Let us now praise famous men and our fathers that begat us.
—Ecclesiasticus 44:1

Bells should ring for Colonel Henry Bouquet and western Pennsylvanians should give obeisance this 200th year of the anniversary of the Battle of Bushy Run.

This was the battle in which on August 5 and 6, 1763, Colonel Bouquet's intrepid little army of less than 500 men repulsed an almost equal number of Indians on the hilltops east of Harrison City, Westmoreland County.

This was the battle that assured the relief of Indian-invested Fort Pitt and that marked the turning point in the break-up of the widespread Indian rebellion — misnamed "Pontiac's Conspiracy" — that for a time threatened to wipe out all inroads of white civilization in the frontier country and when, as one writer has stated, "Anglo-Saxon civilization stood in the presence of the greatest crisis of its history along the frontiers of Pennsylvania."  

This paper is the basis of an address delivered at a meeting of the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania on April 10, 1963. Mr. Anderson is the Solicitor for the Board of Public Education, a graduate of the Law School of the University of Pittsburgh, and a Colonel in the United States Army Reserve, Retired.—Ed.

1 History of Cumberland Valley in Pennsylvania, George P. Donehoo, editor, Susquehanna History Association, Harrisburg, 1930, Vol. I, 189. At p. 185 the author notes that the uprising of the Indians was no more a conspiracy "than the uprising of the colonies in 1776 against Great Britain."
This was the battle characterized by historian Francis Parkman as “one of the best contested actions ever fought between white man and Indians.” The Bushy Run State Battlefield Park now commemorates the combat site.

Minimize the battle if you will and call it a small skirmish in the wilderness; assert defeat of the roiled up Indians as sooner or later inevitable — do all these and the past will hoot the detractor.

The battle was no small skirmish to the 500 or so of beleaguered garrison and townspeople in crowded Fort Pitt. It assured their relief and spared them the possible ugly choice of starvation or tomahawk.

It was no small skirmish to the uneasy garrisons and their wards at Fort Ligonier and Fort Bedford. If Fort Pitt fell they fell.

Nor was it a small skirmish back east over the mountains in the overflowing and rumor-filled streets of Shippensburg and Carlisle where hundreds of pioneers and their families had fled from forest homes in panic, abandoning ripening grain fields to escape the threat of the red marauders. To them defeat of Bouquet’s little rescue band would mean the end of a way of life.

So to Colonel Bouquet and his valiant soldiers, on this the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Bushy Run, we render salute and say well done. Western Pennsylvania plaudits go as well to Captain Simeon Ecuyer, commandant at Fort Pitt, and to Lieutenant Archibald Blane at Fort Ligonier and to Captain Lewis Ourry at Fort Bedford.

3 Preservation of the site is a tribute to the activities of the Bushy Run Battlefield Memorial Association. In 1918 school children of Westmoreland County, in a penny collection, made possible the purchase of the original six and one-half acres. In 1927 the Commonwealth established the Bushy Run Battlefield Commission and appropriated $25,000 for the purchase of the Association’s land as well as additional property. Another appropriation of $10,000 was made in 1937 for further land acquisition. The present historical park of 162 acres is managed by the Department of Forests and Waters of the Commonwealth. A small museum complements battlefield walks, markers and picnic areas.
4 For example, James T. Flexner in his recent biography of Sir William Johnson, Mohawk Baronet, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1959, writes at p. 257, “The battle they fought at Bushy Run is written down as a great victory for the white man: more than four hundred and sixty regulars actually managed to fight off ninety-five Indians with the loss of only sixty soldiers. This triumph got the survivors into the fort, where they did little but stare out again over the walls.”

