LIFE AND SERVICES OF COLONEL HENRY BOQUET

BY

HON. EDWARD E. ROBBINS.*

Among the distinguished men who acted a prominent part in the early history of that part of the United States lying west of the Alleghany Mountains and between the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico, between 1754 and the Revolution, none, except perhaps Washington and Forbes, rendered more important services than Colonel Henry Boquet. It is the purpose of this address to give a brief biography of Boquet and a description of the battle of Bushy Run, upon which his fame chiefly rests, with some comments upon its effect on the civilization of the pre-Revolutionary period of our country's history.

No extended biography of Boquet is in existence. Little is known of his life prior to his coming to America. From various sources the following can be stated as the authentic facts of his illustrious career so far as preserved.

Henry Boquet was born at Ralle', a small Swiss town on the northern shore of Lake Geneva in 1719. At the age of seventeen he entered the army of the Low Country and at nineteen was commissioned ensign. After that he served with distinction in the army of the King of Sardinia, in the war against France and Spain. In 1748 he entered the Dutch service, and was employed by the Prince of Orange in occupying the posts lately evacuated by the French in pursuance of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. After this he traveled extensively in Italy in company with Lord Middleton, studying English, and from him he acquired his surprising knowledge of that language. His letters and papers so far as they are preserved show a surprising familiarity with English for one who never had left the continent of Europe until he was approaching middle age. On his return from Italy, Boquet lived several years at The Hague, where he industriously studied his profession and cultivated the friendship of the learned men of that period.

The war between England and France, which had opened disastrously for England in 1755, made it necessary for the English government to send large reenforcements

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To America. To carry out this program the Royal American Regiment was raised for service in the colonies. This body consisted of four battalions of 1,000 men each. Fifty of the officers might be Protestants of foreign birth, while the enlisted men were to be raised largely among the German settlers in America. This plan was adopted, with the hope that it might stir up military enthusiasm among the settlers.

Sir Joseph Yorke, the English Ambassador to The Hague, persuaded Boquet and his friend, Col. Frederick Haldimand, to enter this service. Boquet sailed for America in the summer of 1756. During that period the English officers were advanced generally by influence. Boquet, however, seems to have gained all his promotions by merit and hard service.

No information is available as to Boquet's family. His name was evidently not a distinguished one in Switzerland, nor was his family very prominent. He never married, and although his will disposed of a large landed estate, it does not mention his heirs or relatives.

Boquet with several other officers of the Royal Americans arrived in New York in June, 1756. On November 24, 1756, a battalion of the Royal Americans and two independent companies had arrived in Philadelphia, and over these Col. Boquet was placed in command, and he applied at once to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania for quarters for these troops, stating that they were suffering severely from the cold and had been "cruelly and barbarously treated." Boquet complained to the government of Pennsylvania, which passed an Act of Assembly, authorizing the troops to be billeted in the houses of Philadelphia. A controversy at once arose between the people, the Assembly and the troops, and the government was compelled to ask the Assembly to rescind its action. This early legislation, which was so invaluable at that time, created a lasting impression on Boquet against the colonies. He never used the power given by this law and held it only in terrorem, as appears in his subsequent letters. During the winter of 1756 and 1757 Boquet had no further difficulty with the civil authorities of Philadelphia, and to no point in his career does his good sense appear to greater advantage than in the manner in which he overcame the prejudice of the people of Philadelphia, who were forced to have foreign troops thrust upon
them who were affected with smallpox and other diseases. As time passed on Boquet became a great figure in society in the Quaker City. He was the friend of Chief Justice Allen, Attorney General Chew and Dr. William Smith, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania and of Bartram, the botanist, and many others.

During the years of 1756 and 1757 little progress was made in America by the English arms, but in July, 1757, William Pitt became Prime Minister of Great Britain and all was changed. The discontent that had heretofore reigned in the colonists because they were in constant uncertainty as to the amount of military contributions they would be compelled to make and the object of the same, that were constantly being levied against them, ceased. Pitt understood the causes of America's discontent, and knew what to do.

