Fragmented Nationalism:
Right-Wing Responses to September 11 in Historical Context

Nationalism has always been a central theme for the U.S. political Right, but different rightists have expressed and interpreted nationalism in sharply different ways. Right-wing movements have disagreed on key questions about nationhood: Whom does the nation include and exclude? Who or what threatens it? How should the United States relate to the rest of the world? What is the state’s role in building or protecting the nation?

The U.S. Right’s complex, divided response to the September 11, 2001, attacks embodied all of these disagreements. Neoconservatives and paleoconservatives, Christian rightists and Far rightists disagreed about what caused the attacks, how the federal government should respond at home and abroad, even about the legitimacy of the attacks themselves. Rooted in the distinct histories and nationalist philosophies of these varied right-wing factions, the debate reflected, above all, the U.S. Right’s fragmentation brought on by the end of the cold war, and the diverse ways rightists attempted to replace anticommunism as an overarching principle.

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1 Scholars have used many different terms to describe branches of the political Right. “Neoconservative” and “paleoconservative” are standard terms that are or have been widely used by members of these factions themselves. The Christian Right is often mislabeled the “Religious Right,” a term which obscures the existence of completely separate right-wing movements among religious Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and others. What I call the Far Right is often termed the “Extreme Right” or sometimes the “Radical Right.” I choose “Far Right” for the sake of consistency with my own earlier work. Portions of this article are adapted from Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort (New York, 2000); Matthew N. Lyons, “Business Conflict and Right-Wing Movements,” in Unraveling the Right: The New Conservatism in American Thought and Politics, ed. Amy E. Ansell (Boulder, Colo., 1998), 80–102; and Matthew Lyons, “Deportations Not Bombs,” Z Magazine, Jan. 2003, 36–40.
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon violently opened a new chapter in U.S. history and the history of American nationalism. Within days, President George W. Bush identified the attackers as members of al Qaeda, an underground Islamic Right organization headed by exiled Saudi Arabian millionaire Osama bin Laden, and proclaimed a far-reaching, open-ended “war on terrorism.” U.S. troops soon invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban, Afghanistan’s Islamic rightist rulers who had provided al Qaeda with a home base. In January 2002, President Bush shifted focus by proclaiming Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to be an “axis of evil” that sponsored terrorism and possessed or sought weapons of mass destruction with which to threaten the United States and its allies.\(^2\)

Reactions to September 11 within the United States included pervasive patriotic displays and a general upsurge in nationalism and nativism. Over the following months, human rights groups reported hundreds of incidents of physical violence, harassment, and threats against Arab Americans, South Asians, Sikhs, and other people perceived to be Arab. President Bush and other officials repeatedly spoke out against ethnic and religious scapegoating. Bush declared that “the enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends” and that “the terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself.”\(^3\)

At the same time, the Bush administration began a series of roundups of people from Middle Eastern and Muslim countries, many of whom were held secretly and under conditions that Amnesty International described as harshly punitive and in violation of basic rights. Most of the twelve hundred detainees in the first group were deported; almost none were charged with any crimes connected with terrorism. The federal government also instituted a series of new security measures that critics across the political spectrum denounced as serious infringements on civil liberties. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October 2001, created a vague new crime of “domestic terrorism” and gave the executive branch unprecedented latitude to conduct surveillance, share information


between criminal and intelligence operations, and detain and deport noncitizens without due process. To many opponents, these measures evoked the mass imprisonment of Japanese Americans during World War II and the political witch-hunts of the early cold war.4

Cold war themes echoed loudly in the dominant right-wing response to September 11. As John Fousek argues, the United States’ cold war foreign policy doctrine embodied a combination of three themes: national greatness, global responsibility, and anticommunism.5 President Bush’s speech of September 20, 2001, which summarized the case for a war on terrorism and set the stage for the invasion of Afghanistan, presented almost the same ideological package.

In his televised address to Congress, Bush expressed pride in his country’s greatness: “America is successful because of the hard work, and creativity, and enterprise of our people.” He asserted that the United States had been targeted for attack because of its democratic system and freedoms of religion, expression, and assembly. Invoking a U.S. responsibility to lead “civilization’s fight,” Bush declared that through the war on terror “we have found our mission” and that “the advance of human freedom now depends on us.” Echoing language once used against communism, he condemned the September 11 attackers as heirs to fascism and totalitarianism who “sacrificed life to serve their radical visions” and “abandoned every value except the will to power.” Just as cold warriors had once divided the globe starkly between the free world and the red menace, Bush now told the nations of the world, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”6

Many rightists embraced President Bush’s resurrected cold war vision. It expressed, above all, ideas formulated by the neoconservatives, who played key roles in shaping Bush administration foreign and military policy. Yet other rightists diverged from Bush’s line to varying degrees.

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5 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000), 8.

6 Bush, “Address to a Joint Session.”
Christian rightists generally supported the war on terrorism but condemned America's sinfulness in terms that called into question the concept of national greatness. Paleoconservatives denounced the war on terrorism and criticized claims of global responsibility as a cover for U.S. expansionism; at the same time, they demonized non-European immigrants as an immediate threat to U.S. security. Far rightists rejected loyalty to the United States altogether and, in many cases, applauded the September 11 attacks as righteous blows against an evil Jewish elite. In place of cold war ideology, these various factions offered alternative nationalist doctrines, all of which drew on themes older than the cold war itself.

This article traces the origins and dimensions of the U.S. Right's fragmented nationalist response to the September 11 attacks. Part I explores the debate's roots, showing how rightists gravitated toward three overlapping forms of nationalist ideology in the twentieth century: first racial nationalism, then business nationalism, and finally cold war nationalism, which largely subsumed the other two and gave the U.S. Right a degree of unity for several decades. Part II examines the development of four major right-wing factions after the cold war, emphasizing the different ways in which they reworked right-wing nationalist themes to address post-cold war circumstances in general and the September 11 attacks in particular. At issue here are not only the varied fortunes of different rightist factions in shaping public policy, but also the tensions and interplay among them.

I

U.S. nationalism has never been a unified ideology. Gary Gerstle argues that the interplay between civic nationalism, which defined the United States in terms of philosophical ideals of political freedom and economic opportunity, and racial nationalism, which conceived of America as "a people held together by common blood and skin color and by an inherited fitness for self-government," radically shaped U.S. history in the twentieth century. Both of these traditions, Gerstle emphasizes, were complex: racial nationalism could demand narrow Anglo-Saxon purity or celebrate a degree of (European) ethnic melding; civic nationalism

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could encompass struggles for social justice or campaigns to isolate and suppress those regarded as politically disloyal.

In a related approach, Cecilia Elizabeth O'Leary traces half a century of conflict over the meaning of "true patriotism" following the Civil War. "It was not until World War I, when the government joined forces with right-wing organizations and vigilante groups, that a racially exclusive, culturally conformist, militaristic patriotism finally triumphed over more progressive, egalitarian visions of the nation." This triumph, she adds, was soon contested once again by feminist, black, labor, and leftist movements, although some radical groups, such as the Industrial Workers of the World, disavowed patriotism altogether and professed working-class internationalism.

When we look at nationalism specifically within U.S. right-wing movements of the twentieth century, three major ideological currents stand out: racial nationalism, business nationalism, and cold war nationalism. Often interconnected, these three political strands grew or changed, and gained or lost prominence, in distinct ways over the course of the century.

Racial nationalism held that the United States was a nation of and for white people, i.e., those of exclusively European descent. In this view, America's national health required the defense of white people's physical and cultural purity against racial "pollution," and the subjugation, expulsion, or annihilation of "inferior" non-European peoples. Racial nationalism was often an expansionist ideology, and often portrayed the United States as a Christian nation sanctioned by God. These themes came together in the nineteenth-century doctrine of Manifest Destiny.

