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COVER ILLUSTRATION: Senator Joseph S. Clark and Hon. Richardson Dilworth: Partners in Pennsylvania's Progress, cover of paid political section appearing in several Pennsylvania newspapers, Oct. 21, 1962. Richardson Dilworth Papers. For a discussion of the relationship between Clark and Dilworth, see John M. McLarnon and Terry Madonna's article, "Damon and Pythias Reconsidered," in this issue.

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ERRATA: On page 84 of the January 2012 issue, Martin G. Brumbaugh's middle initial was incorrectly given as an S. On page 85, Charles Willson Peale's name was spelled incorrectly as Wilson rather than Willson.



Franklin's Turn: Imperial Politics and the Coming of the American Revolution

ON JANUARY 29, 1774, Benjamin Franklin stood silently in the Privy Council chamber (popularly known as the Cockpit), representing a Massachusetts petition to oust its current governor and lieutenant governor, Thomas Hutchinson and Andrew Oliver. Spectators quickly filled all available seats in the chamber, leaving minimal standing room. As Franklin noted, “there never was such an appearance of privy counsellors on any occasion, not less than thirty-five, besides an immense crowd of other auditors.” They came, Franklin stated, to see some “entertainment.” Alexander Wedderburn, solicitor general and counsel for Hutchinson and Oliver, gave the crowd their show by verbally attacking Franklin for over an hour. Amid a cheering, laughing, and clapping multitude, Wedderburn slammed his fist into a pillow situated on the table in front of him as he called Franklin a thief, an “incendiary,” and a man who “moves in a very inferior orbit.”¹

The author would like to thank Douglas Bradburn, Diane Somerville, Owen S. Ireland, the Upstate Early American Workshop, and the reviewers and editors of the *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* for their careful reading of this essay and thoughtful suggestions.

¹ Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 15, 1774, in Leonard W. Labaree et al., eds., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, CT, 1959–), 21:86 (hereafter *PBF*); “The Final Hearing before the Privy Council Committee for Plantation Affairs . . . Wedderburn’s Speech before the Privy Council,” in *PBF*, 21:37–70. *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* are available online at franklinpapers.org/franklin/.

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The infamous Cockpit episode is often represented in historical treatments of Franklin as the watershed moment that solidified his “alienation” and “Americanization.”² The event caps a standard historical narrative focused on Franklin’s British American identity, his reaction to aggressive parliamentary acts, and his petty squabbles with imperial officials. In the historical literature, the Cockpit affair has represented “in microcosm the causes of the revolution” by symbolizing the irrationality of an arrogant ministry that alienated loyal subjects.³

Nevertheless, well before the event in the Cockpit, a fundamental transformation of Benjamin Franklin’s understanding of the empire and the imperial constitution occurred that had little to do with personal intrigues and aggressive parliamentary acts. From the 1750s, Franklin had promoted a vision of a “consolidating Union,” a British nation composed of “one Community with one Interest.”⁴ His proposals for imperial reform addressed far more than representation in Parliament; he advocated for an imperial currency, new colonies, and a restructuring of the Acts of Trade and Navigation. In 1768, however, Franklin abandoned this vision of a larger British nation for an imperial federation and even started arguing for the natural right of expatriation, the ultimate justification for independence.

Franklin changed his mind due to the difficulty of achieving imperial reform and as a result of his frustrating experience with English politics. Analyzing Franklin’s ideas for imperial reform and his attempts to persuade imperial officials of its necessity reveals far more about his transformation, and about the coming of the American Revolution, than an explanation that attributes this change in thought to the symbolic event in the Cockpit or to an inchoate crisis of identity. His writings expose the

² Jack P. Greene, “The Alienation of Benjamin Franklin, British American,” in *Understanding the American Revolution: Issues and Actors*, ed. Jack P. Greene (Charlottesville, VA, 1995), 249; Gordon S. Wood, *The Americanization of Benjamin Franklin* (New York, 2004), 151. Greene and Wood both make identity the central component of their studies of Franklin. The importance of identity in interpreting Franklin is discussed below, in note 5. For other studies that use the Cockpit as a pivotal moment, see Esmond Wright, *Franklin of Philadelphia* (Cambridge, MA, and London, 1986); Robert Middlekauff, *Benjamin Franklin and His Enemies* (Berkeley, CA, 1996); William B. Wilcox, “Franklin’s Last Years in England: The Making of a Rebel,” in *Critical Essays on Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Melvin H. Buxbaum (Boston, 1987); Cecil B. Currey, *Road to Revolution: Benjamin Franklin in England, 1765–1775* (Garden City, NY, 1968); and Sheila L. Skemp, *Benjamin and William Franklin: Father and Son, Patriot and Loyalist* (New York, 1994).

³ Wright, *Franklin of Philadelphia*, 228.

⁴ Franklin to Lord Kames, Feb. 25, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:65; Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:449.

inner workings of an informed colonial intellectual who observed in the governance of the empire structural and functional problems that he believed threatened its very existence.⁵ Yet Franklin could not move men or measures in England. The unstable and divisive politics of England restricted negotiation and limited the possibilities for reform. Franklin's experience with English politics led him to believe that the British government could barely govern England, let alone an extended empire. With a growing disdain for the processes of English government, Franklin jettisoned his idea for a closer union with Britain and articulated and embraced a vision of the colonies as distinct states.⁶

Ultimately, this transformation placed Franklin outside the acceptable political thinking of those governing the empire and effectively ended his ability to negotiate reconciliation between the colonies and Britain on what he considered acceptable terms. By 1768, reconciliation could not be achieved simply by returning to the ambiguous imperial relationship of the pre-1763 status quo, which Franklin found untenable. The imperial government, Franklin maintained, should recognize the colonies as "different states" under the same king and "absolutely independent" from Parliament. British officials refused to accept such a political position, and the little negotiation that Franklin could muster quickly faltered and fell apart.⁷ His inability to negotiate reconciliation with Britain is significant

⁵ Because scholars such as Gordon S. Wood and Jack Greene focus on Franklin's identity, Franklin's plans for imperial reform have taken on a specific meaning. They are seen as highlighting Franklin's imperial inclinations and his identity as a Briton. While Franklin's plans certainly demonstrate his self-identification with the empire and Britain, they also highlight long-existing problems of governance in the empire that Franklin sought to reform. He was not, as Greene argues, enamored with the status quo. See Jack Greene, "Alienation of Benjamin Franklin," 255–59; Greene, "The Background of the Articles of Confederation," *Publius* 12 (autumn 1982): 22–25; and Wood, *Americanization of Benjamin Franklin*, 115–16.

⁶ While historians have given some attention to Franklin's initial ideas for imperial reform and a parliamentary union, his transition to an articulation of an empire of distinct states has been given less attention and little significance. Wood, for example, argues that the transformation of Franklin's view of the empire occurred during the disputes over the Stamp Act. He posits that Franklin's vision was "precocious," but leaves off his investigation of this change, stating that Franklin "hesitated to follow out the logic of this doctrine of sovereignty" because of his hopes for reconciliation. This was definitely the case before 1768, as Franklin often wrote about the distinctness of the colonies in a negative light to promote his vision of "consolidating union," but after 1768 Franklin did not hesitate to draw out the full implications of this vision of an imperial federation. Moreover, this transition marks a critical juncture in the possibilities for reconciliation in the empire. Wood, *Americanization of Benjamin Franklin*, 123.

⁷ Franklin, "Arguments Pro and Con: I," *London Chronicle*, Oct. 18–20, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:233–37. The British government did not find the position of the colonies as distinct states an acceptable proposal for reconciliation until the Carlisle Commission of 1778, but by that time any possibility for reconciliation within the empire was too late.

not only to our understanding of Franklin but to that of the imperial crisis as well. Franklin was a major colonial political figure in the empire and a leading voice for the colonies—he held the colonial agency for Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, and Massachusetts—and so this failure of diplomacy had a considerable impact on the colonies’ ability to achieve a political settlement in the empire.

* * *

By as early as the 1750s, Franklin had developed plans for the future of the empire that were informed by his understanding of the changes taking place within the colonies. The colonial population had grown from an estimated 265,000 in 1700 to just over 2 million in 1770. With an average annual increase of 3 percent, the population, as Franklin noted in his “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind,” doubled every twenty years. The colonial economy expanded accordingly over the course of the eighteenth century. Due to the development of commerce and industry and the diversification of crops, the colonies’ long-term rate of growth doubled that of Britain.⁸

Franklin recognized that these demographic and economic changes drastically altered the internal dynamics of the colonies. The basic institutional and constitutional mechanisms for governing the empire that existed in 1765 had not changed significantly since the beginning of the eighteenth century.⁹ The empire suffered from a lack of currency and from disparate and contradictory paper money laws. Population growth and the formation of internal markets for trade outpaced the regulations set forth in the antiquated Acts of Trade and Navigation. Franklin argued that American commerce and manufacturing, which grew with its population, should be cultivated, not inhibited. According to Franklin, an inadequate currency policy and “restraining the trade or cramping the manufacturers” only served to distress the colonies, and “to distress, is to

⁸ John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607–1789* (Chapel Hill, NC, and London, 1985), 54; John J. McCusker, “Colonial Statistics,” chap. Eg, in *Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition*, ed. Susan B. Carter et al. (New York, 2006), online at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Eg.ESS.01>, accessed Aug. 1, 2010.

⁹ Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period of American History*, vol. 4, *England’s Commercial and Colonial Policy* (New Haven, CT, 1938); Ian R. Christie, *Crisis of Empire: Great Britain and the American Colonies, 1754–1783* (New York, 1966).

weaken, and weakening the Children, weakens the whole Family." Adding to his frustrations, internal dissension and intercolonial conflict proliferated. Describing the government of Pennsylvania, but addressing a problem he saw throughout the colonies, Franklin noted that the body "that ought to keep all in Order, is itself weak, and has scarce Authority enough to keep the common Peace."¹⁰

In order to "strengthen the whole," Franklin imagined the empire as "one Community with one Interest." Discussing the troubles of imperial defense, imperial policies, and the governance of the colonies in 1754 with then governor of Massachusetts William Shirley, Franklin concurred with his correspondent on a vision for the future of the empire as a greater British nation. The vicissitudes of colonial politics—the intra- and intercolonial squabbling—had only, as far as Franklin was concerned, promoted within the empire deep divisions that threatened its future existence. Any initiative for defense, for example, was beset by the "*Particular whims and prejudices*" of the individual colonies.¹¹ Compounding this problem, the "private interest[s]" of a few in England, particularly "petty corporation[s]," merchants, and artificers, shaped imperial policies concerning trade and manufacturing. Colonial representation in Parliament, he argued, would erase such distinctions "and greatly lessen the danger of future separations." This level of inclusion would have radically transformed the constitutional makeup of the British Empire. In Franklin's view, colonial representation in Parliament was a step toward a consoli-

¹⁰ Franklin, "The Interest of Great Britain Considered," 1760, in *PBF*, 9:47; Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:449; Franklin, "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind," 1755, in *PBF*, 4:225; Franklin, "Cool Thoughts on the Present Situation of Our Public Affairs," Apr. 12, 1764, in *PBF*, 11:153. In a January 2008 conference paper at the AHA, Douglas Bradburn argued that the causes of the American Revolution stemmed from an imperial breakdown long in the making. Demographic and economic growth in the colonies, coupled with a failure of the empire to evolve, adapt, and meet these changing circumstances, led to a breakdown in the empire and to the American Revolution. Douglas Bradburn, "Rise of the States: The Problem of Order and the Causes of the American Revolution" (manuscript in the author's possession). Many of Franklin's ideas for reform showcase these long-existing problems in the governance of the empire. Moreover, his experiences in England highlight the limits of the possibilities for these reforms and the centrality of English politics, both popular and parliamentary, in setting these limits.

¹¹ Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:449; Franklin, "Reasons and Motives for the Albany Plan of Union," July 1754, in *PBF*, 5:399, 401, 402. Through his experience with colonial politics and his efforts to create a colonial union at Albany, Franklin began to view imperial distinctions as a fundamental problem. One of the main reasons Franklin supported the creation of a colonial union at Albany was his expectation that such a union would eventually erase colonial distinctions. He hoped that "by this connection" the colonies would "learn to consider themselves, not as so many independent states, but as members of the same body." Franklin, "Reasons and Motives for the Albany Plan of Union," 401–2.

dated empire in which the colonies would operate not as so many distinct states but as “so many *Counties* gained to Great Britain.”¹²

Franklin’s plans for the empire included far more than colonial representation in Parliament; they also tackled the reform of imperial policies and the creation of more effective administrative institutions. Imperial policies that tended to treat the colonies as existing only for the benefit of the mother state—policies that had emerged at a time when the British mainland colonies were sparsely populated—Franklin deemed inexpedient and out-of-date by midcentury.¹³

One major problem, the lack of a common imperial currency or a standardized method for making bills of credit legal tender, hampered the colonial economy and created internal factionalism. According to Franklin, for want of a uniform policy, the value of colonial paper money suffered from “Irregularity” and resulted in some “Injustice.” While paper money worked in some colonies, such as New Jersey, it did not in others, such as Rhode Island. Colonists recognized the problem and argued in the 1730s for a uniform plan. By the 1740s, the Board of Trade and Parliament also conceded that there were troubles with American currency. Nevertheless, Parliament, instead of fixing the problem with long-term goals in mind, looked to the status quo and merely reinforced existing policy by ordering that all governors obey the Act of 1708 regulating the price of foreign coin. Parliament refused to sign any currency bill without an attached “suspending clause.” The king’s veto power remained the controlling mechanism, and the colonial governments fractured over the power of the purse and the viability of paper money. Such internal disputes, Franklin maintained, resulted in “clogging and embarrassing all the Wheels of Government.”¹⁴

A dismayed Franklin insisted to George Grenville, Lord Hillsborough, Lord Chatham, and other agents and officers of the Crown

¹² Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 4, 1754, and Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:443, 449 (italics added).

¹³ Nor was Franklin the only one harboring these sentiments. In her dissertation, “Re-Writing the Empire,” Heather Schwartz focuses on themes of imperial union and institutional reorganization in the political atmosphere before and during the American Revolution. She has unearthed over 130 plans to reform the empire. Heather Schwartz, “Re-Writing the Empire: Plans for Institutional Reform in British America, 1643–1788” (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2011).

¹⁴ Franklin, “The Legal Tender of Paper Money in America,” Feb. 13, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:35; Joseph Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1973), 18–42; Franklin, “Cool Thoughts,” in *PBF*, 11:153.

that the empire needed a “fixed, steady, uniform Value” for all colonial paper currency, backed by mortgage-loan securities, in order to correct this problem in the colonies. His plan for “an equal Currency for all Amer[ica]” called for the establishment of new imperial institutions, new loan offices in each of the colonies, new imperial officers to staff those offices, and a standardized policy for the emission of bills and the maintenance of securities. In essence, Franklin envisioned a bureaucratic structure tying the colonies closer together with themselves and with the metropole.¹⁵

Franklin likewise contended that imperial impositions that cramped and restrained trade, manufacturing, and imperial expansion should be repealed or reconsidered after a parliamentary union. Franklin opined that imperial policies only created “great and violent jealousies.” He well knew that colonial settlers already pushed westward beyond the control of the empire, that hatters still made hats, that slitting mills continued to grow, and that colonists, whether in Boston, New York, or Philadelphia, openly defied imperial trade regulations. As Franklin asked Shirley in December 1754, “what imports it to the general state, whether a merchant, a smith, or a hatter, grow rich in *Old* or *New* England?” The “strength and wealth of the whole,” he resolved, was necessary to sustain the empire and to prevent its ultimate collapse. Consequently, Franklin promoted new colonies in the Ohio Valley, joined the Grand Ohio Company, attempted to push through grants of land in the Board of Trade, and hobnobbed with other imperial officials.¹⁶

The aggressive acts of Parliament of the 1760s initially solidified Franklin’s belief in the necessity of a consolidated empire and policy reform. Writing in May 1764 to Richard Jackson, colonial agent for Pennsylvania, Franklin reasoned that “two distinct Jurisdictions or Powers of Taxing cannot well subsist together in the same Country.” “If you chuse to tax us,” he concluded, “give us Members in your Legislature and let us be one People.” For Franklin, such a union could heal the widening breach in the empire. As he posited to Joseph Galloway in 1767, “I doubt People in Government here will never [*sic*] be satisfied without some

¹⁵ Franklin, “Legal Tender of Paper Money,” in *PBF*, 14:36; William Riddell, “Benjamin Franklin and Colonial Money,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 54 (1930): 60; Franklin, “Scheme for Supplying the Colonies with a Paper Currency,” Feb. 11–12, 1765, in *PBF*, 12:47.

¹⁶ Franklin, “Magna Britannia: Her Colonies Reduc’d (Explanation and Moral),” [Jan. 1766?], in *PBF*, 13:66; Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:449.

Revenue from America, nor America ever satisfy'd with their imposing it; so that Disputes will, from this Circumstance besides others, be perpetually arising, till there is a consolidating Union of the whole."¹⁷

Franklin did not confine his proposals for reform to an official and formal audience. He utilized a growing popular political interest in England to present his visions for imperial reform to a larger English public. Between 1765 and 1768, he published fifty-five letters and articles in the London press. He used these writings not only to attack parliamentary taxation but also to convince the populace of the deleterious effect of the longstanding imperial laws and regulations. As in his private correspondence, Franklin's letters in the London press lambasted trade regulations, the stifling of manufacturing, and the lack of an imperial currency. He put forth that should the imperial government "persist in restraining their Trade, distroying their Currency, and Taxing their People by Laws made by a Legislature, where they are not Represented," the "whole state" would be "weakened" and "perhaps ruined for ever!"¹⁸

To combat this weakness of the empire and ensure its future strength and stability, Franklin's publications also tackled the necessity of imperial reform. He informed English readers that it was "*highly the interest of this country* to consolidate its dominions, by *inviting*, and even (if it has a power) *compelling* the Americans as well as Irish to submit to an union, send representatives hither, and make one common p——t of the whole." In 1766, he published in the *London Chronicle* three of his old letters to William Shirley of 1754 that argued for the importance of restructuring the Acts of Trade and Navigation and the necessity of a consolidated empire. Likewise, he published his thoughts on an imperial currency and wrote the chapter on its necessity in Thomas Pownall's *Administration of the Colonies*. Nevertheless, neither Franklin's prognostications in the press nor his arguments to imperial officials had any effect.¹⁹

¹⁷ Franklin to Richard Jackson, May 1, 1764, in *PBF*, 11:185; Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Apr. 14, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:122. See also Franklin's letter to Lord Kames, Feb. 25, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:62.

¹⁸ Franklin, "Magna Britannia: Her Colonies Reduc'd (Philadelphia Explanation)," [1767–1768?], and "Magna Britannia . . . (Explanation and Moral)," in *PBF*, 13:71, 66. Franklin made similar arguments in his "N. N.: Reply to Vindex Patriae," *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 28, 1765, in *PBF*, 12:413. See also his "Reply to Coffee-House Orators," *London Chronicle*, Apr. 7–9, 1767; "On the Propriety of Taxing America," *London Chronicle*, Apr. 11, 1767; "Right, Wrong, and Reasonable," *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Apr. 18, 1767; and "On Smuggling," *London Chronicle*, Nov. 21–24, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:102, 110, 129, 315.

¹⁹ Franklin, "N. N.: Reply to Vindex Patriae on American Representation in Parliament," *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 29, 1766, in *PBF*, 13:65; Franklin, "A Lover of Britain:

The “unsettled State of the Ministry,” Franklin believed, hindered his ability to promote reforms. As one ministry settled into office, rumors of a new one abounded. Between 1760 and 1770, the English government rotated through seven different ministries, and Franklin complained that all public business was at a standstill until “the ministry is established.” He found the frequent changes in the ministry exasperating. When attempting to impress upon the Chatham administration in 1767 the necessity of colonial paper money and the repeal of the Currency Act, he found his attempts “frustrated” by the “strong Talk” of a new ministry.²⁰

In addition to the frustration caused by frequent turnovers of administrations, the ministerial cabinets were, as John Brooke argues, “a jumble of opinions.” The 1760s witnessed a clash of political worlds. The Old Corps Whigs—the world of Walpole, Pelham, and Newcastle’s broad-bottom coalitions—had transformed into a more factionalized political existence. There were Grenvillites, Bedfordites, Chathamites, Rockinghamite Whigs, and a growing popular opposition unattached to a parliamentary faction. This factionalism had a profound impact on the functioning of several different administrations. Lord Chatham’s cabinet, for example, included not only Chathamites such as Lord Shelburne and Lord Camden but men from the Grenville and Rockingham factions. Accordingly, no clear direction or policy emerged. Although Chatham intended to quell party interests when putting together his cabinet, his administration proved fractured and politically divisive. As Franklin pointed out, internal factionalism made any attempt to reform the empire exceedingly difficult, as time was “wasted in Party Contentions about Power and Profit, in Court Intrigues and Cabals, and in abusing one another.”²¹

The chief obstacle to reform and the redress of grievances, however, proved to be the fact that avenues of negotiation within the empire were diminishing as a result of Parliament’s rigid attitude toward opposition. Parliament adopted this disdainful mood in response to an outbreak of

Preface to Three Letters to William Shirley,” *London Chronicle*, Feb. 6–8, 1766, in *PBF*, 13:118. The three letters to William Shirley were written between December 3, 1754, and December 22, 1754 (see *PBF*, 5:441–49); Thomas Pownall, *The Administration of the Colonies*, 4th ed. (London, 1768), 243–53.

²⁰ Franklin to Hugh Roberts, July 7, 1765, in *PBF*, 12:201; Franklin to William Franklin, July 26, 1765, in *PBF*, 12:221; Franklin to Joseph Galloway, May 20, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:163.

²¹ Sir Lewis Namier and John Brooke, *The House of Commons, 1754–1790* (London and New York, 1964), 98; Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Aug. 8, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:228.

popular protests that revolved around domestic grievances that were often fueled by the growing imperial dispute. By the 1760s, clubs and societies that existed outside the purview of elite parliamentary leadership had sprung up in London and throughout the provincial towns of England. Such extraparliamentary politics, while providing many people with a sense of their own voice, simultaneously demonstrated their marginalization in a political system that treated popular opposition as illegitimate and unworthy of formal recognition. Such a realization helped generate, according to historian Kathleen Wilson, a “radical rhetoric” that expressed frustration with political exclusion and led to “more far-reaching demands for change.”²² The popular press started to decry not only the existence of rotten boroughs but also the relationship between representatives and their constituents. Banners, flags, handbills, and tickets adorned in hats promoted “Annual Parliaments” and “Equal Representation.”²³ Throughout the latter half of the 1760s and early 1770s, London witnessed numerous riots and public political ceremonies challenging the authority of the government. As a result, British politicians became fixated on political instability and methods by which to cure it.²⁴

The crisis in relations with the North American colonies that stemmed from parliamentary taxation exacerbated political problems in England. Colonial grievances agitating for representation in Parliament resonated with an English public that harbored similar complaints.²⁵

²² Kathleen Wilson, *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture, and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (London and New York, 1995), 227–28.

²³ Wilson, *Sense of the People*, 212–29; Lucy S. Sutherland, *The City of London and the Opposition to Government, 1768–1774: A Study in the Rise of Metropolitan Radicalism* (London, 1959), 12.

²⁴ My understanding of English politics is largely based on the works of John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (London and New York, 1976); Robert R. Rea, *The English Press in Politics, 1760–1774* (Lincoln, NE, 1963); Sutherland, *City of London and the Opposition to Government*; and Wilson, *Sense of the People*.

²⁵ Colonial grievances, however, did not speak to everyone. As Eliga Gould has recently shown, colonial resistance to parliamentary taxation divided Britain between those who sympathized with the colonies and those who supported the government. Gould often depicts the majority of Britons as supporters of the government and parliamentary taxation. Pamphlets serve as the central component of Gould’s study, although in the years leading up to the American war, Parliament attempted to stifle popular opposition in the press. Nevertheless, Gould excellently demonstrates that after the colonists changed their argument from inclusion in Parliament to exclusion many in England expressed their antipathy toward this position and thus supported imperial measures against the colonies. Eliga H. Gould, *The Persistence of Empire: British Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, and London, 2000), xv–xvii, 140–47. Parliamentary action against the printers of London is discussed in more detail below.

Because of this connection, London newspaper publishers and printers such as John Almon and Henry S. Woodfall readily made available colonial grievances and colonial political tracts.²⁶ Famous anonymous writers such as Junius attacked imperial policy, petitions from the London Livery and the electors of Middlesex drew on colonial grievances to make their cases, and the Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights (SSBR) and the Constitutional Society sent adulations to the colonies for their resistance. As John Horne and John Glynn, members of the SSBR, proclaimed to the Assembly of South Carolina, "Our cause is one—our enemies are the same."²⁷

The instability within the ministry and the eruption of popular political protest led many in Parliament to level blame for public discontent and political volatility on what they viewed as a few mischievous malcontents (notably John Wilkes) and, more broadly, on the very notion of popular opposition. Opposition, according to one anonymous pamphlet extolling the ministry, did nothing more than "controvert every thing advanced by an administration in the gross, and without exception." Popular opposition, the pamphlet continued, promoted through that "dirty channel of the common news-papers," threatened to level "all *distinctions* by which peace, regularity and good government subsist amongst mankind" and should, as such, be discountenanced.²⁸

Many in Parliament concurred, and they responded by stifling the popular press. Between 1763 and 1773, Parliament took part, in the words of historian Robert Rea, in an "orgy of printer-baiting."²⁹ As one member of the House of Commons noted in 1768, "We have been putting off affairs of the greatest consequence, and the time of Parliament has

²⁶ John Sainsbury, *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America, 1769–1782* (Kingston, ON, 1987), 13, 31. Sainsbury, "The Pro-Americans of London, 1769 to 1782," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35 (1978): 423–54; C. C. Bonwick, "An English Audience for American Revolutionary Pamphlets," *Historical Journal* 19 (1976): 355–74.

²⁷ The full letter is in R. T. H. Halsey, *The Boston Port Bill as Pictured by a Contemporary London Cartoonist* (New York, 1904), 111. Franklin was no stranger to the popular politics of London. He frequented the coffee houses and taverns of London and joined the Club of Honest Whigs, which included members such as Joseph Priestley, Richard Price, James Burgh, Joseph Jefferies, and the founder of the SSBR, Richard Oliver. Franklin's acquaintances during his years in England led some, such as Lord Hillsborough, to label him a "Republican, a factious mischievous Fellow." Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Jan. 13, 1772, in *PBF*, 19:16; Franklin to William Franklin, Jan. 30, 1772, in *PBF*, 19:47.

²⁸ *A Vindication of the Present Ministry* (London, 1766), 12, 38, 40, 50. See also Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics*, 55–76.

²⁹ Rea, *English Press in Politics*, 149.

been taken up in what? In examining horse-waterers and newspaper-jackals.”³⁰ Parliament attempted to control and suppress the opposition by issuing general warrants and information ex officio for libel against the printers and writers of London and its environs.³¹ The purpose of the attacks on the press, according to Lord Camden (writing under his nom de plume, “Candor”), was to repress all hints of opposition. “Men known to be in opposition to the Ministry,” he explained, had “their studies rummaged, whenever a galling or abusive pamphlet came out,” all “for the sake of getting at private correspondence and connections, and for the business of disarming the opposition.”³²

Consequently, some publishers flouted the power of the Parliament, and others grew extremely cautious. William Woodfall, part owner of the *Public Advertiser* and sole owner of the *Morning Chronicle*, found that his “slumbers were discomposed by nightly visions of Newgate, yeoman ushers, and serjeants-at-arms.” Publishers and printers such as Charles Say of the *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* and Richard Nutt and John Meres of the *London Evening Post*, who experienced firsthand the power of Parliament, issued warnings in their papers. Say advised “all who honour this paper with their favours” to “have a regard for the safety of the printer.” Likewise, Nutt and Meres instructed their contributors that their statements “must have some softening; for truths are told in so spirited a manner that we dare not run the risque of publishing it.” Even John Almon confessed to John Wilkes in March 1767, “I am now not concerned in any of the public papers,” as “they are so often brought before the House of Lords, and there is so little faith among the printers.”³³

³⁰ Sir Henry Cavendish, *Sir Henry Cavendish's Debates of the House of Commons during the Thirteenth Parliament of Great Britain, Commonly Called the Unreported Parliament, May 10, 1768 to May 3, 1770*, ed. J. Wright (London, 1841), 111.

³¹ Rae, *English Press in Politics*, 110, 143–44. Local magistrates seized private papers, took printers into custody, and hauled them before the King's Bench, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. Once before the court, the detainee was most likely reprimanded with a stiff fine, on average one hundred pounds, and in some cases sent to Newgate or the pillory. According to Robert Rea, printers lost up to a week's ability of work and were “several shillings out of pocket in fees and gratuities to sundry doorkeepers and petty officials” each time they were brought in on a charge of libel. Rae, *English Press in Politics*, 144.

³² Candor [Lord Camden], *A Letter from Candor to the Public Advertiser* (London, 1764), 31–32.

³³ Quote of Woodfall in Alexander Andrews, “History of the Newspaper Press,” *New Monthly Magazine* 109 (1857): 493. Quotes of Say, Nutt, and Meres in William T. Laprade, “The Stamp Act in British Politics,” *American Historical Review* 35 (1930): 744n20; and *London Evening Post*, Mar. 20, 1764. Quote of John Almon to John Wilkes in Rae, *English Press in Politics*, 149.

