
This major contribution to early American scholarship, marketed as a trade book, succeeds as both a professional and a popular publication. Its price is a monumental bargain. An informed person without specialized prior knowledge will undoubtedly enjoy reading the book. Seventy-four chapters present with clear focus the war and its results in North America, but Anderson gives other areas enough attention to make British policy clear. He highlights George Washington’s wartime career as military leader and land speculator, emblematic of American success. Anderson maintains a lively, penetrating, and vigorous mode of expression throughout, particularly when he discusses battles. Nine excellent maps are placed at the front of the book to locate military operations, though the discussion needs more detailed maps showing individual battles and troop movements. Anderson’s elaborate endnotes thoroughly explain many important points for scholars and inquiring general readers. Research is thorough and current.

In 1984 Anderson published his study of A People’s Army, in which colonial common soldiers in this war expected their rights to be respected and their contractual obligations honored. In this book he presents this major conflict as “a people’s war,” in which, to defeat France, British and colonial leaders “had been able to mobilize the resources of entire colonial societies in support of the campaigns of 1758, 1759, and 1760” (p. 412) by making them partners in the enterprise. The author also depicts the war “above all as a theater of multicultural interaction” (p. xx), in which the varied participants demanded treatment that respected their cultural situations. Anderson carefully assesses the military abilities of the leaders on both sides. He views the Earl of Loudoun as an overworked commander who organized the supply system, compelled colonial governments to cooperate, and was handicapped by circumstance, particularly bad weather. Anderson’s fine account of the battle of Quebec shows that both Montcalm and Wolfe committed major errors. He also gives Gen. Jeffrey Amherst’s Indian policy its due, both for his failure to recognize Indian needs and for his efforts to spread smallpox among them. British generalship was inferior to the civilian leadership of William Pitt, whose policies Anderson clearly admires, particularly those that encouraged colonial cooperation.

Pennsylvania in the war, in Indian relations, and in the Stamp Act crisis is generally well covered, although Anderson gives more attention to Massachusetts.
He thoroughly describes the military actions in Pennsylvania from Washington's mission to Ft. Le Boeuf in 1753 to Col. John Bradstreet's Lake Erie expedition in 1764. He also does a fine job discussing the contributions of Pennsylvania's representatives in conferences with the Indians. Anderson shows a comprehensive understanding of the proprietary-assembly political disputes that at first hampered war support, but were temporarily settled, allowing Pennsylvania to raise supplies and troops. He also treats Pennsylvania's reaction to the Stamp Act with care, except that he completely ignores John Dickinson, who was at least as important in framing the Stamp Act Congress resolutions and in inspiring resistance as were any of the men whom Anderson discusses.

The innovative grouping of the Seven Years War with the Stamp Act "as epochal events that yoked imperialism with republicanism in American political culture" makes a major point that is often neglected: the contrary yet connected major attributes of America (p. 746). Anderson carries the narrative through the Stamp Act crisis of 1766 because the rebellion of the Indians against British rule from 1763 to 1765 directly paralleled the colonial resistance of 1763 to 1766 against imperial impositions. These themes provide new and provocative perspectives on the prerevolutionary period.

It seems appropriate to include the Indian rebellion of 1763 to 1765, because of the Indians' attempt to continue their loyalty to the French and to oppose British suzerainty. It is not so dear that George Grenville's new imperial policy is a direct consequence of the war. This seems true of the Stamp Act in particular. The war and the expenses of the new imperial establishment in America did not necessitate antagonizing the colonists to the degree that this innovative tax did. The discontinuity between the war and the Stamp Act becomes most obvious when one considers the position of William Pitt, the great war leader and the great Stamp Act opponent. I predict that American history texts will continue to treat the Stamp Act as the turning point in the coming of the revolution rather than as closely bound to the preceding war.

The major flaws in the book, which are few, appear in the latter chapters on imperial issues. To state that "[e]verybody [among British politicians]... also knew that the colonists contributed to the support of the empire only by paying customs revenues on their trade, and the customs receipts barely covered the costs of collection" is very misleading (p. 563). Anderson should have written "erroneously believed" rather than "knew." Stating that the Stamp Act would mean that "the Crown sent two or three pounds to the colonies for every pound that Americans contributed to the empire" repeats the misstatement (p. 645). Pitt's January 1766 speech to Parliament, quoted at length by Anderson, was much closer to the truth in asserting that the two million pounds commercial profit to Britain per year is "the price America pays for her protection" (p. 700). The studies of economic historians that quantify the colonists' burden of empire are not cited. Anderson also
erroneously minimizes the concern of the colonial legislatures concerning the Stamp Act. That "less than half of the colonial legislatures made even the minimal gesture of petitioning or instructing their agents to object" (p. 614) to the act is contrary to evidence from the agents that all were so instructed. Anderson attempts to show the legislatures as overly cautious while the populace was riotous, but there was no material difference in the ends each sought, and legislatures observed some caution because they wanted to be heard rather than be condemned as impertinent.

This book supersedes all other accounts of the Seven Years War in America, but it is not as important a contribution to the beginning of the British-colonist conflict.

*Texas Tech University*

**BENJAMIN H. NEWCOMB**

*Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754.*


Historians of colonial America must constantly be on guard against the demon of hindsight. Their knowledge that the American Revolution erupted in 1776 can easily intrude on the story, though the colonists themselves were innocent of the impending rupture. The Albany Congress of 1754 offers a case in point. As Timothy Shannon argues in this highly discerning, lucidly written book, most interpretations of the Albany Congress are clouded by hindsight. John Adams, writing in the early nineteenth century, praised the Congress as a turning point on the road to colonial union and eventual independence from England. Nineteenth-century historians often cast it as a forerunner of the federal system achieved under the United States Constitution. And, recently, a few writers have pointed to the importance of the Iroquois Confederacy as a model for the union proposed by the Albany Congress though many historians, Shannon among them, find the evidence for such influence suspect. Shannon holds that all such interpretations fall short because they feature "state-making" over "British empire building" (p. 10), though the latter was indisputably the prime impulse for assembling the Congress. As another war with France loomed by 1754, issues of defense, Indian alliances, and territorial claims occupied colonial officials' attention. And though Benjamin Franklin's plan for colonial union would be recommended by the Congress, neither Britain nor the colonial legislatures gave it much heed.

Perhaps the most striking achievement of this study is the close analysis Shannon directs to the main groups in contention during the Congress: the Iroquois, British imperial reformers, and colonial imperialists. The conference had been called to firm up the Covenant Chain, the fragile and desultory alliance between the English and the Iroquois Nations. Though the Iroquois had lost much of their economic and
political power by the mid-eighteenth century, their historic connection to the English formed the basis for British territorial claims in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes regions. Further, the Mohawks occupied strategic terrain between French and English forces in North America. William Johnson, appointed Britain's official Indian agent in 1746, had built a close relationship with the Mohawk chief Hendrick, leading Hendrick and some of his brethren to join Johnson on raiding parties against the French. But when in 1752 New York's royal governor ousted Johnson from his post, the Mohawks declared the Covenant Chain broken. The Earl of Halifax, reformist president of the Board of Trade, took alarm at this turn of events and ordered that a conference be convened to repair relations with the Iroquois.

Imperial-minded Britons in the colonies who supported the conference fell into two main groups. The first was composed of royal officials like Thomas Pownall, William Shirley, and James Abercromby, colonial "sojourners" all, though dedicated to the reform and expansion of Britain's North American empire. These men supported three central propositions. First, they believed that Indian affairs should be centralized under one imperial office. Further, they backed the notion of colonial union as a way to strengthen British defenses against New France. Finally, they urged revision of the colonies' constitutional relationship to England under uniform provincial charters, the colonists' English rights to be secured along with an acknowledged degree of subordination to Parliament. The Earl of Halifax, in continuous dialogue with imperial reformers at home and abroad, propounded a similar set of principles.

The second group of imperial reformers was led by Benjamin Franklin and included such royal functionaries as the New Yorkers Cadwallader Colden and Archibald Kennedy. These men, permanently resident in America, gained their primary sense of identity from a common attachment to Crown and empire. They celebrated the colonies growth and maturation, and saw them as key partners in the imperial enterprise. This group too promoted colonial unity, with Franklin's *Short Hints* toward a scheme for uniting the Northern Colonies the only written proposal presented to the Albany Congress advocating an intercolonial legislature that would rise above provincial factions. The American imperialists also encouraged the centralization of Indian affairs and a united defense against French Canada. After laying out these profiles, including an incisive sketch of Benjamin Franklin beset by "provincial anxiety" (p. 93), Shannon proceeds to examine the Albany Congress itself. He explores the positions taken by such leading figures as Franklin, James DeLancey, the acting governor of New York and presiding officer of the Congress, William Johnson, the friend and advocate of the Iroquois, and Hendrick, the aging Mohawk chieftain. He traces the emergence of two competing perspectives in the Congress: one set of localist colonials clung to their charter rights and parochial interests; a second group of American imperialists contemplated a colonial union
with taxing power, to be created by an act of parliament. As we know, the final Albany Plan proved acceptable to neither the colonial assemblies nor the Crown. Benjamin Franklin, who had envisioned an empire that was “egalitarian and filial” (p. 231), retreated from the idea of colonial union after 1763. The Crown’s consolidation of Indian affairs under royally appointed superintendencies after 1755 presaged its post-1763 reforms. And Anglo-American union remained “a path not taken” (p. 233).