Racial nationalism was rooted in the system of racial oppression that originated in the seventh century with the first expulsions and mass killings of American Indians and the enslavement of African people. This

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system was periodically changed—notably with the abolition of slavery—and expanded to include white dominance over Mexicans, Asians, and other peoples of color, but remained a central facet of U.S. society. Beginning in the nineteenth century, as first Irish and then southern and eastern Europeans temporarily held subordinate and racially ambiguous status, some versions of racial nationalism defined the privileged group more narrowly, e.g., as white Protestants or northern Europeans.¹⁰

Racial conceptions of American nationhood have shaped political forces and institutions across the spectrum. Among twentieth-century right-wing movements, racial nationalism's high point was the resurgence of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1920s. Glorifying the original Ku Klux Klan of the Reconstruction era, the refounded Klan attracted millions of supporters in all regions of the country behind its ideology of white Protestant supremacy. The Klan vilified and sometimes physically attacked African Americans, Mexicans, Catholics, Jews, and immigrants if they were not subservient enough. It supported the 1924 Immigration Act, which shut out most Asians and southern and eastern Europeans. Within white Protestant society, the Klan championed religious piety and “traditional values” against the growing independence of young men and women and the rising commercialization of sexuality in popular culture.¹¹

Like many right-wing movements, the 1920s Klan not only defended traditional hierarchies but also spoke to its members’ sense of disempowerment and real grievances against elites. Often it promoted civic reform and challenged local elites in the name of “the plain people.” At a time when racism and nativism pervaded the white labor movement, the Klan sometimes aided strikes by white workers and even Socialist Party electoral campaigns. In addition, the Klan movement included an


autonomous women's organization, whose half-million members interwove racial and religious bigotry with calls to expand white Protestant women's social, economic, and political rights.12

Internal conflicts, leadership scandals, and lack of a clear program weakened the Klan and it quickly collapsed as a national movement. It continued in the South, without its antielite tendencies, as a vigilante wing of the local power structure, using threats and violence to enforce Jim Crow segregation and stifle political dissent.

The Great Depression of the 1930s spawned a new array of racial nationalist organizations influenced by European fascism. Some groups, such as Gerald Winrod's Defenders of the Christian Faith, added fascist trappings to an essentially conservative program of old-style racism, Protestant fundamentalism, and laissez-faire capitalism. In contrast, Father Charles Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice moved from liberal, pro-New Deal populism in 1934–1935 to full-blown fascism by the end of the decade. Initially, Coughlin presented himself as a friend of workers and advocated currency reform as a way to reduce economic inequality. At the same time, he was bitterly antileftist and targeted "parasitic" bankers while praising industrialists as "producers of real wealth"—a phony distinction historically linked to anti-Semitism. By the late 1930s, Coughlin attacked Jews openly and defended German Nazi policies. He envisioned a strong authoritarian state to stifle class conflict and enforce a new racial order. Even as he helped intensify right-wing anti-Semitism, Coughlin rejected Klan-style anti-Catholicism and nativism. Coughlin was himself a Catholic priest and his movement welcomed whites of many different ethnic backgrounds.13

In 1940–1941, U.S. fascists and fascist sympathizers were active in the broad coalition that opposed U.S. entry into World War II, including the America First Committee and other groups. This movement collapsed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States

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into the war.\textsuperscript{14}

After World War II, open anti-Semitism and, to a lesser extent, white supremacy were discredited by their association with Nazism. During the 1950s and 1960s, as the civil rights movement gathered strength, Citizens' Councils and various Klan factions helped lead a racist backlash that championed southern regional pride and defense of "states' rights" against federal interference, echoing themes from the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{15}

After the 1960s, some white-supremacist groups on the Far Right concentrated on physical violence, while others focused on electoral activism and propaganda. Far rightists were only intermittently able to build larger coalitions, but they emboldened more moderate political forces to scapegoat oppressed groups.

The civil rights movement and related antiracist initiatives of the 1950s–1970s did not end racial oppression in the United States, but they broke the back of open, legally sanctioned racial discrimination. As a result, much of the U.S. Right moved away from open racial nationalism with its explicit claims of racial superiority and inferiority. Many rightists turned to coded racism, scapegoating people of color implicitly through symbols such as welfare, crime, and immigration. Governor George Wallace of Alabama, a major champion of segregation, pioneered this tactic in his 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns, each of which attracted millions of votes. In addition, many rightists shifted away from biological racism toward a more sophisticated cultural racism, which allowed for the inclusion of a few people of color as long as they were loyal to dominant white values and beliefs. At the same time, explicit biological white supremacy and anti-Semitism remained strong in the paramilitary Far Right and related circles.\textsuperscript{16}

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The second right-wing nationalist current, business nationalism, was rooted in capitalist opposition to the New Deal of the 1930s. In 1935–1936, after two years of temporary relief measures to soften the Great Depression’s impact, the federal government began to establish a permanent system of welfare state policies, including unemployment and disability insurance, retirement benefits, minimum wage laws, tax reform, and limited support for labor unions’ right to organize. President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration also abandoned the U.S. government’s traditional policy of high tariffs to protect U.S. industries against foreign competition and initiated a series of reciprocal agreements with other countries to reduce trade barriers.

As Thomas Ferguson has shown, a new “historical bloc” of capital-intensive firms, investment banks, and internationally oriented commercial banks rallied to Roosevelt’s combination of welfare state and free trade policies. This “multinationalist” business bloc included firms that were internationally competitive, and thus wanted low tariffs to boost trade, as well as companies with relatively low labor costs, which were willing to cut a deal with the increasingly militant labor movement. The multinationalists began as the cutting-edge minority within the business community, grew in numbers after World War II, and formed a dominant bloc in U.S. politics for forty years.17

Multinationalists included a few Jews and Catholics, but most of them belonged to the white Protestant “Eastern Establishment” that dominated the most prestigious universities, foundations, and newspapers, as well as the foreign service. The multinationalists were oriented toward Europe; the British Empire was their model for a globally managed economy. They controlled both the national Democratic Party and the moderate wing of the Republican Party.

Business nationalists, based mainly in the Republican Right, bitterly opposed the multinationalists and the New Deal. The nationalist bloc within the business community included labor-intensive manufacturing

industries, which were especially vulnerable to labor unions, and large numbers of private or family-controlled firms committed to laissez-faire individualism and hostile to the federal government. The bloc also included companies oriented toward domestic markets or U.S.-dominated regions such as Central America and firms that wanted high tariffs to protect them against stronger foreign competitors.

For most business nationalists, national independence meant economic self-reliance. They wanted a free hand to exploit the home market; cheap, minimal government; and high tariffs to keep out foreign competition. They hated Britain, the main foreign competitor, and the Anglophile Eastern Establishment that advocated free trade and international alliances. Many of them feared a plot by Jewish bankers, communistic labor unions, and an anti-free enterprise Roosevelt administration. Isolationist with regard to Europe, business nationalists favored unilateral U.S. expansion into Latin America and across the Pacific into Asia.

Business nationalism was initially centered in the Midwest, later in the Sun Belt. It won support from midwesterners and westerners who resented the dominance of eastern politicians and banks and from ethnic groups disproportionately hostile to Britain or sympathetic to the Axis, particularly German, Irish, and Italian Americans. In 1940–1941, midwestern business nationalists spearheaded the America First Committee, the most prominent organization working to keep the United States out of World War II.

Like racial nationalism, right-wing isolationism was partly discredited by World War II, and it declined further as the United States entered the cold war against the Soviet bloc. After the 1949 Chinese Revolution, business nationalists turned toward a "rollback" military strategy of unilateral attack against communism, while multinationalists favored Truman’s more moderate "containment" strategy. Both factions supported the cold war crusade against leftists at home and abroad. But nationalist-affiliated politicians such as Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon also used the charge of communist conspiracy against representatives of the Eastern Establishment, particularly in the Anglophile State Department and related agencies. McCarthy denounced as communists "the whole group of twisted-thinking New Dealers [who] have led America near to ruin at home and abroad."18

After the defeat of McCarthy’s effort to purge eastern elite figures from government, business nationalists in and around the National Association of Manufacturers provided core support for an array of ultra-conservative organizations that moved from McCarthyism into even more grandiose conspiracy theories. The John Birch Society, for example, attacked the United Nations, the income tax, and all incursions by the welfare state or “world government” and alternated between isolationism and rollback in military affairs. Business nationalism also strongly influenced Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, which denounced the Rockefellers, low tariffs, and federal government efforts to end segregation. Goldwater’s business backing was confined almost exclusively to nationalists concentrated in the Sun Belt and the Midwest.

The third major strand of right-wing nationalism centered on the cold war itself. According to the cold war foreign policy consensus that emerged in the late 1940s, not only was the United States the greatest country in the world, but it stood for universal values of freedom, and it had a global responsibility to uphold these values and spread them to the rest of the world. This mission, furthermore, pitted the United States in a global struggle against what many regarded as the expansionist, totalitarian menace of international communism.

John Fousek calls this hybrid doctrine “American globalist nationalism.” The term “cold war nationalism” more clearly emphasizes its ties to a specific historical period. From 1947 until the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989–1991, it served as the overarching rationale for U.S. geostrategy under both major parties.

President Harry Truman’s Democratic administration—not the political Right—first formulated and promoted cold war nationalism. In his 1947 speech proclaiming the anti-Soviet strategy of containment, the president declared, “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our Nation.” The idea of America’s global responsibility reflected the multinationalist Eastern Establishment’s vision of the United States as leader of a global system. Yet by the 1950s, many former anti-interventionists on

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20 Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 189.
the Right, too, had embraced cold war nationalism. Given the Soviet threat, they argued, the United States could no longer avoid international alliances and overseas commitments.