The illustration on the facing page is reproduced through the courtesy of Society member, Edward G. Williams, from a rare 1766 London reprint of Dr. William Smith’s An Historical Account of Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764, first published in Philadelphia in 1765.
PLAN OF THE BATTLE NEAR BUSHY-RUN,
Gained by Colonel Bouquet, over the
Delaware's, Shawanees, Mingoess, Wyandots, Mohikons, Miamies, & Ottowas;
on the 5th and 6th of August 1763.
Survey'd by Tho' Hutchins, Assistant Engineer.
The briefest of backgrounds will give perspective to the Battle of Bushy Run. We bypass events between the capture of Fort Duquesne by Brigadier General John Forbes in November 1758 and the outbreak of the Indian Rebellion of 1763, noting that in the intervening years the British supplanted the French on the frontier; and noting further that the 1763 Treaty of Paris, confirming French defeat in North America, instead of dampening growing Indian unrest with British occupation, fanned smoldering fires of revolution that had been fueled and kept alive by the Senecas.5

Indian unrest at white encroachment and British policy was of long standing. Even before the embers at burned Fort Duquesne had cooled, the Indians warned Forbes and the British military command that they would not sacrifice freedom for trade goods. Christian Frederick Post made the prophetic entry in his Journal for November 29, 1758:

Ketiusshund, a noted Indian, one of the chief counsellors, told us in secret "That all the nations had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at Alleghenany and suffer nobody to settle there ... And if the English would draw back over the mountain, they would get all the other nations into their interest; but if they staid and settled there, all nations would be against them; and he was afraid it would be a great war, and never come to a peace again." 6

Evidence was at every hand of growing disaffection among the Indians. It was in the air in 1760. It was in the open in both 1761 and 1762 when war belts of the Senecas were refused by other tribes. But despite intelligence of the mounting disaffection, the British top command, heads in the sand, discounted the possibility of a general conflict.

Thus the long threatened Indian uprising, breaking out at


Detroit in the early days of May 1763, came as a surprise. Like a brush fire the rebellion spread rapidly through the forests to singe Fort Pitt, Fort Bedford and Fort Ligonier; to consume the small out-forts from Detroit and the out-forts from Fort Pitt of Venango (Franklin), Le Boeuf (Waterford) and Presque Isle (Erie); and to char the inhabited borders of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.

In two months time not only was the vaunted British military line broken but also all British civilians west of the Alleghenies — trader, hunter and farmer alike — were driven to cover if not killed and scalped beforehand. Trade goods were appropriated by the Indians. Raids in the Cumberland Valley and on the borders of Maryland and Virginia created panic and headlong flight.

In the first week of May the gifted Pontiac, a chief of the Ottawas, had his single entry on the stage of history and played a noble scene. He united warriors of the Ottawas, Wyandots, Chippewas and Potawatomies for an assault on Detroit. Failing to take the fort by trickery, he settled down to a siege that was not lifted until the end of October.

Flushed with the intoxication of battle, Pontiac’s cohorts enlarged the horizon of revolt to capture and in most instances kill the small garrisons of the satellite forts about Detroit. The messages of success, carried on moccasined wings through the forests, brought new allies, one by one, to join in the kill, the Shawnees being the last to join as the battle front reached into Pennsylvania.

Because control of communications was with the Indians, news of the uprising trickled slowly through the endless forests to the British garrisons and to the British command. Captain Ecuyer at Fort Pitt did not suspect what was happening until the end of May when he hastened an express to Bouquet at Philadelphia. General

7 See Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising, op. cit. Fort Sandusky (Sandusky, Ohio) fell on May 16 to the Ottawas and Hurons. Fort St. Joseph (Niles, Mich.) was the victim of the Potawatomies on May 25. May 27 saw the capture of Fort Miamis (Fort Wayne, Ind.) to Pontiac’s couriers aided by the Miamies. On May 28 a party of Queen’s Rangers under Lieutenant Abraham Cuyler, conveying supplies by boat to Detroit, was ambushed on the north shore of Lake Erie at Point Pelee. Fort Ouiatenon (Lafayette, Ind.) fell on June 1. Fort Michilimackinac (Mackinaw City, Mich.) fell on June 2. Fort Edward Augustus (Green Bay, Wis.) was abandoned by the British.

8 Croghan estimated that the Indians plundered 100,000 pounds worth of trade goods. Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1959, 199. The Bouquet Papers (see note 12) contain several lists of traders who were victims of the Indian war. BP 21654, f.177, lists 18 traders and 88 servants killed or made prisoner; BP 21655, f.275, lists 47 traders killed.
Jeffery Amherst, Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty’s Forces in North America, received his first account of frontier atrocities on June 6 from Bouquet;9 he did not receive confirmation of rumors concerning Detroit until after the middle of June when a report from Detroit commander Major Henry Gladwin reached New York.10

Amherst lost no time in reacting to the emergency. Part of his small reserves were released for use of Bouquet to relieve Fort Pitt and the remainder were earmarked for relief of Detroit. Bouquet at this time was commanding officer of the Southern Department (Pennsylvania and provinces south) and reported direct to Amherst.