Timothy Shannon’s prizewinning study offers a wealth of interpretive insights and a mastery of sources that can only be suggested here. It also signals the arrival of a major young scholar of the First British Empire.

**New York University**

**PATRICIA U. BONOMI**


This second in a projected series of three volumes represents an impressive work in progress. Yet it may puzzle the uninitiated for, lacking an introduction, it begins precisely where its predecessor left off—with the consecutive enrollment in 1768 of new members in what was then known as the “American Society for Promoting and Propagating Useful Knowledge, held in Philadelphia.” Here are a total of eighty-nine biographical essays, ranging in length from fourteen pages to two or three brief paragraphs, and occasionally accompanied by a portrait or silhouette of the subject. The last twelve entries are for members of the Philadelphia Medical Society who, in December 1768, were absorbed en masse into the American Society.

To put the process in perspective and understand the reason for the deluge of new members in 1768, the attentive reader needs to consult the explanatory material in the first volume. Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., distinguished historian and librarian emeritus of the American Philosophical Society, has undertaken to provide biographies for the founding and early members of that society through January 2, 1769, the date when, by consolidation with the American Society, it assumed its present name and form. Tracing its origins to Benjamin Franklin’s proposal of 1743, the nascent American Philosophical Society had ceased its activities by 1747 and remained for the next two decades, in the most charitable reckoning, moribund. In 1750 or thereabouts the “Young Junto,” modeled on another proposal of Franklin’s, separately came into existence; it too struggled to survive, as a club of twelve Philadelphia citizens of kindred intellectual interests rather than as a broadly based learned society. The Young Junto evolved into the more elaborately styled American
Society, which in late 1767 and early 1768, under the guiding hand of Charles Thomson, redefined its mission and sought to enlarge its membership. At the same time the long-gone American Philosophical Society was taking on new life and emerging as a rival force. The year 1768 would thus become a period of competition between two organizations in Philadelphia devoted to the cultivation of the arts and sciences, but it was also the year in which representatives of these two societies pursued negotiations that led quite quickly to their merger. That the recruitment effort had been so intense may account, however, for the weak attachment to the united society that Bell reports many of these new members later had.

Did the members of the American Society whose biographies occupy this volume have characteristics discernibly in common? The historian of science and technology Brooke Hindle, to whom the second volume is dedicated, thought the American Society “a den of liberal Quakers” (see his Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America), an observation that seems hard to square with the conservative instincts of Quakers like the brothers John and Henry Drinker and the adequate representation of other religious denominations. The latter included Anglicans of the rank of William White, a bishop-to-be, who was elected a member of the American Society at the almost callow age of twenty, and Jacob Duché, a minister at Christ Church and St. Peter’s, whose personal history would bear repeated witness to his wavering allegiances, both political and religious. There was, to be sure, a strong contingent of medical practitioners and teachers, mostly, but not entirely, as a consequence of the year-end influx from the Medical Society. What is striking is the large presence among the resident members (as distinguished from the out-of-town or corresponding members) of merchants and tradesmen, many of whom, comparatively young in 1768, would achieve status and success in the years to follow.

The obscure keep company with the famous in these pages. No doubt because of his continuing enthusiastic commitment to the united society, and also perhaps because of certain wayward impulses that would disconcert no less a person than George Washington, Lewis Nicola merits the longest essay in this collection. Neither famous nor obscure, “Signor Famit” of Naples has simply eluded all detection. His enrollment under that identification resulted, it would appear, from a too hasty attempt to decipher a message submitted in support of an eminently qualified candidate from Italy who, notwithstanding the letter of appreciation he subsequently sent for the honor conferred on him, never made it on the society’s rollbook. (In the grand total of eighty-nine entries there are “sketches” for both of these nonmembers, one of whom had in all likelihood the curious biographical attribute of being nonexistent.)

Henry Drinker, a wealthy merchant, belongs to the category of low-profile members, discreetly recognizable by their Philadelphia contemporaries. His numerous good works were recorded by his wife, a famous diarist; among them was the Union Farm, a utopian venture for producing maple sugar in quantity, which
elicited the support of several other members of the Philosophical Society but which was located in northeastern Pennsylvania some two hundred miles distant from where the author has placed it in New Jersey. As a double signer (albeit a hesitant one when it came to the Declaration of Independence), James Wilson has a clear claim to the fame which he coveted. While Bell is gentle in his treatment of Wilson's flawed personality, one wishes that he had omitted the canard, wholly at variance with the documented presence of Wilson's wife during his final hours, that a distraught Wilson, hounded by his creditors, may have taken his own life.

Every student of eighteenth-century American history and culture must be grateful to Whitfield Bell for the significant service he has once again rendered to the American Philosophical Society. The full measure of the debt owed him will be calculable only upon the publication of the third volume, covering the lives of the members of the revived Philosophical Society who were admitted in the two years prior to the merger and providing, it is hoped, a cumulative name and subject index which will make his labor an even more valuable contribution to useful knowledge.

Gladwyne, Pa.

DAVID W. MAXEY


John Laurens (1757-1782) led a short but extraordinary life. If he was not a major player in the American War of Independence, his war-time record is worth recounting in its own right as is his controversial diplomatic mission to France and close friendship with Alexander Hamilton. Massey tells the story well. His John Laurens was truly a child of the Revolution. The son of Henry Laurens, a wealthy South Carolina merchant/planter and later president of Continental Congress, who was a major player, John Laurens devoted his entire adult life to securing American independence. Educated at Geneva, Switzerland, and at the Inns of Court in London, he left England in 1777 to join the Revolutionary War as an aide to General Washington. He left behind not only his legal studies, but a pregnant and hastily married wife whom he would never see again. At a succession of major battles and sieges—Germantown, Monmouth, Newport, Charleston, Savannah, and Yorktown—he earned high praise for his conduct, four wounds, a lieutenant colonelcy, and six months as a British prisoner of war.

John Laurens and the American Revolution works best in conveying Laurens's military record and devotion to the cause of American independence. But it also provides a window into several themes that are important to revolutionary-era history. In the introduction Massey outlines an ambitious agenda. Laurens's life, he
maintains, connects to "the construction of identity and masculinity in the Anglo-American world; the meaning and importance of virtue in Revolutionary America; and the future of slavery and the distribution of wealth in the American republic" (p. 3). If there is a criticism of this fine book, it is that the author seldom ventures beyond Laurens himself to discuss these issues. What he does provide, however, is a well-integrated account of how Laurens's life intersects with these issues, especially identity and virtue in revolutionary America.

When word spread that John Laurens had been killed on August 22, 1782, at Chehaw Creek, South Carolina, many grieved but few were surprised. His last battle was neither major nor praiseworthy; it was a needless encounter against overwhelming odds to prevent the British from confiscating some rice. In the words of his commander, Gen. Nathaniel Greene, "Poor Laurens is fallen in a paltry little skirmish" (p. 228). He was grieved by many because he had become a symbol of republican virtue and disinterestedness, but his death in a reckless venture hardly surprised those who knew him well. What Massey does with this theme is to establish the connection between Laurens's recklessness and his republicanism. Laurens won renown for his heroism in battle. "More successfully than anyone else, he played the role of the disinterested young republican gentleman and received the applause of public men" (p. 168). Yet he never found fulfillment in his accomplishments. Always aspiring to do more, success eluded him and almost drove him to despair. Related to this despair was his failure to achieve his plan for raising black regiments in South Carolina and Georgia. Believing that whites and blacks shared the same nature, Laurens, more clearly than most members of his generation, realized that the ideals of the Revolution were incompatible with slavery. While he did succeed in getting the approval of the Continental Congress, it stipulated that it would need the concurrence of the South Carolina and Georgia legislatures. Although Laurens lobbied the South Carolina legislature on three separate occasions (1779, 1780, 1781), the proposal to raise 3,000 slaves with a promise of their freedom failed miserably.

University of Missouri, St. Louis

ARTHUR H. SHAFFER


This well written, fast moving text describes the encounter between Gen. Anthony Wayne's Pennsylvania Continental troops and British Gen. Charles "No flint" Grey's force of light troops and highlanders. The campaign that led up to the
battle is covered, and details of the command structure and its problems are well documented.

