

## WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA AND THE MORRILL TARIFF\*

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The tariff has always been a controversial subject in American politics. As sections developed and their activities changed, their ideas concerning the tariff also changed. The Southern states so long as they hoped to build up an industrial system, tended toward protection, but when such a system based on slave labor was found to be an impossibility, they upheld free-trade. This change took place in 1828 and from that time on free-trade and extension of slavery became the cornerstones of Southern principles. (1) The cause of this about face of the South may be found in the fact that protection seemed to benefit in a special way the manufactures of Pennsylvania, New York and New England. (2) These states were the hot-beds of abolitionist agitation and Southern antipathy would naturally be aroused. The industrial success of the Northern states and the failure of the South to establish manufactures was the cause of much jealousy and of the growth of a desire to hinder the North by agitation of a free-trade program. (3)

Following the 'Tariff of Abominations' and the attempted Nullification of South Carolina in 1832, the Compromise Tariff of 1833 was introduced whereby the rates were gradually reduced until 1842 when a protective tariff was passed. This tariff remained in effect until 1846 when a tariff greatly lowering existing rates was passed by Southern men led by Robert J. Walker, then Secretary of the Treasury. (4)

The next tariff legislation was the Act of 1857 which was the closest approach to the free trade ideal in our tariff history. (5) This Bill had generally lower rates than the tariff of 1846 but because of the great number of raw mater-

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ials put on the free list it was supported by the manufacturing states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New England. (6) This fact was later used by the Democrats of Pennsylvania to show that the record of the Republicans on the tariff question was not consistent.

During these years of free-trade the country prospered greatly and the fact was established that a protective tariff is not necessary for the growth of our manufacturing industries. (7) The drift toward free trade had gone far and it is impossible to determine to what extent it would have gone had it not been checked by the financial depression of 1857 and by the necessity growing out of the Civil War. (8)

Even Pennsylvania had ceased to a large extent protectionist agitation during these years. The Panic of 1857, which followed directly upon the passage of the new tariff act, and which particularly affected the iron producing sections, was a potent factor in strengthening the cause of protection. (9)

The Panic was attributed by the North entirely to the free-trade policy then in existence and opposition began to form for the first time in a decade.

The Panic of 1857 in itself was short-lived but its financial results were severe. (10) Naturally Pennsylvania was among the states most affected. Her trend toward protection is seen in the attitude of her President, James Buchanan, who was elected on the free-trade platform of 1856 but was active in agitating a tariff which would afford incidental protection.

In his first annual message of December 1857 he emphasized the serious financial condition of the country, (11) but favored no change in the tariff legislation as "the tariff of 1857 has been in operation for so short a period and under circumstances so unfavorable to a just development of its result as a revenue measure that it would be inexpedient, at least at present, to undertake a revision." (12)

In his message of the next year he advocated incidental protection afforded by a revenue tariff which "would at the present moment to some extent increase the confidence of the manufacturing interests and give a fresh impulse to our reviving business." (13)

In his last message he continued the advocacy of an increased tariff stating that "it is quite evident that the financial necessities of the government will require a modification of the tariff during the present session." (14)

Buchanan was undoubtedly influenced by the public opinion of his state, (15) where all parties were unanimous in upholding the tariff and were asking for increased rates.

Business conditions revived during the three years following the panic and by 1860 another season of prosperity had begun and would undoubtedly have continued had it not been checked by political trouble and the war. (16)

In this year Pennsylvania once more regained her position and produced one-half of the iron made in the whole country. (17) The *Pittsburgh Dispatch* for January 2nd, 1860, in reviewing the past year, states that "in Pittsburgh manufacturing interests have revived, commerce and trade extended and a public spirit has developed in the erection of substantial business blocks unprecedented in our past history." (18)

Protectionist agitation did not cease and the *Dispatch* of the 25th of January advises its readers "to look out for a visit from tight times. He comes oftener than seven year locusts and the Asiatic cholera. Nobody knows exactly how to deal with him. Some people prescribe high tariffs, some specie currency and others greater caution and economy. But no one takes the prescription. We have free-trade, paper funds and general extravagance." (19)

As a result of this continued agitation on the part of the Keystone and other manufacturing states the Morrill Tariff Bill was introduced into the House in March 1860. Politics entered largely into the introduction of the Bill at this time. Taussig, in his *Tariff History*, says: "It was introduced undoubtedly with the intention of attracting to the Republican party at the approaching presidential election, votes in Pennsylvania and other states that had protectionist leanings." (20)

The Bill was introduced by Justin S. Morrill, a Representative from Vermont and a member of the Ways and Means Committee. "Mr. Morrill was eminently well-fitted to prepare a tariff bill. He had been engaged in trade and com-

merce, was a man of sound judgment, perfectly impartial and honest. Representing a small agriculture state, he was not biased by sectional feeling or interests of his constituents. He regarded tariff not only as a method of taxation but as a method of protection of the existing industries in the United States with a view to encouraging and increasing domestic production." (21)

Mr. Morrill realized that there was no chance of passing a strong protectionist bill as the Senate was Democratic. (22) In his explanation of the Bill in the House he emphasized that "no prohibitory duties have been aimed at; but to place the people upon a level of fair competition with the rest of the world is thought to be no more than reasonable." (23) The principal argument for the Morrill Bill was not the need of protection but of revenue. (24)

The first part of the Bill called for "the payment of outstanding Treasury notes and to authorize a loan." (25) The loan was not to exceed twenty millions and was to be used only for appropriations made by law and to liquidate the outstanding Treasury notes issued during the crisis of 1857. (26)

The most important feature of the Bill was to increase the revenue. The increase was to be brot about chiefly thru the change from ad valorem to specific rates. (27) This change was in line with the recommendations of President Buchanan (28) and therefore met the approval of all Pennsylvania's Democratic Representatives.

According to the provisions of the Bill, duties on sugar, spirits, cigars, tobacco, iron, coal, wool and its products and numerous other articles were specific with a small ad valorem duty added in some few instances. The tariff was further simplified by fixing three schedules for articles upon which ad valorem duty was placed, making the duty ten, twenty, and thirty percent according to the classification of the article. The free list was quite extensive including asphalt, cocoa, coffee, tea and cotton. (29) Tho the Bill was not in a strict sense a protective measure, the change from ad-valorem to specific rates afforded incidental protection and secured the revenue against false and fraudulent invoices.