It was now announced that while New England, New York and New Jersey were expected to assist in the northern portions of the country, Pennsylvania and the south would be looked to for aid in the conquest of the west. England would provide the arms, munitions, tents and equipment, and nothing would be required of the colonies, but to raise a portion of the troops, pay and clothe them, and that Parliament would be urged to reimburse those furnishing the funds. Relying on this promise, Pennsylvania went into the campaign of 1758 with great vigor, and raised 2700 men for the expedition against Fort Duquesne, the strongest French fort west of the Alleghany Mountains. This expedition was put in command of Brig. Gen. John Forbes, a Scotch officer of great merit. Col. Boquet, who had been sent south, was recalled with the Royal Americans and made second in command. The army consisted of 7,000 men, including 2,600 Virginians under Col. George Washington. By July 1, 1758, a large portion of these forces under Boquet had arrived at Fort Bedford. The Virginians under the command of Washington, then a colonel of the Virginia militia, were at Fort Cumberland, thirty miles south. Then arose the famous controversy between Boquet and Washington over the road that should be taken to Fort Duquesne. Washington urged the Braddock road, which had been constructed three years before and was followed by Braddock to the point of his disastrous defeat at Braddock's field, some ten miles from Fort Duquesne, while Bo-
Boquet took a decided stand for the building of a new road westward from Bedford by way of Fort Ligonier and Hannastown. Boquet dreaded the old ill-fated road. The details of this controversy, which are of record, cannot be recounted here. Letters are in existence reflecting upon Washington, which subsequent facts prove were unfair. Boquet, however, won the approval of Forbes, and succeeded in carrying his point, and the new road was built, known in history as the "Forbes Road," about the exact location of which at certain points considerable difference of opinion exists to this day. The partisans of the different roads were very strong in their contentions as to the various locations of this now famous road.

It was during this march through the wilderness from Bedford to Fort Ligonier, that Boquet first displayed his genius as an Indian fighter. He was tireless in drilling his men. It was said of him "that every afternoon he exercised his men in the woods and bushes in a manner of his own invention, which would be of great service in an engagement with the Indians."

It was also stated that he dreaded the moral effect, that would be produced upon his men by their association with the Braddock road, and especially of his ill-fated battlefield, upon which lay the bones of the unfortunate dead, and he afterwards attributed the success of the Forbes expedition, in a great part, to his adoption of the new route.

Finally on September 9, 1758, Washington came up from Wills Creek, now Cumberland, and joined Boquet at Bedford and the march over the mountains to Ligonier began.

The laying out of the road and the construction of Fort Ligonier were under the immediate direction of Boquet, although the selection of the site of Fort Ligonier and its exact plan was adopted at the suggestion of Washington. On these two officers the burden of managing and planning the campaign rested because General Forbes was so ill that he had to be carried on a litter. It would be unfair, however, to detract anything from the military ability of General Forbes, as he was a man of iron will, unconquerable energy and determination, and of superior military genius. He was carried to the end of the journey to Fort Pitt, and afterward back to Philadelphia, where he died in December, 1758, and was buried in chancel of Christ Church.
From Ligonier the expedition advanced against Fort Duquesne, constructing the Forbes Road by way of Loyalhanna Creek, crossing the same near Beatty Station, thence by Hannastown, following Brush Creek and Turtle Creek and entering Fort Duquesne November 25, 1758, which had been blown up and set on fire the day before by the French, and was a smoldering ruin when the troops entered in the evening of that day.

In a letter written from Fort Duquesne by Boquet, on the 25th of November, 1758, to Miss Annie Willing, he related that the French had burned to the ground and destroyed the houses and magazines, leaving no covering for himself and the troops that accompanied him, and added "the glory of our success must after God be allowed to our General, who from the beginning took those wise measures which deprived the French of their chief strength * * * His prudence in all measures in the numerous difficulties he had to overcome deserves the highest praise."

General Forbes immediately changed the name of Fort Duquesne to Fort Pitt in honor of William Pitt.

Boquet was left in command of Fort Pitt and began the reconstruction of the fort.

This part of Boquet's life is only given for the purpose of throwing light upon his subsequent success at Bushy Run, and I pass over his career until the beginning of 1763, when we find him in Philadelphia.

By Boquet's expedition two well established ways were opened across the Alleghany Mountains, the Forbes Road and the Braddock Road. Along these two established routes settlers began to pour over the mountains and into the fertile valleys adjacent to the headwaters of the Ohio. These settlers felled the forests and built permanent improvements and began to cultivate the land. Their coming drove away the game, and their settlements were permanent. The Indians began to perceive that these settlements meant the complete expulsion of the Indians from all that territory; that they could not live where the white men had driven away the game. The settlements along the Great Lakes were springing up as far west as Detroit, and the same changed conditions were rapidly taking place there, to their great astonishment and fear. Pontiac, the most sagacious Indian of his day, succeeded in uniting the western tribes in an attempt to drive out the white men from
all this vast region. His plan has been designated in history as "Pontiac's Conspiracy."