McGuire is well qualified to write on this topic. A resident of the Paoli area, he has been studying the 1777 campaigns around Philadelphia for years and has produced other texts on the topic, most notably his 1994 work, The Surprise at Germantown. The author is knowledgeable about the eighteenth-century military, its tactics and weaponry and this contributes a great deal to his presentation.

By setting the operational situation within the Philadelphia campaign, the author shows that the British tactical stroke at Paoli was part of an attempt to control the countryside. The British had planned an earlier attack on Wayne but were thwarted by American movements and weather. The infamous Paoli Massacre was just a continuation of British attempts to eradicate a division of the Continental army guarding the hinterlands around Philadelphia.

By presenting specific details about the vidette (outpost) locations, McGuire makes a very good case for changing current perceptions of the “massacre.” It is clear from his running account of reports and responses that the engagement was a very successful British surprise attack, coupled with many bayonet casualties. The Pennsylvanians’ withdrawal was more orderly than previously thought and, despite confusion, demonstrated that the Americans were beginning to conduct military operations with some success. In fact, without showing bias, McGuire indicates that Pennsylvania commanders’ personality conflicts may have contributed to the casualty list with their slow responses to orders requiring immediate action. McGuire clearly shows the encounter was a fight, even if the Americans were badly handled by British bayonets.

The nearby presence of supporting Maryland troops is little known today but the Marylanders affected British maneuvering. More importantly, an anticipated Maryland arrival caused Wayne to delay his withdrawal from an exposed position. With better communications and more rapid American movements the encounter between Wayne and Grey might not have occurred because the Pennsylvanians would have moved out of the danger zone.

The maps could show more detail, especially as they relate to the text. There are many detailed references to locations not shown on the maps, and the maps are not always placed judiciously in the text. Despite this criticism, the maps do clarify much of the maneuvering to bring about the engagement and cover the American withdrawal fairly well.

Additional research on the battle would be exceptionally tedious. The only major untapped source is the Pension-Bounty-Land Warrant Files in the National Archives. Given the number of Pennsylvania and Maryland soldiers involved in the Paoli engagement, and the lack of any service or battle-related index to the pension files, such research is not practical at this time.

The interpretations presented here are not part of the traditional view, but
McGuire supports his case very well and presents transcriptions of many original documentary sources in an appendix. The notes are not simply a key to sources; they usually include additional points about their relevance and accuracy. The wide range of primary texts used in the research is an outstanding reading list for the early Philadelphia campaign.

East Carolina University

LAWRENCE E. BABITS


Frederick C. Leiner is a lawyer in Baltimore, Maryland, and the author of a number of articles on maritime and legal history. Millions for Defense is his first book. Its title comes from a popular phrase in the United States in the late 1790s: "millions for defense, not a cent for tribute." This was in response to French demands for the payment of bribes.

As tensions with France rose, pushed by the seizure of American merchant ships and their cargoes by French warships on the high seas, American leaders responded slowly. Any American action would have to come in the naval sphere. The U.S. Navy dated only from 1794, when Congress passed legislation providing for the construction of six frigates. President John Adams urged the completion of these ships and during the years 1798 to 1799 the government purchased a number of merchant vessels and converted them into cruisers: six ships and two brigs. The need to meet French privateers preying on American shipping in the West Indies dictated small fast vessels, and eight recently built revenue cutters were also turned over to the navy. This conversion program being inadequate, the government also built two twenty-eight-gun frigates, three smaller ships of twenty to twenty-four guns each, two schooners, and seven galleys.

"Subscription" vessels were also built, and it is these warships that are the subject of this fine book. Under the subscription plan, public-minded citizens financed ships that were built in various ports with little government supervision and then presented as gifts to the United States. Merchants in Newburyport, Massachusetts, took the lead when they began a subscription drive to fund a twenty-gun ship to be built within ninety days. Other coastal communities followed suit. Ultimately more than a thousand subscribers in ten ports pledged money to build ten warships: five frigates rated at twenty-eight to forty-four guns each, four ships of eighteen to twenty-four guns, and a brig of eighteen guns. These included three famous frigates: the Philadelphia (destined to go aground off the coast of Tripoli and be taken by the Tripolitans, then boarded and burned by young Stephen Decatur and other
volunteers in one of the most daring actions of the age of sail), the Essex (first U.S. warship to make it round the Cape of Good Hope and loser during the War of 1812 in one of the most sanguinary battles of the age of sail with British ships Phoebe and Cherub) and the Boston (which captured the French corvette Le Berceau and was burned at the Washington Navy Yard in 1814 to prevent capture by the British).

Leiner is familiar with the source material. He makes excellent use of personal papers, memoirs, and government documents, as well as secondary sources, in this first book-length study of these vessels. He discusses the origins of the idea, where and how the ships were built, and their contributions in the so-called Quasi-War against France from 1798 to 1800. Leiner also discusses the political aspects of this program and how Congress enacted a statute that provided interest-bearing stock to the private subscribers: the first time in U.S. history that the government issued "bonds" to provide for the national defense. Leiner also treats the establishment of the Navy Department, which came into existence in 1798 under the able leadership of Benjamin Stoddert.

Leiner's book is about an era long gone, when public-minded citizens, who had only recently won their freedom, willingly stepped forward to assume the burdens of the national defense, instead of attempting to profit from it. The late 1790s was an era of rather unsophisticated weaponry, and defense needs could indeed be met rather easily and quickly. Try to imagine a small community today funding by popular subscription and building within ninety days a modern fleet aircraft carrier or ballistic missile submarine.

Virginia Military Institute

SPENCER C. TUCKER


This collection of essays is the fifteenth and final volume in the Perspectives on the American Revolution series sponsored by the United States Capitol Historical Society. Like previous volumes, this one brings together a number of scholars whose work portrays the lay of the field and suggests where it might be heading in the future. It is only fitting then that the last volume in this valuable series deals with Native Americans, long underrepresented in studies of the early republic. As James Merrell notes in his essay, included here as an afterword but worth reading first as an orientation to the subject, not too long ago a reader looking for something on Indians in this period would have had to settle for whatever fell under the subject headings of "policies and attitudes" (p. 339) toward them. As this volume attests,
the field is now much more attentive to the Indians’ perspectives and experiences in the early republic.

Not that policies and attitudes are a dead letter. Indeed, a number of essays in this book deal primarily with the intersection of ideology, both European and native, with federal Indian policy. Reginald Horsman dissects the Enlightenment notions about human progress that shaped the new nation’s efforts to assimilate Indians into American society. Daniel H. Usner writes in a similar vein about the blind eye policymakers turned toward Native American agriculture because it failed to match the criteria of Jeffersonian agrarianism. Usner’s conclusions compliment those of Theda Perdue, who in an essay on Native American women notes how popular literature described Indian dress, bodies, sexuality, and labor in ways that contradicted republican notions of domesticity and virtue. Richard White discusses a conflict of metaphors between Anglo-American notions of patriarchy and Algonquinian notions of fatherhood that emptied intercultural diplomacy of its meaning. What sets these essays apart from an earlier generation of scholarship is the careful attention they devote to explaining native gender relations, kinship systems, and economies.

The rest of the essays in this volume fall into two categories: Indian responses to American expansion or the Indian’s changing image in American popular culture. Colin Calloway’s prologue provides an overview of the effects that the “endemic warfare” (p. 18) unleashed by the Revolution had on Indian communities. In a case study of the postrevolutionary land scramble, Daniel K. Richter describes how Pennsylvania’s residents were transformed in Indian eyes from “Brother Onas,” neighbors known for their peaceful and even-handed relations with the Indians, into “Long Knives” indistinguishable from other citizens of the United States. Joel W. Martin writes of “a kind of cultural ‘underground,’ a hidden set of beliefs and practices” (p. 226) that Cherokees and Mukogee Creeks used to preserve their native identities in the face of missionaries and federal agents determined to erase them. In his study of Shawnee leader Black Hoof, R. David Edmunds draws the reader’s attention to those Indians who pursued accommodation with the United States. Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet may have become the most celebrated Indian figures of the early republic, but Edmunds notes that far more Shawnees chose to follow Black Hoof’s path of accommodation.

The Indian’s changing image in American popular culture is tackled in the book’s final two chapters. Reviewing an array of popular literature, including poems, songs, and captivity narratives, Elise Marienstras argues that the image of the Indian helped reconcile the new nation’s imperialist and republican values by making conquest ennobling and providential for its participants. Vivien Green Fryd comes to similar conclusions in her study of the Indian figures in the four bas-reliefs completed between 1825 and 1828 for the rotunda of the United States Capitol. These scenes, which literally carved in stone the nation’s history, made Indians the
foil of the colonial enterprise and reflected the growing sentiment for their removal west of the Mississippi.