The concept of America’s global responsibility to uphold freedom gained broad support, in part, because it tapped into deeply rooted ideas of national mission that reached back to Manifest Destiny and ultimately to the New England Puritans. Manifest Destiny sanctified the conquest of Mexico’s northern half and the systematic extermination of Native peoples. Cold war nationalism provided a justification for the expansion of U.S. military, economic, and political dominance worldwide.

In the name of protecting freedom, the United States supported or installed brutal dictatorships in numerous countries, mostly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Indonesia, for example, the U.S. government halted the Communist Party’s growing popularity by backing a 1965 military coup that murdered close to five hundred thousand people, according to the Indonesian government’s own conservative estimates. In this and other instances, the persistence of U.S. racial nationalism, and the assumption that people of color’s lives were more expendable than European lives, reinforced cold war doctrine in shaping U.S. foreign policy.

Sara Diamond draws a distinction between *anti-Communism*, meaning “opposition to Communist bloc states and real live Communists,” and *anticommunism*, which involved “a package of beliefs about the moral superiority of the United States, about the importance of protecting American lives above all others, and about the necessity of ensuring international order through military force.” Anticommunism, which tended to reduce all progressive movements to Soviet plots, involved viewing the world dualistically: “good guys versus bad guys; bright, true Americans versus dark, suspicious aliens and criminal elements.” These beliefs were central to cold war nationalism.

Cold war circumstances contributed to the decline of older nationalist doctrines. In the 1950s and 1960s, economic and political elites became

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21 Truman quote is from Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 8. On anti-interventionists embracing cold war nationalism, see Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 190; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 33.


more willing to accept growing popular demands for civil rights reform, in part because the United States was competing with the Soviet Union for support and influence among Africa and Asia's newly independent countries. At the same time, the United States' dominant position in the post–World War II capitalist world strengthened the multinationalist faction within the business community and weakened capitalist support for protectionism and other business nationalist themes.

As we have seen, however, both racial nationalism and business nationalism continued during the cold war, notably in the anti–civil rights backlash, the John Birch Society and related conspiracist groups, and the Goldwater and Wallace presidential campaigns. All of these movements, however, bolstered their arguments with cold war themes, portraying antiracist groups and welfare state reformers as communist tools or dupes.25

Conversely, the right-wing version of cold war nationalism incorporated themes from both business nationalism and racial nationalism. It rejected the New Deal legacy of social programs and government regulation, as well as newer civil rights reforms, as socialistic and un-American. Although often avoiding explicit racism, it treated cultural diversity as something that must be contained or suppressed. With a belief that America was threatened by enemies within and without, right-wing cold war nationalists promoted political and social conformism and the scapegoating of anyone they considered to be disloyal.

Cold war anticommunism brought together conflicting conservative factions and ideological tendencies. Economic libertarians emphasized individualism, market forces, and a sharply limited role for the state, while social traditionalists called for a strong state to enforce traditional morality and preserve existing social hierarchies. Anticommunism, which stood for both the capitalist market and obedience to authority, did not obliterate the differences between libertarians and traditionalists, but enabled them to join forces and see themselves as part of one movement. This conservative synthesis was known as “fusionism.”26

Right-wing ideological unity, fostered by fusionism and the cold war, powered both the Old Right of the 1950s and 1960s and the New Right


26 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 9, 29–31.
of the 1970s and 1980s. The Old Right emphasized anticommunism in both foreign and domestic policy and treated welfare state policies as a major target. New rightists retained these concerns. But rather than target popular New Deal programs such as Social Security, they focused on social issues such as abortion, education, homosexuality, and crime. With an aggressive mobilizing style, skillful organizing, and big increases in funding from a rightward-moving business community, the New Right helped send Ronald Reagan to the White House in 1980 and 1984 and gained direct access to the highest levels of government.27

Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue that the New Right gained mass support because it spoke to a far-reaching sense of national crisis that many people experienced in this period. This crisis reflected the emergence of “new social movements” in the 1960s, the resulting transformation of political culture (especially racial politics), economic dislocations of the 1970s and 1980s, and the erosion of U.S. global hegemony highlighted by the Vietnam War.28

The New Right addressed this crisis, in part, by reasserting so-called traditional values such as belief in the sanctity of Western European culture, private property, and the nuclear family. This reaction involved explicit and implicit attacks on efforts by subordinate groups such as women, gay men and lesbians, and people of color to win equal rights and status. The New Right also employed populist scapegoating, blaming supposed liberal elites for a host of social problems. And the New Right’s aggressive foreign policy appealed to many who feared a decline in U.S. global power.

Changes in the business community contributed to the New Right’s rise. During the 1960s and 1970s, rapid growth of the Sun Belt economy fostered a new crop of right-wing entrepreneurs deeply hostile to the eastern elite, concentrated in independent oil, real estate, finances, and other industries. Meanwhile, due to a variety of economic and political changes, many business multinationalists became increasingly hostile to the New Deal legacy. They began to call for cutbacks in government regulation and social programs, lower taxes, a rollback of labor union gains,


and a more interventionist foreign and military policy.\(^2^9\)

The New Right represented a coalition of secular anticommunists, newly mobilized evangelical Christians, militarists, libertarians, tax cutters, nativists, and other factions. The New Right was also allied with the neoconservatives, a group of former cold war liberal intellectuals who were alienated by 1960s social activism and George McGovern’s 1972 presidential candidacy.

Cold war nationalism held these various forces together. The Reagan administration abandoned New Right tax doctrine where it clashed with corporate subsidies, angered militarists who wanted an even more aggressive foreign policy, and frustrated Christian Right traditionalists by failing to outlaw abortion or restore prayer in public schools. But as a bloc, New rightists and neoconservatives supported the administration as it reintensified the cold war and sharply increased military spending. Members of different conservative factions worked closely with the Reagan administration to bolster antileftist military and paramilitary forces around the world, from Salvadoran and Philippine death squads to Nicaraguan contras and Angolan UNITA rebels.\(^3^0\)

Cold war nationalist unity did not survive the cold war. The U.S. Right had sought to roll back communism for decades. In 1989, when the Soviet bloc actually began to disintegrate (and President Reagan left office), the conservative coalition fell apart. As the Reagan coalition splintered, three main centers of right-wing ideology emerged: neoconservatives, paleoconservatives, and the Christian Right. These forces, along with a resurgent Far Right, do not encompass all of the Right, but illustrate the range of right-wing approaches to nationalism in the post–cold war period.

II

In some ways, neoconservatives seemed unlikely candidates to become the leading voice of right-wing foreign policy. For much of their history, neoconservatives coexisted uneasily with older rightist factions. Many neocons were former liberal Democrats who only gradually abandoned


\(^{3^0}\) Ferguson and Rogers, *Right Turn*, 120; Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, 214–26, 237–41.
their support for the welfare state. Many were former socialists or Trotskyists who brought an Old Left polemical style to conservative politics. Many were Jews or Catholics—both groups with not-so-distant memories of discrimination. While much of the Old Right had leaned toward nativism and coolness toward Israel, neocons were staunchly pro-Zionist and often favored open immigration policies. Contrasting neoconservatism with other rightist currents, Gary Dorrien describes it as "a vehemently conservative ideology that accepts no guilt for reactionary movements of the past. [Neoconservatives] oppose feminism, affirmative action, and multiculturalism without the baggage of a racist and nativist past." Neoconservatism's roots were cold war nationalist—not racial nationalist or business nationalist.31

Neocons celebrated the United States as a land of individual opportunity and meritocratic fairness. They praised American capitalism as a system culturally and spiritually superior to all other systems. During the cold war, they promoted anticommunism as a transcendent moral crusade, a world-historical struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. After the Soviet bloc's collapse, they looked for new targets in order to revive the United States' sense of national mission and global responsibility.

The neoconservatives were a small network of professional intellectuals, not a political movement. Their influence depended on winning elite patronage, not on organizing a popular base. In the 1970s, the neocons forged links with national security elites and, along with the emerging New Right, profited from growing business support for conservative activism. In the 1980s, neoconservatives such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and William Bennett held important positions in the Reagan administration. In addition to their own publications such as Commentary and later the Rupert Murdoch–owned Weekly Standard, neocons built influential roles within older conservative bastions such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution, the National Review, and the Wall Street Journal. They also gained leading positions in the Olin Foundation and the Bradley Foundation, two important conservative funding sources.32

During the 1990s, neocons developed strategic proposals for asserting

U.S. global dominance. A 1992 Pentagon paper coauthored by neocons Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby argued that the United States should use its military power to “deter . . . potential competitors from ever aspiring to a larger regional or global role” and to preempt other countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In 1997, neocons William Kristol and Robert Kagan cofounded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) to “promote American global leadership.” Criticizing the Clinton administration’s “incoherent policies,” PNAC’s founding document urged a return to “a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity” and proclaimed “America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”

PNAC embodied the neoconservatives’ close ties with economic, political, and military elites. In addition to neocons such as Abrams, Bennett, Libby, Wolfowitz, and Midge Decter, signers of the PNAC founding statement included Florida governor Jeb Bush, media mogul Steve Forbes, and two hawkish former defense secretaries: Dick Cheney, CEO of the oil services firm Halliburton Company, and Donald Rumsfeld, also in private industry. Another signer was Christian Right leader Gary Bauer. PNAC project directors included investment banker Lewis Lehrman and Bruce Jackson, a vice president at defense contractor Lockheed Martin and a former military intelligence officer.

