

# *The Market Structure of Shipping German Immigrants to Colonial America*

**B**Y THE END OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY the power of royally chartered trading companies to monopolize trans-Atlantic routes had waned. Within the confines of the Navigation Acts, eighteenth-century British shipping was openly competitive.<sup>1</sup> However, the transportation of German immigrants from Rotterdam to America in the middle of the eighteenth century might have been the exception. Several authors have suggested that a few shippers monopolized this trade prior to the Seven Years War.<sup>2</sup>

Monopolization of the German passenger trade would have dire consequences for the emigrants. A monopolist's goal of higher profits

The author wishes to thank David Galenson and Jimmie Lee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

<sup>1</sup> See Simeon J. Crowther, "The Shipbuilding Output of the Delaware Valley, 1722-1776," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 117 (1973): 90-104; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the English Shipping Industry* (London, 1962); Thomas M. Doerflinger, "Commercial Specialization in Philadelphia's Merchant Community, 1750-1791," *Business History Review* 57 (1983): 20-49; Marc Egnal, "The Changing Structure of Philadelphia's Trade with the British West Indies, 1750-1775," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 99 (1975): 156-79; Farley Grubb, "The Market for Indentured Immigrants: Evidence on the Efficiency of Forward-Labor Contracting in Philadelphia, 1745-1773," *Journal of Economic History* 45 (1985): 855-68; W. E. Minchinton, ed., *The Growth of English Overseas Trade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1969); James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development of Colonial North America* (Cambridge, 1972); Gary M. Walton, "New Evidence on Colonial Commerce," *Journal of Economic History* 28 (1968): 363-89.

<sup>2</sup> For example, see Frank R. Diffenderffer, "The German Immigration into Pennsylvania Through the Port of Philadelphia, and 'The Redemptioners,'" pt. 7 of "The German Influence in its Settlement and Development," *Pennsylvania German Society* 10 (1899), 239-42; Karl F. Geiser, *Redemptioners and Indentured Servants in the Colony and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (New Haven, 1901), 47-48; Abbot E. Smith, "Some New Facts About Eighteenth-Century German Immigration," *Pennsylvania History* 10 (1943): 105-17; Abbot E. Smith, *Colonists in Bondage* (New York, 1947), 59, 208-18; Marianne S. Wokeck, "A Tide of Alien Tongues: The Flow and Ebb of German Immigration to Pennsylvania, 1683-1776," Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1983, 137-202.

could only be achieved by artificially restricting the supply of services, thus causing the price to rise far above the cost of supplying the service. Noncompetitive behavior has been used to explain why the 55,000 Germans migrating to Philadelphia between 1730 and 1756 experienced conditions worse than British emigrants.<sup>3</sup> With no alternative shipping readily available, Germans might have had little choice but to accept relatively higher transportation prices and less tolerable voyage conditions. High passage fares could have discouraged German emigration or led to more Germans relying on servitude to finance their voyage compared with British emigrants. Poor voyage conditions could have led to more discomfort, sickness, and death among German emigrants compared with British emigrants. In addition, Germans who paid for passage through servitude could have had little choice but to accept the less desirable redemptioner contracts instead of the standard British indentured contracts which prevailed in competitive markets. Thus, German servants may have labored under less advantageous conditions in America compared with British servants.<sup>4</sup>

Recently, the conclusion that German immigrants experienced the worst voyage conditions of any immigrant group on the North Atlantic passage has been challenged. In addition, it has been suggested that redemptioner contracts were not necessarily less desirable than indentured contracts because redemptioner financing offered a more flexible contract.<sup>5</sup> Although these findings call into question some of

<sup>3</sup> The vast majority of Germans who migrated to the New World in the eighteenth century came between 1730 and the Seven Years War. See Marianne S. Wokeck, "The Flow and Composition of German Immigration to Philadelphia, 1727-1775," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 105 (1981), 260-61.

<sup>4</sup> See Diffenderffer, "German Immigration into Pennsylvania," 55-68, 147, 256-62; John Duffy, "The Passage to the Colonies," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 28 (1951): 21-38; David W. Galenson, *White Servitude in Colonial America* (Cambridge, MA, 1981), 13-15; Geiser, *Redemptioners and Indentured Servants*, 26-27, 43-58; Richard B. Morris, *Government and Labor in Early America* (New York, 1946), 319-22; Billy G. Smith, "Death and Life in a Colonial City: A Demographic Analysis of Philadelphia," *Journal of Economic History* 36 (1977), 872; Smith, "Eighteenth-Century German Immigration," 105-117; Smith, *Bondage*, 20-22, 35-41; *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia* 29, 86, 96; 21, 418-419. For the incidence of European immigrant servitude in Philadelphia see Farley Grubb, "The Incidence of Servitude in Trans-Atlantic Migration, 1771-1804," *Explorations in Economic History* 22 (1985): 316-39.

<sup>5</sup> Farley Grubb, "Morbidity and Mortality on the North Atlantic Passage: Eighteenth-Century German Immigration to Pennsylvania," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 17 (1987),

the suggested consequences of monopolization in the German immigrant trade, the conclusion that the trade was monopolized prior to the Seven Years War has remained unchallenged. Therefore, the existing evidence for and against monopolization will be evaluated to better establish the market structure of German immigrant shipping in the middle of the eighteenth century.

The relevant evidence for judging effective monopolization should come from the market characteristics of monopoly. An effective monopolist should be observed making profits above what is normal for competitive merchants. The monopolist would acquire these profits by artificially restricting the supply of services, a restriction that would lead to higher prices. Higher prices and excess profits would attract competitors who would increase the supply of services, drive prices down, and eliminate the monopolist's profits. Therefore, the monopolist should be observed driving existing competitors out and keeping potential competitors away through legal or extra-legal means. Because maintaining a monopoly is easier for one or at best a few merchants, a high degree of concentration in the trade should be observed, and easy entry and exit from the market should not be observed. If these conditions are not met, then effective monopolization of the German immigrant trade would be unlikely.

#### EVALUATION OF THE LITERARY EVIDENCE SUGGESTING MONOPOLIZATION

There are three separate allegations of monopolization, each supported by quotations from different contemporary observers of the

---

forthcoming; Farley Grubb, "Redemptioner Immigration to Pennsylvania, Evidence on Contract Choice and Profitability," *Journal of Economic History* 46 (1986): 407-18. See also *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418-19; Donald F. Durnbaugh, "Two Letters from Germantown," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 84 (1959), 231-33; Galenson, *White Servitude*, 14; Farley Grubb, "Immigrant Servant Labor: Their Occupational and Geographic Distribution in the Late Eighteenth-Century Mid-Atlantic Economy," *Social Science History* 9 (1985): 249-75.

trade. The first allegation, and the only one from within the Pennsylvania market, presented by Frank Diffenderffer, came from the Pennsylvania-German printer Christopher Sauer. In 1755 Sauer wrote to Governor Morris about the wrongs done to German immigrants in the late 1730s.