Grievances both domestic and imperial received similar disdain from Crown, Lords, and Commons. This was especially true as colonial and domestic complaints coalesced. The colonies, according to Franklin, had “many Friends among” the populace of London, particularly the electors of Middlesex and the London Livery, whom he described as “loving and honouring the Spirit of Liberty, and hating arbitrary Power of all Sorts.” He applauded their inclusion “among their Grievances the unconstitutional Taxes on America.”³⁴ Some members in the House of Commons, nevertheless, expressed their opinion that petitioners were merely “a few despicable mechanics, headed by base-born people, booksellers, and broken tradesmen,” those “scum of the people, unworthy to enter the gates of his majesty’s palace.” As Charles Jenkinson, MP for Appleby, argued, “to found . . . the authority of this House upon the popular voice, is vain and idle.” Colonial petitions, likewise, received little recognition. Barlow Trecothick, MP and alderman for the city of London and colonial agent for New Hampshire, caustically remarked, “The practice of refusing to receive petitions from America is, it seems, to be continued.”³⁵

To make matters worse, the empire had changed the way it managed the colonies. In January 1768, the ministry attempted to streamline its management of its North American empire by creating a secretary of state for the colonies. At first, Franklin applauded the efforts of the ministry to update its management, but when he observed how the office actually functioned, he changed his mind. The first secretary of state, Lord Hillsborough, proved no friend of America. Obsessed with proper form, and incensed by what he viewed as colonial truculence, he refused to recognize agents who were not approved by both the colonial assemblies and the governors, effectively denying numerous agents access to the central power governing the colonies, Franklin included. Where Franklin had once been able to grease the palms of members of the Board of Trade and petty office holders to advance colonial business, he was now cut off and unable to travel within the inner governing circles of the empire.³⁶

³⁴ Franklin to Samuel Cooper, Apr. 27, 1769, in *PBF*, 16:117; Franklin to James Bowdoin, July 15, 1769, in *PBF*, 16:176–77. For an example of domestic uses of colonial grievances, see “The Humble Petition of the Freeholders of the County of Middlesex,” *London Magazine, or, Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer*, May 1769, 227–28.

³⁵ Thomas De Grey and Charles Jenkinson in the House, Jan. 9, 1770, *Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England* (London, 1813), 16:690, 696; Barlow Trecothick in the House, Jan. 25, 1769, *Cavendish’s Debates*, 185.

³⁶ For Franklin’s initial response see “On the New Office of Secretary of State for the Colonies,” *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 21, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:17. Less than a year later, as

The contemptuous disposition of the British government toward opposition and popular grievances is significant for two reasons. First, it displays the seizing up of negotiation within the empire; the press was at least muffled, and grievances were thrown out on mere pretense. This factor alone not only angered Franklin but hampered his ability to present grievances through the proper bureaucratic channels and to utilize the fourth estate. Second, parliamentary action against opposition sparked conflict, sometimes violent, in London. The inability and unwillingness of the government to quell these disturbances by any other means than the show of force correlated, in Franklin's mind at least, with the same problems the governments of the colonies faced and, moreover, with imperial policy. Together these issues changed Franklin's attitude on the future of the empire and the colonies' place within it.

The unwillingness of the imperial government to hear and redress grievances irritated Franklin, who concluded that the members of Parliament were "partial, prejudiced and interested Judges" who had "no true Idea of Liberty, or real Desire to see it flourish or increase." The presentation of petitions was, according to Franklin, "the ancient well contrived channel of communication between the head and members of this great Empire, thro' which the notice of grievances could be received that remedies might be applied." That channel, however, "hath been cut off." Parliament refused to recognize grievances, and Lord Hillsborough had repeatedly dismissed petitions and agents on mere punctilios about form. Speaking of the Dutch Revolt, Franklin argued that the "History of a similar conduct in the Ministry of Spain with regard to the Low Countries, makes one doubt a little the prudence (in any Government how great soever) of discouraging Petitions, and treating Petitioners (how mean soever) with contempt."³⁷

Hillsborough refused to accept agents, Franklin abused the minister in the press and in letters to the colonies. See Franklin to Dennys De Berdt, printed in the *Public Advertiser*, Aug. 31, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:196. Hillsborough, according to Franklin, looked at agents "with an evil eye" and wanted "to get rid of them, being as he has sometimes intimated, of opinion that agents are unnecessary." Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 5, 1771, in *PBF*, 18:25. Nor was Franklin the only agent who thought along these lines. Edmund Burke, agent for New York, argued that this "new plan" for the acceptance of agents marked the "destruction of one of the most necessary Mediums of communication between the Colonies and the parent Country." Edmund Burke to James De Lancey, Dec. 4, 1771, in *Selected Letters of Edmund Burke*, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. (Chicago, 1984), 222.

³⁷ Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Jan. 9, 1769, in *PBF*, 16:10; Franklin, "A Purported Letter from Paris," *Public Advertiser*, Jan. 17, 1769, in *PBF*, 16: 19; Franklin, "The Rise and Present State of Our Misunderstanding," *London Chronicle*, Nov. 6–8, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:268.

Moreover, Parliament's attempt to stifle popular agitation in the press directly affected Franklin's ability to defend colonial resistance and present colonial grievances to the public. In 1768, Franklin noted to his son that he had difficulty publishing his tracts. Writing about the *London Chronicle*, Franklin complained, "The editor of that paper one Jones seems a Grenvillian, or is very cautious," as "his corrections and omissions" had "drawn the teeth and pared the nails of my paper, so that it can neither scratch nor bite. It seems only to paw and mumble."³⁸ Between 1765 and 1768, Franklin averaged around fourteen publications a year; between 1769 and 1773 this rate dropped to an average of four per year.³⁹

Between 1769 and 1772, we know that at least four of Franklin's publications never made it to press. In the first, "A Horrid Spectacle of Men and Angels," Franklin castigated the English government for its "Destruction of Civil LIBERTY" and its "boasts of enjoying Freedom itself," while it "would ruin others for vindicating their common Right to it." The second, "An Account against G. G.," written for the *Public Advertiser*, assailed the policies of Grenville and his faction, particularly Lord Hillsborough, the American secretary. This article was never published and remained in manuscript form. The third and fourth, respectively titled "On the Conduct of Lord Hillsborough" and "A Reply to a Defender of Lord Hillsborough," were savage attacks on the ability and policies of the American secretary and, significantly, on the entirety of imperial governance. Franklin attempted to publish "On the Conduct of Lord Hillsborough" in the *Public Advertiser* on two occasions and was denied each time.⁴⁰ These four articles, by attacking the actions, decisions, and policies of the government, would have been deemed seditious and dangerous to what Parliament considered "the peace and good order, as well as the dignity, of his Majesty's government." Moreover, refusal to publish Franklin's articles was completely comprehensible, as such statements were particularly perilous for printers at a time when the

³⁸ Franklin to William Franklin, Jan. 9, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:16.

³⁹ These averages are taken from *PBF*, vols. 12–20, and Verner W. Crane, *Benjamin Franklin's Letters to the Press, 1758–1775* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1950). The averages do not include "The Colonist's Advocate" letters written in 1770, as Carla H. Hay argues persuasively that these were authored by James Burgh, not Benjamin Franklin. See Hay, "Benjamin Franklin, James Burgh, and the Authorship of 'The Colonist's Advocate' Letters," *William and Mary Quarterly* 32 (1975): 111–24.

⁴⁰ These articles are located in *PBF*, 16:18–19, 19–26; 19:216–26, 296–97.

Parliament was demonstrating to “the people, that we are determined to exert ourselves” to suppress all notions of “sedition” in the press.⁴¹

Parliament’s actions toward the press, opposition, and popular grievances played a role in the general disorders on the streets of London. Riots over Wilkes’s imprisonment on May 10, 1768, culminated in the Massacre of St. George’s Field, during which British troops killed at least six people. Parliament’s insistence on stifling the press also resulted in crowd action in which a mob harassed incoming legislators, forcing them to flee through a gauntlet run up to the House doors. Charles James Fox was sent sprawling into a gutter, and Lord North had to dash for his life as the mob overturned his carriage, demolished it, and then proceeded to attack him with a constable’s staff. During the melee North lost his hat, which the mob tore into small pieces and sold as “relics and monuments of their fury.”⁴² Between 1766 and 1770 there were, additionally, silk-weaver riots, grain riots, and crowd activity by coal heavers, sailors, watermen, coopers, glass grinders, sawyers, hatters, and tailors.⁴³

By the middle of 1768, the instability of the ministry, the stifling of opposition, Parliament’s refusal even to consider petitions, and the general disorder on the streets of London weighed heavily on Franklin’s mind. For Franklin, the lawlessness of London conjured up images of the “Disorders on our Frontiers, and the extreme Debility if not wicked Connivance of our Government and Magistrates” in Pennsylvania. Since the early 1760s, Franklin had deplored the weakness of Pennsylvania’s government and its inability to deal with the “lawless” frontier as he sought to transform the province into a royal colony. In the same vein, Franklin wanted to remove instability within the entire empire through imperial reform and the formation of a stronger “consolidating Union.”⁴⁴

To Franklin’s dismay, though, the English government was in a “Situation very little better” than Pennsylvania, as “all respect to law and government seems to be lost.” Writing just four days after the Massacre at St. George’s Field, Franklin expressed his consternation that “Even this Capital, the Residence of the King, is now a daily Scene of lawless Riot and Confusion.” Mobs and crowds patrolled “the Streets at Noon Day,

⁴¹ *Cavendish’s Debates*, 101–6.

⁴² Horace Walpole, *Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third* (London, 1845), 4:302–3.

⁴³ Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics*, 18.

⁴⁴ Franklin to John Ross, May 14, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:128; Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Apr. 14, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:125.

some Knocking all down that will not roar for Wilkes and Liberty." He saw "Coalheavers and Porters pulling down the Houses of Coal Merchants . . . Sawyers destroying the new Sawmills; Sailors unrigging all the outward-bound Ships," and "Weavers entering Houses by Force, and destroying the Work in the Looms." Yet instead of redressing the public's grievances or even considering petitions, the ministers were "divided in their Counsels, with little Regard for each other, worried by perpetual Oppositions, in continual Apprehension of Changes." Their only solution was to send "Soldiers firing among the Mobs and killing Men, Women and Children." He concluded that a "great black Cloud" hovered over London, "ready to burst in a general Tempest."⁴⁵

With this realization, all talk of a consolidated union, a British nation composed of "one Community with one Interest," vanished from Franklin's writing.⁴⁶ Over the course of the 1750s and 1760s, Franklin thought long and hard on what was right, what was just, what was reasonable, and, ultimately, what would govern effectively. For the greater part of the 1760s, all those thoughts added up to a closer union with Britain, but by the latter half of 1768, that idea was no longer desirable. Writing in the *London Chronicle* on October 20, 1768, Franklin laid bare his new vision for the future of the empire. The colonies, Franklin contended, were "different states" under the same king.⁴⁷ While Franklin had flirted with the idea of the colonies as dominions under the king before, he had always prefaced his statements as unsettled and the imperial relationship as ambiguous. In essence, Franklin had believed that the colonies could be subjects under the king or that they could be subjects of the King-in-Parliament, but the relationship had never been settled.⁴⁸

By the latter half of 1768, however, no middle ground remained, and no ambiguity existed. The colonies, in Franklin's mind, were and ought to be distinct states under the king. Although many in England would find this notion of the colonies as distinct states absurd, a claim "founded on an impossibility, an *imperium in imperio*," Franklin argued that "a King may be constitutionally King of two different states, as was formerly the

⁴⁵ Franklin to John Ross and Franklin to Joseph Galloway, May 14, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:127, 128. See also Franklin to William Franklin, Apr. 16, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:98.

⁴⁶ Franklin to William Shirley, Dec. 22, 1754, in *PBF*, 5:449.

⁴⁷ Franklin, "Arguments Pro and Con: I," *London Chronicle*, Oct. 20, 1768, in *PBF*, 15:233–37.

⁴⁸ Franklin, "N. N.: On the Tenure of the Manor of East Greenwich," *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Jan. 11, 1766, in *PBF*, 13:22; Franklin to Lord Kames, Feb. 25, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:64–71.

case here, when the Parliaments of England and Scotland were absolutely independent of each other." The colonies, Franklin maintained, had a constitutional arrangement similar to that of Scotland before the union and therefore existed as different states under the king and independent of Parliament.⁴⁹ In 1769, Franklin further separated the colonies from Britain by arguing that they were composed of different peoples. The colonists were no longer "British Subject[s]" but "American Subject[s] of the King." Those writers and political thinkers with whom he had agreed before 1768 who still argued for a consolidated union, such as Thomas Crowley, Franklin deemed "a little cracked."⁵⁰

Such ideas pushed Franklin beyond the boundary of accepted political thought in England. While men such as William Strahan, Franklin's friend and correspondent, instructed the printer of the *Pennsylvania Gazette* to "trust, with some Degree of Confidence, in the Justice and the Wisdom of Parliament," Franklin wrote differently to the colonies.⁵¹ To Joseph Galloway he explained, "the Publick affairs of this Nation" were "in great Disorder."⁵² The British government had no "wise regular Plan," and Britain suffered under "unjust and blundering Politics." "We govern," Franklin concluded to his son, "from Hand to Mouth." Privately, Franklin asked, "How can we suppose they [Parliament] will be just to us at such a Distance, when they are not just to one another?" The answer, Franklin believed, was that they could not be trusted. Expressing indignation while reflecting on his experiences with the vagaries of English politics, he complained of "the *unequal Representation*, too, that prevails in this

⁴⁹ Franklin, "Arguments Pro and Con: I," in *PBF*, 15:233. The formulation of an idea of the colonies as independent states cannot be understated, as it was a crucial element in the justification for resistance against the empire and a central idea in the formation of statehood and federalism after American independence. See Douglas Bradburn, *The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774–1804* (Charlottesville, VA, and London, 2009), 60, 61–100, 291. See also David C. Hendrickson, *Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding* (Lawrence, KS, 2003), 263–66. Moreover, Franklin's articulation of the colonies as independent states within an empire of states was much earlier than other known colonial articulations such as James Wilson's and Thomas Jefferson's in 1774. Wilson, *Considerations on the Nature and the Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament* (Philadelphia, 1774), and Jefferson, *Summary View*, Aug. 1774, both in *American Archives*, ser. 4, ed. Peter Force (Washington, DC, 1837), 1:690–91.

⁵⁰ Franklin, "Marginalia in a Pamphlet by Allan Ramsay," in *PBF*, 16:304; Franklin to William Franklin, Sept. 1, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:387.

⁵¹ William Strahan to David Hall, Apr. 4, 1770, in "Some Further Letters of William Strahan, Printer," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 60 (1936): 478.

⁵² Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Mar. 21, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:118.

Kingdom, they are so far from having Virtue enough to attempt to remedy, that they make use of it as an Argument why we should have no Representation at all. Be quiet, says the Wag in the Story, I only p[iss] o[n] y[ou]: I sh[it] o[n] t[he] o[ther].” Trust in Parliament, in short, was “totally lost.”⁵³

The only effectual remedy was the establishment of a constitution “ascertaining the relative Rights and Duties of each.” Such a constitution, he believed, would rid the colonies of the “Corruption and Servility of Parliament.” Grievances would have a better chance of being redressed, and the agents of the separate states might have more negotiating power. “When they [the colonies] come to be considered in the light of *distinct states*,” Franklin exhorted, “possibly their agents may be treated with more respect, and considered more as public ministers,” but “if agents can be allowed here on no other footing than is now proposed, we should omit sending any, and leave the crown, when it wants our aids, or would transact business with us, to send its minister to the colonies.”⁵⁴

Although not many politicians would accept such a constitution, Franklin weighed all imperial policies with *his* understanding of the imperial relationship in mind. The ordering of British troops into Boston and the subsequent violence that erupted on March 5, 1770, for example, he found deplorable. “Instead of preventing complaints by removing the causes,” he argued, “it has been thought best that Soldiers should be sent to *silence* them.” The mere presence of British troops in Boston, or any colony for that matter, was not “agreeable to the British Constitution,” for, he reasoned, “the King who is Sovereign over different States” could not “march the Troops he has rais’d by Authority of Parliament in one of the States, into another State, and quarter them there in time of Peace, without the Consent of the Parliament of that other State.”⁵⁵

Once articulated, Franklin’s turn away from a closer union to Britain and toward a vision of the colonies as independent states took him down radical paths that challenged fundamental assumptions not only of sover-

⁵³ Franklin to William Franklin, Apr. 6, 1773, and Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Feb. 14, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:145, 65; Franklin, “Marginalia in *An Inquiry*, an Anonymous Pamphlet,” in *PBF*, 17:330–31; Franklin to Galloway, Mar. 21, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:119.

⁵⁴ Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Jan. 11, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:23; Franklin to Galloway, Apr. 20, 1771, in *PBF*, 18:77; Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 5, 1771, in *PBF*, 19:103; and Franklin to Cushing, Apr. 13, 1772, in *PBF*, 18:25.

⁵⁵ Franklin, “The Rise and Present State of Our Misunderstanding,” in *PBF*, 17:270; and Franklin to Joseph Galloway, June 11, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:168.

eignty but of subjecthood. He had already concluded that Americans were not British subjects, but American subjects of the same king. By 1773, as he pored over press articles calling for parliamentary acts to ban emigration to the colonies, and as the prospects for new colonies floundered, Franklin expressed his opinion “that it is the natural Right of Men to quit when they please the Society or State, and the Country in which they were born, and either join with another or form a new one as they may think proper.”⁵⁶

Such thoughts of the natural right of expatriation stemmed from Franklin’s evolving understanding of the history of the colonies. As he articulated a vision of the colonies as distinct states, he justified this position by presenting a picture of colonial settlement under the king as one of contract and choice. The colonies, Franklin argued to Lord Kames, “were planted at the Expence of private Adventurers” who “*voluntarily* engag’d to remain the King’s Subjects, though in a foreign Country, a Country which had not been conquer’d by either King or Parliament, but was possess’d by a free People.” Similarly, he argued “that every Briton who is made unhappy at home, has a Right to remove from any Part of his King’s Dominions into those of any other Prince where he can be happier,” or emigrants could “purchase Territory in another Country” and “either introduce there the Sovereignty of their former Prince” or “erect a new State of their own.”⁵⁷

Franklin realized that his opinions differed substantially from “those great Common Lawyers” of England. In fact, such thoughts were beyond the pale, as expatriation was antithetical to British subjecthood. According to Douglas Bradburn, “British subjecthood depended upon feudal conceptions of perpetual natural allegiance, enshrined by such standards as Coke’s interpretation of *Calvin’s Case* of 1603.” Moreover, *Blackstone’s Commentaries*, in which Blackstone stated that a “natural-born subject of one prince cannot by act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the for-

⁵⁶ Franklin to William Franklin, July 14, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:300.

⁵⁷ Franklin to Lord Kames, Feb. 25, 1767, in *PBF*, 14:62 (*italics added*); Franklin, “On a Proposed Act to Prevent Emigration,” 1773, written for the *Public Advertiser* but never printed, in *PBF*, 20:527; Franklin to William Franklin, July 14, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:300. As with Franklin’s formulation of the idea of the colonies as distinct states, he articulated an idea of the natural right of expatriation earlier than many of his colonial compatriots. See, for example, Thomas Jefferson’s *Summary View*, which is often cited as the first full-fledged articulation of the natural right of expatriation in the colonies before the American Revolution.

mer," were less than ten years old.⁵⁸ These were the acceptable positions in Britain concerning subjecthood and expatriation, and Franklin had pushed them aside.

Franklin's thoughts on sovereignty and subjecthood became known in the political circles of England and effectively alienated Franklin from those governing the empire. His personal letters were often "rubbed" open by imperial officials, and his few letters in the press during his last years in England sparked significant controversy. Franklin's intimate correspondences made their way to the American secretary, Lord North, and other ministers, and even the press published Franklin's private letters without his consent. In addition, Franklin published in September 1773 two political satires in which he skewered imperial policies, attacked parliamentary sovereignty, and attempted to cast the notion of perpetual natural allegiance of British subjecthood as absurd.⁵⁹

Such "political Opinions," as William Strahan noted, put Franklin "not only on bad Terms with Lord Hillsborough, but with the *Ministry in general*."⁶⁰ Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench and the principle promoter of the government's attack on the printers of London, found Franklin's writings "*very ABLE and very ARTFUL* indeed; and would do mischief by giving here a bad impression of the measures of government; and in the colonies, by encouraging them in their contumacy."⁶¹ The political opinions expressed in Franklin's private letters and in the press played a significant role in his "Bull-baiting" in the Cockpit and his subsequent dismissal as deputy postmaster for America.⁶² Franklin even learned "that Copies of several Letters" of his to Thomas Cushing were "sent over here to the Ministers, and that their Contents are treasonable for which I should be prosecuted if Copies could be made

⁵⁸ Franklin to William Franklin, July 14, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:303; Bradburn, *Citizenship Revolution*, 105. Blackstone quoted in Bradburn.

⁵⁹ Franklin to William Franklin, Dec. 2, 1772, in *PBF*, 19:416; Franklin, "Rules by Which a Great Empire May be Reduced to a Small One," *Public Advertiser*, Sept. 11, 1773, and "An Edict by the King of Prussia," *Public Advertiser*, Sept. 22, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:389–99, 413–18. The *Critical Review* (London), for example, published excerpts of a June 8, 1770, letter to Samuel Cooper in which Franklin argued that parliamentary sovereignty over America was a claim "founded only on Usurpation." *Critical Review* 36–40 (1774): 199.

⁶⁰ William Strahan to William Franklin, Apr. 3, 1771, in *PBF*, 18:65.

⁶¹ Franklin to William Franklin, Oct. 6, 1773, in *PBF*, 20:436.

⁶² Franklin to Jane Mecom, Nov. 1, 1773, and Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Jan. 5, 1774, in *PBF*, 20:457, 21:5; Franklin, "Extract of a Letter from London," Feb. 19, 1774, *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Apr. 20, 1774, in *PBF*, 21:112.

Evidence.” Franklin worried about the rumors circulating in London of “apprehending me, seizing my papers, and sending me to Newgate.”⁶³

Franklin’s experience in the Cockpit, his dismissal from office, and even rumors about jailing him for sedition, however, had little impact on his understanding of the status of the colonies in the empire. The vision of the colonies as distinct states, which he had formulated before those dramatic events, endured. When David Barclay, John Fothergill, and Lord Richard Howe, supposedly on the authority of some ministers, asked Franklin to compose terms for reconciliation in December 1774, Franklin adhered to his understanding of the imperial constitution. In his “Hints” for reconciliation, he opined that “Parliament had no Right” to tax America and considered “all Money extorted by it as so much wrongfully taken.” Moreover, Franklin stated flatly that the Navigation Acts should be reconsidered and “re-enacted in all the Colonies” and that “all the duties arising on them were to be collected” by the colonies and “paid into” their treasuries. He also called for the repeal of the acts “restraining Manufactures in the Colonies.” In short, his “Hints” rested on one principle: that the colonies were distinct states under the king and independent of Parliament. He demanded the repeal of all acts or policies that challenged that distinction, or else their reconsideration in those distinct states.⁶⁴

According to Barclay, Franklin’s terms “had been shewn high, and consider’d to contain Matter worth Notice.” Nevertheless, he concluded, “Lords high in Office” considered Franklin’s proposals “*inadmissible*.” Indeed, when Lord Howe learned of Franklin’s “Hints,” he claimed to be “rather sorry to find that the Sentiments express’d in it were” Franklin’s, “as it gave him less hopes of promoting” reconciliation with Franklin’s “Assistance.” There was, Howe stated, “no likelihood of the Admission of those Propositions.”⁶⁵

The reaction to Franklin’s proposals reflect just how politically out of step Franklin had become in the eyes of imperial officials by 1768. Franklin felt out the limits of the possible, stepped beyond them, and found himself in a position of no return. The colonists found themselves

⁶³ Franklin to Thomas Cushing, Apr. 16, 1774, and Feb. 15, 1774, in *PBF*, 21:191, 86.

⁶⁴ David Barclay to James Pemberton, Mar. 18, 1775, and Franklin to William Franklin, Mar. 22, 1775, in *PBF*, 21: 532, 540–99.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

in a similar situation when the first Continental Congress declared their independence of Parliament and their status as citizens of distinct states under the king in 1774. Neither Crown nor Lords nor Commons would accept such a notion, and the colonies, like Franklin, had stepped beyond the permissible notions of sovereignty within the empire.

Franklin's last years in England, his experience with the gritty and divisive politics of the metropole, and his disappointment with the possibilities of imperial reform all contributed to a significant evolution of political thought that was central to the coming of the American Revolution. His position on the place of the colonies in the empire transformed; he went from clamoring for inclusion to demanding exclusion, from promoting a model of a consolidated union to advancing one of distinct states under the king. The latter vision was the main factor in the formulation of an idea of the natural right of expatriation, the ultimate justification for independence. Such ideas were necessary components in the rationalization of colonial resistance and of severing ties with the Crown, the remaining bond holding the colonies to the empire in the 1770s. Moreover, Franklin's experiences with the government of England and his thoughts on imperial reform exposed long-standing structural and functional problems in the empire and a political system that possessed an ineffective mechanism for negotiation that only worsened over the course of the 1760s. Reform could not be achieved nor grievances redressed in such a system. The failure of negotiation was, perhaps, the most crucial event in the coming of the American Revolution. As Franklin himself noted about the causes of civil wars, when diplomacy fails, "the worst of Remedies becomes the only one, the Sword."⁶⁶

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⁶⁶ Franklin to Joseph Galloway, Mar. 21, 1770, in *PBF*, 17:114.

Forgetting Freedom: White Anxiety, Black Presence, and Gradual Abolition in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, 1780–1838

SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVING in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1801, newly appointed state supreme court judge Hugh Henry Brackenridge sat down to finish the sequel to his lengthy and peripatetic satire on the dangers of popular democracy, *Modern Chivalry*. As in the work's earlier installments, it followed the quixotic adventures of the educated and virtuous Captain John Farrago and his naïve “bog-trotting” servant, Teague O'Regan—the former symbolic of thoughtful republican citizenship, the latter of the recently enfranchised, unlettered voter who elected unqualified men to high station. Yet Brackenridge offered more than a lesson on republican citizenship. As John Wood Sweet, Matthew Frye Jacobson, and others have shown, *Modern Chivalry* had a much broader ambit. Had they the opportunity to read it, Brackenridge's Cumberland County neighbors might have found neatly summarized in the text's later pages their own struggle to define citizenship in the age of emancipation.¹

Like Brackenridge, rural citizens were living amid one of the Revolution's most profound and flawed legacies: abolition. In Pennsylvania, full-scale emancipation began in 1780, when the state

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¹ Hugh Henry Brackenridge, *Modern Chivalry*, ed. Claude M. Newlin (New York, 1968); John Wood Sweet, *Bodies Politic: Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730–1830* (Philadelphia, 2007), 309–11; Matthew Frye Jacobson, “‘Free White Persons’ in the Republic, 1790–1840,” chap. 1 in *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, MA, 1999).

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assembly passed An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery.² Uncomfortable with immediate emancipation, Pennsylvania's assembly provided freedom to the children of slaves, but only after twenty-eight years of indenture, or term slavery, that enabled rural masters to recoup their original investment and even profit from the slow end of slavery. Though the act succeeded in delaying black freedom, it fell far short of allaying white worries over the social and material costs of that freedom and actually helped to highlight the deeper political and economic anxieties of postrevolutionary society. Forced to radically reimagine the composition of the body politic, whites across Pennsylvania soon began to ponder how and whether freedpeople would be woven into the new republic. At the same time, emancipation forced rural whites, especially those impacted by postrevolutionary economic depression and the emergence of capitalist social relations, to question their own place in the politics and economy of the new republic.

Keenly, albeit obliquely, Brackenridge revealed how abolition was a site of struggle in rural Pennsylvania and the early republican North. By the closing chapters, Farrago, Teague, and a ragtag group of settlers, in the midst of building a new society in the wild frontier, become embroiled in a debate over suffrage and citizenship: "should the suffrage be universal, or with a qualification of property?"³ As the debate ensues, questions of voting rights rapidly devolve into "admitting beasts to a vote in elections." Even after failed attempts at teaching algebra to squirrels, establishing a monkey as the clerk of courts, and admitting a hound to the bar, the situation remains tense.⁴ Then, Farrago offers some clarity: "if we should admit the beasts to the rights of citizenship, we should have to set them

² On gradual emancipation in Pennsylvania see Gary B. Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Pennsylvania and Its Aftermath* (New York, 1991); and Arthur Zilversmit, *The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slavery in the North* (Chicago, 1967), 124–37. For slavery and emancipation in the postrevolutionary North see Sweet, *Bodies Politic*; Joanne Pope Melish, *Disowning Slavery: Gradual Emancipation and "Race" in New England, 1780–1860* (Ithaca, NY, 2000); Graham Russell Hodges, *Root and Branch: African Americans in New York and East Jersey, 1613–1863* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1999); James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, *In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community, and Protest among Northern Free Blacks, 1700–1860* (New York, 1998); Leon Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860* (Chicago, 1961); David Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, NY, 1975); Gary B. Nash, *The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge, MA, 2006); and Paul Finkelman, *Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson* (Armonk, NY, 1996).

³ Brackenridge, *Modern Chivalry*, 644.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 646–52, 661–64, 680–719.

free as we have the Negroes.” “The very right of suffrage,” he suggests, “would be a manumission.” Farrago reminds settlers that extending “equal privileges” to animals would mean they could no longer “treat them as beasts of burden, or use them for the draught . . . nor even ride a horse, but on condition of taking turns, and letting him sometimes ride us.” With that, Farrago’s hyperbole makes clear the link between emancipation and inclusion. Urging settlers to consider the psychic and material benefits gained from domination, Farrago reveals that the extension of rights to animals is problematic, just like the extension of such privileges to African Americans. Troubled by the implications of animal suffrage, the settlers in *Modern Chivalry* choose to forget the idea.⁵

The same could be said of Brackenridge’s Cumberland County neighbors: anxious about impending freedom for slaves, they simply chose to forget freedom. Borrowing from Joanne Pope Melish, this essay argues that rural whites, faced with the uncertainties of gradual emancipation, economy, and citizenship, developed a twofold amnesia about slavery and emancipation. On the one hand, rural actors chose to forget the “ontological condition” of freedom implicit in the idea of term slavery; they continued to treat post-nati slave children as property. On the other hand, and encouraged by the seemingly degraded condition of free blacks and early national racial discourse, rural whites chose to ignore former enslavement as a causative factor in the persistent disadvantage of freed-people. An exploration of emancipation and its discontents in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, allows for an investigation into the ways in which white anxiety over the black presence in the decades following gradual emancipation collided with anxieties over citizenship and economic inequality to limit freedom, solidify racial difference, and mark free blacks as unfit for inclusion in the body politic. Such an investigation not only broadens and deepens our understanding of rural emancipation by contributing to a growing literature on slavery and abolition outside of Philadelphia but also enhances our understanding of the reshaping of racial attitudes and African American lives during the early years of the republic.⁶

⁵ Ibid., 712.

