lution, evangelism, and urban growth threatened it. Hessinger contends that it was through the struggles to control and direct youth that the middle class forged its defining cultural attributes: meritocracy, chastity, domesticity, conscience, and respectable piety. In their attempts to win over youth, adults, paradoxically, often adopted the very strategies of self-interest, competition, and materialism that they spoke against. He shows, for example, that moral advice literature aimed at tempering the quest for individual gain in young men held out the promise of economic success as a reward for making proper moral choices. Likewise, anti-masturbation texts sought readers by employing erotically charged language.

Hessinger is at his best when he deviates from his strict cultural-history format by bringing young men and women into the story as actors, as he does in his discussion of control over antebellum college life. Here, one can see the interplay of youth and their would-be reformers and gauge the power granted to each in Hessinger’s analysis. At times, however, the choice to focus this study on ideas leaves one wondering how important adults’ concerns over youth really were and what impact they had on the lives of young men and women. The study also overemphasizes the early national and antebellum era as the genesis of the trends he traces. Concerns over courtship and the intellectual development of the importance of self-control and self-regulation for the middling classes were not new in the early nineteenth century, nor do they need to be for Hessinger’s argument to hold up. Greater attention to the eighteenth-century intellectual history of Philadelphia would have allowed him to explain with greater precision why these ideas were particularly salient in antebellum Philadelphia.

Nevertheless, Seduced, Abandoned, and Reborn succeeds in making an important contribution to our understanding of antebellum bourgeois culture and the dialectical power plays enacted by its youth and their elders.

University of Maryland

CLARE A. LYONS

Harry, Tom, and Father Rice: Accusation and Betrayal in America’s Cold War.
By JOHN HOERR. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. xii, 311p. Illustrations, notes, index. $29.95.)

Two of the three protagonists of this triple biography, Thomas J. Quinn and Charles Owen Rice, are well-known to historians of post–World War II Pittsburgh. The third, however, was completely forgotten in both history and memory until the appearance of this book. Harry J. Davenport (1902–77) was the author’s uncle. From 1948 to 1950 he was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, having won by nearly ten thousand votes as a New Deal Democrat in a district whose boundaries were drawn up to be safely Republican. At the time, Representative Davenport may have had higher name recognition
than Tom Quinn and Charles Owen Rice combined.

What are these three men doing between the covers of the same book? Tom Quinn was an intelligent and talented trade union activist in the United Electrical Workers, which in the late 1940s was the third largest CIO union, with over five hundred thousand members nationwide, and a powerhouse in the Turtle Creek Valley, located just east of Pittsburgh and home of Westinghouse Electric and Westinghouse Air Brake. Quinn and the UE helped get Davenport elected in 1948. Father Rice had already established himself as Pittsburgh’s leading labor priest. Harry Davenport was exactly the kind of politician on whom liberal and pro-labor Americans of the time counted to undo the handiwork of the reactionary Eightieth Congress. All three were thus key Pittsburgh players in a political and social movement to broaden and deepen the New Deal in postwar America.

By Election Day 1950, however, any chance that such a movement had to become a permanent force was shattered by the cold war. Starting in 1949 and continuing throughout the 1950s, Tom Quinn was called before investigating committees three times. His union was driven out of the CIO. As a national leader of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, Father Rice played a crucial role in the effort to drive Communists and fellow travelers out of the labor movement and cooperated with the FBI, though Hoerr notes that “it was never clear how much information he gave or received” (p. 100). Harry Davenport lost his bid for reelection in 1950. He refused to go to bat for Quinn and the UE when they came under attack. Indeed, Davenport voted in 1949 to continue funding for the House Un-American Activities Committee. As payback, the UE refused to support his reelection campaign in 1950.

Quinn and Rice were survivors. Rice’s militant support of the civil rights movement and his equally militant opposition to the Vietnam War reestablished his progressive credentials. The end of Quinn’s ordeal came in 1959 when he categorically denied under oath being a Communist and his inquisitors could not prove otherwise. He went on to have a distinguished career, first as a UE official and later in the 1970s and 1980s as head of the Pennsylvania State Bureau of Mediation.

But Harry Davenport’s life was ruined. Never again was he elected to any public office. His earlier professional talents in the field of advertising atrophied. His marriage fell apart. A few stints as a political consultant all ended in electoral defeat for his clients. He died a completely unnoticed death in a flophouse in the Pittsburgh suburb of Millvale in 1977.

John Hoerr tells the story brilliantly and modestly. His history detective work to uncover the life of Uncle Harry is superb. His grasp of the industrial, political, and cultural history of mid-twentieth-century Pittsburgh is unrivaled.

Hoerr’s even-handed approach will not suit everyone. Some will think that he is too soft on Father Rice, despite his characterization of Rice’s subsequent apologies for his anticommunist activities as a “strange combination of remorse,
regret, and [an] extensive—though not complete—repudiation” (pp. 248–49). Others will think that Hoerr is too soft on Quinn and places too much emphasis on Quinn’s denial that he was a Communist, despite his conclusion that “Quinn was, indeed, guilty of associating and working with Communists on union matters, [and] of belonging to a union with Communist leaders” (p. 218). My own view is that by going far beyond serving as a “loyal opposition” to the pro-Communist UE leadership, forcing the UE out of the CIO, and setting up the rival International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), Rice and his allies gravely weakened trade unionism in the electrical industry and elsewhere. I agree fully with Hoerr’s observation that “much of the accusatory activity and accompanying suffering should never have occurred” (p. 249).

Is there a cautionary tale struggling to get out of this book? Whether one reads it for its putative lessons or as an account of a past long gone and unlikely ever to return, *Harry, Tom, and Father Rice* is a magnificent achievement that deserves the widest audience.

*University of Pittsburgh*  

**Joseph White**


“A man could campaign half his life in Pennsylvania and still not know what he’s doing.” So observed George Wallace during his 1972 presidential campaign. Had Wallace had access to *Elections in Pennsylvania*, he may have been less mystified. Likewise, Governor Leader might have revised his recipe for political success: “speak on anything as long you’re against gun control, the Court’s decision on school prayer, and Philadelphia.”

Jack Treadway has analyzed a massive amount of data on legislative, congressional, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections from 1900 through 1998, placed that analysis in a historical context, and drawn several conclusions regarding electoral behavior. Some are not new. It will come as no surprise that “despite the dramatic political transformations . . . the state has always retained a Republican bias” (p. 199). Nor will it shock many to learn that marginal incumbents have been more likely than safe incumbents to lose. The value is not in the conclusions themselves, but rather in the quantitative methods Treadway has applied to demonstrate their validity.

Other conclusions are more intriguing. Democrats’ recent inability (until this past election) to dominate in statewide elections despite a four hundred thousand registration advantage is a good example. Treadway has found that “both parties’ mean share of the vote was less than their mean share of registered voters when