Despite their elite connections, the neoconservatives’ aggressive vision placed them at odds with much of the foreign policy and military establishment, which wanted the United States to exert world power through a pragmatic, managerial approach in collaboration with other industrialized countries. Both George Bush senior and Bill Clinton mostly followed the establishment foreign policy line. Bush’s 1991 war against Iraq over its invasion of Kuwait raised neocons’ hopes. But rather than overthrow


Saddam Hussein’s government, as neocons urged, both Bush and Clinton pursued a policy of “containment” against Iraq, including air strikes and economic sanctions that resulted in hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths but left the Iraqi government in place. In 1999, neocons supported Clinton’s war against Yugoslavia, even in the face of Republican congressional opposition, but criticized his conduct of the war as half-hearted and inept.1

The neoconservatives’ political fortunes improved dramatically after the 2000 presidential election. George W. Bush’s choice of Cheney as vice president and Rumsfeld as secretary of defense placed two close allies of the neocons in top patronage positions. Neocons in Bush’s administration included Wolfowitz as deputy defense secretary, Libby as Cheney’s chief of staff, Douglas Feith as undersecretary of defense for policy, and David Frum as Bush’s speechwriter. The attacks of September 11 helped the neocons and their allies overpower the foreign policy pragmatists within the administration, represented above all by Secretary of State Colin Powell.36

To neoconservatives, the war on terrorism filled the void left by the end of the cold war. “On September 11,” wrote Charles Krauthammer, “American foreign policy acquired seriousness. It acquired a new organizing principle: We have an enemy, radical Islam . . . and its defeat is our supreme national objective, as overriding a necessity as were the defeats of fascism and Soviet communism.”37

In the wake of September 11, neocons presented an idealized portrait of the United States: united, determined, virtuous, and strong. “At the moment,” wrote David Tell in the Weekly Standard, “America fairly


36 Hardisty, “Some Mid-Year Thoughts.”

vibrates with an almost tribal sense of identity, a fraternal concern that can barely be contained. We know exactly who we are. And we love ourselves as we should and must. We are all thinking the same things, and reaching the same conclusions." America's strength, neocons argued, was rooted in its commercial values of individual initiative, hard work, ambition, and reward for merit. "Never mistake our prosperity for sloth," warned Richard Poe, a columnist for neocon David Horowitz's *FrontPage Magazine*. "The zeal with which we peddle Big Macs can be a dreadful thing when turned to the bloody business of war."\(^{38}\)

Despite their own role as professional intellectuals with privileged access to the circles of power, neocons castigated U.S. critics of the war on terrorism as elitist intellectuals who sneered at ordinary Americans. To the neocons, any effort to contextualize the September 11 attacks in relation to the United States' long history of military intervention and support for oppressive regimes was simply an expression of hatred for America. They dismissed as groundless any concern about the human costs of bombing Afghanistan, nativist attacks against Middle Easterners and South Asians in the United States, or growing domestic repression associated with the war on terror.\(^{39}\)

From the beginning, neoconservative aims for the war on terrorism went far beyond the destruction of al Qaeda. In October 2001, Max Boot argued that the United States should depose Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, regardless of whether the Iraqi government was implicated in the September 11 attacks, since he was "currently working to acquire weapons of mass destruction" that would eventually be used against America. A PNAC open letter signed by many leading neocons shortly after the attacks urged President Bush to bring military pressure against Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and cut off all aid to the Palestinian Authority unless it immediately stopped all anti-Israeli terrorism based in its territory.\(^{40}\)

As during the cold war, neocons argued that the United States had a mission to spread capitalist democracy across the globe. Some neocons

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openly presented this as a program of imperial conquest, such as Max Boot in an article entitled “The Case for American Empire”: “Afghanistan and other troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodphurs and pith helmets.”

Despite such visions of a new White Man’s Burden modeled after the European example, neocon comments about Europe were generally negative, based on a perception that many current-day European intellectuals were critical of the U.S. role in the world. “Europeans,” wrote David Brooks, “simply can’t remember what it’s like to be imperially confident, to feel the forces of history blowing at one’s back, to have heroic and even eschatological aspirations.” Once, multinationalists had looked to Europeans as partners in enforcing collective security; now, to neoconservatives, Europeans were has-beens who should stay out of America’s (unilateralist) way.

Brooks’s words evoke Gary Dorrien’s comment that one of neoconservatism’s distinctive features is a “tendency to invest its political beliefs with absolute ideological or even religious significance.” Neocons celebrated the war on terrorism as a cosmic struggle between Good and Evil—in Charles Krauthammer’s words, “a transcendent conflict between those who love life and those who love death.” True to their disavowal of ethnic and religious bigotry, neocons endorsed President Bush’s repeated statements that Islam and Muslims were not the enemy. Yet they demonized “radical Islam” as the embodiment of pure evil, and described the war on terrorism as a manichean struggle between the civilized West and Middle Eastern barbarians.

David Brooks presented one of the most extraordinary elaborations of this type of demonization in his portrait of “bourgeoisophobes”: those who hated America and Israel as the chief exemplars of commercial success. Bourgeoisophobia, Brooks argued, was rooted in a mixture of snobbery, envy, pessimism, anti-Semitism, and nihilism. Its adherents included Islamic terrorists and European intellectuals, leftists such as Karl Marx and W. E. B. Du Bois, liberals such as Arthur Miller and Michael Moore, race theorists such as Houston Chamberlain and Arthur de

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Gobineau, and even conservative pessimists such as Robert Bork and Allan Bloom, both of whom were often grouped with the neocons. In other words, bourgeoisophobes included virtually everyone who disagreed with Brooks’s celebration of America, all supposedly linked in a shared belief system. This type of sweeping guilt-by-association logic was reminiscent of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s 1950s smear campaigns which had threatened neoconservatism’s own forebears among cold war liberals.\textsuperscript{44}

The neoconservatives’ hawkish rhetoric resonated with many other conservatives. The Heritage Foundation, one of the core New Right institutions founded in the early 1970s, and one of the earliest to forge ties with the neocons, continued to support an interventionist foreign policy after the end of the cold war. In the fall of 2001, Heritage Foundation policy analyst Kim Holmes urged “a systematic and comprehensive war against all forms of international terrorism,” including the overthrow of the Afghan and Iraqi governments and threats of force against Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. The Heritage Foundation also called for looser restrictions on cooperation between the military, intelligence agencies, and law enforcement; and investigation of immigrants who overstayed their visas for possible terrorist activity. Yet Heritage warned that to stop all immigration, as some rightists urged, “contradicts the free and open nature of America’s democracy.”\textsuperscript{45}

Other rightists, too, echoed neoconservative themes. William F. Buckley, National Review editor-at-large and one of the founders of conservative fusionism, responded to the World Trade Center attacks by urging the United States to invade Iraq and seize Baghdad. Buckley commented that “From now on, enemies who are associated with terrorist activity will not cohabit the globe with the United States of America.” Columnist Ann Coulter declared that “This is no time to be precious about locating the exact individuals directly involved in this particular

\textsuperscript{44} Brookes, “Among the Bourgeoisophobes.”

terrorist attack,” and that those responsible included “anyone anywhere in
the world who smiled” in response to the mass killings. To deal with such
enemies, Coulter urged, “We should invade their countries, kill their leaders
and convert them to Christianity.” Jeffrey Hart wrote of the war on
terrorism, “A lot of people are going to die. We should make sure that
most of them are not Americans.”

If the neoconservatives and their allies responded to the Soviet bloc’s
collapse by trying to recreate cold war nationalism, the paleoconservatives
took the opposite approach. “All the institutions of the Cold War,” Patrick
Buchanan declared, “from vast permanent U.S. armies on foreign soil, to
old alliances against Communist enemies that no longer exist, to billions
in foreign aid, must be re-examined.” Paleoconservatives wanted, instead,
to revive business nationalism and a semiveiled racial nationalism.
Evoking conservative positions going back to the 1930s, they promoted a
noninterventionist foreign policy, ethnic monoculturalism, traditionalist
Christian morality, and a complete end to government social programs.
They called for protectionist trade barriers and attacked President George
Bush senior as a representative of the globalist eastern elite. While
disavowing ethnic bigotry, paleocons portrayed dark-skinned immigrants
as a threat to American civilization and denounced the power of a Zionist
lobby in terms that played into classic stereotypes of Jews as a hidden,
superpowerful presence.