It was planned that the attack should be made on all the forts and settlers during the harvest season of 1763, when not only the settlers should be killed, but their crops destroyed, their houses burned, their forts captured, and the white race driven completely out of the country. It was even Pontiac’s wish that they might be expelled from the continent. Pontiac was the principal chief of the Ottawas. He was the son of a chief. He possessed courage and eloquence in a preeminent degree. His commanding energy, and force of mind and craft, were superior to that of any savage of his time. He was to the Indians of his generation what Washington was to the Americans. At the time of the conspiracy he was about fifty years of age. He had commanded the Ottawas at the attack upon Braddock, and had gained thereby an enviable reputation for bravery, strategy and skill, that made him easily the foremost Indian of his day. He succeeded not only in inducing the Ojibwas and Pottawattomias, who were friendly to his tribe, by the Wyandots, Sanecas and Delawares and several other tribes, fourteen in all, to become parties to his common warfare against the white man. The attack upon the settlers was so well planned, and so perfectly executed that they were not prepared to defend against it. His principal assistant was Guyasutha, a chief of the Senecas. Pontiac had charge of the attack upon Detroit, the strongest English post in the west, and Guyasutha led the attack on Fort Pitt. Had not Pontiac's treachery been disclosed to Captain Gladwyn, the commander of the fort at Detroit, by a young Indian maid with whom he had an acquaintance, and who had acquired a warm attachment for him, Detroit doubtless would have been captured.

On the morning of May 9, 1763, Pontiac began his attack upon Fort Detroit. Every inhabitant found outside of the fort was murdered in cold blood, and at the same time all along the frontier of Pennsylvania, from the Great Lakes to the southern boundary of Virginia, the Indians laid siege to every fort and murdered every settler. Fully 600 Indians were under the command of Pontiac, in his attack upon Fort Detroit. He was aided in this attack by Canadians, who not only counselled and advised, but furnished the warriors under Pontiac with food and provisions.
On May 4, 1763, Simeon Ecuyer, a brave officer of the same nationality as Boquet, was in command of Fort Pitt. That day he sent a letter to Major Gladwyn, advising him that the fort was surrounded by Indians; and on the 27th the attack began on that fort. Ecuyer succeeded in writing a letter to Boquet the same day, in which he said: "My garrison consists of 330 men all counted, 104 women, 106 children, total 540 mouths, of whom 420 receive provisions from the king." He added: "We are so crowded in the fort that I fear disease and in spite of every care I cannot keep the place as clean as I should like. Besides the smallpox is among us; and I have therefore caused a hospital to be built under the drawbridge, out of range of musket shot. * * * I am determined to hold my post, spare my men, and never expose them without necessity. This, I think, is what you require of me."

Every fortified post established or held by the English, except Detroit, Fort Pitt and Ligonier, were captured by the Indians, and the troops with rare exceptions were murdered. Le Boeuf, Venango, Presque Isle, La Bay upon Lake Michigan, St. Josephs upon the river of that name, Miamis upon the Miamis River, Ouchtanon upon the Ouabache, Sandusky and Michilimackinac had all been captured, and Ligonier and Fort Pitt were entirely cut off from communication with the rest of the world. The settlers were driven from their homes as far east as Carlisle. Their houses were burned, their stock driven away and killed, their crops destroyed. It seemed as if all the white settlers were doomed to be driven back across the Susquehanna, if not ultimately across the Delaware. The success had so emboldened the Indians, and disheartened the settlers, that nothing appeared to stand between them and utter extermination. Some were murdered in cold blood, others were burned; the most cruel, relentless and revengeful punishment was visited upon all.

The cruelty of this campaign was carried to such an extent that some of the prisoners captured near Detroit were eaten by the Indians at a form of war feast as a superstitious rite, as they considered that this would increase their courage and hardihood. Such were the terrible conditions of the white settlers in Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia when Col. Boquet was summoned by Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in
North America, to organize the expedition against the Indians and to rescue Fort Ligonier and Fort Pitt. At that time the Commander-in-Chief was almost without an army. All the armed forces from Canada had been sent home. Nothing remained but to gather the scattered regiments together that had lately arrived from the West Indies and were sick and diseased from service in the tropics.

Boquet was at this time colonel of the First Battalion of Royal Americans, and had his headquarters in Philadelphia. He had a fine knowledge of Indian warfare. His experience with Forbes had made him easily the foremost Indian fighter of his day.

Sir Jeffrey Amherst possessed some of the traits of Braddock; stern, obstinate and phlegmatic, he refused to believe that the Indian uprising was worthy of notice.

On June 4th Boquet received a letter from Captain Ecuyer, which portrayed graphically the real conditions that existed at that post, and told of the widespread desolation wrought by the Indians. Amherst, on the other hand, wrote a characteristic letter, in which he said, among other things: "Fort Pitt could never be in any danger from such a wretched enemy."