⁶ On slavery and abolition outside of Philadelphia, especially at the rural county and town level, see Nash and Soderlund’s work on Chester County in *Freedom by Degrees*; John Alosi, *Shadow of Freedom: Slavery in Post-Revolutionary Cumberland County, 1780–1810* (Shippensburg, PA, 2001); Willis L. Shirk Jr., “Testing the Limits of Tolerance: Blacks and the Social Order in Columbia, Pennsylvania, 1800–1851,” *Pennsylvania History* 60 (1993): 35–50; Christopher M. Osborne,

For some in Cumberland County, including Roger B. Taney and the other young men who made up the Belles Lettres Society of Dickinson College in Carlisle, Enlightenment-era science and the natural histories of racial groups offered ready answers to the questions gradual abolition provoked. When in 1795 the society held a debate on the “origins of the races of mankind,” they brought to the rural world a question of considerable currency among enlightened scholars on both sides of the Atlantic. Influenced as much by Christian theology as by emergent ethnology, the debate over whether human differentiation was explained by multiple creations (polygenesis) or whether man descended from a “common original” (monogenesis) encouraged Taney and his fellow students to undertake an exploration of the (un)naturalness of racial equality.⁷

In the theory of polygenism, members of the Belles Lettres Society found an account of separate, distinct, and hierarchical creations that presented racial difference as innate and unchangeable. First broached in Isaac La Peyrère’s *Praeadamitae* (1655), polygenism had gained considerable influence around the Atlantic world and found a number of supporters—whether in the patent racism of Edward Long’s *History of Jamaica* (1774), the strange rereading of the second chapter of the Book of Genesis offered by Scottish philosopher Henry Home, Lord Kames, or Thomas Jefferson’s quasi-polygenism in *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785). Though not a fully committed polygenist, Jefferson floated in the *Notes* a particularly negative supposition about black citizenship; blacks, “whether originally a distinct race,” a “separate species,” or made different by time and environment, “are inferior to the whites in the endowments of both body and mind.”⁸

“Invisible Hands: Slaves, Bound Laborers, and the Development of Western Pennsylvania, 1780–1820,” *Pennsylvania History* 72 (2005): 77–99; Steven B. Burg, “The North Queen Street Cemetery and the African-American Experience in Shippensburg, Pennsylvania,” *Pennsylvania History* 77 (2010): 1–36.

⁷ Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (New York, 1963), 41; Colin Kidd, *The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600–2000* (Cambridge, 2006), 109–10.

⁸ Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (London, 1787), 239–40; Peter Kitson, “‘Candid Reflections’: The Idea of Race in the Debate over the Slave Trade and Slavery in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century,” in *Discourses of Slavery and Abolition: Britain and Its Colonies, 1760–1838*, ed. Brycchan Carey et al. (New York, 2004), 11–25; Michael Banton, *Racial Theories* (Cambridge, 1987), 17, 27–28; Kidd, *Forging of Races*, 62–66; Nicholas Hudson, “From ‘Nation’ to ‘Race’: The Origin of Racial Classification in Eighteenth-Century Thought,” *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 29 (1996): 247–64.

Polygenist thought raised important questions for white citizens tackling the issue of black inclusion in the young American republic. That members of the Belles Lettres Society would ultimately ignore polygenism in favor of the then-dominant monogenist strain of racialist thought does not obscure the fact that the future leaders' concern for racial origins was rooted in the question of whether blacks were capable of becoming equal citizens. Monogenists answered in the affirmative—so long as free blacks could become culturally and physically white. Convinced though they might have been of the universality of mankind, monogenist thinkers nevertheless neatly supported Caucasian cultural superiority—and, by extension, racial superiority and imperial authority.

Monogenism emphasized the universal origins of mankind established by the Mosaic account of creation. This idea was developed and expanded upon by Continental natural philosophers and by American thinkers such as Philadelphia's Benjamin Rush and Princeton's Samuel Stanhope Smith with increasingly complex—and arguably misguided—explanations for human racial variety. Monogenists argued for a process of degeneration that began after the fall from Eden. It was, to be sure, an uneven process, for most natural historians argued that some races had degenerated more than others—in particular, Africans more than Europeans. As such, when natural historians pondered the causes of degradation, they often explained human difference through social and environmental forces that Smith and Rush thought to be reversible. By the close of the eighteenth century, Scottish philosophy led them to see blackness not as a sign of permanent difference and degeneracy but as a condition. Rush's earliest denunciations of slavery attacked the perceived inferiority of black folks by arguing that degeneracy was the consequence of enslavement. The Rush of later years was more "scientific" in that he expended much of his intellectual energy in locating the cause of blackness, which, he suggested, was "a disease in the skin of the leprous kind." Blended together over a thirty-year period, these views amounted to a hopeful vision of a more inclusive future in which educated and employed African Americans could gain the same "privileges of free-born" whites.⁹ Likewise convinced

⁹ On Rush's monogenism see Rush, *An Address to the Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America upon Slave-Keeping* (Philadelphia, 1773), in *American Political Writing during the Founding Era: 1760–1805*, ed. Charles S. Hyneman and Donald S. Lutz (Indianapolis, 1983), 1:217–30; Rush to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 4, 1797, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, ed. Lyman H. Butterfield (Princeton, NJ, 1951), 2:786; Rush, "Observations intended to favour a supposition that

of blacks' ability to become physically and culturally white, Smith offered in his *Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species* (1788) a convoluted explanation for corporeal difference: the compounding effect of climate and savagism upon the human skin. Inhabitants of torrid climes and savage states gained their "deep bilious tinge" from long-term exposure to the sun, "extreme heat . . . putrid animal, or vegetable exhalations," and the "injurious effects" of uncivilized social, political, and economic formations. Together, change in geography and the opportunity to attain the advanced mode of living displayed by white society, Smith believed, would wash African Americans of their more "barbarous" features. For evidence, Smith turned to the story of the "Great Curiosity," Henry Moss: a Virginia-born African American whose color changed "from a deep black, to a clear and healthy white." Moss and his whitening body provided physical proof for Smith that people of color could be woven into the republic, that seemingly degraded and different folks might metamorphose into respectable (white) citizens.¹⁰

And such ideas seemed to have an impact upon rural areas, where by the last decade of the eighteenth century a once-certain institution was being scrutinized and, in some cases, satirized. During the first two decades of emancipation, the *Carlisle Gazette* ran a series of humorous though telling anecdotes in which cheeky slaves posed their masters—and those reading the paper—profound questions about race. Deploying stock African American characters and dialect, such tales might have supported longstanding notions about racial inferiority, but they also, through the language of morality, turned to questions of equality. The story of Cato is a good example. Approaching his dying master's bedside, Cato is surprised by his master's desire to "do [Cato] a very great honour before he died." Cato is elated, expecting real recompense for his life of service. He is troubled, however, to discover that his master's gift is to bury him in the "family vault." For Cato this represents "neither honor or profit," for he fears that when "the devil come looking for massa in the dark, he might

the Black Color (as it is called) of the Negroes is derived from the Leprosy," *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 4 (1799): 289–97.

¹⁰ Samuel Stanhope Smith, *An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1810), 51, 151; Bruce R. Dain, *A Hideous Monster of the Mind: American Race Theory in the Early Republic* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 25–26, 38–39. For Henry Moss see Smith, *Essay*, 83, 92–95; Charles D. Martin, *The White African American Body: A Cultural and Literary Exploration* (Piscataway, NJ, 2002), 34–41; Sweet, *Bodies Politic*, 275–86; and Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 140–50.

take away the poor negar man by mistake.”¹¹ Interrogations about the devil are equally reflexive. “Asked what colour he believed the devil was,” a slave responds, wryly, “the white men paint him black, we say he is white; but from his great age . . . I should suppose him grey.”¹² Such anecdotes—and there were a number of them—undermined slavery by highlighting the immorality of white masters and reflected monogenist notions of shared creation by making sin neither exclusively black nor white.

Still, in rural Pennsylvania, the humor of such maxims and the power of enlightened monogenism would have faded quickly. Beyond the walls of Dickinson College there was little debate on the natural history of race, the subject of racial equality, or the morality of slave keeping. In large part, views on slavery and equality were a product of geography. Located near the Maryland border, Cumberland residents might well have seen slavery as more acceptable than their neighbors elsewhere in Pennsylvania.¹³ Moreover, the institution’s acceptability was strengthened by the absence of abolitionists and by religious institutions that did not immediately call slavery into question. Indeed, as Steven Burg’s recent work on Shippensburg has shown, abolitionist sentiment in Cumberland County was always quite limited, in large part because so few Quakers lived in the region and because the county’s predominately Presbyterian slaveowners did not encounter “pressure” from the pulpit to end slavery or manumit slaves.¹⁴ Finally, rural residents, if they turned to the institution of slavery later than their urban counterparts, nevertheless understood the critical role slavery played in the development of personal and regional economies.¹⁵ Thus, the breakdown of slavery did not immediately prompt rural masters to consider questions of racial equality and origins. Rather, it prompted them first to register their slaves and post-nati children with John Agnew, clerk of the Court of Session for Cumberland County, and, second, to ponder the implications of emancipation.

Agnew did not have an enviable job. Following the enactment of gradual abolition in 1780, which required masters to register their slaves, and amendments passed in 1788 that required the registration of term-slave

¹¹ *Carlisle Gazette, and the Western Repository of Knowledge*, Aug. 2, 1786.

¹² *Ibid.*, July 15, 1789.

¹³ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 4–5, 82–85.

¹⁴ Burg, “North Queen Street Cemetery,” 3–4.

¹⁵ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 82–85; Burg, “North Queen Street Cemetery,” 5.

children, the clerk of sessions was visited by nearly four hundred of his neighbors, many of whom grumbled at the very idea of recording their human property. While we are not privy to the conversations that went on between the clerk and his neighbors, some of them, like Carlisle attorney George Stevenson and Shippensburg merchant Francis Campbell, did us the favor of writing down their reactions to the Gradual Abolition Act. On October 7, 1780, just like other registrants, Stevenson dutifully recorded the names and ages of his three adult slaves, Dick, Phil, and Mills. Then, at the bottom of his registration document, he wrote a short but incisive attack on the clerk and Pennsylvania's General Assembly. First, Stevenson chided his representatives for creating such "an useless Act." Then, he complained about the costs of registration, attacking Agnew at the same time for profiting from the act, since the clerk would be able to "pay his tax" with the fees collected from registration. Eight years later, Francis Campbell echoed Stevenson's sentiment when he registered five-year-old Dave and three-year-old Agee. "Excuse My Freedom," begged Campbell, but it is "Surprising" that the assembly's self-described "Gentlemen" would "load the Inhabitants with Expenses in making their frivolous Laws." Together, Stevenson and Campbell probably said what many of their slaveholding neighbors were thinking: that as property owners, the very public that the General Assembly represented, they paid for legislation they did not want in the first place. Yet beneath Stevenson's and Campbell's candor and disgruntlement lay the deeper worry that a profitable and once-permanent institution was ending, bringing about troubles economic, social, and, eventually, political.¹⁶

Understanding these troubles begins with a consideration of Cumberland County's slave and post-nati servant populations in the decades surrounding emancipation. Slaves had been present in the county since its creation in 1751, though the slave population remained quite low during the prerevolutionary years—representing, for instance, less than 2 percent of the population in Carlisle during the mid-1760s.¹⁷ Reliant, scholars tell us, upon a mix of family labor, wage labor, and indentured

¹⁶ Slave Returns, 1780–1841, Clerk of Courts Record Group, Cumberland County Historical Society, Carlisle, PA, online at Cumberland County Archives at <http://ccweb.ccpa.net/archives/inventory.aspx?PSID=541>. On George Stevenson and Francis Campbell see nos. 1780.050 and 1788.001.

¹⁷ Judith Ridner, *A Town In-Between: Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the Early Mid-Atlantic Interior* (Philadelphia, 2010), 53–54, 230n37.

servitude, Cumberland County residents eschewed slavery for other labor forms, in large part because slavery was at odds with traditional modes of household or extensive production employed by most rural agriculturalists.¹⁸ Yet as the county and its economy grew, the expanding demand for labor led rural residents and producers to organize and deploy slaves on a greater scale.

Examining the body of records to which Stevenson's and Campbell's begrudging registrations were added not only illuminates countywide slave populations but also reveals the degree to which Cumberland residents had come to rely on slave labor. In 1780 alone, 322 registrants claimed ownership of 775 enslaved men and women. During 1788–89, the years in which masters were first required to register the children of slaves, 74 owners registered 149 term slaves. And between 1790 and 1820, another 283 registrants would visit the clerk of sessions in order to maintain legal rights to the labor of 287 post-nati servants. The importance and meaning of these numbers, especially slave ownership, is amplified when the county is placed within a state-level context. By the close of the eighteenth century, the majority of Pennsylvania slaves lived and worked in the central and western parts of the state. By 1800, there were but 228 slaves in Cumberland, up only slightly from 223 a decade earlier. Yet compared to state-level trends, slave ownership was alive and well in rural Pennsylvania. Some owners, like Alex Bryan, did manumit their slaves; others, however, chose to hold onto their property.¹⁹ And even at a moment when slavery was rapidly disappearing, slave ownership among Cumberland residents grew relative to the rest of the state. In 1790, when the total number of slaves in Pennsylvania stood at 3,000, Cumberland owners claimed only 7.43 percent of the state's enslaved men and women. By 1800, when the statewide slave population dropped to 1,706, more than 14 percent of slaves resided in the county. Within another decade, almost 39 percent of all Pennsylvania slaves resided in Cumberland County, demonstrating the continuing importance of the institution to rural residents and the rural economy, an economy into which slavery was intricately woven and vitally important.²⁰

¹⁸ Darold Wax, "The Demand for Slave Labor in Colonial Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History* 34 (1967): 333–34; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 8, 15, 32.

¹⁹ Slave Returns, 1780–1841.

²⁰ Federal Census, 1790, 1800, 1810; Burg, "North Queen Street Cemetery," 3.

For Francis Campbell—a Shippensburg-area merchant, innkeeper, and gentleman farmer assessed for more than six hundred acres of land in 1782—the labor of the seven slaves he claimed in 1780 and the six post-nati servants he registered between 1788 and 1802 was irreplaceable.²¹ But Campbell was just one among many masters in the county. In 1780, and for a forty-year period between 1780 and 1820, the majority of slaves and servants registered by the clerk of sessions belonged to farmers—seemingly in spite of the fact that, according to Darold Wax, the “labor requirements” of most farms “did not greatly exceed that which the farm owner and his family could themselves provide.”²² Of the 775 slaves registered in 1780, just over 65 percent were claimed by farmers.²³ Such figures point to an important fact about slavery in rural Pennsylvania. While never deployed “in large numbers,” slaves were nevertheless crucial to colonial and postcolonial agricultural development, for “agriculture probably employed more slaves than” other sectors of the colonial and early national economies.²⁴ Thus, while the nature of Pennsylvania agriculture was such that gang-labor production was inappropriate, inefficient, or cost prohibitive, rural agriculturalists found ample ways to use the labor of slaves. Assessed for more than two hundred acres of farmland in 1780, Fannett Township “cropper” John Holliday had five slaves, according to registration documents. Those slaves, four of them likely under the age of twelve, were vital to the daily and commercial operations of his farmstead. Still, few rural masters owned as many slaves as Holliday; most farmers, in fact, had between one and four slaves. Such was the case with another Fannett Township resident, Robert Anderson, whose slave, an eight-year-old boy named Tom, helped to manage Anderson’s 129-acre farm and sizeable livestock population. Slavery was not merely confined to the county’s agricultural sector, however. Since the county’s founding, and even in the midst of gradual emancipation, slavery was a critical labor source for the region’s ironmasters, innkeepers, millers, heelmakers, watchmakers, and blacksmiths who deployed slaves in the day-to-day operations of their homes and businesses.²⁵

²¹ On Campbell’s property holdings see “State and Supply Transcripts County of Cumberland for the Years 1778, 1779, 1780, 1781, 1782, and 1785,” *Pennsylvania Archives*, 3rd ser. (Harrisburg, 1897), 20:171, 212, 306, 432, 588, 724, 755.

²² Wax, “Demand for Slave Labor,” 333.

²³ Data on profession and slave ownership compiled from Slave Returns, 1780–1840.

²⁴ Wax, “Demand for Slave Labor,” 334.

²⁵ For Holliday see “State and Supply Transcripts,” 570; and Slave Returns, 1780–1841, no.

The centrality of slavery, though, went far beyond economy. Just as important as slavery's place in rural agriculture and industry was its role in shaping the asymmetrical relations of race and power from which white residents benefited. If masters like Holliday came to see the benefits of slave labor late in the eighteenth century, they likely learned quite quickly of the power that came from the ownership of black slaves. Colonial attitudes forged a clear racial divide that made slaves "alien to the white man's culture, in every respect," while at the same time ensuring that masters such as Holliday gained some social status in a community that increasingly divided along economic lines.²⁶ Slavery, too, enabled those without property, but possessing whiteness, to gain and keep certain legal rights and powers, even as their material conditions often marked them as marginal or kept them from direct participation in the society and polity. In short, slavery helped to level white society, to disavow and push to the margins of thought the growing class divisions of rural communities. Nevertheless, emancipation and emergent environmentalist discourse opened new avenues for the achievement of black freedom and equality that threatened to rend not only individual economies but, in the midst of postrevolutionary economic and political uncertainty, the very fabric of rural America as well.

By the last decade of the eighteenth century, Cumberland County was a region marked by deep class divisions, economic insecurities, and, in the midst of the Constitution's ratification, profound questions about its inhabitants' inclusion in the postrevolutionary polity. Cumberland County's "chimney sweeps," "ragamuffins," and farmers alike faced the frustrating realities of a liberalizing economy and a new system of government that promised, as one vocal citizen announced, to "raise the fortunes and respectability of the *well born few*, and oppress the plebeians."²⁷ Emancipation only heightened these anxieties.

Though rural economic instability and the political uncertainty to which it was wedded were not direct products of emancipation, the threat

1780.258. For Anderson see "State and Supply Transcripts," 568; and Slave Returns, 1780–1841, no. 1780.245.

²⁶ Wax, "Demand for Slave Labor," 343.

²⁷ William Petrikin, "The Scourge," *Carlisle Gazette, and the Western Repository of Knowledge*, Jan. 23, 1788. On Petrikin see Saul Cornell, "Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry Anti-Federalism," *Journal of American History* 76 (1990): 1,148–72; and Michael McCoy, "The Margins of Enlightenment: Benjamin Rush, Rural Farmers, and Sociability in Post-Revolutionary Pennsylvania," in *Sociability and Cosmopolitanism: Social Bonds on the Fringes of the Enlightenment*, ed. Scott Breuninger and David Burrow (London, 2012), 141–62, esp. 157–60.

of black freedom deepened these anxieties and left many to ponder the meaning of independence and citizenship. For rural whites, the declining opportunities of the postrevolutionary era were bad enough, but emancipated slaves added another layer of social and economic competition to a world of limited possibilities. Many rural citizens witnessed downward economic mobility, which in turn left their place in the early republican body politic in doubt.

Well before the Revolution, land speculation, population growth, and increased land prices made Cumberland County a site of diminishing opportunities. cursory examination of land warrants reveals that regional notables, such as John Armstrong and George Croghan, sought warrants on several thousand acres, while John Baynton and Samuel Wharton of the Philadelphia-based firm Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan sought warrants on more than eight thousand acres between June 1766 and March 1767.²⁸ Such speculative activities helped to drive up land prices, but so too did the influx of new settlers ensure that the coeval “reduction in the number of local opportunities and the increased value of land” left many Cumberland residents landless.²⁹ Nationally, landlessness was the norm for roughly 10 to 40 percent of the rural population. Locally, the “natural” transition of the county from borderland to hinterland ensured not only that Cumberland County would be woven into “a geographically extended cash and credit market” but that more residents would find themselves among the ranks of the county’s waged laborers, impoverished renters, and depressed tenants.³⁰ Merged with the economic uncertainty of the postrevolutionary years, emancipation unhinged what Melish describes as the once “neat configuration of citizenship, virtue, and economic success.”³¹

In short, the political and economic conditions of the county’s middling and meaner sorts cannot be abstracted from emancipation. No matter how slow the process, the demise of slavery proved quite disconcerting to

²⁸ Baynton and Wharton warrants, Records of the Land Office: Warrant Registers, 1733–1957, ser. 17.88, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.

²⁹ Jackson Turner Main, *The Social Structure of Revolutionary America* (Princeton, NJ, 1965), 18, 46, 61, 62. On Cumberland County see James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man’s Country: A Geographical Study of Early Southeastern Pennsylvania* (Baltimore, 1972), 128; and Ridner, *Town In-Between*, 179–80.

³⁰ Lucy Simler, “Tenancy in Colonial Pennsylvania: The Case of Chester County,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986): 542–69, quote 546; Ridner, *Town In-Between*, 180–83.

³¹ Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 134.

rural whites. For those with slaves, abolition signaled a crisis in production; no longer was their hold on or access to slave labor permanent and unquestioned. For those without slaves, emancipation proved equally troubling. While many rural slaveowners weathered the postrevolutionary years unscathed, the economic crisis that followed the War for Independence further diminished the opportunities for gaining land and ensured that even those who had land were hard-pressed to keep it. Between 1787 and 1795, state monetary policies that limited the supply of paper money, creditor-friendly legislation, and the diligent collection of debts, back taxes, and new taxes led to “mass property foreclosure throughout the state” that unsettled “both the perception and the reality of rural independence.” Exasperated farmers complained that “merciless, rapacious creditors” took farm and field, home and business from “good people” and that elite policies drove hardworking folk “from a state of competency to beggary.” Of course, farmers were not alone in their plight and penury; rural towns such as Carlisle also witnessed the impact of capitalist transformation and postwar economic insecurity. As Ridner has shown, rural townspeople, too, witnessed “a widening chasm between the economic haves and have-nots.”³² By the close of the eighteenth century, Carlisle possessed a growing body of wage and day laborers whose economic position was every bit as precarious as that of their Philadelphia counterparts. By 1798, the bottom 50 percent of taxpayers could claim only 15.5 percent of all the housing value and but 12.8 percent of all taxable wealth in the town. Carlisle was a town where some men’s kitchens were larger and more stately than the residence rented by Joshua Jones on Pomfret Street—a crude home measuring some 15 by 15 feet—or John Walker, “who lived with his wife and six young children in a tiny house measuring a scant 16 × 16 feet . . . that he rented from Robert Blaine.”³³ Set against the backdrop of economic downturn and the closure of opportunities, emancipation read not only as an attack on property rights but on rural folks’ liberty and independence as well.

Emancipation merely added to a context already thick with apprehension because it raised two interrelated questions: what color was the early

³² Terry Bouton, “A Road Closed: Rural Insurgency in Post-Independence Pennsylvania,” *Journal of American History* 87 (2000): 855–87; Ridner, *Town In-Between*, 153.

³³ US Direct Tax, Carlisle, 1798; Judith Ridner, “‘A Handsomely Improved Place’: Economic, Social, and Gender-Role Development in a Backcountry Town, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1750–1810” (PhD diss., College of William and Mary, 1994), 373–77, 379–80.

American citizen, and did poor whites qualify as citizens? As Melish has suggested, “the disassociation of ‘slave’ and ‘negro’ in the course of emancipation inevitably wrenched apart the previously unchallenged association of ‘free’ and ‘white’ as well.”³⁴ Moreover, emancipation and the prospect of black enfranchisement made manifest the deep gulf that lay between revolutionary ideals of equality and the rural socioeconomic realities that disenfranchised many free white men. As Sarah Knott, Colleen Terrell, and Gordon Wood have shown, the revolutionary vanguard aimed to transform atomistic men into a single “body politic.”³⁵ Yet if the revolutionary vanguard envisioned a homogenous and sociable “body politic,” the creation of that collective republican identity was built not on universal democracy but upon the interwoven ideals of virtue and independence. “Virtue” was, as Wood reminds us, “found only in a republic of . . . independent citizens.” Liberated from “dependence,” citizens were “autonomous individuals.”³⁶ These foundations of citizenship mirrored the problems faced by rural folks at the end of the eighteenth century. Viewed against the backdrop of economic decline and shaky autonomy, emancipation made citizenship even more suspect.

With the advent of emancipation, cottagers, laborers, and farmers, already troubled by political and economic changes, witnessed the reconfiguration of previously unquestioned—and psychologically beneficial—hierarchies. Not only did poorer whites face questions about their place in the new republican schema, but they also had to contend with the fact that their longstanding racial superiority over a degraded and enslaved population was trending toward an uncomfortable equality. Indeed, even if freedpeople would increasingly be defined as racially inferior, they were equal to Cumberland County’s poorer whites in two respects. First, they were competing for work in a wage labor economy in which black presence might threaten to lower wages and heighten competition.³⁷ Second, as the political presence of freedpeople grew, especially those men who met the property requirements for voting, it was quite possible that poor

³⁴ Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 138.

³⁵ Colleen Terrell, “‘Republican Machines’: Franklin, Rush, and the Manufacture of Civic Virtue in the Early American Republic,” *Early American Studies* 1, no. 2 (2003): 100–32; Sarah Knott, *Sensibility and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009); Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York, 1992).

³⁶ Wood, *Radicalism of the American Revolution*, 104.

³⁷ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 9.

whites could be written out of the body politic while previously inferior African Americans were written into it.

By forgetting freedom, rural masters and their nonslaveholding neighbors could forestall and foreclose the disruptive future that emancipation offered. Indeed, if the Revolution and gradual abolition seemingly undermined the social and political positions of free whites already marginalized by their declining material conditions, woven into the very fabric of gradual abolition (and located in the processes by which masters negotiated the act) were mechanisms for forestalling the threat posed by impending black freedom. Taken together, gradual abolition and the direct and indirect actions of rural whites created the conditions in which the ontological status of freedom implicit in the status of term slave could be forgotten.

Even as the radical strains of the Revolution offered to widen the body politic, the very document that made such radicalism possible was contradictory enough to create the foundations on which rural communities could construct barriers to black freedom and equality. From the start, Pennsylvania's well-meaning legislators ensured that freedom was limited to a certain segment of the slave population—those whom reformers such as Benjamin Rush thought least tainted by the evil institution—and that the long and “complicated” process of freedom failed to redefine the status of term slaves or prevent rural masters from passing term-slave status on to the free children of term slaves. First, Pennsylvania's conservative brand of abolition did not change slaveowner outlooks, for, as Nash and Soderlund point out, even after emancipation, “owners viewed their bound servants . . . in much the same way as masters of servants and slaves before the Revolution—as laborers owing years of service in return for the price of purchase.”³⁸ And for masters such as Thomas Fisher, a return on his investment often meant an extension of service. In November 1806, Fisher petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions to extend the length of servitude for Lett, a female term slave who had “abandoned” the service of her master. A month earlier, Lett had taken flight with her fourteen-month-old child and a slave for life named Harry Collins. Fisher quickly found the family, but he had been “put to great expenses and troubles in the process.” Hoping to recoup nearly fifty dollars in reward and advertisement costs, Fisher thought an additional six months beyond Lett's

³⁸ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, xv, 186.

twenty-eighth birthday a fair trade.³⁹ Second, while gradual abolition was never intended to create a form of servitude that “continued,” in Pennsylvania’s Justice William Tilghman’s words, “from generation to generation to the end of the world,” cases such as *Stiles v. Nelly* (1823) reveal how the law’s ambiguity helped Cumberland masters to forge “an indefinite chain of limited servitude” to encompass the free grandchildren of slaves.⁴⁰ In the *Stiles* case, Nelly, a term slave claimed by Edward Stiles, sought to use errors in her mother’s registration documents to claim her freedom. Closer inspection of those documents reveals more than a faulty registration. Nelly’s mother, Rachael, was born in November 1780 and registered as a servant to age twenty-eight by Carlisle merchant John Duncan in 1789. Nelly was born six years later, in 1795. Evidently, Duncan’s widow, Sarah, considered Nelly a term slave, for she sold the remainder of Nelly’s time to Stiles, who “claimed Nelly as his servant till 28.”⁴¹ Finding that the “defects” in Rachael’s registration were ultimately corrected in the clerk of courts’ official records, the supreme court ruled in Stiles’s favor and ignored completely the fact that Nelly’s servitude was wholly illegal. Not until *Miller v. Dwilling* (1826) were masters and jurists forced to concede that children born to post-nati servants were not term slaves but perfectly free individuals.⁴²

Yet if state law, by ensuring a slow demise of slavery, proved a useful tool for rural masters hoping to overcome the anxieties raised by abolition, it still fell upon slaveowners to fully forget that term slavery and permanent bondage were not the same. Such obfuscation began and ended with amnesia about freedom. Two cases—Eanus’s struggle to keep his son and the experience of a post-nati woman named Chloe—instructively reveal how masters and their communities overcame their anxieties about emancipation.⁴³

³⁹ Petition of Thomas Fisher, Nov. 5, 1806, Clerk of Courts, Indentured Servant and Apprentice Matters Record Group, Cumberland County Archives, online at <http://ccweb.ccpa.net/archives/Inventory.aspx?PSID=578>, record no. 1806.01.

⁴⁰ Tilghman quoted in Robert Cover, *Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process* (New Haven, CT, 1984), 66; quote in Cover, *Justice Accused*, 63. See also Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 195.

⁴¹ *Stiles v. Nelly* (1823), in *Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, ed. Thomas Sergeant and William Rawle Jr., 17 vols. (Philadelphia, 1818–1829), 10:366–72.

⁴² Edward Raymond Turner, *The Negro in Pennsylvania: Slavery—Servitude—Freedom, 1639–1861* (Washington, DC, 1911), 100; *Miller v. Zwilling* (1826), in *Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania*, 14:442–46; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 195.

⁴³ Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 101; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 186.

