Pacifism was one of the fundamental tenets of the Society of Friends. War, according to their view, could not be justified in any form. They followed the teaching of Christianity that the nations should beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. "Nor," argues Penn, "ought they for this to be obnoxious to Civil Government: since if they cannot fight for it, they cannot fight against it, which is no mean security to any state." (1) They were firm believers in the state and bowed obediently to its authority except when the law's demands clashed with those of their consciences. (2) Then they were adamant. Whenever, in spite of their political opposition, provisions were made for raising a militia in Pennsylvania, they as a society remained sullenly inactive, even when not expressly excused from the action of the law. (3) He who lived according to the true principals of religion, they contended, needed no other protection than that of the God "Who for the Sake of ten righteous Persons would have spared even the Cities of Sodom and Gomorrah." (4)

It was, however, impossible to hold all their members, particularly the younger and more progressive, to this orthodox but unnatural doctrine. There soon appeared a considerable minority who, although they held the orthodox belief as to offensive war, maintained that in case of attack a defensive war was clearly justifiable. (5) These at times

(1) PENN, WILLIAM, Rise and Progress of the People called Quakers, 37
(2) Votes of Assembly, II, 99. "That the Majority of the Inhabitants of this Province being of the People called Quakers, religiously persuaded against war, and therefore cannot be active therein; yet are as fully persuaded, and believe it to be their bounden Duty to pay Tribute, and yield due Obedience to the Powers God has set over them in all things, as far as their religious persuasions can permit."
(3) Col. Rec., XV, 418.
(4) Votes of Assembly, III, 367.
(5) FRANKLIN, Autobiography, 151.
even took part in military operations, (1) but their action was always promptly repudiated by the society. A distinction was also made between warfare and the preservation of internal peace. Their state existed primarily for the maintenance of public order; and if its existence was to continue, it must have the power to protect itself against internal insurrections and rebellions. (2) It must maintain order if necessary at the point of the magistrate's sword. The execution of a criminal, whose existence threatened the life and property of every individual within the state, was considered quite different from the killing on the battlefield of a soldier whose only crime was obedience to the command of his sovereign. The Quakers sympathized with and aided in raising money for the construction of a fort below the city of Philadelphia as a protection against pirates. (3) Some even aided in the work of construction.

While the Quakers were principled against participating personally in any military undertaking, they did not condemn the use of arms by others. Franklin states that the defence of the province was not disagreeable to them as long as they were not required to assist in it. (4) When in times of public danger the governor stated to the assembly his purpose to put the province in a condition for defence, they offered usually no objection as long as military service remained purely a voluntary matter. (5)

Penn himself was opposed to the use of force as has been shown by the quotation from his Brief Account of the Rise and Progress of the People Called Quakers. He also drew up a plan for the pacification of Europe. (6) When confronted with the actual necessities of government, his ac-

(2) BUDD, THOMAS, Good Order Established in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 73. “I do believe it to be both lawful and expedient to bring offenders to justice by the power of the magistrate's sword, which is not to be used in vain, but may be used against such as raise Rebellions and Insurrections against the Government of the Country, be they Indians or others, otherwise it is vain for us to pretend to Magistracy or Government.”
(3) True and Impartial State of the Province of Pennsylvania, 49/ ROUSSELOT DE SURGY, Historie naturelle et Politique de la Pennsylvanie, 201. “La crainte de tomber en un instant an pouvoir des corsaires ennemis, leur fit supprimer toutes representations. Quelquesuns meme y travaillèrent de leurs mains d'autres fournirent de l'argent, & toutes les provisions necessaires.”
(4) FRANKLIN, Autobiography, 151.
(5) Votes of Assembly, II, 274.
(6) See Old South Leaflets, III, No. 75.
tions did not conform exactly to his theory. He accepted from the king a charter which empowered him to levy, muster, and train troops, to make war, and to pursue enemies or robbers even beyond the limits of the province. (1) These are rather extensive military powers for a peaceful minded Quaker, (2) yet there is no record that Penn protested against them. James Logan testifies that in the few years during which the proprietor administered the government in person he found himself so embarrassed between his evident duties as a governor and his expressed convictions as a Quaker that he was determined, if he had remained, to perform those duties through a deputy. (3) During his absences he almost invariably appointed non-Quaker deputy governors. That this was not a premeditated policy can hardly be assumed. James Logan is the most important example of those who refused to be bound by the principle of non-resistance. In 1741 he wrote a letter to the yearly meeting in which he upheld defensive warfare. (4) While condemning offensive war, he maintained that the bearing of arms for self defence is lawful. The Quakers, he says, “although they allege they cannot for Conscience-sake bear Arms, as being contrary to the peace-

(1) HAZARD, Annals, 496.
(2) Votes of Assembly, III, 365. Governor Thomas to Assembly. “A mind employed as mine has been, about the Defence of the Province, has long since made itself acquainted with the Powers granted in the Royal Charter for that End; and I think that it may be reasonably concluded...that the first Proprietor, tho’ one of the People called Quakers, must have entertained an Opinion (however different from yours) of the Lawfulness and Necessity of bearing Arms in the Defence of his Government against the Invasion of Enemies, otherwise he would not have accepted of the Powers of a Captain General in that Charter.”
(3) Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, VI, 407. James Logan to the Yearly Meeting, 1741: “And I am a witness that in those two years, or somewhat less, that the Proprietor took the Administration on himself, when last here, He found himself so embarrassed between the indespensible Duties of Government on the one Hand, and his profession on the other, that he was determined, if he had staid, to act by a Deputy.”
(4) Ibid, VI, 402-411. This letter was refused a reading in the meeting. Besides the quotation given in the text, the following extract is interesting: “But as I have always endeavored to think and act consistently myself, observing Friends had laid it down for their Principle, That Bearing of Arms, even for Self-Defence, is unlawful; being of a different Opinion in this Respect, though I ever condemned offensive War, I, therefore, in a great Measure, declined that due attendance on their Meetings of Business, which I might otherwise have given.”
able Doctrine of Jesus (whose Disciples nevertheless are known to have carried Weapons) yet, without regard to others of Christ's Precepts, full as express, against laying up Treasure in this World, and not caring for the morrow, they are as intente as any others in amassing Riches."

The Quaker principles were put to their first serious test at the outbreak of the French and Indian War. The frontier inhabitants, incensed by the depredations of the Indians, demanded protection by a military organization. The Quakers stoutly opposed it. In opposition to the petitions for defence came their addresses protesting against the use of force and the payment of a tax for such purposes. (1) Committees were sent to interview all those with whom they had any connections; their sermons were adapted to show the sin of taking up arms and to persuade the people to remain true to their principles. (2) Some even declared that Braddock's Defeat had come as a just judgment for attempting to disturb the French in their settlements. (3) In 1757 the bodies of a number of inhabitants who had been killed and scalped at Swatara Gap were paraded through Lancaster as a spectacle for some Quakers who were then in that town. (4)

When, as the war forced upon the government the adoption of a military policy, the pacifists felt their grip upon the government relaxing, they formed themselves into an extralegal society pledged to maintain, as far as possible, the old doctrines. This was known as The Friendly Association for regaining and preserving Peace with the Indians by pacific Measures. During the next few years they, with the aid of the Germans, voluntarily contributed several thousand pounds toward regaining the good will of the Indians. (5) They began in 1756 by opposing a declaration of war against the Indians until pacific measures had first been tried. Finding that the governor and council did not agree with their plans, they addressed a letter to the general assembly. Their efforts to gain this point, however, were in vain. They continued nevertheless to write letters to officers, intrude at treaties, and make presents

(1) Pa. Arch., 1st ser., II, 487. Quaker protest against raising money for defence: "We apprehend many of Us will be under necessity of suffering rather than Consenting Thereto by the payment of a Tax for such Purposes."
(2) Ibid, 4th ser., II, 478.
(3) Ibid, 489.
(4) Blach, Thomas, Letters and Papers relating chiefly to the Provincial History of Pennsylvania, 78.
to the Indians in spite of the protests of the governor and proprietors that such actions tended to prevent the successful issue of the government's plans. (1) In 1757 they advanced money to aid in sending messengers to the Ohio Indians in order, if possible, to regain their friendship. (2) During Pontiac's War they were still active. (3)

The Quaker's doctrine was severely criticized by many of his contemporaries, but he seems to have acted according to what he considered the wisest policy. His mistakes were made, to a great extent, because he did not understand the facts. During the early years his principles had been successful in maintaining the peace, and now when difficulties were arising, he thought that peace could be regained by a rigid prosecution of the old policy. Living in the southeastern corner of the province, he knew little of the frontier. He interpreted all news in terms of the olden days when Quakers and Indians smoked together in the shade of the elms. He did not understand that the restless progress of the western pioneers had now aroused in the heart of the Indian the apprehension that he would soon be driven from his hunting grounds. His policy had kept the peace for the first half century when whites were few and land was plenty; and now without considering the great change in conditions, he felt that upon him developed the task of making the policy succeed still.