The Bill does not hold a place with the other great tariff bills of our financial history due to the fact that it was superseded by the Act of August 5th, 1860 before its results could be determined. (30) It is significant, however; it marked the end toward free trade and the beginning of protectionist legislation. Had it not been for the engrossing political struggles at this time the Morrill Bill would have marked an era in history. (31)

The Bill is also significant because of its political effect. It was doubtless introduced to attract votes to the Republican party. (32) In this the Bill was successful as the united stand of the Republicans for the Bill in the House showed them to be the better tariff party and determined to a large extent the vote in Pennsylvania.

The Bill, passed after secession, exerted an international effect in that it had some influence upon relationship between Great Britain and the United States. A protective tariff would naturally antagonize Europe especially as the Confederacy supported free-trade legislation.

An editorial in the *London Times* emphasized this fact; "It will not be our fault if the inopportune legislation of the North combined with the reciprocity of wants between ourselves and the South should bring about considerable modification in our relations with America." (33) This fact is given further force by a letter from John Lathrop Motley, in which he wrote, "I am obliged to say that there has been a change in English sympathy since the passing of the Morrill Tariff Bill. That measure has done more than any commissioner from the Southern Republic could do to alienate the feelings of the English people towards the United States." (34)

The Confederate agents used the opposition to protection to advantage in their endeavors for recognition. They went so far as to state that it was the protective tariff, upon which the North insisted, that made it necessary for the South to secede. (35) Of course in the final analysis these facts exerted small influence, but they are injected here to show the importance of the tariff at this time.

The Morrill Bill is unique in several ways: first in that it was to an extent a protective measure, passed when pro-

tective sentiment was confined to a few states, and made a law by a President who was elected on a free-trade platform; second, that it met with such strong opposition as to make necessary numerous amendments which so changed it that its author was inclined to abandon it; (36) and third, that it was not passed until Southern Senators had withdrawn from Congress. (37)

In the following history of the Bill in the House and Senate I have endeavored first to give such general facts in regard to the Bill as will show the opposition in either House and the reasons for it and then to deal especially with the position of Western Pennsylvania's Representatives and Pennsylvania's Senators on the Bill.

The Morrill Bill met with much opposition in the House and would have in all probability failed if it had not been for the successful management of John Sherman, Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means. (38)

The first attempt to introduce the Bill was made by Mr. Morrill on March 12th. After the reading of the title there was much discussion. The question was asked by Mr. Houston of Alabama, who became one of the great opponents of the Bill, "Is this a Tariff Bill?" Mr. Morrill answered; "For that and other purposes." He then moved that the rules be suspended so that he could report the Bill. The vote was taken, but a two third vote was necessary, and as this was not procured the bill was not reported. The whole Pennsylvania delegation voted for suspension. (39)

On the next day Mr. Sherman endeavored to introduce the Bill. Messers Cobb, McQueen, and Houston, all Southern Democrats, objected on the grounds that the appropriation bills should be introduced first. After much discussion the Bill was not reported on this ground. (40) Mr. Morrill finally succeeded in reporting the Bill on March 19th and having it referred to the Committee of the Whole and ordered to be printed. (41) On March 28th Mr. Sherman offered a resolution that the Bill be taken up for discussion on April 4th and continued until disposed of. He gave warning that he intended to rush the Bill. (42)

On April 5th the House, in the Committee of the Whole, discussed the Bill after a number of other bills had been

passed over. (43) The Bill was referred to briefly almost every day but nothing definite was done. On April 23rd, Mr. Morrill in a long address defended the Bill. (44) This address has been referred to above and contained elaborate arguments as to the necessity of the Bill for revenue and also numerous tables and data which showed the advisability of specific duties.

After this address the debate became general. Numerous amendments were prepared and presented. Among them was one by Mr. Florence, a Pennsylvania Democrat (45) who proposed numerous changes, practically reverting to the rates of 1846. Nothing was done following this suggestion.

Beginning with May 7th the debate became hotly contested. Mr. Sherman was untiring in his efforts for the Bill and tried all means to prevent the numerous amendments which were changing its nature. On the 7th he addressed the House. He said in part: "In my judgment Mr. Morrill's Bill is a great improvement on the tariff of 1857. It is more certain, it is more definite. It gives specific duties. It is more simple. It conforms to our decimal currency and duties under it are easily calculated." (46)

On the 8th there were numerous attempts by Houston of Alabama and Millson of Virginia to change the character of the Bill. (47) The argument was based on the inadvisability of protection. Mr. Morrill in answer to Houston upheld the Bill at length, proving advisability of protection by statistics. (48) Mr. Houston claimed that the protection of iron was unnecessary. Mr. Stevens of Pennsylvania opposed these statements showing by statistics that the iron industry in Pennsylvania was failing. (49)

The next days were taken up by filibustering, the Democrats using all means available to prevent a vote. The amendments were so numerous and the Bill so changed that Mr. Morrill was disposed to abandon it to its fate. At this juncture the parliamentary skill of Mr. Sherman saved the Bill. Mr. Sherman suggested to Mr. Morrill that he offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute. To that amendment Sherman offered as an amendment a bill which embodied nearly all the original bill as reported. (50) This

brot matters to a head as no other amendments could be made. A vote was taken on May 11th after filibustering and political argument had postponed it for several days. The final vote on the Morrill Bill was Yeas 105 and Nays 64. (51)

I have not so far referred in the history of the Bill in the House to the part taken by Western Pennsylvania Representatives in the debate. From the *Congressional Globe* I conclude that the Representatives were of mediocre caliber as they took no active part in the discussions, tho they voted consistently, regardless of party, for the Bill. Of the Pennsylvania Representatives twenty were Republicans and five were Democrats. (52) All supported the Bill. Of the Representatives from Western Pennsylvania Steward of Mercer, Hall of Warren, Babbitt of Erie, Moorhead and McKnight of Pittsburgh were Republicans while Montgomery of Washington was a Democrat. (53) Of these, Montgomery, Moorhead and McKnight were the only ones who took any part whatever in the discussions.