In April 1800, “Negro Eanus,” a slave of undetermined age, was indicted for “assault and battery on William Kilgore,” the brother of the man who owned Eanus’s young son and one of two men who attempted to break up Eanus’s family. More than a heartrending tale of a family torn apart by slavery in the age of abolition, the case reveals the ways in which the limits of gradual abolition merged with individual action to undermine and ignore black freedom. Eanus’s trouble with the law and his confrontation with the Kilgores began when his son, an unnamed, seemingly unregistered post-nati servant, ran away from Jesse Kilgore and arrived at the Southampton Township home of Eanus’s master, Robert Clark. The family reunion was short-lived. The Kilgores knew that they would find the boy in the presence of his father. Soon after arriving at the Clark home, the Kilgores found the boy and his father in the kitchen and proceeded to retrieve Jesse Kilgore’s rightful property. The Kilgores were, however, unprepared for the resistance they would encounter. When the boy protested, William Kilgore “took [the boy] by the shoulder and told him to come along.” At that, the boy’s father “cried” out, leapt to his feet, and grabbed his son’s other arm. After a brief tussle, the Kilgores gained control of the boy, “tied him up,” and attempted to leave. Yet just as the Kilgores attempted “to take the boy home,” Eanus appeared with a gun. Distraught at the idea of losing his son again, Eanus told the Kilgores, “if they didn’t leave the boy alone he would blow them up.” Eanus did no such thing; the tense situation was quickly diffused, Eanus was arrested, and Jesse Kilgore regained his property.⁴⁴

Kilgore’s rights to his property were suspect, and, ultimately, the story of Eanus’s encounter with the Kilgores and the courts is rife with the sort of loose ends that helped masters deny that slavery was ending. Unnamed in the indictment, Eanus’s son was reduced to pure property. His lack of a name was possibly a consequence of an even greater error on Kilgore’s part: his seeming refusal to register the young boy. The 1780 Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery required masters to register their slaves with the local clerk of courts, and amendments made in 1788 required masters to register the post-nati children of slaves within six months of their birth. When James McGufin and William Rippey registered their post-

⁴⁴ *Indictments—1750–1800, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania*, ed. Merri Lou Scribner Schaumann (Dover, PA, 1989), no. 2161; *Kalendar of Prisoners*, Apr. 1800, Commissioners Record Group, Cumberland County Archives, online at <http://ccweb.ccpa.net/archives/inventory.aspx?PSID=533>, no. 1800.01.

nati children, they made sure to list “negro wench Sall” and “Negro wench Rachel” as the mothers of Jack and Hannah.⁴⁵ Kilgore missed that detail, for (as far as can be ascertained) he took no pains to register his human property with the Cumberland County clerk of courts. Had he done so, he would have likely noted the boy’s parentage and provided the young boy with a name. More importantly, he would have offered Eanus’s son proof of his date of birth—a birth that likely occurred after the enactment of gradual abolition. Without evidence of his age—without proper registration—the unnamed boy became a slave for life who had emerged, as if by magic, into Kilgore’s service.

Chloe, it seems, also arrived into the world by sleight of hand; and her story, like that of Eanus, survives because the family drama of which she was a part wound its way through the Cumberland County legal system. In June 1801, Chloe was convicted for the murder of her master’s children. Five months earlier, on January 14, 1801, she had drowned Andrew Carothers’s youngest daughter, Lucetta. Seven days later, she did the same to six-year-old Polly Carothers. Soon after, the family’s grief turned to suspicion, and the Carotherses wrung a confession from their tight-lipped slave. After that, her path from the courtroom to scaffold was quick, and in the baking sun of a summer afternoon, Chloe swung.⁴⁶

Just before her execution, Chloe had the opportunity to confess her crime to James Smith, a local Methodist minister. Days later, Smith sent the confession to the local newspaper for publication: “I was born a slave to Mr. William Kelso, who died when I was young and willed me to his daughter, Rebecca, in whose service I lived four years and an half, at the expiration of which time, I was to sold to Mr. Oliver Pollock, with whom I lived about four years, who sold me to my late Master Mr. Andrew Carothers, with whom I lived until I committed that greatest of crimes.”⁴⁷ So begins and ends the story of Chloe’s life. Comprising less than one-quarter of a two-column article, Chloe’s biographical information is brief.

⁴⁵ Slave Returns, 1780–1814, nos. 1801.142 and 1791.013.

⁴⁶ *Kline’s Carlisle Weekly Gazette*, June 24, 1801, July 15, 1801, July 22, 1801.

⁴⁷ *Kline’s Carlisle Weekly Gazette*, July 22, 1801. For comparative purposes see *Confession of John Joyce, Alias Davis, Who Was Executed on Monday, the 14th of March, 1808 . . .* (Philadelphia, 1808), and *Confession of Peter Matthias, Alias Matthews, Who Was Executed on Monday, the 14th of March, 1808 . . .* (Philadelphia, 1808). These confessions, published by Richard Allen, offered much more biographical detail than did Smith. See also Richard S. Newman, *Freedom’s Prophet: Bishop Richard Allen, the AME Church, and the Black Founding Fathers* (New York, 2008), 151–55.

And while Chloe's confession is temporally accurate, her place of birth, her family, several masters, and a sense of her impending freedom are all absent from the story. Such silences help pinpoint an important amnesia that shaped Chloe's life. Chloe's future should have progressed neatly from slavery to freedom. Instead, the two decades between her birth and execution represented a sometimes concerted, sometimes inadvertent, attempt to resolve important questions of race, place, and power in post-emancipation Pennsylvania.

For nearly two decades, legal documents and public discourse described Chloe as property. Chloe was one of three children likely belonging to two of Kelso's adult slaves, Will and Dinah. Will and Dinah, both slaves for life, worked initially on ferryman William Kelso's two-hundred-acre farm in Lancaster County and later at his East Pennsboro home opposite his ferry operation on the Susquehanna River. Of the three children, Chloe was the only one to benefit from Pennsylvania's conservative abolition; Peter and Sib were both registered in 1780 as slaves for life. Strictly semantic, though, was the difference between Chloe and her siblings. In theory, post-nati servitude was a temporary status, a steppingstone to freedom and some form of inclusion.⁴⁸ Ideally, twenty-eight years of servitude would prepare Chloe for freedom and encourage her masters to come to terms with the end of slavery, thus creating "a new set of relations" for dealing with "statutory slaves" and free blacks—or not. As Melish has shown, neither masters nor society created "new," inclusive definitions; rather, existing notions of property and power remained intact, even for post-nati slaves. However incongruous slavery and freedom were, masters "resolutely continued a set of practices that failed in every way to acknowledge the children's legal or ontological status as free persons."⁴⁹ By forgetting her status, Chloe's masters could avoid the intellectual and economic problems that arose with emancipation.

⁴⁸ Handwritten copy of the slave register for 1780, Manuscript Group 240, African American Records Collection, series 1, folder 17, Lancaster County Historical Society, Lancaster, PA; Slave Returns, 1780–1840, no. 1789.065. On Kelso see William H. Egle, *History of the County of Dauphin in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Biographical and Genealogical* (Philadelphia, 1883), 104; Egle, *Notes and Queries of Pennsylvania, 1700s–1800s*, 4th ser. (Philadelphia, 1898), 2:8; *History of Adams and Cumberland Counties, Pennsylvania* (Chicago, 1886), 275, 299; 1790 Federal Census, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania (microform), reel no. M637-9; F. Edward Wright, *Abstracts of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania: Wills, 1750–1825*, 2 vols. (Westminster, MD, 1999).

⁴⁹ Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 88, 89.

Chloe's registration offers an important point of inquiry. Kelso's signed and handwritten registration is straightforward in its purpose. Kelso, the self-nominated "farmer," "return[ed] Cloe a negro child Born in Decemb[er] 1782 to be registered according to Law." Though the registration appears at first to be a relatively unambiguous document, it nevertheless highlights important anxieties over emancipation. Dated "27th March 1789," Chloe's registration came a full seven years after her birth, and only after the Pennsylvania legislature amended and strengthened the original 1780 law. In other words, it was grudging acquiescence and possible forfeiture of Chloe that prompted Kelso to visit the clerk of courts in March 1789. Like his disgruntled neighbors, Kelso benefited from a loophole in the first emancipation act that was only closed in 1788.⁵⁰ And the seven years that separated Chloe's birth from her registration had other important consequences. Read as a direct transcription of her words, Chloe's confession announces quite early her status—that of slave. Why that description? While it is possible that Chloe lacked the proper words to describe her temporary enslavement, it is also likely that she, like her masters, defined herself as such. Indeed, if it was common for masters to accept gradual emancipation without accepting the end of slavery, so too was it common for masters to keep people like Chloe "in ignorance of their entitlement to freedom."⁵¹ Thus, if Kelso left Chloe without a clear sense of her potential freedom and without reference to her parents, he nevertheless did help her to materialize into service as his property—a status she tacitly accepted in her confession.

In 1794, Chloe was sold for the first time. On first read, the slave transfer records, like her registration document, accepted Chloe's statutorily limited servitude, "assign[ing] . . . unto the said John Harland his heirs and Assigns, the Residue of the time of Servitude for a negro Girl named Cloe." If the document is the site of numerous errors—recording her age as "sixteen years & five months" instead of twelve and noting her emancipation date as 1710 instead of 1810—the transfer from Rebecca Kelso to John Harland follows the letter of the law. Unlike many masters, Chloe's had made the transition to buying and selling time as opposed to buying and selling human property; still, Chloe remained an investment from which masters sought to recoup the purchase price and make a profit.

⁵⁰ Slave Returns, 1780–1814, no. 1789.065; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 105.

⁵¹ Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 91.

After passing briefly to an obscure Philadelphia owner, Chloe was sold in October 1794 to an influential Philadelphia merchant, Louis Martial Jacques Crousillat.⁵² No evidence exists for Chloe's time with Crousillat, nor does Chloe mention him in her confession. But it was the sale that mattered. Indeed, Chloe's bondage, rather than her eventual freedom, came to define her teenage years. By autumn 1795, Chloe was sold again—this time to Oliver Pollock, a slave dealer, Revolutionary War financier, and impoverished patriot with extensive business dealings in Philadelphia's "principal commercial houses" and financial and political ties to the young American government.⁵³ For the price of "118 Spanish Milled Dollars," Chloe became property, her period of indenture little more than an inconvenient but easily forgettable notation on an obscure record to which Chloe had no evident access.⁵⁴

Thus, in many ways, the transfer record also reflects the contradiction with which masters approached the end of slavery. Whatever her documented status, this successive chain of masters continued to treat Chloe as a slave. And if abolitionists believed that Pennsylvania's laws had "exterminated domestic slavery," Kelso and Chloe's subsequent masters proved otherwise.⁵⁵ Chloe remained with Pollock until November 1796, when she was once again sold, this time to the Carotherses, a young East Pennsboro family who lived and worked on a sizeable farm—measuring some 230 acres by 1790 and nearly 300 acres by 1798.⁵⁶ For four years, they tolerated one another. Chloe, by her account, endured the violent whippings of her mistress, and the Carotherses put up with Chloe's willfulness, until late December 1800, when Chloe decided "to bring all the misery [she] possibly could upon the family." "Twice" that month, Chloe

⁵² On Crousillat see Henry Simpson, *The Lives of Eminent Philadelphians, Now Deceased* (Philadelphia, 1859), 271–73; and John T. Scharf and Thompson Westcott, *History of Philadelphia, 1609–1884* (Philadelphia, 1884), 3:2212–13.

⁵³ On Pollock see James Alton James, *Oliver Pollock: The Life and Times of an Unknown Patriot* (New York, 1937), 54, 339, 269–346.

⁵⁴ Slave transfer from Rebeckah Kelso to John Harland, July 17, 1794, Philadelphia. Original document in the archives of the Cumberland County Historical Society, box 9, folder 15, available online at Afrolumens: <http://www.afrolumens.org/slavery/source3.html#123>; Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 101.

⁵⁵ Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp, Philadelphia, Aug. 1791, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, 1:608.

⁵⁶ US Direct Tax, East Pennsboro Township, 1798; Will of Andrew Carothers of East Pennsborough, will book H, 460, Cumberland County Historical Society.

“carried fire to the hog-house, next to the barn.” Unable to light it, she then turned her anger on the Carothers children.⁵⁷

Chloe’s crimes garnered nationwide attention but defied easy explanation.⁵⁸ Indeed, while nearly twenty newspapers covered the story, only the *Carlisle Gazette* and Rev. James Smith sought to explain Chloe’s actions. Unfortunately, Smith chose to do so via a text that at once situated Chloe within larger environmentalist arguments and strengthened her slave status as it forgot her freedom.⁵⁹ Part sermon on God’s “unbounded goodness” and part lecture on the duties owed by masters to their slaves, Smith’s transcription was a collision of eighteenth-century environmentalism, the patriarchal family, and Chloe. Chloe made a good vehicle for proving links between slavery and degeneracy, and her example highlighted the importance of moral and secular education in the early republic. Thus, Smith transformed Chloe’s crimes into a moral lesson, a critique of slavery in which bondage, rather than race and heredity, left folks ill-prepared for freedom. And he placed the blame squarely upon Chloe’s masters, who were duty bound to deliver the proper moral education to their dependents. But Chloe had never “received an education.” Until her sale to Oliver Pollock, Chloe claimed, “no pains were taken by any of my Owners, to instruct me in any duty I owed to God.” Chloe was twelve when she arrived in the Pollock household. Young and impressionable, she was ripe for “education in the principles of virtue.” And she did, for the first time, receive some instruction. Shamefully, however, the confession announced that the duty of her education had fallen not to Mr. Pollock but to his young daughter. The implications were obvious. The moral lessons that should have been given Chloe by her adult masters were left to a child, and as a result, Chloe’s prayers were “indifferent and cold,” and she led an unchristian life punctuated by “profane Swearing,” “high Passion,” and murder.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Kline’s *Carlisle Weekly Gazette*, June 24, 1801, July 15, 1801, July 22, 1801.

⁵⁸ Chloe’s crime and death made news in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, DC.

⁵⁹ See Thomas P. Slaughter, *Bloody Dawn: The Christiania Riot and Racial Violence in the Antebellum North* (New York, 1994), 30.

⁶⁰ Kline’s *Carlisle Weekly Gazette*, July 22, 1801; Sweet, *Bodies Politic*, 272. On patriarchy see Clare A. Lyons, *Sex among the Rabble: An Intimate History of Gender and Power in the Age of Revolution, Philadelphia, 1730–1830* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2006), 6, 12; Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), chap. 5; and E. Anthony Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era* (New York, 1994), chap. 1.

Well-intentioned though it might have been, Smith's abolitionist endeavor tacitly accepted the various amnesias that shaped Chloe's life. As Chloe did for Kelso, so she did for Smith: she materialized into service. Through a polished and published biography, Smith situated Chloe in binary relationship to now one, now another, and finally a third male master—never mind that Chloe had at least six masters after 1794. Like Chloe's masters, Smith helped to "dissolve" the very clear difference between post-nati servitude and chattel slavery. Smith strengthened the idea that Chloe was property; his transcription ensured that Chloe was "born a slave" and that her last words were uttered in that selfsame condition.

As Eanus's and Chloe's cases demonstrate, whites troubled by the implications of impending black freedom could answer the problems of emancipation and citizenship by forgetting freedom, by producing fictions of slavery that "dissolved" post-nati folks into the ranks of slaves. Yet as slavery disappeared and the ranks of freedpeople grew, new questions required new answers. Going beyond attempting to forget freedom, rural whites, troubled by the growing presence—and, in some cases, social and political power—of free blacks sought to disavow the promise of revolutionary equality, forgetting revolutionary promises of inclusion and forging a discourse of enduring racial difference, inferiority, and unquestioned exclusion from the body politic.

The process by which equality was disavowed was complex; though, critically, such amnesia was a product of some rather circular reasoning. First, and thanks in part to the colonial legacies of race and to the economic and political struggles of the first decades after American independence, rural whites had historic justification and immediate reason for seeing blacks as inferior. Second, already armed with this belief, they failed to recognize that slavery and racial discrimination left freedpeople economically ill-prepared for freedom. As a result, former slaves were pushed into the swelling ranks of paupers and criminals, and the perceived increase in black crime and poverty became the foundation for notions of racial difference, danger, and inferiority.

Abolition did not breed equality. Not only did the historic experience of colonial slavery provide early republic citizens well-established notions of black alterity and inferiority, but the changing discourse of race offered new mechanisms for forgetting black equality, for "reconstituting racial oppression without slavery." Moreover, work by Roxann Wheeler and Bruce Dain, among others, reveals how the Enlightenment helped to

cement ideas of racial inferiority, marking the black body as the site not only of physical difference but of mental and cultural inferiority as well. As time wore on, even optimistic abolitionists grew circumspect, because “free blacks were not whitening and increasingly seemed little less degraded than slaves.”⁶¹

If ideas of black difference and inferiority persisted through the end of slavery, the same could not be said for the historic experience of slaves. Together, supporters and opponents of black freedom seemingly forgot former enslavement as a causative factor in the persistent disadvantage of free blacks and ignored the fact that emancipation left freedpeople dependent upon whites not only for their freedom but often for their lives after slavery.⁶² Rather, white Pennsylvanians soon came to fear black “dependency and disorder,” seemingly ignoring historic sources for blacks’ precarious social and economic condition; at the same time, they focused their concerns on the growing “problem” of black freedom. Slaves were generally ill-prepared for freedom, especially freedom in a world defined by emergent capitalist imperatives and the drive to keep many freedpeople in positions that looked suspiciously like slavery. Benjamin Rush argued that freedpeople’s “quality and quiet deportment” rendered them “universally preferred to white people of similar occupations.” White preference for black labor likely had little to do with comportment and more to do with masters’ ability to keep former slaves “in a state of semi-freedom.”⁶³

Semifreedom took many forms. Among Philadelphia’s freedpeople, it meant continued reliance upon or service to their former masters—and, even by 1800, more than half of the city’s free blacks remained in “white households.” In rural areas such as Chester County, Pennsylvania, the number of freedpeople residing in white households two decades after emancipation was well over 60 percent. For those who ventured into the urban and rural labor markets, the prospects were often dismal, and upward mobility was hard to come by; work by Gary Nash and Jean R.

⁶¹ Lyons, *Sex among the Rabble*, 4–5, 88–89, 225–32, 394–95; Roxann Wheeler, *The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British Culture* (Philadelphia, 2000); Dain, *Hideous Monster of the Mind*, 38. See also Horton and Horton, *In Hope of Liberty*, 101; Sweet, *Bodies Politic*, 296; and Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 161.

⁶² Melish, *Disowning Slavery*, 158.

⁶³ Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp, Philadelphia, Aug. 1791, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, 1:608; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 168.

Soderlund, Ira Berlin, and James and Lois Horton has shown that “many free blacks” encountered a “racially restricted system of employment that practically guaranteed” poverty and dependency. Free women found their way back into gendered and raced work as domestic servants and laundresses. Two-fifths of Philadelphia’s free black males worked as “laborers,” another 25 percent of black males turned to the sea for dangerous (though more reliable) employment, and only a handful of freedpeople rose into the professional classes in the four decades after 1780. Too often, freedpeople found infrequent work as day laborers or domestic servants.⁶⁴ Francis Smith understood that. A laboring “man of color” in early national Carlisle, Smith was driven to insolvency because there was simply no work to be found.⁶⁵

Exploring the words of some of the fourteen free blacks who filed for relief from their debts between 1800 and 1860, it becomes clear that even when they found steady work, Cumberland County’s free people of color faced the prospect that illness, injury, or the vicissitudes of a transforming economy could render them homeless, indebted, or imprisoned. Hard as he worked, George Fisher was “barely able to support and clothe himself from his wages.” The same was true for another “poor” laboring man named John Thomas. Though he had always “ma[de] use of industry to support his family,” Thomas could only find work during the “summer season.” Thus, in the winter of 1831–32, he opened an oyster house in Carlisle. When he and his family fell ill and the business faltered, he was unable to meet his obligations. Thomas was subsequently jailed and had his property sold to pay his creditors. A few months later, in January 1833, Thomas was back in court. Penniless and broken by “sickness,” Thomas had no illusions of moving up in the world; he had no property to take and little recourse but to rely upon the courts and, quite possibly, the county poorhouse. Though representing less than one percent of all insolvent petitions, the very public failures of freemen like Francis Smith, George Fisher, and John Thomas represented not only the moral failings of the poor but also the material and social costs of a dependent popula-

⁶⁴ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 167, 173, 182–83; Horton and Horton, *In Hope of Liberty*, 110; Ira Berlin, *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 246–51.

⁶⁵ Petition of Francis Smith, June 30, 1818, Insolvent Debtors Petitions, ser. 3, 1799–1860, Prothonotary Records Group, Prothonotary’s Office, Carlisle, PA, online at Cumberland County Archives at <http://ccweb.ccpa.net/archives/inventory.aspx?PSID=455>, no. 1818.0256.

tion. Few thought to consider how whites, consternated by black freedom, erected barriers that would force free blacks into the very ranks of paupers and criminals that they already saw blacks like Hope inhabiting.⁶⁶

Indeed, Hope embodied the material costs produced amid white abjuration of and anxiety over black freedom. A slave owned by Philip Baker of North Middleton Township, Hope was born twenty-one years before the enactment of gradual emancipation.⁶⁷ Upon Baker's death, Hope gained his freedom. Within a few years of freedom, however, the aging freedman found himself dependent upon handouts, and by 1818, justices declared him a pauper and remanded him to the custody of the local poorhouse. Hope's situation was by no means unusual. Countless residents, black and white, found themselves reliant upon the goodwill of community.⁶⁸ Yet, at another level, Hope's case was different. That Hope's story survives is less a testament to recordkeeping or to lucky research than to the developing amnesia about the region's history of slavery. Indeed, our knowledge of Hope's life and experience results from a telling but convoluted legal battle that hit the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1824. By the mid-1820s, two counties, several townships, and the family of Hope's former master were in a pitched battle to determine who was liable for the care of an aging black pauper. Convinced that freedpeople like Hope were a drain on public resources, officials became less concerned with liberating slaves and more worried about what to do with blacks once they were free. Representative though he was of the "grinding poverty" that awaited so many freedpeople in the decades after emancipation, Hope was also symbolic of the growing culture of dependency born of limited opportunity and poverty and reified by whites unable or unwilling to see that reliance upon the almshouse was not the product of blacks' inborn inferiority but of whites' resistance to black material and political independence.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Petition of George Fisher, Aug 9, 1831; Petitions of John Thomas, Apr. 9, 1832, Jan. 14, 1833, Insolvent Debtors Petitions, ser. 3, 1799–1860, nos. 1831.1146, 1832.1171, and 1833.1253.

⁶⁷ Frederick Watts, ed., *Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1835), 2:280–82.

⁶⁸ In 1814, for example, a 113-year-old African American was one of thirty-three aged and infirm men and women "supported" by the poorhouse. Poorhouse Directors' Statements, Apr. 1814, Clerk of Courts Record Group, Cumberland County Historical Society, online at Cumberland County Archives at <http://ccweb.ccpa.net/archives/inventory.aspx?PSID=469>.

⁶⁹ Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 191.

If freedpeople like Hope inspired for whites anxiety about black dependency, other rural blacks conjured a much more dangerous image—that of black crime. Again, it was a particularly circular brand of reasoning: black crime begat a racist “trope” of thievery in the “popular press,” thus making crime the focal point for urban and rural worries over “the state of race relations in the emerging republic.”⁷⁰ At one level, black crime was rooted in the precarious economic conditions in which freedpeople were left after slavery. Chloe made that manifest when she suggested that “people of her color [were] induced” to steal “on account of their necessities.”⁷¹ Studies of court records from both rural and urban Pennsylvania confirm Chloe’s assessment of black crime. Jack Marietta and G. S. Rowe have shown that 75 percent of all black crimes were property crimes, while Leslie Patrick Stamp instructively suggests that stolen property—consisting mainly of “clothing and fabric, bank notes and money, food and tools”—reveals “the relationship between race, poverty, and crimes against property.”⁷² And, of course, black crime was not confined to the city. Many African Americans graced the pages of the *Carlisle Gazette* or the cells of the local jail. Kelso’s slave Will wound up in the Carlisle jail after he “stole £23 from John Carver of York Co.” An ingenious slave named Cuffee stole two cows and sold them to laborer James Orr before stealing the purloined cows again.⁷³ And even if freed blacks were not paupers or criminals, white society increasingly saw them as such. In time, the Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS) would see black freedom through a similar lens. “Freed from the shackles,” suggested the PAS, “those victims of inhumanity thronged on our streets . . . only to swell the list of our criminals and augment the catalogue of our paupers.”⁷⁴ In the end, the growing number of rural Pennsylvania’s black pau-

⁷⁰ Sweet, *Bodies Politic*, 263, 276.

⁷¹ Kline’s *Carlisle Weekly Gazette*, July 22, 1801.

⁷² G. S. Rowe, “Black Offenders, Criminal Courts, and Philadelphia Society in the Late Eighteenth-Century,” *Journal of Social History* 22 (1989): 689; Nash and Soderlund, *Freedom by Degrees*, 191; Jack D. Marietta and G. S. Rowe, *Troubled Experiment: Crime and Justice in Pennsylvania, 1682–1800* (Philadelphia, 2006), 249; Leslie Patrick Stamp, “Numbers that Are Not New: African Americans in the Country’s First Prison, 1790–1835,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 119 (1995): 121–22.

⁷³ Schaumann, *Indictments, 1750–1800*, nos. 1368, 1531, 1552.

⁷⁴ Benjamin Rush to Granville Sharp, Philadelphia, Aug. 1791, in *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, 1:608; *Minutes of the Proceeding of the Twelfth American Convention for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery and Improving the Condition of the African Race* (Philadelphia, 1809), 16.

pers and criminals whose destitution led them to the workhouse and whose crimes led them to the penitentiary or the gallows helped, at once, to heighten black difference and mark African Americans as inassimilable.⁷⁵

There was, of course, nothing new in all this. The idea that Pennsylvania's African American population was different was the product of a legal and cultural order established during the colonial era. During the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania's legislators not only established special courts and punishments for African Americans but, more importantly, marked the black body, free or slave, as different.⁷⁶ With the 1726 Act for the Better Regulation of Negroes in This Province, Pennsylvania whites forged a legal and cultural order that assumed free and enslaved blacks were dangerous, criminal, and shiftless. Indeed, while the initial lines of the act outlined compensation for masters whose slaves were executed for a capital crime, the brunt of the legislation worked to contain, constrain, and categorize the colony's black population by barring interracial marriage, preventing the hiring out of slaves, and, in viewing freedpeople as slothful burdens on the public coffers, creating strict regulations on masters seeking to free their slaves.⁷⁷ Together, these early slave codes ensured that, as Edward Turner suggested, "not only was the negro now subjected to special regulation because he was a slave, but whether slave or free he was now made subject to special restrictions because he was a negro."⁷⁸

These ideas and policies cast a long shadow over the postrevolutionary period and proved useful to whites attempting to disavow black freedom and equality. Indeed, in their effort to suture the wounds left by revolution and emancipation, some rural whites turned their pens and presses over to highlighting the difference and dangers posed by an unredeemable population. Public discourse, especially newspaper accounts of Chloe's crime, resonated with those very ideas and fears. In his accounts of Chloe's crime and trial, the editor of the *Carlisle Gazette*, George Kline, highlighted her degeneracy and corporeal difference. Whether summarizing the confession, published court documents, or execution notice,

⁷⁵ James Brewer Stewart, "Modernizing 'Difference': The Political Meanings of Color in the Free States, 1776–1840," *Journal of the Early Republic* 19 (1999): 693–94.

⁷⁶ An Act for the Trial of Negroes (1700, 1705–1706), in *The Statute at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682–1801*, comp. James T. Mitchell et al., 18 vols. ([Harrisburg], 1896–1915), 2:77–79.

⁷⁷ An Act for the Better Regulation of Negroes in This Province (1726), in *Statutes at Large*, 4:59–64.

⁷⁸ Turner, *Negro in Pennsylvania*, 26.

Kline was always ready to describe Chloe's crimes as "inhuman," "unparalleled," or "unexampled in atrocity." And just like his slavekeeping neighbors, Kline defined Chloe as different, for her blackness was made integral to her crimes. To Kline, the court, and Mrs. Carothers, it mattered that Chloe was a "Negro Wench," "Negro Woman," or just plain "Negro." Backed by colonial foundations and an emergent racist discourse that "locat[ed] the source of a distinctive collective identity in the body,"⁷⁹ armed with mounting evidence of poverty and criminality, and blessed with the ability to forget that slavery—let alone the limited opportunities afforded to blacks in freedom—had placed African Americans in precarious socioeconomic positions, rural whites helped to slowly erode any chance that freedpeople might be woven into the American republic. Whether through forgetting the distinction between slave and servant or, in the face of freedpeople's degraded condition, ignoring the central role played by the history of slavery and emergent ideas of race in creating such conditions, rural Pennsylvanians forgot freedom.

Still, blacks would not fully be written out of Pennsylvania citizenry until the late 1830s. Even by that time, the possibility remained that blacks might achieve citizenship and that the amnesia about emancipation and slavery might be replaced with an enduring language of equality. Throughout Pennsylvania's rural counties, once-large slave populations gave way to large free populations that began to forge important and powerful religious and political blocs. Likewise, the prominent role of the African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church in Shippensburg as an organizing force against southern slavery and northern inequality and the direct participation of African Americans in Pennsylvania elections together revealed a powerful presence that made fully forgetting freedom impossible. Unable to forget freedom, whites chose instead to aggressively act against free blacks' calls for citizenship and inclusion.

Armed with scientific and folk notions about race, whites worked diligently to so marginalize freedpeople as to transform them into a subordinated, noncitizen other and thus erase from memory longstanding anxieties over slavery and freedom. By the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, and hastened by the forces of democratization, national party formation, and economic transformation, Pennsylvania politics began focusing on the still-unresolved issue of black citizenship.

⁷⁹ Joanne Pope Melish, "The 'Condition' Debate and Racial Discourse in the Antebellum North," *Journal of the Early Republic* 19 (1999): 657–68, 660–64, 669.

