnish the necessary labor to operate mills for other parties." Several of the workers he provided his unnamed clients were his own progeny. "Sevill, in common with his four brothers and two sisters, contributed their labor, but received no wages." Here lies a fascinating variation on the customary textile family economy, the family economy of a nascent capitalist. Whether their father worked on shares with the mill entrepreneurs, who "furnished machinery, materials, etc.", or simply appropriated his children's earnings cannot be determined. In a few years of steady work with fair profits, the elder Schofield might hope to amass a modest capital, enabling him to join the ranks of partners and proprietors.

4 The best materials on ephemeral firms survive in the decennial federal Manufacturing Census manuscripts (1850-1880), though they naturally miss hundreds of enterprises which started and folded in the years between surveys. Business and city directories are of some value, but their coverage is far more spotty than census tallies in the years for which they can be cross-checked.

5 Bulletin of the Historical Society of Montgomery County, Pa, XVI, 79.

6 Charles Robson, ed., Manufactories and Manufacturers of Pennsylvania of the Nineteenth Century (Philadelphia, 1875), 185-6. (Hereafter M & M Pa.)
The particular characteristics of ante-bellum Manayunk eased this pathway. Though the district possessed a row of power-mills strung along the Schuylkill Navigation Company's canal, it was not uncommon for some of these facilities to be leased to manufacturers, as an entirety, or subdivided by floors ("rooms with power"). Similar rentals might be had of mills along the Wissahickon and Mill Creeks, lowering substantially the capital requirements for entry. Used machinery could be secured at liquidation or bankruptcy auctions, or if appropriate for the uses intended, might be purchased from the previous tenant. A good reputation, or a partner well-connected with the Front Street jobbing and commission houses could facilitate establishment of trade credit and a first-stage marketing linkage. For spinning firms, familiarity with the masters of Manayunk's larger power-weaving mills could bring contracts for yarns tailored to the needs of a solidly-functioning enterprise. Where New England corporations would invest half a million or more in erection of integrated factories, power canals and attendant housing, a Philadelphia hopeful might commence in partnership with a thousand dollars or less.⁷ (For handloom or hand-knit operations or a modest dye-shed, a few hundred dollars capital was sufficient, as the 1850 Manufacturing Census schedules noted with regularity.)

After four years as a contractor, Joseph Schofield in 1849, "associated with James Lees . . . and operated mills upon Mill Creek." In the business with Lees, Joseph likely kept his offspring active. Elder sons John and Thomas appeared in the 1850 household census, listed as "manufacturers", and later in the decade Sevill handled local transport.

[I]n 1857, the partnership was dissolved and Sevill assumed full charge of the business. Having purchased a team, he himself did all the hauling, besides superintending indoor matters.⁸


⁸ M & M Pa., 185-6.
The circumstances surrounding young Schofield's replacement of his father at the head of the family enterprise remain unclear, but the death of Joseph Schofield later in the year suggests that ill-health may have been the root-cause of the transfer. The family base of capitalist manufacture is underscored by the relationships surrounding the Schofields' acquisition of a small Manayunk mill the same year (1857).

According to Daniel Robson, Sevill's industry and energy were noticed by the proprietor of McFadden's Mill, who was on intimate terms with his father's family, and he one day proposed [that] Sevill purchase his mill. The offer was at first declined, on account of limited means, but, on the proposal of the owner, William McFadden, to sell for $10,000, one fifth to be paid in one year, and the balance in ten years, he resolved that the opportunity was not to be lost. ⁹

Whether McFadden was motivated by personal financial troubles in the Panic year, or by a combination of friendship and respect for the Schofields' manufacturing talents, he repeated his initial offer on terms which were clearly generous. No cash was initially required, though realizing $2,000 at the close of the first year's operations would surely be quite a task for a new venture in a troubled economic environment. Sevill would either put his skills immediately to profitable use, or the firm would fold in defaulting the year-end payment. If that hurdle were cleared, generosity for the longer term was present. Rather than being tied to subsequent annual obligations, the firm would have nine years to reserve funds for the $8,000 balance, being thus able to plow back surpluses into equipment and plant. ¹⁰ This transaction illustrates an intersection between family and community networks and the economics of small manufacture. The sale was neither simply a favor to a friend nor purely a "free-market" exchange, but a more subtle amalgam of the cultural and economic relations of a manufacturing district.

⁹ *Ibid.* McFadden was a Scots-Irish Presbyterian, as were the Somersets. Schofield was later active in the Fourth Reform Church of Manayunk. See Goshow, *Mills and Mill Owners*, 103; *Manayunk Directory* (1883), 59.

¹⁰ Were an alternate reading of this passage to presume nine payments of $900 over the rest of the ten years (plus interest, which is not mentioned), a similar initial test would remain, with skillful first-year performance the opening to smaller payments thereafter.
Though Sevill was to run the firm, and had reached the age of 25 at that time, the papers were drawn up in his father’s name. When six months later, Joseph Schofield died, “leaving a will providing that the property should not be divided during the lifetime of his widow,” Sevill responded to the family obligations, “carrying on the business in his mother’s name until 1859.”\(^{11}\) (This assertion is confirmed in part by the presence of M(alley) Schofield of Manayunk in Freedley’s 1857 list of city textile manufacturers.)\(^{12}\) During these years, Schofield’s tiny operation prospered. The firm spun cotton and carpet yarns, aiming their output toward the substantial handloom trades in cross-town Kensington. In two years, Sevill’s enterprise increased his mother’s wealth “from $800 to $16,000.”