The Quakers, however, were not the only pacifists. Many of the Germans, belonging to various sects, were also opposed to war. (4) Then, too, having come so recently from the fatherland, they had not yet developed a sense of provincial patriotism. The struggle between the French and the English did not concern them. "They say it is all one to them which king gets the country, since, if they remain quiet, they will be permitted to enjoy their Estates, under the Conqueror, whoever he is; and as they have, many of them, lived under Popish rulers on their own Country, they give out that they know the worst that can happen." (5)

---

(2) Ibid, 391. A receipt from George Croghan to the Friendly Association for one hundred pounds which they had contributed "for regaining and preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures, to be employed in sending messengers to the Ohio Indians, and obtaining a Conference with them, in order to endeavor to settle the Differences between them and the Subjects of His Majesty in this and the adjacent Provinces."
(3) Ibid, IX, 141.
(4) ROUSELLOT DE SURGY, Historie, 223. "Ils sont encore plus ennemis de la violence que les Quakers: car ils ne se permettent pas meme de l'employer pour leur propre defense."
(5) SMITH, Brief State, 29.
in the heat of the war, when their lands were being devastated, their homes destroyed and their families murdered, they unlike the Quakers, often abandoned their pacific principles and joined in the defence of the province. This was probably due primarily to their position on the frontier where the necessity of defence was manifest. The Germans knew at first hand the conditions of which the Quakers, situated about Philadelphia, heard only reports.

Some historians of early Pennsylvania like to dwell upon the pacific principles of the Quakers and the readiness with which the Indians were captivated by their just and friendly measures. According to one of them the Quakers lived unharmed while others were being murdered all about them. (1) Only two Quakers, he writes, were killed by Indians during the period of the wars, and these only when evidence appeared to show that they had given up their pacific principles. It is probably true that but few Quakers lost their lives in the Indian wars. This, however, was not due so much to the Indian’s making a distinction between Quaker and non-Quaker as it was to the fact that the territory occupied by the Quakers was comparatively secure. Between them and the danger line was a broad belt of Scotch, Irish, and Germans in whose blood the thirst of the tomahawk was quenched before it could threaten these friends of peace.

**Frontier Conditions.**

The Quaker method of preserving peace was eminently successful during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Indians lived usually on terms of friendship with his white neighbor. He was ready to furnish food, assistance, or protection whenever they were needed. (2) His love for Penn was almost unbounded. (3) There were naturally occasional differences on questions of land or trade. But before 1750 the great majority of these differences were easily adjusted; the question of an Indian war was seldom seriously involved. During the earlier years attacks were feared from the sea rather than from the forest. (4) In

---

(1) Applegarth, A. C., *Quakers in Pennsylvania*, 54-56. One case was that of a young man who carried a gun with him on his way to work in order to shoot some squirrels. The other case was that of a young Quaker woman who had not been molested while others were being killed in great numbers. At last her fear became so great that she fled to a fort for safety. The Indians, thinking that she had deserted her pacific principles, killed her.

(2) Budd, *Good Order*, 65.

(3) Col. Rec., II, 628; III, 288.

(4) *N. Y. Col. Docs.*, IV, 965.
1709, for example, Governor Charles Gookin communicated to the assembly as follows: "The boldness of our Enemies this summer, in Plundering Lewis, Watering in our Bay, and sounding it as they passed along, is so remarkable, that it may justly give us occasion to apprehend a nearer visit; ___But at present we are so unprovided, that there is no money to pay an Express on any occasion." (1) Many demands were made by the crown for military aid against the French and Spanish, but until the second quarter of the eighteenth century there was no question of an attack upon the Pennsylvania frontier.

In April, 1728, however, Indian alarms frightened the frontier inhabitants of the County of Philadelphia and caused them to petition the government to take such measures as might be deemed necessary for their protection. Less than two weeks later, May 10, 1728, the inhabitants of Colebrookdale informed the governor that the Indians had already fallen upon the frontier settlers and that aid was imminently necessary. (2) In 1743, when the situation was becoming much more serious, Governor George Thomas who had formerly, on account of the defenceless condition of the province, petitioned the crown to order for their safety, was directed and required to lay before the king whatever plans he apprehended it would be necessary to adopt for the security of the province. (3) In 1745 the back inhabitants of Lancaster County petitioned the Government to provide them with arms and ammunition, but in spite of the governor's recommendation that the petition be granted, it was laid unanswered on the table. (4) Thus Quaker opposition to war left the frontier unprotected.

The event that finally awakened the Quakers to the seriousness of the situation and forced them to turn over the control of the government to those who were not principled against the use of arms was the attempt by the French to appropriate the western part of the province. Pennsylvania was expanding gradually westward; Canada was throwing out feelers to the south. On the Ohio their interests clashed. As early as 1719 Governor Keith became apprehensive of the growing power of the French. He urged upon the Lords of Trade the erection of a fort on Lake Erie to check their southern advance. (5) He feared, too, that the Six Nations would be enticed away from the English

(2) Ibid., 1st ser., I, 209, 213.
(3) Ibid, I, 636.
(4) Votes of Assembly, IV. 24.
(5) Olden Time, I, 7.
interest. (1) After the migration of the Delawares and Shawanese to the west James Logan became very earnest in his portrayal to the proprietors of the French danger. In 1731 he prepared a memorial on the state as the British Plantations which was presented to Walpope, (2) but that minister was too busy with his own concerns to notice interests so distant. Even the assembly seems to have appreciated the danger. (3) The friendly Indians of the west advised the building of a fort and the taking of aggressive measures, but their advice was not followed. (4) The only English west of the Alleghanies were the traders, who were sometimes seized and carried away as prisoners to Canada without the least struggle or opposition. Upon the very eve of the conflict, when the rumor of war was the chief subject of conversation in Philadelphia, it was generally ridiculed by the people as false. (5)

The frontier of Pennsylvania was, therefore, practically defenceless when the struggle started in 1754. It was not, however, until after Braddock's defeat that the province began to reap the fruits of its listless policy. The remainder of the shattered army was withdrawn from the frontier. The Delawares, Shawanese, and many other Indian nations went over to the French who promised to return to them their hunting grounds. (6) General Shirley refused to furnish protection by the regular troops, saying that Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland were populous enough to protect themselves. (7) The Indians fell first upon the inhabitants west of the Susquehanna. The settlement at the Great Cove was attacked, the houses burned, six persons killed, and seventeen carried away. The settlers of the frontier counties were driven into the interior, (8) and

(1) *Pa. Arch.*, 4th ser., I, 361. William Keith to the Governor of New York: "The prudent apprehensions which we ought to have of the extravagant Growth of the French Settlements upon the Back of these Colonies, and the Inconveniences which must follow upon the Success of their Jesuits in debauching many out of the five Nation Indians from the English to a French Interest, are very fully and clearly set forth in your letter to me of the 20th of December last _______."

(2) *Olden Time*, I, 8.

(3) *Votes of Assembly*, III, 169. Assembly to Governor; "We cannot be without just Apprehensions of the daily Encroachments of the French, as well upon our frontiers, and our Indians, as those of our neighboring Colonies. This danger now seems very imminent; _______."


(6) *Col. Rec.*, VI, 768.


(8) *Col. Rec.*, VI, 767.
in November and December the incursions were extended east of the Susquehanna River. (1) In November, Ganadenhutten, a Maravian settlement on the west branch of the Delaware, was burned and six persons killed.

During 1756 and 1757 the frontiers were still in danger. Cumberland and York counties were almost depopulated. (2) Fort Granville was burned by the enemy; Fort Shirley was evacuated by the governor's order. (3) The people everywhere were dispirited and clamoring for protection. The Indians pressed forward scalping and murdering as far as Swatara and Paxtang. It appeared that Lancaster was to become once more a frontier town, (4) but now upon a receding instead of upon an advancing front. The year 1758, however, brought relief.

During the remainder of the war the frontier of Pennsylvania was practically secure, but hardly had peace been declared when the storm broke forth again. The Indians, not the French, were now the instigators. Under their leader, Pontiac, they strove to hurl back the tide of whites which was driving them gradually westward. Almost without warning they fell upon the frontier settlers. Forts Pitt and Ligonier alone held out. Houses and mills were burned. The inhabitants of the West huddled together within the protecting walls of Fort Pitt; those east of the Alleghanies fled toward Lancaster and Philadelphia. (5) The ripe crops in the deserted fields stood waiting in vain for the reaper. The despondent settlers had so little faith in the expedition which was sent for their relief that none of them would join it, (6) although their service, on account of their acquaintance with the country, would have been of great value. Bouquet, nevertheless, succeeded in relieving Forts Ligonier and Pitt and in once more bringing peace to the distressed frontier.