Though the Gradual Abolition Act freed not a single slave, it “made,” Edward Price suggests, “no comment as to the political status of free blacks.”⁸⁰ Until voting rights for blacks were eliminated in the constitutional convention of 1837–38, the state’s ambiguous definition of a citizen as a taxpaying “freeman of the full age of twenty one years,” theoretically extended suffrage to free black males—who did vote in Cumberland and other rural counties. Thus, while African Americans met with increased barriers to social and economic equality, many could still participate directly in politics. Then, in January 1838, and in spite of passionate attempts to uphold the early national dream of democracy, Pennsylvania’s constitutional convention stripped free blacks of citizenship when it redefined voters as white male taxpayers.⁸¹ Convinced by their representatives that any effort “to place the black population on an equal footing with the white population, would prove ruinous to the black people” and disastrous to “the poor laboring white man,” Pennsylvanians high and low announced not merely that blacks were different and inassimilable, but, after decades of uncertainty, that the promise and anxieties of gradual abolition could be forgotten.⁸²

SUNY Orange

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⁸⁰ Edward Price, “The Black Voting Rights Issue in Pennsylvania, 1780–1900,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 100 (1976): 356.

⁸¹ On the end of black political participation see John Agg, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to Propose Amendments to the Constitution, Commenced and Held at Harrisburg, on the Second Day of May, 1837*, 14 vols. (Harrisburg, 1837–1839), 9:380; Price, “Black Voting Rights Issue,” 357; Eric Ledell Smith, “The End of Black Voting Rights in Pennsylvania: African Americans and the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1837–1838,” *Pennsylvania History* 65 (1998): 279–99; Christopher Malone, *Between Freedom and Bondage: Race, Party, and Voting Rights in the Antebellum North* (New York, 2008); Roy Akagi, “The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 48 (1924): 301–33; Horton and Horton, *In Hope of Liberty*, 106; Theodore Hershberg, “Free Blacks in Antebellum Philadelphia: A Study of Ex-Slaves, Freeborn, and Economic Decline,” in *African Americans in Pennsylvania: Shifting Perspectives*, ed. Joe William Trotter and Eric Ledell Smith (University Park, PA, 1997), 124–27; and Philip S. Klein, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1817–1832: A Game without Rules* (Philadelphia, 1974).

⁸² *Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 2:477.

Damon and Pythias Reconsidered

Their right hands gripped. . . . The warmth of the friendship that existed between them was plainly revealed.

Both were of noble proportions. . . . It would have been odd if a pair so well matched should not have been drawn by the call of like to like, into friendship.

But the years that had passed since their first meeting had steadily disclosed the fidelity, courage and honor that were at the core of each of the two friends' character, and had long since ripened their feeling of mutual respect into an enduring love.

—Albert Payson Terhune, *The Story of Damon and Pythias*

TO STUDENTS OF PHILADELPHIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY, the names Damon and Pythias mean only one pair of politicians: Joseph Sill Clark Jr. and Richardson Dilworth, the men who inaugurated the current era of Democratic rule in Philadelphia. Although they had been politically active for nearly two decades, their names were relatively unknown in the Quaker City until Dilworth splashed onto the front pages in 1947 and declared virtual war on the rapacious Republican organization that had held sway in Philadelphia since the Civil War.

Unlike the gentlemen politicians who governed antebellum Philadelphia, the GOP bosses who wielded power from midcentury on had no family fortunes or respected family businesses to sustain them. They had little use for classical liberal education or governmental theory. Politics was their livelihood, a means through which they could amass their own fortunes at the expense of their fellow citizens. They possessed exceptional organizational skills, unusual degrees of self-discipline and personal charisma, and a capacity to act with ruthless cunning and calculation. They utilized their innate skills, the power of their personalities, and the promise of financial gain to dominate the political life of the city.¹

The two most successful nineteenth-century Republican bosses were “King” James McManes and “Sweet” William Stokley, who used, respec-

¹ See Peter McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia: The Emergence of the Republican Machine, 1867–1933* (University Park, PA, 1993).

tively, the Philadelphia Gas Trust and the Public Buildings Commission to rule the city. By the turn of the century, they had been supplanted by Iz Durham, “Sunny Jim” McNichol, and the Vare brothers. For a brief time following Bill Vare’s death, reform seemed possible, but ultimately the would-be Democratic reformers of the 1930s—John B. Kelly and Matthew McCloskey—lost their bid for control of city hall. Consequently, unlike many large northern cities, Philadelphia did not go Democratic during the New Deal era. By 1947, Philadelphia had been suffering under Republican machine rule—a regime once described as “the most thoroughly organized and uniformly successful incarnation of the spoils system in the entire country”—for nearly a century.² During the following two years, a scandal of epic proportions would rock the city, exposing the theft of over \$40 million and leading to the suicide of five city officials, the conviction of several others, and the dawn of the era of Democratic reform led by a new pair of gentlemen politicians—Clark and Dilworth. While reform continued only through the mayoral years of Clark and Dilworth (1951–62), Democratic rule continued and eventually became as entrenched as the Republican rule it replaced.³

It is not clear who first compared the heroes of an ancient Greek fable to the leaders of Philadelphia’s mid-twentieth-century reform movement, but by the late 1950s the reference had become part of the city’s political lore. “Clark and Dilworth,” wrote Stewart Alsop in 1957, “are called, inevitably, the Damon and Pythias of politics and it is widely assumed, even in Philadelphia, that their relationship has been one long, mutual lovefest.”⁴ Journalist Paul Beers perpetuated the comparison twenty years later in his popular work on Pennsylvania politics:

Clark and Dilworth were the Damon and Pythias of midcentury Pennsylvania politics. There was never such a pair for controversy, flam-

² Clinton Rogers Woodruff, “Philadelphia’s Revolution,” *Yale Review*, o.s., 15 (May 1906): 8–23.

³ See Special Committee on City Finance, *Philadelphia’s Management: An Appraisal by the Committee of Fifteen* (Philadelphia, 1948), 16, 46; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Mar. 10, 1948, June 10, 1948, Sept. 7, 1948, Oct. 28, 1948, Nov. 23, 1948, Jan. 11, 1949; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, May 26, 1948, Sept. 28, 1948; G. Terry Madonna and John Morrison McLarnon III, “Reform in Philadelphia: Joseph S. Clark, Richardson Dilworth, and the Women Who Made Reform Possible, 1947–1949,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 127 (2003): 57–88. For a succinct summary of the charges against the city Republicans, see ADA Research Committee, “File of the Facts No. 12: The Bill of Indictment, A Summary of the Charges against the Republican Organization,” Nov. 1949, Joseph Sill Clark Papers (Collection 1958), Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

⁴ Stewart Alsop, “The Paradox of Gentleman Joe,” *Saturday Evening Post*, Apr. 27, 1957.

boyance, and verbiage. They were rich men who hungered for votes and civic achievement. For the 34 years they were active in the political arena, they were either lavishly admired or fulsomely despised, but never ignored.⁵

It was a convenient phrase—a short but memorable remark, a slogan useful in political marketing. It defined Clark and Dilworth as blood brothers totally devoted to each other and united in the battle against corruption and tyranny. Few people, however, actually know the details of the ancient Greek fable. If they did, they would also know that describing the Clark-Dilworth team as Damon and Pythias was almost total fiction. That is the reason Alsop followed up his reference to the comparison by stating categorically, “Nothing could be further from the truth.”⁶

And yet that assertion too is not totally accurate. The two possessed a number of similarities. Just as Terhune describes both his heroes as being “of noble proportions,” Clark and Dilworth shared similar social proportions. Both—to make another Hellenic reference—were “gentlemen of rank and breeding.”⁷ Both were born into wealthy, upper-class families that spent summers on the beaches of Southampton, Long Island. Both attended New England prep schools only twenty miles from each other. Both attended Ivy League universities where they competed in multiple intercollegiate sports, and both graduated from Ivy League law schools. But the assumption that the two enjoyed a lifelong friendship dating from those idyllic summers on the Long Island beaches is a mischaracterization—something Clark corrected in his March 1975 interview with Walter Phillips Jr. As Clark described it, both he and Dilworth had learned “the American way of life on the beaches of Southampton.” But “Dick was several years older than I and was always a glamorous figure. . . . We didn’t know each other terribly well at the time because the difference between being fourteen and being seventeen is a very great one at those ages.” It was not until Dilworth moved to Philadelphia that the relationship between the two developed.⁸

⁵ Paul B. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics Today and Yesterday: The Tolerable Accommodation* (University Park, PA, 1980), 193.

⁶ Alsop, “Paradox of Gentleman Joe.”

⁷ Werner Jaeger and Gilbert Highet, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 1, *Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens* (New York, 1986), 20.

⁸ Joseph S. Clark, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Mar. 18, 1975, Walter Phillips Jr. Oral History Project, Urban Archives, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia.

On balance, there were more differences than similarities between the two. Clark was aloof, pompous, arrogant, and openly contemptuous of professional politicians. Natalie Saxe, a Dilworth assistant, described Clark as a “wasp snob—anti-political organization, anti-ethnic, and a loner.”⁹ He was keenly aware of his social standing and virtually incapable of laughing at himself. As Dilworth described him, “Joe didn’t like company. He never felt easy with political leaders and ward heelers.”¹⁰ “Joe could be a terrible snob,” recounted Franklin & Marshall College professor Sidney Wise, who served as an aide to Clark in 1965. “I suspect the only reason he took me into that office was because I graduated from Harvard.”¹¹

Another F&M professor, Richard Schier, who also worked in Clark’s Washington Senate office, similarly found Clark “aloof, distant, snobbish, introverted, and a loner.” Schier described Clark and Dilworth as studies in contrast, with Clark “leaving one with the impression that you were bothering him, while Dilworth made you feel that he had been waiting all his life to meet you.”¹² According to protégé and campaign operative Joe Stratos, Dilworth had charm and a “certain degree of integrity about himself; we became friends from the first day we met.”¹³ The difference between Dilworth and Clark became particularly obvious when they appeared together:

If we had a political grouping in some room prior to a dinner or a speech, and if Clark would walk into the room he wouldn’t shake anyone’s hands. He would go up to somebody he knew and that was it. Dilworth came in and everyone flocked around him and he was shaking everyone’s [hand].¹⁴

Dilworth was far more personable and appeared not nearly as impressed with his family background or his Ivy League pedigree. But as Natalie Saxe, his assistant who knew him best, remembered, he was “in no small measure a perfectly hideous snob. It never showed through the

⁹ Natalie Saxe, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Aug. 1989, Phillips Oral History Project.

¹⁰ Richardson Dilworth, interview by Steven G. Neal, in “Reflections of a Crusty Reformer,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Jan. 7, 1973.

¹¹ Sidney Wise, interview by G. Terry Madonna, Jan. 17, 1990.

¹² Richard Schier, interview by G. Terry Madonna, June 8, 1989.

¹³ Joseph Stratos, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Jan. 24, 1979, Phillips Oral History Project.

¹⁴ William Rafsky, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Oct. 25, 1989, Phillips Oral History Project.

way it did with Joe Clark” because “Dick essentially liked and understood other human beings while Joe did not. He [Dilworth] disguised it beautifully.”¹⁵

Both men were labeled “silver spoon liberals,” but only Clark behaved like one. Dilworth possessed a genuine empathy for people from all walks of life. “He was the type of person who really cared,” and it was in that concern that his progressive reform instincts were rooted.¹⁶ Clark seemed to pursue a career in politics out of a sense of noblesse oblige. He once said that, like his father, he did not need to work for a living. But while his father was “completely devoid of a social conscience,” he could not, like the elder Clark, spend his time in self-indulgent pursuits.¹⁷ He felt it was his responsibility to help the less fortunate, but he did not have the slightest desire to have any personal interaction with the underclass whose lot he felt obligated to improve. An incident from his senatorial years was particularly revealing. As Wise recalls:

Joe was deeply into housing and that sort of stuff. Bernie [Norwich] took him through this slum housing and there were people living there; you can imagine what they looked like, and there’s the senator—he was terribly, terribly upset by this exposure and he said to Bernie: “Don’t you ever do that to me again.” It’s part of that description heard many times about Joe. He loved humanity but he wasn’t too sure about people.¹⁸

Clark’s sense of superiority extended to the treatment of his staff. He could, occasionally, show remarkable warmth to those who worked for him. On one occasion he took the time to call assistant William Rafsky’s wife the day she came home from the hospital with the couple’s second child. But Rafsky said later, “I’ll admit I’m more the exception than the rule.”¹⁹ More typical was the experience of Natalie Saxe: “I was made to feel very much like a paid flunky by Joe Clark and rather more like a human being by Dick Dilworth, so it’s easy to see more and more that I worked on the Dilworth meetings.”²⁰ To be fair, Clark’s apparent superior attitude extended to the mighty and powerful as well. According to Wise, he expressed his disdain for Senate majority leader and later president

¹⁵ Natalie Saxe, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Jan. 15, 1975, Phillips Oral History Project.

¹⁶ Stratos interview.

¹⁷ Alsop, “Paradox of Gentleman Joe.”

¹⁸ Wise interview.

¹⁹ Rafsky interview.

²⁰ Natalie Saxe, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., July 30, 1974, Phillips Oral History Project.

Lyndon Johnson on numerous occasions. As Wise recalled, "He hated Lyndon with an irrational passion. I think a lot of it was sociological. Joe could be a terrible snob."²¹

Dilworth, nonetheless, was far from perfect. As a young lawyer, he liked to drink; in fact, he met John O'Hara—the great American novelist who would become his best friend—in a New York speakeasy. By the early 1930s, Dilworth had developed a serious drinking problem. He credited his wife Anne with picking him "up out of the gutter" and "straightening him out."²² He was never able, however, to shake his reputation as a heavy drinker. During the 1955 mayoral campaign, Nancy Claghorn Longstreth, the wife of his opponent, claimed Anne never left Dilworth's side because he was an "uncontrollable alcoholic."²³ Two years later when Stewart Alsop wrote that Dilworth had not taken a drink in seven years, Anne responded derisively, "Who the hell told him that?"²⁴

Dilworth had a well-developed sense of humor, but it could have a remarkably caustic edge, especially when talking about Philadelphia WASP society; Saxe characterized him as "mean-little-kid enough to enjoy thumbing his nose at the very establishment he wanted to be part of."²⁵ His description of Main Line Protestants' anxiety over the prospect of a Catholic in the White House was typical:

Many [are] talking of resettling in Canada or returning to their native lands of England, Scotland or Wales. Since most of their forebears had to get out of those countries in a hurry to avoid debt proceedings or criminal proceedings, I do not believe their reentry would be as smooth as they may think. . . . Having been one of the original Kennedy backers, I am not in any immediate danger of being subjected to the inquisition which the citizens of our Main Line appear to believe will be inflicted upon white Protestants in the next four years.²⁶

Dilworth's sarcastic wit contributed to his reputation as one of the great bare-knuckled political fighters that Philadelphia has produced in

²¹ Wise interview.

²² Natalie Saxe, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Jan. 23, 1975, Phillips Oral History Project.

²³ Richardson Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Oct. 20, 1955, Richardson Dilworth Papers (Collection 3112), Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

²⁴ Richardson Dilworth to Stewart Alsop, Apr. 22, 1957, Dilworth Papers.

²⁵ Saxe interview, Jan. 15, 1975.

²⁶ Richardson Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Nov. 16, 1960, Dilworth Papers.

the twentieth century. For Clark, this was one of Dilworth's least attractive personality traits. According to Rafsky, "Clark thought Dilworth was too political; he thought he was kind of an abrupt person who shot from the hip."²⁷ Dilworth's public remarks, his "off-the-cuff nastiness in the form of vicious remarks against the opposition," became almost legendary; few colleagues and even fewer opponents were immune.²⁸ Of James Tate, his successor in the mayor's office, he opined, "As a mayor he absolutely stinks, he is primarily a ward leader with the mentality of a ward leader."²⁹ Another fellow Democrat (later turned Republican), Arlen Specter, was "extremely able and would make a very good mayor but his trouble is that he is a sort of Jewish Tom Dewey—tremendously efficient but unlovable."³⁰ Harry Luce, publisher of *Time* magazine, "combine[d] the worst features of the boy scout and the Chicago gangster";³¹ Charles J. Hepburn, chairman of the reform-minded Committee of Seventy, was "a dilettante self-styled reformer who cannot believe anybody is honest but himself";³² and Frank Rizzo, yet another Democratic mayor, was just plain stupid. According to Dilworth:

Rizzo announced that Nixon is the greatest president this country has ever had. When asked if he had overlooked Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and the two Roosevelts, it was apparent the mayor was not quite sure who these gentlemen were or whether any of them had, in fact, ever been president.³³

Dilworth seemed to save his most colorful remarks for 1955 mayoral opponent Thatcher Longstreth. Longstreth was, variously, "a big, good-natured clown who wears argyle socks," a "sanctimonious Quaker" who "would undoubtedly slit his own Mother's throat to get what he wants," and a "big, good-natured, not-too-bright human replica of a St. Bernard puppy. The only drawback being that he does not have a keg of brandy

²⁷ Rafsky interview.

²⁸ Natalie Saxe to Jo W. Saxe, no date, Natalie Saxe Randall Papers (Collection 3466), Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

²⁹ Richardson Dilworth to Stewart Alsop, Nov. 27, 1967, Dilworth Papers.

³⁰ Ibid. Specter was subsequently elected to five terms in the US Senate as a Republican before returning to the Democratic Party in 2009 for an unsuccessful bid for a sixth term.

³¹ Richardson Dilworth to John O'Hara, June 29, 1961, Dilworth Papers.

³² Richardson Dilworth to Charles J. Hepburn, Jan. 6, 1954, Dilworth Papers.

³³ Richardson Dilworth to Stewart Alsop, Apr. 26, 1962, Dilworth Papers.

hanging from his neck.”³⁴ Dilworth was equally unkind to Mrs. Longstreth, calling her a “hatchet-faced young lady, a typical product of Chestnut Hill.” “If I should win,” he confided to longtime friend Harold “Mike” Vanderbilt, “I hope to have the opportunity of kicking Mrs. Longstreth in a very prominent part of her anatomy.”³⁵

Such venom might have seemed shocking coming from the normally suave, impeccably tailored Dilworth—the man Clark labeled “D’Artagnan in long pants and a double-breasted suit.”³⁶ But as Dilworth once admitted to independent Republican Arthur Binns, “to lick them you literally have to wade through rivers of mud.”³⁷ Dilworth’s willingness to get down in the mud may have been the reason why, in the estimation of one Clark intimate, Clark “didn’t think that Dilworth was the kind of person he would normally want to associate with,” even when the two men shared such similar backgrounds.³⁸

Clark was the scion of an old Chestnut Hill family. His grandfather Enoch founded E. W. Clark & Company and oversaw its growth into one of the most successful financial firms in the city. An amateur Egyptologist, he endowed the chair in Babylonian research at the University of Pennsylvania. Enoch’s second son, Joseph Sill Clark Sr., matriculated at Harvard, where he won the first intercollegiate singles and doubles tennis championships. After college and law school he went into the family business. He also continued his tennis career and was eventually elected president of the US Lawn Tennis Association. He married Kate Richardson Avery of Avery Island, Louisiana. Her father, Daniel, owned a sugar plantation on the island, and her brother-in-law Edmund was the founder of the McIlhenny Company, producers of Tabasco hot pepper sauce. Joe Sr. lost much of his fortune in the 1929 stock market crash, but in 1945 oil was discovered on the island property Kate had inherited and the family’s financial well-being was restored.

The Clarks resided at “Kate’s Hall,” a fifteen-acre estate in Chestnut Hill built by Joseph Sr. for his wife at the turn of the century. Joseph Jr. was born into this life of privilege in 1901. He attended Chestnut Hill

³⁴ Richardson Dilworth to Walter Annenberg, Aug. 6, 1971; Dilworth to John O’Hara, Oct. 6, 1955; and Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Oct. 20, 1955.

³⁵ Richardson Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Oct. 20, 1955.

³⁶ Roger Butterfield, “Revolt in Philadelphia,” *Saturday Evening Post*, Nov. 9, 1952.

³⁷ Richardson Dilworth to Arthur Binns, July 18, 1949, Dilworth Papers.

³⁸ Rafsky interview.

Academy and Middlesex Preparatory School in Concord, Massachusetts, where his classmates included Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. He matriculated at Harvard University, where he “played centerfield on the baseball team and was a sprinter on the track team.”³⁹ He graduated from Harvard in 1923 and from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1926. After finishing at Penn, he joined the firm Clark, Clark, McCarthy & Wagner, where his father was senior partner. Within months he would take the first tentative steps into the political career that would follow.

Richardson Dilworth was born in Pittsburgh on August 29, 1898. The Dilworths’ Pittsburgh roots stretched back to 1795, when great-great-grandfather Samuel arrived from Dilworthtown, Chester County—the village that still bears the family name. His grandfather Joseph Dilworth founded several businesses in the mid-nineteenth century, including Dilworth, Harper & Company (later Dilworth Brothers), the largest wholesale grocery operation in Pittsburgh; Dilworth and Bidwell, a powder-making concern affiliated with the DuPont Company; and Dilworth, Porter & Company, iron products manufacturers that held patents for high-quality railroad flange ties and spikes. It was on those patents that the family fortune was built. Joseph’s son, Joseph R. Dilworth (Richardson Dilworth’s father), graduated from Yale and joined the family business. By the time he retired in 1901, he held directorships on the Great Northern Railroad and the Citizens’ Bank of Pittsburgh and was president of the National Iron and Steel Publishing Company, trustee of the Pittsburgh YMCA, and cofounder of the Pennsylvania College for Women. Two years later, Joseph R. and his wife, Annie Wood Dilworth, moved to New York City; within another year, they were listed on the Social Register. Both were dedicated conservatives. Joseph R. “believed that Theodore Roosevelt was a ‘dangerous radical.’” Annie, who “helped to found Southampton as a summer playground for the robber-baron class,” once observed that only good presidents ever got assassinated, opining that it was now about time someone assassinated “a bum president like FDR.”⁴⁰

³⁹ *Philadelphia Record*, Apr. 8, 1934.

⁴⁰ John Newton Boucher and John Woolf Jordan, *A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People*, vol. 3 (Pittsburgh, 1908), 49–50; Norman F. Rehm, ed., *Track Standards* (Chicago, 1910), 180–82; *Goldie et al. v. Diamond State Iron Co. et al.*, 81 F. 173 (Circuit Court, D, Delaware, June 16, 1897), <http://openjurist.org/81/f1d/173>; *New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1928; Richardson Dilworth biographical sketch, Saxe Randall Papers; Jason Fagone, “Searching for Richardson Dilworth,” *Philadelphia Magazine*, Dec. 2008; Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, 198.

Dilworth attended St. Mark's School in Southborough, Massachusetts, from 1911 to 1917 and then entered Yale University. World War I interrupted his studies when, at age nineteen, he enlisted as a private in the Sixth Regiment, Marine Corps Brigade. He saw action in the Belleau Wood and Soissons campaigns. At Belleau Wood, "on a foray into No Man's Land to rescue two wounded Americans, enemy machine gun fire left him with a shattered left arm and a Purple Heart." After the war he returned to Yale and, despite his war injuries, played football and rowed on the four-man crew. Following graduation, Dilworth worked for US Steel, the M. W. Kellogg Company, and in the Oklahoma oil fields before entering Yale Law School. He graduated from Yale cum laude and as an editor of the law review in 1926—the same year Clark graduated from Penn—and came to Philadelphia to begin his legal career. His goal was to become a trial lawyer, and he became associated with Ralph B. Evans, considered the best trial lawyer of his generation by many contemporary lawyers.⁴¹

Clark became active in politics in 1926 when he ran unsuccessfully for Republican committeeman in the Twenty-second Ward. Two years later, motivated by the Prohibition issue, he switched parties and campaigned for Al Smith. Dilworth, a lifelong Democrat, also campaigned for Smith. But despite having known each other from family vacations in Southampton, Clark and Dilworth were not well acquainted, and it would be several years before their political alliance would begin to take shape. Like Smith, Clark was an avowed opponent of Prohibition and worked for its repeal. He was appointed state commander of the Crusaders, a national organization "formed for the primary purpose of aiding in the solution of the liquor problem." The Crusaders used their legal expertise to protect against illegal enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment and lobbied for its repeal. He also organized a local group—the Vigilantes Committee—to "render free legal service to any citizens" who believed they had been subjected to illegal police searches. At thirty-two years of age he became the youngest delegate to the 1933 state convention that voted to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment.⁴²

⁴¹ Richardson Dilworth press release, no date, and Richardson Dilworth biographical sketch, Saxe Randall Papers.

⁴² Joseph S. Clark, interview by Walter Phillips Jr., Mar. 18, 1975, Phillips Oral History Project; Joseph S. Clark, "Richardson Dilworth," *Shingle*, Nov. 1948, Clark Papers; Joseph S. Clark, speech delivered at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, July 18, 1951, Dilworth Papers; Joseph S. Clark to Wilbur Morse, Nov. 21, 1933, Clark Papers; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Mar. 19, 1931, and Dec. 5, 1933.

In the early 1930s, Philadelphia's most prominent Democrats were millionaire contractor Matthew McCloskey and fellow millionaire bricklayer and sportsman John B. Kelly, the man who urged Dilworth and Clark to seek elective office. According to Dilworth,

Jack Kelly and Matt McCloskey organized the first genuine Democratic Party in Philadelphia. One year after they got started, they won all four row offices in the 1933 election. In 1936 and again in 1940 they carried the city by such large majorities that the State went Democratic for the first time since the Civil War.⁴³

Dilworth overstated the case. It is true that in November 1933 the Democrats shocked the city by winning four row offices—controller, registrar of wills, coroner, and treasurer. But at that point Kelly and Democratic City Committee chairman John O'Donnell were still locked in a struggle for control of the party. Moreover, a series of events significantly contributed to the Democrats' success in the mid-1930s. Republican boss Bill Vare suffered a stroke in August 1928 and spent most of the remainder of his life either in Florida or at the Jersey shore. From that point on, Vare henchmen engaged in a long, internecine war for control of the organization. At the same time, despite Vare's well-known opposition to the Eighteenth Amendment and the fact that Prohibition had always been unpopular in Philadelphia, Republican ward bosses insisted the rank and file cast their votes for Hoover—a dedicated “dry”—in the 1928 presidential election and thus reinforced the idea that the Democratic Party was the party of repeal. The popular referendum on the Twenty-first Amendment was on that same November 1933 ballot. Philadelphia voted to ratify by a ratio of twelve to one. Finally, Franklin Roosevelt had not carried the city in 1932, but he did extremely well, and by the following November his popularity had grown even greater.⁴⁴

Nonetheless, in April 1934, it was Kelly who pushed Clark to run in a special election to succeed deceased councilman William Roper. The following month, Kelly was among those who supported Dilworth's bid for the Democratic nomination for state senate. However, the 1934 elections were not, as Alsop and others have asserted, the genesis of the Clark-

⁴³ Richardson Dilworth, speech delivered at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner, Apr. 8, 1954, Dilworth Papers.

⁴⁴ *Philadelphia Record*, Apr. 3, 1934; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Apr. 4, 1934; *New York Times*, Nov. 8, 1933; J. T. Salter, “The End of Vare,” *Political Science Quarterly* 50 (1935): 214–35.

Dilworth alliance. No “remarkable game of political leapfrog” began in 1934. Dilworth and Clark had certainly become acquainted, largely through their work in support of the Twenty-first Amendment. But, as Clark told interviewer Walter Phillips Jr. years later, even as late as 1934 when both sought election, “neither of us had any particular impact on the other’s campaign.” Perhaps more important in the long run, Clark conceded that the two “really didn’t take turns managing each other’s campaigns.”⁴⁵ Contrary to Philadelphia mythology, Clark never functioned as Dilworth’s campaign manager. He served as an assistant—the “Director of Independent Activities”—in one Dilworth campaign: the mayoral race in 1947. Dilworth returned the favor once, in 1956, when he served as state chairman of the Clark for Senator Committee.⁴⁶

With the coming of World War II, both men volunteered for the military—another similarity but with a significant, almost predictable, difference. Dilworth participated in one of the bloodiest operations in the Pacific Theater. By contrast, Clark “never heard a gun fired in anger and spent a lot of time on grass tennis courts in New Delhi and Hastings Air Force Base.” He received a commission in the US Army Air Force, where his assignments were “entirely administrative and organizational.” He worked as director of organizational planning for General Henry “Hap” Arnold and as executive officer for General George Stratemeyer.⁴⁷ Dilworth returned to the Marine Corps, this time as a captain. He saw action with the First Marine Division in the Guadalcanal and Russell Islands campaigns. At Guadalcanal he won the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry and finished his active duty with the rank of major.⁴⁸

At the end of the war, on the eve of the reform movement that Clark and Dilworth would lead, Philadelphia remained the only big city in the country still governed by Republicans. And it was in 1947, when the Democrats nominated Dilworth to run for mayor, that the two men forged the alliance that would begin the Quaker City’s conversion to Democratic control. Dilworth’s nominal opponent was incumbent Republican Barney Samuel, but his real opponents were the three men who ruled the GOP organization and, thus, the city—Sheriff Austin

⁴⁵ Alsop, “Paradox of Gentleman Joe”; Joseph S. Clark interview.

⁴⁶ Undated 1947 campaign memo from Dilworth to all Democratic ward leaders, Dilworth Papers; Joseph S. Clark to Steven G. Neal, Jan. 17, 1973, and press release, Clark for Senator Committee, Clark Papers.

⁴⁷ Clark interview; Joseph S. Clark, Ritz-Carlton Hotel speech, July 18, 1951, Dilworth Papers.

⁴⁸ Biography of Richardson Dilworth, Clark Papers; Dilworth biography, Saxe Randall Papers.

