Anxious Hospitality:  
Indian “Loitering” at Fort Allen,  
1756–1761

Of the many occupations Benjamin Franklin pursued during his storied life, one of the least acclaimed was that of frontier fort builder. Franklin’s achievements in philosophy, politics, diplomacy, and science are so significant that his contributions to defending Pennsylvania during the late-1750s Delaware Indian uprising have paled in comparison. But given the unexpected developments at Franklin’s Fort Allen, it is fitting that it was planned and built by an individual known more for his diplomatic legacy than his martial expertise. Constructed as part of a chain of defensive outposts to protect Pennsylvania’s towns and cities from Indian threats, Fort Allen instead became a diplomatic way station, a moderately successful trading post, and even a drunken watering hole. In fact, the fort became many things, but it never really fulfilled its original purpose in Pennsylvania’s frontier defense plans. Like other forts scattered throughout British North America, Fort Allen’s mission...
was defined not only by those who planned and built it, but also by its occupants and visitors. Fort Allen was not exceptional in this regard. It does, however, provide an excellent example of how the collision of provincial military imperatives, backcountry settlement ambitions, and Native American cultures helped define and complicate an outpost’s mission.

Much of the tension that defined Fort Allen’s brief existence on the northern slope of Pennsylvania’s 150-mile-long Blue Mountain ridge stemmed from its frequent Indian guests. Situated astride the Lehigh River near a vital passage through the ridge, the fort was sure to attract native passersby. It was especially well placed as a stopping point for Indian diplomatic visitors to the Lehigh Valley towns of Easton and Bethlehem. During such visits, native travelers expected the full hospitality of the fort’s garrison and commandant, as they would of any hosts throughout Indian country. Thus, Fort Allen became a native diplomatic checkpoint and resting place, a dramatic shift from its original role as a frontier base for punitive expeditions against belligerent Delawares. With hundreds of Indians visiting each year, and with a garrison that never exceeded one hundred men and seldom exceeded fifty, it is understandable that Indian visitors helped define the identity and nature of the small wooden stockade. Meant to reassure local settlers and to bring stability to the liminal geography that divided the upper Susquehanna River Indian country and British Pennsylvania, Fort Allen produced unexpected and ironic results. Instead of keeping Delawares away from the Blue Mountain region, it attracted them. Instead of regulating unscrupulous British traders, the fort helped bring them a ready, native customer base. Fort Allen ultimately became an Indian place as well as an English one, and the most famous resident was not Franklin or some other provincial celebrity, but rather the renowned Delaware chief Teedyuscung. Colonial exigencies and anxieties merged with native notions of hospitality and reciprocal obligation at Fort Allen, producing a place of anxious hospitality for both Europeans and Indians.1

1 Fort Allen has received scant historical attention as a cultural contact point. The most complete history of the fort is William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753–1758* (Harrisburg, PA, 1960), 233–59. For an older and less analytical account, see H. M. Richards, “The Indian Forts of the Blue Mountains,” in *Report of the Commission to Locate the Site of the Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania*, eds. Richards et al. (Harrisburg, PA, 1896). See also Charles Morse Stotz’s valuable illustrations and description in *Outposts of the War for Empire: The French and English in Western Pennsylvania: Their Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749–1764*, 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh, 2005), 106–7. For descriptions of the political and social contexts in which Fort Allen was built, see Holly
DANIEL INGRAM

For many Pennsylvanians, Northampton County in the mid-1750s might have seemed like a place of both promise and tension. Rapid demographic expansion and ethnic and religious diversity characterized the region. Indeed, Northampton County itself was relatively new, as were many of the towns south of Blue Mountain. A boom in town building had created a minor white population explosion in the Blue Mountain region after 1730, though most of this settlement was located west of Reading and the Schuylkill River. In Northampton County, the principal towns were the new county seat of Easton, founded by Pennsylvania’s proprietary Penn family in 1752, and the German Moravian spiritual capital of Bethlehem, established in 1741. Easton lay at the fork of the Delaware and Lehigh rivers, about sixty miles north of Philadelphia. It was a planned town, similar in design to recently established Reading, laid out in a grid pattern surrounding a central square. The strategic spot had been settled since the 1730s, and the town already had hundreds of inhabitants at its founding, including English, Scots-Irish, and German immigrants. Though Easton’s position at the fork of two major waterways made it a natural trade center for goods moving into Pennsylvania from New Jersey, it would take several decades for the town to find commercial success.

Twelve miles to the west lay Bethlehem, another planned town with about six hundred residents. But Bethlehem’s planning concerned its society as well as its shape. Its population was ordered into “choirs” divided by gender, age, and marital status as part of a utopian, communal “General Economy” designed to maximize social and spiritual education. In contrast to Easton’s polyglot ethnic population, Bethlehem’s was relatively homogeneous: Moravian, German-speaking, communal, and almost uniformly literate. From Bethlehem one could travel west, past small settlers’ farms, toward the towns of Northampton and Reading, or northeast to

Bethlehem’s sister town of Nazareth, about ten miles distant. Or, a traveler could take the northern path parallel to the Lehigh River and head toward the river’s water gap through the stony face of Blue Mountain. Thirty miles north of Bethlehem, on the north side of the ridge, lay Gnadenhütten, the most important of several Moravian–Indian mission towns scattered throughout the region.²

Gnadenhütten was probably the most ethnically diverse community in Northampton County. Established in 1746 as a home for the Moravians’ Mahican refugee–converts from New York, the town quickly became a center of Moravian and native activity. The town provided separate sections for its German, English, Mahican, and Delaware inhabitants. Its idyllic setting and tidy town plan and architecture probably did make it feel like the “little sylvan utopia” described by historian Anthony F. C. Wallace, except when its frequent European and Indian visitors complicated the town’s communal idealism. Gnadenhütten’s Christian Indian townsfolk did not abandon their kinship ties or friendships with Indians throughout the region and far beyond. As a result, both Christian and non–Christian Indians made Gnadenhütten their home, or at least a regular resting place. Because of its location at a vital pass through the mountains, the site hosted itinerant traders and Indians from many backgrounds. A visitor unfamiliar with Gnadenhütten might be surprised to find a diverse multiethnic crowd gathered around a Moravian “love-feast,” listening to sermons extolling vividly the glories of Christ’s blood, or enjoying a trombone recital given by resident Brethren. As the anchor of the Moravian mission towns, Gnadenhütten figured prominently in the order’s proselytizing efforts. But with the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, both the mission towns north of Blue Mountain and white settlements to the south would feel the sting of decades–old Delaware–white animosities.³

The Seven Years’ War began in 1754 with Virginia’s inability to


remove expansionist French forces from the forks of the Ohio and Monongahela rivers in western Pennsylvania. This immediately imposed crises of allegiance upon Indian groups from the Delaware River to the Great Lakes. The Delawares themselves, British allies and supposed tributaries of the Six Nations Iroquois, were quickly disappointed with Lieutenant Colonel George Washington's blunders at Fort Necessity in 1754 and General Edward Braddock's disastrous expedition into the heart of Pennsylvania in 1755. Besides failing to challenge the French establishment of Fort Duquesne, Braddock further alienated Indian allies by arrogantly refusing their help and repeatedly insulting them. Many Delawares' allegiances to Pennsylvania were already stretched thin by years of frustrating diplomatic encounters with provincial officials, Iroquois envoys, and fearful, suspicious white settlers, all while trying to maintain the European trade upon which they had come to depend. By 1755, Britain and Pennsylvania had displayed only a pitiful lack of power and a total inability to protect their friends from the French and their native allies. Several Delawares responded by striking out in anger against their best targets of opportunity: the white settlers scattered throughout the Pennsylvania backcountry. In 1755 and 1756, Delawares raided white farms and settlements both north and south of Blue Mountain. Fearful traders refused to journey into the Susquehanna region. Trade ground to a halt, further infuriating belligerent Indians and impoverishing many others. Unable to do anything about the French threat in the Ohio Valley, Pennsylvanians now faced an uprising of their closest neighbors.4

As Susquehanna-region Delawares grew increasingly attached to French interests and threatened British settlements, those Delawares still allied with Pennsylvania requested that forts and trading posts be constructed near the multicultural Susquehanna towns of Shamokin and Wyoming to guard and supply those increasingly important population centers. In this sense, they found common cause with Pennsylvania's white settlers south of Blue Mountain, who also petitioned the province repeatedly for forts and troops to protect them against real or rumored Indian threats. Pennsylvania's remaining Delaware allies would be disappointed. The province was not yet willing to fund military outposts deep in Pennsylvania's interior in 1755. However, escalating Indian attacks forced the assembly to consider providing frontier fortifications and