James T. Moorhead, Representative from the 22nd district, made a speech on March 8th, before the introduction of the Bill, in which he made a strong plea for protection. (54) He showed that the excess of imports over exports was steadily increasing and asked for a tariff that would foster and protect our own manufacturers and give employment to our labor at home. He upheld the Republican measures of harbor improvements and railroad expansion. In conclusion he said: "Let us improve our rivers and harbors, build one or more railroads to the Pacific, giving employment to thousands of laborers, binding together our union with bands of American steel. Let us spread and diffuse manufacturing skill throughout the states, North and South, so that we may rely more upon ourselves and less upon foreign merchants and we will soon find that sectional disunion will dissappear and we will occupy the position among nations that God and nature intended we should." (55) This is exactly the kind of an address one would expect a Pittsburgh Representative to make.

Mr. Moorhead took no further part in the debates on the Morrill Bill except to engage in a partisan argument



with Mr. Florence, Democrat from Philadelphia as to the party responsible for the tariff of 1846. (56) This emphasizes the fact which will be brought out later, that the tariff was no issue in Pennsylvania, except that each party endeavored to prove their party the better tariff adherent.

The *Gazette* (57) and the *Chronicle* (58) commended Mr. Moorhead for his position on the Bill. The *Gazette* of April 28th says: "This able Representative from Allegheny is devoting all his great energies to the tariff question and wields considerable influence in the House." This statement was probably intended to secure votes for Mr. Moorhead at the coming election. He was nominated by the Republican Convention held May 3rd. In his acceptance of the nomination he referred to the fact that "the Democratic party has placed itself on record during the past winter in opposition to that beneficent measure," (the Morrill Bill) .(59)

Robert McKnight, the other Representative from Pittsburgh, made one address on the floor of the House in the interest of protection. (60) The keynote of the address is found in the opening sentence; "It can hardly be denied that the country is the most prosperous which produces within her borders the articles useful to her citizens." (61) The *Chronicle* referred to the address as a "vindication of the rights of free labor, in favor of protection and tending to show that the Republican party is not the sectional party of the country." (62)

The partisan nature of the tariff question is again emphasized, as McKnight devoted much of his time to showing that the Democrats did not uphold protection. The *Dispatch* in a long editorial on his address, stated that "he proceeds to explode the fallacies upon which the advocates of free-trade base their opposition to protection." (63)

The *Washington Reporter*, Republican, does not think that Mr. McKnight's record was very consistent on the tariff. "Notwithstanding his loud-mouthed professions on the tariff," they stated, "his record is not such as to inspire Pennsylvania with any great degree of pride; it seems that just at the trying moment he is either absent or seized with a sudden fit of hunger as to render him incapable of service." (64) In my examination of the *Globe* I have found

Mr. McKnight absent on only a few minor occasions, such as votes on adjournments or on a few minor amendments.

William Montgomery, the Democratic Representative from Washington, voted consistently on such occasions as he was present, tho he was absent for several days during the debate, being in attendance at the Charleston Convention. (65)

Before the House was organized Mr. Montgomery delivered an address, referring to the position of the various candidates for the Speakership on the tariff. (66) Mr. Montgomery supported Babcock as against Sherman. The *Washington Reporter* played him mercilessly for his stand. The *Reporter* said: "To the old Whig element of the Republican party Montgomery appealed on the score of his devotion to the doctrine of protection to domestic industry and especially to the great interests of Pennsylvania. He was a tariff man in the strictest sense. A most consistent tariff man, indeed! Instead of living up to the assurances he gave prior to the election he votes from the start for Mr. Babcock for speaker—a man who has been noted for his steadfast and persistent devotion to free-trade." (67) This attack is justified in part but depends on the question, what is protection? Mr. Babcock voted for the tariff of 1846 while Mr. Sherman supported the tariff of 1857 which was still closer to the free-trade ideal. (68)

The *Post* claimed that Montgomery had proved himself to be a true friend of protection in the debate regarding the election of Speaker. They reported that "Mr. Montgomery stood most nobly for the interest of Pennsylvania and American labor." (69)

After the opposition noted above the *Reporter* has nothing more to say concerning Montgomery's position on the tariff. It criticised him most bitterly for his vote against the Homestead Bill, referring to him as the "only man north of the Mason-Dixon line to oppose the Bill" and calling him "a traitor to the cause." (70)

However, during the debate on the Morrill Bill, Montgomery voted consistently and made several strong remarks favoring the measure. On May 9th he said: "I regard the tariff not as a political question but as a national question

on which all men of all parties agree and should act consistently. I am in favor of the tariff and so are the Democracy of my state and I will not permit anyone to read us out of the Democracy or lecture us on our stand." (71)

The *Washington Review*, Democrat, sums up Montgomery's position: "During the discussion of the Bill in the House, it was steadily opposed by a number of members from different parts of the Union and Mr. Montgomery was always found battling for the success of the act that re-established the protection extended by our manufacturers by the tariff of 1846. (72)

In the Senate the Bill met even more opposition than in the House. The Bill was announced on May 11th. On motion it was read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance. (73) On June 13th it was reported by Mr. Hunter of Virginia, a member of the Finance Committee, who moved that the consideration of the Bill be postponed until the second Monday in December. (74)

On June 14th the Bill was taken up by the Senate as the Committee of the Whole. (75) The question of postponement was discussed for several days. Mr. Hunter who led the opposition gave several reasons for postponement;—First—this was not a propitious time as politics would enter into the consideration to too great a degree. Second—there was no financial necessity for changing the present system. (76)

A vote was taken on the motion for postponement which was passed by a vote of twenty-five yeas and twenty-three nays. Senator Cameron and Bigler, the Pennsylvania Senators, voted against the postponement. (77) On the same day Senator Slidell of Louisiana proposed that a committee be appointed to report such modifications of the Bill on the second Monday in December as they deemed proper. (78)

On the 16th Mr. Powell of Kentucky moved for a reconsideration of the vote by which the discussion of the Bill was postponed. (79) No action was taken but the supporters of the Bill continued their efforts to have the Bill considered.

On the 20th of June the motion to reconsider the postponement of the Bill was passed, Bigler and Cameron voting

for reconsideration. (80) The opposition endeavored to change contents of the Bill, Mr. Lane of Oregon attempting to introduce a substitute which would have reinstated the rates of 1846. (81)

Pennsylvania's Senators endeavored to aid the Bill by various motions. Mr. Bigler moved that all other bills be passed over so that the Tariff Bill could be considered immediately. (82) Mr. Cameron attempted to have the session prolonged a week so that the Bill might be considered. (83) Both these motions were unsuccessful and the Senate adjourned, in spite of the activities of the Pennsylvania Senators, without action on the Bill (84) which they deemed of such great importance.