Steadman at the time bought a license in Holland that no captain or merchant could load any [German emigrants] as long as he had not two thousand loaded. I wrote to the magistrate at Rotterdam, and immediately the "*Monopolium*" was taken from John Steadman.<sup>6</sup>

John and Charles Stedman commanded eight German immigrant voyages between 1731 and 1740, one each in 1737 and 1738. (See Table 1.) They may also have been partial owners in three other German immigrant voyages in the 1730s. If the Stedmans had a license to load at Rotterdam the first 2,000 Germans bound for Philadelphia each year during the 1730s, they would have had substantial monopoly power because only in 1738 did emigration definitely exceed 2,000.<sup>7</sup>

Table 1 outlines the activities of the Stedmans in the German passenger market between 1731 and 1754. They only handled 18.7 percent of the voyages and 20 percent of the adult males arriving in Philadelphia, although they were probably the largest single shipper. The Stedmans' market share in the 1730s was not much different than in the 1740s and 1750s. They acquired the capacity to carry 2,000 immigrants yearly around 1738, but never came close to carrying 2,000 in any year.<sup>8</sup> They probably possessed the carrying capacity

<sup>6</sup> "Christopher Sauer's First Letter to Governor Morris on the Trials and Wrongs of the Early German Immigrants," March 15, 1755, quoted in Diffenderffer, "German Immigration into Pennsylvania," 239-45.

<sup>7</sup> Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," 260.

<sup>8</sup> The Stedmans registered the *Charming Nancy* in 1736, the *Lydia* in 1738, and may have controlled the *St. Andrew* and two ships named *Thisle* though they did not register them in Philadelphia until a decade later. With at best five ships at their command they would have had to carry 400 passengers per ship to attain 2,000 immigrants per year. The implied passengers per ship ratio, although not impossible, would have been at the extreme upper end of the observed distribution for any period. See Table 5 and Strassburger, *German Pioneers* vol. 1. Wokeck has estimated total passengers to be 2.5 to 2.8 times the number of adult men. Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," 260. Therefore, the Stedmans' best year was 1754 when they carried around 1,400 emigrants or roughly 280 per ship. Their best year in the 1730s was 1738 when they carried around 800 emigrants or roughly 200 per ship.

**Table 1**  
**The Activities of the Stedman Family in Shipping German Immigrants to Philadelphia, 1731 1754**

Year	Shipments	Adult Males Carried <sup>a</sup>	Methods and Ships Used
1731	1 (25 0%) <sup>b</sup>	57 (24 3%) <sup>b</sup>	captain ( <i>Pennsylvania Merchant</i> ) <sup>c</sup>
1732	1 ( 9 1)	73 ( 9 0)	captain ( <i>Pennsylvania Merchant</i> )
1733	1 (14 3)	71 (16 6)	captain ( <i>Pennsylvania Merchant</i> )
1734	1 (50 0)	89 (63 6)	captain ( <i>St Andrew</i> )
1735	0	0	
1736	0	0	
1737	2 (28 6)	259 (41 7)	captain ( <i>St Andrew</i> and <i>Charming Nancy</i> )
1738	4 (25 0)	321 (26 5)	captain ( <i>St Andrew</i> and <i>Charming Nancy</i> ) and partial owners of two ships named <i>Thistle</i> <sup>d</sup>
1739	1 (12 5)	24 ( 4 5)	partial owners ( <i>Lydia</i> ) <sup>e</sup>
1740	1 (16 7)	68 (16 8)	partial owners ( <i>Lydia</i> )
1741	2 (20 0)	174 (27 2)	captain ( <i>St Andrew</i> ) and partial owners ( <i>Lydia</i> )
1742	0	0	
1743	3 (30 0)	171 (27 2)	partial owners ( <i>Lydia</i> , <i>St Andrew</i> , and <i>Endeavor</i> )
1744	0	0	
1745	0	0	
1746	0	0	
1747	1 (20 0)	14 ( 4 1)	partial owners ( <i>Lydia</i> )
1748	1 (12 5)	124 (21 3)	partial owners ( <i>Patience</i> )
1749	3 (12 5)	397 (15 0)	partial owners ( <i>St Andrew</i> , <i>Patience</i> , and <i>Lydia</i> )
1750	4 (26 7)	405 (23 7)	partial owners ( <i>St Andrew</i> , <i>Patience</i> , <i>Brothers</i> , and <i>Nancy</i> )
1751	4 (25 0)	336 (17 9)	partial owners ( <i>St Andrew</i> , <i>Patience</i> , <i>Brothers</i> , and <i>Nancy</i> ) <sup>f</sup>
1752	4 (18 2)	423 (19 7)	partial owners ( <i>St Andrew</i> , <i>Brothers</i> , <i>Nancy</i> , and <i>Halifax</i> )
1753	4 (15 8)	420 (23 0)	partial owners ( <i>Patience</i> , <i>Brothers</i> , <i>Peggy</i> and <i>Halifax</i> ) <sup>f</sup>
1754	5 (26 3)	507 (24 3)	partial owners ( <i>Nancy</i> , <i>Barclay</i> , <i>Brothers</i> , <i>Peggy</i> and <i>Halifax</i> ) <sup>f</sup>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>43 (18 7)</b>	<b>4,761 (20 0)</b>	

*Notes* The activities include those of John, Charles, and Alexander Stedman as captains or partial owners of vessels that transported German immigrants from Holland or London to Philadelphia

<sup>a</sup>Includes those who were required to sign the loyalty oaths which provides the most direct, consistent, and accurate measure of the relative number of passengers across shippers

<sup>b</sup>The percentage of the respective totals from German immigrant shipping to Philadelphia are in parentheses

<sup>c</sup>John Stedman captained voyages in 1731 1734 and in 1737 1738 Charles Stedman captain voyages in 1737, 1738, and 1741

<sup>d</sup>1738 includes deliveries by two different vessels named *Thistle* commanded by captains not otherwise employed by the Stedmans before or after in the trade The Stedmans registered two vessels named *Thistle* in Philadelphia, in July 1750 and May 1752 That these are the same vessels and were under the control of the Stedmans in 1738 is not known, possibly making the estimated numbers high

<sup>e</sup>The Stedmans registered 14 vessels at the port of Philadelphia between 1731 and 1754 *Charming Nancy* (1736), *Lydia* (1738), *Argyle* (1743), *St Andrew* (1749), *Nancy* (1749), *Brothers* (1750), *Patience* (1750), *Thistle* (1750), *Endeavor* (1750), *Halifax* (1751), *Minerva* (1752), *Thistle* (1752), *Barclay* (1752), and *Peggy* (1754) Since 18th century ship names were commonly duplicated, consistency across the captains employed, consignments of cargo, and the port register were used to confirm that the German immigrant ships in question were probably owned by the Stedmans