This dramatic success was facilitated by at least three elements in the larger strategy for accumulation used widely in the city’s textile trades. First, Schofield operated on but one floor of the small (40’ x 60’) five-story factory, renting out “the remainder, from which the revenue was sufficient to cover all expenses.” The tenants, Lord, Ralston and Co. and Greenwood and Co., were both spinners of carpet and woolen yarns, a fact which proved useful several years later. Second, local markets for yarn sales were readily available, as Kensington carpet firms were uniformly weave-sheds without spinning capacity. Third, the M. Schofield firm evidently retained virtually all earnings, Sevill again drawing no wages. Given the expansion that followed in 1859-60, Malley likely banked the profits less a sum for running the family household, which then included her manufacturing son and three younger children.\(^{13}\)

Given the two decades of filial duty here outlined, Sevill’s relations with his widowed mother might be expected to alter only when he established his own family, through marriage. On April 28, 1859 Reverend Culver of the First Presbyterian Church solemnized vows between the 28-year old manufacturer and Miss Kate Somerset, then 23.\(^{14}\) The Schofields and Somersets both lived on Mechanic Street in 1858, according to the city directory, and it is plausible that Kate had

\(^{11}\) Robson, *M & M Pa.*, 185.


\(^{13}\) Ibid., 259-60; *M & M Pa.*, 186. The $16,000 figure likely represents equity in mill and machinery along with retained earnings.

\(^{14}\) *Manayunk Star and Roxborough Gazette*, April 30, 1859. The editor expressed thanks for the “excellent cake” which accompanied notice of the wedding to the *Star*. 
been the "girl next door." The 1860 manuscript Population Census schedules listed Malley Schofield and her three youngest children in the household following the Somersets.¹⁵ The young couple did not strike out on their own, for they and their four-month old son, William, made their home at the time of the 1860 census tally with the Somerset clan. Though Sevill had only moved next door, marriage and departure from his mother's house occasioned a major change in the social and economic arrangements through which manufacturing had been prosecuted to that point. Robson reports that,

having married, he arranged to engage in business on his own account, and giving his mother the interest on her $16,000, associated with his brother Charles, as S. & C. Schofield, and commenced operating.¹⁶

Though there was surely no break in production at the old McFadden Mill, this brief account indicates a substantial transformation of the economic relationships within the firm. Henceforth, such accumulation as was managed by the partner brothers would be theirs to enjoy or reinvest. Malley was guaranteed an income of perhaps a thousand a year (if 6% were the interest), but would no longer hold the entire capital. In a sense, Sevill came into his inheritance upon this agreement, and drew his younger brother into the firm to share its potential. There was justice in this arrangement, for while two elder and one younger brother had married and departed,¹⁷ Sevill had remained with the core family long after reaching his majority and had devoted his energies to his mother's welfare after his father's death. Sevill's offer of a partnership to Charles was both culturally sound and organizationally practical, anticipating division of production and office/marketing tasks as the business expanded. It was surely not a fund-raising effort, for in 1860 the two brothers reported almost identical property holdings to census marshalls (Sevill — $3750, Charles — $3950).¹⁸

¹⁶ Robson, M & M Pa., 186.
¹⁸ Ibid., 241, 256.
The elder sons were excluded and never appeared in any connection with the firm's subsequent development.

If Sevill's marriage signaled a reformulation of economic, and by extension power relations within the Schofield family, it also exemplified a variant of a wider phenomenon pertaining to proprietary manufacture, that linking of capitalist families through marriage, elsewhere termed "dynastic industrialism". A well-documented practice for textile firms in Lancashire, dynastic marriages stemmed from a social context in which "the management function of the family is directly geared to the preservation of the estate". Daughters were useful in such an environment, insofar as they might be matched to locally powerful families or to "incomers", men of peculiar talent whose energy, rather than wealth or contacts, were prized. The Somerset-Schofield marriage falls in the latter category.

William Somerset was a Scots-Irish Presbyterian immigrant manufacturer, a partner in the Manayunk firm of Archibald Campbell and Co., makers of cotton goods. He possessed at the time of his daughter's marriage property worth over $60,000. His three children were Kate, her teenaged sister Ann Eliza, and his namesake William, twelve in 1859. The 1860 Census property report showed William retaining real estate valued at $6,000 and personal property, probably his interest in the Campbell firm, worth $37,000. Twenty thousand dollars of real and personal property was listed as being held by Catherine Schofield, a third of the Somerset holdings having likely been conferred upon her as a marriage settlement. That these properties were not conveyed to her husband reflects not an early feminist consciousness on William Somerset's part, but instead both an understanding of business law and the conservancy-of-the-estate element common to such marriages. Unincorporated businesses were vulnerable to the seizure of all personal property of the principals should they default on their creditors, though this unlimited liability generally assured the close attention of partners to the firm's affairs. Were Schofield's promising but fledgling enterprise to go under, the Somerset estate would rest untouched given the prudence of resting the marriage endowment in Kate's name. Had Sevill Schofield been a bit


piqued by this caution, his grumbles should have been assuaged by reflection that two-thirds of the settlement was real estate, the remainder "personal" property (cash?). The income from this sizeable holding, whether in rents or interest, would easily meet the new family's needs with expenses lessened by their sharing of the Somersets' quarters. This in turn left Sevill financially free to funnel manufacturing profits into expansion, without having to draw off funds for his own household in addition to the sums guaranteed his mother.

Sevill Schofield had left one family only to join another, on terms which were clearly set by the Somersets, but which were of tangible advantage to his own prospects. His father-in-law shared in the operations of one of Mānayunk's largest mills (765 workers in 1860), opening a range of valuable trade contacts. Sevill stood no longer as the dependent, while remaining the dutiful son (and son-in-law, for the Schofield's first-born was named William, not Joseph). 21 Here was a young man of potential, upon whom had been conferred an opportunity to prove himself worthy of integration into an established clan. As a result, his situation involved substantial psychological pressures for performance, relieved only to a small degree by the birth of a grandson. The aggressive business moves Sevill Schofield made over the next few years probably stemmed in part from a fundamental need to show his individual capacities, indeed to match or best his successful father-in-law. Surely the incorporation of new blood through dynastic marriage was intended to elicit just such entrepreneurial assertiveness, as the "incomer" sought both to demonstrate the wisdom of his selection and to transcend the personal shackles it carried.