In 1774 hostilities again commenced on account of the murder of some Indians by Virginians. The usual panic ensued. (7) The back settlers fled from their homes. There

(1) Ibid, VI, 767.
(3) Ibid, VII, 278.
(4) BALCH. Letters and Papers. 79. Edwards Shippen to James Burd: "You will see by the inclosed papers, that the savages have been committing some murders near Swatara, and it appears to me that unless the Militia Act be passed, with the Governor's amendments, we of this borough (Lancaster) shall, in less than a month, become the frontiers."
(5) SMITH WILLIAM, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the year 1764.
(6) Ibid, 12.
(7) Col. Rec., X, 192.
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

was fear of a general war, but the conflict was happily confined within rather narrow limits.

During the Revolution the red allies of the English committed their customary depredations. The Ohio Country and the upper Susquehanna Valley were the greatest sufferers. The western inhabitants were again driven into the forts where they could get no food from their plantations. (1) Stockades with store houses were erected at Ligonier and Hannastown at public expense to protect the people and their goods. The massacres in Cherry and Wyoming valleys in the upper Susquehanna district are too well known to require more than a passing mention. After the Revolution isolated clashes still took place. (2) There were occasional alarms, (3) but the days of widespread destruction were over. The Ohio settlements like a wedge were forcing the danger farther west. It was only when the Indians were elated by their victories over Harmar and St. Clair that there were serious apprehensions that they would again fall upon Pennsylvania in numbers. "The late disaster of the army," wrote the inhabitants of Pittsburgh to the governor in 1791, "must greatly effect the safety of this place. There can be no doubt but the enemy will now come forward, and with more spirit, and greater numbers than they ever did before, for success will give confidence, and secure allies. The Indians at present hostile are well acquainted with the defenceless situation of the town. During the late war there was a garrison at this place, though, even then, there was not such a combination of the savage nations, nor so much to be dreaded from them. At present we have neither garrison, arms, nor ammunition to defend the place." (4)

(1) Pa. Arch., 1st ser., V, 471. "The Distressed situation of our Cuntery is such, that we have no Prospect But Disolation and Destruction, the whole country on the north side of the Rode from the Alegany Mountains to the River is all kept close in forts; In short there is very few Days there is not some murder committed on some part of our frontiers."

(2) Col. Rec., XVI, 306.
Pa. Arch., 1st ser., XI, 377. James Marshall to Benjamin Franklin: "From numerous applications by the frontier Inhabitants, in the County of Washington, especially in that part of the county, where the families were killed last fall: I found it necessary early in the spring to order on duty, about twenty men, and to continue from time to time, nearly that number."

(3) Pittsburg Gazette, October 27, 1787. A report was received that some warriors having with them four scalps were encamped about sixty miles west of the town. A band of forty inhabitants marched out in quest of them, but their search was in vain.

Throughout these wars defence became gradually more difficult on account of the increasing extent of the frontier. In 1756 the frontier east of the Susquehanna River followed the line of the Blue Hills; west of that river it might be roughly drawn as a semicircle with a one hundred mile radius from Harris' Ferry. During the Revolution it extended from Wyoming to Pittsburgh. It was impossible to defend this line efficiently. The Indian method of fighting complicated the question. Their attacks were not made in large bodies; but parties of from five to twenty would creep noiselessly upon their unsuspecting victims, kill, scalp, and be gone before an alarm could be spread. Forts were of little avail against such a method of warfare unless the whole population could be gathered within their walls. The vast uncharted wilderness in which a campaign against the Indians must be carried on made it a thing of dread to the soldiers. "There is no refreshment for the healthy nor relief for the sick. A vast inhospitable desert, unsafe and treacherous, surrounds them, where victories are not decisive, but defeats are ruinous; and simple death is the least misfortune which can happen to them." (1)

The settlers on account of the lack of arms were often unable to defend themselves. During the earlier years this was due primarily to the poverty of the immigrants; all their surplus capital was expended in clearing and improving their lands. (2) But in later years it was often a case of negligence or carelessness. When Indian hostilities threatened in 1791, not more than one sixth of the western militia had guns. The considerable period of peace which preceded this outbreak had given them confidence that they would never be called upon to defend themselves again; and as game was becoming scarce, arms were of no great use to them. Most of these, therefore, had been sold to emigrants who were going to Ohio, Kentucky, or some other section of the new frontier. (3)

The Assembly and Military Affairs.

Such was the situation which confronted the provincial government of Pennsylvania—a frontier at first peaceful but later hostile, a problem of defence becoming more difficult as the settlements became more extensive. The government itself was divided on the issue. The deputy governors stood always for defence; the assembly before 1756 was invariably anti-military. The military powers of the governor, according to the charter, were sufficiently great;

(1) SMITH, Bouquet Expedition, 19.
(3) Ibid, 2nd ser., IV, 652, 786.
but could be of no avail without the enactment by the legislature of laws to compel service and an appropriation of money for the purpose. Governor George Thomas in an address to the assembly in 1743 concerning putting the provinces in a state of defence in case of a rupture with France argued in part as follows: “All that it is now possible for me to do is to issue a Proclamation requiring the Inhabitants to prepare themselves in the best manner they can to repel any attack that may be made upon Us, And to commission the best qualified to Levy, Muster, and Train them. Upon you it lies to prepare a Bill for obliging then to appear well Armed and Accounted at convenient Stated Times for their Instruction in Military Discipline, and whenever else it shall be necessary for the Defence of the Province; And as the Disposition of the Public Money is in You, it should be your Care likewise to provide a Stock of Arms and Ammunition, as well as to make some Provision for the security of our back Inhabitants against Inroads from the French Indians, And of this City; upon which the Trade of the whole Province chiefly depends, against any Attempt that may be upon it from the Sea.” (1) The political history of military affairs before the French and Indian War is, therefore, that of a struggle between the governor and the assembly, the former favoring military defence and the latter opposing it.

This struggle began before the close of the seventeenth century on account of the wars between France and England spreading to their colonies. There was fear that the Five Nations would go over to the French interest; and Benjamin Fletcher, who for a short time was governor of Pennsylvania as well as of New York, recognizing the hopelessness of enticing the Quaker assembly into warlike measures, appealed to them for aid in the following message: “Gentl., I consider your principles that you will not Carrie arms nor Levie money to make warr, though for your own defence, Yet I hope that you will not refuse to feed the Hungrie and Cloath the Naked. My meaning is to supply those Indian nations with such necessaries as may influence them to a Continuance of their friendship to these provinces. And now, Gentl., if you will consider, wherein I may be useful to you, according to the Tenor of my Commission, in redressing your grievances, (if anie you have,) you shall find me readie to act by the rules of Loyalty, with a true regard to Libertie & propertie.” (2) The assembly,

(2) Ibid, 171.
however, spent more time in reporting their grievances than in considering means of complying with his request. He, therefore, called them before his council and insisted that they should give a positive answer. (1) They reported finally, June 7, 1694, a bill to raise a fund, part of which should be expended in purchasing presents for the Indians, but the disposal of it remained in their own hands. (2) As this was considered unsatisfactory, the governor again called the assembly before him and insisted upon more definite action. They contended that their former bill met all requirements and were dissolved. (3) Again in 1795 a demand came from the queen through Fletcher to raise a quota of men. The council considered that they had no power to act in a matter so important. A meeting of the assembly was therefore called. (4) They, however, refused to provide for the raising of the men unless they were granted a charter of liberties, and were thereupon dissolved. (5) In the early years of the next century came further appeals for men, but the assembly consistently declined to furnish them. (6)

As the French peril began to cast its shadow over the province, the contest became more acute. Governor Thomas hurled volumes of argument against the assembly's defensive principles. "I must lament," he said, "the unhappy Circumstances of a Country, populous indeed, extensive in its Trade, bless'd with many natural advantages, and capable of defending itself, but from a religious Principle of its Representatives against bearing Arms, subject to become the Prey of the first Invader, and more particularly of its powerful Neighbors, who are known to be well armed, regular in Discipline, inured to Fatigue, and from thence capable of making long Marches, in Alliance with many