Paleocon bastions included the Ludwig von Mises Institute, the
Rockford Institute, the Independent Institute, and the journal
Chronicles. Some paleoconservatives were veterans of the Old Right
whose core beliefs had never changed. Others were New Right activists
whose politics shifted under post–cold war circumstances. Former
Heritage Foundation policy analyst Samuel Francis reversed his aggres-
sive interventionism when African and Latin American national insur-
gencies no longer loomed as “Soviet-sponsored terrorists”—and when he
began to see non-European immigration and racial mixing as greater

46 William F. Buckley, “War on Saddam Hussein,” Ann Coulter, “America Welcomes Its
2001, 4, 27, and 17.
47 Buchanan quote is from Patrick J. Buchanan, “Why I am Running for President,” Human
threats to U.S. security. Buchanan, a journalist who worked in both the Nixon and Reagan White Houses, abandoned his longtime support for free trade when he confronted Bush senior in the 1992 Republican primaries.\(^{48}\)

Paleocons resented neoconservatives' influence within the federal government and decried a neocon "takeover" of rightist think tanks and foundations. In 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and President Bush massed troops in Saudi Arabia, the staunchly pro-Zionist neocons loudly supported war with Iraq. Paleocons portrayed the drive toward war as a Zionist plot. Buchanan, for example, charged that "the Israeli Defense Ministry and its amen corner in the United States" were the only groups pushing for war. He opposed military preparations until actual combat began in January 1991.\(^{49}\)

Despite its roots in the 1930s Right, paleoconservatism was not simply a throwback to a dead political era. It spoke to current-day fears and resentments among a broad sector of white Americans, who were angered both by the power of economic and political elites above and the erosion of their own privileges over traditionally oppressed groups below. The paleocons—and related movements such as the Patriot movement—expressed a backlash against several developments: recent social liberation movements, growing state power, and economic dislocations connected to globalization, such as declining real wages and the shift of industrial jobs from the United States to the Third World.

Tapping these resentments, paleoconservatives contributed to several important post–cold war political developments. In the 1990s, paleocons such as Sam Francis and Chronicles editor Thomas Fleming helped lead a resurgence of mass-based racial nationalism in the form of anti-immigrant campaigns and a neo-Confederate movement. Buchanan's 1992 and 1996 presidential campaigns garnered a third of the vote in many Republican primaries. Mixing anticitorporate rhetoric with scapegoating of immigrant and foreign workers, Buchanan and his supporters forged ties with the antiglobalization movement's liberal wing, including


\(^{49}\) Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 286–88.
labor union leaders and Public Citizen founder Ralph Nader.\textsuperscript{50}

Paleocons also influenced the rise of the Patriot movement, which feared that secret elites behind the federal government were plotting to impose tyrannical world government on the United States. Sections of the movement organized armed militias to thwart the expected crackdown and formed so-called common law courts that claimed legal authority and dismissed U.S. courts as corrupt and unconstitutional. Although spurred partly by genuine government repression, such as the 1993 destruction of the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, the Patriot movement was pervaded by apocalyptic conspiracy theories and specious constitutional arguments. Many Patriot activists claimed that all constitutional amendments after the Bill of Rights were invalid, including those that abolished slavery and gave women the right to vote.\textsuperscript{51}

The Patriot movement was strongest in the Midwest and West and appealed particularly to white working-class and middle-class men hurt by corporate restructuring. The movement peaked in 1996, when 858 identified groups were active, militia members were estimated in the tens of thousands, and supporters and sympathizers, by one estimate, numbered up to five million. After that the movement declined rapidly: by 2000, only 194 units were active.\textsuperscript{52}

Several factors contributed to the Patriot movement’s collapse. The militias were widely blamed for the 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, although convicted bomber Timothy McVeigh was a neonazi with no direct ties to the militias. After the Oklahoma City bombing, fear of violence and increased law-enforcement pressure drove many moderate activists out of the Patriot movement, even as Far rightists provided new recruits. Factional clashes between moderates and neonazi sympathizers tore apart some Patriot groups. Many activists were diverted into Republican electoral politics or other initiatives such as the campaign to impeach Bill Clinton. With a core constituency that was largely rural and downwardly mobile, and no significant elite support, the Patriot movement’s access to funds and other political resources was limited. The movement failed to build durable institutions and could not sustain the apocalyptic fervor that fueled its explosive growth when the expected

\textsuperscript{50} See Berlet and Lyons, \textit{Right-Wing Populism}, 282–84, 338–40.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 287–304.

dramatic confrontation with federal tyranny failed to take place.  

Buchanan's presidential campaigns rode much the same wave of populist nationalism that buoyed the Patriot movement. In 1992, he criticized Bush senior's vision of a new world order and condemned "the predatory traders of Europe and Asia" who threatened American industry and jobs. In the 1996 primaries, Buchanan intensified his populist rhetoric against "unfettered capitalism": "What's good for General Motors is not good for America if General Motors has become a transnational corporation that sees its future in low-wage countries and in abandoning its American factories." Buchanan's effort to build a power base for paleoconservatism suffered with the Patriot movement's collapse. In addition, most Christian Right leaders, who shared Buchanan's positions on many social issues, did not support his campaigns, because they were building their own base within the Republican Party and did not want to alienate the party's establishment.

At the same, Buchanan's economic protectionism, military anti-interventionism, and to some extent his anti-Zionism alienated potential business support. Some capitalists still endorsed business nationalist policies, but in an era of globalization and free trade orthodoxy, such support was far more limited and sporadic than it had been in the 1930s.

In 2000, Buchanan left the Republican Party and won the Reform Party presidential nomination after a bitter struggle with other party factions. Racial nationalist groups such as the Liberty Lobby rallied to Buchanan, who tried to deflect charges of racism by expelling a number of campaign staffers and choosing Ezola Foster, a black conservative activist, as his vice-presidential running mate. Buchanan received only four hundred thousand votes (0.43 percent) in the general election, sparking infighting among paleocons over whether he had betrayed the cause.

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Thus, at the time of the September 11 attacks, paleoconservatives were in an isolated position. They held no significant positions in George W. Bush’s administration. Yet their influence could be felt indirectly: President Bush sometimes played to economic nationalist constituencies with rhetoric about protecting U.S. “food security” and “industrial security” against foreign imports and even imposed new tariffs on imported steel. And the paleoconservatives’ anti-interventionism was echoed by several related sectors of the Right, such as the John Birch Society, the Libertarian Party, and groups focused on promoting white racial identity.

Unlike most conservatives, paleocons regarded the September 11 attacks as a predictable response to the United States’ own brutal crimes overseas. To protect itself against future terrorist attacks, they argued, the United States must end its policy of global military intervention. “Who has reason to hate this country?” asked Joseph Sobran rhetorically. “Only a few hundred million people—Arabs, Muslims, Serbs, and numerous others whose countries have been hit by U.S. bombers.”

Paleoconservatives portrayed the September 11 attackers as rational enemies, not evil nihilists, and they ridiculed claims by President Bush and neoconservatives that the United States was targeted because it stood for freedom and democracy. Buchanan retorted, “Osama bin Laden did not convince 19 educated young men to simultaneously commit suicide in defiance of freedom of assembly.” The issue, he stressed, was U.S. foreign policy, not our system of government. “As Osama bin Laden said, they want us to stop propping up the Saudi regime they hate, and to get off the sacred Saudi soil on which sit the holiest shrines of Islam.”

Paleocons wanted the United States to be (as Buchanan titled one of his books) “a republic, not an empire.” They were horrified by neoconservative rationalizations for imperialism, such as occupying other countries in order to win them to democracy. Joseph Sobran wrote, “the United States is now a global empire that wants to think of itself as a universal benefactor, and is nonplussed when foreigners don’t see it that way.” Buchanan commented, “only naivete would expect an occupied country to

57 Barry and Lobe, “U.S. Foreign Policy.”
thank rather than revile us."\(^6^0\)

In their denunciations of U.S. militarism and imperialist expansion, paleoconservatives sometimes resembled leftist critics of the war on terrorism. Such resonances were evident, for example, on the paleoconsponsored Antiwar.com Web site. A few war opponents, such as left-wing columnist Alexander Cockburn, even called for an alliance between leftist and rightist anti-interventionists. Yet most leftists were deeply hostile to the paleoconservatives' racial nationalism, antifeminist and antigay politics, and authoritarian tendencies.\(^6^1\)

Like many rightists less critical of Bush's war, paleoconservatives opposed the expansion of federal authority to spy on U.S. citizens. They saw serious threats to civil liberties in such measures as the USA PATRIOT Act and the short-lived TIPS program (Terrorism Information and Prevention System), which would have recruited millions of civilians to report on "suspicious" activities.\(^6^2\)

At the same time, paleoconservatives tended to support repressive security measures against non-U.S. citizens. They called for the racial profiling of Middle Eastern men to screen potential terrorists and endorsed President Bush's plan to try noncitizens suspected of terrorism in special military tribunals where basic constitutional protections would be absent. Looking far beyond the government's mass round-ups of Middle Easterners and South Asians, paleos demanded an immediate halt to all immigration and deportation of all undocumented immigrants.