In the year and a half between his marriage and the opening of the year 1861, Sevill Schofield thoroughly reshaped his manufacturing array at the McFadden Mill. In 1859, the partners labored alongside their few employees.

The two brothers worked in every department of the mill, and though they employed but six hands, their progress was so great in the first year, that they were enabled to purchase for cash an entire outfit of new machinery, costing $4,000. 22

21 Charles' first two children, born 1856 and 1858, were named for his parents, a frequently observed custom. See 1860 PCS, Phila. Co., Ward 21, 256.

22 Robson, M & M Pa., 186.
The mill had initially been a yarn-based operation, employing "two sets" of carding and spinning machinery "left by their father." This new "outfit" must have been a set of powerlooms, for the 1860 Manufacturing Census return for S&C Schofield shows a capital of $20,000 (up $4,000 from $16,000) and the presence of 32 looms which had produced $44,000 worth of jeans, a popular cotton and wool blend. By the time of the Census, the Schofields had displaced one of their tenants, Lord Ralston and Co., purchasing their machinery, and adding additional working space. The redundant machinery was sold at auction, June 18, 1860. The second tenant, James Greenwood, listed immediately beneath the Schofields in the Census manuscripts, was bought out later in the year, for "January 1, 1861 found them the occupants of the whole building."23

Since the M. Schofield firm of 1857 had produced only yarns, the 1859-60 venture into weaving represented Sevill's attempt to internalize the profit potential of finished fabrics by integrating forward in production. This expansion entailed acquisition of machinery, both new looms and the preparatory and spinning equipment of the former tenants. Where did the money come from for such purchases, made in at least one instance "for cash"? Figures the partners supplied the Census allow some rough calculation of the surplus generated from manufacturing during this initial year. Wages paid monthly averaged a bit over $800, about $10,000 maximum, if the mill ran a full twelve months. (This is a high figure, for canal repairs shut down all the Manayunk water-wheels for several winter weeks, and short water was common in August, necessitating cut-back or closings.) The raw materials and supplies reported totaled just under $25,000, to which we may add $1,000 for Malley Schofield and a like sum (conjectured) for Charles, whose marriage brought him no assets comparable to Sevill's. These sums total $37,000, which set against the valuation of products (jeans, $44,000; carpet yarns, $16,800), leaves a residual of nearly $22,000. Power-rental along the canal, repairs, commissions, insurance and other items might deduct a third from this figure; a thousand set aside for McFadden's payment would reduce it a bit more. Yet it appears that from a year's operations the Schofield partners should have netted at least ten and perhaps fifteen thousand clear. Such profits

could readily be translated into new equipment, indeed allowing the Schofields to announce at the sale of the Lord, Ralston leftovers that “Conditions [of sale] . . . will be easy”.24

Still, a return on capital of over 50% must be accounted for if the figures here noted are not to be dismissed as erratic or falsified. The trick lies in the raw materials used by the firm, and in the savings thereby deftly incorporated into its products. Cotton yarn is customarily spun from the baled fresh staple; for their cotton-wool mixed jeans, the Schofields purchased 48,000 pounds of raw cotton (at 12½ cents) for $6,000. Woolen yarn may be made from new wool or from shredded rags, commonly known as shoddy. The finer grades of yarn demand new wools; coarser counts may consist partly or totally of reprocessed fibre. The cost differential is awesome. The Schofields used only rags to constitute the wool portion of their “union” fabrics and for their carpet yarns. For over 450,000 pounds of these baled castoffs, their cost was under 4¢ per pound. Though the weight-loss in processing rags is far higher than that in scouring and carding new wool, running a third to half of the input, Schofield paid a tenth of what neighbor David Wallace did for the new wool which went into his jeans (45¢ per lb.). Moreover, despite their components humble origins, Schofield’s jeans were fully half wool, while Wallace had only about 12% wool blended into his cotton yarns. Thus the Schofields’ output could be sold for a slightly higher price (20¢ vs. 16¢ per yard).

With a dramatically lower factor cost for raw materials, a substantially higher proportion of wool content than competing mixed goods, for a price increase of but 4¢ a yard, Schofields’ jeans facilitated rapid accumulation for the new partnership.25 Other Manayunk spinners turned rags into carpet yarns, as did the Schofields, but none had taken the second step, weaving their own fabrics from these shoddy-based yarns. Here lay a crucial source of the funds for expansion, carpet yarn profits first leading to power looms, fabric profits to occupancy

24 Manayunk Star and Roxborough Gazette, June 16, 1860

25 From existing resources it cannot be determined whether Schofield’s buyers were aware of the use of shoddy in his fabrics. However, quite serviceable goods could be made using reprocessed wools, despite their unsavory popular reputation. For a balanced view of shoddy as a textile material, see Channing Smith, “Shoddy: Its Uses and Abuses”, Second Annual Report, Alumni Association of the Philadelphia Textile School (Philadelphia, 1903), 34-38

1860 MCS, Phila Co , Ward 21, 474 Schofield’s and Wallace’s returns are given on the same manuscript page. Some contrasts drawn from the returns are given below
of the full mill, both keyed by reinvestment of earnings in extended capacity and a market-conscious product specialization.