On the 11th of December the Morrill Bill was again called up in the Senate. There was again much opposition to its consideration, Senator Cameron upholding it. By a vote of thirty-nine to thirty-seven it was moved that the Bill be considered. (85)

Other more serious questions now engaged the attention of the Senate. Secession was imminent and it was impossible for the measure to pass. When the vote was finally taken on February 20th the Southerners had left the Senate in sufficient number to give a Republican majority in that body. (86) The final vote was twenty-four to fourteen in favor of the Bill, (87) Bigler was the only Democrat who voted for the Bill, while no Republican opposed it. (88)

Opposition to the Bill had not ceased with the Southerners leaving the Senate. The opposition however took another trend. It was now led by Senator Douglas of Illinois who based his argument on the inauspicious time for such legislation. (89) Senator Bigler answered Douglas several times. He endeavored to show in his remarks that there was an absolute need of additional revenue. (90) The Democrats on the whole admitted the need of additional revenue but desired a tariff for that purpose only. (91) However, after numerous attempts to return to the rates of 1846, the Bill, as noted above, was passed.

During the debate numerous amendments had been passed. A joint committee was appointed from both houses to agree on the amendments. Messers Simmons, Bigler and Hunter acted on the part of the Senate and Messers Sher-

man, Phelps and Moorhead on the part of the House. (92) A favorable report was received and the President affixed his signature to the Bill on the 2nd of March, (93) two days before the expiration of his term.

The activities of Pennsylvania's Senators have been mentioned above. Both Bigler and Cameron voted consistently. Mr. Bigler was influenced largely by the position of President Buchanan and served as the administration mouth-piece during the debate.

The opposition papers in Pittsburg and Philadelphia accuse Mr. Bigler of duplicity in regard to his stand on the Bill. (94) This fact cannot be substantiated. He always opposed the postponement of the Bill and endeavored in all ways possible to have the Bill passed.

His speeches and motions in the Senate also refute this charge. In his speech on June 20th his position was unmistakable. He said in part: "I have hitherto said that I am willing to take up this question of tariff as a business question. I have long expressed a desire that it be taken out of the ordinary party scrambles. I may be mistaken, sir, but I have acted in the firm belief that it is necessary as a measure of revenue to increase the means of the government. I am for a readjustment of the tariff." (95)

The Republican dailies were compelled to give him some recognition for his part played in the debate. In an editorial, the *Chronicle* stated that, "Mr. Bigler is doing all he can to push the Bill to a successful conclusion." (96) The *Chronicle* also reported that Senators Bigler and Cameron spent several hours with Representative Morrill endeavoring to devise means of passing the Tariff Bill. (97)

Mr. Cameron, the Republican Senator, also exerted much influence for the Bill, voting consistently and using his great ability as a lobbyist to have the measure passed. He always emphasized the importance of protection to the welfare of industry. In one of his remarks he gave a very graphic statement of the importance of the Tariff in Pennsylvania. He stated; "To Pennsylvania this is the great question of the day, it is our nigger." (98)

In another address, Mr. Cameron showed the gain in specie during the years of protective tariff and the consequent loss under the free-trade policy. He urged protection

and traced financial depressions to free-trade legislation. (99)

Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussion of the relations of Western Pennsylvania's Congressmen to the Morrill Bill. None of the Representatives took a prominent part in the debate, but the fact that the delegation was unanimous shows the importance of protection in Pennsylvania. When it is remembered that the tariff question was at this time a strict party issue the stand of Pennsylvania's Democratic Representatives and Senator takes on added significance.

It is very interesting to follow the editorials in the four leading Pittsburgh papers as they note the progress of the Bill. The comment below is arranged chronologically with reference to the facts as they have been discussed above in the history of the Bill.

The *Daily Post*, the Democratic organ in Pittsburgh, showed the adherence of Pennsylvania Democracy to the Bill during the debate in the House in numerous editorials. In the early days of the debate the *Post* stated that, "the Bill appears to suit the people of Pennsylvania, both Democrats and Republicans will stand by the Bill." (100) It further claimed that the Democracy of Pennsylvania were "as sound on the tariff question as ever the Republicans were." (101)

On the other hand the *Gazette*, the Republican organ, continually called attention to the fact that, "the Democratic party as represented in Congress has put itself on record as against a tariff so framed as to afford incidental protection to suffering American industry." (102) The filibustering of the Democrats during the last days of the debate was condemned as the unmanly way in which "The minority in the House may entirely prevent the passage of the Bill during the present session." (103) The *Gazette* also spoke of the possible advantage the non-settlement of the tariff question would be to the Republicans in the coming election but "prefers the interest of the Commonwealth and would gladly see the question removed from politics by the passage of the Bill." (104)

When the Bill was finally passed on May 11th all papers united in praising the action. The *Chronicle* rejoiced "to learn that the protective measure has passed the House by

a large majority----Sufficient glory for one day." (105) The *Post* proclaimed the passage in as favorable a tone and commended the measure as one which "affords additional protection and will be of great benefit to Pennsylvania." (106)

The *Gazette*, on July 9th, charged Senator Bigler with duplicity in regard to the Bill. In a long editorial, in which the New York *Tribune* was quoted freely, it revealed a scheme in which the Democratic Senator was to propose another Bill, protective to the extreme, which was bound to be defeated in the Senate but which would aid the Democratic cause in Pennsylvania. The *Gazette* referred to Bigler as "the dirty tool with which the Senate desires to defeat the Morrill Bill." (107) The *Pittsburgh Dispatch* confirmed the plot, quoting the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. (108) The scheme was not carried out, as has been proven by Bigler's record discussed above. The *Gazette* later referred to Bigler's stand but does so in a minimizing tone stating that "the feeble voice of Bigler alone of all the Democratic Senators has been raised in behalf of protection, but no one heeds what he says, not even in his own party." (109)

All papers regretted the postponement of the Bill. The *Post* sought to exonerate its party by stating that "the failure has not occurred thru the negligence of Pennsylvania Democrats." (110) The *Gazette*, on the other hand, stated that the Bill was shelved "because Democracy and Slavery are inseparably welded and the control of the one must always be turned to promoting the interest of the other. Free labor can find protection only by over-turning the proslavery Democracy and the solution of the tariff question is therefore happily hastened by the dissolution of the Democratic party." (111)

The *Chronicle*, upon the adjournment of Congress, summarized the work accomplished. "Congress adjourned yesterday. We have no tariff, no homestead law, no Pacific Railroad, no abolishment of polygamy, no mileage retrenchment. Go home now and be good boys. School is over." (112)

When Congress adjourned in December the election was over and we find no comment of importance on the Bill. These quotations however emphasize three facts; first,—

the prominent position of the tariff in the state; second,—the unanimity of the state on the issue; and third,—the tendency of the rival parties to assert theirs to be the better tariff party.