Boquet understood the peril of the situation, and advised the abandonment of the outlying posts at Venango and Le Boeuf, and the concentration of the forces at Fort Pitt. This Amherst refused to consider, taking the position that it would induce the Indians to think they were more formidable than they really were. Finally on June 25th Amherst wrote to Boquet that he had ordered the 42nd and a portion of the 77th Highlanders, consisting of 214 men, with their officers, to accompany him on an expedition against the Indians for the relief of Fort Pitt, adding: "Should the whole race of Indians take arms against us I can do no more." Boquet had by this time proceeded as far as Lancaster, and on receiving this letter replied from his encampment near Carlisle on July 3rd, advising his commander of the loss of Presque Isle, Le Boeuf and Venango. The correspondence shows that Amherst proposed the same tactics with the same arrogance that had characterized Braddock in his Indian warfare. It was at about this time that Amherst apparently awoke to the gravity of the situation and wrote to Boquet, advising him to inoculate the Indians with smallpox, by the use of blankets. This
seems to have brought the method of warfare within the range of the barbarous, cruel and outrageous methods used in the present war by the Germans. Boquet's reply to this suggestion of Amherst's seemed to discourage such cruel methods, but it is recorded that smallpox during the war did break out among the Indians who besieged Fort Pitt and decimated the Mingoes, Delawares and Shawanes to a frightful extent. When Boquet reached Carlisle he found every building and house in the little town crowded with families driven from their homes by the terror of the Indians; wives made widows, children made orphans, wailing in anguish and despair. On July 13th he reported to his commander that the list of people known to have been killed was increasing very fast, that the desolation of so many families reduced to the last extremity of want and misery, the despair of those who had lost their parents, relations and friends and children who filled the streets was indescribable. Boquet was full of anxiety for the safety of Fort Bedford, Fort Ligonier and Fort Pitt. Capt. Louis Qurrey was in command at Bedford, Capt. Archibald Blaine at Ligonier and Capt. Simeon Ecuyer at Fort Pitt. Qurrey had no garrison worthy the name, and yet the inhabitants for many miles around had gathered at the fort for protection. No word could be obtained from any of these forts. The fate that awaited them can well be imagined by what occurred at Venango. This fort was besieged by the Indians. A large body of Senecas gained an entrance under the pretense of friendship, fell upon the garrison, murdered all of them except Lieut. Gordon, who was burned over a slow fire for several successive nights until he died in great agony. They then set fire to the fort, burned it to the ground and departed. Not a man remained alive to tell the fate of Venango. An Indian who took part in this treachery disclosed it afterward.

Boquet began his march from Carlisle on July 10, 1763, leaving behind him a miserable crowd of refugees quartered around the fort, who were then in a half-starved condition. His little army was composed of the remnant of the 22nd and 77th Highlanders who had been weakened by service and disease. Sixty of them were too weak to walk and had to be transported on wagons. He drove with him 200 head of cattle and a 100 sheep for food, with a train of 350 pack-horses and a number of wagons bearing supplies for the re-
life of Forts Ligonier and Pitt. His entire military force, however, did not include over 500 men counting those that were sick and those capable of service. To proceed meant new dangers for this little army of weary, worn and sick Highlanders unaccompanied by a single provincial soldier, marching away from the desolation that prevailed on the frontier at Carlisle and disappearing in the limitless forests to the west, uncertain as to whether they would ever reach their destination and rescue Forts Ligonier and Pitt.

Before them lay the great and unexplored forests infested with Indians. They knew that ahead of them was the battlefield on which Braddock and his soldiers had met defeat and where a greater number had been killed eight years before than their entire present force. They knew that every fort had either fallen or was besieged. They did not know that Ligonier and Fort Pitt were yet in the possession of the English. Furthermore they were unaccustomed to Indian warfare, and no man among them except their commander had the slightest conception of the stupendous task that confronted them. They arrived at Fort Bedford on the 25th of July and learned that 18 settlers had been murdered in the immediate neighborhood of the fort, and that all the settlers roundabout were gathered there for protection. Burned houses and desolation met them on every side. They discovered that Ligonier was besieged and that it was doubtful whether it could hold out until relief arrived.

Boquet also learned that no word had been received from Fort Pitt for weeks, other than that it was besieged. Here he secured thirty frontiersmen, who were driven in from their farms and who agreed to accompany his expedition as guides, the Highlanders being unable to penetrate the woods without becoming lost. This was the first colonial military aid furnished him on an expedition that was conspicuously for the relief of the settlers. Here he also learned that every messenger from Ligonier to Fort Pitt had either been murdered or driven back. He immediately selected thirty of the Highlanders, with guides, and ordered them to push forward with all speed, by unfrequented paths, to the relief of Ligonier. These men reached Ligonier the next day after running a gauntlet of Indian fire, much to the relief of Blaine, who was holding out against great odds. After several days' rest at Bedford, Boquet
himself pushed on for the relief of Ligonier and Fort Pitt. The road over the mountains had been roughly built by Forbes eight years before. It was difficult to move the wagons on account of the rocks, roots and deep washings in the road, but Boquet had aided in its construction, and knew every foot thoroughly.