If by the summer of 1860, the Schofields had devised a production formula that promised hearty profits, the election of Lincoln and the threats of war attendant upon that triumph sabotaged their hopes. The relatively coarse mixed goods they produced were "before the war . . . manufactured largely for the Southern market" and such trade was naturally "wholly suspended during the Rebellion." Well before the opening of hostilities, those manufacturers whose raw materials and markets lay in the South faced serious credit and supply problems. Thus in February 1861, the Manayunk Star and Roxborough Gazette, the neighborhood weekly, noted pithily: "A notorious fact — that the times are hard in Manayunk." March brought some recovery, as those firms with woolen capacity began to run their goods for the fall season. Nonetheless, the Star cautiously recorded the reopening of mills following canal repairs, observing that business "for several months past has been completely prostrated." April brought the first days of war and a dismal report:

We did anticipate [that] with the opening of spring, business would revive to some extent, but time has only proved our hopes to have been delusions. Many of our large manufactories are now lying idle, and thousands of both sexes are out of employment. The condition of our town is indeed deplorable.

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<th>Wool-Cotton Jeans</th>
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<th>Wallace</th>
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26 Robson, M & M Pa., 186.
27 Manayunk Star and Roxborough Gazette, February 2, March 9, 1861.
28 Ibid., April 13, 1861.
By May, the newspaper expected that all mills would close shop after their raw stock on hand had been run into yarn or piece goods. With that sad observation the Star suspended publication (except for a Fourth of July special) until the end of September, when the editor joyfully announced: "the Factories — all the factories in and about Manayunk are in full blast, except those of Mr. Joseph Ripka." What had happened?

The impending cotton famine had triggered the great wave of wool substitution that attended the war years in the North. Although the massive cotton enterprises at Lowell dismissed their operatives and sold their raw stocks into speculative markets, those Philadelphia mills with mixed goods or woolen capacity ran day and night. Already known for specialized and flexible output, Philadelphia textile firms boomed through the war, building additions or whole new factories with their bountiful returns. Cotton rags, shredded and bleached, were recycled and blended with wool or flax for summer fabrics and wool consumption rocketed. As the wearing of wool became a symbol of patriotism throughout the Union, a second source of rising demand took shape. The armies being massed for battle with the Confederate States proved larger than any forces ever created in the Republic's history. To outfit warriors in their hundreds of thousands was a staggering task, as the confusion of the first war year fully demonstrated. Nonetheless, by 1862, the Quartermaster Corps, headed by Philadelphian Montgomery Meigs, had routinized its contracting for supplies, uniforms, horses and other equipment. In this process, bids were solicited at St. Louis, New York, Cincinnati and Philadelphia. The latter's Schuylkill and Frankford Arsenals expanded dramatically. Millions of yards of blue-dyed army cloth, tons of blankets, mountains of knitted hose, produced to official specifications, were being sought posthaste.

Possessed of years of mill experience but never having produced a blanket, S&C Schofield plunged into the war supply business, being

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29 Ibid., September 28, 1861. Ripka's mills went under during the war after thirty years' activity in Manayunk. He had, with others, been heavily committed to the Southern trade and after losses in 1857, collapsed under the weight of uncollectable accounts, c. 1862. Ripka died in 1864 and his mills were secured by General Robert Patterson, who operated them successfully.

30 Charles Cowley, Illustrated History of Lowell (Boston & Lowell, 1868), 48ff; Emerson Fite, Social & Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War (New York, 1913), 83-4, 94-5, 98.

"among the first in Philadelphia to contract with the United States Government to furnish blankets for the army.\footnote{National Association of Wool Manufacturers, \textit{Bulletin XXXI} (1901), No. 1, 69. (An obituary reporting Schofield's death the previous December.)} The Quartermaster Corps' records do not show a direct bid by the Schofields early in the war, but one of the very first blanket agreements was concluded July 8, 1861 with their brother-in-law and fellow woolen manufacturer John Dobson. Dobson, yet another English immigrant textile entrepreneur, had about 1855 married Sevill's older sister Sarah, and was by 1860 partner with his next-door neighbor, James Lees, in a shawl and blanket mill at southern edge of Manayunk, an area known as Falls of Schuylkill.\footnote{National Archives, Record Group 92, Entry No. 1239, \textit{Abstracts of Contracts}, I, 227; 1860 MCS, Phila. Co., Ward 21, 470; 1860 PCS, Phila. Co., Ward 21, part 2, 118.} While Lees may well have been kin to Sevill's father's former partner, the Dobson connection was certainly the conduit by which S&C Schofield ventured into the blanket manufacture. Other neighborhood manufacturers entered the blanket market during the conflict (notably J.B. Winpenny and James Lord), but Dobson and Schofield won nine of sixteen direct blanket awards to Manayunk firms, representing two-thirds of local output (365,000 of a total of 555,000 blankets). Subcontracts likely added to this total, for Front Street merchant houses pulled in scores of awards, turning to millmen for the actual manufacture of the goods. Bypassing these middlemen and their profits late in the war, Sevill Schofield snared three 1864-65 contracts in his own name, receiving a staggering $962,500 for 150,000 units.\footnote{National Archives, RG92, Entry No. 1239, \textit{Abstracts of Contracts}, II, 50, 283. The surety bonds guaranteeing performance of these contracts are recorded in RG92, Entry No. 2227. For the December 3, 1864 contract, John Dobson signed for Schofield, and Schofield reciprocated upon a Dobson contract awarded the same day. The second guarantor in both cases was Benjamin Bullock, woolen manufacturer of Philadelphia and Conshohocken, who received frequent contracts throughout the war and may have been one source of subcontracting for the two Manayunk firms.} While his "industry and energy" surely contributed to Schofield's later reputation as a "self-made man," it might be more accurate to suggest that the combination of family networks and the Civil War made him.