Justin Raimondo, editorial director of Antiwar.com, was a senior fellow at the Center for Libertarian Studies, adjunct scholar at the Ludwig von Mises Institute, and a staunch supporter of Pat Buchanan. See Raimondo, "Behind the Headlines," Antiwar.com, http://www.antiwar.com/justin/justincol.html.

Sam Francis warned that “a vast subculture of non-Western immigrants” allowed terrorists to move freely within the United States. He declared that “Islam, a great and in many respects admirable faith, simply is not part of [the West], and those who subscribe to Islam and its civilization are aliens.”63

The paleocon-neocon debate involved strange reversals. Paleocons expressed open ethnoreligious bigotry yet portrayed Islamic militants as having legitimate grievances against the United States, while neocons, supposedly free of a nativist heritage, painted these militants as demonic, irrational killers. Similarly, while paleocons have usually been identified with isolationism or unilateralism, after September 11 neoconservatives urged unilateral action while paleocons stressed the need to build alliances with Arab and European states and warned that war with Iraq could leave the United States truly isolated.

To varying degrees, other sectors of the conservative Right echoed paleoconservative arguments after September 11. Some shared the paleocons’ critique of U.S. foreign policy. A larger number supported or were silent about U.S. interventionism but agreed with the paleoconservatives about the expansion of police powers within the United States. Anti-immigrant groups thrived on the upsurge of nativism and racism that followed September 11. The neo-Confederate movement, too, benefited from the post–September 11 climate.64

The Libertarian Party and the John Birch Society, both relatively isolated factions within the Right, supported focused military retaliation against the al Qaeda network but urged an overall shift to noninterventionism. The Birch Society argued that the United States must not become “further enmeshed in entangling alliances abroad” and that the Bush administration undermined U.S. sovereignty by seeking United Nations approval before bombing Afghanistan, rather than getting a congressional declaration of war as the Constitution required.65

Libertarian Party commentator Mary Ruwart traced the September 11 attacks to U.S. policies such as stationing troops in the Middle East, giving aid to Israel, blockading Iraq at the cost of hundreds of thousands of children’s lives, and funding and training Osama bin Laden to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Harry Browne, the Libertarian Party’s 2000 presidential candidate, asked on the day after the attacks, “When will we learn that we can’t allow our politicians to bully the world without someone bullying back eventually?” He predicted that the government’s response to the attacks would include a loss of freedoms for Americans. In response to those who would call his criticisms unpatriotic and un-American, Browne asked, “When will we learn that without freedom and sanity, there is no reason to be patriotic?”

Phyllis Schlafly’s Eagle Forum, an important New Right group, applauded the Bush administration’s military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, as well as Bush’s demand that other countries choose sides in the United States’ war on terror. But like the paleoconservatives, the Eagle Forum warned that the administration’s domestic antiterrorism measures were too harsh on U.S. citizens and too lenient on noncitizens. Schlafly’s organization denounced plans to create a national I.D. card, use army troops in domestic police work, or give police broad new powers to spy on citizens, such as those enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act. Instead, Schlafly urged, the United States should immediately halt all immigration for at least one year, deport all “illegal aliens,” expand the Border Patrol and back it up with soldiers, require all noncitizens to carry an I.D. card, and sanction airlines to use racial profiling when boarding passengers. Schlafly denounced the growing numbers of documented immigrants as “mostly people from non-Western countries who don’t share our respect for the Rule of Law and don’t learn how to speak English.”

The Free Congress Foundation (FCF) also agreed with the paleoconservatives in part. FCF (originally the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress) was one of the core New Right think tanks founded in the early 1970s and was headed by Paul Weyrich, arguably the number one architect of New Right political strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. Weyrich criticized the USA PATRIOT Act as a dangerous expansion of the police state and an unconstitutional attack on citizens' rights, and FCF compared it to past civil liberties abuses such as the World War II mass internment of Japanese Americans. At the same time, FCF warned that the United States faced a "real war" along its southern border: a Mexican "war of reconquest" waged by "millions of illegal immigrants flooding into California and other states." Like the paleocons, the FCF considered it a top priority to restore the dominance of traditional Western (white Anglo) culture in the face of rising multiculturalism and moral decadence.

While the paleoconservatives stressed social traditionalism, the Christian Right successfully used it to build a mass movement. Conservative evangelical Christians formed the bulk of the New Right's activist base in the 1970s, and over the following two decades Christian Right groups mobilized an ever-widening circle of religious activists, from Baptist fundamentalists to Pentecostals and charismatics to right-wing Catholics. Christian rightists warned that liberal and morally corrupt elites were engaged in a secular humanist conspiracy to destroy traditional values. Their core agenda was to reassert rigid gender roles, male dominance, and compulsory heterosexuality.

For Christian rightists, questions of nationalism were grounded in their belief that the United States was a Christian nation. This idea had been a component of racial nationalism, business nationalism, and some...

versions of cold war nationalism; the Christian Right made it central and elaborated it in the doctrine of dominionism, which said that Christian men were called by God to assert control over a sinful secular society. Dominionist ideology was pioneered and disseminated by hard-line groups such as the Chalcedon Institute, which advocated comprehensive theocratic rule. For a pragmatic majority of Christian rightists, represented by big organizations such as Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition, Concerned Women of America, and the Family Research Council, dominionism meant gaining a measure of power within the existing political order.

Of the four post-cold war right-wing factions examined here, the Christian Right was one of only two to achieve major political influence, and the only one to build a sustained mass movement. Several factors contributed to this success. The Christian Right primarily drew in prosperous Sun Belt suburbanites who were relatively well positioned to attract sympathetic media attention and exert political pressure. With financial help particularly from rightist Sun Belt entrepreneurs, Christian Right leaders built a large, well-rooted infrastructure of local, state, and national organizations, think tanks, and lobbying groups, as well as international media empires that were both powerful and lucrative. In addition, leading Christian Right groups carefully tailored their politics to channel popular grievances without cutting themselves off from elite support.

The Christian Coalition, founded by televangelist Pat Robertson in 1989, illustrates the movement's success at organizing. In 1987–1988, the Christian Right was rocked by highly publicized sex scandals involving leading televangelists Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart, followed by Robertson's loss to George Bush in the 1988 Republican presidential primaries. Many predicted that the movement was finished. But building on Robertson's campaign organization and media empire and the huge grassroots constituency of conservative Christians, the Christian Coalition enrolled hundreds of thousands of members within a few years. Unlike the earlier Moral Majority's national direct-mail approach, the Christian Coalition focused on local organizing, and by 1995 it claimed 1,425 local chapters. And while the Moral Majority appealed mainly to Baptists, the Christian Coalition also recruited many charismatics, Catholics, and others.71

Following the New Right coalition's breakup in the late 1980s, the Christian Coalition leadership pursued an ideological balancing act between the paleoconservatives and other factions. They echoed paleocon rhetoric about an elite globalist conspiracy threatening U.S. sovereignty, but, at least at the leadership level, sided with the neocons on issues of trade and military intervention. In the 1992 and 1996 Republican presidential primaries, Robertson supported moderate conservatives George Bush senior and Robert Dole, respectively, not paleocon Pat Buchanan.

As a rule, Christian rightists considered non-Christian belief systems to be illegitimate if not downright evil, and they tended to promote Western civilization as superior to all other cultures. But Christian rightists worked harder than paleocons to protect themselves against charges of ethnoreligious bigotry, reaching out to politically conservative Jews and calling for "racial reconciliation" with people of color.

Unlike the anti-Zionist paleoconservatives, most Christian Right organizations strongly supported the Israeli state and especially Israel's political Right. This stance was rooted in apocalyptic theology, not concern for Jews. Most Christian rightists believed that a strong Israel hastened the millenial End Times in which all except true followers of Christ would be destroyed. Nevertheless, pro-Zionist politics helped draw the Christian Right and the neoconservatives closer together, and the latter generally tolerated anti-Semitism among their Christian Right allies.