This book encapsulates a growing subfield in the history of the early republic that would have barely rated a one-page bibliography twenty years ago. Much of this interest is owed to the flowering of ethnohistory in colonial era studies, as witnessed by the fact that many of the contributors to this volume have made their reputations by writing first in that field. It is apparent from this volume that whereas the colonial historiography emphasizes the range of responses to the European-Indian encounter, the scholarship on the early republic is more uniform in its narrative. In the fifty years between 1780 and 1830, native peoples east of the Mississippi saw their lives disrupted and land seized in a burst of nation-building typically celebrated in American history texts. Indians, once valued allies and trading partners, found themselves reduced to the status of an unwelcome anachronism. The essays in this volume present an excellent introduction to the historical circumstances surrounding that dispossession.

Gettysburg College

TIMOTHY J. SHANNON


This is the first biography of Charles-Lucien Bonaparte, a leading naturalist of the early nineteenth century and a nephew of Napoleon. Stroud, an experienced biographer, has made an important contribution to the history of comparative zoology and of natural science in its infancy.

It is surprising that no biography of Bonaparte has been written before. An unusual person who led a life filled with contradictions, he is an excellent subject. As a naturalist, he was in the first rank, with international recognition as a founder of descriptive ornithology by the age of twenty-two. As a Bonaparte, he made use of his status as the senior male heir of Napoleon and as an Italian prince. At the same time, he was an ardent democrat and active in the republican movement in Italy in the nineteenth century.

A reader with no knowledge of natural history will find this book a fascinating personal window into the world of the Bonaparte heirs. Bonaparte was the eldest son of Lucien Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother. Lucien had engineered the coup that brought Napoleon to power, but he later fell out of favor and was forever excluded from the imperial circle. Lucien was, however, Prince of Canino in the Papal States, and he lived in the grandest style in an immense palace in Rome and at his country estate. It was at this latter spot that Charles-Lucien was first to find and to develop
his talents as a naturalist.

When Napoleon took over the Papal States in 1809, he evicted his brother Lucien from Rome. We get a glimpse of the style of Lucien's life by the fact that he had to charter an entire ship to take himself and an entourage of forty-six persons out of the country. When this ship was captured by the British, the Lucien Bonapartes became gilded prisoners for four years in England, where young Charles learned the language and continued his studies of animals.

After Napoleon's fall in 1815, Charles married his uncle Joseph Napoleon's eldest daughter, which united the senior male and female lines of the Bonaparte families. This union took Charles to America, where his father-in-law resided in Napoleonic style on a 1,700-acre estate near Bordentown, New Jersey, complete with an artificial lake and elaborate gardens in the French style. During his stay at Joseph Bonaparte's Point Breeze Charles became acquainted with American fauna and naturalists, and he was elected to membership in the Academy of Natural Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. After his return to Europe in 1828, he completed and published his American Ornithology, illustrated by Audubon and Titian Peale, a work that was to establish his scientific reputation.

At first, he continued his writing and his leadership in international scientific congresses. However, his return to Italy had brought him increasingly into political intrigues with the growing republican movement there that culminated in the revolutions of 1848 that swept Europe. Bonaparte eventually had to flee the country and moved to France. There he was ill received by his cousin Napoleon II, who doubtless considered Charles's more senior status in the Bonaparte family as a possible threat to his own uncertain crown. Charles resumed his scientific studies, but died in Paris at the early age of fifty-four.

As a pioneer in natural history, and particularly in the scientific classification of creatures, Charles' fame was assured. This was of far greater importance than his role as a Bonaparte or as a liberal republican. Indeed, without those distractions, and without the constant periods of exile that doubtless shortened his life, his achievements could have been far greater.

As this is the first biography of Charles Bonaparte, Stroud had to explore a vast number of archives, and work through volumes of family letters in French and Italian. She knows French well, but had to teach herself Italian to master the many documents in that language. She writes in an easy style and gives a lively account of Charles Bonaparte's adventures, both in the world of natural studies and that of the political intrigues of the Bonaparte clan. There are splendid color illustrations and numerous sketches of persons and creatures. This book is well recommended for general readers, as well as for naturalists and historians.

Universitatea Babes-Bolyai
Cluj-Napoca, Romania

Nicholas Sellers
BOOK REVIEWS


This is the best social history available of American Methodism’s formative years in the key cities of Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. Based on a wealth of archival research, Andrews carefully analyzes the cross currents at work in American Methodism from its beginnings to 1800, the point at which the church was poised to become the leading Protestant denomination in antebellum America. While most Methodists of this period lived in rural areas, few records of their activities survive. The comparative wealth of data available for the eastern seaboard cities allows Andrews to penetrate beyond the lives of the movement’s preachers and leaders to examine the experiences of a broader cross section of early Methodists. The result, perhaps not surprisingly, is that Andrews finds a good deal more variety and social diversity than historians have yet noticed. “Methodism was neither a classless nor a democratic movement,” writes Andrews. “On the contrary, gender, racial, and social distinctions were conspicuously part of its every development” (p. 241). While early American Methodism was “extraordinarily inclusive,” it also “placed limits on the kinds of social, as opposed to spiritual, change permissible” (p. 242).

The book is divided into three sections. The first provides a close reading of American Methodism’s beginnings, from the foundations of John Wesley’s religious experience, including his 1730s mission to Georgia, through the American Revolution. Despite the many setbacks and conflicts of this period, both within and without, Methodism survived largely because of its “extraordinary ability to sustain both the missionary organization and preaching drive that most distinguished it” (p. 95). Section two looks at “social change,” with chapters focusing on women, African Americans, laboring men, artisans, and entrepreneurs. It is here that Andrews is able to use her archival sources to their fullest, drawing fresh insights into the experiences of these groups in the nation’s three largest cities. The result is a picture of various constituencies—men and women, rich, middling, and poor, black and white, slave and free—vying to shape Methodism to best meet their needs. The book’s final section, entitled “Politics,” examines the church’s struggles to come to terms with its new-found success and emerging sense of its place in American society.

The strength of this book is the depth of Andrews’s research on Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York City, woven into the text and presented in a set of helpful appendices. Andrews’s insights from this data are often brilliant. But while she has a keen eye for cross currents and contradictions, the book’s central thesis is less clear. In the closing chapter, Andrews asks if Methodism entailed “only schismatic breakup and reflexive responses,” then “Wherein lay the fundamental unity of Methodism” (pp. 222–23)? This is a good question, but not one that this
study is really designed to answer. Nevertheless, this is a path breaking work in the social history of American Methodism, the largest and most dynamic religious movement of the antebellum period. It complements a number of other recent books dealing with early American Methodism, including Christine Heyrman's *Southern Cross: The Beginnings of the Bible Belt* (1997) and Cynthia Lynn Lyerly's *Methodism and the Southern Mind, 1770–1810* (1998), which focus on Methodism's early development in the South, and William R. Sutton's *Journeymen for Jesus: Evangelical Artisans Confront Capitalism in Jacksonian Baltimore* (1998) and Beth Barton Schweiger's *The Gospel Working Up: Progress and the Pulpit in Nineteenth-Century Virginia* (2000), which examine evangelical religion's next phase. Together, these books are reshaping the way we look at the development of popular religion in America.

University of Missouri, Columbia

JOHN WIGGER


With the continuing erosion of a self-confident reform movement alongside the vertiginous corporatization of the U.S. academy, nineteenth-century Americanist studies has shifted focus away from the New England Brahmin elites and toward the mid-Atlantic and southern writers who were more clearly dependent on the nascent commercial literary marketplace. In this trend, Terence Whalen provides a sophisticated, thoroughly researched, and long-overdue argument for Poe emblematizing cultural shifts driven by antebellum U.S. capitalism. Whalen frames Poe's work as a response to three generic social forces or "readers": the "ideal Reader," or sympathetic receiver of the author's genius; the new mass audience as an "anonymous, collective reader"; and the "Capital Reader," or editor who distributes texts based on their profitability rather than any aesthetic criteria. The magazine world's massified readership acts as the contested field between Poe's initial idealization of literature as an autonomous, self-valorizing club and the market's intervention. As the logic of commerce increasingly regulates cultural fields, they exhibit the features of capitalism's intrinsic crises. Accumulation for accumulation's sake results in literary overproduction, spurred on by advances in printing technologies, so that an overwhelmed market must compensate for the decreased price of its goods by systematically undercompensating the producers (authors). For Whalen, this dynamic is more salient for Poe than any other writer in the period, because of Poe's pro-active, self-consciousness of the problem. Poe attempts a variety of countervailing tactics ranging from a literary approach that
emphasizes stylistic “newness,” as one means for authors to generate new value for what might otherwise be the same old goods, to the dream of owning a magazine as a means of controlling the mode of one’s own creative production. Though Whalen’s interest does not lie in adjudicating the relative success of these efforts, we could predict these projects’ failure, since none of these strategies radically disrupts the system so much as they are merely an attempt to gain a more advantageous position in the structure of profiteering. Poe’s phenomenology is thus akin to the contradictions of a colonial petit bourgeois—at once jealous of the distant elite’s privileges, intrigued by how the market and the slogan of regional exceptionalism may overcome the old establishment, while simultaneously being deeply ashamed of the local populace that exemplifies the market and that regional difference.