<sup>f</sup>If the shipments of redemptioners consigned to the Stedmans by other merchants for sale in Philadelphia were included, it would raise the Stedmans' total to 10 ships and 1,003 men in 1751 (62 5 and 53 3 percent of the totals, respectively), 4 ships and 497 men in 1753 (21 1 and 27 2 percent of the totals, respectively), and cause no change in 1754 This consignment information was only recorded in 1751 and 1753 1774, see Table 3 and text

*Sources* Derived from Ralph B Strassburger, *Pennsylvania German Pioneers* Vol. 1 (Norristown, Pa., 1934) "Ship Registers for the Port of Philadelphia, 1726 1775," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* Vols. 23 28 (1899 1904) and Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," pp. 260 61

to monopolize the trade between 1734 and 1748, having the potential to transport all the passengers who actually emigrated, except in 1738 when emigration exceeded 3,000. However, even with a monopoly license, they could not prevent other shippers from taking a substantial portion of the trade. Without strict government enforcement of a legal monopoly, which according to Sauer did not long continue, the Stedmans were not powerful enough to exclude other British merchants or even other Philadelphia merchants from the German immigrant trade. Charles Stedman was only the seventeenth largest ship-owner in Philadelphia.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, it seems unlikely that the Stedmans exercised effective monopoly power in the market.

The Stedmans may have tried to acquire a monopoly license because of their changing role in the trade. Between 1737 and 1739 they made the transition from being active ship captains to just partial owners of the vessels involved in the trade. At the same time they expanded their yearly carrying capacity by investing in more ships. They increased their involvement in the German passenger trade from one ship a year to at least two in 1737 and four in 1738. Committing four vessels to the trade in 1738 may have been risky because the yearly flow of German emigrants was very volatile. From 1733 to 1737 German passengers averaged only 465 per year and the number of voyages averaged less than three per year. Since some of the same ships in the 1750s averaged 300 passengers per voyage, underutilized freight space and the cost of searching for alternative cargo may have been a problem. For example, in 1737 Hope & Co. would not finance a separate immigrant voyage to Georgia unless the Georgia trustees recruited at least 140 to 150 immigrants rather than the 60 proposed. The costs of underutilized freight space or excessive port delays could be avoided by finding some way of guaranteeing an emigrant cargo. Therefore, given the commitment in 1738 of four vessels to the trade, it would have been sensible for the Stedmans to seek the rights to load the first 2,000 emigrants, an effort that proved to be unsuccessful.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Charles Stedman was part owner of eleven vessels registered in Pennsylvania, a total investment of 316 tons with a mean tonnage per investment of 29. See Crowther, "Ship-building Output," 103.

<sup>10</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418-23, 437-38; 29, 200-201. The Stedmans' vessels

The cause of Sauer's complaint against John Stedman may have been, rather than true monopolization, the loss of life and illness aboard the *St. Andrew*, commanded by John Stedman, by the time it arrived in Philadelphia in 1738. John Stedman had been praised for other voyages. Christopher Schultz, who arrived on the *St. Andrew* in 1734, wrote of Captain Stedman, "We had a very good captain, who kept strictly to his contract, and very able sailors, who had very much patience with us."<sup>11</sup> Unsuccessful voyages were commonly attributed to the cruelty, incompetence, or monopoly power of the shipper instead of bad luck or changes in voyage plans caused by the weather.

The second and most convincing allegation of monopolization was uncovered by Abbot E. Smith. He quoted a letter written in 1739 by the British secretary of legation at the Hague, "Till of late there was but one Merchant (Zachary Hope) at Rotterdam, with his Associates, who was allowed to answer for, and transport these [German] emigrants."<sup>12</sup> However, Smith did not tell the full story behind the quotation. In February, 1739, the trustees for the colony of Georgia wrote to Robert Trevor, British minister at the Hague, and to D. Wolters, English royal agent at Rotterdam, informing them that seven Salzburgers had set out for Rotterdam, by way of Augsburg and Frankfort, to take passage to England and from there to Georgia. The trustees further requested that Wolters and Trevor assist these Georgia colonists if any difficulties arose on their passage through Holland.<sup>13</sup>

The full content of Trevor's reply was to inform the Georgia trustees that sometime before 1739 the Dutch had instituted a passport policy for German emigrants passing through Holland in response to complaints by local inhabitants. The passports had to be acquired by

---

were not the first to arrive in Philadelphia during the 1738 fall migration season. See Strassburger, *German Pioneers* vol. 1. Their ships must have loaded the emigrants who arrived late in the season rather than the first arrivals in port, or they had to stay in Rotterdam for a longer period than other shippers to complete their emigrant load.

<sup>11</sup> Donald F. Durnbaugh, ed., *The Brethren in Colonial America* (Elgin, IL, 1967), 42-53; Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 1, xxxiii; Waldmar Westergaard, "Two Germantown Letters of 1738," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 56 (1932): 9-14.

<sup>12</sup> Smith, "Eighteenth-Century German Immigration," 106; Smith, *Bondage*, 208.

<sup>13</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 30, 22-23.

a "subject of credit and substance" who would guarantee the conduct, maintenance, and speedy transportation of the emigrants through Holland. Trevor also claimed that prior to 1739 only one merchant (unnamed) was allowed to acquire these passports, but by 1739 the government ended this legal monopoly to prevent the potential abuses associated with monopoly behavior. After 1738 any subject of credit and substance could acquire the passports. Trevor recommended that the Georgia trustees place an agent in Rotterdam to acquire the passports whenever prospective Georgia colonists were to pass through Holland. Apparently the Salzburgers in question had little difficulty embarking for Georgia in the spring of 1739.<sup>14</sup>

The history of the Dutch passport regulation and its possible creation of a monopoly in the German passenger trade prior to 1739 can be traced in the correspondence of emigrant recruiters for the colony of Georgia. The cause of the regulation was the trouble created by fifty Swiss families from Zurich who arrived in Rotterdam in the fall of 1734. They had resolved to migrate to England and then to British America but had no money for passage. They evidently refused to use redemptioner servitude to finance their migration and expected colonial recruiters to pay their expenses. However, no colony had invited, encouraged, or promised to pay for their migration. They were supported by the charity of the Rotterdam Magistrates and shipped to England from a collection taken by the inhabitants of the city. Passport regulations instituted in May, 1735 were meant to prevent the re-occurrence of such behavior.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 22, pt. 2, 106-7; 30, 42-43. Efforts to regulate German emigration through Holland to lessen the burden on Dutch charity were not unprecedented, see the discussion of the 1709-1711 migration in Walter A. Knittle, *Early Eighteenth Century Palatine Emigration* (Philadelphia, 1937), 47-65; Frank R. Diffenderffer, "German Exodus to England in 1709," pt. 1 of "The German Influence in its Settlement and Development," *Pennsylvania German Society* 7 (1897): 264-75. In later periods the Dutch resorted to the same procedures when similar problems reappeared, see the discussion of the 1816-1817 German migration in Marcus L. Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607-1860* (Cambridge, MA, 1940), 87-89.