The Christian Right encompassed a range of doctrines and strategies. Starting in the 1980s, a clandestine wing of the movement targeted abortion providers with threats, vandalism, arson, bombings, and several assassinations. Some members of this wing, which was rooted in hard-line theocratic doctrines, also supported or helped to build the Patriot movement and armed militias in the 1990s. A much larger section of the Christian Right was active in electoral politics, lobbying, and grassroots propaganda work. Christian rightists did not seize control of the Republican Party, though the Christian Coalition tried in the 1990s, but became a large and powerful faction within it. In 2001, the Christian Right's most prominent and powerful representative in the Bush administration was Attorney General John Ashcroft, the son of a Pentecostal minister. Its influence was also reflected in the administration's strong

opposition to abortion rights and sexual health education,\textsuperscript{74} and in President Bush's frequent use of religious language to explain his policies.

In the wake of September 11, many Christian rightists declared that the attacks happened because the United States had turned away from God. The anti-abortion rights group Operation Save America (formerly Operation Rescue) asked, "How much more of our heavenly Father's wrath must we experience before we turn to our offended Lord and confess and repent of the sin of shedding innocent blood (abortion)."

Televangelist Jerry Falwell said that gays and lesbians, abortion providers, and liberal advocacy groups helped to secularize America and thereby helped let the attacks happen. Other Christian Right leaders criticized Falwell for being divisive but implicitly agreed with him. Robertson, for example, backed away from Falwell's comments but still asserted that groups that "strip religious values from our public square" helped to "take away the mantle of divine protection" that keeps America from harm. Embarrassment caused by these remarks contributed to Robertson's resignation as president of the Christian Coalition in December 2001.\textsuperscript{75}

Most Christian Right groups supported President Bush's call for a war on terrorism. But while Bush spoke unambiguously of America as a bastion of freedom, justice, and moral strength, Christian rightist rhetoric shifted uneasily between America the virtuous and America the sinful. Family Research Council president Ken Connor declared that "family, faith, and freedom . . . are the eternal verities, the bedrock virtues on which our American civilization stands." But in the same article he warned that "We cannot ask the nation's young men and women to go forth into danger merely to defend a grasping consumerism [or] the right of pornographers to exploit women and children [or] so that the innocent unborn can continue to be slaughtered in abortion clinics."\textsuperscript{76}


Some Christian rightists took advantage of the post-September 11 climate of fear to intensify their harassment of abortion providers. In October and November 2001, when anonymous mailings of anthrax spores to federal officials caused widespread fear of bioterrorism, women's health clinics received hundreds of hate letters that contained an unknown powdery substance. Many of these letters were signed by the “Army of God.” Anti-abortion activist Clayton Waagner, who had publicly threatened to kill abortion providers, later admitted to sending more than 550 of the letters and was indicted on federal charges.\textsuperscript{77}

On the issue of state repression, Christian rightists were divided. The American Center for Law and Justice, founded by Robertson, supported the USA PATRIOT Act and military tribunals, and Falwell's \textit{National Liberty Journal} published an article endorsing looser rules on FBI surveillance. However, the Rutherford Institute, a Christian Right legal advocacy group, declared that the USA PATRIOT Act “pushes aside the Bill of Rights in favor of granting the federal government sweeping new powers to investigate and detain anyone deemed a threat to national security.” Many Christian rightists, such as Ken Connor, expressed dismay that one of their own, Attorney General John Ashcroft, was helping to lead the expansion of federal police power.\textsuperscript{78} These tensions reflected the conservative Right’s longstanding ambivalence about government repression.

There was also a degree of complexity in Christian Right statements regarding Islam. Some groups condemned Islam without hesitation. The American Center for Law and Justice declared simply that “If Christianity is true then Islam cannot be.” The Chalcedon Institute’s Mark R. Rushdoony warned that “Islam is a dangerous religion primarily


because it is a false one.” Rushdoony claimed that Islam (unlike Christianity) had promoted forced conversion, slavery, prostitution, sexual debauchery, treachery, despotism, oppression, and murder. President Bush was “avoiding the root of the problem” when he praised Islam and denounced only its radical adherents. 79

Other Christian Right groups took a more nuanced approach to Islam. Focus on the Family’s Citizen magazine published a series of relatively informative articles by Mark Hartwig about Islam and Osama bin Laden. Hartwig noted that “Muslim opinion is not uniformly in favor of bin Laden—not is it uniformly anti-American,” and quoted a fatwa by the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia condemning the September 11 attacks. Summing up an analysis of the concept of jihad, Hartwig concluded, “Christians should not accept the sweeping claim that Islam is a religion of peace. There’s just too much contrary evidence. On the other hand, Christians shouldn’t jump to the conclusion that their Muslim neighbors are bomb-toting fanatics: Even Muslims who believe in militant jihad don’t necessarily like violence. Instead of fearing or hating Muslims, Christians should view them in light of our duty to preach the gospel.” 80

A few Christian Right commentators recognized similarities between their own critiques of American society and those of Islamic militants. A Focus on the Family article entitled “Understanding Islamic Fundamentalism” observed: “Citing pornography, materialism, and a high divorce rate, radical Muslims see the United States as a failed Christian nation. One scholar observed that Muslims ‘would respect the U.S. much more if we did not separate God from governance.’” Joel Belz, in an article in the Protestant fundamentalist magazine World, condemned the September 11 attacks as “a monstrous kind of evil” far beyond America’s own sins. Yet he quoted an Islamic fundamentalist, an embassy driver in New York City, as applauding the attacks with the words “The Americans have forgotten that God exists.” Belz commented, “How strange that an Islamic fundamentalist might explain the problem with the very same


diagnosis offered by a typical American evangelical—but still mean something so very different.” Belz himself described the World Trade Center as a symbol of America’s “false deities,” including materialism, secularism, and pluralism. “Babel needed just one tower; New York built two.”81

Christian rightists such as Belz might hint that the World Trade Center deserved to be destroyed, but many Far rightists declared it openly. This position traced back to major changes in the Far Right that began shortly before the end of the cold war. Starting in the early 1980s, most white-supremacist groups abandoned Ku Klux Klan-style segregationism in favor of neonazi doctrines that called for a racially pure New Order. With segregationism permanently defeated and a powerful New Right distancing itself from open racism, Far rightists increasingly abandoned loyalty to the United States, arguing that the country was hopelessly controlled by a secret Jewish elite. The Far Right remained small and politically marginalized, yet its doctrines and creative tactics influenced a much larger array of rightist initiatives.

Two main branches of the Far Right emerged. Cryptofascists such as Willis Carto of the Liberty Lobby and political cult leader Lyndon LaRouche pioneered electoral strategies that used a veneer of antielite conservatism to mask their authoritarian agendas. The most successful practitioner of this approach was former Klan leader David Duke, who won a seat in the Louisiana state legislature and the Republican nominations for U.S. senator in 1990 and governor in 1991. Although Duke lost both the Senate and governor’s races, he received a majority of white votes statewide in both campaigns. Paleocons Sam Francis and Pat Buchanan, in turn, heralded Duke’s opposition to affirmative action, welfare, school busing, and immigrants of color as a model for conservatives, and shaped their own political work partly after his example.82

At the same time, more militant groups such as Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus, and White Aryan Resistance openly rejected the legitimacy of the U.S. political system and promoted paramilitary strategies. They called for the creation of a racially pure white homeland in the Pacific Northwest or the complete overthrow of the “Zionist Occupation


82 Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 272.
Government” (or “ZOG”) in Washington. In the 1980s, federal agencies cracked down hard on the Order, an armed offshoot of Aryan Nations that “declared war” on the U.S. government, and the Justice Department brought conspiracy indictments against a number of neonazi leaders. This marked a sharp turnaround from the 1970s, when the FBI had helped certain Far Right groups bomb, kidnap, and assassinate leftist activists.83

The Far Right’s big advance came in the 1990s, with the brief explosion of the Patriot movement and its paramilitary wing, the armed citizens militias. Fascists did not control the Patriot movement, but the movement allowed them to break out of political isolation more than any development since the America First anti-intervention campaign of 1940–1941. Neonazi ideas circulated widely among Patriot groups, helping to frame the discussion for large numbers of politically engaged people alienated from the established order.

In the late 1990s, the Patriot movement shrank into a small, hardened core. This increased neonazis’ role within the movement but cut them off once again from more moderate activists. The Far Right suffered more setbacks in 2001. In July of that year, the Liberty Lobby, a leading disseminator of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories since its founding in the late 1950s, dissolved itself as a result of financial mismanagement. Also in 2001, Aryan Nations, a major center of the 1980s neonazi revival, was forced to sell its Idaho compound and headquarters after being ordered to pay millions of dollars in damages to a woman and her son attacked by the group’s security guards.84

Neonazi groups benefited, though, from the outpouring of conspiracy theories and anti-immigrant racism that followed the September 11 attacks. The Southern Poverty Law Center, a human rights group, reported increases in the number of active neonazi groups and Web sites from 2000 to 2001, as well as a big jump in shortwave radio programming by hate groups.85

85 “The Year in Hate.”
Unlike many of those who scapegoated immigrants, however, neonazis refused to rally behind the U.S. government or embrace American patriotism. Their loyalty was not to the United States but to the Aryan race. Edgar Steele, former attorney for the Aryan Nations, wrote: “America is Jewish controlled now, at all levels. America IS the Jews.” Posse Comitatus, a self-appointed “law enforcement” group that repudiated all government authority above the county level, called on Far rightists to “sit back and watch the death throws [sic] of this Babylonian beast system.”