Addressing long-standing debates in Poe studies, Whalen convincingly demonstrates that Poe neither scripted the notoriously racist Paulding-Drayton review in the 1836 Southern Literary Messenger, nor was he the editorial success there that he later claimed. Addressing the larger question about Poe and race, Whalen claims that Poe’s reluctance to alienate an imagined audience that included northern and southern readers led to Poe’s studied refusal to take any explicit position on slavery as he reproduced an “average racism,” which would play to racial prejudices held even by white, Northern abolitionists. In the terms framed by Whalen, the claim makes sense, since Whalen’s interest is with Poe the reviewer and editor, rather than Poe the fiction writer. When Whalen does treat the stories and narratives, he does so mainly to illustrate positions taken in the reviews. But composing a review entails different forms of pre-editorial self-censorship and horizons of possible formal address. In a brilliant treatment of “The Gold Bug,” Whalen demonstrates how Poe consciously designed the story for popular success while also encoding a cryptographic message for his ideal reader of potential political patronage. This strategy creates a tension between a manifest tale of collegial betrayal and a latent content of homosocial affiliation and seduction. With Whalen’s own insight, we could invert the proposition and say that while Poe may have skillfully avoided race as an explicit theme in the editor’s department, he did so only to circulate it within the compartment of fiction. It is hard, surely, not to see Poe’s stories as obsessively preoccupied with slavery. “The Black Cat” is, after all, a tale about a black domestic familiar who is lynched, but returns to instigate the primal anxiety of southern racism, violence against white women. While “The Black Cat” foretells the black rage that Melville scripts in “Benito Cereno,” Poe also contributes to the “tragic mulatto” genre as white Rowena is revealed as the “passing” version of black Ligeia. Whalen’s turn here to describe Poe’s “average racism” is a move that abandons the alternative conceptual categories of “ideology” or “hegemony.” By isolating race in this way, Whalen prevents it from being a site of multiple implication, which may account for a surprising silence on Poe’s relation to the pressures of gender and sexuality. Because the mass reader was relentlessly gendered
in the period, not least through the cult of domesticity, the absence in Edgar Allen Poe and the Masses of any critical reflection on sex and gender as a regulator of the literary market holds Whalen's otherwise magistral monograph back from easily becoming this generation's field-defining work on Poe.

University of Warwick

STEPHEN SHAPIRO

Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor, 1864. By ERNEST B. FURGURSON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000. xii, 328p. Maps, illustrations, notes, appendixes, bibliography, index. $27.50.)

In the minds of many Americans Cold Harbor is all you have to know about the generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. The blind and bumbling butchery of that fateful June 3, 1864, in which perhaps as many 6,000 Union soldiers fell in the course of a few hours (sometimes this is compressed into a few minutes), remained a lifelong regret for the Union general-in-chief, as did the subsequent botched effort to recover the wounded between the lines. The result obscures in many minds the skillful generalship of the Vicksburg and Appomattox campaigns and warps our understanding of Grant's overall plan of campaign in 1864. Some historians, with more enthusiasm than insight, have used Cold Harbor to bludgeon Grant's reputation, with one going so far as to allege that there was a coverup of the casualties, a rather ludicrous charge. In these circumstances one welcomes Ernest Furgurson's new study of the battle, which attempts to set it in wider context. Adding to the work already done by Louis Baltz and Noah Andre Trudeau (soon to be joined by Gordon C. Rhea) as well as several recent biographies, Furgurson's volume promises to help us reappraise Grant's spring 1864 offensive in Virginia.

Furgurson offers a rather severe indictment of the command team of Grant and George G. Meade, woven together with quotes carefully selected from Grant's critics (such as John C. Ropes). The analysis of the growing friction between Grant and Meade will come as no surprise to scholars, although at times it appears that Furgurson attributes what happened solely to Grant's stubbornness and Meade's churlishness. Historians critical of the admittedly awkward command arrangement have failed to offer much in the way of a satisfactory alternative that did not carry with it equally severe problems. Meade and his corps and division commanders were derelict in planning for the June 3 assault, especially in failing to do sufficient reconnaissance to assess the difficulties involved or in coordinating the attacking forces. As Meade himself observed, he (and not Grant) was in command on the field during the assault proper (Furgurson's unconvincing efforts to prove that Grant was at Meade's side throughout much of that morning show how willing he is to strain the evidence to make a point—a practice evident throughout the book). Grant
readily admitted that he bore ultimate responsibility for what happened on June 3, but Meade and his generals deserve to share in the blame. And one might add that the Confederates had something to do with it, although at times Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia are reduced to the role of supporting cast members looking on as the drama unfolds across the way.

One might indeed argue that Furgurson's study, welcome as it is, only adds to the distorting impression left by Cold Harbor on students of the Overland campaign and Grant's generalship. Fewer Union soldiers fell there than at Spotsylvania or the Wilderness; in terms of military setbacks, Fredericksburg, Pickett's Charge, and Franklin were far bloodier than the assault on June 3. Grant had always contemplated a crossing of the James River; it was not forced upon him by Cold Harbor. Indeed, if anything, recent studies suggest that Cold Harbor was an aberration, a horrible mistake caused by a misinterpretation of the condition of the Army of Northern Virginia and of the ability of Union forces to take advantage of an opportunity. Still, that does not erase the memories of a horrendous and futile bloodletting; even Furgurson's study will do little to lift the shadow of gloom that hangs over the words Cold Harbor.

Arizona State University

BROOKS D. SIMPSON

The Union Image: Popular Prints of the Civil War North. By MARK E. NEELY, JR., and HAROLD HOLZER. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 266p. Illustrations, notes, index. $45.00.)

Our American Victorian forebears—in any event those not in the elite, who alone could afford oil paintings—frequently decorated their homes with inexpensive, mass-produced prints, often put on sale for under a dollar. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that when the Civil War exploded, a vast number of popular print makers turned their presses to scenes of martial glory. Not the gore but the romance and excitement of war was in demand, according to Mark E. Neely, Jr., and Harold Holzer in this lively essay, and "what popular prints illustrate is not events or personalities but the popular culture of the time" (p. 17).

Holzer and Neely are the leading scholars of Civil War illustrations. Their previous books include Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory: The Civil War in Art (1993); The Confederate Image: Prints of the Lost Cause (1987); and, with Gabor S. Borritt, The Lincoln Image: Abraham Lincoln and the Popular Print (1984). As has always been true of their work, this is a nicely written but serious scholarly study of popular Unionist image making. The handsome, over-sized book includes twenty-one color plates and 123 black and white illustrations, accompanying a probing and engaging, if at times a bit disjointed text.
As well as art history and cultural history, this is a business history. Neely and Holzer have dug out a considerable amount of information on the printmakers and the presses, on the marketing as well as the creation of the images. They demonstrate the widespread piracy of images before the days of enforceable copyright laws. And they illustrate other forms of appropriation: for example many different generals' heads were pasted over older images—for instance, Grant in 1864 being grafted onto a portrait of Zachary Taylor and his white horse done in 1848.

Often, the popular sentiments expressed were incredibly mawkish—angels hovering over dying men, little babes and forlorn women pining away in reverie for their distant heroes, who hover over them, ghost-like. No realism wanted and none delivered: for these romanticizing purposes prints were widely preferred to photographs. Indeed, such false images might well have sustained the popularity of the war, a subject the authors do not engage.

Rather than refighting the war chronologically, the book is arranged topically. The authors start with the flag mania that immediately followed the firing on Fort Sumter, and with the quick reinvigoration of the traditional heroism of military portraiture—often based on the wrong photos or none at all. For at least a year at the beginning of the war, for example, popular prints of Ulysses S. Grant copied the image of William Grant, an Illinois meat contractor!

As the war ground on, more homely images began to appear, of camp life, for example (where we discover the spread of baseball). But here caricature—an extension of then current romantic practices in genre painting—and not grimy realism, filled the illustrators' production. There was no hint of bad food and worse sanitation, of foraging off the local southerners, or of the nocturnal visits of prostitutes, bootleg hooch under their hoop skirts. The authors also emphasize that there was no real depiction of the home front (a site of poverty and greed, profiteering and grief), but only of "home"—domestic blissfulness peopled by "stoic women and fatherless children" (p. 84). The 1864 presidential election made for nasty cartoons, Republican ones depicting thuggish, ape-like Irishmen, while the Democrats demonized black folks.