<sup>15</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 20, 114-15, 328-34, 345; 21, 100-102, 406-13, 473-78; 29, 35-36, 41-42, 136. The colony of Georgia may have created some of these unrealistic expectations by transporting small groups of German immigrants, mostly Salzburgers, at the colony's expense, and by allowing some unauthorized recruiting to occur on its behalf. Groups of Swiss and German emigrants continually petitioned the Georgia trustees to be transported under the same conditions as the Salzburgers.



The only recorded enforcement of the regulation occurred in the spring of 1736 when 300 Palatines were arrested "contrary to all expectation" at Schenkenschauz on the Dutch frontier "under the pretense that they first settle with a merchant of Rotterdam, named Zachary Hope."<sup>16</sup> This was also the first instance where Zachary Hope was named as the monopolizing merchant; surprisingly throughout the Georgia correspondence the Stedmans were never mentioned. Therefore, Hope & Co. may have had a legal monopoly over the German emigrant trade through Holland for the years 1735 through 1738, perhaps maybe only for part of 1736.

However, from 1735 to 1738 there were many shipments of Germans from Rotterdam to the colonies that did not pass through the hands of Hope & Co. The colony of Georgia, employing the London merchant Peter & J.C. Simonds, had few problems shipping German colonists through Holland to Georgia. The Pennsylvania Brethren relied on the Rotterdam merchant Peter De Koker to aid their members. Two hundred Swiss were able to contract directly with a ship sailing from Rotterdam to Carolina in 1736. Hans Trachsler, in the account of his migration to Carolina in 1736, claimed that those with money could engage passage by themselves with the many ships at Rotterdam, but that those without money would "be taken charge of and sent over by Mr. Hope, a prominent merchant."<sup>17</sup>

Therefore, the larger German passenger market was competitive. Any legal monopoly Hope & Co. may have had was confined to "leftover" redemptioner servants. If emigrants reached the Dutch border without money or sponsorship for passage or without having agreed to purchase passage via servitude with some other merchant, then by default they were directed to Hope & Co. These emigrants would only be allowed to enter Holland if they employed the Hopes to finance their migration using redemptioner servitude. The ability

<sup>16</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 100-102. Over 200 Swiss were detained by the Magistrates of Rotterdam in September, 1736, but the detention involved an unsuccessful effort to have them use a Dutch vessel rather than an English vessel. This was not a passport violation. Gilbert P. Voigt, "Swiss Notes on South Carolina," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 21 (1920), 93-94.

<sup>17</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 4, 54-55; 20, 287; 21, 433-34; 22, pt. 1, 86, 107-8, 250, 297, 321, 342-50; 29, 74, 77, 89, 95-104, 136, 200-201, 229-31, 242-45, 293-95; Durnbaugh, *Brethren in Colonial America*, 39-41; Voigt, "Swiss Notes," 93-94, 100.

of the Hopes to use this passport regulation to restrict competition for German redemptioners was very limited because the recruiting of German emigrants beyond the Dutch border was competitive.

Hope & Co. also failed to control the market for redemptioners in Holland. In 1735, 1736, and 1737, recruiters from Georgia could have shipped German redemptioner servants if they had been willing to put up the financing. In 1738 Capt. Thomson shipped German redemptioners to Georgia "at his own risk." In the fall of 1737 agents for Georgia intercepted a group of German servants at Cowes who were under contract by Hope & Co. to go from Rotterdam to Philadelphia, gained their release from the Hopes contract, and diverted them to Georgia under a new contract.<sup>18</sup> It seems unlikely, then, that Hope & Co. could have excluded competitors from the market and exercised effective monopoly power.

The third allegation of monopolization, also presented by Abbot E. Smith, was by John Dick in a report sent to the British Board of Trade in 1750. Dick complained that the Hopes and John Stedman had monopolized the German immigrant trade in Rotterdam. In 1750 Dick had recruited German colonists for Nova Scotia. As these emigrants arrived at the Dutch border they changed their destination to Pennsylvania after recruiters from competing colonies described Nova Scotia in harsh terms. Frustrated in his recruitment effort, Dick charged that the Hopes and John Stedman had monopolized the German immigrant trade. Smith interpreted this evidence as indicating that the Hopes and the Stedmans were able to maintain their monopoly, even after losing their legal right in 1739, through extra-legal recruitment methods in the 1740s and 1750s. But Dick was able to ship 860 Germans to Nova Scotia in 1752 raising questions about the validity of his claims about the Hopes and John Stedman. The difficulty John Dick experienced in recruiting German colonists was probably the result of intense competition rather than restrictions to competition. Several colonies—Georgia, Massachusetts, Nova Scotia, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia—sent recruiters to the Rhineland to compete for immigrants. Dick combated Joseph Crelius, agent

<sup>18</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418-23, 437-38; 22, pt. 1, 107-8, 297, 321; 29, 95-104, 135, 200-201, 229-31, 242-45, 293-95.

for Massachusetts, in the press of German towns, praising destinations he offered while denouncing rival colonies.<sup>19</sup>

The competitive success of such shippers as the Hopes and the Stedmans in the Pennsylvania market should not be confused with monopoly power over the immigrant business. Other recruiters were not excluded from competition. But it was difficult to counter the amenities offered by Pennsylvania, often the preferred New World destination of German emigrants after 1709. For example, in 1737 John Kramer tried to recruit sixty German servants for Georgia, but he found that all the servants in Rotterdam wanted to go to Pennsylvania. Kramer concluded that only after all the Pennsylvania ships had departed might some servants be convinced to take passage to Georgia.<sup>20</sup> Germans preferred Pennsylvania because it possessed an established and prosperous German community and was hospitable to German immigrants in terms of ethnic and religious tolerance. A large flow of independent and reliable information had been sent to Germany by Pennsylvania Germans which corroborated the information presented by Pennsylvania recruiters.<sup>21</sup>

Another reason for Pennsylvania's competitive success in recruiting German immigrants was the willingness of shippers serving the Philadelphia market to transport immigrants without requiring advance payment, either in cash or by signature on indentures. Passengers were allowed to arrange payment after their arrival in Philadelphia. This redemptioner system allowed poor immigrants a chance to find alternative ways of paying their passage, such as borrowing from American relatives, before being forced to resort to servant contracting. The redemptioner system was invented in the Rotterdam to Philadelphia market in the 1720s and quickly became universal in that market. Recruiters serving other markets were reluctant to adopt the

<sup>19</sup> Smith, "Eighteenth Century German Immigration," 107; Smith, *Bondage*, 55-59, 208-9. See also Bernard Bailyn, *The Peopling of British North America* (New York, 1986), 70-72; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*, 217; Morris, *Government and Labor*, 401.