Far rightists were hostile to patriotic displays and calls for national unity. A. V. Schaerffenberg in the NS [National Socialist] News Bulletin commented, “No amount of chauvinistic cheers, jingoistic rhetoric or solemn vows to rebuild the obliterated buildings can bring back their dead, sacrificed on the altar of America’s self-defeating Near East policy.” Schaerffenberg was disgusted by media images of white people and people of color, Jews and non-Jews coming together in a time of crisis: “We’re all Americans now! Ugh!” Responding to calls for ethnic and religious tolerance from President Bush and other leaders, Christian Identity minister and former Klan leader Thomas Robb commented, “Remember tolerance is an act of Satanic worship because Satan is the god of tolerance. He has no absolutes of right and wrong. Satan loves everybody! … But we are taught by Jesus Christ to be intolerant.”

Far rightists were split between opponents and supporters of the September 11 attacks. Some neonazis condemned the hijackings, which they blamed on the United States’ “slavishly pro-Israeli foreign policy” coupled with lax immigration rules. Matt Hale, leader of the neopagan World Church of the Creator, declared: “4000 people died because Israel uses America as a ‘human shield’ . . . September 11th wouldn’t have happened if the corrupt traitors in Washington D.C. didn’t bankroll the terrorist state of Israel and didn’t allow Arabs into the country in the first place.” Posse Comitatus urged, “It is time to make those strangers in the land know under no uncertain terms that they are not welcome here. BOYCOTT ALL business’s [sic] not owned and operated by White Europeans! Let’s let them know that we DO NOT want them in our


Christian Republic.”

Others saw an Israeli plot behind the September 11 attacks. Aryan Nations blamed the World Trade Center attack on “the Ruling Elite, the Jews: i.e., Mossad, the so-called New World Order,” and called it a move “to further enslave us in a total police state.” David Duke claimed that Israeli intelligence had “deeply penetrated” al Qaeda and helped engineer the attacks in order to win more U.S. support against Arab and Muslim opponents. He repeated a widely circulated fiction that thousands of Israelis working at the World Trade Center received prior warning of the September 11 attack and stayed away from work that day.

A number of Far Right groups, however, applauded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which they saw as targeting Jewish power, and praised the hijackers’ courage and self-sacrifice. Bill Roper, deputy membership coordinator of the National Alliance, a leading neonazi group that advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government and extermination of Jews, people of color, and white “race traitors,” wrote: “The enemy of our enemy is, for now at least, our friends. We may not want them marrying our daughters, just as they would not want us marrying theirs. We may not want them in our societies, just as they would not want us in theirs. But anyone who is willing to drive a plane into a building to kill jews [sic] is alright by me. I wish our members had half as much testicular fortitude.”

Neonazis’ admiration for al Qaeda reflected more than momentary approval. Organizational ties between Western fascists and Islamic rightists went back to the 1930s, based on shared hatred of Jews, communists, the British Empire, and (later) the United States. By the 1990s, European neonazis had built extensive links with both religious and secular Middle Eastern rightists. After the September 11 attacks, a number of Muslim newspapers published anti-Jewish hate pieces by American fascists such as David Duke and National Alliance head William Pierce.

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90 “Reaping the Whirlwind.”

In broader terms, sections of the U.S. Far Right sought to build alliances with militant right-wing anti-imperialists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as with rightist black and Latino organizations within the United States. In the 1980s and 1990s, for example, both the Lyndon LaRouche network and Tom Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance forged active ties with Louis Farrakhan’s Nation of Islam. In conjunction with these efforts, some neonazis moved from racial-supremacist ideology toward a racial separatism that envisioned separate monocultural societies coexisting alongside each other. This trend was particularly notable among advocates of “Third Position,” a neonazi doctrine that denounced capitalism as well as communism and called for a revolutionary white working-class movement to (in Metzger’s words) “take the game away from the left.” In the period after the September 11 attacks, some antifascists regarded Third Position as the most dangerous form of neonazi politics in the long run, because of its potential to preempt egalitarian leftistm as a voice of mass insurgency.\(^2\)

The September 11 crisis and the war on terrorism highlighted and intensified divisions within the U.S. Right. On core questions of nationhood—foreign and military policy, domestic security and repression, and even fundamental loyalty—different factions of the Right took diametrically opposing positions. Even when rightists agreed on specific questions, their motivations or underlying assumptions and priorities often differed. Christian rightists joined neoconservatives in supporting the war on terrorism and an interventionist foreign policy, but while many neocons described U.S. capitalist culture in rigidly upbeat terms, Christian rightists included materialism and consumerism in their critique of America’s “sinfulness,” and some criticized the Bush administration’s growing power to repress U.S. citizens. Paleoconservatives and neonazis opposed U.S. expansionism, vilified immigrants of color, and scapegoated Israeli Jews in terms that often sounded similar, but paleocons wanted to rebuild the American republic, while neonazis wanted to dismantle or overthrow it.

Of the four factions, the neoconservatives have most heavily influenced the federal government’s response to September 11. True to their

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92 Don Hamerquist, et al., Confronting Fascism: Discussion Documents for a Militant Movement (Chicago, 2002), 34–40; Berlet and Lyons, Right-Wing Populism, 269.
cold war nationalist roots, the neocons saw a chance to rally Americans behind another global crusade against evil. Their strident response gave voice to the fear and national pride that millions of Americans felt after September 11, and won favor with important sections of the political and economic elite.

Yet the neocons' lack of an organized popular base leaves them heavily dependent on elite backing. In addition, their program of open-ended, unilateral conquest in the name of spreading democracy is both expensive and risky. The program's potential effects on the United States include skyrocketing military budgets, wrecked international alliances, crippled civil liberties, an open-ended stream of military casualties, a popular anti-American backlash across the Middle East, and more September 11–style attacks on U.S. civilians. Should such costs become too high, the neocons could rapidly lose their elite patronage, high-level appointments, and ability to shape U.S. nationalism.

The Christian Right, to the extent that it has embraced the neocons' global crusade, shares some of the neocons' vulnerability. But the Christian Right is a mass movement, with millions of participants organized at all levels, from prayer groups to national mailing lists, and a broad funding stream largely beyond external control. Leading Christian Right groups have been skillful at borrowing populist rhetoric, while working as a conventional power bloc within the Republican Party. The movement's ambivalence about U.S. culture speaks to many conservative Christians' sense of dissatisfaction with the existing order, but in a way that does not substantively challenge established power relations.

By contrast, Far rightists and paleoconservatives have been shut out of power, both before and after September 11. Both neonazis and the more moderate racial nationalists associated with the paleocons have benefited from the rise in ethnic scapegoating and violence that followed the World Trade Center attacks, but modest growth has not translate into significant political gains. That could change, however. Both paleoconservatives and Far rightists tap into political undercurrents that run deep in sections of white America. The Patriot/militia movement's brief explosion in the 1990s indicated a broad reservoir of anger—anger at losing privilege and status over traditionally oppressed groups below, and at disempowerment by massive bureaucratic institutions, both public and private, above.

Paleoconservatives' mix of business nationalism and racial nationalism address that popular anger in a way that might still win broad support.
The paleocons offer a telling critique of expansionist militarism and rising state repression, coupled with anti-immigrant scapegoating and a general celebration of traditional social hierarchies. If the neocons' global crusade runs into trouble—for example, if substantial numbers of U.S. troops begin dying overseas—the paleocons could benefit.

The neonazis' potential for broad support is more limited for the foreseeable future. Their anti-Semitic and white-supremacist views are more explicit than those of the paleocons, they call for more sweeping sociopolitical change, and they stand apart from the American patriotic consensus. However, Far rightists have a history of pioneering political slogans, tactics, and strategies that more moderate rightists have then copied, and this pattern of indirect influence might well continue.

Right-wing nationalism did not speak with one voice either before or after September 11, 2001. The Right's internal divisions and nationalism's multilayered history have blocked the effort to restore the nationalist consensus of the cold war era. Yet fragmented nationalism is also a mark of the U.S. Right's strength. The ability to address hopes and fears, prejudices and grievances in a shifting variety of ways has long contributed to the Right's political success and durability.

The Historical Society of Pennsylvania