McFadden's Mill quickly proved too small to handle the government work and the manufacture of woolens and blends for the private market. Thus S&C Schofield
enlarged their building in the spring of 1863, and having procured the necessary additional machinery, erected a powerful [steam] engine for its operation, and occupied the whole in October of that year.\textsuperscript{35}

The water-wheel at the mill had delivered but 45 horsepower;\textsuperscript{36} war expansion brought the transition to steam and enhanced the reliability of the firm's power-supply. At this juncture, Charles withdrew from the firm "with a competency," selling his share in the partnership to Sevill for $40,000.\textsuperscript{37} The younger Schofield had multiplied his wealth tenfold in three years. Hence, "deeming himself sufficiently opulent and fearing the result of the war," he retired from manufacture, aged 29. Having experienced a spectacular rise, and fearing either an economic reversal or another southern invasion similar to that which had Philadelphians scurrying about the previous July, Charles settled back to a comfortable income (conservatively, $2-3,000 a year), while Sevill carried on as sole proprietor.

That Charles may well have been expendable can be inferred from a tale Robson relates concerning the firm's response to summer Southern incursions in 1862 and 1863.

When the Rebels threatened Pennsylvania in 1862 and 1863, moved by the common impulse of patriotism, the proprietors of these mills raised a company of men among their own operatives, continuing their wages during their absence, and sent it out under the command of Charles Schofield, Sevill assuming the double burden [production and sales] at home.\textsuperscript{38}

While the vision of a manufacturing partner leading "his" men off toward battle evokes images of industrial paternalism, reinforced by the continuation of wages, Charles' absence was hardly crippling. His withdrawal from the firm was promptly followed by yet more venturesome maneuvers. Now that he was fully master of the mills, Sevill not only sought and won nearly a million dollars in contracts in his own name, but also bought and built energetically.

\textsuperscript{35} Robson, \textit{M & M Pa.}, 186.
\textsuperscript{36} 1860 MCS, Phila. Co., Ward 21, 474.
\textsuperscript{37} George Kennedy, \textit{Roxborough, Wissahickon, and Manayunk in 1891} (Philadelphia, 1891), 112.
\textsuperscript{38} Robson, \textit{M & M Pa.}, 186.
J.C. Kempton had been one of Manayunk's early textile magnates, introducing the power-weaving of checked cottons in the 1830's, retiring from active business in the mid-Fifties. Thereafter, Archibald Campbell and Co. rented Kempton's Blantyre Mill until his death in 1862. Upon the settling of the Kempton estate, Sevill Schofield purchased the Blantyre Mill, then leased part of it back to his father-in-law's firm, placing his own woolen looms in the remainder. This move both recapitulated the pattern followed with the acquisition of the McFadden Mill, and quietly stressed his rapid ascent, Sevill having in four years moved from "incomer" to landlord for the business in which the Somersets shared. (When the Campbell firm removed from Blantyre in 1869, Schofield continued to rent part of the mill, ultimately hosting William Allen, a Schofield superintendent (1861-69) and former Campbell and Co. foreman (1851-58), in his effort to start manufacturing "on his own account."

With the revenue from the final federal contracts flowing in, Schofield in 1865, "purchased adjoining properties" and undertook the erection of a new mill, five stories and "70 by 120 feet," roughly doubling his operating space. Completed the following year, the Economy Mill was outfitted with "imported machinery," but burnt to the ground, March 26, 1867, before production commenced. Owing to a dispute with his insurers, Schofield's policies had been cancelled the very day of the fire; and the entire loss, estimated at $225,000, was unrecoverable. Some indication that his capital and credit positions were strong is given by Schofield's immediate departure for England to secure replacement equipment and the subsequent, rapid construction on the cleared site of a fire-proof mill, twice the length of the burnt structure (270').

Until it was completed in 1868, he operated as best he could under the circumstances, having his spinning done by other parties, and still running the original mill.

39 Robson, M & M Pa., 514. Both Allen and his partner, Henry Morris, were Lancashire men, the former born at Manchester, the latter at Bolton.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., 186.

42 Ibid.
John Dobson had expanded his factories during these years and was probably of some assistance. Dobson's younger brother James had in the interim married Schofield's younger sister, Mary Ann, doubling the inter-family bonds. Sevill had in turn named his second son Dobson Schofield.\(^43\)

Though other older firms which had undertaken wartime blanket production returned to their customary outputs at war's end (e.g., McCallum's Germantown carpet works, the Whitaker cotton mills above Frankford\(^44\)), Schofield retained his woolen broadlooms and added additional lines to the profitable blanket operation. By 1870, he reported manufacturing 175,000 yards of cassimeres and coatings, in addition to 76,000 yards of blanketing, total value — $433,000. In the decade since 1860, a hundred new looms had been set in place, together with commensurate preparatory machinery. The Schofield mills could now process three thousand pounds of carded wool daily and employed over three hundred workers (165 men, 112 women and 37 boys and girls).\(^45\) However, with this expansion, the surplus generated had declined sharply as a proportion of total value produced. In 1860, wages represented 16% and materials 41% of total product value. Ten years later, wages constituted 24% and materials 67% of each dollar of output, radically narrowing the margin from which insurance, repairs and profits might be drawn.

The engagement of skilled workers for finer woolen work (mule spinners, finishers, et al.), together with the rising trend of wages during the Sixties may account for the increased labor figures. The dramatic surge in materials costs largely stemmed from the purchase of new wools for coatings and cassimeres. For two hundred tons of domestic raw wool, Schofield spent $195,000, two thirds of his raw materials total. Shoddy remained a crucial component of his manufacturing strategy, however, for two hundred fifty tons of reprocessed wool were secured (at a third of the cost of new, 15\(\pi\) vs. 50\(\pi/\)lb.) and blended into coarser yarn grades. Here too there had been an escalation of input costs, for Schofield had ceased grinding rags into shoddy, buying instead ready-processed materials. Though the price of baled

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rags had risen sharply (to 10¢ vs. 4¢/lb. in 1860), finished shoddy was yet half again as expensive. Thus even as Schofield moved his production upscale, assisted by the protection afforded by the Morrill Tariff, the wide surpluses of the early years faded. In dollar amounts, the crude return from production in 1870 was double that of 1860 ($41,000 vs. $22,000), and yet the 1860 crude surplus had matched the total capital reported invested while the 1870 figure was but 20% of the later larger firm capital ($200,000). If the rate of return had declined, Schofield was nevertheless still in a comfortable situation. His part-shoddy goods could be marketed cheaper than competing fabrics composed entirely of new wool, rental income supplemented his manufacturing operations, and residual profits were his alone to enjoy.