(1) Col. Rec., I, 460, 462.
(2) Ibid, 468. "His Excellie ordered the reading of a bill giving one pennie in the pound...The Council are of opinion that the sd bill Cannot pass, and that it is no answer to the Queen's Letter, nor does anie thing towards the support of the government."
(3) Ibid, 460, 472.
(5) Ibid, 82. Markham to Assembly: "Gentl., As oft as I press you to ansr the Late Quenn's Letter for the Supplie of New York, your ansr to me is that your privileges ought to be confirmed to you. I never did, nor ever shall endeavor to diminish them. But Gentl., Since there's no Likehood of obtaining from you anie ansr to the Late Quenn's Letter, nor to his Excellie Govr. Fletcher's Demands thereupon, Unless Ile enter upon and grant you a Charter of privileges, I dissolve you, and you are hereby dissolved."
(6) N. Y. Col Docs., V, 71, 78.
Votes of Assembly, II, 34, 36.
Nations of Indians, and of a boundless ambition." (1) He accused them of inconsistency in making a distinction between the execution of a criminal and the killing of a soldier in the defence of a state. "If a Burglar acts contrary to the Laws of Christianity and of the land in breaking open your Houses, and by those Laws you are justified in putting him to Death; and if a soldier acts contrary to the Laws of Christianity (as he does according to your own principles) and the Laws of Nations, in plundering your Houses and murdering your Families, it will be difficult to show why you may not as justly put the latter to Death as the former." (2) He considered, too, that assemblymen should be the watchmen of the whole people, not of a particular religious sect. (3)

The assembly in justification of their conduct urged that they were exempt from military service by a charter of privileges granted to them by the first proprietor and by their own laws; that the colony had existed and prospered without forts or militia; that being a peaceful people, there was no danger of their neighbors molesting them; and that in case of emergency the proprietor was obliged to defend his province. It was found, however, upon examination that they were nowhere exempted by law from military service; and that the proprietor, although his personal interests might be greater, was no more obliged to defend the province at his own expense than the governor of any other colony. (4) The argument that there was no danger from their neighbors reflects once more their misunderstanding of the real situation.

A circular signed by Conrad Weiser was published by order of the proprietors in order to draw the Germans over to their viewpoint. (5) It refuted the idea, instilled by the Quakers, that the proprietors were endeavoring to enslave the inhabitants of their province, and called upon them out of gratitude for the privileges they were enjoying to elect assemblymen who would show their loyalty to the government by a vote of supplies. This was answered by an anonymous writer who disparaged Weiser's statements and accused him of either being deceived or attempting to

(2) Ibid, 699.
(3) Ibid, 712. "But as every account from Europe gives us more and more reason to apprehend a general War, you must excuse me if I still consider you as the Representatives and the Watchmen of the whole People of the Province, and not of a particular religious Society,---."
(5) Egle, Notes and Queries, 4th ser., I, 33.
deceive his countrymen. Weiser had recently been made justice of the peace. He was now, says, this author, seeking to make his position secure by ingratiating himself with the governor. The chief positive argument was that the encroachments of the proprietors tended to bring upon them the same slavery which they had left their own country to escape. (1) But in spite of all representations the Germans, as well as most of the other citizens, gave their support to the policy of the Quaker representatives by re-electing them to the assembly until the outbreak of war in 1755 brought with it the necessity of more strenuous measures.

When the requisitions upon them to raise men or money became too urgent to be refused, the assembly managed generally to comply with the spirit of the demand without disturbing their consciences. As long as they were required to perform no military service and to grant no money for definite military ends they were satisfied. Since they did not condemn the use of arms in others, they raised no objections to their grants being turned to military ends. Their plan was to throw the responsibility from their own shoulders and let it fall where it would. They granted at various times thousands of pounds “for the king’s use” or “for the queen’s use” without stating definitely how it should be expended. (2) This, they said, did not concern them. At other times they stated particularly not only how the money should be raised but also how it should be used. (3) In 1745, for example, a grant of four thousand pounds was made for “bread, beef, pork, flower, wheat, or other grain,” although it was well known that provisions were plentiful. The words “other grain” were interpreted to mean powder. The assembly made no objection and the money was so expended. (4)

There was sometimes difficulty in raising the money after it had been granted by the assembly. As proof of this we have a message of Governor Charles Gookin to the assembly. “But I must first recommend to you,” he wrote, “as I did to the last assembly, that the 2000 Granted for the Queen’s use, may be made ready paymt. when Demand-ed:___for notwithstanding the Powers Given for the Raising that money, ’tis not yet paid in.” (5)

The outbreak of the French and Indian War brought to

---

(2) *Votes of Assembly*, II, 98.
(3) *Col. Rec.*, I, 361; IV, 366; VI, 133.
a crisis the struggle between the governor and the assembly. The governor's chief ally was necessity; the assembly's most serviceable weapon was the power of the purse. The latter, to use the words of a contemporary writer, "seem quite intoxicated; are factious, contentious and disregard the Proprietors and their Governors. Nay, they seem even to claim a kind of Independency of their Mother-Country, despising the Orders of the Crown, and refusing to contribute their quota, either to the general Defence of America, or that of their own particular province." (1) Early in the year 1754 Governor Hamilton, having received orders from the king to arm the province, solicited a grant from the assembly to enable him to obey; but after considering the matter for several weeks, they adjourned on the ninth of March without coming to any decision." (2)

After the Virginians had been driven from the Ohio, the governor again called the assembly, pointed out the extreme dangers of the situation, and implored them to enable him to put the province in a condition for defence, promising even to disregard the proprietary instructions against an issue of paper money, providing they would make a generous grant and sink the issue within five years as had been prescribed by Parliament in the case of New England." (3) They then passed a bill granting ten thousand pounds redeemable in twelve years. As he considered five the legal limit, the governor vetoed it. Upon the news of Washington's defeat he again convened the assembly and entreated them to find ways and means consistent with his instructions to repel the enemy. They voted fifteen thousand pounds to be raised as in the former bill. Upon the governor's refusal to sign it they adjourned without voting him any salary. (4)

Governor Hamilton gave up in disgust and was succeeded by Robert Hunter Morris. He informed the assembly that he was subject to the same instructions as his predecessor, but they sent up to him a bill to raise twenty thousand pounds by an issue of paper money to extend for the same length of time. (5) The grants seemed to become more generous as the governor's veto became more sure.

In August a petition from a great number of frontier

(1) SMITH, Brief State, 10.
(3) SMITH, Brief State, 18.
(5) Ibid, 22.
inhabitants was presented to the assembly, praying that they might be furnished with arms and ammunition. It was not granted. The friendly Indians sent a request to the governor begging that he should direct the building of a stockade in which they might defend themselves from the incursions of the enemy; but the assembly refused to grant any money for the purpose, and advised the Indians that if they were afraid, they might move down into the settled part of the province. (1)

The same procrastinating policy was pursued during the early months of 1755. In January the assembly proposed to adjourn until May without making any provisions for the defence of the province or granting the supplies which had been requested by the governor. The governor objected to the adjournment and insisted that they should continue in session until they had provided some effective plan for defence, (2) but it was nevertheless made. But in the spring of this year a new influence was brought to bear upon them. The governor convened the assembly on March 17 and laid before them a letter from General Braddock. The following account of its reception was written by Edward Shippen to his father two days later: "The Governor has laid before the Assembly a most alarming letter from General Braddock, which charges them in strong terms with faction and disaffection, and assures them, that, as the assigning quarters for the army is his province, he shall take due care to burden those colonies the most, that show the least loyalty to his Majesty; and lets them know that he is determined to obtain, by unpleasant methods, what it is their duty to contribute with the utmost cheerfulness. The Assembly know not how to stomach this military address, but 'tis thought it will frighten them into some reasonable measures." (3) Provision was immediately made, as he demanded, for the establishment of a post to Winchester and the opening of a road westward from Carlisle to the Youghiogheny. It was also voted to raise Pennsylvania's portion of the general fund. No troops, however, were raised by the province.