The Pittsburgh papers were also unanimous in upholding the various features of the Bill. All papers concurred in the change from ad valorem to specific duties. The *Post* stated: "An ad valorem tariff protects where protection is least needed. (113) The *Post* has always lent its support to such a tariff of specific duties as Pennsylvania needs." (114) The *Chronicle* held an ad valorem tariff "to be a sliding scale in the wrong direction; it protects when protection is least needed and refuses to protect when the manufacturer is in danger." (115) The *Dispatch*, in emphasizing the protective element of specific rates, stated that, "the lower the price sunk the higher would be the rate percent granted by specific duties." (116)

The *Post* was the only paper, which, tho strongly for protection, feared a cessation of Southern trade and cautioned that continued agitation of protection might cause such a cessation. In the editorial in the issue for April 19th it make this statement: "Our iron, plows, wagons, stoves, glass, manufactured cotton fabrics, steamboats, and a great variety of products, to say nothing of coal seek a market in the South in immense quantities. Is there no danger that the course which the Republican politicians and the newspapers of Allegheny County are pursuing will, if persisted in, seriously damage the interests of the country?" (117)

From these quotations we must conclude that the Morrill Bill was upheld in its entirety by all parties and that public opinion was unanimous, though in some cases more conservative than in others.

Demonstrations and meetings showed the public opinion of the section. Pittsburgh, the center of protection agitation, could not let such a great victory as that of May 11th, when the Morrill Bill passed the House, go without some fitting celebration. The *Chronicle* of the 11th reported that the "Republicans intend to honor the passage of the popular measure by firing from Boyd's hill one hundred and five rounds, the number of ayes for the Bill." (118) In advertising the celebration it advised that they load the



big gun "up to the muzzle and stand away from the touch hole. Let our hills of coal reverberate the sound which proclaims them disenthralled and brought into the glorious service." (119)

A meeting of the Board of Trade was held on the 30th of May for the purpose of taking some action in relation to the Morrill Tariff Bill. A committee of five was appointed to draft a memorial and resolutions on the subject. (120)

The resolutions which were presented and unanimously passed give the opinions of the section so well that it seems pertinent to give them in full.

"What we ask for, our Representatives and Senators, in Congress, is for an enactment of such a tariff law as will give the largest possible protection to our interests. This we think the bill passed by the House of Representatives and now before the Senate will do. As the Representatives of a great working community, we therefore ask that it become a law.

In our opinion this bill sufficiently guards against the evils which a fluctuation in price and unfair invoices produce under the ad valorem system. From experience of the past ad valorem duties were not consistent with the steadiness which protective industry imperatively demands. Constant fluctuations make it unsafe to invest capital in large amounts in manufacturing business. The man who builds a furnace, a rolling mill, a cotton or woolen factory might almost as well be a tenant at will of his establishment as to be subject to the ups and downs of a constantly fluctuating tariff. We want responsible protection and we want certainty.

Specific duties such as are proposed in the bill now before the Senate stand steadily in the defense of our industrial prosperity. The passage of the bill would give us confidence. All the experience of the past has proven that under tariffs devised to promote the interests of labor and supply the wants of government, those creating specific duties are the most adequate and reliable." (121)

That this opinion was unanimous not only in the western part of Pennsylvania but in the whole state is shown by the resolutions passed at a meeting of the Iron Manufacturers at Philadelphia. They resolved: "First,—that the meeting approve the Morrill Bill; second,—that the part of the bill referring to iron is fair; third,—that this bill will allow American manufacturers to compete with foreigners." (122)

On September 26th, in a political demonstration, the importance of the tariff issue in the election was stressed by the number of banners favoring protection. The *Chronicle* reported the demonstration: "The Pittsburgh Steel Works had a large force out. . . . In the second wagon was a banner

on which was represented a rolling mill in ruins as the result of free trade and on the other an establishment in a flourishing state as we would have had we protection. The Soho Works had out over thirty workmen in two wagons and bore the banner, 'We will have protection.' Mitchell, Herron & Co. had a banner with the motto 'American Industry must be protected.'" (123)

The County Conventions of January 1860 further show the unique position of the tariff issue. As both parties upheld protection it could not be, strictly speaking, an issue. Each party however attempted by resolutions and addresses to show that they had done more for the tariff than their opponents had done and that their party was the true protective party.

The Allegheny County Conventions were held in January 1860. The 11th resolution passed by the Republicans on January 5th read as follows:

"11. Resolved that we regard protection to our home industries as one of the cardinal purposes of the national government and that specific duties upon certain articles can alone insure honest execution of the law". (124)

In the resolution passed by the Democratic Convention held January 25th we find the subtle charge that the Republicans were not consistent in their tariff stands.

The resolution read:

"Resolved that we are in favor of an economical administration of General and State government and of encouraging domestic manufactures by a repeal of the Republican Tariff of 1857 and a restoration of the Democratic Tariff, modified by the substitution of specific for ad valorem duties as recommended by President Buchanan." (125)

These resolutions show that each party endeavored to make the most out of their respective cases. The tariff question occupies the same unique position in the state elections. Both State Conventions passed tariff resolutions, both candidates for governor made tariff speeches and both went to Washington to endeavor to have the Morrill Bill passed.

The Republican State Convention met in Harrisburg on February 22nd and nominated Andrew Curtin for governor. Their stand for protection was unmistakable and is shown by the following resolution:

"Resolved that in the enactment of revenue laws by the general government, fair and adequate protection should be systematically afforded to industry of all classes of citizens." (126)

The Democrats in their convention at Reading, March 21, nominated Henry Foster of Greensburg for governor and passed a strict protectionist resolution:

"Resolved, that the convictions of the Democratic party of Pennsylvania remain unshaken in the wisdom of adequate protection to the coal, wool and great productions of the country. The views of Mr. Buchanan on the subject of specific duties are approved. Our Representatives in Congress are desired to produce such modification of the law as the unwise legislation of the Republicans in 1857 renders necessary to the prosperity of the industrial interests of Pennsylvania." (127)

The Democrats were on the defensive, their record was against them and they must find some means of equalization. This they found in the alleged support of the Republicans for the Tariff of 1857.