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troops to protect white settlements closer to Philadelphia. Northampton and Berks counties’ small towns and farms, perched precariously between Philadelphia and the Blue Mountain ridge, lacked sufficient arms and experienced military leaders to organize effective local militias. Panic and rumors spread quickly throughout the frontier, inflaming settlers’ anti-Indian animosities. By November 1755, both white settlers and “friend” natives were demanding greater provincial protection and a resumption of trade in the Blue Mountain region. As events would have it, one of the first forts to be built would serve both constituencies, albeit unexpectedly.⁵

Of immediate concern to the inhabitants of Easton and Bethlehem were reports of unfamiliar Indians near Gnadenhütten. Reports from the town’s native inhabitants and Moravian missionaries that Delawares would soon attack the settlement sent waves of fear throughout the region. Gnadenhütten’s Indian converts had long been a source of suspicion for Delawares living in Pennsylvania’s interior, as they saw the Christian Indians as being too closely allied to English settlement ambitions and too eager to reject native for European culture. Gnadenhütten’s residents took the rumors and warnings seriously and planned to take refuge in Bethlehem until the danger passed, but tragedy struck before they could evacuate their village. On November 24, 1755, a large band of French-allied Munsee Delawares attacked Gnadenhütten, killing several inhabitants and partially burning the village. By attacking the mission town, the Munsees hoped to demonstrate their ability to kill English allies and thwart provincial plans quickly and easily. Local white settlers began fleeing their homes and farms for the larger towns south of the mountains. Munsees attacked Gnadenhütten again on January 1, 1756, after a provincial company under the command of Captain William Hays arrived to protect the townspeoples’ corn stores and remaining property.

Twenty of Hays’s seventy-two men died in the attack and more deserted after fleeing the town, reducing the company to only eighteen men. Gnadenhütten itself was burned. The defeat of Hays’s troops sent the region into full-blown panic. On January 3, a handful of Indians attacked settlers near Allemangel, a few miles from Gnadenhütten, and set the entire population of seventy people fleeing for their lives over Blue Mountain. With backcountry tensions at the breaking point, Philadelphians feared that these attacks on a peaceful mission town would bring the Delaware uprising into the populated heart of the province.6

If Gnadenhütten’s attackers had hoped to drive a wedge between Christian Indians and their European friends, they must have been disappointed by the results. Terrified and impoverished by the loss of their village and with few options open to them, Gnadenhütten’s Delaware and Mahican residents sought refuge among the Moravians in Bethlehem and assured Governor Robert Morris of their loyalty to Pennsylvania and Britain. Morris commended the refugees and promised that they would receive aid commensurate with their status as full citizens of Pennsylvania. He also promised to build and garrison a fort at Gnadenhütten to help the refugees reclaim and guard their property and offer them “equal Security with the white people” on the frontier. Morris’s goals were modest. “The Fort intended to be built will only be a Wooden one,” Morris told the Bethlehem Moravians, “Or a Stockade thrown round the Buildings there, as shall be found most convenient.” On November 26, Pennsylvania’s assembly had already authorized a grant of sixty thousand pounds for frontier defense. The fort at Gnadenhütten would be just one in a line of forts stretching along Blue Mountain from the Delaware River in the north to Maryland’s border in the south, so economy was essential. The original plan was to have the Brethren con-

6 “Examination of David Zeisberger,” Nov. 22, 1755; Robert H. Morris to Timothy Horsfield, Dec. 4, 1755; Horsfield to Morris, Dec. 8, 1755; Augustus Gottlieb Spangenberg to Morris, Dec. 17, 1755, all in Horsfield Papers; Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 234–35. For a description of the Gnadenhütten attack, its causes, and its significance, see Merritt, At the Crossroads, 184–86. See also Horsfield to Morris, Nov. 26, 1755, in Pennsylvania Archives, 9 ser., 120 vols. (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, PA, 1852–1935), 1st ser., 2:520–23; and Horsfield to Morris, Nov. 29, 1755, Horsfield Letterbook, for Horsfield’s frantic call for assistance and fears that the Indian attacks might endanger the province’s western settlement ambitions. For the attack on Hays’s company, see William Hays to Morris and the Provincial Commissioners, Jan. 3, 1756, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, eds. Leonard W. Labaree et al. (New Haven, CT, 1959–), 6:341–42. The settlers fleeing from Allemangel soon met a party of seventeen men led by trader Jacob Levan, and they regrouped and fought off the pursuing Indians. Benjamin Franklin to David Hall, Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 6:348–49.
struct the fort on Moravian-donated land near the ruins of Gnadenhütten, but the missionaries had other ideas. While they had already begun to fortify and arm Bethlehem to a degree unusual for pacifists, they claimed little expertise in fort construction and asked Easton’s justice of the peace and militia commander, William Parsons, to undertake the project. Several members of Pennsylvania’s assembly fanned out across the backcountry in December to help erect the new forts. The January attack on Hays’s company accelerated their efforts.  

Benjamin Franklin arrived in Bethlehem in January to organize the Gnadenhütten fort-building expedition and was appalled at the chaos in the Blue Mountain region and in the Moravian capital. Hundreds of white and native refugees had poured into Bethlehem, doubling the town’s population. “We found this place fill’d with Refugees,” Franklin wrote to Morris, “the Workmen’s Shops, and even the Cellars being crowded with Women and Children.” He warned the governor that all the regions’ settlements were requesting additional troops. Lehigh Township had been entirely deserted after Hays’s defeat. Refugees from the Irish settlement on the Lehigh promised to retreat from the area entirely unless thirty men could be sent to guard them and their property. Franklin was hesitant to begin moving troops around at the whims of panicked residents, especially refugees who had chosen to flee rather than to “behave like Men.” He immediately ordered local magistrates to raise troops or risk losing their settlements and authorized a bounty of forty dollars per Indian scalp. He also set out for Gnadenhütten with his fort-building party of 130 men and suggested to Morris that the province hurry in completing the “Ranging Line of Forts” as soon as possible. The thirty-mile march to Gnadenhütten was terrifying and intimidating for Franklin’s detachment; much of the route was a desolate and frightening scene of burnt farms and unburied bodies. Despite the risk of attack by the Delawares, who had already shown their willingness to attack large
bodies of troops, the expedition arrived safely in Gnadenhütten on the sixteenth and began burying the dead, laying out their fort, and cutting palisades.⁸

Nine days later, Franklin declared the fort finished and named it for his friend William Allen, Pennsylvania’s chief justice. The finished fort was 125 feet long and 50 feet wide, with triangular bastions, a 12-foot high palisade, a surrounding trench, and three buildings for the garrison. “We had one swivel Gun which we mounted on one of the Angles,” Franklin wrote later in his autobiography, “and fired it as soon as fix’d, to let the Indians know, if any were within hearing, that we had such Pieces, and thus our Fort, (if such a magnificent Name may be given to so miserable a Stockade) was finished in a Week.” He hoped that the “contemptible” fort would still be “a sufficient Defence against Indians who have no cannon.” Despite Franklin’s uncomplimentary description, the small fort was a substantial symbol for the chaotic Lehigh region. It was fairly well built despite its speedy construction—unlike Fort Franklin, the next fort down the defensive line, which would stand for only a few months. With a proper garrison, Fort Allen could serve to anchor the province’s defense of the Lehigh region.⁹


⁹ Benjamin Franklin, Franklin: The Autobiography and Other Writings on Politics, Economics, and Virtue, ed. Alan Houston (New York, 2004), 123–24. Franklin’s later self-deprecation was probably an effort to downplay the importance of a fort that ended up being manned for only a short period.
Procuring and provisioning garrisons proved more difficult than building forts. By early February 1756, the project had nearly devoured the sixty thousand pounds authorized by the assembly. Lack of experienced officers and proper measures for establishing military law and discipline also threatened the enterprise. Fort Allen’s original garrison consisted of 50 men under Captain Isaac Wayne, and the combined garrisons on the fort line totaled only 389 men. Many of them spent much of their time away from their forts, escorting wagon trains and friendly Indians, ranging the frontier, and protecting settlers when requested. Such duties taxed the understaffed militia units to their limits. Without sufficient numbers of well-trained soldiers and officers, the fort-line garrisons were stretched too thin to guard against Indian incursions. Furthermore, it was increasingly clear that the original strategic basis for the fort line was unworkable. Pennsylvania’s commissioners had hoped that after the frontier was secured and its women and children possessed safe refuges, provincial troops could invade the Susquehanna country and take the fight to the attackers’ homes. But settlers and militiamen were hesitant to invade Indian country, preferring to guard their own homes and towns instead. Attempts to motivate colonial raiding parties with scalp bounties failed. Settlers living under the constant threat of attack had little desire to further infuriate Munsees or other hostile Indians and valued the fort line for the defense it offered them rather than for its role in any overall strategic scheme. As long as soldiers remained nearby, settlers were satisfied to wait out the situation and hope for the best. 10

By the summer of 1756, Fort Allen had already fallen into a state of mismanagement and confusion. When James Young, Pennsylvania’s commissary general of the musters, inspected the fort in June, he found only fifteen men present and no one commanding the post. The rest of the garrison was scattered throughout the country between Fort Allen and

For Franklin’s quote and some of his letters describing Fort Allen’s construction, see Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 6:365–71. See also Hunter, Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 259, for a general account of the fort’s construction.