During the alarm after the defeat of General Braddock the Assembly talked of contributing largely but delayed as long as possible. A bill was finally passed to raise fifty thousand pounds but a clause was attached to tax the unprofitable proprietary lands, which made it necessary for

(1) Smith, Brief State, 23.
(3) Balch, Letters and Papers, 35.
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

the governor to veto it. (1) On the question of raising a militia they would take no action. (2) A later bill was sent up granting sixty thousand pounds to the king's use, and including all the amendments formerly made by the governor, except that the taxation of the proprietary estates was to be submitted to royal determination. (3) This, too, was vetoed by the governor as he considered that he had no power to pass any bill which did not definitely exclude such taxation. At this point certain gentlemen of Philadelphia, evidently despairing of a settlement, offered to subscribe five thousand pounds in lieu of the proprietary share of the tax in question, upon the presumption that the proprietors would honorably reimburse them. (4) There was no need, however, to take the risk. The proprietors offered five thousand pounds to be used in the defence of the province. (5) In consideration of this gift the proprietary estates were exempted in a new bill, which became a law, granting fifty-five thousand pounds for the king's use. (6)

According to this law the money raised was to be placed in the hands of a committee of the Assembly to be used by them "for supplying Friendly Indians, holding Treaties, relieving distressed settlers who have been driven from their lands, and other purposes for the King's use." Nothing was said about military service, although the words other purposes could be given such an interpretation. Some, considering the principles of the committee, had little anticipation that they would be given such a meaning; (7) but Benjamin Franklin, who was one of the members and who probably knew better than any other the real inclination of his colleagues, was more hopeful. Eight days after the passage of the law he wrote to William Parsons, saying that the money was to be used chiefly for the defence of the province, and stating that orders had already been issued to raise three hundred rangers and erect block houses along the frontier. (8)

The Quaker's opposition to the use of arms and the taxation of the proprietary estates were, however, not the only points of contention between the governor and the Assem-

(1) Col. Rec., VI, 599.
(3) True and Impartial State, 139.
(4) Franklin, Review, 254.
(5) Votes of Assembly, IV, 582.
(6) Statutes at Large, V, 201-212.
(7) Col. Rec., VII, 274.
(8) Franklin, Works, II, 427.
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

bly. The latter feared that the proprietors were attempting to introduce a system of despotism and slavery, and to augment their own powers at the expense of the peoples liberties. (1) A general militia law would, they thought, materially strengthen this power by creating a host of officers dependent upon the proprietors alone. (2) It could have in Pennsylvania only the same centralizing effect which such laws had shown in Europe. The assemblymen conscientiously felt that if they submitted to the amendments of the governor, they would be guilty of a breach of trust in surrendering up the rights of the people whom they had been chosen to represent.

The governor on the other hand considered that the assemblymen were striving to promote their schemes of independence by grasping at the disposition of all public money. (3) He was charged by the partisans of the Assembly with inciting the people to come down to the city in multitudes to coerce them into compliance with his plans. (4) Whether the governor was guilty of instigation or not, popular influence was brought to bear upon the Assembly. In November, 1755, a remonstrance was presented to them by the mayor, aldermen, and common council of Philadelphia calling their attention to the importance and urgency of the problem which they were facing, and insisting that all disputes should be laid aside until the defence of the province had been provided for. "You were," ran the remonstrance in part, "lately called together upon more urgent Business than ever came before an Assembly of this province, and while you have been sitting, scarce a day has passed wherein you have not heard of the inhuman Slaughter of our Fellow Subjects, & been loudly called upon for that protection, which by the most sacred Ties you owe to the People. On such an Emergency we imagined you had an easy and expeditious mode of procedure before you,

(1) *True and Impartial State*, 37.
(2) *Ibid*, 56. A general Militia Law...would naturally produce this long train of ruinous Effects; an infinite Number of new Relations, Dependences, &c. would be created, all under the Control, and subject to the Dominion of our Proprietaries, and their Governors; on them would the Officers of the Militia alone be dependent, being commissioned by them, and liable to be turned out at their pleasure; the common Men would be influenced by their Officers, and directed by them in their Choice of Representatives; so that, not only the Quakers, but every man who had the Virtue and Spirit to oppose such arbitrary and unjust Proceedings, would be utterly excluded from that important Trust."

namely, to postpone all Disputes to a more seasonable time, to grant the necessary Supplies on such Terms as those on which the rest of his Majesty’s Colonies have granted large sums for the like purposes; and lastly to pass a reasonable Law in order to collect and regulate the Force of the Province for repelling the cruel Invasion. Nevertheless, while you have been deliberating, much innocent Blood has been spilt, a great deal of our country laid waste, the miserable Inhabitants scatter’d abroad before the savage Spoiler.”

There were for a time constant reports that mobs of frontier inhabitants were preparing to come to Philadelphia to force the government to provide efficient means for defence. (2) The mobs, however, failed to come in any great numbers, and the few who did come proved harmless. (3) The governor, evidently desiring to bring the Assembly into closer touch with actual frontier conditions or probably under the influence of mob domination, advised with his council in 1756 whether he should call them to meet at Lancaster. (4) The council advised that the meeting should be called for Philadelphia. The writ was, therefore, issued to meet in this city.

The argument had been occasionally advanced that those who had scruples against the use of arms should in times of public danger decline to act as assemblymen. (5) This was consistent with the Quaker’s policy of shifting the burden of defence from his own shoulders and letting it fall where it would. Acting therefore, in accordance with the request of the ministry the Quakers in 1756 did not offer themselves as candidates, and the four who were nevertheless elected asked to be relieved from the responsibility of

(1) Col. Rec., VI, 734.
(2) Ibid, VI, 729. Minutes of Council. “A Letter from Colonel William Moore, dated yesterday, to the Governor advising him of 2000 Inhabitants preparing to come to Philadelphia from Chester County, to compel the Governor and Assembly to agree to pass Laws to defend the Country and oppose the Enemy, was read.” See also a letter from the assembly to the governor and contain the same facts in vol. VII, page 91.
(3) True and Impartial State, 142.
(5) Pa. Mag. of Hist. and Biog., VI, 410. James Logan to the Yearly Meeting: “It is therefore proposed to the serious and most weighty Consideration of this Meeting, Whether it may not, at this Time, be advisable, that all such who for Conscience sake cannot join in any Law for Self-Defence, should not only decline standing Candidates at the ensuing Election for Representatives themselves, but also advise all others who are equally scrupulous, to do the same.
service. (1) Their request was granted, their seats declared vacant, and they themselves disabled from sitting or serving in the Assembly for the ensuing year.

Even before the resignation of the Quakers a makeshift militia bill had been passed. During the Indian incursion of the summer and autumn of 1755 petitions came from all parts of the province, interior as well as frontier, stating that the people would concur in taking measures for the defence of the province. (2) The Assembly’s bill, which will be treated more fully in the section devoted to the militia, seemed to be calculated rather to exempt persons from military service than to encourage them in it. The whole was purely voluntary. There was no method of compelling those principled against fighting to find substitutes. (3) The governor, contrary to expectation, signed the bill in order to show that he was willing to do anything that had the slightest chance to contribute to the defence of the province, (4) and also to show by experience that such laws would do more harm than good. (5)

(1) Votes of Assembly, IV, 626. October 16, 1756: “Understanding that the Ministry have requested the Quakers, who from the first Settlement of this Colony have been the majority of the Assemblies of this Province, to suffer their Seats, during the difficult Situation of the Affairs of the Colonies, to be filled by Members of other Demoninations, in such Manner as to prepare, without any Scruples, all such Laws as may be necessary to be enacted for the Defence of the Province in whatever Manner they may judge best suited to the Circumstances of it; and notwithstanding we think this has been pretty fully complied with at the last Election, yet, at the Request of our Friends, being willing to take off all possible Obligation, we who have (without any Solicitation on our Part) been returned as Representatives in this Assembly, request we may be excused, and suffered to withdraw ourselves, and vacate our Seats in such Manner as may be attended with the least Trouble, and most satisfactory to this honorable House.

Mahlon Kirkbride, Peter Dicks,
William Hoge, Nathaniel Pennock,”

(2) Col. Rec., VI, 680.
(3) Ibid, VII, 274.
(4) Ibid, VI, 741.
(5) Pa. Arch., 1st ser., II, 531. Governor Morris to Governor Dinwiddie: “If with this Grant they had made a good Militia Act, I might have done something toward putting the Country into a posture of Defence; but as they offered me a senseless, partial and impracticable Bill, rather than have any more disputes with them, and as it was only to continue in Force till next October, I passed it, that Experience may convince them such Bills will do infinitely more harm than good.”
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

This law having proved satisfactorily its inefficiency, the governor in May, 1756, recommended to the Assembly to form a bill that could be carried into immediate execution and that would enable him to throw the strength of the province into those sections where the danger was most imminent. (1) The law of 1755 was disallowed by the king in council, (2) the chief objection to it being the election of officers by a vote of the soldiers. Pennsylvania was thus left without even the shadow of a legal military establishment. During the next eighteen months the governor appealed constantly for an efficient military bill, (3) but of all those returned to him not one was free from the objections which had caused the disallowance of the former law. A good example of these bills is that which passed the House, March 20, 1757. (4) It provided that the constables should make out a list of the inhabitants of each township, indicating the religion of each. Those religiously opposed to bearing arms were not to be forced; the others were to be formed into companies of sixty each. Each company was then to choose by ballot its own captain, lieutenant, and ensign.