The July sun was exceedingly hot and oppressive. The animals could scarcely be urged forward, but marching on with all energy and enthusiasm, the expedition reached Ligonier on August 2, 1763, and raised the siege.

I wish to pause long enough here to say that Fort Ligonier had been built near the site of an Indian village by Washington, assisted by Col. John Armstrong and Col. Boquet in 1758, and that part of Forbes' expedition had wintered there. It was garrisoned until the close of the Whisky Insurrection in 1794. It was attacked vigorously by the French and Indians just after the disastrous defeat of Major Grant at Grant's Hill, near Fort Duquesne, in 1758. It was besieged by the Indians in 1763 most ferociously when relieved by Boquet. Washington asserts under his own hand, that it was in a battle with the Indians at this place that he was in the greatest personal jeopardy in all of his long military career; and although the fort was several times attacked, assaulted and besieged, it never surrendered. It was the home of Gen. Arthur St. Clair, and is still the home of a patriotic, stirring, liberty-loving people. The Sons of the American Revolution have marked with a fitting tablet, erected in the public square at Ligonier, the historic events that occurred there, and modern travelers passing over the Lincoln Highway may read if they wish about its historic importance.

Boquet arrived at Ligonier on August 2nd and rested three days. The report that he received warned him that he was in danger of being ambushed, and that the condition of Fort Pitt was such that he should go forward with all speed. Hence he left all his wagons and heavy baggage at Ligonier, together with his sick and disabled men, and such equipage as would impede a rapid march to Fort Pitt, and moved forward with his army, now reduced to 500 men, a few cattle, with 340 pack horses to carry the baggage and provisions that he proposed to take with him. He pressed forward with great rapidity, the first day covering a distance of seventeen miles.
Boquet's familiarity with the road led him to plan carefully about crossing over the defiles at Turtle Creek, where the high hills and steep valleys rendered it a point formidable for attack from the Indians. He resolved to pass through this narrow valley by night. He well knew, however, that he could not attempt to do this at the close of a day of toil and severe marching, so he endeavored to reach Turtle Creek in the afternoon and rest there until dark and move forward in the night. At about 1 o'clock in the afternoon he reached Bushy Run, a branch of Brush Creek, and a halt was ordered. Sentinels were posted at different points around the camp and the troops were allowed to rest under the trees, seeking shade from the scorching sun of the hot August afternoon.

Scarcely had they lain down when a sudden volley of musketry in front made every man spring to his feet and reach for his rifle. In a few moments the savage war whoop sounded, and the rattle of musketry at different points warned the men that they were attacked from all sides by Indians. The advance line was quickly hurled back but the Highlanders formed in companies, and found it an easy matter to drive the Indians away. As soon as they charged the Indians fired from behind trees bushes and rocks, and disappeared. Charging now on one side and now on the other, the troops easily chased the Indians away, but as soon as they retired they were followed by the Indians who poured their fire upon the troops, who were now being formed in companies around the horses, baggage and cattle, that had been driven to the center of the camp. Boquet observed that the savages invariably recoiled before the bayonet and ordered a charge wherever the fire was hottest. In sections they steadily advanced at different points, and were always successful in driving the Indians back, but the ring of fire was elastic, springing back to its place the moment the pressure was removed. Thus they fought on hour after hour, and although the Highlanders carried every point upon which they charged, not the slightest ground was gained. The Indians continued fighting from behind trees and in ambush, following up their assailants as soon as they retired. Their assaults became fiercer and bolder and their rifle fire more deadly. Had Boquet held his troops massed, as Braddock had done seven years before, the conflict would soon have ended in the massacre of his entire
command, but he kept them constantly moving from point to point, and thus distracted the enemy, and suffered less loss than otherwise would have been the case. Still each charge was followed by the loss of some of those in his command, and as the commander looked around and saw how thickly the woods were strewn with his men, either dead or wounded, he grew more distressed, and longed, like Wellington at Waterloo, for the setting of the sun. He knew that his forces were rapidly melting away, and that by this method of warfare his defeat or utter annihilation was only a question of time. If he could hold on until dark he knew he would have a respite and time to form new plans. He was convinced that the Indians would not risk the charge of the bayonet in the night, which they held in even greater dread than in daylight. As the shadows began to fall and darkness came on, the girdle of hostile fire gradually slackened and finally ceased altogether, and the silence was only broken by the moans and shrieks of the wounded. These were carefully gathered together and laid on blankets under the trees and surrounded by a barricade of bags of flour and baggage, while the dead were left unburied where they had fallen. The night that followed was a sad one for the weary troops and without fire to cheer their gloom they sank to rest upon their arms. The rapid march of seventeen miles, followed by seven hours of uninterrupted fighting had completely worn out the Highlanders, to whom all the scenes, as well as the fighting, were strange and new. Forming a circle around their convoy they stretched themselves on the ground, ready at the first alarm to spring to their feet and renew the conflict. Not a drop of water could be procured where they were compelled to encamp. This to those who were well was a terrible deprivation on that hot August night, but to the wounded, whose thirst was increased by their loss of blood, the torture was indescribable.

