The "Church People" are also a part of this group, though, in contrast to the "sects," were more generously accepted in Europe than in America. Space forbids the listing of the conditions of hardships, and of the sterling traits thus developed.

In closing, this quote has meaning: "The chief contribution of the Pennsylvania Dutch to the American way of life is not in the value of their folkways nor in individual achievement, great as these are, but in their mixing in marriage and still retaining the good in their heritage." Referring to the "interaction of many nationalities and religions," . . . "as one of these varied groups, the Pennsylvania Germans have been a significant factor in the progress of the state and the nation. It is this diversity in which lies the greatness of both Pennsylvania and America." "To see them as an indigenous and developing part of American life, gives the reader a true perspective." (pp. 70, 71)

The reviewer agrees with the Committee (Standing Committee on Publications, Pennsylvania Historical Association) in the foreword, that this "is the most scholarly, all-inclusive, and readable account of the Pennsylvania Germans . . . in one small volume." A must on the P.G.'s!

Accompanying this brief 71 page story is a valuable, select and classified bibliography of twelve pages.

A number of books might be added for the interested researcher but particularly European Origins of the Brethren (a source book), compiled and translated by Donald F. Durnbaugh; Die Deutschen, Ihr Werden und Wesen, Ernest Jockers, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of German, University of Pennsylvania; Two Centuries of Brothervalley Church of the Brethren (1762-1962), H. Austin Cooper, Times, Inc., Westminster, Maryland.

Pittsburgh

Alvin G. Faust


For the reader interested in the wars of the eighteenth century in America but who has not time to delve into their correlation with
European conflicts of which they formed a part, this book will prove useful as well as entertaining. It will help to dispel from the mind of the layman the confusion regarding King William's, Queen Anne's, King George's, and the French and Indian wars, in their correct relation to the treaties of Ryswick, Utrecht, Aix-la-Chapelle and Paris.

Written in a delightfully flowing style, it is a well organized presentation of the field so well covered at much greater length by Francis Parkman, Lawrence Gipson, and others. The reader should also notice in both the Author's Note and Preface, the acknowledgments to the wealth of original materials.

The chapter entitled "They Fought with Flintlocks" is a fine exposition of the weapons which shaped the tactics of the era. Several observations are made, critical of methods employed by British commanders, which apparently are unsupported by accepted authorities on military tactics. The author's advocacy (page 224) of the employment of "columns with narrow fronts and great depth" by General Abercromby at Ticonderoga is in contraposition to all of the tactical authorities on early wars — Jomini, Napier, Wagner, Halleck, to name a few. In his Organization and Tactics, Major Arthur J. Wagner, Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. Army, has summed up the consensus of opinion thus:

In thrusting forward these lengthened columns with narrow fronts, they voluntarily gave [to the enemy] much of the advantage that an army gains by attacking its adversary's flank; and repeated disaster seemed unable to correct this tactical folly . . . . In attacking Jackson's position at New Orleans, [Packenham] formed the attacking force in heavy columns . . . . and their enormous losses and complete repulse furnished additional proof of the folly of opposing heavy columns to a line capable of delivering an effective fire.

Abercromby should be criticized for failing to employ artillery to blow to pieces the abatis in front of Montcalm's intrenchments.

Referring to Wolfe's tactics at Quebec, the author has been critical of the employment of a "thin red line" with intervals of three feet between the men. The same authority, Wagner (Ibid., 91), thus accounts for British successes in the Peninsular War: "The tactics of the British was superior . . . . they habitually received the enemy in a 'thin red line' of only two ranks, supported by a similar line a short distance in rear . . . . and pouring into it a concentric fire at close range before closing upon it with the bayonet." Precisely the situation of Wolfe at Quebec.

In deploring (page 158) Colonel Gage's failure to deploy his
troops in line when receiving the attack of the French and Indians at the Monongahela, the author had forgotten that the "evolution" of deployment into line did not exist at the time in the Manual Exercise of the British or the manuals of any other army. It was only as a direct result of the disastrous experience of this very battle that the tactics of deployment were evolved, later to be carried to perfection in the American Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War.

This reminds us that the author erroneously claims (page 191) that Gage organized the first infantry in the British army, in 1758. This has also been claimed by Gage's biographer, Richard Alden. The Regimental Chronicle and List of Services of the 60th or Royal American Regiment of Foot, by Nesbit W. Wallace (page 10), states clearly, under date "March to April (1757), Five companies, First Battalion, 60th Royal American Regiment of Foot, under Lord Loudoun, were employed in skirmishes with the Indians . . . . Five companies, First Battalion, under Colonel Stanwix, were employed in the back woods of Pennsylvania, and also in protecting the Canadian frontier." The Royal Americans were designedly instituted as light infantry. All of this was more than a full year before Mr. Hamilton states that Gage's 80th Regiment was activated.

The author is expressly biased in favor of the New Englander's viewpoint of the military strategy of the Seven Years' War, as old as the problem itself. There were then, and always have been, advocates of movement up the Hudson and Mohawk valleys to take advantage of what appears to be an almost all water route to Niagara and Oswego.

In the Cumberland Papers, published as Military Affairs in North America, by Dr. S. M. Pargellis, is found a transcript of the full weight of evidence, pro and con, concerning the different routes, their merits, military feasibility, as they existed in 1754 used by the Duke in forming the British strategy. A full discussion of the relative advantages of the two routes was also contained in Lewis Evans' Analysis of a General Map of the Middle British Colonies. It was upon the information contained therein that the governors' council predicated their plans for the Braddock campaign. Therein is included a detailed tabulation of the comparative costs of transporting a "battoe load" by either route and showing a more than 40 per cent advantage in favor of the Fort Duquesne route over that to Oswego. Decision was finally made on the grounds of the danger of over-
whelming French forces available to attack the three difficult carrying places on the Mohawk route, the doubtfulness of the support of the Iroquois Indians, the advantage to the Potomac route of the food supplies available from the, then, greatest farmlands of America in Pennsylvania. It seemed imperative to sever the French line of defense and communications from the Mississippi forts at its most extended point, which was Fort Duquesne, then to roll up the line of French forts by capturing all of the intermediate forts to Niagara. This plan had the added feature of giving a part to be borne by the southern colonies. It was upon the best information available at the time that the planners had to base their decisions, and we are ill able to pronounce them wrong unless we are thoroughly conversant with all of the conditions and environment influencing those decisions.

The claim made by Mr. Hamilton (page 258) that the Forbes expedition was unnecessary because of Bradstreet's hit-and-run blow at Fort Frontenac is easily seen to be invalid when we remember that the French immediately rebuilt Frontenac and their ships on Lake Ontario, and that a larger force than ever before assembled was poised at Fort Machault (Venango) the very next spring, ready to descend upon Colonel Mercer's fort at Pittsburgh. The force had to be diverted to the assistance of Niagara, but Bradstreet's success was only a temporary interruption of supplies.

In the light of the foregoing it appears that this purely military history presents only one viewpoint in a controversial problem. With today's knowledge and modern facilities the solution would undoubtedly have been different, but the eighteenth century generals did well with the materials at hand upon which to base their decisions.

Pittsburgh

Edward G. Williams