Bethlehem, escorting friendly Indians and Moravians. Jacob Meis, the fort’s commanding lieutenant, was in Easton petitioning for soldiers’ back pay. Young could not even find most of the fort’s provisions, though he noted seeing a “large Quantity of Beef very ill Cured.” When Fort Allen’s new commandant, Captain George Reynolds, arrived in late June, he reported the poor condition of the garrison and a shocking lack of decent arms and ammunition, “not above fifteen Gunes any ways Good.” He asked William Parsons for permission to raid Bethlehem’s armories for decent munitions, but other more farsighted fort commanders in the region had already coveted and confiscated some of the Moravian Brethren’s best weapons. After six months, the Blue Mountain forts had done little to improve the province’s position in the ongoing Delaware war, and they seemed barely capable of maintaining their own garrisons and protecting the region.11

However ill-suited Fort Allen was as a protector of the region’s settlers, it soon emerged as an inviting meeting place for Indians. In May 1756, an Iroquois delegation led by Seneca headman Kanuksusy, an influential British ally, arrived at the fort and settled in to await additional native ambassadors. Kanuksusy had asked several Indians to meet at Bethlehem during the summer to begin peace deliberations. The Moravian capital had been inundated with white and native refugees since the beginning of the year. “Most of our Rooms have been obliged to lodge 20 or 25 Persons and Seventy of our Indians have lived in one Small House where they had but 2 Rooms,” wrote a Bethlehem resident in April. But many British-allied Indians still preferred the cramped quarters of Bethlehem or spartan Fort Allen to the uncertainties of the Susquehanna region. For example, two Moravian Indians, Nicodemus and his son Christian, had tried moving to the multicultural native town of Tioga near the New York border. When they learned that French-allied Munsees dominated the town, they returned to the safety of Fort Allen and the protection of Kanuksusy. The influential Iroquois ambassador, along with Shawnee sachem “King” Paxinos, persuaded both Bethlehem Moravians and Fort Allen militiamen to ensure the safety of visiting native ambassadors in preparation for a major peace conference to be held in Easton, a town that had already become a haven for disgruntled refugee settlers and a major center of anti-

Indian animosities. Most of the delegates waiting at Fort Allen were in no hurry to move on to the county seat. As the summer wore on, many native visitors continued to prefer the hospitality of Bethlehem or the Fort Allen area to the intolerant atmosphere of Easton.12

It is not unusual that Indians would expect comfort and hospitality in a fort built to defend the province against belligerent native interlopers. Hospitality toward visitors was a fundamental fixture of Eastern Woodland Indian life. Throughout eastern North America, Indians felt obligated to be generous to their guests, and friendly visitors expected polite treatment when visiting allies or kin. This type of reciprocal social exchange helped prevent destructive conflicts between native groups and made traveling far from home bearable. Such effusive hospitality and forbearance were sure to create friction with less patient Europeans. When Indians made extended visits to European towns and forts, their hosts sometimes complained, to other Europeans at least, about native “loitering.” Such descriptions pepper British documents of the period and identify a basic incongruity between native and European conceptions of manners and meetings in the colonial American woods. What Europeans considered to be loitering was an essential expectation in native culture. Indians would have found frustration over the length of a guest’s stay to be both disrespectful and offensive.13

In Pennsylvania, hospitality was rooted firmly in native culture and was typically extended to Indian and European visitors alike. Moravian missionary David Zeisberger personally experienced Delaware hospitality after his arrival in Pennsylvania in the 1740s. He observed that it was a host’s duty to “care for the wants of a guest as long as he may choose to remain and even to give him provisions for the journey when he does

12 Timothy Horsfield to Robert H. Morris, June 21, 1756; “Memorandum Regarding Unfriendly Indians,” June 30, 1756; Letter from Unnamed Bethlehem Resident, Apr., 1756, all in Horsfield Papers. British officials often referred to Kanususy as Captain Newcastle, and he is so called in reports surrounding these events. “Captain Newcastle’s Instructions,” June 28, 1756, Horsfield Papers; Newcastle to the Captain of Fort Allen, July 1, 1756, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:189; Newcastle to Augustus Gottlieb Spangenberg, July 1, 1756, Horsfield Papers.

13 Some of the earliest European visitors to North America commented on native hospitality. Jesuit missionaries noted that Indians in New France would sometimes extend hospitality to friendly guests even at the cost of their own health and comfort. Father Superior Francesco Bressani claimed that this hospitable attitude was not even considered a virtue among the Hurons, just a standard feature of reciprocal native relations. For some seventeenth-century descriptions of Indian hospitality, see Rueben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610–1791 (Cleveland, OH, 1896–1901), 35:207–9; 38:267; 58:79.
make up his mind to go.” Food was always provided immediately to weary travelers. According to Zeisberger, “If the guests are from a distance and are very good friends, the whole kettle of food is set before them, they are given dishes and spoons and allowed to help themselves first to as much as they wish.” Zeisberger’s friend John Heckewelder noted that on “more than one hundred instances” he had experienced this effusive brand of hospitality and that it was not reserved exclusively for Indian guests: “A person is never left standing, there are seats for all; and if a dozen should follow each other in succession, all are provided with seats, and the stranger, if a white person, with the best.” Heckewelder insisted that these favors were given out of a sense of social responsibility and that hosts would expect the same treatment themselves. But reciprocal hospitality did not imply a simple quid pro quo relationship, according to Heckewelder:

I have seen a number of instances in which a return was out of the question, where poverty would not admit of it, or distance of abode put it out of the power of the visitor to return the same civilities to his host; when white people are treated in this way, with the best entertainment the house affords, they may be sure it is nothing else than a mark of respect paid to them, and that the attentions they receive do not proceed from any interested view.

Hospitable treatment became doubly important when guests were diplomats. Ambassadors on diplomatic missions usually enjoyed the comforts of the chief’s house, and nothing would be spared to make such delegates feel welcome. To do otherwise would degrade a headman’s reputation and power among other nations and weaken his status among his own people.14 Presenting guests with gifts was also an important component of native hospitality. Presents served as physical examples of generosity that went beyond supplying visitors with provisions, which was expected of everyone. In Pennsylvania’s native societies, where material goods and abstract favors were deemed to exist in a constant state of reciprocal redis-

tribution, exchanged presents served as concrete examples of love, alliance, and peaceful intentions. These obligations were especially important in times of great danger, such as when help in battle was requested and given. Indian notions of generosity, hospitality, and reciprocal exchange influenced dealings among native groups and between Indians and Europeans. Favors were not to be refused among friends. Presents and hospitable treatment were the glue that held friends together in the face of natural challenges and human belligerence. Pennsylvania’s Delaware and Iroquois allies, especially those who risked life and limb by acting as go-betweens in the province’s Indian-white conflicts, had every reason to expect hospitable treatment at Fort Allen.  