The importance of the state election in Pennsylvania in its relation to the national election in November could hardly be overestimated. Pennsylvania had been a Democratic state but due to the importance of the tariff question it was doubtful in this election. The gubernatorial returns would show to a large extent the trend of opinion and aid in the prediction of the result in November.

Both candidates for governor supported the Morrill Bill and made protective addresses during the campaign. Mr. Curtin, the Republican nominee, put forth prominently in his campaign speeches the importance of the protective tariff and argued strongly that it would be adopted by the Republicans but certainly not by the Democrats. (128)

Foster and Curtin both went to Washington when the Morrill Bill was being debated and used their influence in urging that the measure be passed. (129) Mr. Foster met with some of the Southern Democrat Senators in behalf of the Bill. (130)

The *Post* used the activity of Foster in regard to the Morrill Bill as a leading campaign cry. An editorial made the bold claim that, "it was mainly thru his efforts in conjunction with some of the active and prominent Democrats of the House that the bill in question passed that body." (131) It also claimed the Republicans were "unable thus far to show that Mr. Curtin has rendered any important service in this particular." (132)

**The Gazette**, on the other hand, headed its editorials with these words: "Do you want a Protective Tariff, vote for Curtin. Vote for Curtin if you wish to vote on the side of free-labor, if you wish to support American Industry. A vote for Foster is a vote for free-trade. Curtin is for Protection." (133)

Curtin won a decisive victory with a majority of 32,000, largely due James G. Blaine says: "to his able and persuasive presentation of the tariff question and to his effective appeals to the laboring men in the coal and iron section of the state. Governor Curtin gave a far greater proportion of his time to the tariff and financial issues than to all others combined because a majority of her voters believed that the Democratic party tended to free-trade and that the Republican party would espouse and maintain the cause of protection." (134)

All writers concur that this state victory for the Republicans assured the election of Lincoln in November. (135) This state election clearly demonstrated the strong hold the principle of protection had upon the affections of the people.

Tariff was bound to play an important part in the national election in Pennsylvania. It was a minor issue in all other states. (136) Naturally there was no mention of it in either platform of the two branches of the Democracy. There had been an attempt by the Pennsylvania Democrats to introduce such a plank into the Charleston Platform. (137) Copies of the Resolutions passed at the State Convention at Reading were presented to the Convention. (138a.) These resolutions were not acted upon as the Charleston Convention soon disbanded. There was no reference to the tariff in the platforms which were later passed by the two branches of the Democracy, both upholding the Cincinnati free-trade plank. (138b.)

The Republican Convention held in Chicago, impelled by the trend of public opinion in Pennsylvania, saw the need of recognizing the principle of protection. (139) This recognition was not without opposition. Horace Greeley, a pronounced protectionist, opposed such a plank on the ground that the greater the number of issues the greater

would be the tendency to divide on the smaller issues and the harder to unite on the prime issue. (140)

The great leaders of the Republican party, Lincoln, Chase, and Seward were opposed to taking up the tariff at this time. (141a) Only a few days before he was nominated Mr. Lincoln wrote to a correspondent: "The tariff question ought not to be agitated at this time." (141b.) This stand had been taken before by Mr. Lincoln, as evidenced by a letter to Edward Wallace in which he wrote: "still it is my opinion that a revival of the question will not advance the cause itself or the man who requires it." (142) Seward and Chase opposed the tariff on grounds similar to Greeley.

The Republicans, however, succeeded in placing in the platform the 12th resolution which was lauded by the Republicans as a protectionist plank and criticised by the Democrats as neither clear-cut nor with definite meaning. The resolution which was largely responsible for the Republican majority in Pennsylvania read: (143)

"Resolved. 12th. That while providing for the support of the general government by duties upon imposts such adjustment should be made as to encourage the development of the industrial interests of the whole country."

The importance of this plank may be over-emphasized but many of the authorities of financial and political history trace to it the election of Lincoln in November. (144) Mr. Blaine says in his *Twenty Years*, "It was to this recognition that Mr. Lincoln in the end owed his election." (145)

It was only natural that Pennsylvania with its great economic resources should stress those problems which, in the opinion of her citizens, vitally affected the advance and growth of their industrial system, and that the tariff rather than the extension of slavery should be the true issue in Pennsylvania.

The Democrats had been losing ground in the Keystone state since the Panic of 1857. This depression occurred with a tariff of Democratic choice, a Democratic President, a Democratic Congress and every department of government under Democratic control. (146) Naturally since Pennsylvanians had been seriously affected by the Panic of 1857 these facts did much to weaken the Democratic cause.

Protection had been a prime issue in Pennsylvania in preceding elections. To show the weakness of other issues the state election of 1856 might be quoted. In this election David Wilmot, a strong anti-slavery man was defeated by Packer, who upheld protection. (147) Disassociated from the question of protection, opposition to slavery extension was a weak issue and the Republicans insured success when they identified hostility to slave labor with the protected labor of Pennsylvania. (148)

The campaign arguments in Pennsylvania centered on four controversial questions. First, which party is the better tariff party in Pennsylvania? Second, Is the tariff plank in the Chicago Platform sincere? Third, Are the Republican candidates protectionists? Fourth, Is protection advantageous at this time?