<sup>20</sup> *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418-23, 437-38.

<sup>21</sup> See Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," 249-78; *Historical Statistics of the United States From Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, DC, 1975), 1, 168; Diffenderffer, "German Immigration into Pennsylvania," 97-106; Knittle, *Palatine Emigration*; Peter Kalm, *Travels in North America*, Adolph B. Benson, trans. and ed. (New York, 1937), 1, 142-43; fn. 5; fn. 6.

innovation, clinging to the older indentured contract or preferring to avoid the difficulty of dealing in servants by recruiting emigrants who could pay for their own passage.<sup>22</sup>

Although various colonies competed for German emigrants, Pennsylvania was the German preference. The supposed monopolization of the passenger or redemptioner trade from Rotterdam to Philadelphia may have been enough to cause the noncompetitive behavior attributed to shippers. Hope & Co. provided financing for other merchants who carried emigrants under the redemptioner system. Only once did Hope & Co. take a role in actually shipping emigrants to Philadelphia. Although the proportion of German redemptioners who used Hope & Co. could not be ascertained, the frequency with which the Hopes were mentioned as a redemptioner merchant suggests that their share was substantial. They may have specialized in the trade, more than other Rotterdam merchants, because of their British and North American family connections.<sup>23</sup>

Without a legally enforced monopoly, however, the Hopes were probably not powerful enough to prevent competition from spoiling efforts to reap monopoly profits. They were only one of a number of prominent merchant houses in Rotterdam and certainly not the largest. In 1742 John Hancock pointed out in a letter to Thomas and Adrian Hope that he had been advised to employ a different merchant house in Holland but would not do so, as long as the Hopes treated him fairly. In 1749 the London firm of John Hunt & Issac Greenleaf decided to enter the Rotterdam to Philadelphia market in German servants and was able to negotiate both with John Stedman and Hope & Co. Hunt & Greenleaf rejected Stedman's conditions but accepted Hopes', suggesting that competition existed between

<sup>22</sup> For discussions of redemptioner servitude and servant recruiting, see Durnbaugh, "Two Letters," 231-33; Diffenderffer, "German Immigration into Pennsylvania," 141-315; Geiser, *Redemptioners and Indentured Servants*; Galenson, *White Servitude*, 13-15; Grubb, "Redemptioner Immigration," 407-18; Smith, *Bondage*, 20-66; *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418-23, 437-38; 22, pt. 1, 321; 29, 89, 96, 229-31, 242-45.

<sup>23</sup> Alexander Hope commanded the *Queen Elizabeth* to Philadelphia with 324 German emigrants in the fall of 1738. Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 1, 216-21. For the history of the Hopes see Marten G. Buist, *At Spes Non Fracta, Hope & Co. 1770-1815* (The Hague, 1974).

merchants providing redemptioner financing. This also illustrates the ease with which new shippers could enter the market.<sup>24</sup>

Once at their port of embarkation, German emigrants may have been able to negotiate passage with any merchant or captain.<sup>25</sup> Under the redemptioner system the initial recruiter, like Hope & Co., would lose the money spent on delivering the emigrants to port (providing food, shelter, toll fees, passports, etc.) if the emigrants were able to sail with other merchants. Recruiting may therefore have been a risky business. The reluctance of recruiters, like the Hopes, to allow emigrants to break their agreements and negotiate passage with other shippers should not be interpreted as monopoly power over recruiting but rather as an effort to keep from losing the investment already spent on delivering their recruits to port.

Hope & Co. experienced competitive recruitment problems. In 1756, for example, a group of twenty-six Germans contracted with the Hopes to be shipped from Rotterdam to Philadelphia for 7.5 doblons each. The contract also contained the following contingency:

But if anyone agrees to take these Germans for less than the above-mentioned sum, Messrs. Isaac & Zacharias Hope promise to do the same, except where it is plainly done as spite work against Messrs. Isaac & Zacharias Hope, in which case they release the people from the contract, however in such case those who offer cheaper transportation are to pay Messrs. Isaac & Zacharias Hope for the expenses which they incurred before the people arrived in port.<sup>26</sup>

This contract suggests that competition was quite spirited and that bidding emigrants away from other recruiters was common. The Hopes contracted not to be undersold on the passage fare, which suggests that they had no monopoly power to raise prices. Secondly, they realized that other shippers could underbid them on the passage fare because these shippers would not have to pay recruitment costs.

<sup>24</sup> Stuart Bruchy, *The Colonial Merchant* (New York, 1966), 182-83; Buist, *Hope & Co.*, 6-22; Wokeck, "Tide of Alien Tongues," 141-44.

<sup>25</sup> There was little enforcement of Dutch regulations on loading and shipping passengers. Geiser, *Redemptioners and Indentured Servants*, 47-48; Voigt, "Swiss Notes," 100; *Colonial Records of Georgia* 21, 418.

<sup>26</sup> Otto Langguth, "Pennsylvania German Pioneers from the County of Wertheim," *Pennsylvania German Folklore Society* 12 (1947), 260-61.

The Hopes thus tried to protect their investment by contractually requiring compensation for recruiting expenses if their emigrants deserted them for other merchants. This behavior is more characteristic of competitive than monopolized markets.

Finally, the redemptioner trade must have represented only a small part of the Hopes' business. Hope & Co.'s annual turnover at the Amsterdam Exchange Bank was over 900,000 pounds sterling by mid-century. Even if they shipped all the Germans going to Philadelphia between 1730 and 1756, the potential gross revenue would represent less than 2.5 percent of the annual turnover. Their annual turnover at the Amsterdam Exchange Bank between 1730 and 1756 was also very stable, especially compared with other large Dutch merchant houses and with the volatility of German emigration. This suggests that changing fortunes in the German redemptioner trade, like the possible acquisition and loss of monopoly rights or interruptions in the flow of emigrants during upheavals like the War of the Austrian Succession, had little effect on Hope & Co. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Hope & Co. would have invested the considerable resources needed to acquire a monopoly position and prevent competition in the German redemptioner market.<sup>27</sup>

#### QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE SUGGESTING COMPETITION IN THE PENNSYLVANIA MARKET

Pennsylvania was the overwhelming choice of German immigrants during the middle half of the eighteenth century. The available quantitative evidence on the market structure of the German passenger

<sup>27</sup> Buist, *Hope & Co.*, 6-8, 476-85. The turnover represented the transfer of sums, credits and debits, to and from other bank accounts and so represented a low estimate of total business activity. Appropriate currency conversions were taken from John J. McCusker, *Money and Exchange in Europe and America, 1600-1775* (Chapel Hill, 1978). Expected annual German migration was taken from Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," 260. Ten pounds sterling was used as a high estimate of the gross revenue from shipping each emigrant. Thus, the 2.5 percent estimate is probably high. Hope & Co. did not undergo dramatic growth until after 1756 when they also began to phase out their emigrant business.