Meehan, chairman of the Board of Tax Revision William Meade, and ward leader Mort Witkin. Dilworth was not a member of the regular Democratic organization; in fact, so few Democratic leaders knew him that he thought it necessary to set up daily meetings at Democratic headquarters in the Bellevue Stratford Hotel between eleven o'clock and noon so the ward leaders could "stop in and get acquainted." Dilworth also announced he was bringing Joe Clark on as his assistant campaign manager. "I am sure," he wrote, "that his coming into the campaign in an active way is going to be a tremendous help."⁴⁹

The sentiment in much of the city and in the press was that Dilworth was little more than "this year's sacrificial lamb," because, as the *Philadelphia Dispatch* opined, no other Democrat would "touch the mayoralty spot with a 40-foot pole."⁵⁰ Democrats may have agreed with the *Dispatch*. After all, the Democrats had not won a mayoral election since 1881. Nevertheless, it took a tie-breaking vote of Democratic committee chairman Mike Bradley to insure Dilworth's nomination.⁵¹ To bolster his candidacy, he tried to find a strong running mate for the district attorney's office. One potential candidate after another declined—including Clark, who claimed he did not have the criminal law experience to be a competent district attorney. Both Dick and Anne Dilworth were angry at Clark's refusal. They believed that Clark, like the rest of those who had turned Dick down, "would have managed to say yes to the top spot."⁵²

Few in the city expected what followed the announcement of the Democratic slate. Dilworth campaigned as no Democrat had done in the twentieth century. He was out virtually every night, making speeches on street corners all over the city, attacking the total lack of vision, gross mismanagement, massive waste, and ubiquitous corruption in city government. In a series of radio addresses broadcast on WFIL, he laid out the principal shortcomings of the current administration. The airport had no hangars or repair shops, no provision baggage handling, and no places to sit down. The "policy of apathy and indifference" was so pervasive that Trans World Airlines had stopped flying into the Quaker City. "When the TWA vice-president asked what kind of equipment the city would

⁴⁹ Richardson Dilworth, memo to all Democratic ward leaders, Aug. 15, 1947, and Dilworth, undated form letter to all ward leaders, Dilworth Papers.

⁵⁰ *Philadelphia Dispatch*, July 13, 1947.

⁵¹ Joseph S. Clark, "Working within the System," unpublished chapter draft, Clark Papers.

⁵² Clark interview.

furnish the 1,000 workers the company expected to bring in," he accused, "the mayor lost all interest for fear these workers might be Democratic."⁵³

Philadelphia's port had also been "shamefully neglected." The river channel, he charged, was filled with so much mud and silt that ocean-going vessels had to remain downstream until high tide. And when a ship finally docked, passengers were greeted by a "mass of sunken barges and old sailing ships which clutter the channel" along with the "filth, refuse and garbage covering the surface of the water. The resulting stench makes it almost unbearable to remain on deck."⁵⁴

The state of affairs in housing, especially for returning veterans, was an even greater failing of the Republican regime. Republicans had done nothing to make the vast inventory of empty residential buildings available to veterans. "No one" Dilworth charged, "can become a tenant in our 9,000 public housing units without first obtaining the written approval of his Republican Ward Leader," and the ward leaders did not want veterans and their families moving into their wards because "young veterans might have ideas about decent government. They won't stand being pushed around." Equally scandalous was the pervasive rent gouging that Mayor Samuel claimed was beyond his power to curb. Landlords regularly forced tenants to sign "voluntary rent increase agreements" in the middle of a lease. If the tenant protested, the landlord found a "friendly magistrate," and the tenant was evicted. "It is actually just as voluntary as an election in Moscow."⁵⁵

Lastly was the issue of the politicization of the police department and the large-scale corruption that resulted. Unlike any previous administration, division inspectors and precinct captains were assigned to precincts where they resided, which "put them directly under the thumbs of their own ward leaders." Patrolmen were instructed to turn a blind eye to prostitution, betting parlors, numbers banks, speakeasies, and gambling establishments operated by organized crime under the protection of the political leaders. A patrolman was "permitted to collect \$2 a week from each gambling headquarters, speakeasy or house of prostitution on his beat." At the other end of the scale, inspectors could make \$30,000 to \$75,000 a year in pay-offs, captains from \$10,000 to \$30,000. In the

⁵³ Richardson Dilworth, radio address, Oct. 6, 1947, Dilworth Papers.

⁵⁴ Richardson Dilworth, radio address, Oct. 13, 1947, Dilworth Papers.

⁵⁵ Richardson Dilworth, radio address, Sept. 29, 1947, and July 22, 1947, Dilworth Papers.

mayor's home ward, the rackets were controlled by his son. "So it hardly seems likely," Dilworth concluded, "that Mayor Samuel has either the will, the freedom, or the capacity to reestablish an effective police force." Dilworth lodged similar charges of police corruption in Sheriff Meehan's home ward. The sheriff offered to donate \$5,000 to charity if Dilworth could prove his charges and challenged Dilworth to a public debate to "compare personal reputations." Dilworth accepted immediately.⁵⁶

Clark, in addition to his "manager" status, took to the stump, calling the GOP leaders "a pathetic group of little men squabbling with each other over their petty cuts from slot machines, numbers, and vice." "The dull rot of cynicism and senility," he told the women of the Society for Ethical Culture, "is weighing the city down." Like Dilworth, Clark also scheduled a public debate. His was against Republican City Committee chairman David W. Harris. The Clark-Harris debate did indeed occur, but Dilworth's opponent failed to make an appearance.⁵⁷

Despite Dilworth's and Clark's efforts, voters gave Samuel the "biggest majority in a municipal contest since 1931." Republicans also won all twenty-two council seats and all the row offices that were contested that fall. Yet Dilworth won 321,319 votes—the largest number ever for a Democrat in a Philadelphia mayoral election—as nearly 75 percent of the city's registered voters cast ballots.⁵⁸

The loss notwithstanding, the results augured well for Clark and Dilworth. Two years later, Clark was the Democratic nominee for city controller. Dilworth was not a candidate for office, but he scheduled fifty street-corner rallies to stump for Clark.⁵⁹ Those plans changed the night he debated Sheriff Meehan at the Academy of Music. He had challenged Meehan to a debate during the 1947 campaign—a challenge Meehan seemed eager to meet. "All I want to do," Meehan had told a Union Republican Club meeting, "is get Dilworth on a platform alone and match my reputation against his. I'll even pay for the hall."⁶⁰ But his advisors bitterly opposed the idea, and rumors began to circulate that Meehan

⁵⁶ Richardson Dilworth, radio address, Sept. 22, 1947, Dilworth Papers; Joseph S. Clark, "No Mean City," chap. 5, Clark Papers.

⁵⁷ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Oct. 11, 1947, and Oct. 12, 1947.

⁵⁸ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 5, 1947; Joseph Clark, "No Mean City," chap. 5.

⁵⁹ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, June 26, 1949.

⁶⁰ Austin Meehan, speech delivered at Republican Club meeting, Oct. 14, 1947, Dilworth Papers.

would back out. "If Sheriff Meehan does not show up," Dilworth declared in an effort to bully him into debating, "the people of Philadelphia will know him for what he is." The people would recognize "his complete ignorance of and indifference to the issues of the campaign; his complete ignorance of the obligations of a public servant; his corrupt conduct of his office . . . his corruption as a political boss and his corruption as a city contractor."⁶¹ The sheriff, nevertheless, concluded that discretion was the better part of valor and failed to show up.

Two years later, Meehan's people were again fearful that Dilworth, one of the most accomplished libel lawyers in the city, would "cut the Sheriff up into small pieces, artistically and with a very sharp knife." But this time Meehan met the challenge. He spoke first, using thirty minutes to attack Dilworth's character and drag his and his wife's names through the mud. "I have no interest in your personal life or morals," Meehan disclaimed, "but people of Philadelphia are entitled to know you are . . . a chronic dishonest liar," a "faking hypocrite," and an adulterer who "ran off to Cuba" less than twenty-four hours after obtaining a Reno divorce. Meehan also went after Clark, calling him Dilworth's "Charlie McCarthy" and attacking Clark's support for birth control: "What does he know about housing? He and his wife can live in a telephone booth." "Now," the sheriff wrapped up, "don't give us any Yale or Harvard lawyer tricks in your answer to me. Mr. Dilworth, you take over."⁶²

The street-corner Dilworth might have responded with the formidable vitriol and venom he was capable of mustering. But Dilworth had come prepared for Meehan's personal assault. Municipal Court judge Nochem Winnet had tried to talk Meehan out of debating. When the sheriff rejected his advice, Winnet strongly advised against a personal attack. Again Meehan ignored his advice. Frustrated with his boss's intransigence, Winnet had told Natalie Saxe exactly what the sheriff planned to say, and Dilworth had taken the weekend prior to the debate to prepare a detailed, dispassionate response that destroyed whatever credibility the sheriff had left. Near the end of his dissertation, Dilworth pointed to the family dog. "I thought Prudence should be here to speak for herself," he mocked, "in case the sheriff attacked her."⁶³

⁶¹ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Oct. 20, 1947.

⁶² *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 13, 1949; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 13, 1949.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

Meehan had been embarrassingly outclassed. Dilworth finished with an announcement that he was a candidate for city treasurer. The news might have surprised Republicans, but it shocked Democrats. Not only had Dilworth made no mention of his plan to run to anyone, including Clark, but it was common knowledge that he planned to run for the governor's office in 1950. Saxe later said the decision was made in the heat of the debate. "At no point [prior to the debate] did he remotely consider running for city treasurer. . . . He made it up as he was going along" on the Academy stage.⁶⁴

Republicans and Democrats were also surprised by Meehan's performance and impressed with Dilworth's. "Mr. Meehan," observed one member of the audience, "showed to all intelligent people the low, uneducated type of person he is." Another thought the sheriff came across as a "big fat slob such as one would expect." Still another wrote that she was "nauseated with his [Meehan's] ignorance and cheap political scheming." And yet another commented on Meehan's "ghost written speech of vilification." The president of Provident Trust Bank, a Republican, praised Dilworth's "courageous and able handling of the personal attack." The son of former governor George Earle wrote, "My father's unwarranted intercession on behalf of Meehan does not represent my brother's or my own convictions. We are with you 100 percent."⁶⁵

One of the Republicans most impressed with Dilworth's performance was Arthur Binns, former chairman of the Committee of Fifteen—the group that had uncovered massive fraud and graft in city hall. The day after the debate he sent a short letter to Dilworth:

I have the utmost sympathy for your position and great admiration for your courage . . . to stand up and take the sort of beating you have been taking. It is the courage which is the stuff of which progress is made. . . . Every decent citizen must have a great sense of gratitude for your willingness to take it on the chin and slug it out in the hope of stimulating public interest and eventually achieving some measure of improvement in our

⁶⁴ Butterfield, "Revolt in Philadelphia"; Saxe interview, July 30, 1974.

⁶⁵ Mrs. Edwin G. Ruerswald to Richardson Dilworth, July 13, 1949; Samuel A. Crozer to Richardson Dilworth, July 13, 1949; Mrs. Mattie T. Robinson to Richardson Dilworth, July 16, 1949; James G. Krause, director of the Department of Parks and Public Property, Lebanon, PA, to Richardson Dilworth, July 14, 1949; William R. K. Mitchell, president, Provident Trust of Philadelphia, to Richardson Dilworth, July 13, 1949; Lawrence W. Earle to Richardson Dilworth, July 13, 1949, Dilworth Papers.

sad civic state. The picture is so confused I scarcely know where to turn but I certainly can say with all the sincerity within me that I appreciate your courage and your staying power under punishment and I am extremely grateful, as one citizen, to you.⁶⁶

Dilworth responded almost immediately, saying that he was “reminded of the smearing they tried to give you when your committee was hitting pay dirt and beginning to seriously worry the boys in City Hall . . . [and] the courage with which you stood up to those attacks.”⁶⁷ Less than three months later, Binns announced the formation of the Independent Republicans for the 1949 Democratic Ticket. “The Republican Organization of Philadelphia,” his press release announced, “has fallen into the hands of men who have brought our party and the government of the city into disrepute.”

Efforts to reform the party from within have failed. Nothing short of a stinging rebuke from the voters can remedy this situation. The present Republican leaders must be replaced by men and women of vision and integrity.⁶⁸

There have been several analyses of the 1949 Philadelphia municipal elections; a score of reasons have been offered for the outcome. Clearly, the factors that contributed to the Democratic victory included the reorganization of the Democratic Party, with Jim Finnegan taking over as city chairman; the series of scandals that came to light between 1948 and 1949 and led to five suicides and the revelation that \$40 million in city funds was unaccounted for; the political maturation of the Americans for Democratic Action and its active support for Clark and Dilworth; the collapse of the *Philadelphia Record*, which opened the door for the *Inquirer* to support Democrats for the first time in its history; the inclusion on the 1949 ballot of a nonbinding referendum on the question of awarding bonuses to World War II veterans; and the campaign, independent of the regular Democratic organization, organized by Clark and Dilworth and run by six remarkably politically savvy women. But added to these must be the effect of a group of highly respected Republicans—

⁶⁶ Arthur Binns to Richardson Dilworth, July 14, 1949, Dilworth Papers.

⁶⁷ Richardson Dilworth to Arthur Binns, July 18, 1949, Dilworth Papers.

⁶⁸ Press release, Independent Republicans for the 1949 Democratic Ticket, Clark Papers.

in open revolt against what they called the Republican “Frankenstein Monster”—who urged one hundred thousand of their party colleagues to support the Clark-Dilworth ticket. In addition to the corruption uncovered by the Committee of Fifteen, Dilworth’s performance on the stage of the Academy of Music helped push Binns to lead that revolt.⁶⁹ Only seven days after the debate, Binns sent another short note to Dilworth:

At considerable mental distress I am arriving at some such solution as follows. There will never be any improvement in the Philadelphia situation until there is change. Whether a new ticket would be better or worse is not primarily the issue. Our situation appears to me to much resemble a man seriously ill who is informed that, with an operation he may live, and that, without it—he certainly will die. In any case, I do want to perhaps have a serious talk with you to see whether there is anything I can do, consistent with my conscience, which would be useful.⁷⁰

The election surprised nearly everyone. Almost 80 percent of the city’s registered voters came out to the polls; the total number of votes cast was the third highest in the city’s history as virtually the entire GOP slate was beaten “by a tidal wave of protest.” Clark won by 109,000 of the 831,000 votes cast. Dilworth’s plurality was 111,000. Democrats won the other two row offices being contested, both city council seats, and the only superior court race. The only victorious Republicans were three candidates for magistrate. November 8, 1949, marked the beginning of a political renaissance in Philadelphia that would continue for twelve years. It may also have marked the high point of the Clark-Dilworth alliance.⁷¹

Two years later, Clark ran for mayor and Dilworth for district attorney. Once again the pair presented a united front to the public. Certainly both were still dedicated to continuing the reform movement they began two years before. But the lead-up to the 1951 campaign was not without some internal dissention. Dilworth had been told that he, not Clark, would be a better choice for the mayoral slot. It seemed logical, since he had run such a good campaign four years earlier. And besides, party elders were not convinced Clark would be a cooperative party man should he be elected. Dilworth was noncommittal. Ultimately, his sights were still

⁶⁹ See *ibid.*; Madonna and McLarnon, “Reform in Philadelphia.”

⁷⁰ Arthur Binns to Richardson Dilworth, July 20, 1949, Dilworth Papers.

⁷¹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 9, 1949; *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 9, 1949.

set on Harrisburg. He had lost the 1950 race for the governor's mansion, but that had in no way dampened his gubernatorial aspirations. Nevertheless, he had made no public statements about his place on the 1951 ticket. Late in the summer, the party leadership met at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel to slot the top positions on the Democratic slate. Those invited included Jack Kelly, Matt McCloskey, millionaire developer Albert Greenfield, Senator Frank Myers, City Chairman Jim Finnegan, Dilworth, and Clark. They had a statement from a group of 1949 Clark-Dilworth volunteers urging them to slot Clark for mayor and Dilworth for district attorney, but they planned to do just the opposite.⁷² Clark arrived late to the meeting and, before any decisions could be formalized, preempted all of them by announcing that less than an hour before, he had released a press statement of his "irrevocable intention to run for mayor . . . whether or not I have your backing."⁷³ Clark had outmaneuvered them all. They could accept Clark's candidacy or engage in a bitter primary fight that might ruin the party's chances in the fall.⁷⁴

Dilworth remained silent throughout the meeting and, at the end, agreed to accept the district attorney nomination. Years later, Clark insisted that episode was the "last time Dick and I were in any apparent conflict."⁷⁵ Perhaps their subsequent conflicts were not apparent to the public, but they nevertheless occurred. Clark's virtual seizure of the nomination left a smoldering resentment among Dilworth's senior staffers, earned him the permanent hatred of Dilworth's wife Anne, and began to change the nature of the relationship between the two reformers.⁷⁶

Clark and Dilworth both won in 1951. Philadelphia had its first Democratic mayor in nearly ninety years.⁷⁷ In the euphoria of their victories, the two exchanged congratulatory letters that took on the aspect of a mutual admiration society and reflected a degree of closeness the two would never again share. "It has been a wonderful four years," Dilworth reflected, "and I think we have been as good a political team as could be

⁷² Walter Phillips Jr., David Berger, Ada Lewis, et al. to James A. Finnegan, May 8, 1951, Clark Papers.

⁷³ Alsop, "Paradox of Gentleman Joe."

⁷⁴ Clark interview.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Stratos interview; Saxe interview, July 30, 1974.

⁷⁷ Rudolph Blankenberg, an independent Republican, was elected in 1911 on the Keystone-Democratic ticket.

found anywhere. I honestly feel that each of us has been essential to the other, and we have not let anyone, or anything divide us." Dilworth went on to reassure Clark that he would be a "splendid" mayor and pledged he would "run the DA's office so that it will be a helpful and component part of your administration."⁷⁸

"Thanks a lot for your two swell letters," Clark replied. "It has been a wonderful four years and I agree with everything you say about the team. We have needed each other and will again in the future. I think in many ways our greatest achievement has been in refusing to let anyone or anything break up the team." "Incidentally," Clark added, "I have no further political ambitions; but I do want to do the best job that is humanly possible for the next four years [and] I want to see you governor. There is nothing inconsistent in these ambitions but there may be times when the ice seems thin."⁷⁹

Dilworth followed up his congratulations with a second letter—this one much longer than the first. It had a distinctly pedantic tone and clearly reflected Dilworth's concerns about Clark's political savvy. Dilworth did not trust Clark to pay attention to those things Dilworth considered politically essential to Clark's success in office. Dilworth knew Clark adamantly opposed patronage, so he reminded him that "in politics even more than any other field, you have to look out for those who have been loyal and helpful and take care of them as far as their capabilities will permit." He went on to advise that Clark's appointments show the proper deference to the various minority interests within the party. Luther Cunningham could help gain the confidence of the African American community. Sam Regalbuto would do the same with the Italians. "And," he wrote, "you should also be on the constant lookout for a good young Pole who can be made into a real leader in that community." Finally, Dilworth advised, Clark should get rid of current office holders, even if they had performed well in their jobs. "We should not leave in power men who are against us—always have been and always will be." It was essential that Clark "set about destroying the [GOP] city hall organization," even if the new city charter had to be amended to do so.⁸⁰

As Clark began assembling his staff, Dilworth requested that he hire two deserving aides: Bill Hennegan and David Berger. Hennegan had

⁷⁸ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Nov. 10, 1951, Clark Papers.

⁷⁹ Joseph S. Clark to Richardson Dilworth, Nov. 1951, Dilworth Papers.

⁸⁰ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Nov. 18, 1951, Clark Papers.

served as Dilworth's assistant city treasurer. "I have an enormous obligation to him," Dilworth wrote Clark. "He is loyal, conscientious to a degree, and a really hard worker."⁸¹ Berger, a lawyer "who had been terribly helpful" to Dilworth, had met Dilworth when both were in a military hospital in the South Pacific. He was also one of the volunteers who had urged party leaders to slot Clark for the mayoral nomination. Clark took no action on the request, and Dilworth went on vacation "very angry at Joe because he felt Joe dragged his feet on what Dilworth felt were very minimal requests." While Dilworth was gone, Clark contacted Natalie Saxe, who by this time had become Dilworth's most trusted assistant, and offered her the position of executive secretary. Clark had not checked with Dilworth before proffering the offer. Dilworth told Saxe that while he wanted her to continue to be his "eyes and ears in Harrisburg," he would not stand in the way of her advancing her career. As in the Ritz-Carlton meeting, Dilworth gave no indication of any displeasure with Clark. But Saxe was certain he resented Clark's attempt to steal his aide-de-camp. Moreover, she was sure that Anne Dilworth "said to him [Dilworth] something to the effect of 'Look what that son of a bitch did to you when your back was turned.'" Saxe refused Clark's offer; Clark never did give Hennegan a job.⁸²

During their first four years in power, Clark and Dilworth worked well together, but not without their share of disputes. In 1954, for example, the operating procedures on the Committee for Philadelphia—a volunteer organization put together by the reformers—led to a heated disagreement. Clark insisted that bills had to be approved by all members of the committee before being paid. He also complained that he had been listed as a cochair without his knowledge or consent. Dilworth's angry response was immediate:

The thing which really disturbs me is what appears to be a combination of indifference and suspicion on your part. I have no desire to be associated with anyone who does not have confidence in me, and I am perfectly happy to dissolve the Committee for Philadelphia, if that is your desire.⁸³

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Saxe interview, July 30, 1974, and Sept. 18, 1975; Walter Phillips Jr., David Berger, Ada Lewis, et al. to James A. Finnegan, May 8, 1951.

⁸³ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Apr. 21, 1954, Dilworth Papers.

Of much greater significance was the disagreement over patronage. In 1951 the city adopted a new charter—something both Clark and Dilworth had advocated for years. It went into effect the same day Clark was inaugurated. The new charter was meant to prevent the rot of the corruption that had pervaded city hall during the Republican years, but, ironically, it also became a source of friction between the mayor, the Democratic City Committee, and the district attorney. The charter placed many patronage jobs under the purview of civil service laws. This meant that thousands of city employees—loyal Republicans who owed their jobs to Clark's predecessors—could not be fired and replaced with Democratic loyalists. The new charter also prohibited city employees from engaging in political activities. While that prohibition would prevent those Republicans from working for the party now out of power, it also prevented many new employees from working in the interests of the Democrats who had hired them.

Clark broke an almost sacrosanct law of politics by announcing he would not seek a second term as mayor. That freed him to pursue relentlessly his long-stated objective—the end of patronage in city hall. Clark believed patronage was one of the worst evils in the American political system, and he refused to appoint anyone based solely on party loyalty. Not a single member of his cabinet was the man recommended by party leaders for the job. Party regulars came to view many of Clark's appointees as “carpetbaggers.”⁸⁴

The mayor's position on patronage immediately put him at odds with the leaders of his own party and created a tension point between himself and Dilworth, who disagreed with Clark's dogmatic opposition to a time-honored political tradition. Dilworth believed the art of compromise was necessary for a successful career in politics. “Make sure,” he advised Clark two days after the election, “the backbone of our own organization is taken care of, provided they can and will do a decent job in any position to which they are appointed.”⁸⁵ He agreed that patronage had run amok under the Republicans, but he also understood that he could not simply turn his back on “party leaders without whose exertions we would not be here today.” “The mere fact,” he insisted, “that a ward leader wants jobs

⁸⁴ Dilworth, speech delivered at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner, Apr. 8, 1954.

⁸⁵ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Nov. 10, 1951, Clark Papers.

for his good committeemen and women certainly does not make him a scoundrel." On the other hand, he also believed that "the fact the mayor insists that the heads of departments be the best persons available does not make him a sworn enemy of political organization."⁸⁶

Clark was equally unbending in his opposition to any changes in the new city charter. His position put him at odds not only with the Philadelphia Democratic organization but with Democratic leaders across the state. State senator and future governor George Leader even threatened to travel to Philadelphia to "persuade that 'son-of-a-bitch' Mayor Clark to retreat from his position on the charter."⁸⁷

Dilworth found himself in the middle—trying to keep the Democratic reform movement intact while the city committee and the mayor battled over patronage and charter change. The infighting cost the Democrats the 1953 municipal elections as Dilworth was unable to find a compromise—a failure that added to his frustration, especially with the mayor:

He is absolutely inflexible politically, with the result he is at complete loggerheads with the Democratic organization in a running battle, which grows more serious every week. I personally do not believe any administration can be a success and perpetuate itself unless it has a reasonable amount of political know-how and tact.⁸⁸

That inflexibility strained the relationship between Clark and Dilworth and might have cost Dilworth at least one statewide election. By 1954 it was clear to Dilworth that Clark's battle with the city committee over patronage and the charter had damaged Dilworth's electoral aspirations. "We have very stupidly failed even to work out a decent arrangement with the political organization," he complained to political confidant Roger Kent. "The result is that the regular organization here is dead set against me [running for governor]." Eventually, Dilworth came to believe that Clark was purposely trying to ruin his chance for the governor's mansion. It was the closest Clark and Dilworth ever came to an open break.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Dilworth, speech delivered at the Jefferson-Jackson Dinner, Apr. 8, 1954.

⁸⁷ Saxe interview, Aug. 14, 1974.

⁸⁸ Richardson Dilworth to Roger Kent, May 11, 1954, Dilworth Papers.

⁸⁹ Richardson Dilworth to Roger Kent, Jan. 5, 1954, Dilworth Papers; Saxe interview, Sept. 18, 1974.

As Clark's first term came to a close in 1955, the question in the public's mind was whether he would seek a second term and, if not, who would succeed him. Democratic insiders thought they knew the answer. Clark had often indicated that he intended to be a one-term mayor. Saxe recalls, "His intention was to not run but rather wait until 1956 and take a crack at the senate seat then occupied for former Governor Duff."⁹⁰ Dilworth intended to run for mayor. Clark had told Dilworth directly of his plans, but there was now a note of ambivalence on a second term in the mayor's office. "Joe told me," Dilworth wrote Walter Annenberg, "he does not intend to be a candidate for reelection unless the city committee insists upon slating someone repugnant to him."⁹¹ But as the time for filing approached, Clark maintained a curious silence. Public speculation grew. According to Joe Stratos, everyone wondered, "was Joe Clark going to resign . . . or run again, or was he going to run for the Senate?" Finally, Dilworth called Clark in frustration: "Joe, if you're going to run, run! Then I will run for Senate."⁹² Still, Clark seemed unable to make a decision.

Saxe knew better. As the filing deadline approached, she learned that Clark had his filing papers for a second term filled out and notarized. She told Dilworth of Clark's preparations and then directed one of his office secretaries to prepare the paperwork, "get from Dilworth a check for the filing fee, and [go] downstairs to file" before Clark filed. A short time later, Clark assistant Michael Byrne visited the district attorney's office to assure him that "Joe at no time had any intention of filing."⁹³

Dilworth won the 1955 contest against W. Thatcher Longstreth. Clark left city hall and prepared for his 1956 senatorial run. By the time of Dilworth's inauguration, enthusiasm among party leaders statewide for Clark's candidacy had waned considerably. Congressman Bill Green, the leader of the Philadelphia organization, "hated" Joe Clark and had secured the support of forty-seven of fifty-two ward leaders for a run against him. Green also had the backing of every big money raiser in the city except Matt McCloskey.⁹⁴ Pittsburgh's David Lawrence called Dilworth to see if he would consider resigning and announce for the sen-

⁹⁰ Saxe interview, Sept. 18, 1974.

⁹¹ Richardson Dilworth to Walter Annenberg, Nov. 30, 1954, Dilworth Papers.

⁹² Stratos interview.

⁹³ Saxe interview, Sept. 18, 1974.

⁹⁴ Richardson Dilworth to Roger Kent, Dec. 27, 1955, Dilworth Papers.

ate. Dilworth advised him that he had committed his support to Clark and would not renege. Clark, seeing the chances for his nomination crumbling, called Dilworth and asked for a private meeting to determine Dilworth's intentions; "he had some doubts about Dilworth's wholehearted support." When they met, Clark told Dilworth that, "with or without Dilworth's support, he was going for it." Dilworth, who insisted on having a witness at the meeting, assured his old colleague that he would keep his commitments, but the job of putting together a new administration would make it impossible for him to devote his full energies to Clark's campaign; he certainly could not consider managing it. Clark left, still not convinced of Dilworth's loyalty. Nevertheless, Dilworth did indeed support Clark, and Clark went on to win the Democratic nomination and the general election, defeating incumbent James H. Duff by a slim 2 percentage points.⁹⁵ Dilworth called Clark's victory "amazing" and believed it was due to three things: "First the fact that he was a splendid candidate and second, the regular old-line Republican organization really hates Duff and were ready to stick the knife into him. On top of that, Duff has actually been a miserable failure as a Senator."⁹⁶

Clark spent twelve years in the US Senate—from 1957 until 1969. Dilworth served as mayor from January 1956 until he resigned to run for governor in 1962. He was pleased that 75 percent of Clark's senior staff agreed to stay on, but it did make the selection of the remaining 25 percent more difficult. "I have already been called an ingrate so many times," he complained, "that I am beginning to consider it a term of endearment." In testament to Dilworth's people skills, when he left the mayor's office six years later, all but one of those original appointments were still on the job. By contrast, there was significant turnover during Clark's four years in city hall.⁹⁷

During Dilworth's mayoral years, and later as president of the Philadelphia School Board, he and Clark corresponded occasionally and met infrequently for lunch. Dilworth continued the reform agenda initiated by Clark and tried to repair the relationship between the mayor's office and the Democratic City Committee. Clark established himself as a harsh critic of prevailing Senate rules. He detested the majority rules

⁹⁵ Saxe interview, Sept. 18, 1974.

⁹⁶ Richardson Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Nov. 12, 1956, Dilworth Papers.