The governor objected to these bills because they did not subject the militia to the proper discipline; because trials by courts martial were not provided; and because the appointment of officers was taken out of the hands of the government. (5) The Assembly on the other hand considered that their bills were reasonable; that subjecting the people to a court martial would be inconsistent with their liberties; and that the appointment of officers was not taken out of the hands of the government, as the governor, according to the later bills, was empowered to appoint one from several whose names had been recommended by the soldiers. (6) They could see in such a law as the governor desired only an attempt to undermine their liberties. (7)

The tension was finally somewhat relieved by the ap-

(1) Col. Rec., VII, 121.
(2) Statutes at Large, V, 201.
(3) Col. Rec., VII, 444, 720, 758.
(6) Ibid, 733.
(7) Ibid, 618. Resolution of Assembly: "That it appears to Us, that the Governor is determined to withhold that Protection from the People of this Province, which a proper Militia might afford them, Unless we will present him such a Bill as will enable certain designing men to subvert the Constitution, and deprive the Inhabitants of every Liberty they think worth enjoying."
pointment of Pitt to the English premiership. His liberal and energetic policy soothed the fears of the Pennsylvanians, and to a great extent obviated the necessity of a military law. To encourage enlistment the Assembly now voted a bounty of five pounds to each able bodied soldier and twenty shillings to the enlisting officer; (1) and recommended to the governor to do every thing in his power to have the forces ready at the time designated by the ministry. Pennsylvania was not provided with a militia law, but hence forth she furnished to the general army with little opposition her quota of men and supplies. (2)

After the French and Indian War the Assembly did not show themselves so strongly opposed to providing for military defence, although they cannot always be complimented for their prompt and efficient action. During Pontiac's War and Dunmore's War they provided for the defence of the

(1) Col. Rec., VIII, 53. The Assembly to the Governor: "It is also the Opinion of this House that Five Pounds be given as a Bounty to every able bodied Man that shall voluntarily enter into the Service of the Province, and Twenty Shillings to the Officer for every Man he shall enlist."

(2) During the period of contention between the governor and the assembly a veritable pamphlet war was carried on between the champions of the opposing viewpoints. William Smith in his Brief View of the Conduct of Pennsylvania, 1755, and his Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania upheld the policy of the governor and proprietors, holding the Quakers and their assembly responsible for the misfortunes which had fallen upon the province; while Cross's Answer to an invidious pamphlet, intitled "A brief state of the province of Pennsylvania" and the anonymous True and Impartial state of the province of Pennsylvania take the side of the assembly. The first of these latter two is an inadequate, unreasonable, vindictive and altogether amusing attack upon Smith's position. It is rather a raillery than an argument, leaving the points made by Smith unanswered. The True and impartial state of the province of Pennsylvania is on the other hand more reasonable and presents arguments of some weight in favor of the assembly's position. Benjamin Franklin's An Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania is another excellent statement of the assembly's viewpoint. Charles Thompson's Enquiry into the Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest is a careful study of Indian affairs from 1722 to 1758, in which the author shows how the whites imposed continually upon the Indians, especially in matter of land and trade.
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

frontier either by arming the settlers themselves (1) or by raising bands of rangers. (2) During the Revolutionary War the control of frontier defence was voluntarily given over to the president and council. (3) Action was often crippled by the lack of funds, but for this the Assembly can no longer be held responsible. After the capture of the government by the revolutionists, they stood necessarily for military defence.

The Indian and Frontier Defence.

Having thus sketched in outline the necessity for defence, the conflicting views of the assembly and the proprietors, and their prolonged quarrel over military grants and laws, I shall now take up in the following sections what is an even more pleasant task, a description of the methods of defence which were put into actual operation.

As has been stated formerly, the Indians during the early years of the province lived on terms of friendship with their English neighbors. When, therefore, the traders began to bring in rumors of danger and the Indians to grow gradually more restless on account of the encroachments of the whites, the great problem was that of maintaining their friendship. If the Indians who lived along the frontier could only be retained as friends, the necessity for defence would, if it did not entirely disappear, at least be greatly minimized.

The methods employed to maintain and, after many tribes had been alienated, to regain their friendship have been treated quite fully in the chapter on Indian Policy. It it, therefore, only necessary to review here some of the most important points. Many thousand pounds were ex-

(1) N. Y. Col. Docs., VII, 530. Sir Jeffrey Amherst to the Earl of Egremont: "The Province of Pennsylvania has, on this Occasion Empowered the Governor to raise Seven Hundred Men, but it is only with a view of getting in their Harvest, which entirely frustrates the Public good that might be expected from such a number actually raised; whereas, these in effect are only farmers and reapers, which the Assembly mean by their vote to arm to defend their own fields."

(2) Pa. Arch., IV, 548. Resolution of Assembly: They authorize the payment of a sum not exceeding two thousand pounds for paying "a number of Rangers lately raised by the Magistrates of Westmoreland County, for the removing the Panic into which the Inhabitants of the sd County have been thrown by the late Indian Disturbances."

pended for Indian presents as a voluntary return for services which they had rendered or merely to retain their good will. Agents whose personal influence was strong were sent to treat with them. (1) They were flattered into making treaties of friendship. The name of their "good brother Onas" (2) was conjured for this purpose. Goods were furnished them cheaper than they could be procurred from the French. Lands, the purchase of which they considered fraudulent were returned.

If a buffer state of Friendly Indians could be maintained on the frontier, the danger of attacks by the French or hostile Indians would be greatly lessened. But the policy of erecting such a state was not consistently followed. The rapid westward expansion of population and the consequent purchases of land would have prevented its operation except for brief periods of time. In his agreement with the Susquehanna Indians in 1701 Penn insisted that they should allow no tribes of strange Indians to settle upon the western bank of the Susquehanna or along the Potomac and that they should bring no other Indians into any part of the province without his express consent. (3) But there seems to be no indication that such a policy was pursued from that date until the outbreak of the French and Indian War. The Indians were, on the contrary, gradually receding before advancing settlements.

In 1757, however, the policy was again acted upon. The friendly Indians requested lands about Wyoming upon which they might settle and live permanently. The assembly, recognizing the advantage of such a settlement, recommended that the request be granted and that a comfortable place of security be erected for their reception. (4)

(1) Votes of Assembly, IV, 137. Governor Hamilton to Assembly; "The Indians of those Parts are not of the most prudent Behavior, and therefore it seems necessary there should be always among them some discreet Person, who by his Influence may be able to regulate their Conduct, and keep them firmly attached to the British Interest;___."  
(2) The Indian word for "pen" by which William Penn was commonly known among them.  
(3) Col. Rec., II, 16.  
(4) Col. Rec., VII, 730. Assembly to Governor: "The securing an Indian Barrier to the Frontiers of this Province is of so much importance to the Safety and Welfare of the People, that we are of Opinion, a Compliance with this Request should not be postponed a Moment longer than is necessary; therefore, we earnestly entreat your Honor, with all Expedition, to proceed to build such a place of Security as shall be agreeable to the Indians; and as many houses as they shall stand in need of at the Place nominated by Teedyuscung, for their comfortable Living and Safety."
The governor, acting in accordance with the assembly's recommendation and the promise made to the Indians at Easton, appointed commissioners for the immediate construction of a stockade and such houses as were necessary for their accommodation. (1)

The Indian was not extensively used in actual warfare. As his acquaintance with the country and his skill in woodcraft made him an excellent scout, he was at times employed in this capacity. (2) The Quakers were, however, naturally opposed to his use, and when wars had finally become serious, most of the Indians were allies of the French. The problem of the English was one of regaining or retaining their friendship (3) rather than of using them against their enemies.

Here duty demands that I deal with a subject which, out of respect for our ancestors, I should prefer to pass in silence. The Indian at times paid dearly for his neutrality. The frontiersmen, frantic with the losses which they had suffered and unable to satisfy their vengeance upon an elusive foe, fell upon and destroyed the neutral Christian tribes which were situated within their lines. The first massacre occurred at Paxton (or Paxtang as it was then spelled) during Pontiac's War and the second at Gnadenhutten, Ohio, in 1782. The latter took place in Ohio, but the perpetrators were chiefly Pennsylvanians. An account of these massacres or an account of the Indian's suffering does not lie within the scope of our present task. But we are somewhat concerned with the attitude of the frontiersman to the subject and to the policy of permitting bodies of neutral Indians to dwell behind the frontier in time of war. The frontiersman looked upon the situation quite differently from the inhabitants of the interior. (4) He could not understand the attitude of a government that would grant neither men nor funds for the protection of its own citizens, yet fostered and protected a band of dangerous Indians. (5) All Indians, whether Christian or

(1) BALCH, Letters and Papers, 99.
(2) Col. Rec., VII, 46. Minutes of Council, February 24, 1756; "Two of the Six Nation Indians were sent at the instance of the Governor up the River Sasquehannah to gain Intelligence of the Motions and Number of the Enemy Indians."
(3) Ibid, 435.
(4) DARLINGTON, Fort Pitt, 239.
(5) Col. Rec., IX, 148. Declaration of frontier inhabitants, 1764: "Both money and protection is granted to Indians who were enemies of Bouquet, while at the same time 100s of distressed families were compelled to flee from their homes to starve neglected."
pagan, were, according to their conception, equally treacherous; and to allow bands of them to remain in times of war was simply nursing an adder in the bosom of the province. (1) The massacres were carried out in cold blood after days of careful consideration.