Fort Allen’s strategic location made it a familiar locale for travelers. Indians visiting the fort did not have to worry about interactions with local white settlers, as most resided south of Blue Mountain. Indeed, Fort Allen’s location was a major source of contention with the white population of Northampton County; settlers preferred that the line of forts be located south of the ridge and among their homes and farms. Perhaps because of the fort’s location, its frequent Indian visitors, or its relatively short existence, no white settlement or garrison community emerged near the fort. This was also a welcome development for native visitors, who detested the growth of white settlements much more than the establishment of forts. Instead of settlers’ farms, temporary Indian shelters surrounded the fort. There is little indication that Fort Allen played host to female camp followers or white families, as was the case at larger British forts like Ligonier and Pitt, at least in its first three years of service. Traders probably did not operate close to the fort before 1758, a likely result of the ongoing threat of native violence in the backcountry during the Delaware uprising. But with Bethlehem and Easton only a day or two’s journey away, provisions and supplies were easy to obtain when needed. Provincial troops were probably never crowded in the small fort because there were few times when the entire garrison was present; troops were usually away escorting travelers, protecting farmers’ homesteads, or ranging the countryside. In many ways, Fort Allen was the kind of out-

15 For gift giving, see David Murray, Indian Giving: Economies of Power in Indian-White Exchanges (Amherst, MA, 2000), esp. 31–38 for Indian generosity and the ambiguities of native notions of reciprocity. See also Axtell, European and the Indian, 136, 348n8. For the “redistributive” reciprocal nature of Indian exchange, especially among the Iroquois, see Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992), 21–22, 47.
post that visiting Indians liked best: it provided provisions and presents without the threat of permanent settler farms or overwhelming troop strength.  

If traveling Indians expected hospitable treatment at Fort Allen, their expectations were doubled for the upcoming Easton conference, where the presence of important provincial officials and hundreds of Indian delegates would ensure their safety and comfort. The provincial government and their Iroquois allies had called for the Easton conference as a way to stop Delaware attacks and discover the sources of their animosities. As the date of the conference approached, Morris decided to concentrate as many displaced friendly Indians in the county seat as possible. He ordered that all Indian refugees and visitors be moved to Easton from Bethlehem to relieve crowding in the Moravian town and to allow the province to aid the displaced natives. It devolved upon Parsons, as Easton’s chief magistrate and the region’s military commander, to prepare the town for their arrival. Easton must have been quite a sight during such treaty conferences. The Penns’ idyllic, neatly surveyed county seat was near to bursting with townspeople, traders, white and Indian refugees, native ambassadors and their retinues, and even a group of armed New Jersey vigilantes who had moved into Easton to prevent any native incursions into their own province. Morris asked Parsons to post plenty of guards to ensure that the Indians remained safe “from the Insults of the People,” but also to watch the Indians themselves, “in case they should not be so Friendly as they pretend.” In addition to those worries, Parsons needed to maintain order among the guards themselves. Easton’s tavern keepers loved new customers and sold rum to Indians, townsfolk, and soldiers alike. With Indians, civilians, and soldiers “being all drunk,” Parsons complained, the town would be “in the Utmost Confusion and Danger” during the conference.  

16 For settler complaints about the location of the fort line, see Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier*, 214–15. The forts on the Blue Mountain ranging line must have had social cultures that were very different from the larger forts in western Pennsylvania, which featured garrison communities, responsibilities for civil authority, and especially numerous women, whose presence brought eastern social customs that both meshed with and complicated the forts’ military cultures. See Mayer, “From Forts to Families.” White women may have lived at or near the fort during its post-1758 existence as a trading post; the Fort Allen daybook lists many English female given names as customers, though these could be converted Indians or women from settlements south of Blue Mountain. Fort Allen Daybook, Indian Affairs, Simon Gratz Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.  

On July 18, the guest of honor arrived. Teedyuscung, a Munsee headman living at Tioga whom the English sometimes called “King of the Delawares,” had led a few violent forays against white settlements during the preceding months. His influence throughout the Susquehanna country, much of it a result of his own aggressive self-promotion, made his participation vital to securing peace. After carefully weighing the benefits that might accrue from alliances with France and Britain, Teedyuscung had decided that a British alliance was the best way for Pennsylvania Delawares to retain enough power to survive the complicated international contest for control of the region. However, Teedyuscung’s reputation in the region as a drinker and reveler was as well-known as his status as a diplomat and headman. When he arrived in Easton, he lost no time in taking advantage of the hospitality commonly offered at peace conferences. No traders had traveled up the Susquehanna for some time, and Teedyuscung hoped that he would find plenty of provisions and rum at the conference. He told Parsons that his journey from Tioga was a long way to go without any rum, and he continued hinting at his desires until Parsons supplied him with two small bottles. The merriment continued as the conference wore on, frustrating the conference’s organizers but providing rare wartime entertainment for the native delegates. Morris’s secretary, Richard Peters, reported that Teedyuscung and his “wild Company” started the conference off “perpetually Drunk, very much on the Gascoon [bragging], and at times abusive to the Inhabitants” of Easton. Peters found the “King of the Delawares” to be a formidable figure. He described the Munsee chief as a “lusty rawboned Man, haughty and very desirous of Respect and Command” who could supposedly “drink three Quarts or a Gallon of Rum a Day without being Drunk.”

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18 George Reynolds to William Edwards, July 14, 1756, and William Parsons to Timothy Horsfield, July 18, 1756, Horsfield Papers. After fifty years, Wallace’s King of the Delawares remains the best study of Teedyuscung, certainly one of the most colorful, complicated, and intriguing figures in eighteenth-century North America. See pages 83–86 for details of his participation in the uprising. For an explanation of Teedyuscung’s approach to diplomacy, which involved positioning the Delawares in rewarding alliances with the English and native groups, see Schutt, Peoples of the River Valleys, 115–16. For an amusing and informative description of how treaty conference organizers worried about attendees’ revelry, see Merrell, Into the American Woods, 262–64. Weiser spent prodigious energy keeping visiting diplomats from engaging in alcohol-fueled violence. For example, in one instance he mediated a dispute between Teedyuscung and Kanuksusy, who feared that the Munsee chief meant to kill him with witchcraft. Parsons’s Diary of a Council Held at Easton, July 24–27, 1756, in Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607–1789, gen. ed. Alden T. Vaughan, vol. 3, Pennsylvania Treaties, 1756–1775, ed. Alison Duncan Hirsch (Washington, DC., 1979), 106–9. Indians’ recreational use of alcohol is stressed in this article because of the focus on hospitality, but it should not be overemphasized; Indians had many uses for liquor. For native uses of
The July 1756 Easton conference was only a preliminary meeting, designed to lay the groundwork for more substantive talks later that fall. In the meantime, native diplomats clearly intended to take advantage of all the customary accoutrements of friendly diplomacy while they lasted. Morris began to wonder if Easton, with its taverns and temperamental residents, might not be a poor place to conduct Indian diplomacy. But when the governor suggested moving the proceedings to Bethlehem or some other more placid location, Teedyuscung was indignant. He was having a good time in Easton and did not wish to be shuttled “from place to place like a Child.” Morris relented and continued the conference at Easton. In the end, Teedyuscung and Kanuksusy agreed to convince other influential Delawares to meet again at Easton later in the year. But the summer conference’s completion did not mean the end of the delegates’ appetite for revelry. By then, Easton’s townsfolk were ready for some peace and quiet, and Bethlehem still stretched at the seams with refugees. Luckily for Teedyuscung’s retinue, another familiar, entertaining location lay just across the Blue Mountains.19

By early August, Teedyuscung had concluded his talks with Morris and had started his journey back to Wyoming and Tioga to convince belligerent Delawares to make peace with the province. On the way he stopped at Fort Allen to wait for his baggage train to catch up and enjoyed the garrison’s hospitality so much that he settled in for a short stay. Teedyuscung was no stranger to the location; indeed, he was a past resident. From 1750 to 1754, he had lived (unhappily) as a Moravian convert at Gnadenhütten under the Christian name Gideon. Richard Peters was alarmed at news of Teedyuscung’s “loitering” at the fort and insisted that the chief be sent on his way in order to convince Tioga’s delegates to come to Easton before winter. Teedyuscung apologized and agreed to send two men to Tioga in his place, implying that he was comfortable where he was. He promised that when the men returned he would “make all Dispatch” in bringing the talks to a successful conclusion. Morris was surprised that Teedyuscung kept “loitering at a fort in so shameful a man-

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ner when he knows the necessity there is of his speedy Return to his People.” He sent Parsons a string of wampum for the chief to urge him on his way. “Remind him how much he has to do and how little a time it is before the Winter will set in,” Morris prodded Parsons impatiently. But trouble was brewing at Fort Allen. When Morris referred to Teedyuscung’s “shameful” manner, Parsons thought he was referring to the chief’s tardiness. He would soon find that the matter was more complicated.20