In the last years before the Depression of 1873, Sevill Schofield continued to expand his facilities, adding a third mill, bringing his total manufacturing space to above 170,000 square feet and increasing the workforce to over five hundred. With additional spinning capacity, yarns again were offered for sale, and new fabrics (chinchillas, elyzians) joined the woolen standards. Narrowed manufacturing margins may have necessitated some borrowing for this construction. When credit tightened as demand and market prices for fabrics dropped in the depression, Schofield moved to attempt reduction of the rates paid for labor in his mills. Cuts in unspecified Manayunk mills appeared in October and November of 1873, yielding a strike at Archibald Campbell and Co., where women weavers lead a walkout against a 15% reduction. Textile firms in Germantown and Kensington shortened hours and laid off up to half their workers in response to dull trade, while carpet workers nominated shop delegates to coordinate resistance to lowered rates in that sector.

Whether Schofield joined the fall wave of wage-cuts is unclear, but the following June, his announcement of a reduction brought the first recorded strike at the Economy and Blantyre Mills. A second cut in November, 1874 produced a second strike, though in the latter case spinners and weavers seemed initially disposed to continue work, while

46 Robson, M & M Pa., 186.
47 Public Ledger, October 11, 13, 31, November 3, 8, 1873.
48 Ibid., December 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 1873.
49 Ibid., June 2, 1874.
fullers, dyers and finishers, all skilled male workers, walked out. "One of the operatives stated that the reduction was 10 and 15% and that a portion of the spinners were also on strike," reported the Public Ledger. Shortly after a meeting at Manayunk's Temperance Hall, at which "the men on strike demand [ed] they be paid the same wages as before," Schofield shuttered the factories. Given the interlocked nature of production, the withdrawal of "one-fourth" of his 550 workers, concentrated in skilled positions, froze production and brought the "lock-out of the rest." The results of the two conflicts were not recorded, but few such strikes in this period gained their objective.

Schofield may have been emboldened to lower rates and his workers to resist by the drama played out nearby at his brothers-in-laws' mills. J&J Dobson, ten days before the Schofield announcement, cut wages in their cloth, carpet and blanket mills, triggering strikes which expired shortly after Schofield's skilled workers downed tools. The Dobsons' success, together with faltering market conditions, surely encouraged Schofield to bide his time until the approach of winter and absence of alternative employment engineered his workers' acquiescence. (The two largest Manayunk mills, Patterson and Campbell, had wholly suspended.) Though frays recurrent at the Dobson facility and at other Manayunk mills through the rest of the decade, no reports of strike activity at the Schofield firm appeared until the cyclical downturn of the mid-Eighties, which brought a citywide epidemic of reductions and turnouts amid feverish organizational efforts by the Knights of Labor.

Continued extension of Schofield's shoddy-substitution manufacturing strategy may well have helped the firm weather slack times through the Seventies. Exhibiting at the Centennial Exposition (1876)

Various grades of cotton warp and all-wool fur beavers and chin-chillas, of excellent designs, at cheap prices; together with cotton-warp bed and horse blankets, for general consumption, at very low cost,
the Economy Mills gained a commendatory award from a panel of judges headed by the venerable John Hayes, Secretary to the National Association of Wool Manufacturers. In his Claim, accompanying the exhibit, Schofield elaborated briefly on his productive orientation.

We claim for all our varieties of goods, not so much originality in design and construction, as an adaptation in both these particulars of the leading styles of the market, to general consumption.

In this direction, that is, that of furnishing the multitude with facsimiles of high-cost goods, at low prices, yet of good materials, we have led the manufactures of the country for many years; and with ever-increasing facilities, propose still to do so in the future.54

These general-market copies, frequently of fashionable French and British designs, sold well enough to fund the firm’s “ever-increasing facilities,” at least through 1880. In that year, the Economy and Blantyre Mills occupied five Manayunk factory buildings, powered by steam engines with triple the force reported in 1870 (1150 vs. 350 HP). Six hundred workers were distributed among 39 sets of preparatory cards and combs, 14,300 spindles and above two hundred looms.55

The proprietor of such a massive establishment had become a figure of citywide visibility, at least among the textile community. In November 1879, Philadelphia’s wool manufacturers hosted the annual meeting of their National Association. At the banquet, for which James Dobson had been committee chairman, Sevill Schofield delivered brief remarks. William S. Schofield, his eldest son, soon to be admitted to the firm, was in attendance, as were over 160 local wool merchants and millmen.56 In the wake of these festivities, the Philadelphia wool manufacturers moved toward creation of a local industry-wide association, initially focused on Washington and the defense of protective tariffs. To this end, a “reception” for General Grant was soon followed by an organizational banquet, January 27, 1880, at which both Schofields again appeared. Sevill’s $500 contribution toward the $3,900 cost of the fete for Grant was dutifully recognized, and he shortly

54 Ibid. Emphasis in original.
56 NAWM, Bulletin, IX, (1879), No. 4, 285-293.
signed the Association's articles, becoming a member of the Board of Managers.57

Addressing the January gathering, Thomas Dolan, later President of the National Association of Manufacturers, offered a sketch of the Philadelphia trades.