It was a night of anxious suspense and gloomy forebodings, and as Boquet sat and pondered on his prospects for the morrow, in the midst of the wounded, listening only to their shrieks and groans, thinking of the melancholy fate of Braddock near this spot seven years before, he was forced to the conclusion that his situation was perilous and perhaps hopeless. He could not advance, and clear the road in front at the point of the bayonet, without abandoning his
convoy and the wounded, while to stay and defend them was certain destruction. Whichever way he turned, defeat or disaster seemed inevitable. Still nothing further could be done but wait and see what the morning might bring forth.

It was during this time that he wrote a letter to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, that was discovered long afterward, which shows the characters of the man. I quote it in part:

"Whatever our fate may be I thought it necessary to give your Excellency this early information that you may at all events take such measures as you think proper with the Provinces, for their own safety, and the effectual relief of Fort Pitt, as in case of another engagement I fear insurmountable difficulties in protecting and transporting our provisions, being already so much weakened by the losses of this day in men and horses, besides the additional necessity of carrying the wounded, whose situation is truly deplorable.

"I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the assistance I have received from Major Campbell during this long action nor express my admiration of the cool and steady behavior of the troops, who did not fire a shot without orders, and drove the enemy from their posts with fixed bayonets. The conduct of the officers is much above my praises."

The short summer night, though long enough to the beleaguered force at length passed, and the gray light of dawn appeared above the tree tops. But before the shadows below had wholly disappeared, the loud tap of the drum brought the weary troops to their feet and the next moment the forest rang with the war whoop of the savages, who still surrounded the camp a few hundred feet distant. Rapidly flitting from tree to tree, they closed in on every side, and began to renew their fire on the besieged army. The Highlanders charged as before and forced them back. They disappeared behind the trees only to reappear and press harder on the opposite side, and the scenes of the day before were repeated again and again, and the savage rush was repelled by the steady charge of the bayonet. The Indians however, by skulking behind the trees, defeated every attempt to bring them into close conflict. By this method they avoided serious disaster to themselves, while the troops furnished a conspicuous mark. The destructive fire of the savages was easier to bear than the burning thirst that consumed the men. The long struggle of the previous afternoon followed by the hot night, had made their thirst most excruciating, and the struggle of the morning intensified it to such a degree that they were driven to madness,
and thought of victory only that they might obtain water. Boquet stood in the midst of the field, keeping in touch with every movement. He surveyed the scene with a feeling of dread as he clearly saw that unless the nature of the conflict was changed, it could have but one termination. His little band was so decimated that soon the dead and wounded would outnumber the living. Each time that the companies returned from a successful charge their number was diminished, until their ranks began to assume the form of mere skeletons. The gloomy aspect of affairs was rendered still more hopeless by the apparent steady increase in numbers and boldness of the foes. After leaving the siege at Fort Pitt they had come here to the rescue of their savage friends, and furnished two strong warriors for every one that had been slain. The woods on every side was alive with shouting, yelling and screeching demons. Some of the Indians in broken English used insulting vulgarity and profanity, yelling from behind trees, taunting the troops and making the woods ring. Unable to move either backward or forward, on account of his convoy and his wounded, Boquet was perplexed and undecided as to what course he should take in his now desperate situation. The savages seeing his powerlessness grew bolder, pressed closer and closer until their bullets hit the horses, causing them to break away and run violently among the troops, and even out among the Indians. The drivers, unable to control them, sought shelter behind the trees and hid wherever they could. These signs of disorder Boquet knew, must sooner or later affect the morale of his troops and dishearten them. It was then that he rose to the situation, and displayed the ability, that distinguished him as a great military genius.