Naval warfare was underportrayed, in part because blockade duty, the main use of the Union navy, was dull and inglorious. The river war in the West, ironclads blasting away, made for somewhat more desirable illustrative material. The great Union heroes, Grant and William T. Sherman, became the subject of prints increasing in number along with their victories. While Grant usually looked placid and rather ordinary, Sherman made a splendid subject, his "stern visage," the authors conclude, becoming transformed "into a virtual icon of modern war" (p. 196).

As for prints of the great battles, most of these were executed in the first great revival period for war nostalgia in the late 1880s and early 1890, a chronological gap the authors fail to analyze in any depth. At the very end of the war, some positive
images of African American soldiers finally emerged, although in numbers less than the authors imply. Here too, as the authors omit to mention, a decade after the close of the war, following the end of Reconstruction, vile racist images of blacks reemerged in the North as much as the South, along with those falsely dashing battle scenes and idealized portraits of ex-Confederate generals, notably Robert E. Lee.

Quibbles aside, all in all, this is a splendid book that would not only look good on the coffee table, but would serve teachers of Civil War history quite well in the classroom.

Simon Fraser University

Michael Fellman


The subject of this book, Edward H. Harriman, at long last has found its author. Having published The Life and Legend of Jay Gould (1986), a two-volume history of the Union Pacific (1987; 1989) and other works on both railroad history and general American history, no one else could even be imagined as being better qualified to author such a stunning biography of this preeminent railroad leader. Many who read this book will wish they had written it.

Klein opens his definitive study by tracing the research materials garnered by George Kennan for his family-sponsored biography. A journalist rather than a scholar and without historical detachment, Kennan possessed one singular advantage: he not only gained access to Harriman’s papers but also obtained interviews with many who knew him. Kennan’s notes presumably had been lost but Klein discovered and put them to excellent use.

Klein portrays Harriman as a superb financial organizer and efficient manager of existing railroads. The Illinois Central, the Union Pacific, and the Southern Pacific all benefitted immensly from his management. Much like James J. Hill, his implacable enemy, Klein characterizes Harriman as a cost-conscious efficiency-driven railroader. Harriman’s railroads paid low dividends so that earnings could be used to pay for betterments; dividends came later out of increased earnings. Advocating high volume at low rates, Harriman had his eye on the long-run savings rather than the short-run cost.

His treatment of the notorious Chicago & Alton affair at the turn of the century, “the most controversial affair of Harriman’s career” (p. 173), results in Klein striking a treacherous balance. Harriman, George G. Gould, James Stillman, and, indirectly, Jacob H. Schiff formed a syndicate that refinanced this railroad connecting Chicago and St. Louis. It substantially increased the capitalization, invested little, and sold
its members the bonds at a preferential price. While acknowledging that Harriman himself viewed this as his “biggest mistake” (p. 173), Klein savages Harriman’s contemporary and later critics for being deficient in historical perspective. On the contrary, Robert S. Lovett, Harriman’s more scrupulous confidant and successor as head of the Union Pacific, recognized that one could not defend the morally indefensible. Business morality does evolve constantly, partly in response to the critics’ jabs, but in this instance Harriman lowered rather than raised the accepted standard.

Placing Harriman in context, Klein furnishes a comprehensive analysis of railroad strategy and considers the alternative options available to the protagonists. It is highly unlikely that any future scholar will contribute significant new evidence to Klein’s account of the sequence of events surrounding the Northern Pacific panic, the Northern Securities Company, and the Northern Securities decision. While still maintaining the dramatic quality in this thrice-told tale, Klein accomplishes the difficult feat of offering a fully-rounded narrative.

In Klein’s version, Harriman and his allies lost to Hill, J. P. Morgan, and their associates because Schiff decided not to execute Harriman’s final buy order; Schiff’s customary attendance at his synagogue constitutes a trivial and fundamentally irrelevant detail. Unfortunately, Klein cannot explain Schiff’s motivation; the primary evidence, if it ever existed, has not survived. It is noteworthy that while Harriman complained briefly about Schiff’s transgression, their long-standing close relationship endured.

Klein presents Harriman as a happy warrior whose business morality fell within a precarious and uncertain code. Honest by his own lights, Harriman lied but denied having lied. Klein acknowledges that Harriman, like most others in the business elite, believed in situational ethics in which he was the sole judge.

“How much power should any one man be allowed” (p. 394)? While not supplying a direct answer to this inherently unanswerable question, Klein utilizes it to explain three fights (1905–1907) in which Harriman played a pivotal role: Harriman resigned from the Equitable Life Assurance Society board during an intense and bitter contest to reform that enterprise; the ouster of Stuyvesant Fish, Harriman’s former mentor and longtime friend, as president of the Illinois Central owing to conflict of interest; and President Theodore Roosevelt’s castigation of Harriman and others of his ilk as malefactors of great wealth whose power the government should curtail.

Klein relies on the Wall Street Journal for day-to-day events which imparts a sense of immediacy. Moreover, his use of epigraphs from the contemporary press enhances reader interest. In contrast, more maps and fewer illustrations would have helped, especially since some illustrations lack specificity or direct connection to Harriman.

Any reservations regarding Klein’s monumental achievement are minor indeed
and pale by comparison with the evidence marshaled and interpretation offered. Exceptionally well written, this biography merits prizes and a wide readership.

Boston University

SAUL ENGELBOURG

John Wanamaker: Philadelphia Merchant. By HERBERT ERSHKOWITZ.
(Conshohocken, Pa., Combined Publishing, 1999. 227p. Illustrations, notes, bibliographic essay, index. $29.95.)

In June 1995 when May's Department Stores acquired the John Wanamaker stores and turned the Philadelphia flagship location into a Hecht's (later it became a Lord & Taylor's), many Philadelphians mourned. The Philadelphia Inquirer marked the famous institution's official closing in August of the same year by publishing a special section, "John Wanamaker, Philadelphia Says Goodbye." Wanamaker's was not merely an elegant department store to many Philadelphians, but a unique public institution and powerful symbol of Philadelphia's commercial vitality. And Wanamaker's "Grand Emporium" embodied the extraordinary vision, dynamic personality, merchandising genius, and civic pride of its founder, John Wanamaker.

In his engaging new biography, Herbert Ershkowitz masterfully captures Wanamaker's complex personality, restless ambition, boundless energy and capacity for hard work, his bold retailing strategies, successes and failures. He traces Wanamaker's sixty-year, multifaceted career, presenting him not only as the most outstanding retailing entrepreneur of his day, but also as an important Evangelical Protestant leader, a philanthropist, politician, public official (postmaster general under Benjamin Harrison), dedicated Philadelphia booster, and civic leader. Though a daunting task in the brief format (part of the Signpost biography series), Ershkowitz deftly narrates Wanamaker's intricate story. He bases his study on extensive research in the voluminous Wanamaker Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and on earlier biographies written by Herbert A. Gibbons (1926), Wanamaker's official biographer, and Joseph Appel (1930), a Wanamaker advertising executive.

Although Wanamaker's profound religious faith and civic commitment pervade his daily life, Ershkowitz's account suggests that his leadership in religious, political, and civic affairs ultimately served his business interests. For example, Wanamaker introduced Philadelphians to his new Grand Depot store when he sponsored eight weeks of daily revival meetings featuring famous evangelical preacher Dwight Moody, just before the store opened for business in 1876. As a dedicated Bethany Sunday school teacher (and founder), Wanamaker found an excellent source for reliable store employees among his pupils. Further, while other retailers lobbied for
legislation favorable to business, Wanamaker actually became a politician to influence policy himself. As postmaster general, Wanamaker's innovations—affordable parcel post and rural home delivery—promoted the interests of both retailers and consumers.

Wanamaker, the civic leader, envisioned his store as "an educational institution, a center of patriotic festivals, and an entertainment palace" (p. 114). Splashy daily newspaper advertisements drew thousands of Philadelphians to Wanamaker's for public celebrations, art exhibitions, films, and concerts. On these occasions vast theatrical displays of merchandise from across the world surrounded store visitors. Elaborate store holiday celebrations transformed the major religious festivals, Christmas and Easter, into shopping extravaganzas. Wanamaker's also promoted minor holidays, Halloween, St. Valentine's Day, patriotic holidays, such as the Fourth of July, and the newly invented Mother's Day as special consumer events.

Ershkowitz does not romanticize this charismatic, brilliant, overbearing, and sometimes sanctimonious figure. He discusses his risky ventures, his financial problems as well as an occasional inconsistency between his political positions and business practices. As the largest U.S. Importer of European goods, low tariffs suited Wanamaker's business interests, but as a loyal Republican he strongly supported high tariffs. When higher tariff laws were passed in 1891, he instructed his son Rodman, his Paris operations manager, to ship all French purchases to Philadelphia immediately before the new laws went into effect (p. 87).