The textile manufacturers of Philadelphia, from statistical reports for 1879, show a productive capacity of about seventy-five million dollars. One of the peculiarities of the interest is that it is composed almost exclusively of individuals and individual firms, in the aggregate 849, no corporations, divided as follows: cloth, weaving, spinning &c., 478 establishments; carpets, 223; hosiery and knit goods, 148 . . . (I)n almost every case, [the firms are] conducted by the originators, and the early life of the greater number of these originators was a school where economy, energy and industry was the necessity. . . .

It should be our aim to make Philadelphia the attraction and centre for all textiles, by establishing the proper schools for design and weaving, . . . and in that manner offer one of the most important features for success in the manufacture of textiles. Our purpose should be to gather around us the dissatisfied manufacturers of other countries, encourage the classification of the trade, such as yarn manufacturing of all kinds, dyeing and finishing of all kinds of materials and fabrics, and in this manner divide the cost of the plant and invite the young and small capitalist to locate with us.58

This oration both assessed the vast extent of then-current production in the Quaker city (849 firms) and recounted the pathway followed by many of those present. Like Schofield, scores of Philadelphia's textile capitalists had started as immigrants on the mill floor (the originators' "school"), had specialized in a fraction of the overall production process as he had (yarns initially), and had gradually built substantial enterprises, a process accelerated in some cases by war-era demand.

By 1880, however, as Dolan stressed, something more was needed; the school of experience ought be formalized into an institution for textile manufacturing education, examples of which were then scattered

57 Public Ledger, January 28, 1880.
58 Ibid.
throughout Britain, France and Germany. To this textile school project, the pet idea of Theodore Search, a one-time schoolteacher become partner in a Spring Garden worsted yarn concern, Sevill Schofield pledged $1,000 in 1883.\textsuperscript{59} After initial funding difficulties occasioned by a market slump in that year, the school opened in 1884 under Search's supervision, the first of its type in the United States. (It continues to operate today as the Philadelphia College of Textiles and Science.)

The broadening of Sevill Schofield's "presence" in the city soon came to include his participation in the businessmen's reform movement known as the Committee of One Hundred. Created in response to the corruption in the Republican administration of Mayor William Stokeley, once pledged to cleaning up a tawdry city government, the One Hundred (actually 107) were chiefly merchants and manufacturers who viewed both parties as boss and patronage machines. After much shuffling, the reform Committee nominated an independent slate, for Mayor, Republican Samuel King, a retired brush manufacturer long active in ward politics, and William Hunter, Democrat, for Receiver of Taxes. Hunter was a West Philadelphia dyeworks proprietor, though operation of the family firm was managed by his brothers while he served as a City Council member and constantly criticized the sloth and waste in Stokeley's regime. Schofield played no memorable role in the Committee's agitation, though his donations helped in a well-financed campaign that swept both reformers to victory in the February election.\textsuperscript{60}

His activities with the Manufacturers Association, involvement in the school project, and operations on the fringes of reform politics indicate the emergence of Sevill Schofield as an industrial figure of some consequence. Yet this period of public activity seems to have been the high-water mark of his career. The mid-Eighties depression in the wool trades brought about another round of wage reduction efforts, and with them four strikes in four years at his mills.\textsuperscript{61} His relatively straightened circumstances might be indicated by the contrast

\textsuperscript{59} Philadelphia Textile School, Subscribers' List, 1883 (unpaged), Archives of the Philadelphia College of Textiles and Science, Pastore Library

\textsuperscript{60} See Biographical Album of Prominent Pennsylvanians, First Series (Philadelphia, 1888), 217-222, George Vickers, The Fall of Bossism (Philadelphia, 1883)

\textsuperscript{61} Public Ledger, April 24, 1882, January 4, 1883, February 4, 7, 25, 28, March 3, 4, 11, 17, 1885, June 4, 1885
between his and Dobson's donations to the PTMA in 1880 and the
school fund in 1883. Where in the first instance Schofield had matched
Dobson's $500 contribution to the Grant affair, three years later his
thousand dollar pledge was dwarfed by those of Dobson and Dolan,
$5000 each. The 1885 strike brought "riotous scenes" to Manayunk,
and Schofield and his son ultimately withdrew their planned wage cuts
after a six weeks' shut-down. The tariff system that had been so
valuable for twenty years was altered in 1884, and came under steady
attack by free-traders for the next generation. Competition intensified
with every new entry into the wool manufacture, though Schofield
erected yet another, his final mill, the Eagle. The contradiction embed-
ded in the process was that vastly expanded facilities had brought
increasing complexity of operations and a deteriorating relationship
with Manayunk's workers. It may have been toward restoring lost
good faith that the Schofields, in the fall of 1885, increased wages 5%
across the board "without being asked." The extension of a partner-
ship to William Somerset, Jr., during these same years may have been
a consequence of long-term kinship relations and an effort to supple-
ment the management team of a family firm which had grown too
large for its principal and his son to handle.

At the time when Philadelphia's boast was the functional division
of the textile manufacture into interdependent component firms, each
"divid(ing) the cost of the plant," the Schofields' were possessed of an
immense integrated mill system, each element of which needed to be
kept technically at a "state of the art" level in order to mount effective
competition with smaller, disintegrated networks of single-function
firms. Ultimately, as their founder aged, the Economy, Eagle, and
Blantyre Mills grew ever more troubled. Following the Crash of '93,

Mr. Schofield experienced several financial embarrassments and the
extensive mills were latterly conducted by James Dobson, his brother-
in-law.