Teedyuscung stayed at Fort Allen because of the availability of liquor there and because of the corrupt conduct of the fort’s temporary commandant, Lieutenant Miller. According to Teedyuscung’s interpreter, Ben, the “villainous” lieutenant, made good profits selling liquor to Indians and whites alike. “As long as the Indians had money,” Ben told Parsons, “the Lieutenant sold them Rum, so that they were almost always drunk.” Miller had also cheated the drunken Teedyuscung out of some deerskins, which had been intended as a present for Morris. The prospect of a provincial officer cheating and delaying an important Indian delegate at such a critical point in peace negotiations was bad enough, but Parsons learned soon that the context of Teedyuscung’s loitering was even more troubling. When Captain Reynolds returned to Fort Allen, he wrote to Parsons and reported having had some trouble with the visiting Indians. “I am resolved to let no more of them into ye fort for ye are So unruly that there is no Liveing with them,” he reported. He added perfunctorily that while he was away in Philadelphia, some of the soldiers “got a little mery with the Liquor.” Reynolds was gifted at understatement. That merriness was actually a full-fledged mutiny, prompted by a corporal, Christian Weyrick, and the ready availability of liquor.21

On August 5, Teedyuscung brought three women into the fort. While he “kept one as his own,” according to Reynolds, the other two joked and

20 Timothy Horsfield to William Parsons, Aug. 9, 1756; Horsfield to Parsons, Aug. 9, 1756; Teedyuscung to Horsfield and Parsons, Aug. 9, 1756; Richard Peters to Parsons, Aug. 11, 1756; Horsfield to Teedyuscung, Aug. 12, 1756; Robert H. Morris to Horsfield, Aug. 13, 1756, all in Horsfield Papers. For Teedyuscung’s earlier attempts to convert to Christianity at Gnadenhütten, see Wallace, King of the Delawares, 39–53.

21 William Parsons to Robert H. Morris, Aug. 8, 1756, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 2:745–46; George Reynolds to Parsons, Aug. 12, 1756, Horsfield Papers. Discipline was a major problem among provincial forces during the Seven Years’ War for a variety of reasons, including a lack of capable officers, inability or unwillingness of officers to inflict the full brunt of military punishment, and the socioeconomic backgrounds of the troops themselves. This was especially true in Pennsylvania, where most troops were day laborers or artisans and were not used to harsh discipline and unwilling to change their ways. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry, 107–21.
cavorted with Miller and his sergeants. Jealous of the officers, the drunken Weyrick tried to have the women ejected from the fort. When Miller refused, the corporal assaulted him. Weyrick and two other men proceeded to behave "very undecently" with the women, washing their genitals with rum afterwards to prevent "Getting Sum Distemper of ye Squas." The mutineers then went on a full-fledged alcohol-fueled rampage, firing guns into the fort’s walls and encouraging their comrades to take over the post and kill several Reading militiamen who had sided with Miller. After hearing about the uprising, Parsons sent Captain Jacob Wetterhold to Fort Allen to arrest Weyrick for inciting the mutiny and Miller for not doing enough to suppress it. Upon his arrival, Wetterhold reported that the fort’s ensign, who had also been absent, had already returned and brought the situation under control.\(^\text{22}\)

Wetterhold confirmed that liquor was the probable catalyst of the dispute. Parsons responded by ordering the Indians’ rum allowance lowered to one-quarter of a pint per day, and he restricted them to shelters built outside the fort. He immediately informed Morris that the fort’s officers had apparently “turn’d ye Fort to a Dram Shop.” Horsfield confirmed Parsons’s report. He told Parsons, “I’ve been told that Capt. Reynolds has had one hogshed of rum after another and sold it to his Men and Doubly to ye Indians and Every one that would give Money for it.” Fort Allen had gone from providing rum as Indian gifts and militia provisions to selling it as a commodity. From the provincial perspective, the danger to Pennsylvania’s defensive and military imperatives was obvious. From Teedyuscung’s cultural vantage, it was unacceptable to be barred from the fort and have his liquor restricted as if the mutiny had been his fault. He stormed away from Fort Allen in a huff. His role in the episode should not be romanticized; he had “loitered” at the fort partially because liquor could be had there, apparently at affordable prices and in good supply. Still, he considered himself an ambassador on official provincial business and expected politeness and hospitality from the fort’s commandant. Teedyuscung needed no correction or punishment, as Horsfield knew well. The fort’s garrison and officers had failed in their mission to guard

\(^{22}\) George Reynolds to Conrad Weiser, Aug. 11, 1756, in \textit{Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier}, by Hunter, 241; William Parsons to Jacob Wetterhold and Wetterhold to Parsons, Aug. 12, 1756, \textit{Pennsylvania Archives}, 1st ser., 2:741, 754–55. See Wallace, \textit{King of the Delawares}, 116–18 for a full description of the mutiny and its causes. Wallace claims that Teedyuscung “struck the match” that sparked the mutiny by bringing women into the fort, but that seems an unfair burden to place upon Teedyuscung, and especially upon the women, who were possibly raped by drunken soldiers.
the province and support its diplomatic efforts. Teedyuscung needed to be hurried upon his way, but Horsfield also understood that the situation required tact and understanding of the Munsee headman’s point of view.²³

Unrest at Fort Allen threatened to upset the province’s peace plans, and Pennsylvania’s assembly acted quickly to clean up the mess. The Provincial Council recommended that Conrad Weiser and Parsons be sent to Fort Allen to punish Lieutenant Miller, reestablish order, and urge Teedyuscung on his way. Morris, no longer governor but still in attendance at the council (he had been succeeded by William Denny in the interim), suggested that Kanuksusy be sent to the Six Nations to ask what their leaders thought of Teedyuscung’s loitering and rumored acts of sedition. Denny immediately ordered Weiser to look into the affair and to make any inquiries and arrests he deemed necessary. After spending over sixty thousand pounds on frontier defenses, Pennsylvania’s government could not allow one of its own forts to endanger the peace of the region it had been charged to protect.²⁴

As the governor and council tried to minimize the diplomatic damage caused by the mutiny, Horsfield arrived at Fort Allen and set about placating an ill-tempered Teedyuscung. He caught up with the chief (who had angrily left the fort) and apologized for the misunderstanding, promised to punish Miller, and agreed to forward the controversial deerskins to Morris. Teedyuscung appreciated Horsfield’s efforts and agreed to accompany him back to the fort and then to hurry on with his mission to Wyoming. When they arrived at Fort Allen, they found that Reynolds and his ensign had abandoned the fort (again) and that the post was under the temporary command of the “sober and prudent” Lieutenant Geiger of Wetterhold’s company. By then Horsfield had confirmed that Reynolds and Miller had “made a Tippeling House of the Fort,” writing to Morris that “Several of the Men after a Deduction of all their pay remain 14 or 15 [pounds] indebted to their Capt. for Liquor.” Horsfield promised to restrict all rum and punch sales indefinitely, hoping that this


²⁴ Pennsylvania Council, Aug. 21, 1756, and William Denny to Sir Charles Hardy, Aug. 21, 1756, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:222–23, 223–25; Denny to Conrad Weiser, Aug. 21, 1756, Horsfield Papers. On sedition: Earlier in August, rumors spread that Teedyuscung had been encouraging English-allied Indians to leave the region or be killed along with their white friends. Timothy Horsfield to William Parsons, Aug. 19, 1756, Horsfield Papers.
would correct the discipline problems. Weiser and Parsons decided to go further; apparently, the officers’ malfeasance had sunk too deeply into the garrison’s structure. They determined that Fort Allen’s entire complement of troops must be removed to alleviate the stain of corruption. Their solution was to switch garrisons with one of the nearby forts. Reynolds and his whole garrison ended up at nearby Fort Norris, and that fort’s complement, led by Captain Jacob Orndt, arrived at Fort Allen just in time to host Teedyuscung and his retinue one last time before the King’s return to the north.25