**Table 2**  
**Role of Ship Captains in Carrying German Passengers to Pennsylvania**

Voyages Undertaken	Number of Captains	Total Adult Males Carried
	<b>1727 1775</b>	
13 ( 4 1%)	1 ( 0 5%)	1,277 ( 5 3%)
11 ( 3 5)	1 ( 0 5)	812 ( 3 4)
8 ( 2 5)	1 ( 0 5)	1,077 ( 4 5)
7 ( 6 6)	3 ( 1 6)	2,140 ( 8 9)
6 ( 7 6)	4 ( 2 1)	2,140 ( 8 9)
5 ( 3 2)	2 ( 1 1)	1,216 ( 5 1)
4 ( 2 5)	2 ( 1 1)	673 ( 2 8)
3 (12 3)	13 ( 6 8)	2,740 (11 4)
2 (12 6)	20 (10 5)	2,775 (11 6)
1 (45 1)	143 (75 3)	9,182 (38 2)
<b>317 (100%)</b>	<b>190 (100%)</b>	<b>24,015 (100%)</b>
	<b>1730 1756</b>	
8 ( 7 3%)	2 ( 1 5%)	1,884 (10 0%)
7 ( 6 4)	2 ( 1 5)	1,568 ( 8 3)
6 (10 9)	4 ( 2 9)	2,123 (11 3)
5 ( 2 3)	1 ( 0 7)	405 ( 2 2)
4 ( 5 5)	3 ( 2 2)	1,393 ( 7 4)
3 ( 6 8)	5 ( 3 7)	1,303 ( 6 9)
2 (12 7)	14 (10 2)	2,352 (12 5)
1 (48 2)	106 (77 4)	7,792 (41 4)
<b>220 (100%)</b>	<b>137 (100%)</b>	<b>18,820 (100%)</b>

*Notes* Percentages of the respective totals are in parentheses. Only passengers who signed the loyalty oath in Philadelphia, required of adult male German immigrants, were used as the most direct and accurate measure of the relative number of passengers carried across shippers.

*Source* Derived from Strassburger, *German Pioneers* Vol. 1. Only ships arriving from London or Holland were included.

trade to Philadelphia is probably more extensive and complete than for any other large colonial migration.<sup>28</sup> The evidence exhibits none of the characteristics associated with a monopolized market. High market concentration, restriction of services, above normal prices and profits, and difficulty in entering or exiting the market are not observed.

Between 1727 and 1775 there were 317 German immigrant voyages employing 190 different captains. (See Table 2.) Seventy-five percent of the captains carried German immigrants only once. These one-time participants in the trade accounted for 45 percent of the voyages and 38 percent of the immigrants. Only ten captains, 5

<sup>28</sup> See the assessment in Smith, *Bondage*, 320.

percent, made six or more voyages. They accounted for 24 percent of the voyages and 31 percent of the immigrants. The subsample from the alleged period of monopolization, 1730-1756, is similar to the overall sample except that captains who participated only once are more important during the 1730-1754 period. This pattern of small numbers of specialists along with large numbers of occasional shippers may have been common for colonial trade routes in general.<sup>29</sup>

Seventy-eight ships in the German passenger trade could be traced in the Philadelphia port register which provides information on vessel ownership. Only half of the seventy-eight were owned by the twenty largest shippers in Philadelphia, those with interest in eleven or more vessels. Only half of the captains who made over five German immigrant voyages were employed by these large shippers. The pattern changed little between 1727 and 1775. Quite a diverse group of large and small, Philadelphia and non-Philadelphia merchants, were engaged in shipping German immigrants to Philadelphia. In particular, small independent shippers entered and exited the trade at will. This low level of concentration in the shipping of German immigrants suggests that little effective monopoly power could have been exercised in the market during the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>30</sup>

When the ships docked at Philadelphia the redemptioner servants were consigned to local merchants who collected the amounts due from their sale. Prepaying passengers did not have to be consigned. The consignment of German immigrant ships was recorded for 1751, 1753-1756, and 1763-1774. (See Table 3.) The market structure of ship consignments was similar to that of ship captains. A large number of merchants took occasional consignments. A few merchants specialized in the trade. As a group Stedman, Shoemaker, Willing &

<sup>29</sup> See Doerflinger, "Commercial Specialization in Philadelphia's Merchant Community," 20-49; Egnal, "Changing Structure of Philadelphia's Trade," 156-79; Walton, "Colonial Commerce," 363-89.

<sup>30</sup> Derived from Strassburger, *German Pioneers*, vol. 1; "Ship Registers for the Port of Philadelphia, 1726-1775." A match between a listing in the port register and a German immigrant vessel listed in Strassburger was considered only when both the name of the ship and the captain or owners names were the same in both sources. Duplicate ship names were common in the register. The concentration of ship owning was taken from Crowther, "Shipbuilding Output," 103.



Table 3  
 Consignment of German Redemptioner Cargos  
 in Philadelphia, 1751-1774

Philadelphia Merchant	1751 & 1753-1756		1763-1774	
	Number of Ships	Total Adult Males Carried	Number of Ships	Total Adult Males Carried
Benjamin Shoemaker	12 (21.1%)	1,535 (26.7%)	8 (10.5%)	680 (16.1%)
Charles Stedman	16 (28.1)	1,667 (29.0)	0	0
Charles Willing	1 (1.8)	49 (0.9)	0	0
Willing & Morris	0	0	20 (26.3)	1,270 (30.0)
Samuel Howell	0	0	12 (15.8)	810 (19.2)
Daniel Beneset	7 (12.3)	712 (12.4)	0	0
Robert Ruecastle	0	0	6 (7.9)	507 (12.0)
Keplee	6 (10.5)	504 (8.8)	0	0
Keplee & Steinmetz	0	0	3 (4.0)	52 (1.2)
Robert Ritchie	0	0	2 (2.6)	228 (5.4)
Joshua Fisher	0	0	4 (5.3)	175 (4.1)
John Pole	1 (1.8)	139 (2.4)	0	0
Greenway & Rundel	1 (1.8)	53 (0.9)	0	0
Rundel	0	0	1 (1.3)	68 (1.6)
Able James	2 (3.5)	60 (1.0)	0	0
James & Drinker	0	0	1 (1.3)	52 (1.2)
James Pemberton	1 (1.8)	84 (1.5)	1 (1.3)	9 (0.2)
James Searle	0	0	2 (2.6)	92 (2.2)
James Christie	0	0	2 (2.6)	82 (1.9)
Hillegas	1 (1.8)	82 (1.4)	0	0
O'Kill	1 (1.8)	64 (1.1)	0	0
John Ross	0	0	2 (2.6)	42 (1.0)
Richard Neave Jr	0	0	1 (1.3)	37 (0.9)
Warder & Parker	0	0	1 (1.3)	15 (0.4)
Warder & Sons	0	0	1 (1.3)	8 (0.2)
Barclay	0	0	1 (1.3)	13 (0.3)
Cunningham & Nesbit	0	0	1 (1.3)	12 (0.3)
Gibs & West	0	0	1 (1.3)	12 (0.3)
Mease & Callents	0	0	1 (1.3)	8 (0.2)
John Jones	0	0	1 (1.3)	7 (0.2)
Shervel & Salter	0	0	1 (1.3)	7 (0.2)
Unconsigned	8 (14.0)	807 (14.0)	2 (2.6)	35 (0.8)
<b>Totals</b>	<b>57 (100%)</b>	<b>5,754 (100%)</b>	<b>76 (100%)</b>	<b>4,227 (100%)</b>