As he envisioned and developed the Grand Depot and the later Market Street store opened in 1911 as elegant downtown department stores, Wanamaker joined other pioneering merchants such as A. T. Stewart, R. H. Macy, and Marshall Field as they launched "one of the most sweeping changes in retailing in American history" (p. 55). Indeed, highly profitable, lavishly appointed department stores dominated main streets in cities and towns across the country by the 1890s, revolutionizing American retailing practice, middle-class values, buying patterns, and promoting a new pervasive consumer culture.

Ershkowitz, however, does not adequately contextualize Wanamaker's religious beliefs or his labor practices. Analyzing these dimensions of Wanamaker's worldview would reveal just how unusual he really was among his contemporaries. While Wanamaker insisted that his Sunday school students memorize his favorite biblical passage, "To set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace" (Rom. 8:6), he dedicated his entire business life to setting minds on things of the flesh." Although his passionate religious beliefs seem to be in tension with his business practices and grand life style, John Wanamaker and other late nineteenth-century "liberal evangelical" Protestants perceived no conflict, according to historian William Leach in *Land of Desire*. They saw themselves as good Christians if they led moral personal lives and enthusiastically and generously supported church life and missionary work. They essentially ignored the broader
social implications of the powerful materialistic values they energetically cultivated to insure their business success.

Secondly, many of Wanamaker's prominent contemporaries also presumed that employers and employees fundamentally shared common interests in business success, even if workers did not always agree. Though Ershkowitz discusses Wanamaker's view as an echo of nineteenth-century artisan rhetoric, many other department store managers of his day referred to store employees as "family" and established similar labor policies. In the wake of violent industrial strikes in the 1890s, both management professionals and business leaders sought new strategies to convince industrial workers that a fundamental harmony of interests does exist between capital and labor. Prominent corporate leaders advocated mediation to settle conflicts and promoted "welfare capitalism," consisting of pension plans, insurance, and educational and recreational activities to create a loyal and stable work force committed to promoting business success, practices clearly designed to discourage unionization. Though ultimately rejected by most employees, especially in industry, department store owners with mostly female employees and many southern textile mill owners continued welfare policies well into the 1930s with some limited success.

Finally, Ershkowitz's claim that "To know [Wanamaker's] life story is also to know the biography of the city of Philadelphia" (p. 11) is simply untrue. Philadelphia's city fathers did honor Wanamaker's many economic, cultural, philanthropic, and political contributions to the city by erecting a life-like statue, inscribed "John Wanamaker, Citizen," next to City Hall shortly after his death. Yet were "the biography of Philadelphia" told from the point of view of those who physically built his stores or by those who worked in them, or by those whom Wanamaker refused to hire, it would be quite a different tale. Though Ershkowitz's purpose is to give a nuanced account of this outstanding leader's life and thought and to explain his special place in Philadelphia's history, it is essential to locate him in his particular social context. His life story reflects only one perspective on the history of the city.

Ershkowitz concludes his book with a very useful bibliographic essay describing the contents of the Wanamaker archives, other contemporaneous sources on Wanamaker and his stores, and the earlier biographies. He also evaluates more general recent studies exploring the relationships between the emergence of grand department stores and the growth of consumer culture. Ershkowitz argues that these studies portray department stores as having had a potentially "corrupting influence on the morals of American society" (p. 193) and assesses them by discussing how positively they depict the stores and their founders. It is more accurate, I think, to understand these recent works as efforts to explain how department stores played an essential role in transforming the U.S. into the all-encompassing consumer society we know today and to explore the social consequences of consumer culture.

In spite of these limitations, John Wanamaker: Philadelphia Merchant is a very useful and well-written study, providing an excellent overview of this complex
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retailing genius's life and achievements in an era when large scale enterprises and spectacle dazzled urban populations. His stores created a new kind of community spirit in the anonymous modern city and sparked city dwellers' fascination with the limitless possibilities of a new society built on buying consumer goods, mass commercial entertainment, and technological innovations. This book is highly recommended for general readers and students interested in the history of contemporary culture and the strategies and sensibilities of one of the greatest innovators in modern retailing.

Guilford College

SARAH S. MALINO

Honest John Williams: U.S. Senator from Delaware. By Carol E. Hoffecker. (Newark: University of Delaware Press. xxii, 277p. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $45.00.)

Occasionally the call to public service produces a genuine man of the people, a commoner of uncommon integrity. John J. Williams, U.S. Senator from 1947 to 1971, according to professor Carol Hoffecker of the University of Delaware, was such a man. Born in Millsboro, Delaware, in 1904, reared in a strict Methodist home, Williams remained socially conservative in his tastes and politics. With only a high school education, he co-owned nineteen farms and a successful feed business serving Sussex County, the center of the East Coast poultry industry, which forms the backdrop of this highly readable, commendably detailed study.

Using a network of associations through the Rotary, Methodist Church, and Masons, fortified by twelve presumably uneventful years on the Millsboro town board and his service as president of the Delaware Poultry Improvement Association, Williams ran for the Senate in 1946, according to Hoffecker, because of his pent-up anger over restrictive depression-era (NRA) and World War II (OPA) federal regulations of the poultry industry, which in Williams's view constricted the free market and artificially deflated poultry prices. Tall, lean, and reedy voiced, Williams campaigned quietly and indefatigably, defeating the incumbent Democrat, James M. Tunnell, his longtime friend and personal lawyer, by capitalizing on the popular outcry over postwar shortages, especially meat, and attacking Tunnell and his party as "dupes of the Communists" (p. 67).

Williams later called Harry Truman the most "honest" of presidents (and there are many interesting parallels in the two men's careers), but Williams helped defeat Truman's Fair Deal package. Against virtually every Democratic initiative or anything that, in his words, "advanced socialism," he opposed Kennedy's federal aid to education and tax reduction plans and Johnson's Medicare and War-on-Poverty programs. Complex and unpredictable, Williams railed against the urban riots of the
1960s, but supported gun control legislation. He fell out of favor with President Nixon for refusing to support the supreme court appointment of Clement Haynsworth, helped kill Nixon's family assistance plan, and criticized the 1970 Cambodian incursion.

Hoffecker gingerly approaches Williams’s “mixed” record on race relations. Conditioned by his upbringing in Sussex County’s southern environment, which countenanced slavery until outlawed in 1865 and which remained thoroughly segregated until the mid-1960s, Williams criticized the Supreme Court’s 1954 school desegregation ruling (yet advised constituents to obey the law), voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1957, infuriated African American constituents by accusing prominent blacks of misconduct, yet felt “obliged” to vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

A believer in fiscal frugality, balanced budgets, lower taxes, reduced government intervention, and market-driven economies, Williams contributed to the conservative vanguard by exposing government waste and official wrongdoing (mostly by Democrats). Relying on a small personal staff, informants, and reporters (Hoffecker makes no mention of the FBI), Williams first gained recognition by exposing Truman administration scandals, verifying Republican outcries over the “mess in Washington,” winning Eisenhower’s approbation, and solidifying his own reelection. His roles in uncovering the Billy Sol Estes and the Bobby Baker-Ellen Rometsch-Fred Black scandals (the “capstone” of Williams’s senate career) helped win a fourth term in 1964.

Describing Williams throughout as politically incorruptible and strenuously independent, Hoffecker relies heavily on newspapers and on Williams’s senatorial papers, along with interviews with family, friends, and his assistants. She probes little of Williams’s private dealings, leading her often to infer his motives, perhaps in part because Williams and his assistant carefully screened his personal correspondence “to destroy all evidence of accusations that had proven untrue” (pp. 233-34).

A useful contribution to recent political history, Hoffecker’s study is indispensable to students of Delaware history and of the nexus of business and politics.

Temple University

James W. Hilty


For David Kaiser, there are several tragedies about the U.S. decision to fight a war in Vietnam. These conclusions rest on several underlying arguments and comparisons. First, and most important, he argues that President John F. Kennedy resisted committing to a full-scale, U.S.-directed and -staffed war in Vietnam.
Tragedy one was Kennedy's death, since it put Lyndon B. Johnson, who did not resist a wider war, in the White House. Second, Kaiser throughout compares U.S. policy toward Vietnam and Laos during the 1960s. Tragedy two is that the United States was able to pursue a policy of neutralization for Laos, but not Vietnam. Third, Kaiser argues that most people in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy were eager to pursue a military option in Vietnam, but were restrained primarily by a skeptical Kennedy. Tragedy three is that Johnson, less competent at and less interested in foreign policy than Kennedy, failed to expose the false assumptions of those who advocated war. Finally, Kaiser asserts that U.S. tactics were not likely to influence Vietnamese political actors. Tragedy four, then, is that U.S. political actors never understood Vietnamese history and politics.