63 Ibid., September 10, 1885.
64 Goshow, Mills and Mill Owners, 105; Textile Manufacturers Directory of the United States (1885)
(Boston, 1885), 203.
65 NAWM, Bulletin, XXXI (1901), No. 1, 69.
The family connections held to the end. Sevill’s son, Dobson Schofield, had by 1900 become treasurer and buyer for the Imperial Woolen Company, the trade name under which his uncle James Dobson operated the Eagle and Blantyre Mills. Sevill had managed to retain only the rebuilt Economy Mill, running blankets and coatings until his death, of “heart disease,” December 21, 1900, aged 68."

In closing this review of an immigrant manufacturer’s half-century in the textile trades, several general observations may be in order. The intricacy and durability of networks founded on common ethnicity, religion, craft and above all, family relations and strategic marriage empty the content from the notion of the “self-made man.” To appreciate the means by which men of no standing became manufacturers, built trade contacts, and accumulated capital, historians will be well repaid for efforts spent reconstituting elements of the family and community environment which facilitated entry and expansion. Sevill’s “industry and energy” may have been striking to any observer, but operative in a context of transplanted British Protestant textile family firms at Manayunk, they became valuable as well. The reciprocities among the Schofields, Somersets and Dobsons, from the naming of children through partnerships and financial affairs, suggest the existence of a vital manufacturing subculture, spanning generations, in which family and business were interwoven. Replicated throughout the Philadelphia textile trades and perhaps in other manufacturing sectors, such a pattern stands as a rich contrast to the distanced corporate professionalism elaborated at Lowell and routinized by the Pennsylvania Railroad in the same era.

The steep trajectory of Schofield’s rise, from one room in 1857 to possession of two mills and construction of a third by the war’s end, underscore some customary observations about small businesses. Initially, both the rental of four of his mill’s five floors and the brothers’ direct labor kept operating expenses at a minimum, a crucial issue for fledgling enterprises. Second, the firm put forward a product innovation, shoddy-based jeans, which sustained the firm through the

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66 Textile Record, XXII (1901), No. 1, 59; Textile World Official Directory of the Textile Mills and Buyers of Textile Fabrics (1900) (Boston, 1900), 214, 222.
market failures that preceded the Civil War boom. The extension of this technique to other fabrics allowed the firm to sell "at low cost" copies of top-scale goods, the hallmark of the Economy Mills to which Schofield referred in 1876. Third, the risks taken in commencing blanket manufacture were fully rewarded, as profits from state contracts helped fund expansion and as blankets became a firm specialty through the close of the century. Cost economy, product innovation and risk-taking continue to be strengths within the world of "small business" to the present day.

By the same token, the Schofield case also illustrates recurrent problems confronting proprietary manufacture in a competitive and changing industrial sector. The innovations which "make" a company may be difficult to replace with other experiments, as the willingness to accept risk ebbs with the increasing age of the firm and its founder.\(^{67}\) This is hardly universal, but it is noteworthy that in 1900, Sevill Schofield was still producing blankets and coatings in his one remaining factory, the fabrics which had brought his mills to prominence in the Sixties. Further, the dramatic expansion that follows initial success tends to stretch thin the managerial capacities of family firms. When this is combined with an understandable reluctance to trust "outsiders" with key functions affecting the fate of the firm, catastrophe may well result. It is in this light that admission of William Somerset, Jr., to the firm during the difficult Eighties is readily intelligible.

Finally, the generational transition often proves problematic. Despite all good intentions, a founder set in his ways may stifle the innovative sallies of his heir, staying active within the business that has been his life to the point of running it into the ground. This may have been the case with the later years of Sevill Schofield, Son, and Co. Alternatively, the heir may die, leaving the firm bereft of a successor. This happened to the pioneering Joseph Ripka family, as the founder's son died in 1860, preceding the firm's wartime bankruptcy and Joseph's death in 1864.\(^{68}\) Other scenarios for collapse may be added, and for each, examples drawn from local experience. The private firm, unlike its public, incorporated colleagues, is thoroughly

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\(^{67}\) This phenomenon opens the way for "new-starts" to become upstarts, displacing increasingly rigid older firms through venturesome manufacturing and/or marketing efforts.

mortal and more vulnerable to age, madness, incompetence or death.

Remembering Dolan's "individual firms, in the aggregate, 849; no corporations," it should be stressed that as the corporate empires of rail, steel, and coal stretched themselves across Pennsylvania, the family textile firms of Philadelphia did not fade quietly away. Waves of new-starts, often in the hands of new immigrants, replaced ailing older enterprises, commencing as did Schofield, in a "room with power." Sturdier family firms incorporated for the legal benefits, but remained closely held, their proprietors sending their sons to the Textile School or to Wharton. The new century brought wide unionization of the Philadelphia textile trades, particularly knit-goods, and new specializations, lace, upholstery and industrial fabrics. Eastern European immigrants joined the ranks of manufacturers and workers in time for the First World War boom. Although the 1920s were a dynamic era for other manufacturing sectors, depression struck the textile industry five years before the stock market collapse, cutting a wide swath through Kensington and Manayunk. While perhaps a quarter of the local firms failed, the survivors prospered again with the onset of the Second World War, when government contracts again lit the mills far into the night. Deteriorating only in the 1950s, the textile firms of Philadelphia had played a leading role in the city's manufacturing economy for well over a century.

This examination of the life of Sevill Schofield opens a window into the first half of that long span, enabling us to appreciate the means and mechanisms by which hundreds of immigrant, shop-schooled entrepreneurs created the most extensive textile manufacturing concentration in nineteenth-century America. Schofield's example should encourage historians to look beyond the robber barons and the corporate managers toward a complex world of specialized partnerships and family enterprises, whose role in American capitalist development has all too rarely been considered. Additional studies of immigrant and proprietary manufacture should contribute toward a fuller reconstitution of the economic past as a moving totality in which culture and the social

relations of production played as essential a role as did technology and factor costs.

Philadelphia College of Textiles & Science