Notes: Percentages of the respective totals are in parentheses. Only ships arriving from Holland or London were considered. The adult males carried are those whose names appear on the loyalty oath lists for each ship which represents the most direct and consistent measure of the relative number of passengers across shippers. The consignment was for collection of passage fares from passengers under redemptioner contract. The proportion of redemptioners to prepaying passengers was not available for these ships.

Source: Strassburger, *German Pioneers* Vol. 1

Morris, Howell, and Beneset gained around 60 percent of the consignments. The degree of concentration in consignments was similar between the two periods 1751-1756 and 1763-1774, but with substantial changes in individual merchant shares. Therefore, compared

with what happened after the War, it seems unlikely that monopoly power was exercised in the sale of German redemptioners in Philadelphia prior to the Seven Years War.

Occasionally an individual merchant or two attained a substantial market share of consignments in a given year. The Stedmans and Shoemaker, for example, had 71 percent in 1751, Shoemaker had 95 percent in 1763, and Willing & Morris had 86 percent in 1771. There was, however, no consistent yearly pattern in market shares across merchants. Merchants presumably took consignment of the vessels they partially owned.<sup>31</sup> But there was competition for consignments from other shippers. George Parish, for example, consigned the redemptioners aboard the *Queen of Denmark* to the Stedmans in 1751, but to Keplee in 1753. Charles Smith consigned the redemptioners aboard the *Chance* to Robert Ruecastle in 1765, but to Willing & Morris in 1766.<sup>32</sup> It seems unlikely, therefore, that effective monopoly power could have been consistently exercised over the consignment and sale of German redemptioners in Philadelphia.

If the market for shipping Germans from Rotterdam to Philadelphia was monopolized prior to the Seven Years War, then the passage fare and shipping profits should have been higher before the War than after. There is little evidence on shipping profits in general. However, the rate of return to shipping redemptioners was estimated to be 11 to 15 percent above the return to prepaid passengers on voyages between 1802 and 1819.<sup>33</sup> After subtracting compensation for expected defaults and a return to uncertainty, this return was approximately equal to the return on other competitive, safe investments. In 1750 John Dick claimed it was customary to add 15 percent to the passage fare of redemptioners "as an Indemnity for the Charges and laying out of the money."<sup>34</sup> The similarity in the return to shipping redemptioners between these two periods suggests that above normal profits were not realized prior to the Seven Years War.

<sup>31</sup> There were exceptions. James Abercrombie commanded the *Peggy* for the Stedmans and consigned his redemptioners to the Stedmans in 1753, but changed to the Stedmans' competitor, Daniel Beneset, in 1754. Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 1, 545-50, 636-42; Table 1.

<sup>32</sup> Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 1, 472, 516-21, 705, 708-9.

<sup>33</sup> Grubb, "Redemptioner Immigration," 411-17.

<sup>34</sup> Smith, *Bondage*, 40.

Evidence on German passage fares exhibits a pattern opposite from that suggested by the monopolization argument. Fares were higher after the Seven Years War when shipping was less risky and supposedly more competitive. (See Table 4.) Passage fares from 1708 to 1756 were consistently between five and six pounds sterling during peace and seven to ten pounds sterling during war.<sup>35</sup> After the Seven Years War passage fares were consistently above ten pounds sterling. Effective monopolization of the market before 1755 seems unlikely, given evidence on passage fares and profits.

Finally, if the German passenger market was effectively monopolized, then the quantity of services would have been restricted to force passage fares up, lower the cost of underutilized freight space, and thus increase profits. The restriction of the number of vessels available to transport immigrants would lead to a higher number of passengers per ship. Trans-Atlantic shipping was characterized by underutilized cargo space on the return voyage from Europe to America. Immigrants represented important freight on the westward voyage throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.<sup>36</sup> A merchant could eliminate some of his underutilized freight space by gaining a monopoly over the passenger trade.

Table 5 presents the average number of immigrants per ship in the German trade for five year intervals. From 1727 to 1749 this average stayed fairly constant at about 185. The surge in German emigration between the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War raised the average number of passengers per ship to about 300. The revival of emigration after the Seven Years War brought an average number of passengers per ship only slightly less than in the 1727-1749 period.<sup>37</sup> This suggests that there was substantial excess

<sup>35</sup> A notable exception was the ten-pounds sterling fare reported by Mittelberger during peace in 1750. However, Mittelberger's journal was an open attempt to discourage emigration and so may have been prone to exaggeration. See Grubb, "Morbidity and Mortality."

<sup>36</sup> See Davis, *Rise of English Shipping*; Hansen, *Atlantic Migration*; Shepherd and Walton, *Shipping, Maritime Trade, and the Economic Development*.

<sup>37</sup> There is very little evidence on passengers per ton which would be better evidence with which to compare changing capacity utilization. Grubb, "Redemptorier Immigration," 416-17. Because the tonnage of ships in the trade changed little and because the number of passengers on repeating ships in the trade fluctuated considerably, the aggregate number of passengers per ship over five year intervals should provide a reasonable approximation of the true trend.