To inspire the friendly Indians to activity rewards were sometimes offered for enemy prisoners and scalps. This plan was first adopted on the recommendation of the Indian commissioners (2) in 1756 at the same time that war was declared against the Delawares. The rewards were graduated as follows: (3) for male prisoners above ten years of age, $150; for females and males under ten, $130; for scalps of males over ten, $130; for scalps of Indian women, $50; for the recapture of English prisoners, $150. Soldiers in the pay of the province could lay claim to one half of the above amounts. The same plan was followed during Pontiac's War. (4) The system was attended by some favorable results, but appealed for the most part to the baser motives. The effect upon the Indians was particularly bad, leading to the murder and scalping of innocent Indians in order to get the reward. (5)

Militia.

Before 1755 the pressure of danger was never sufficiently great to overcome the religious prejudices of the Quakers against the establishment of a militia. But the governors at times were able, acting under their charter authority, to raise a body of men. (6) The majority of the Quakers, as long as service was purely voluntary, remained passive. There was some opposition on the part of the extremists but never enough to interfere seriously with the governor's plans.

(1) Col. Rec., IX, 141. Petition of Inhabitants of Frontiers, February 13, 1764: "We humbly conceive that it is contrary to the maxims of good Policy, and extremely dangerous to our Frontiers, to suffer any Indians, of what tribe so ever, to live within the Inhabited parts of this Province, while we are engaged in an Indian war, as Experience has taught us that they are all perfidious, & their Claim to Freedom & Independency puts it in their power to act as Spies, to entertain and to give Intelligence to our Enemies, and to furnish them with Provisions and Warlike Stores."

(2) Ibid, VII, 74.

(3) Ibid, 88.


(4) Col. Rec., IX, 188.


(6) Col. Rec., IV, 696; V, 251.
These companies were raised by voluntary associations of citizens. In fact when a militia law was finally passed in 1755, it was professedly nothing more than the legalization of the method which had formerly been followed without the sanction of law. Franklin's Association of 1747 was probably the most successful attempt to raise troops in this manner. (1) By the spring of 1748 almost twenty thousand men had joined the Association and become somewhat adept in the use of arms. (2) The governor, therefore, at the beginning of the French and Indian War naturally followed the same plan. He informed the several counties that if they would enter into associations, form themselves into companies, and recommend proper persons for officers, he would grant them commissions and give them all the encouragement in his power. (3) Many followed his suggestion and thus the foundation for a military establishment was laid.

The act of November 25, 1755, as has just been stated, merely put the stamp of legal approval upon the method of raising troops which was already in common use. The preamble shows its spirit. The Quakers state themselves principled against the use of arms but not opposed to their use by others as the world was then circumstanced. To compel them to enlist would be a breach of privilege, for them to compel others would be inconsistent. But owing to the great number of petitions showing a popular desire for defensive organization they pass an act providing for the better organization of those who are willing and desirous to be united for military purposes. (4)

This act made it lawful for freemen to form themselves into companies "as hitherto they have used in time of war without law;" to choose their own captain, lieutenant, and ensign, and present their names to the governor or to the commander in chief for his approval. The officers of the various companies were empowered to choose and present in the same way the name of a colonel. The officers should

(1) FRANKLIN, Autobiography, 141-149.
(2) BALCH, Letters and Papers, 15. John Swift to John White, April 12, 1748: "The association for the militia goes on very well here, there are upwards of 8000 men in this city (Philadelphia) that bear arms, and are already become pretty expert in their exercise; and in the province there are near 20,000 associators, and more daily coming in. The platform for a battery is begun by the swamp below the Swedes' church, and we have cannons coming to us from New York. With these we shall be able to make some resistance in case of an attack."
(3) Col. Rec., V. 680.
(4) Statutes at Large, V, 197.
then draw up articles of war for the government of the forces. (1) These articles must be read before the companies, and each man, after at least three days consideration, must sign them in the presence of a justice of the peace. No regiment or company could be compelled to go more than three days march beyond the inhabited parts of the province or be detained longer than three weeks in any garrison without a previous engagement signed by each man for that particular service.

The law was wholly inadequate to provide for the defence of the province. It provided that freemen might form themselves into companies and choose their own officers. But neither time nor place was designated; no person was empowered to call them together; there was no method to compel those not principled against the use of arms to enlist or to force others to find a substitute. (2) Beyond the moral obligation which it placed upon the assembly to provide funds for the payment of the troops there was little gained. A number of companies were formed under its sanction, but the process of mobilization was necessarily so slow and the restrictions upon the action of the governor so great that little could be accomplished. (3)

In 1756 there were three battalions engaged in the defence of the frontier. Each consisted of seven companies of infantry and one of cavalry. (4) In 1757 thirteen thou-

---

(1) Pa. Arch., 1st ser., II, 547. Soldiers' Agreement: “We, the Subscribers do hereby engage ourselves to serve as Soldiers in his Majesty's Service, under the command of Captain John Vanetta, for the space of one Month, and whoever of us shall get drunk, desert, or prove cowardly in Time of Action, or disobedient to our Officers, shall forfeit his Pay. This Agreement we make in Consideration of being allowed at the rate of Six Dollars per Month, Wages, one Dollar for the use of a Gun and Blanket, to each Man who shall furnish himself with them, and the Provisions and Rum mentioned in a Paper hereunto annexed.”

(2) Col. Rec., VII, 274.

(3) Votes of Assembly, IV, 557.

Col. Rec., VII, 121. Governor to Assembly, May 11, 1756: “The Law for the Better Ordering and Regulating such as are willing and desirous to be united for military purposes, within this Province, has contributed very little toward the Defence of the Frontiers, and as I observed to you when I Passed it, is so Defective in itself, and requires so much Time to carry it into Execution, that Nothing Good is to be expected from it, though many Companies have formed themselves under that Law, yet it is not in my Power to Order any of them to the frontiers, they are, as to that most Martial Service, entirely useless.”

sand men were in the pay of the province; (1) in 1758 twelve thousand seventy-four are reported. (2) These were engaged in garrisoning the forts and ranging the frontiers.

After the first panic and confusion of 1763 had passed away the frontier settlers formed themselves voluntarily into companies (3) and the assembly ordered seven hundred men to be raised for the protection of the frontier during harvest. Most of these were newly raised and undisciplined troops, but working in conjunction with the voluntary companies they were able to gather in the greater part of the harvest. (4)

When the news came from New England in 1775 that the struggle with Great Britain had begun, the inhabitants of western Pennsylvania were involved in difficulties with the Indians and almost on the verge of civil war among themselves over the question of the boundary between Pennsylvania and Virginia. But within four weeks after the Battle of Lexington, meetings were held in Pittsburgh and Hannastown and resolutions unanimously passed indorsing entirely the action of Massachusetts. (5) It was determined to form military associations to oppose by force if necessary the encroachments of a "wicked ministry and a corrupted parliament." (6) A tax of 2s. 6d. per tithable man was also recommended for the purpose of providing the associations with arms and ammunition. A standing committee was appointed to collect, repair, and deliver such arms as could be obtained to the captains of the various companies. (7) The boundary question in the presence of the common danger became a minor issue. Other counties followed the same plan. (8) Thus the problem of organization was met until the state and the confederation were able to take up its solution.

A militia law providing for the enrollment of all males

(1) Ibid, 99.
(2) Ibid, 341.
(3) Ibid, IV, 120, 124.
(4) Col. Rec., IX, 42. Governor Hamilton to Assembly, September 12, 1763: "I have__taken into the Pay of the Province Seven hundred Men__for the defence and protection of our Frontiers __: And I have the satisfaction to acquaint you, that under the aforesaid protection, great part of the Harvest, which is of so much Importance to the back Inhabitants, hath been gathered in, and as well secured as the Season of the Year would admit."