In regard to the first controversial point the Democrats placed much emphasis on the Tariff of 1857 which they styled a Republican Tariff and held was the cause of the Panic of 1857. The *Post* in its editorials gave much argument and more statistics to prove conclusively that the Republicans had supported measures contrary to protective ideals. (149) The *Post* also claimed for the Pennsylvania Democrats a more active stand for the Morrill Bill than the Republicans. (150) The *Gazette* replied to these arguments by referring to the "unanimity with which the Republicans in Congress had supported the Morrill Bill." (151) They also traced the history of protection and the frequency with which protective measures had been defeated by Southern votes and influence was made much of. They also referred to the 12th plank of the Chicago Convention and pointed out that "protection to the principle interests of our country is one of the cardinal doctrines of their creed." (152)

The question of the sincerity of the tariff plank was perhaps the strongest point of the opposition. We have noticed in the wording of the plank a certain vague indefiniteness. The *Post* said concerning the plank: "Take for instance the 12th resolution of the Republican platform, which professes to pledge the Republican party to a protective tariff—do we find its terms beyond iniquocation or cavil?" (153) In another issue the same paper made the statement that: "there is no reason to doubt that the

tariff resolution introduced into the Chicago platform was introduced to conciliate the protectionists of Pennsylvania while it was so worded as to give no offense to the free-trade Republicans of New York and elsewhere." (154) The Republicans in turn disclaimed all these charges and alluded to the 12th resolution as a recognition of the "great principle of protection of the industrial interests of the nation and a demand for an honest and economical administration of government." (155)

The question of the tariff policies of the Republican nominees caused much attention. The *Pennsylvanian* quoted by the *Washington* (Pa.) *Review* stated: "Lincoln is claimed to be a friend of protection. Hamlin is the special champion of free-trade." (156) This was a strong point for the opposition, as Hamlin, the Republican nominee for vice-president, had supported free-trade. The *Hollidaysburg Standard*, in an editorial entitled: "Are the Republicans sincere?" (157) showed the discrepancies of the Republicans on the tariff question in various parts of the country. "The supporters of Lincoln in this quarter profess a rigid sentiment in favor of protection, and disclaim loudly for the passage of the tariff bill which the House of Representatives have been considering. The *New York Evening Post* and the journals of Maine (Hamlin's state) and everywhere down east denounce the bill as the odious tariff act and call for its unconditional defeat" (157) The *Pittsburgh Post* referred to the free-trade attitude of Hamlin and the *New York Post*. (158) According to a letter from the Democratic Candidate for governor of the state of Maine, Hamlin, in a desire to conciliate the manufacturers in Pennsylvania, insisted upon protection and made speeches in its behalf. (159) This is hailed by the Democracy as another evidence of Republican hypocrisy.

The Republicans in rebuttal of course referred to Mr. Lincoln as an advocate of protection. "On one important point," the *Philadelphia Bulletin* wrote, "Mr. Lincoln has a record which will tell in his favor in Pennsylvania. Here after all, the Tariff is the vital question. All parties are for the Union and the Constitution, so there can be no issue there. But all parties are not for protection of American industry. The Democrats ignore it. . . . Mr. Bell has been

a tariff man, but as he has no platform and as he relies mostly on the Southern states for support he will have to conform to a considerable degree to Southern policy which favors free-trade. Mr. Lincoln is a tariff man on a tariff platform." (160) This statement, tho a partisan one, is backed up by facts and is correct in regard to the principles of the various candidates on the tariff question in 1860.

The fourth question which was debated in the campaign was the advisability of tariff agitation and revision at that time. The Democrats counselled moderation. They knew that they must uphold the tariff but they attempted to show that the interests of Pennsylvania would be injured if too stringent a campaign for protection was undertaken. Conservatism was urged by the *Post*. "The trade of Pennsylvania with the South is large. The attitude of Republican papers is deleterious and will deflect trade of the South to other sources. We must be conservative and the Democratic party is now the conservative party." (161) In another editorial the *Post* stated: "it is time for the conservative men among merchants and business men to look matters fairly in the face and ask themselves the question: 'Are not the rabid politicians of the Republican party destroying our interests?'" (162) The Democrats also made much of the fact that the bank and tariff were dead issues and no longer the leading political questions of the day and were therefore receiving undue consideration from the opposition. (163)

The Republicans in reply to these arguments stressed the importance of industry and the aid of protection in the advancement of manufacturers. In Allegheny and Washington counties enthusiastic Republican meetings were held and the tariff always occupied an important place in the discussion. The Washington County Convention, meeting on June 17th, resolved that, "the declaration of the principles of protection for the whole country be upheld." (164) At the second meeting of the Central Republican Campaign Club of Washington the tariff was alluded to and the President of the Club in lengthy remarks showed the importance and necessity of judicious protection. (165) These incidents while of minor and local importance show the influence of the tariff issue in the campaign.



The result was as predicted by the state election—Pennsylvania gave to Lincoln a majority of nearly 300,000. "This is a result unprecedented in political history of the state and shows the unanimity which prevails among the people in favor of Free Territory, Free Labor and Protection to Home Industry." (166)

While no mention of the tariff as a grievance or cause of secession was made in South Carolina's ordinance (167) nevertheless the action of Pennsylvania and its ardent support for the principle undoubtedly had some influence.

The evidence given above will show that while the Morrill Act was not a success as a financial measure, not yielding sufficient revenue for the war emergency, its influence was far-reaching. The Republican agitation for protective tariff proved to be the great attraction for Pennsylvania voters. This fact shows that at least in some localities economic considerations overshadowed the great question of the extension of slavery.

The importance of the vote of Pennsylvania in the election of 1860 and the unique position of the tariff question in the state and the subordination of all other questions to it cannot be overlooked.

The tariff was paramount. Both parties upholding protection made it in reality no issue. Since the national parties were not in accord on the subject it was necessary for the Democrats to take the defensive in an endeavor to satisfy a constituency which favored protection with a national platform which entirely ignored it. The campaign arguments show that both parties were consistent, altho the Democrats were naturally the more conservative.

The importance of the Morrill Act, therefore, lies in the fact that it showed the Republicans to be the supporters of protection. The Act coupled with the resolution in the Chicago Platform which upheld protection was the balance which decided the election of 1860 in favor of the Republicans.