**Table 4**  
**Trans-Atlantic Passage Fares for Adult Male Germans,**  
**Holland to Philadelphia, 1708-1819**

Source	Year	Passage Fare in Pounds Sterling	
Kocherthal <sup>a</sup>	1708	5-6	(in peace time)
		7-8	(in war time)
Samuel Guldin <sup>b</sup>	1710	7	(war time)
Unknown Immigrant <sup>c</sup>	1728	5	(servant rate)
Andrew Boni <sup>d</sup>	1736	5	
Hans Trachsler <sup>e</sup>	1736	5.1	(Holland to Carolina)
Muhlenberg <sup>f</sup>	1742	10	(normally, war time)
		8.4	(on his ship, London to Georgia)
Mittelberger <sup>g</sup>	1750	10	
Ship <i>Nancy</i> <sup>h</sup>	1750	5.9	(servant rate)
Hope & Co. Contract <sup>i</sup>	1756	6.2	
Ship <i>King of Prussia</i> <sup>h</sup>	1764	8.6	(servant rate, from London)
Muhlenberg <sup>j</sup>	pre-1769	6.1-10.2	
	after-1769	14.3-17.3	
Ship <i>Britannia</i> <sup>k</sup>	1773	9.9	(servant rate)
Ship <i>Belvidere</i> <sup>l</sup>	1802	14.4	
Ship <i>Commerce</i> <sup>l</sup>	1803	13.65	
Ship <i>Pennsylvania</i> <sup>l</sup>	1803	16.45	(servant rate)
Ship <i>Elizabeth</i> <sup>m</sup>	1819	18	

*Notes:* All fares are for free, prepaying immigrants in peace time, except where indicated. Appropriate currency conversions were made from McCusker, *Money and Exchange*.

*Sources:*

<sup>a</sup>Joshua Kocherthal, *Full and Circumstantial Report Concerning the Renowned District of Carolina in English America*, quoted in Henry E. Jacobs, "The German Emigration to America 1709-1740," *Pennsylvania German Society* 8(1897), p. 39.

<sup>b</sup>William J. Hinke, "Diary of the Rev. Samuel Guldin, Relating to his Journey to Pennsylvania, June to September, 1710," *Journal of the Presbyterian Historical Society* 14(1930), p. 71.

<sup>c</sup>Julius F. Sachse, "A Missive From Pennsylvania in the Year of Grace 1728," *Pennsylvania German Society* 28(1909), p. 18.

<sup>d</sup>Durnbaugh, *Brethren in Colonial America*, p. 39.

<sup>e</sup>Voigt, "Swiss Notes," p. 98.

<sup>f</sup>Henry M. Muhlenberg, *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*, Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein, trans., (Philadelphia, 1942) 1, p. 23.

<sup>g</sup>Gottlieb Mittelberger, *Journey to Pennsylvania in the Year 1750 and Return to Germany in the Year 1754*, Oscar Handlin and John Clive, trans. and ed., (Cambridge, Ma., 1960), p. 17.

<sup>h</sup>"Redemptioners, Philadelphia, 1750-1830," (unpublished manuscript held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Miscellaneous Collection, Box 7a, Folder 7).

<sup>i</sup>Langguth, "Pioneers from the County of Wertheim," pp. 260-61.

<sup>j</sup>Henry M. Muhlenberg, *Hallesche Nachrichten*, new ed., 2, pp. 460-61, quoted in Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 1, p. xxxvii.

<sup>k</sup>"Passenger Account of Ship *Britannia* (mustered book), Capt. James Peter (which arrived in Philadelphia, 18 September 1773)," (unpublished manuscript held at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).

<sup>l</sup>Strassburger, *German Pioneers* 3, pp. 112-14, 131-34, and 137-38.

<sup>m</sup>"Passenger List of the Ship "Elizabeth," Which Arrived at Philadelphia in 1819," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 25(1901), pp. 255-58.

**Table 5**  
**German Immigrants Per Ship**  
**Holland to Philadelphia, 1727-1774**

Year	Average Immigrants Per Ship	Average Ships Per Year
1727-1729	173.76 ( 57.75)	3.3 (1.53)
1730-1734	189.45 ( 24.19)	5.4 (3.65)
1735-1739	188.59 ( 59.85)	7.4 (5.32)
1740-1744	186.44 ( 12.26)	7.0 (2.35)
1745-1749	180.48 (106.29)	8.2 (9.04)
1750-1754	300.80 ( 17.72)	18.0 (2.54)
<i>Seven Years War</i>		
1763-1769	170.90 ( 63.83)	6.0 (2.45)
1770-1774	97.67 ( 18.34)	9.0 (3.54)

*Note:* Standard deviations on a yearly basis are in parentheses. Where possible the evidence is presented in bi-decade intervals.

*Sources:* Strassburger, *German Pioneers*, Vol. 1; and Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," pp. 260-61.

capacity in German immigrant shipping before 1750 and after 1755. The increase in passengers per ship in the early 1750s was probably the result of unexpected increases in emigration and not monopolization. This unexpected demand attracted more merchants and ships into the German passenger market. The evidence suggests that there was no systematic restriction in the quantity of German passenger services, especially prior to 1749. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the market was effectively monopolized.

\* \* \* \*

The market structure of German immigrant shipping from Rotterdam to Philadelphia during the middle half of the eighteenth century was more consistent with competitive behavior than monopolization. It was similar to other trans-Atlantic routes. A few merchants specialized in various aspects of the trade—recruiting, shipping, financing, and redemptioner selling—but only for comparatively short periods. There was always a large number of merchants on the fringe who

entered and exited the trade at will. Evidence on profits, passage fares, and shipping services was more consistent with competition than monopolization. Recruiters from many colonies competed for German emigrants in Europe, and contract evidence from Hope & Co. suggests that there was competition among recruiters from Pennsylvania. The evidence in favor of monopolization—limited essentially to three quotations from different contemporary observers—is not consistent as to time period, monopolizing circumstances, or merchant monopolist. This literary evidence could just as easily be interpreted as complaints about competitive rivalry and unlucky voyage conditions than true monopolization. At best, Hope & Co. may have achieved some temporary and limited monopoly over financing the emigration of unsponsored, impoverished Germans as they entered Holland around 1736. The passport restriction which legally created the monopoly was temporary and did not prevent competition by other merchants. It may have influenced the sharp downturn in German immigration between 1734 and 1737 more than restricted competition so that Hope & Co. could charge excessive fees.<sup>38</sup> Finally, the diaries of German immigrants to Pennsylvania never mention or complain about shipping or recruiting monopolies; nor do the diaries report difficulties in obtaining passports to enter Holland. The diaries did complain about the deceptive practices of competing recruiters.<sup>39</sup> The consistency of the evidence with competition in all aspects of the trade shifts the burden of proof to those who want to maintain that the market was monopolized.

*University of Delaware*

FARLEY GRUBB

<sup>38</sup> See Wokeck, "Flow and Composition," 260. Emigrants may have postponed their journey until they had made guaranteed arrangements or until the passport restriction was clarified.

<sup>39</sup> For denunciations of the infamous recruiters called 'Newlanders,' see Diffenderffer, "German Immigration into Pennsylvania," 188-93; Geiser, *Redemptioners and Indentured Servants*, 18-21; Mittelberger, *Journey*, 26-30; Sachse, "A Missive From Pennsylvania," 23-24; Westergaard, "Germantown Letters," 12.