Teedyuscung wasted little time in finishing his business at Tioga and Wyoming. On October 9, he sent word to Orndt and Reynolds that he was waiting at Wyoming and that he would soon deliver several white prisoners to comply with treaty obligations. But Teedyuscung had heard rumors that if he brought a large party to Fort Allen or Easton, the English would kill them all. He thought it prudent to send one Indian with one prisoner to Fort Allen to make sure his people would be safe. Orndt expected a large number of Delawares and Iroquois to pass by his fort on their way to the autumn Easton conference and wanted no repeat of the summer’s events. He ordered a shelter built well away from the fort for Teedyuscung’s band and awaited his arrival. Three weeks passed with no sign of Teedyuscung, but plenty of other Delawares soon made themselves comfortable at Fort Allen. Over one hundred Minisinks set up camps near the fort, reportedly planning to seek a separate treaty with the province. Denny was at a loss as to how to deal with them; Sir William Johnson had just been appointed Indian superintendent for the entire Northern District, and the provincial government did not yet know how much of their diplomatic responsibility he was to assume. The council advised Denny to offer the Minisinks supplies, gifts, and friendship, but also to inform them that Pennsylvania could not make a separate peace with Indians who might continue to attack neighboring colonies. News of the Minisinks’ arrival came amid new reports of violence in the region—several settlers had been attacked near Forts Lebanon and Northkill, farther south on the defensive line. Fort Lebanon’s commander admitted that the outposts were “too weak to be of any Service to the Frontier” in the face of a large-scale Indian attack or siege. A force of over

25 William Parsons to Robert H. Morris, Aug. 21, 1756, and Jacob Orndt to Conrad Weiser, Aug. 24, 1756, Horsfield Papers. Captain Reynolds and Lieutenant Miller did face charges for turning Fort Allen into a virtual pub and allowing a mutiny to occur, but they defended themselves successfully and avoided a court martial. Reynolds to Weiser, Aug. 26, 1756, Horsfield Papers.
one hundred Minisinks could easily overcome tiny Fort Allen and threaten to disrupt the Easton conference if the Indians decided to pursue conflict instead of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{26}

It was not any nefarious intent, but rather Teedyuscung’s strategy and promises of hospitality, that caused the Minisinks to wait out the Easton conference near Fort Allen. By November 6, Teedyuscung had arrived at Easton, but rumors swirled about a possible Minisink attack on the conference. To combat the rumors, Denny and Teedyuscung sent out Delaware headman Tatamy to meet with the Minisink bands and invite them to the conference. The Minisinks politely refused, saying they preferred the area around Fort Allen and had already arranged with Teedyuscung to remain there. As for the treaty talks, they assured Tatamy that they would agree to any terms that Teedyuscung could secure. Back at the conference, Teedyuscung confirmed that the Minisinks had originally agreed to travel “no further than a certain Place” and to allow him to negotiate in their stead. At first glance, the Minisink presence seemed to be a powerful bargaining chip for the Munsee chief. With 140 armed Delawares ready to attack the most vital fort on the frontier line, and with Easton filled to capacity with Delaware and Iroquois delegates, Denny might have felt obliged to give Teedyuscung excellent terms. However, Weiser soon began to wonder if the Minisinks’ choice of Fort Allen was not based more on their preference for the location rather than on a desire to supply Teedyuscung with negotiating power.\textsuperscript{27}

By this time, Fort Allen had become a principal gateway through the Blue Mountains and into Northampton County for Susquehanna-region Delawares. Rum remained available near the fort, despite orders to limit its sale in the area during the conference. Weiser and his troops could not realistically be expected to enforce liquor regulations, as they spent most

\textsuperscript{26} Jacob Ormdt and George Reynolds to William Parsons, Oct. 9, 1756, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:5–6; Timothy Horsfield to William Denny, Oct. 27, 1756, Horsfield Papers; Council to Denny, Oct. 29, 1756, Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 7:6–7; Jacob Morgan to Denny, Nov. 4, 1756, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:30–31. More serious rumors soon emerged; the band of Minisinks was larger than previously supposed (140 or more), and the Indians intended to fall upon either Easton or Bethlehem, making themselves “Masters of the whole Country.” Conrad Weiser remained skeptical; such rumors were common in the Pennsylvania backcountry. “Extract of Conrad Weiser’s Journal,” Nov. 5, 1756, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:32–33. For an excellent and influential account of how rumors affected backcountry events, albeit in Cherokee country, see Gregory Evans Dowd, “The Panic of 1751: The Significance of Rumors on the South Carolina-Cherokee Frontier,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 53 (1996): 527–60.

of their time escorting Indians back and forth between Fort Allen and
Easton. To ensure good conduct among the encamped Minisinks, Weiser
sent Teedyuscung to act as a liaison between Fort Allen and the Minisink
bands. To Weiser’s dismay, Teedyuscung spent most of his time trying to
acquire rum so that he might “have a Frolick with his Company” at the
fort. Weiser offered liquor to Teedyuscung and the Minisinks on the con-
tdition that they consume it only in the Indian camp outside the fort, and
he warned that if any Indians tried to enter the fort, “they must take what
follows.” That the threat was an empty one became clear when one of
Teedyuscung’s drinking companions tried to climb the palisade one night
and shouted curses to the effect of “Damn you all I value you not!” after
Weiser made him jump down. Fort Allen’s garrison spent a few anxious
weeks surrounded by the Minisinks, many of whom spent their time
enjoying the availability of liquor in the fort’s neighborhood.28

To the province’s great relief, the autumn Easton conference ended
without any serious trouble near Fort Allen. By December, most of the
attendees had been escorted back across Blue Mountain and into the
Susquehanna country. The province had much work to do. Teedyuscung
and other delegates had surprised everyone by claiming that the
province’s fraudulent Walking Purchase land grab of 1737 was the basis
for their war with Pennsylvania, and he demanded that the province
assuage Delaware chiefs on that matter before they would agree to a final
treaty. Events of 1756 had been instructive to visiting Delawares. From a
purely social perspective, they had found that Pennsylvanians would pro-
tect them while they were in Easton and other towns and not kill them as
backcountry rumors continued to assert. They also learned that Fort
Allen offered them little in the way of intimidation. Indeed, the small fort
tucked on the north side of the Blue Mountains was quickly becoming a
favorite Indian place.29

28 “Journal of the Proceedings of Conrad Weiser with the Indians, to Fort Allen, by his Honour
29 The Walking Purchase was a colonial land acquisition in which Pennsylvania’s proprietors
intentionally used ambiguities concerning Delaware and English notions of land tenure and meas-
urement to acquire much more property than the Delawares had intended to sell. The area of the
Walking Purchase acquisition contained much of Northampton County south of Blue Mountain.
With the support of influential Quakers who were political opponents of the proprietors and
Pennsylvania government, Teedyuscung demanded that the province revisit and rectify the specious
land deal. This surprise tactic pushed the proprietors into a defensive posture and delayed indefinitely
hopes for an immediate peace treaty. Wallace, King of the Delawares, 130–36; Merritt, At the
Crossroads, 225–26. For Delaware-Pennsylvania land issues and disputes, see Steven C. Harper,
“Delawares and Pennsylvanians after the Walking Purchase,” and David L. Preston, “Squatters,
Ongoing treaty deliberations throughout 1757 continued to make Fort Allen a desirable stopping point for Delaware and Iroquois delegates and their retinues. Before the winter had passed, more of Teedyuscung’s people began to filter into the fort. First came seven women and three children from Tioga, who arrived in mid-February in advance of Teedyuscung’s main company. While Orndt was happy to provision the small party, Parsons suggested that they might be better off under the Moravians’ care in Bethlehem. Orndt and Parsons probably wished to avoid a replay of the 1756 mutiny and felt that seven unaccompanied Delaware women might provoke too many distractions among the fort’s anxious and frequently disgruntled garrison. Parsons also believed that the women and children might be more comfortable with other Indians until their own party arrived, and Bethlehem still hosted numerous Indian refugees. With a much larger party scheduled to arrive the following month, the province could ill-afford any untoward incidences with Teedyuscung’s people.30

Teedyuscung’s main party arrived at Fort Allen at the end of March 1757, albeit without the “King” himself. The fifty men, women, and children, led by Teedyuscung’s two sons and his brother, Captain Harris, proceeded to make themselves at home. “They behave very civil here,” reported a relieved Orndt. “They have made Cabbins about 60 perches from the Fort, where they live, and intend to tarry here till the King comes.” Even though the visiting Indians maintained their own shelters, Orndt still had trouble preventing rum-induced problems. His orders forbade liquor sales at the fort, but visiting Indians still found ways to procure it, especially when visiting Easton on official business. On one occasion, when Orndt sent Indian emissaries to Easton with a military escort, the emissaries found and purchased so much rum that some of them “stay’d all Night in the Woods, and the remainder went . . . to Bethlehem,” where Orndt feared “there might easily happen any Misbehaviour.”31