I. F. Boughter

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NOTES

1. Blaine. "Nature of Protection"; *Modern Eloquence*; XI, 266.
2. Marvin, *Tariff of 1846-57*; p. 4.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
5. Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 157.
6. Marvin, *Tariff of 1846-57*, p. 23.
7. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 58.
8. Garrison, *Westward Expansion*, p. 187.
9. Killikelly, *History of Pittsburg*, p. 204.
10. Hull, *Financial Depressions*, p. 146.
11. Richardson, *Messages of the Presidents*, V, 436.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 458.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 521.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 650.
15. Smith, *Parties and Slavery*, p. 184.
16. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 56.
17. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, II, 479.
18. *Pittsburg Dispatch*, Jan. 2, 1860.
19. *Ibid.*, Jan. 25, 1860.
20. Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 158.
21. Sherman, *Recollections*, I, 183.
22. Dewey, *Financial History*, p. 266.
23. *Congressional Globe*, 36th Congress, First session, p. 1832.
24. Burton, *John Sherman*, p. 68.
25. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1231.
26. *Pittsburg Dispatch*, May 18, 1860.
27. Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 158.
28. Richardson *Messages of the Presidents*, V, 522.
29. *House Documents*, Vol. 129, pp.164-180.
30. Cox, *Three Decades*, p. 137.
31. Blaine, *Twenty Years*, I, 277.
32. Taussig, *Tariff History*, p. 158.
33. Tarbell, *Tariff in our times*, p. 8.
34. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, III, 315.
35. Lothrop, *William Seward*, p. 277.
36. Kerr, *John Sherman, His life and public service*, I, 107.
37. Cox, *Three Decades*, p. 137. Marvin, *Tariff of 1846-57*. p. 34.
38. Kerr, *John Sherman*, I, 107.
39. *Cong: Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1116.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 1135.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 1231.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 1415.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 1563.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 1832.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 1859.
46. Sherman, *Recollections*, I, 185.
47. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1972.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 1972.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 1972.
50. Sherman, *Recollection*, I, 186.
51. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 2056.
52. *Senate Documents*, Vol. 56 p. 216.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
54. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1046.
55. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 1046.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 1957.
57. *Gazette*, April 27, 1860.
58. *Chronicle*, April 27, 1860.

59. *Dispatch*, May 3rd., 1860.
60. *Cong. Globe* 36th Cong., 1st Ses., 1851.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 1851.
62. *Chronicle*, April 28, 1860.
63. *Dispatch*, April 28, 1860.
64. *Washington (Pa.) Reporter*, June 28, 1860.
65. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., 1972.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 289-90.
67. *Reporter*, Dec. 14, 1859.
68. *Ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1860.
69. *Post*, Jan. 4, 1860.
70. *Reporter*, Apr. 5, 1860.
71. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 2017.
72. *Washington Review*, May 17, 1860.
73. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 1st Ses., p. 2062.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 2910.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 2980.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 3010.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 3027.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 3032.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 3062.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 3101.
81. *Congressional Globe*, 36th Cong., Ses., p. 3094-3101.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 3184.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 3187.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 3195.
85. *Dispatch*, Dec., 12, 1860.
86. Cox, "*Three Decades*", p. 157.
87. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 2nd Ses., 1065.
88. *Ibid.*, 1065.
89. *Ibid.*, 1051.
90. *Ibid.*, 1052.
91. *Ibid.*, 1051, ff.
92. Sherman, *Recollections*, I, 187.
93. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 2nd Ses., p. 1416.
94. *Gazette*, June 9th, *Dispatch*, June 11, 1860.
95. *Cong. Globe*, 36th Cong., 2nd Ses., p. 3181.
96. *Chronicle*, May 24, 1860.
97. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1860.
98. *Gazette*, May 24, 1860.      Speech June 20th, 1860.
99. *Ibid.*, June 28, 1860.      Speech June 15th, 1860.
100. *Post*, April 5, 1860.
101. *Post*, April 17, 1860.
102. *Gazette*, April 20, 1860.
103. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1860.
104. *Ibid.*, May 7, 1860.
105. *Chronicle*, May 11, 1860.
106. *Post*, May 12, 1860.
107. *Gazette*, June 9, 1860.
108. *Dispatch*, June 11, 1860.
109. *Gazette*, June 18, 1860.
110. *Post*, June 20, 1860.
111. *Gazette*, June 24, 1860.
112. *Chronicle*, June 25, 1860.
113. *Post*, April 3, 1860.
114. *Ibid.*, April 20, 1860.

115. *Chronicle*, April, 10, 1860.
116. *Dispatch*, April 7, 1860.
117. *Post*, April 10, 1860.
118. *Chronicle*, May, 11, 1860.
119. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1860.
120. *Ibid.*, May 31, 1860.
121. *Ibid.*, June 4, 1860.
122. *Ibid.*, March 24, 1860.
123. *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1860.
124. *Post*, Jan. 5, 1860.
125. *Post*, Jan. 25, 1860.
126. *Washington Reporter*, Feb. 29, 1860.
127. *Ibid.*, March 7, 1860.
128. Stanwood, *Tariff Controversy*, II.
129. *Chronicle*, June 11, 1860.
130. *Gazette*, June 4, 1860.
131. *Post*, Sept. 10, 1860.
132. *Post*, Sept 10, 1860.
133. *Gazette*, Sept. 10, 1860.
134. Blaine, *Twenty Years*, I, 206.
135. Chadwick, *Cause of the War*, p. 126, Rhodes, II., 479.  
McKinley, *History of Tariff Legislation*—Henry Clay, VII,  
29-30.
136. Fite, *Campaign of 1860*. p. 198.
137. *Gazette*, April 26, 1860.
138. *Chronicle*, April 27, 1860, (b) Fite, *Campaign of 1860*, p. 198.
139. Blaine, *Twenty Years*, I, 140.
140. *Dispatch*, May 2, 1860.
141. (a) Tarbell, *Tariff in our Times*, p. 6.  
(b) Tarbell, *Tariff in our Times*, p. 6.
142. Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works*, I, 584
143. *Dispatch*, May 23, 1860.
144. Dewey, *Financial History*, p. 266.
145. Blaine, *Twenty Years*, I, 206.
146. *Ibid.*, I, 205.
147. *Ibid.*, I, 205.
148. *Ibid.*, I, 206.
149. *Post*, April 17, 1860.
150. *Ibid.*, June 6, 1860.
151. *Gazette*, April 5, 1860.
152. *Dispatch*, Feb. 23, 1860.
153. *Post*, Sept., 11, 1860.
154. *Ibid.*, Sept., 19, 1860.
155. *Gazette*, May 19, 1860.
156. *Washington Review*, June 21, 1860.
157. *Ibid.*, June 21, 1860.
158. *Post*, May 23, 1860., June 23, 1860.
159. *Chronicle*, August 2, 1860.
160. *Gazette*, May 24, 1860.
161. *Post*, January 10, 1860.
162. *Ibid.*, April 10, 1860.
163. *Ibid.*, January 10, 1860.
164. *Washington Reporter*, June 21, 1860.
165. *Ibid.*, March 21, 1860.
166. *Ibid.*, November 22, 1860.
167. Chadwick, *Cause of the War*, p. 140.