Although only the last claim is uncontested by historians, the first three have long been posited. For example, Frederik Logevall's prize-winning, persuasive Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (1999) takes more seriously the role of foreign countries, but comes to similar conclusions about Johnson's responsibility for the war. Kaiser, however, claims to have written the “first treatment based upon a nearly complete documentary record” (p. 2). He has provided a wealth of details not readily available to most readers, thanks to the recently published Vietnam volumes in Foreign Relations of the United States and some documents he got declassified. Others, especially Logevall, with access to the same FRUS volumes and a slightly different set of recently declassified records, provide different details and persuasive interpretations.

Kaiser, referring to Leopold von Ranke and Thucydides, claims to want “merely to show how things happened in their own right” (epigraph before introduction). He does so by exploring the many plans, position papers, and studies produced by those making policy about Vietnam. This approach can be interesting, but readers will find it difficult, as Kaiser did, to know how to interpret this mass of paper. What does it mean that Kennedy, time after time, allowed his advisors to make plans for a militaristic solution to the problem they perceived in Vietnam, but never approved implementation of these plans? Kaiser concludes that Kennedy never intended to implement them. It is impossible to know, but perhaps Kennedy's continued acquiescence in the creation of plans led many in the administration to believe that it was merely a question of finding the right plan, the right moment, or the right justification.

Kaiser's book sometimes seems like a continuation of Vietnam-era arguments. He acknowledges that his military service during the Vietnam era, although not in Vietnam, motivated this study. Kaiser, more than most recent scholars of the war, wants to assign responsibility for the war as much as he wants to explain how and why it happened. In addition, he notes that ignorance of Vietnam's history and politics led U.S. officials to make ineffective, even dangerous policy. His study, however, suffers from the same flaw. Virtually all of his discussion of Vietnamese politics and
personalities is based on assessments by U.S. officials from the time. The growing literature by scholars trained in Vietnamese history and politics, and based on research in Vietnam, is represented in the footnotes only by William Duiker’s recent biography of Ho Chi Minh. The work of such scholars as Robert Brigham and Mark Bradley does not seem to have influenced Kaiser’s understanding of the conflict.

The comparison with Laos reveals how this lack of attention to Vietnam’s history undermines Kaiser’s conclusions. He presents Laos and neutralization as the path not taken. Here again, Logevall explores more fully the domestic and international context of the neutralization question for Vietnam. Military historian Timothy N. Castle also has demonstrated convincingly in At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (1993) that the United States was more involved in Laos than Kaiser suggests. Even if, however, the neutralization policy for Laos seems to have been more rational, Vietnamese and Laotian history suggests that these countries are not comparable. Southeast Asianists may debate whether Laos in 1954 was a modern nation-state, but Laos was a coherent political entity. In Laos, it was a question of who would lead a government which already had legitimacy. For South Vietnam, it was a question of creating a legitimate government. South Korea and possibly Taiwan would make better comparisons, and suggest the difficulties with neutralization.

Kaiser’s study is worth reading for scholars and students who are already familiar with the history and historiography of the U.S. war in Vietnam, for the new detail and provocative arguments. For those new to the study of Vietnam, however, the works of George Kahin, George Herring, Marilyn Young, and Frederik Logevall, to name only a few of many accomplished scholars, are a better place to start.

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ANNIE L. FOSTER


Just when it appeared that Richard Nixon had permanently made it back to a reasonable degree of respectability among historians and political commentators, Anthony Summers comes along with a muckraking, gossipy biography that goes well beyond any previous one-sided assaults against the man who dominated so much of American political life during the cold war. Summers is the BBC journalist who previously published sensational and quite controversial biographies of Marilyn Monroe and J. Edgar Hoover.

Whatever one may think of The Arrogance of Power, which was also the title of Senator J. William Fulbright’s most important book, Summers and his research team did their homework, which included a good deal of time in the several Nixon
archives in Washington, Laguna Niguel, and Yorba Linda, the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidential libraries, and over 1,000 interviews. Among those interviewed were John Ehrlichman, John Dean, George Schultz, Alexander Haig, Leonard Garment, and Johns Sears (Garment's recent choice for Deep Throat) from the administration, Nixon's brother Edward, and in an exclusive, Nixon's psychotherapist, Dr. Arnold Hutschnecker. Summers's documentation appears in forty pages of thick formal footnotes and also, in a curious practice, in over sixty pages of separate "source" notes for allegations not included in the footnotes. Needless to say, this is a bit confusing for the reader who must check on sources for the same page in two different places in the end material.

When the publication of the book made headlines around the world during the summer of 2000, journalists centered their attention around four, allegedly new, discoveries that Summers turned up after five years of digging for dirt. Publicity flacks for the investigative journalist trumpeted his findings concerning Nixon's use of drugs, his physical abuse of his wife, the activities of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on the eve of the resignation, and the Republicans' treasonous behavior just before the 1968 election.

Of the four revelations, only the first is new. Summers, who is constantly on the lookout for explanations for Nixon's pathological personal behavior, discovered that one of the president's friends, Jack Dreyfus, an ardent promoter of the drug dilantin, gave 1,000 pills to the president on at least two occasions. Dilantin, mixed with alcohol, of which Nixon was fond, could produce the violent mood swings about which many observers had previously commented. Summers, however, is unable to identify anyone who saw Nixon take the drug.

As for the wife-beating charge, his direct evidence is meager. That Nixon abused his wife in other ways, or at least frequently ignored her in public, is well-known. Previously, Seymour Hersh reported in a television interview that he had evidence that Nixon struck his wife on three occasions, but the not normally diffident journalist chose not to publish that information.

On political affairs, Summers offers a detailed account of what happened during the week before the 1968 election when Anna Chennault, working for the Republicans, urged South Vietnamese President Nguyen van Thieu to reject the deal Lyndon Johnson had constructed for opening serious peace talks with the communists. But the outlines of the story are well-known, with the major breakthroughs first appearing in Catherine Forslund's 1997 dissertation on Chennault, "Woman of Two Worlds," which the author used. Finally, the fact that Schlesinger claims that he instructed the military to ignore any peculiar orders coming from the White House during the week before the resignation is an old story.

Aside from these headline-grabbing items, the bulk of this hefty volume revolves around two themes, Nixon's and his friends' relationships with criminals and the president's cruel, mean, and often psychotic persona. On the first matter, beginning
in the California campaign, Summers links Nixon to mobsters, especially Mickey Cohen. Criminals allegedly participated in most of his political campaigns and also in helping him to launder personal funds and engage in suspicious financial enterprises. In most cases, his links are through shady individuals such as his political advisor, Murray Chotiner, and later, through his closest friend, Bebe Rebozo. Such links suggest as well a tie to Cuban gambling interests, one of the reasons why Cuba may have been, according to Schlesinger, an “obsession” (p. 162) with Nixon. Other historians have talked about the parallel careers of Nixon and John F. Kennedy, both of whom were navy veterans who entered Congress in 1946. Now, if Summers is to be believed, it was not just Kennedy who was linked to the mob and was obsessed with Cuba.

As in much of the book, Summers rarely finds a smoking gun. He does suggest that Nixon or Nixon confederates were most likely involved in some sort of criminal behavior on scores of occasions, but the evidence is almost always circumstantial. Summers is indefatigable in tracing obscure clues, especially through interviews, but not always with the most reliable sources. Nonetheless, with the amount of evidence presented and some of the logical deductions that he makes, Summers does make a reasonable case that Nixon’s path crossed on more than a few occasions with the “boys.” He is less convincing in making the case that these interactions had a direct influence on his political policies.

More important, perhaps, is Summers’s approach to Nixon’s mental health. If we are to believe his sources, Nixon was a very odd and unpleasant fellow throughout most of his political career. And Summers does his best to document every bit of irrational, paranoid, and even schizophrenic behavior, for which there is ample evidence, whether it is from Nixon’s own tapes or from his colleagues’ memoirs. There is no doubt, as many other historians have documented, Nixon was not as well-balanced an individual as Gerald Ford or Ronald Reagan. But to believe Summer’s depiction, a depiction that suggests a character far more unhinged than Anthony Hopkins’s portrayal in Oliver Stone’s film, one wonders how he ever could be such an effective politician. After all, when Nixon was reelected in 1972 in a landslide, it was not just dirty tricks and smoke and mirrors that won him the allegiance of such a large portion of the electorate. He was perceived by many to be a brilliant diplomatic strategist who also had put together a very active domestic program that made him the last liberal president. Summers’s unbalanced, pill-popping, martini-swilling Nixon could never have accomplished what he did had he been as hopelessly dysfunctional as the author suggests. He does refer to a “Jekyll and Hyde presidency” (p. 382), but the good Dr. Jekyll is rarely on the scene.

What we get with Summers is a juicy story of scandal, mental illness, and evil. Nixon haters will love it. As for historians, that is another matter.

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