30 Jacob Orndt to William Parsons, Feb. 18, 1757, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:429; Parsons to Timothy Horsfield, Feb. 20, 1757, Horsfield Papers.
In the middle of April, Teedyuscung sent word from Tioga. He requested that provisions for his journey be sent to Fort Allen, where his people could then bring them to Tioga on horseback. Denny could not turn him down easily. Fort Allen had become more than a comfortable place for Indian wayfarers. Teedyuscung viewed it as a temporary way station between his country and the English settlements, and keeping an important Indian presence there cemented the fort’s role as an Indian-English outpost of importance. Besides, Denny believed it was better that the Munsees await Teedyuscung’s arrival at Fort Allen than at Easton, where they were “always in the Way of strong Liquor & in Danger” from intolerant residents. Fort Allen’s position had become complicated: in order to protect Indians with whom the province had to make peace, the fort had to endure the presence of large groups of them before (and maybe after) that peace had been achieved. This required the fort to maintain a constant state of alertness, at least until Teedyuscung arrived and removed his waiting entourage. Parsons told Horsfield to be ready for Teedyuscung and to have dozens of wagons available to take the King and his baggage to Philadelphia. A few days later the problem took care of itself. The large band encamped near the fort grew tired of waiting for Teedyuscung and left their temporary lodgings, possibly to return home in time to plant corn.32

In early July, Teedyuscung arrived at Fort Allen. His large band of delegates and followers strained the entire region’s provisions. Teedyuscung brought along 200 men, women, and children and expected to stay at the fort for six to seven days. During that time he expected to meet 100 Senecas at Fort Allen, and then the whole mass of people would have to be shuttled to Easton, where Denny had agreed to meet with them once again. Throughout the month, Orndt and his soldiers transferred Indians back and forth between Fort Allen and Easton, a job made more difficult by apprehensive settlers and wary Indian emissaries. During the July conference, 285 Indians traveled to Easton by way of Fort Allen (112 men, 67 women, and 106 children), though during this period Indians constantly shuttled back and forth between Easton and the fort; there were also Indians encamped near the fort. Satisfied by an interim peace arrangement with Denny, Teedyuscung and his party arrived back at Fort

Allen on August 13. He and his band took advantage of the fort’s hospitality for several more days before departing, “very glad and joyful,” on August 17. Several “sick” families stayed on at Fort Allen. September found Teedyuscung still in the region, lingering in overcrowded Bethlehem while awaiting his son’s return from a diplomatic trip to the Ohio Country. By late 1757, the Fort Allen-Bethlehem corridor had become a familiar, friendly place for Susquehanna natives. Eager to avoid anything that might “give Disgust” to Delawares and threaten the ongoing peace process, Denny tacitly allowed an almost constant native presence at Fort Allen and in the nearby region.33

By demanding the continued presence of forts and garrisons, Pennsylvania’s settlers unintentionally encouraged this fretful brand of hospitality to the Indians. Settlers in Northampton and Berks counties petitioned Denny in May 1757 to protect them from reported Ohio Indian incursions. With peace efforts ongoing, settlers justifiably feared that troops would soon entirely abandon the sparsely garrisoned forts and blockhouses. Fort Franklin had never been tenable, and the British abandoned it in November 1756. Forts Norris and Hamilton were still garrisoned, but both would be empty within a few months. As violence continued in the Pennsylvania backcountry, petitioners asked that more men be sent to the frontiers and that Fort Allen and other forts be maintained. They either did not know or not care that the forts’ roles as diplomatic posts could encourage a persistent Indian presence in the region. In September, Benjamin Franklin defended the expense of maintaining the several forts and blockhouses and over 1,100 men on the frontier, claiming that this policy kept settlers from abandoning their homes altogether. But with peace negotiations nearly completed, any forts that remained in the Pennsylvania backcountry would serve mainly to meet Indian needs rather than to allay settlers’ fears.34

33 Jacob Omdt to Conrad Weiser, July 5, 1757; Omdt to William Denny, July 8, 1757; “Report of Indians that Came to Easton by Way of Fort Allen,” Aug. 1, 1757, all in Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:207, 209–10, 210; Omdt to Denny, Aug. 19, 1757, Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, 7:723–24; Denny to Timothy Horsfield, Sept. 5, 1757, Horsfield Papers. The biggest threat to peace during this period occurred when a fifteen-year-old “foolish white boy” shot and wounded William Dattamy, an unaccompanied Indian on his way to Bethlehem. Omdt was forced to remain in Easton with some of his men to prevent Indian-white animosities from flaring up as a result of the incident, despite the fact that fifty or more Indians remained encamped around Fort Allen.

34 Timothy Horsfield to William Parsons, Apr. 27, 1757; “Petition from Northampton County”; “Petition from the Frontiers,” Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:142–43, 151–52, 153–54. Conrad Weiser had reported the untenable state of Fort Franklin in November 1756 and ordered Jacob Wetterhold and his men to evacuate the fort and proceed to Lynn Township, Northampton County,
Fort Allen’s diplomatic role was prioritized over defense by 1758, and, as such, the fort had only a small military complement. In February, Jacob Orndt’s garrison consisted of 78 men, though later in the year as few as 50 men occupied the fort. Even the complement of 78 was small compared with that of Fort Augusta (362 men) and smaller forts Henry (105) and Littleton (110). In addition to being undermanned, the fort was badly in need of repairs that the province was hesitant to fund. Because of its diminished military role and poor condition, rumors of Fort Allen’s imminent closing spread in the region throughout 1758, prompting more petitions from fearful local settlers. They need not have worried, though. Despite its dilapidated state and small garrison, Fort Allen would remain a necessary Indian way station as long as native diplomats and their parties continued to travel through the Blue Mountains. As early as April 1758, Fort Allen had achieved the status of an official diplomatic checkpoint, “the Place where the Susquehannah Indians are by Treaty obliged first to come to, when they arrive on Our Frontiers,” according to Denny. With its small garrison and ramshackle condition, Fort Allen remained an important stopover for natives even as threats posed by Delaware hostilities began to subside.35

Indians visiting Fort Allen and living nearby often assisted English authorities in ranging the woods for enemies. In doing so, they furthered the peace process while helping to maintain the fort’s status as a welcome haven for traveling Delawares. Orndt had always employed Indians, usually Christian converts from Bethlehem, to patrol the countryside around where they remained in May 1757. “Journal of the Proceedings of Conrad Weiser with the Indians, to Fort Allen, by His Honour the Governor’s Order,” Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:66–68. Morale continued to be a problem at the outposts. In March 1757, another near mutiny took place at Fort Norris when a soldier, Hieronymous Faxtor, was discharged for insubordination. He fired his gun at the fort upon leaving and then attacked a passing settler, making it even more curious that the local inhabitants would want a military presence maintained. Ensign Jacob Snider to William Parsons, Mar. 3, 1757, Horsfield Papers. By April 1757, Denny had decided that only three forts, Allen, Henry, and Hamilton, would be maintained on the frontier and garrisoned with one hundred men each. William Denny to Proprietors, Apr. 10, 1757, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:119–20. Benjamin Franklin to the Printer of The Citizen, in Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 7:261–62; Jacob Wetterhold to Parsons, July 7, 1757, and Weiser to Denny, July 7, 1757, Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 3:211, 218.