The ground occupied by the troops was a slight eminence heavily wooded on the top, where the convoy and wounded were collected. The Indians, attacking the camp on all sides at the same time, rendered this arrangement necessary. Two companies had been thrown out in the direction of Fort Pitt, where the struggle was fiercest. Boquet conceived the idea that if he could draw the Indians into a compact mass, and lead them to believe that they were charging to success, and then fall upon them with the bayonet, he could overwhelm and defeat them. To execute this military strategy he ordered two companies to fall back within the circle, and the companies that held either side to
deploy as skirmishers as if to close the gap opened by the retreat. The movement thus made would, he believed, be considered by the savages as the retreat of his whole army. Two other companies withdrawing were directed to fall back until by the movement they got under cover of the hill, where concealed, they were to wheel and quickly make a circuit in the woods and then fall on the flank of the savages by a bayonet charge, if, as Boquet supposed, the Indians would rush forward to attack the camp through the line of skirmishers. In the meantime he had moved two other companies to the opposite side and placed them in ambush on the other flank. The ruse succeeded, the Indians who observed the retreating movement and the skirmish line giving way, pressed forward and seeing that they had a clear front, rushed forward in great numbers. The few left to hold the line had gradually retired, until they had drawn their pursuers opposite the two companies that had marched back around the hill to attack them on the flank. The companies to the left, under Maj. Campbell, moved forward at double quick and came down from behind the hill upon the savages with a fierce bayonet charge. The Indians were completely taken by surprise. They wheeled and met the charge firmly and actually for a time halted the Highlanders. The other two companies on the right fired from the bushes an enfilading volley and charged forward with fixed bayonets. The Indians were dumbfounded and thrown into consternation, by being attacked on both flanks. They became terror stricken and fled, leaving on the battlefield sixty warriors dead, besides a large number of wounded whom they carried away with them. The charge was followed up by the troops with great vigor, and in a few moments, not an Indian was to be seen on that side of the camp. The Indians on the other side of the circle, seeing the slaughter of their companies, fled in consternation from the battlefield.

Thus ended the Battle of Bushy Run, fought on the 5th and 6th of August, 1763, and the road to Fort Pitt was open. It is singular that the only two severe battles fought around the two forts, Pitt and Detroit, in this war, should have had names so similar—Bushy Run and Bloody Run. They were alike however in name only, for in the latter the Indians defeated the English and Americans with great slaughter. Bushy Run was the first great victory won by the white man over the Indian. Parkman, describing it,
said: “The battle of Bushy Run was one of the best-contested actions ever fought between white men and Indians.” How many dead and wounded Indians were carried off is unknown, but three chiefs lay dead at the point where the final charge occurred.

The victory did not come too soon, for Boquet found when he assembled his troops that out of less than 400 effective men who entered the battle, fifty had been killed outright, sixty wounded, many of whom died afterwards, being over one-fourth of his entire command. The camp on that August afternoon presented a sad appearance. Boquet surveyed the bloody and trampled field and felt that his little force had scarcely escaped a terrible doom. Over 100 of his brave Highlanders lay scattered around, some stretched in death, and others reclining against logs and trees, bleeding from their wounds. This loss prevented him from taking up his march and pressing forward to Fort Pitt. He was compelled to remain four days, during which time he dug graves under the trees for the dead, and constructed litters upon which to carry the wounded. The Indians he left to rot where they fell. On the fourth day he took up his march with the remnant of his little army, carrying the wounded with him, for the relief of Fort Pitt, where he arrived on August 9th. His arrival at Fort Pitt found the garrison on the verge of starvation. It is true that over the log enclosure the English flag was still flying, which was a welcome sight to the weary troops, and they in turn brought joy to the distressed garrison. It would have been impossible for Fort Pitt to hold out forty-eight hours longer, and had it fallen, dominion over the whole region from Bedford west would probably have been changed.

The importance of the battle of Bushy Run was far reaching. It established the dominion of England permanently throughout Western Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland. It cleared the forests of savage warfare and brought about a permanent peace. It completely disheartened the Indians, it broke up the coalition formed by Pontiac, and for the time being completely disheartened and discouraged the wily Guyasutha. In fact, it may be fairly stated, without exaggeration, judged by results, that it was the greatest victory ever won by white men over Indians.
As a result of this battle, Boquet, who always showed a fine grasp of every situation in which he was placed, followed up his success by marching the next year into the heart of the Indian Territory, as far as the Muskingum Valley in the present State of Ohio, and received from the Indians 206 white men, women and children who had been held in captivity, and made treaties with all the Indians that had been engaged in Pontiac's Conspiracy. This resulted in a permanent peace and established finally his reputation as not only a great soldier, but as the greatest diplomatic genius of our colonial period.

He returned to Fort Pitt, where he remained for some time, and then proceeded to Philadelphia, where he was signalty honored by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, as is shown by the following written testimonial, and his reply thereto:

"IN ASSEMBLY, JANUARY 15, 1765, A. M.