⁹⁷ Richardson Dilworth to Harold Sterling Vanderbilt, Dec. 30, 1955, Dilworth Papers; Saxe interview, Sept. 18, 1974.

that led to southern domination of the Congress and the filibuster rule that allowed one man to block legislation. Occasionally the two would trade drafts of speeches, send reports of specific issues, or offer seemingly unsolicited advice. On one occasion Clark sent Dilworth a copy of a speech he made on the floor of the Senate in favor of government-sponsored population control. He suggested that the United Fund (of which Dilworth was a trustee in Philadelphia) “give serious thought to taking into the Fund agencies interested in the solution of this problem” of “uncontrolled fertility” and the “tragic consequences of overpopulation.”⁹⁸ Dilworth’s terse reply emphasized, in his own cynical way, how absurdly impolitic and ill-timed Clark’s speech was:

Thanks very much for your letter and a copy of your speech. I was delighted to read that you were the first man to ever discuss birth control on the floor of the Senate. I agree that it is much needed, but the United Fund is making a renewed effort to persuade the Catholic Charities to come in with it, and so it is probably not the time to also start a drive for birth control.⁹⁹

By the time Dilworth agreed to serve as school board president, his contact with Clark was sporadic at best. In late 1967, he wrote to Clark in the wake of a disastrous confrontation between black students, school board officials, and the Philadelphia police. That year, civil rights activist and mayoral candidate Cecil B. Moore received permission to visit schools with large numbers of black students, whom he called the forgotten victims of a system run by “the white power structure not really interested in the black kids.” Promising to make school officials especially nervous, Moore barnstormed through the schools, repeatedly criticizing the curriculum, denigrating police commissioner Frank Rizzo as a “South Philadelphia high school dropout,” and urging black students to demand a meeting with school officials. School superintendent Mark Shedd agreed, expecting to meet with a small group of student leaders. Instead, 3,500 students arrived at the school board’s headquarters on JFK Parkway. While Shedd and Dilworth met with student leaders, Rizzo arrived with two hundred policemen. Students began throwing bottles and bricks; Rizzo ordered his men to “get their black asses” and “set loose a couple

⁹⁸ Joseph S. Clark to Richardson Dilworth, Aug. 27, 1963, Dilworth Papers.

⁹⁹ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Aug. 28, 1963, Dilworth Papers.

hundred men swinging clubs and beating children.” The students scattered in all directions. Some ran through the city hall, knocking over newsstands and yelling “Black Power.” Others disrupted operations on bus and trolley lines; still others simply assaulted pedestrians on the street and shattered store windows.¹⁰⁰

The incident sparked student unrest throughout the city. By December, 5,600 black students were boycotting school and threatening to stay out until Rizzo was fired. Dilworth blamed the situation on Shedd—who had allowed Moore to campaign in the schools, “foment[ing] unrest”—but more so on Rizzo’s police, who had “indiscriminately” beaten the students. He joined Deputy Mayor Charles Bowser in demanding Rizzo’s removal. Meanwhile, the Fraternal Order of Police and the Catholic War Veterans demanded Dilworth’s firing. The NAACP called Rizzo a “carbon copy of Bull Connor,” while the Neighborhood School Association called him the “most outstanding and dedicated police commissioner” the city ever had while accusing the school board of “coddling, encouraging, aiding and abetting extremist groups.” The Philadelphia assistant district attorney condemned Rizzo for being “hostile to civil rights and civil liberties,” while the Crime Commission praised him, claiming the student rally was “engineered by militant racists.” Most letters to the editor of the *Evening Bulletin* supported the police. A few deplored police “gestapo tactics,” but far more praised Rizzo and his men for their “restraint” and success in preventing “a full-sized riot.”¹⁰¹

In the wake of the incident, Dilworth wrote to Clark, expressing his disgust with “the distinguished commissioner” who “seems to want to stir up trouble in the predominantly Negro high schools just so he can then put it down with a club.”¹⁰² But this was his only communication with Clark, the former mayor, regarding a serious situation in the city they both called home. Instead, he chose to share his thoughts on the school situation with his closest friend, John O’Hara. A year before the school riot, he had written to O’Hara, saying, “I have found being President of

¹⁰⁰ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 5, 1967; Sal A. Paolantonio, *Frank Rizzo: The Last Big Man in Big City America* (Philadelphia, 1993); this account of the November 1967 student riot is based on the following sources: *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 17–21, 1967; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Nov. 17–20, 1967; Paolantonio, *Frank Rizzo*.

¹⁰¹ *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Nov. 17–21, 1967.

¹⁰² Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Nov. 24, 1967, Dilworth Papers.

the School Board calls for a degree of tact which I simply do not possess.” The Teachers’ Union, he complained, had publicly attacked him as “a snob, a private-school boy, an Ivy Leaguer, and one who would not even deign to let his children or grandchildren go to public schools.”¹⁰³

After the riot, his letters grew more typically Dilworth in their cynicism. “The low-income whites and the militant blacks are determined on a confrontation,” he wrote in October 1968.

[The] various PTA groups in the Northeast . . . refuse to discuss the matter beyond saying that their children are not going to be bused to any “nigger” school for anything. . . . I do not think I have ever seen such undisguised hatred in the 20 years I have been in politics in this city. When I left the hearing room, a number of sweet young mothers followed me down the hall shouting, “You bum; you lousy dirty stinking bum We know where you live and we’ll get you there.” It was infuriating and had I been younger, and the ladies less numerous, I think I would have slugged them all.¹⁰⁴

A few days later he penned another letter to O’Hara that evinced a profound pessimism about his or anyone’s ability to solve the racial problems in the schools. “I really do not know precisely what caused me to accept the presidency of the School Board,” he confided. “It has been a 10-times harder job than I ever anticipated. The depth of the hatred between the low-income whites and the black community in a big northern multi-racial city is incredible.”¹⁰⁵ None of these thoughts were shared with Joe Clark.

Naturally, both Clark and Dilworth continued to take an interest in statewide political campaigns. This was especially true for Dilworth, since, through 1962, he still aspired to the governor’s mansion. He had lost a close election to John Fine in 1950, when he attempted to take his attack-style campaigning statewide. A typical Dilworth handout called Fine the “the admitted leader of the corrupt Luzerne County Machine” who is now the “prisoner” of the “leaders of corrupt machines in other parts of the state.”¹⁰⁶ Former Democratic governor George Earle and Charles Margiotti, Earle’s attorney general, worked for Dilworth’s defeat,

¹⁰³ Richardson Dilworth to John O’Hara, May 24, 1966, Dilworth Papers.

¹⁰⁴ Richardson Dilworth to John O’Hara, Oct. 3, 1968, Dilworth Papers.

¹⁰⁵ Richardson Dilworth to John O’Hara, Oct. 24, 1968, Dilworth Papers.

¹⁰⁶ 1950 Democratic campaign advertisement, Saxe Randall Papers.

and he lost by a mere 86,000 votes.¹⁰⁷ Dilworth had considered seeking the gubernatorial nomination again in 1954 but changed his mind, believing that the Democrats had virtually no chance for success. "It is my opinion," he wrote Roger Kent, "that nothing short of the Russians dropping an atomic bomb on Mr. Eisenhower and leaving us to the tender mercies of your fellow Californian, little Dickie Nixon, could possibly bring about a Democratic victory in the state of Pennsylvania."¹⁰⁸ Four years later, party leaders convinced him that he had enough support to win the nomination; there was even vague talk of a presidential bid in 1960.¹⁰⁹ But this time he was denied in favor of Pittsburgh's David Lawrence. Dilworth came to realize that he had never been seriously considered for the 1958 nomination. He had been used as a pawn in a game of power politics: "Once Bill Green and Jim Clark, the Philadelphia leaders, let it be known they would drop Furman and McClelland if Lawrence would drop me, the ballgame was over, and now these gentlemen will sit down and agree on some character they can pretty well handle."¹¹⁰

Finally, in 1962, he won the nomination. He resigned the mayor's office—as required by the city charter he and Clark had fought for—and staged what would be his final political campaign. Clark ran for reelection the same year, but the two did very little campaigning together. "Naturally," Saxe wrote later, "Clark flew solo all the way."¹¹¹ His behavior added to Anne Dilworth's contempt for Clark. Ever since 1951, when, in her estimation, Clark had stolen the mayoral nomination, she had resented Clark's treatment of her husband. As Saxe puts it, "She felt Joe went out of his way to upstage Dick, and Dick, as the father of the reform movement in Philadelphia, should have been mayor in 1951." On several occasions thereafter, Clark seemed to have gone out of his way to "block" Dilworth's political aspirations.¹¹² Consequently, Anne was extremely cool toward Clark and his wife Noel, who had little time for politics. "On the few occasions when Noel and Joe would campaign on behalf of Dick, Dick would be very, very warm . . . but Anne was very, very cold."¹¹³ The public got a glimpse of a problem when Adlai Stevenson came to town

¹⁰⁷ Saxe interview, July 30, 1974.

¹⁰⁸ Richardson Dilworth to Roger Kent, May 11, 1954.

¹⁰⁹ Saxe interview, July 30, 1974; Theodore Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York, 1966).

¹¹⁰ Richardson Dilworth to Roger Kent, Feb. 18, 1958, Dilworth Papers.

¹¹¹ Natalie Saxe to Jo W. Saxe, no date.

¹¹² Saxe interview, Jan. 23, 1975.

¹¹³ Stratos interview.

during the 1952 presidential campaign. Both Clark and Dilworth were seated on the dais; Anne and Noel were seated at a table directly in front of it. "When they introduced Clark, everyone stood up but Mrs. Dilworth. When they introduced Dilworth, everyone stood up except Noel," Rafsky remembers.¹¹⁴ Finally, in 1962, Anne could no longer stifle the frustration that had been building over the past eleven years. She announced, according to Saxe, that she "was not going to vote for Joe."¹¹⁵

Apparently Clark never understood the reason for Anne's behavior. He assumed it was a problem between her and Noel. Years later, Clark and Dilworth were eating lunch at the Midtown Club. Both men ate lunch there daily, but almost never at the same table. Clark had divorced Noel and was now married to his third wife, Iris. In Saxe's words, Clark approached Dilworth and suggested "both Anne and Dick would enjoy Iris [and] the two couples ought to get together. Whereupon Dick, I'm sure with great pleasure, told Joe that he was quite mistaken—that it wasn't Noel that Anne disliked, that it was he, Joe."¹¹⁶

By that time it seems that Dilworth did not like Clark much either. In April 1957, the *Saturday Evening Post* published a feature article on Clark, who had only been in the Senate for four months. Written by Stewart Alsop, the article was almost glowing, hinting that Clark had the White House in his future. Eleanor Roosevelt, Alsop said, had Clark on her short list of five possible presidential candidates for 1960. He was an articulate, unassuming, tough, shrewd, hard-working, proven vote-getter who had "broken the seven-decade hold of the Republican machine on the nation's fourth largest city." He was also willing to make the small concessions all politicians must make from time to time. "The trick," according to Clark, "is to know how to roll with the punches. A man who never rolls, breaks. A man who rolls too easily, destroys himself."¹¹⁷ The article did not impress John O'Hara. "I don't know what Stewart Alsop's intent was," O'Hara wrote to Dilworth, "but he succeeded in giving me the impression that Joe Clark must be a conniving little prick. At the same time he inadvertently or deliberately made you out to be a hell of a guy."¹¹⁸ Dilworth had no comment on his friend's observations.

¹¹⁴ Rafsky interview.

¹¹⁵ Saxe interview, Jan. 23, 1975.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Alsop, "Paradox of Gentleman Joe."

¹¹⁸ John O'Hara to Richardson Dilworth, Apr. 23, 1957, Dilworth Papers.

Five years later, after Dilworth had announced for the governorship, O'Hara volunteered his view of the upcoming campaign and, again, his estimation of Clark:

The unknown factor to me is Clark. You want to know something? I don't trust Clark. You want to know something else? I think you don't trust him. I have a feeling, based on no fact, that Joe Clark convinced himself that you owe everything to him and that you should be obedient and subservient to his wishes. My analysis and advice would be worth a lot more if I knew the precise relationship existing between Clark and Green as regards you. But you know what that is, so I don't need to know.¹¹⁹

This time Dilworth did respond. "I agree with you," he wrote, "that Joe Clark, just like all of us politicians, is an extraordinarily self-centered individual who would cut his own father's throat if necessary to get ahead."¹²⁰

In June 1963, after Dilworth had lost the governor's race and Clark had won reelection, O'Hara wrote of Clark a third time: "I don't know why I think he is an arrogant little prick, but I do. Maybe because he has none of those qualities that you and I have that make us lovable and send us down to defeat."¹²¹ Dilworth's response: "Your description of our senior senator, Joseph S. Clark, is very accurate. I know of no one who is a better judge of character than yourself or who can sum up what a person is really like more succinctly or accurately."¹²²

The years of helping Clark to get virtually everything he sought in public life had finally gotten to Dilworth as he came around to Anne's and O'Hara's way of thinking. Or perhaps there never had existed the "Damon and Pythias" relationship of which everyone wrote. Dilworth and Clark had enjoyed a political alliance of serendipitous convenience that had benefited both men, albeit Clark more than Dilworth, and had benefited the city of Philadelphia as well. William Rafsky may have indeed been correct: "He [Clark] didn't think much of Dilworth, and Dilworth didn't think much of him either."¹²³

Assessing the impact of Dilworth on the Philadelphia reform movement at the end of his own political career, Clark, in a column in the

¹¹⁹ John O'Hara to Richardson Dilworth, Feb. 26, 1962, Dilworth Papers.

¹²⁰ Richardson Dilworth to John O'Hara, Mar. 6, 1962, Dilworth Papers.

¹²¹ John O'Hara to Richardson Dilworth, June 1, 1963, Dilworth Papers.

¹²² Richardson Dilworth to John O'Hara, June 3, 1963, Dilworth Papers.

¹²³ Rafsky interview.

Evening Bulletin, concluded that reform in Philadelphia ended when Dilworth resigned as mayor in February 1962 to run for governor. Clark went on to refer to Dilworth as the “unsung hero of Philadelphia.” Somewhat ironically, however, both Clark and Dilworth always had larger political objectives of their own—Dilworth to attain the governorship and Clark to be a US senator.¹²⁴

Dilworth was certainly the early leader of the reform movement, cemented by his campaign for mayor in 1947. During that campaign, Clark had organized the various independent reform groups, heading an amalgam of these entities oddly named the Independent Activities Committee. Publicly, Clark’s more detached style and intellectual approach never allowed him to compete with the fiery, passionate Dilworth, whose stump speeches became the hallmark of his campaigns. But in 1949, when Clark was elected city controller, he emerged out of Dilworth’s shadow. With a political base of his own and Dilworth increasingly focused on the governorship, Clark began to raise his public profile and moved into the leadership of the reform movement. Clark’s allies in his effort were the independent groups he had helped organize and the local chapter, of which he was the leader, of the Americans for Democratic Action. Additionally, Clark did make an effort to work with the regular Democratic organization, building alliances with them as well as with organized labor. It was also important that as controller, Clark was in a position to attack the corruption and incompetence in the city administration. Consequently, by 1951 Clark and not Dilworth seemed better positioned to run for mayor. Dilworth had run for office in three of the last four years and still had visions of the governorship.

Certainly the personal relationship between Clark and Dilworth mattered. The two had been political friends and leaders of the movement that for two decades had tried to clean up the politics and government of the city. By 1951, Dilworth fully understood how resolute Clark had become to run for mayor and did not stand in his way. But Clark and Dilworth parted ways on the necessity of compromising with the regular Democratic organization. Following the failure of the reformers to broaden the base of the movement, they lost control of city council and the district attorney’s office in 1955. Dilworth, according to Clark, made a deal with Democratic boss Bill Green to amend the city charter to allow for addi-

¹²⁴ “Clark Calls Dilworth Unsung Hero of Phila,” *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, Sept. 25, 1971.

tional patronage and permit him to run for governor without resigning as mayor. Reformers were furious with Dilworth for making the deal; Clark condemned the proposed charter changes, which were rejected by the city electorate in the 1956 primary.

Despite his attempts at conciliation, Dilworth feuded with Democratic Party leaders throughout his first term as mayor. Most notably, "he refused to endorse the renomination of [party favorite] Victor H. Blanc for district attorney in 1957; and after Blanc was renominated over his opposition, Dilworth publicly declared that Blanc was unqualified to continue as district attorney and refused to support him in the general election."¹²⁵ Nevertheless, Dilworth easily won election to a second term in 1959. In 1971, Clark assessed Dilworth's years as mayor, writing that they "were marked by great administrative successes, coupled with fierce and frequently losing political battles."¹²⁶ Dilworth's ultimate goal, however, remained the governor's mansion. In February 1962, he announced his gubernatorial candidacy. Due in large measure to Clark's single-minded opposition to charter change, Dilworth was forced to resign the mayoralty. The following November he was soundly defeated by William Scranton.¹²⁷ He never again ran for public office.

Clark lost his bid for a third term in 1968 to Richard Schweiker. That would be his final campaign. Dilworth sent the expected note of condolence. Back in 1951, Dilworth had penned a personal letter to Clark. It was handwritten, not dictated and typed by a member of the secretarial staff. In it he reflected on their "wonderful four years" together and closed with his anticipation of their political futures:

I want things to continue as they always have in the past. When either of us need[s] the other we can count on him. But when we don't need one another, we don't have to do anything for show or for appearance sake.¹²⁸

Exactly seventeen years later, in the wake of his loss to Schweiker, Clark wrote a similarly personal note to Dilworth:

¹²⁵ Joseph Fink, "Reform in Philadelphia: 1946–1951" (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1971), 223.

¹²⁶ "Clark Calls Dilworth Hero of Phila."

¹²⁷ See Fink, "Reform in Philadelphia," 177–79. In the 1962 election, Dilworth won only five of sixty-seven counties. He polled 44.3 percent to Scranton's 55.3 percent and lost by a half million votes. He carried Philadelphia, but due to his feuding with the city Democratic organization, his margin of victory was far less than anticipated.

¹²⁸ Richardson Dilworth to Joseph S. Clark, Nov. 10, 1951, Clark Papers.

We've had some times together, you and I, since 1947 which I shall always treasure in my memory. And I think we can both say, without that arrogance with which I am charged, that the community is the better for the efforts we put into it these last twenty years. Iris and I are off for three weeks at Cosumel and Mexico. I'll call you for lunch when I get back early in December. In the meantime my best to Anne and thanks again.
[signed] Affectionately, Joe¹²⁹

There is no record of a response from Dilworth.

Millersville University
Franklin & Marshall College

JOHN MORRISON McLARNON III
G. TERRY MADONNA

¹²⁹ Joseph S. Clark to Richardson Dilworth, Nov. 10, 1968, Dilworth Papers.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Nation's Nature: How Continental Presumptions Gave Rise to the United States of America. By JAMES D. DRAKE. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011. 401 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. \$45.)

United States history continues to be written as if it begins and ends at the shores of the North American continent. It is a landlocked narrative, one that distorts the past and obscures the future. James Drake's marvelous exploration of our "continental presumption" opens up an entirely different, wholly original perspective. The New World had been imagined by explorers initially as an island or an archipelago. The British were island and coastal people, more oriented to sea than land, for whom a continental land mass blocking access to Asia was more a frustration than a blessing. Their French rivals coveted America as a waterland, exploring it by way of rivers and lakes. Confined to the coasts and waterways, few knew anything about the continent as such.

The geographical notion of continent did not emerge until the seventeenth century and, as Drake shows, was not considered an indisputable fact of nature until the late eighteenth century. This idea was as much the product of politics as natural science, used by Thomas Paine to justify separation from the mother country when he famously argued that it was absurd for "a continent to be perpetually governed by an island." The rebellious colonists were rhetorically continental long before they were able to explore or occupy even a small part of the continent itself. As Drake demonstrates, ignorance and imagination went hand in hand, creating by 1775 a national metageography which remains largely unchallenged to this day.

Much of Drake's book is concerned with the political details of the struggle for independence and the events of the early national decades. He tells this story well, but the true genius of this book lies in its ability to expose the metageography that underpins our national myth-history. Drake is as conversant with Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community as with the work of cultural geographers such as Karen Wigen and Martin Lewis. For too long, history and geography have been separate disciplines, especially in the United States. Used to thinking of this continent as a natural phenomenon, we assume that geography is destiny when, in fact, it is a contested product of history itself.

In the twenty-first century, boundaries once fixed have again become fluid. In many ways, the United States has become less continental as population has gravitated to the coasts. The center has been hollowed out, and edges have come

to define who we are as a people. Geographers have begun to ask whether continents are any longer a viable category of analysis, while the new field of global history has challenged the idea that the story of this nation can be contained between the seas. In this moment of geographical turbulence, we are suddenly liberated from the tyranny of continental presumptions and encouraged to reimagine ourselves in a less landlocked manner. Drake's book comes as a gift at this critical time.

Rutgers University

JOHN R. GILLIS

The First Prejudice: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Early America.

Edited by CHRIS BENEKE and CHRISTOPHER S. GREND. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 416 pp. Notes, index. \$45.)

The religious diversity of early America has been fully documented in historical scholarship. How religious tolerance was conceived, codified, and practiced has garnered less attention. This anthology by Chris Beneke and Christopher S. Grenda initiates a productive conversation about the contours of religious difference in early America. Tolerance and intolerance are addressed from the colonial to the early national periods through an investigation of religion "as a source of legal repression, political conflict, group attachment, cultural transcendence, and individual freedom" (2). The work of twelve scholars is included in this collection, which is divided into four sections entitled "ideologies," "practices," "boundaries," and "persistence." The essays explain how early Americans experienced degrees of religious liberty, indifference, and discrimination that varied by time, place, and group. Some articles focus on a particular religion (Judaism) or issue (religious infidelity), while others trace a specific concept over time (the use of Amalek in English and American rhetoric). These varied approaches provide trenchant analysis of the complex history of religious tolerance and intolerance in early America.

Religious liberty and prejudice were equally enmeshed in the larger imperial project of British North America. Ned Landsman's contribution demonstrates the role of empire in the debate over instituting an Anglican bishopric in the American colonies. While the "imperial union" of 1707 led to this controversy, "imperial disunion" resolved it when the colonies severed relations with England (96). Likewise, Owen Stanwood uses the context of empire to understand the multiple uses of antipopery sentiment in colonial America, as "fear of Catholics remained a constant backdrop in the American Protestant consciousness" (220).

Attempts by colonial governments to enforce religious orthodoxy faced local resistance. Joyce Goodfriend examines the New Netherlands as a "laboratory of

coexistence" where many religious groups lived in uneasy relationships (99). Petrus Stuyvesant, who believed religious toleration would lead to social chaos, used his authority to persecute Lutherans, Jews, and Quakers. Colonial directives, however, were not always followed; New Netherlanders lived and worked alongside their Jewish neighbors and, in one case, defended the right of Quakers to enjoy religious liberty. Susan Juster studies intolerance in terms of religious offenses, such as heresy, blasphemy, Sabbath breaking, swearing/profanity, and sacrilegious speech. Considered capital crimes, these misdeeds generated activity in colonial courts, but juries were reluctant to put others to death for spiritual nonconformity.

The benefits of religious tolerance were restricted to Europeans. According to Richard Pointer, religious liberty for Native Americans meant conversion to Protestantism, while Jon Sensbach shows how African Americans stood outside the "narrative of increasing religious toleration that defined Anglo-America" (197).

This incomplete sampling hints at the rich and substantive scholarship contained in this anthology. The articles assembled here have activated several strains of scholarly endeavor to address the numerous ways that religious tolerance was theorized and experienced in early America. Hopefully, other scholars will follow their intriguing leads.

Rowan University

JANET MOORE LINDMAN

John Woolman and the Affairs of Truth: The Journalist's Essays, Epistles, and Ephemera. Edited by JAMES PROUD. (San Francisco: Inner Light Books, 2010. 310 pp. Index. \$45 cloth; \$25 paper.)

The textual history of John Woolman's writings is as long and convoluted as an Iowa corn maze, consisting of a bewildering array of manuscripts and printed editions, no two of which agree. Amelia Mott Gummere's pathfinding edition of the *Journals and Essays of John Woolman* (1922) provided a good map, but her choice of Manuscript A as copy text for the *Journal* limited the reliability of her printed texts. This deficiency was corrected in Phillips P. Moulton's definitive *Journal and Major Essays of John Woolman* (1971). Now comes James Proud's edition of Woolman's essays, epistles, and ephemera, which deserves a place on the scholar's shelf next to those landmark twentieth-century editions.

Proud's achievement is to bring together all of Woolman's writings (excluding the *Journal*), arranged by date of composition, in a single volume for a general audience. Woolman was not, Proud suggests, merely "a plain earnest man of local education and limited means" but a thoughtful patrician who "had pur-

posefully renounced his birth-right expectations . . . of wealth and social status" in order to "be free to teach, to travel on missions, to write, and, above all, to engage" the world as a reformer (vii–viii). Proud points out that Woolman was known during his lifetime for incisive writing about social, political, and ethical issues—the affairs of truth, in Proud's title—yet modern readers know him primarily from his posthumously published *Journal*, in which he often appears as a pilgrim engaged in a solitary quest for salvation. To make the case for Woolman as a literary man of "wide erudition," a "master of scripture," and a deep thinker about the human issues involved in work, trade, and political economy (vii), Proud assembles seven major essays by Woolman on human freedom, pacifism, and what we might call the "social gospel." To these he adds four epistles to various meetings of the Friends, a "First Book for Children," a literary dialogue, and other fragmentary ephemera.

Proud provides a general introduction and an introduction to each text. Texts are based on Woolman's holograph manuscripts or, when manuscripts do not exist, on the first printed edition. Proud explains fully how and why he has modernized texts with respect to capitalization, grammar, paragraphing, punctuation, and spelling (xxxvii–xxxviii).

In testing Proud's transcriptions I have noticed few errors, only two of which affect meaning: "outward of two months" for "out upward of two months" (91) and "we treat them" for "we treat concerning them" (50). He also perpetuates a mistake made first by W. Forrest Altman in 1957 and again by Moulton in 1971 when he attributes two quotes from *Considerations on Slavery, Part Second* (52) to John Lockman's edition of *Travels of the Jesuits* (1743 and 1762). They are actually from two Capuchin missionaries quoted in Churchill's *Collection of Voyages* (1744).

But these are peccadilloes, and they pale when placed against Proud's achievement. Every reader of Woolman will find something valuable in this edition; I am especially delighted that he has restored to the canon Woolman's thoughtful meditations on passages from Anthony Benezet's *Caution and Warning to Great Britain and her Colonies*, which are now back in print for the first time since 1837.

Alcorn State University (Emeritus)

DAVID L. CROSBY

American Independence: From "Common Sense" to the "Declaration." By BENJAMIN PONDER. (n.p.: Estate Four Publishers, 2010. 710 pp. Bibliography, index. \$24.95 paper.)

Washington Irving's alter ego Mustapha Rub-A-Dub Keli Kahn once observed that "[American] government is pure unadulterated logocracy, or government of words." Benjamin Ponder, who writes from a "rhetorical studies" per-

spective (xxx), illustrates Irving's principle in a thoroughly researched, highly readable, and illuminating book that centers on an instance when the power of words radically shifted the structure of American politics.

Ponder explains that as late as December 1775, the majority of American colonists were still committed to reconciliation with Britain, yet only seven months later, public opinion had been so drastically turned on its head that the Declaration of Independence was successfully adopted by the Continental Congress. How the tides of public sentiment changed so greatly in such a short period of time is the question of this book, and Ponder's analysis reveals the importance of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* in bringing about this transformation.

Ponder does an excellent job reproducing the late eighteenth-century backdrop. Part of his success can be attributed to his decision to divide chapters by "concepts"—each concept explaining an aspect of the collective colonial mindset (xxx). This division results in a greater understanding of the various facets of the historical period. Yet Ponder's work is about more than just history; it is really three distinct books in one. Upon completion, readers have consumed a limited-scale biography of Thomas Paine, read a history of the colonies in the lead-up to the writing of the Declaration of Independence, and received a crash course in rhetorical criticism, with its emphasis on the definition, classification, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of language. Ponder adeptly rises to the challenge of incorporating rhetorical criticism into the broader historical study without disrupting the flow of the work.

In an effort to weave rhetoric and history together in one study, Ponder provides a rhetorical analysis of *Common Sense*, putting the work in context by discussing the ways in which its language relates to the "concepts" that frame each chapter. In the chapter on "Reformation and Regicide," for example, Ponder first provides relevant historical background about religion in 1776 (Puritan influence, threat of popery, etc.) and then explains, with specific examples from *Common Sense*, how Paine incorporated religious overtones into his text—by referring, for instance, to King George as a "heathen" (85) and by channeling Ecclesiastes with a brief "time for every purpose under heaven . . ." excerpt (90–91). This discursive technique, in which Ponder explains the effect of Paine's language and his deliberate choice of terminology, makes for a highly readable work.

Also contributing to the enjoyment of reading *American Independence* is Ponder's unique, welcoming writing style, which at times seems to transcend the realm of historical analysis and begins to resemble that of a political thriller. Readers may be delighted to find themselves immersed in the sometimes scandalous intrigue of colonial American politics. *American Independence*, while lengthy, is thoroughly absorbing and represents a shining example of what comprehensive scholarship can look like. Ponder has done his research, and with rare

exception, students of this period will be hard-pressed not to find at least a passing reference to their favorite revolutionary. As an additional benefit to the reader, Ponder includes a full text of *Common Sense* in the appendix.

As the lines of communication between disciplines open, expect to see a good deal of crossover melding otherwise distinct disciplines. In this regard, Ponder is ahead of his time and provides a wonderful example of how interesting and engaging good interdisciplinary scholarship can be.

University of Memphis

PATRICK LOEBS

Lessons from America: Liberal French Nobles in Exile, 1793–1798. By DOINA PASCA HARSANYI. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 216 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. \$80.)

According to Doina Pasca Harsanyi, it was not easy being a liberal French noble in the age of the French Revolution. Bred to think of themselves as the vanguard of enlightened reform, these patricians took a central role in the abolition of feudalism and the creation of the constitution of 1791. Yet as the tide of revolution moved forward, these same nobles found themselves characterized by Jacobins as neo-foreign, obstructionist “aristocrats” (15). As a result, a number of them migrated to the United States (via the United Kingdom), where they ruminated on various features of their temporary home as well as on the possibility of returning to France and redeeming the political reform they helped initiate.