(5) Olden Time, I, 571-573.
between the ages of eighteen and fifty-three years passed the state legislature on March 17, 1777. (1) The country was divided into districts, the inhabitants of which should meet and elect their field officers, a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major; subdistricts were erected, each of which should elect captains, lieutenants, and ensigns. The Executive Council, in case of invasion or upon the request of Congress, could call the militia into service. Each enrolled man must serve in his turn or provide a substitute. Service as a substitute did not excuse a man from his own turn.

During the Indian wars of 1791 and 1795 the lieutenants of the frontier counties were authorized in case of actual invasion or imminent danger of invasion to order into service such parts of the militia as the situation seemed to require. (2) In 1793 and again in 1794 three temporary companies of riflemen were also provided to protect the frontiers of Westmoreland, Washington, and Allegheny counties. (3) Each company, according to the law of 1793, consisted of fifty privates, and officers, to continue in service for six months, unless the state of the war made it necessary for the governor to extend their time until the next meeting of the legislature. Captains received twenty-five dollars per month, lieutenants twenty, sergeants eight, and privates six dollars and sixty cents. The law of 1794 was almost a replica of that of 1793. Each company, however, consisted of sixty-five instead of fifty privates; service was to continue for eight months instead of six; and the wages were slightly higher.

After 1754 a plan of patrolling the frontier was followed whenever danger threatened. Bodies of soldiers were stationed at intervals along the frontier. The main body was kept in garrison at a post near the center of their district. From here bands ranged each morning to the end of the district and back in the afternoon. (4) Signals by which a warning of danger could be spread were agreed upon with the inhabitants. (5) The bands consisted usually of from

---

(1) Statutes at Large, IX, 75-94.
(2) Pa. Arch., 4th ser., IV, 271. Governor Mifflin to Assembly: The military officers of the frontier counties were authorized to call out the militia and instructed "by virtue of the discretionary power which the law creates, to continue the three rifle companies in service, till the opening of the present session."
(3) Statutes at Large, XIV 381, XV, 13...
(5) Id.?
The Frontier Policy of Pennsylvania

ten to fifteen men; the posts were situated twelve or fifteen miles apart. (1) At times larger bands were sent to scout beyond the frontier as far as supplies could be provided for them. (2) In 1763 the people about the Great Cove raised money by subscription and employed a scouting party for two months to defend the north and western frontiers of Cumberland County. (3) During Dunmore's War parties were raised to range between Turtle Creek, Bullock Penns, Hannastown, Proctors, and Ligonier. (4) During the Revolution (5) and the later Indian wars (6) the same plan was followed.

The skill in marksmanship which tradition attributes to the frontiersman will not bear the light of careful investigation. Some, particularly among the hunters and traders, were doubtless very expert in the use of the rifle; but as a whole the settlers along the frontier would not appear to much greater advantage than our rural citizens of today. James Young, when on an inspection tour of the western forts in 1756, tested the marksmanship of the soldiers at the various garrisons. (7) At Fort Lebanon only fifteen out of twenty-eight were able to hit within two feet of the center of a target at eighty yards; at the fort above Alleminga not over four in twenty-five could hit a tree at eighty-five yards. James Burd, who inspected the forts in 1758, reports the same conditions as still existing. (8)

The task of recruiting, on account of the attitude taken by the Quakers and many of the Germans, was often tedious and difficult. This fact, as well as the methods sometimes used, is shown by the following extract from a letter written by Joseph Shippen to James Burd, May 31, 1757. "I have found little success, having enlisted as yet but five men. Captain Jameson writes me he has got but six. Captain Hambright has had better success; the day when all the Captains came to town to wait on the governor he enlisted twelve or thirteen of our discharged Dutchmen, by assuring them that they were not to go to Shamokin, nor do any kind of work, but to range and scour the woods continually. This pleased them so much that they have begun

(1) Ibid, 865.
(2) Ibid, 4th ser., II, 626.
(3) Votes of Assembly, VI, 296.
(5) Col. Rec., XI, 750.
(8) Ibid, III, 352-357.
endeavoring to persuade all their countrymen they meet with to enlist with Captain Hambright, by which means I believe he has now thirty recruits.” (1) Captain Hambright’s brother, who was at the same time recruiting at Lancaster, gave each man a dollar and provided him with a pistol.

When General Forbes was raising forces for the expedition against Fort Duquesne in 1752, Provost William Smith at his request wrote and published an address to the colonies calling upon them to raise in defence of their liberties. (2) “Rise then, my countrymen! as you value the blessings you enjoy, and dread the evils that hang over you, rise and show yourselves worthy of the name of Britons! rise to secure to your posterity, peace, freedom, and a pure religion! rise to chastise a perfidious nation for their breach of treaties, their detestible cruelties, and their horrid murders.”

The soldiers, as might be expected under such laws as the assembly provided for their regulation, sometimes showed an inclination to disobedience and insubordination. The officer was rather an advisor than a commander. There was no court martial to punish offenders. Public odium was the only penalty. Even this had little weight as the soldier always received the sympathy of the Quakers and German pacifists. To the honor of the soldier it may nevertheless be said that glaring cases of disobedience were very rare. (3)

Neglect of duty was often more serious. The scouting parties sometimes did not go to their destination; (4) some officers failed to send out any scouts at all; others were drunken and totally unfit. Relief was at times refused to

(1) Balch, Letters and Papers, 82.
(2) Smith, William, Discourses, App. 21-31.
(3) Doddrige, Notes, 110.
(4) Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., IV, 727. William Findley to Secretary Dallas, June 18, 1792: “The Neglect and disobedience of the officers and scouting parties has obliged him (Major McCully) to keep two Companies embodied at one station, where he can enforce the execution of his own Orders. It appears that small scouting parties sent out by Guthrie, never went the length of their destination; this is proved beyond dispute by their trail in the weeds. Cooper sent out no scouts nor did any duty, he has turned out worse than my fears.”
those in danger. (1) Desertion, too, was common. (2) Mutiny sometimes broke out among the men. An instance of this took place at Fort Bedford in 1760. (3) The garrison, on account of a report that they were to receive no pay after January 15, refused to do their duty. They rescued one of their leaders who had been imprisoned. The commandant, drawing his sword and threatening to kill any one who resisted, was able to retake the prisoner. By setting before the men their disgraceful behavior, by threats of court martial and forfeiture of pay he finally succeeded in quelling the disturbance and bringing the men back to a sense of their duty. In 1794 the garrison at Fort Le Boeuf almost broke into mutiny upon the imprisonment of some men who had stolen brandy from the warehouse. The ringleader was, however, secured and sent to Fort Pitt for detention. (4) The troops were becoming dissatisfied because the time set by law for obtaining bounty lands had almost elapsed (5) without their being able to locate any on account of Indian opposition.

But in spite of desertion, neglect of duty, and an occasional mutiny we may say that in general the soldier per-

(1) Ibid, VI, 797. Report of Andrew Ellicott, December 30, 1794: “From some experience of the disutility of our frontier Block House establishments, owing to a general neglect of duty, I would, upon the principles of economy, recommend that they be discontinued. Among the many instances of the inutility of those establishments, I shall take the liberty of relating the following fact: Last June, a party of five Indians attacked three men in a canoe, on the Allegheny River, wounded two, and killed the third. The survivors immediately informed the detachment stationed at a neighboring Block-House of their misfortune; but the commanding officer, instead of sending out a party to oppose the enemy, shut himself up in the building, and stationed a sentinel on the top of the house, to give the alarm, should they appear in the neighborhood of the work.”

(2) Pittsburg Gazette, June 23, 1788.
Col. Rec., VIII, 225.

(3) Balch, Letters and Papers, 171.

(4) Pa. Arch., 2nd ser., VI, 771. A letter dated September 3, 1794, from Captain Denny to General Harmar giving a full Description of the mutiny at Fort Le Boeuf.

(5) Ibid, 775. Andrew Ellicott to Governor Mifflin, September 4, 1794: (The season is now so far advanced that the act of assembly as far as regards bounties may be considered as already expended.) “But this I have carefully concealed from the state troops, two thirds of whom at least came out for the express purpose of making improvements. They are already much discontented, and fear they have been imposed upon; and but few men would have been able to manage them until this period as well as Capt. Denny has done.”
formed his duties willingly, arduous though they might be. I can do no better than to quote here the tribute of Captain Walker to his troops. "One third of our men were constantly employed as Guards to the Inhabitants, and, I may affirm, in Harvest the one half were employed the same way, nor can any man in the County say he ever asked a guard (when he had a Just Occasion) and was denied. During this time the Troops were not supplied even with Ration Whiskey, allmost Neaked, for want of Blankets and Cloathes, and yet I have the satisfaction to inform you they done their Duty Cheerfully." (1)

(To be concluded.)

(1) Pa. Arch., 1st ser., VII, 383. Captain Walker was stationed at Fort Muncy during the Revolution.