To the Honorable HENRY BOQUET, Esq.,
Commander-in-Chief of His MAJESTY'S Forces in the Southern Department of AMERICA:
The Address of the Representatives of the Freemen of the Province of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met:

SIR:

The representatives of the freemen of the Province of Pennsylvania, in general assembly met, being informed that you intend shortly to embark for England, and moved with a due sense of the important services you have rendered His Majesty, his northern colonies in general, and to this Province in particular, during our late wars with the French and barbarous Indians, in the remarkable victory over the savage enemy, united to oppose you, near Bushy Run, in August 1763, when on your march for the relief of Pittsburgh, owing, under God, to your intrepidy and superior skill in command, together with the bravery of your officers and little army; as also in your late march to the country of the savage nations, with the troops under your direction; thereby striking terror through the numerous Indian tribes around you; laying a foundation for a lasting as well as honourable peace with them, and rescuing, from savage captivity, upwards of two hundred of our Christian brethren, prisoners among them; these eminent services and your constant attention to the civil rights of His Majesty's subjects in this Province, demand, Sir, the grateful tribute of thanks from all good men; and therefore, we, the representatives of the freemen of Pennsylvania, unanimously for ourselves, and in behalf of all the people of this Province, do re-
turn you most sincere and hearty thanks for these your great services, wishing you a safe and pleasant voyage to England, with a kind and gracious reception from His Majesty.

Signed, by order of the House,

'JOSEPH FOX, Speaker.'"

Colonel Boquet’s answer was as follows:

“To the Honourable the Representatives of the Freemen of the Province of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met:

Gentlemen:

With a heart impressed with the most lively sense of gratitude, I return you my humble and sincere thanks for the honour you have done me in your polite address of the 15th of January, transmitted me to New York by your speaker.

Next to the approbation of His Sacred Majesty, and my superior officers, nothing could afford me higher pleasure than your favourable opinion of my conduct in the discharge of those military commands with which I have been intrusted.

Gratitude as well as justice demand of me to acknowledge that the aids granted by the legislature of this Province and the constant assistance and support afforded me by the honourable the Governor and Commissioners in the late expedition, have enabled me to recover so many of His Majesty’s subjects from a cruel captivity, and be the happy instrument of restoring them to freedom and liberty. To you, therefore, gentlemen, is the greater share of that merit due, which you are generously pleased on this occasion to impute to my services.

Your kind testimony of my constant attention to the civil rights of His Majesty’s subjects in this Province, does me singular honour, and calls for the return of my warmest acknowledgments.

Permit me to take this public opportunity of doing justice to the officers of the regular and provincial troops and the volunteers who have served with me, by declaring that under Divine Providence the repeated successes of His Majesty’s arms against a savage enemy are principally to be ascribed to their courage and resolution and to their perseverance under the severest hardships and fatigue.

I sincerely wish prosperity and happiness to the Province, and have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, Gentlemen,

Your Most obedient and most humble servant

HENRY BOQUET.

February 4, 1765.”

The Assembly recommended Boquet to the king for promotion, but there was great doubt whether, as an alien, he was capable by law of holding higher rank. It was probably for this reason, that on March 3, 1765, he was naturalized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in accordance
with a late act of Parliament. Still he hardly hoped for promotion, as appears from the following letter to Benjamin Chew, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, which must have been written some time in March of that year: "My good friend must be the first to know the unexpected favor said to have been conferred upon me by His Majesty, in appointing me Brigadier-General, as I have it not from authority, but by private letters of my friends, dated Feb. 13th, I would not choose any one but you to be acquainted with it." The good news was confirmed to everybody's satisfaction.

Boquet expected to be called to England, but he was ordered to Pensacola instead, to take command of the king's forces in the Southern Department of America. He arrived at this most unhealthy post on August 23, 1765, the deadliest season of the year. He there contracted yellow fever and on September 2nd was dead, "lamented by his friends and regretted universally." He sleeps in an unknown and unmarked grave in the vicinity of Pensacola. The battlefield upon which was accomplished an event that had such a portentous bearing upon our future, is also unmarked. The traveler who views the two farms over which the battle was fought will look in vain for any mark or monument to show the place or disclose the events that occurred there. Publicity should be given to the character of Boquet by a proper monument, as he was not only a great military genius and Indian fighter, but he also possessed good sense and diplomatic accumen to a remarkable degree. Indeed he is worthy of a splendid monument at the hands of the people of Western Pennsylvania, and the battlefield of Bushy Run should no longer go unmarked and uncommemorated. The time has arrived when this long neglected service should be performed and a suitable monument erected on the battlefield of Bushy Run that would alike com' memorate that event and perpetuate the name and fame of Brig. Gen. Henry Boquet.