Most of the liberal nobles’ meditations took place in social gatherings modeled on Parisian salons, and Harsanyi focuses on the cohort that gathered in Moreau de Saint-Méry’s Philadelphia bookstore. Unlike thousands of contemporaneous Saint Dominguan refugees, who organized themselves along the lines of previously established trade networks, this group “was formed of individuals whose principal common bond was” the fact that they “had all been part of the Patriot faction at the Constituent Assembly and all had moved from the left to the center in the face of Jacobin intransigence” (56). This particular political orientation helped shape the exiles’ response to American society. More specifically, while French liberal nobles sympathized with Americans’ tolerant attitude toward religion and speech, they feared social disorder and lamented the absence of an enlightened elite not preoccupied with money. Disdain for supposedly widespread American vulgarity endeared individuals like Talleyrand and the Duc de Liancourt to Federalists, who likewise prioritized “a self-selected elite” and polite society (85). But in the end, French liberal exiles resisted drawing close to followers of George Washington because they could not abide harsh criticism of the French Revolution; “they were too connected with the Revolution to allow it to be scorned” (85).

The sense of alienation experienced by liberal nobles influenced their business ventures and travels in the United States. In terms of the former, the “noble ethos held sway . . . and they understood social utility not as productive work but as the duty to provide the masses with enlightened ideas and models of behavior, even at the expense of success in a new line of activity” (114). In terms of the latter, the “émigrés of Moreau’s circle took up traveling more to help pass the time than to educate themselves on the state of the republic” (68). Considering this less than fully invested approach to their activities in the United States, it is no wonder that the exiles returned to France as soon as they were “persuaded that social and political conditions had become compatible with their way of thinking” (106).

This short review fails to capture many of the nuanced insights put forth by Harsanyi. She is particularly adept at explaining the ways in which her subjects supported equality before the law, but not egalitarianism. Indeed, Harsanyi writes, members of Moreau’s coterie were liberty-loving “liberals, not democrats,” and their efforts to oppose both “popular democracy and monarchical absolutism” anticipated Tocqueville (20, 111). By providing the fullest, smartest, and most judicious account of French liberal nobles in the United States, Harsanyi has written a book that will be of keen interest to scholars of the French Revolution, the early American republic, the Atlantic world, and the development of modern political ideologies.

Goucher College

MATTHEW RAINBOW HALE

Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism in the Early Republic. By SETH COTLAR. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011. 264 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. \$35.)

How much economic inequality can a republic accommodate before turning into an oligarchy? How can the people exercise their sovereignty between elections? Should political allegiances be tied to the nation or reach beyond to all mankind? These were some of the questions raised during the 1790s by democratic printers, newspaper editors, and booksellers and their audience of poor-to-middling laborers and farmers. Inspired by the French Revolution and the English and Irish reform movements, they sought to reopen debate on basic principles of governance that many believed had been settled by the ratification of the federal Constitution. Seth Cotlar’s rich, spirited, and provocative account expands the intellectual history of the 1790s in two directions: across the Atlantic and down the socioeconomic ladder.

While several recent books have examined the international dimensions of early American politics, they have focused mainly on members of the political

and upper classes physically traversing the Atlantic world. Cotlar's approach is unique in uncovering the ideas of working-class Americans who could only visit Europe through news reports and imported texts but who were nonetheless deeply committed to applying its lessons in democratization at home. Cotlar presents the rise of democracy in America as driven not merely by ordinary citizens' economic self-interest but by their shared ideas and utopian aspirations.

Given the dearth of archival sources for a popular intellectual history, Cotlar conceives of newspapers like Philadelphia's *Aurora*, the *New-York Journal*, and Boston's *Independent Chronicle* as remnants of an "interpretative community" of editors and readers who together continually redefined the parameters of political debate (17). Cotlar cannot entirely avoid the circularity of this approach (newspapers are said to create a community, the existence of which is then proven by the newspaper) because he can only speculate about the papers' reception. But with the available evidence, Cotlar makes a strong case for these publications' community-building potential.

The first chapter is devoted to the material conditions necessary for the circulation of democratic ideas and news; here Cotlar outlines the economics of print shops, the expansion of the postal service to the frontier, and the close-knit networks of printers and booksellers. The consistency with which the three dozen democratic newspapers published between 1790 and 1798 linked American politics with foreign events and the familiar tone with which they addressed their readers represent further evidence of an ideological community. Subsequent chapters reconstruct crucial debates conducted in the pages of these publications on popular cosmopolitanism as a "language of dissent" (chapters 2 and 3), economic equality as a democratic right (chapter 4), and public opinion as an instrument of participatory democracy (chapter 5).

Tom Paine's America is an unabashedly "sympathetic" (11) account of the radical democrats, their unrealized ideas, and their unequal struggle against the Federalist elite (which is sometimes painted with too broad a brush). Printers and editors appear not as entrepreneurs or political operatives but as idealists seeking to create "an engaged, radicalized, and cosmopolitan citizenry" (33). Cotlar is careful not to exaggerate the democrats' influence and is well aware that their egalitarianism and cosmopolitanism extended in most (but not all) cases to other white men only. Nonetheless, he argues persuasively that the emerging two-party system and the Jeffersonian "Revolution of 1800" (in which the Democratic Party presented itself as a middle way between Federalist aristocracy and "Jacobin" anarchy) marked a retreat from visions of a more inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian democracy.

The Papers of Benjamin Franklin

PHILIPP ZIESCHE

Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the Early American Republic. By MATTHEW DENNIS. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010. 320 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. \$45.)

Matthew Dennis aims to break out of what he sees as a binary narrative trap in the writing of Native American history in his compelling study of early republic-era Seneca life. Rejecting the all-too-familiar trope of declension as well as opposing tales of “uncomplicated Indian triumph” (6), Dennis weaves seemingly disparate threads of Seneca social, cultural, political, and economic history into a unique and convincing interpretation of a crucial era of transition in Seneca peoples’ collective past. Based on deep research in archival sources housed primarily in Pennsylvania and New York, Dennis’s monograph represents an important contribution not only to the historiography of Iroquois people but also to that of the early American republic.

The greatest strength of the book resides in Dennis’s refusal to detach his analysis of the Senecas’ profound cultural metamorphosis circa 1799–1826 from the larger story of American national growth and transformation. Dennis draws frequent analogies between the experience of the Senecas and that of “other poor and middling Americans” (148) at that time, making certain connections evident that contemporary, literate historical actors misunderstood, ignored, or obscured. In so doing, Dennis provides a crucial “how-to” lesson in integrating the often-segmented histories of native peoples into broader contexts more familiar to a wider audience.

Concerned with the theme of possession, Dennis guides his readers through a variety of explanations of how the Seneca people and their homelands in what is now western New York were possessed—culturally, spiritually, materially, and legally—during the first two decades of the nineteenth century. Framed by assessments of the 1821 murder trial of Seneca leader Tommy Jemmy (who was charged by state authorities for executing an alleged Seneca witch), Dennis provides a nonlinear, yet richly detailed, tour of a little-studied period of Seneca history and culture. Among the highlights along this interpretive journey is a fresh analysis of the emergence of the Handsome Lake religion among the Senecas. Here Dennis ascribes relatively greater influence to the presence of Quaker missionaries among the Senecas than other historians have allowed and also suggests that the negative impact of the *Gaiwi’io*, or teachings of Handsome Lake, on Seneca women may not have been as severe as recent feminist readings have charged. Dennis argues for an ultimately sympathetic understanding of the Quaker mission among the Senecas, emphasizing the Friends’ tolerance of Seneca religious practice, the critical nature of their technical advice to Seneca economic innovation, and their acceptance of Seneca choices (on frequent occasions) to ignore or dispute Quaker prescriptions.

Could the Senecas have accomplished their far-reaching cultural overhaul in lieu of the Quaker presence? Dennis thinks not, yet he stresses the agency of Seneca actors in the “purposeful transformation and revitalization” (224) of their lifeways amidst intensifying pressures from the surrounding settler population. By the end of Dennis’s account, the reader is rewarded with a nuanced understanding of how the Senecas, notwithstanding frequent contemporary assertions of their status as a “backward” population (187), represented such a frustrating obstacle for their would-be oppressors precisely because of their innovative success in engaging the new economic realities of the early American republic: market exchange, natural resource management, and land leasing as a means of economic development.

Cornell University

JON PARMENTER

The Union War. By GARY W. GALLAGHER. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. 215 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. \$27.95.)

In *The Union War*, Gary Gallagher seeks to reclaim what the concept of Union meant to Northerners who fought in the Civil War. The author views his thesis as a needed corrective to the common misconception, advanced by historians of the “freedom school” of Civil War history, that the second important goal of the North—emancipation—somehow eclipsed the equally worthy goal of preserving the Union. Gallagher chastens these students of the Union war effort, pointing out that they have collectively failed to appreciate the context in which the citizens of the loyal states understood the significance of the word “Union” as a sacred tradition born of antebellum political philosophy.

Gallagher asserts that the hallowed meaning of “Union” has disappeared from the American vernacular. “Recapturing how the concept of Union resonated and reverberated throughout the loyal states in the Civil War,” he contends, “is critical to grasping northern motivation. No single word in our contemporary political vocabulary shoulders so much historical, political, and ideological meaning; none can stir deep emotional currents so easily” (46). Northerners’ attention to the sanctity of Union emerged from years of poignant reflection through which they collectively connected themselves with a primordial sense of nationalism.

Although Gallagher’s book helps recover this lost vocabulary, his analysis becomes a list of reprimands against historians who have intentionally or unintentionally obscured the importance of Union. Few schools of thought escape his scathing indictment, yet several interpretations stand out as primary culprits. First and foremost, Gallagher rebukes the post-1960s generation who in their effort to recover the centrality of emancipation argued that only the liberation of slaves offered the Union a true purpose (40). Of course, Gallagher does not

ignore the importance of emancipation—in fact, he consigns a whole chapter to its discussion—but he notes that loyal white citizens, both on the home front and on the battlefield, accepted liberation (and, for that matter, black military service) only as a “practical application” to achieve victory (95).

Gallagher also blames academic and popular historians for failing to deal with military action soberly. As Lincoln recognized, and as Gallagher points out, “all else” depended on the progress of Union arms, and “all else” meant the dual goals of Union and emancipation (119). In Gallagher’s words, historians have failed to appreciate the “larger political and social implications of military campaigns” (121). Popular historians trivialized battles and academic historians ignored them. Emancipation could not have occurred without the integral role played by Union soldiers, and the progress of arms resulted in the ebb and flow of the conflict’s other meanings. By avoiding the crucial intersection of military and social life, Gallagher maintains, the significance of Union dropped from the pages of history.

Gallagher’s analysis is forthright and convincing, but not without weaknesses. *The Union War* repeatedly asserts that loyal Northerners used the phrases “Union” and “nation” interchangeably, an avowal that some scholars of nationalism might find troublesome. The true bone of contention, though, stems from Gallagher’s antimodernist approach. He argues that the Union war effort revealed more continuity than change and that “no one should infer a sea change in attitudes toward the nation” (161). Critics might carp on Gallagher’s limited conception of the transformative powers of the war, for he depicts the conflict as a process of restoration, not an ideological crusade to uphold human freedom. These critics have a point; Gallagher might have considered that white Northerners understood and welcomed the transformative powers of the war even if revolutionary motivations never actuated their participation in it.

At any rate, the debate on the Union war is not yet closed, but Gallagher’s excellent book is a sturdy analysis that reminds us that the concept of “Union,” though foreign to readers of the twenty-first century, was nevertheless wholly real and supremely significant to loyal Northerners in the nineteenth.

Old Dominion University

TIMOTHY J. ORR

Last to Leave the Field: The Life and Letters of First Sergeant Ambrose Henry Hayward, 28th Pennsylvania Volunteers. Edited by TIMOTHY J. ORR. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2011). 344 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. \$52.)

During the sesquicentennial commemoration of the Civil War, it is only natural that a plethora of books, articles, essays, and online publications has begun

to appear, highlighting in depth one of America's most tumultuous periods of history. Timothy J. Orr's *Last to Leave the Field* is, hopefully, a portent of the valuable scholarship that will continue to be made available to the avid follower of the war that truly "won't go away" but continues to enthrall both the general public and academic community.

The reader is drawn into the mind and heart of Massachusetts-born soldier Ambrose Henry Hayward from his first enlistment in a Philadelphia militia unit in the spring of 1861 to his death in Tennessee—brought about from wounds received at the Battle of Pine Knob, Georgia, in June 1864—as a sergeant in the Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania Infantry. This attraction is derived not only from Hayward's own observations but from Orr's succinct writing style and meticulous attention to detail, as revealed both in his transcription of the primary source material and in his highly informative, annotated notes, which effectively contextualize Hayward's thoughts and experiences throughout his participation in the Civil War.

In order to elucidate Hayward's life and career in the Union army, Orr has taken the letters from the Ambrose Henry Hayward Collection at the Archives of Gettysburg College as well as primary source material from fellow members of Hayward's regiment (including the letters of Colonel and Governor Geary), which are available at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania and elsewhere. These rich sources, coupled with Orr's fine scholarship, make this work the authoritative publication on the history of the Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania. To date, no individual regimental history has ever been written of this unit—there have only been short sketches such as those that appear in Frank Taylor's *Philadelphia in the Civil War* (1913) and Samuel P. Bates's *History of Pennsylvania Volunteers* (1869). This is surprising, considering that the Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania was formed by postwar governor of Pennsylvania Colonel John W. Geary and that the unit was involved in such famous battles as Chancellorsville, Antietam, and Gettysburg. *Last to Leave the Field* is thus a valuable contribution to Civil War history on a number of levels.

One criticism of the volume is that in each chapter, prior to providing readers the transcribed correspondence of Sergeant Hayward, Orr makes his primary source somewhat redundant by quoting excerpts from many of the letters. This is done, of course, to highlight a point, person, or chronological event pertinent to the letter to be discussed. Having done so, however, Orr once again quotes portions of the letters, often repeating in part what he has already stated. Some of this material could no doubt have gone into the annotated notes at the end of the volume. Another short, critical comment is that the price of the volume may cause many "lay" Civil War enthusiasts to assume the work is too "scholarly" and thus miss out on its true potential for both educational and pleasurable reading.

These criticisms aside, the reader should not be discouraged. If one truly wants to know firsthand how most Federal, or Union, soldiers personally felt

about Copperheadism in the North, slavery in the South, desertion, daily camp life, the rigors of the march, inclement weather, participation in battles or engagements, the horrors of war, and the heroism of individuals (both officers and privates), then this book deserves to be read by all current or would-be historians of the American Civil War. Most importantly, the letters and life of First Sergeant Ambrose Henry Hayward reveal heroic character traits that represent a worthy example for any generation.

Historical Society of Pennsylvania

DANIEL N. ROLPH

Soldiers to Governors: Pennsylvania's Civil War Veterans Who Became State Leaders. By RICHARD C. SAYLOR. (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. xiv, 173 pp. Photographs, notes, bibliography, index. \$59.95.)

"War," as General William T. Sherman put it, "is Hell"; yet, as author Richard C. Saylor generously reminds us, it can also prove advantageous to one's future career. In *Soldiers to Governors*, Saylor offers a compilation of biographies of the six governors of the Keystone State who first answered their nation's call to service during the Civil War and later parlayed their military experience into political fortune. Relying predominantly upon official gubernatorial papers, personal diaries, and other correspondence held by the Pennsylvania State Archives, Saylor crafts an impressive encyclopedic description of the lives of John White Geary, John Hartranft, Henry Hoyt, James Beaver, William Stone, and Samuel Pennypacker while simultaneously seeking to understand how "their war experiences shaped their vision and beliefs" (ix).

Soldiers to Governors's greatest contribution lies in its consideration of these heads of states' postbellum travails and political struggles. Saylor's work draws needed scholarly attention to the consequences and reverberative influence of the nation's bloodiest conflict on those living above the Mason-Dixon Line. Postwar soldiers' issues such as pension reform, battlefield commemoration, and support for the state-run Soldiers' and Sailors' Home became legislative minefields through which, Saylor insists, the veteran governors successfully navigated, while motivated by the loyalty and sense of duty they retained for their fellow brothers-in-arms. Saylor also demonstrates, however, that not all wartime fealty was as progressive or benevolent. As early as John W. Geary's 1866 gubernatorial run, and throughout the remainder of the century, Republicans feverishly "waved the bloody shirt" and condemned their Democratic opponents as traitorous Copperheads simply in the name of political expediency. Nor did all of the six soldier-governors demonstrate particular affinity for African American veterans. Echoing the work of historian David Blight, Saylor maintains that after the

Geary administration, Keystone governors—most notably John Hartranft, who in his twilight years lobbied extensively for the establishment of Confederate soldiers' homes across the South—sought rapprochement and reconciliation with their former foes while remaining reticent on black Union veterans' conditions.

Whenever possible, Saylor allows his subjects' correspondences to progress the narrative. While this approach creates a comforting sense of familiarity and provides a plethora of fascinating quotes, the resulting lack of authorial interpretation works to the detriment of Saylor's stated goal of understanding the post-war experience. Saylor never quite questions whether gubernatorial support for Union veteran concerns stemmed from a sense of shared camaraderie or obligation owed the aging warriors—or from the more practical necessities of ensuring the veterans' Republican vote on Election Day. Similarly, the lack of any information on the two nonveteran governors who served during this period—Democrat Robert E. Pattison and Republican Daniel H. Hastings—robs Saylor of the credibility to attribute the soldier-governors' "visions and beliefs" to their prior wartime experiences.

Despite these limitations, Saylor has provided an engaging history of the six Civil War veterans who found success serving in the highest office of the Keystone State. Lavishly illustrated with images from the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission (PHMC) and the state archive, *Soldiers to Governors* serves both as a fitting tribute to the veterans-turned-Republican-governors and a testament to the invaluable holdings and preservation practices of the PHMC.

Pennsylvania State University

J. ADAM ROGERS

Architecture and Landscape of the Pennsylvania Germans, 1720–1920. Edited by SALLY McMURRY and NANCY VAN DOLSEN. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011. 256 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. \$49.95.)

The Vernacular Architecture Forum, the preeminent group promoting the academic study of ordinary, regional, and folk architecture, meets every year in a different region for one day of academic papers and two days of fascinating tours to down-home, ethnic, and often funky locations. From out of this experience an extensive tour guidebook is published. In 2004 the forum met in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to visit the Pennsylvania German region. For this occasion the guidebook, rather than following the customary stop-by-stop format, was arranged by theme. The book under review—the permanent outcome of that original, "occasional," spiral-bound guide—is an excellent, if typical, academic compendium written by the best scholars of the field. Vast amounts of new and

original material, from measured drawings to historical minutiae, are included in relatively lively essays. A singular strength of the volume is its explicit focus on often-marginally considered structures such as barns, outbuildings, and commercial stores. The theme of “creolization,” the current academic characterization of the process of conscious and judicious mixing of cultural traits by immigrant minorities, is found in many of this volume’s essays.

The initial essay by Gabrielle Lanier properly concerns the landscape as a whole; after a thorough and delicious recounting of early travelers’ stereotypes of the Pennsylvania German immigrants, she assesses the reality by delving into tax records and the findings of various researchers. Scholars have long concurred that Pennsylvania German identity has revolved around farming, and so editor Sally McMurry’s keynote essay is on rural domestic dwellings (i.e., farmhouses). Her major contribution lies in her insightful, sometimes brilliant, synopsis of previous scholarship on this topic.

The heart of the volume’s contribution is represented by the essays on the outbuildings, urban housetypes, and commercial and industrial building types most associated with Pennsylvania Germans. Philip Pendleton addresses the full variety of domestic outbuildings, from bakehouses to springhouses, laundry houses, and privies. His greatest innovation is in his isolation of “ancillary houses” as a specific type unto themselves. He insists that careful dating of these small buildings, often outfitted with dwelling spaces, shows that they are generally not (as has long been assumed) the original settlers’ cabins. Rather, most were built after the main house already existed, often as retirement cabins for elders or as combination craft workshops and tenant dwellings.

The most novel discoveries of new housetypes are discussed by Bernard Herman, Thomas Ryan, and David Schuyler in their chapter on urban homes, although this essay suffers from a deficit of illustrations. The most interesting of these discoveries is truly new to science: a small house, two rooms deep, with one wide room across the front, a small, short stair and another room across the back, and a kitchen located in a long “ell” far to the rear. Just how this abode was used remains to be discovered, but it appears to represent an urban compromise between the modern need for social buffering and the Germanic tradition of a socially open space.

The most lively essay is Diane Wenger and J. Ritchie Garrison’s chapter on commercial buildings. The variety of building types included is positively exuberant. From an archive of store records, Wenger teases out a one-word reference to a “stoveroom” in a tavern and uses it to illuminate a mixing of domestic dwelling and commercial function that parallels the “creolized” premodern amalgam of functions in housebarns and ancillary houses. Wenger and Garrison’s chapter is also strong in relishing obscure or unlikely social uses of their various building types. The mixing of German and English ethnic traits, parallel to those in houses, does not escape Wenger’s eye either, thus demonstrating the theoretic-

cal coherence and general excellence of most of the contributions. Finally, Jerry Clouse's chapter on religious buildings, although the weakest chapter interpretively, boasts the most beautiful architecture.

Cleveland Institute of Art

CHARLES BERGENGREN

Chatham Village: Pittsburgh's Garden City. By ANGELIQUE BAMBERG. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011. 214 pp. Illustrations, notes, index. \$29.95.)

In the 1920s, a relatively small clique of housers, planners, and architects met in Clarence Stein's New York City salon to envision a better world of well-planned, human-scale, and affordable urban residential communities. Among those members of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) who attended this gathering were Henry Wright and Frederick Bigger; they and Stein became involved in the planning and design of Chatham Village, one of Stein and Wright's three iconic "Garden Cities" built in the 1920s and early 1930s.

Bamberg and the University of Pittsburgh Press's beautifully designed, well-illustrated, and carefully crafted book traces the lineage of Chatham Village from the insemination of the Garden City ideal by British court stenographer Ebenezer Howard in the 1890s through antecedents such as John Nolen's Mariemont, Ohio, to the village today as an immaculately preserved and still highly livable Pittsburgh community.

Charles Lewis of Pittsburgh's Buhl Foundation originated Chatham Village in 1929 not as a philanthropic, limited-dividend housing development but as a model of an affordable—and potentially profitable—middle-class community. Despite Lewis's capitalistic proclivities, Bamberg places Chatham Village firmly within the context of iconic planned communities such as Letchworth (near London); Radburn, New Jersey; Greenbelt, Maryland; New Deal public housing projects of the 1930s; and World War II-era defense and war housing, all of which embodied Garden City planning principals, especially in their neighborhood unit and superbloc design.

Buhl and Lewis planned Chatham Village for stable wage earners, teachers, clerical employees, and well-paid, skilled Pittsburgh workers. The community opened in 1932. The wooded, colonial-themed garden complex of 129 units (later 197) was impeccably appointed on a contoured, exquisitely landscaped, forty-five-acre site. Like its sister developments in New York, Radburn and Sunnyside, Chatham Village boasted a park-like setting with grassy interior courts and automobiles banished to the periphery. Protected from its working-class neighborhood by a wooded "Greenbelt," Chatham Village remained socially and physically isolated from the larger community.

Bamberg rejoices at the durability of Lewis's venture. With the exception of now-mature, dutifully maintained shrubs and trees, the village in the twenty-first century stands as it did in the '30s, a tribute to the community's strict management, rigorous maintenance, and regulations against architectural modification. It is also a tribute to Lewis's careful screening of prospective tenants, his rules against pets, and his encouragement of middle-class pastimes such as tennis and bridge.

More questionable is how Bamberg sees Chatham Village influencing subsequent American community planning, including developments such as Buckingham in Arlington, Virginia; Stuyvesant Town in Manhattan; Bedford Heights public housing in Pittsburgh; and even the modern New Urbanism. Not all thrived like Chatham Village. To be successful, contends Bamberg, architect planners must build for preservation—that is, they must erect well-planned projects designed, as Chatham Village was, for a prospective class of tenants, and they must place paramount importance on maintenance and amenities.

Clearly, Chatham Village's rise in 1931–32 was indicative of the emergence of a broader genre of planned neighborhood-unit communities whose economies of scale and efficient design (and, ideally, limited-dividend financing, but more likely federal dollars) would make them affordable for the masses. It was that vision of “modern housing,” not Lewis's, that between 1933 and 1974 produced the effulgence of government-financed communities, many of which succumbed to poor maintenance, poor design, and poor management. Sadly, there were more Pruitt-Igoes and Robert Taylor Homes than Chatham Villages. Bamberg has written and University of Pittsburgh Press has produced a beautiful and nicely written saga of what good planning and good management can accomplish in housing if all the stars—the vision, the resources, and the ideal circumstances—are aligned.

Muskie School, University of Southern Maine

JOHN F. BAUMAN

AFSCME's Philadelphia Story: Municipal Workers and Urban Power in the Twentieth Century. By FRANCIS RYAN. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011. 320 pp. Illustrations, appendix, notes, bibliography, index. \$59.50 cloth; \$27.95 paper.)

Francis Ryan has written a terrific and timely book that helps us understand how and why unionized public employees remain so controversial. This well-written, extensively researched, and—while pro-labor—well-balanced monograph provides an excellent overview of the major political, economic, and demographic trends in Philadelphia from the 1930s to the early twenty-first century.

Ryan argues that class, not ethnicity, was at the center of the economics of Philadelphia's political machine; workers possessed some ability to resist urban bosses' control over an extensive patronage network. AFSCME (the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees) provides a case study of the complex ways in which workers, while racially divided, managed partially to transcend race through their shared participation in the union. As Philadelphia (and its large public sector) became increasingly dominated by African Americans, black workers assumed greater control over the organization and, thereby, the city's politics. Ryan's study thus demonstrates the importance of public unions to the rise of urban black politics and traces the ambiguous effects of these politics on the black working class.

This is a richly detailed book that lavishes attention on the pre-union world of the public worker, the fitful rise of public unionism in the 1920s and 1930s, and the increasing power and confidence of AFSCME in the post-World War II era. The union played a key role in the postbellum development of civil service reform and in Philadelphia's shift from a Republican fiefdom to a Democratic stronghold. Ryan focuses on AFSCME's militant history as well as the growing power of black workers within it. Most significant is the manner in which Ryan deals with the politics of the organization, detailing how the union interacted with the politicians of a major city in long-term economic and demographic decline. By the late 1980s, Philadelphia was in increasingly tough financial shape; it hemorrhaged population, more than one hundred thousand industrial jobs, and its tax base. Higher taxes failed to bring about fiscal health.

These dire economic trends laid the groundwork for a showdown over AFSCME's "archaic work customs," such as the refusal of custodians at city hall "to wash walls above shoulder height since it was not specified in the civil service job description" (221). In 1992, new mayor Ed Rendell provoked a short strike, the outcome of which was that he won everything he wanted. The union had been saved, but hundreds of unskilled workers lost their jobs. Ryan seems to think this setback was due to the union's leadership turning its back on its militant history, though he also acknowledges that the group's rank and file may have had neither the stomach nor the leverage to win the fight. AFSCME waged numerous battles to counteract the privatization and corporate welfare that shaped the post-Reagan political and economic landscape. Ryan shows the political missteps of the union and the problems of corruption while maintaining a sense that AFSCME retains the ability and potential to reform an increasingly economically and racially stratified city.

Lebanon Valley College

JOHN HINSHAW

The Paul A. Stellhorn Undergraduate New Jersey History Award

Sponsored by the New Jersey Studies Academic Alliance • New Jersey Historical Commission, New Jersey Department of State • Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries • New Jersey Caucus, Mid-Atlantic Regional Archives Conference • New Jersey Council for History Education.

Guidelines for 2012

The Stellhorn Award recognizes excellence in undergraduate writing about New Jersey history. It commemorates the career of an outstanding and much-loved historian of New Jersey, the late Paul A. Stellhorn.

In 2012, there will be one or more awards in two categories, one for course or seminar papers, the other for senior theses. Awards will consist of a framed certificate and a cash award. The sponsors will present the award(s) at the New Jersey Forum in November 2012. The New Jersey Studies Academic Alliance will invite the recipient(s) to speak about her, his, or their work at one of the Alliance's 2013 meetings.

Submission Criteria

- Papers or theses may be about any subject in New Jersey's history. They need not be nominated by history professors.
- Nominated works should be truly outstanding in all respects (see evaluation criteria, below).
- Senior theses are eligible for the award and will be judged separately in their own category.
- Papers or theses must be nominated by the professors for whose courses students wrote them or who mentored or served as readers of theses. Students may not nominate their own papers or theses.
- Papers or theses must have been written by undergraduate students attending colleges or universities in New Jersey, Delaware, New York, or Pennsylvania during calendar 2010, 2011, or 2012.
- Papers by graduate students are not eligible unless a student submitted an undergraduate paper about New Jersey history during 2010, 2011, or 2012.

E-mail nominating letters and papers by June 30, 2012, to acrelus@optonline.net, or surface-mail nominating letters and four (4) copies of each paper to Richard Waldron, 150 Flock Road, Hamilton, NJ 08619; 609.468.3824.

Evaluation Criteria

A paper or thesis submitted for the Stellhorn Award will be evaluated on the basis of its narrative strength, the thoroughness of its author's research (mastery of sources and the standard forms of historical citation), and analysis of the paper's subject, including its historical context. A nominated paper should, therefore, tell a good story, explain how its subject changed over time, and utilize a broad array of relevant primary and secondary sources. Evaluators are historians the sponsors have chosen for the breadth and depth of their knowledge of New Jersey and American history.

Call for Papers
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
and
Pennsylvania History

Special Issue:
Teaching Pennsylvania History (fall 2014)

The *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* and *Pennsylvania History* are planning a joint publication, scheduled for 2014, on teaching Pennsylvania history. We invite teachers who have a special interest in a topic such as women's history, African American history, political bosses, religious sects, a particular event (Coal Strike of 1902/03, Centennial Exhibition of 1876), etc. to prepare an article that describes their method, perhaps with illustrations, documents, and connection to websites, that would help others teach that subject in the context of Pennsylvania and US history at the college level (though articles that suggest how to adapt the presented materials for high school use are welcome). Articles should be about 15-20 pages, double spaced. Please indicate any documents or other resources you would like to include, either in print or online.

Submission details: Please send inquiries to either Tamara Gaskell (tgaskell@hsp.org) or Bill Pencak (wap1@psu.edu).

Deadline for submissions: January 1, 2013.