By April 1758, it had become more difficult for him to find reliable Indian rangers, mainly because of the availability of alcohol. Despite his attempts to limit liquor sales at the fort, Orndt complained that the Indian rangers were “continually drunk,” having bought “whole Casks of Rum” in Easton. Even when Indians could not purchase liquor near the fort, they still expected to be provisioned as full British allies. “There is dayly Indians Passing and Repassing, and they want Suplys from us,” a frustrated John Bull, Orndt’s successor as Fort Allen’s commander, reported in the summer of 1758. Reduced funding for frontier defenses made such provisioning difficult, but Fort Allen’s position as a diplomatic station made it a necessity, at least for the moment.36

By 1758, traders near Fort Allen were responding to consumer demand by supplying visiting Indians with liquor. There was little the fort’s small number of troops could do to battle the traders, who openly defied provincial restrictions on alcohol sales. For example, in June 1758, Bull learned that Hans Bowman, a trader who operated five miles from the fort, had “given” five gallons of whiskey to Gabriel Loquus, a visiting Delaware. Outraged, Bull sent a few soldiers to remind Bowman that selling liquor to the Indians was prohibited and could cause civil unrest and violence. The trader replied that the liquor was merely a present for Loquus, that he would give gifts to whomever he pleased, and that not even Fort Allen’s troops could stop him. Bull could do little but ignore the incident; arresting Bowman would only offend native visitors and local white settlers. Because of their constant escort responsibilities, the fort’s troops could not effectively control consumer affairs throughout the Northampton County backcountry.37

Throughout the summer of 1758, hundreds of Indians moved through the Lehigh water gap, many enjoying lengthy stays at the fort. On June 29, Teedyuscung and fifty Delawares and Iroquois arrived at Fort Allen, hoping to meet with Governor Denny at Germantown a few days later. Bull sent the entire party on to Bethlehem under escort, ordering his men to hand them over to Horsfield and return. With Indians lingering near the fort in search of trade and alcohol, Bull could hardly afford to weaken

his force by giving up men for escort duty. Orndt had already lost a detachment of men to Brigadier General John Forbes’s 1758 expedition against Fort Duquesne, and Bull’s garrison at Fort Allen had been reduced to only thirty men. Pennsylvania had begun to devalue what was left of the defensive chain of forts in favor of more proactive measures against the French and their Indian allies. Teedyuscung returned to the fort in July and settled in for another stay. He sought to position himself strategically to influence British and native diplomatic and military initiatives. He also tried to coerce Denny into sending regular supplies of arms and powder to the fort for his Indian allies. Many could be expected to visit, especially with more treaty talks scheduled at Easton for late 1758. On September 12, Orndt informed Denny that 128 Indians had arrived at Fort Allen “and intended to stay there.” From then on, Fort Allen would host many more Indians than white Pennsylvanians.38

With the date of the new treaty conference fast approaching, Denny targeted the hospitable drinking culture near the fort and, even more importantly, at the conference locations. In the summer of 1758, Denny had already posted a prohibition threatening imprisonment for anyone who sold liquor to Teedyuscung and his party during their summer visits. But as more Indians poured into Northampton County in August and September, individual traders and tavern keepers continued to supply Indians with liquor, using their nonofficial status as “private persons” to skirt regulations. Denny knew perfectly well that profit was not always the motive and that some native and Pennsylvanian parties could gain much by the “Prejudice and Hindrance of the Business” at important treaty conferences that liquor could provide. To prevent such disruptions at Easton, Denny forbade liquor gifts and sales “upon any Pretence whatsoever,” except by authorized Indian agents. But many Indians came to the conferences expecting entertainment, liquor, and gifts, and Denny could not hope to prohibit them entirely. The province could, however, change Fort Allen’s role from a purely defensive outpost and diplomatic transfer point into a place that took better advantage of a steady supply of native consumers.39


During the Easton Conference of October 1758, Denny surprised the several Indians present by announcing that Fort Allen would soon become a trading post. In April 1758, the province had passed an act enabling a board of Indian commissioners to establish trading posts where they deemed it most appropriate. Placed at or near manned forts and overseen by Indian agents, they would prevent “Abuses in the Indian Trade” by traders like Hans Bowman; they would also supply “Indians, Friends and Allies of Great Britain” with “Goods at more easy Rates.” Hopefully, this would help strengthen the favorable Indian-white relations established at Easton. Fort Augusta at Shamokin had already opened a trading post in May 1758, and in October, Denny announced to Teedyuscung and many conference attendees that Shamokin was open for business. “The Indians may be Supplied at the most reasonable Rates with any goods they may want,” he stated. “And the best Prices will be given to you for such Skins, Furs, and Peltry as you shall bring them.” Another trading post would soon be opened at Fort Allen, where Indian consumers could “depend upon it” that Indian agents would ensure the “Strictest Justice” in all dealings there. Robert Tuckness became Fort Allen’s first Indian agent on December 11; by December 21, “Quantities of Indian Goods” had arrived at the post, which Denny hoped would please the Susquehanna people and align them firmly with British interests. It was also hoped that an authorized post at Fort Allen would reduce the influence of unscrupulous traders in the region and transform Indian traffic at the post from a financial drain into a profitable enterprise. Far from its original purpose of providing safety for Blue Mountain settlers, the Fort Allen trading post actually became dependent on a regular Indian presence.40

Fort Allen enjoyed a relatively robust business during its short tenure as a trading post. From December 1758 through May 1760, the Pennsylvania Commissioners for Indian Affairs recorded sales amounting to just over £2,333. According to entries in the Fort Allen daybook for the period of October 1759 through April 1760, the trading post offered a wide variety of goods for settlers and Indians alike. But economics dictated that the store’s existence was likely to be short. However much trading posts might have contributed to easing tensions between the province and Pennsylvania’s Indians and in meeting visiting natives’ material needs, the

economic returns never balanced the costs of goods, shipping, and maintaining enough soldiers in the field to protect the trade. At the same time, Fort Allen's diplomatic role diminished in favor of its new economic pursuits. Sir William Johnson’s Indian Department had taken over most Indian diplomacy by 1758, and Easton would host only one more major Indian conference, in 1761. By January 1760, the province had further reduced Fort Allen’s complement to two officers, two sergeants, and twenty-one privates. Fort Allen even proved unable to serve as an effective outpost for equipping Indian diplomatic expeditions. By the summer of 1760, inexperienced leaders, desertions, and mismanagement of stores had made Fort Allen nearly unsustainable.41

By late 1760, the province began to consider closing Fort Allen. There was certainly no shortage of Indians near the fort; in fact, a hundred of them arrived there on August 6 on their way to Philadelphia. The fort’s commandant, Lieutenant Andrew Wackerberg, kept native travelers supplied with provisions and rum, despite orders to the contrary. But Fort Allen had outlived its usefulness, and the assembly refused to fund it beyond January 1761. Peters ordered Horsfield to pay off and discharge Fort Allen’s garrison and take custody of the arms, ammunition, and stores left at the post. On April 27, Horsfield declared the fort closed and returned the land to the Moravian Brethren. In a final humiliation, Indians attending the Easton conference in August 1761 raided Fort Allen, hoping to loot its remaining stores. They found nothing there but a few squatters, one of whom was Lieutenant Wackerberg.42
Fort Allen’s ignominious end was not unusual. Hundreds of forts, stockades, and blockhouses emerged in the colonial backcountry during the Seven Years’ War, only to crumble and return to the earth or be scavenged for materials after they had served their purpose. Nor was it unusual that intercultural contact and negotiation helped redefine the outpost’s mission. Colonial militias and the British army built forts for military purposes, but they almost always saw those reasons augmented and complicated by Indians, settlers (both men and women), colonial politicians and diplomats, and economic concerns. That native cultures helped determine the identities of remote outposts should surprise no one. Soldiers and settlers built forts in Indian country, out of the raw materials found there, and were bound almost as much by the cultural customs that prevailed among Native Americans as by the colonial motivations the fort builders brought with them. This often produced surprising and frustrating results. Hospitality and diplomacy defined Fort Allen’s primary role in Indian-white relations and infused its mission with anxiety and confusion. The builders designed the fort to protect against an invasion by Indians, but instead it became a welcome resting place for them. It never experienced an attack, except by some of its own garrison. Missionaries, not military planners, determined its location. For a brief period, Fort Allen even served as an illegal tavern of sorts. But its use by native visitors made it a link in the chain of Indian-white reciprocal relations. Instead of a military post for keeping Indians and Europeans apart, it became a diplomatic post that brought them together. In this respect, Fort Allen was not unique. Throughout North America, military outposts that were meant to introduce European culture, resolve, and domination into Indian country had their identities reshaped by the complexities of Indian-European politics and intercultural contact. Fort Allen became an example of how tiny, short-lived backcountry contact points could, in their own small ways, redefine Indian-European contact and coexistence.

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DANIEL INGRAM

Horsfield sold the utilitarian goods for just over nine pounds and sent the guns and ammunition to Philadelphia. “Account of Ammunition Stores &ca in Fort Allen, Taken the 21st Sept. 1761,” and Horsfield to James Hamilton, Sept. 3, 1761, Horsfield Papers. For an account of the fort’s final days, see Joseph Mortimer Levering, A History of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, 1741–1892: With Some Account of Its Founders and Their Early Activity in America (Bethlehem, PA, 1903), 370.