Without instruction and with only one-tenth of the troop strength of the Forbes 1758 expedition, Bouquet in two months time assembled his relief pocket-army, gathered supplies and marched 200 miles through the wilderness to relieve Fort Pitt, arriving there August 10. He marched by the then deteriorated Forbes military route he had hacked and blasted and dug through the forests and over the mountains five years before, almost to the day.11 And on the success or failure of his expedition rested the fate of the frontier forts and of the frontier inhabitants. If he failed the clock would be turned back.

Anticipating the possibility of an Indian attack at a time and place of the enemy’s choosing, Bouquet was not disappointed nor caught unawares. A Ligonier granite monument on the Bushy Run battlefield site is an eternal reminder of his decisive victory over the Indians on the hot days of August 5 and 6, 1763.12

9 Bouquet to Amherst, June 4, 1763, BP 21634, f.269; same to same, June 5, 1763, BP 21634, f.270.
10 No information had been received by June 19 but Detroit news was confirmed by June 23. Amherst to Bouquet, June 19, 1763, BP 21634, f.289; same to same, June 23, 1763, BP 21634, f.296.
12 The basic facts in this account of the Battle of Bushy Run and its significance in the Indian Rebellion of 1763 have been extracted from the Bouquet Papers: The Papers of Henry Bouquet, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, Harrisburg, 1940-41, 19 vols. mimeo, hereinafter cited as BP. Supplementary sources of day-to-day activity at Fort Pitt include: “Journal of James Kenny, 1761-1763,” edited by John W. Jordan, PMHB, Vol. 37, 1913, particularly for the dates Jan. 1 to May 31, 1763, at p. 179-198; and “Ecuyer’s Journal” and “Orderly Book,” printed in Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, compiled by Mary C. Darlington, Pittsburgh, 1892. The Journal is from May 14 through October 19, 1763 and the Orderly Book from May 28 through October 17, 1763. “Ecuyer’s Journal,” or rather the identical contents and identified as “William Trent’s Journal,” and in Trent’s handwriting, is in the files of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. It is transcribed and edited by A. T. Volwiler in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, hereinafter cited as MVHR, Vol. 11, 1924, 390-413. References are cited as from “Trent’s Journal.”
The sections that follow tell the Pennsylvania story of the Indian Rebellion of 1763 and in the telling point up the importance of the Bushy Run victory. Analysis accents are: the investment of Fort Pitt, harassment of Fort Ligonier and of Fort Bedford; scurrying to cover of the settlers; reaction of Pennsylvania officialdom; and finally, Bouquet's expedition itself.

Fort Pitt Holds Out

The story of Fort Pitt during the Indian rebellion of 1763 is one of fortitude in rising to the emergency on the part of garrison and townspeople and of able assumption of extraordinary command responsibilities on the part of commandant Captain Simeon Ecuyer.

The story is a saga of hope that Bouquet would come to the rescue and relieve a two-months siege before possible starvation accomplished what the Indians so far had been unable to achieve. Success or failure at Bushy Run, to the entrapped in crowded Fort Pitt, was a matter of life or death.

Eight days before Bouquet's welcome arrival on August 10, Ecuyer urged forward the relief expedition with the laconic report, "I have at present four hams and no flour. Bring a quantity of it or our jaws will be empty." 13 Trader John Ormsby later recollected, "At the time of the arrival of Bouquet at Fort Pitt there was not a pound of good flour or meat there, so that if he had failed we would have starved or been tomahawked." 14 Overstated or not, the supply situation was desperate.

All was quiet at this western outpost of British might at the beginning of 1763 even though the guards once again had been alerted as a result of renewed evidence of Indian unrest. In the closing days of the previous year Bouquet had reacted to warnings sent him by Ecuyer, "I received this moment your Letter . . . inclosing . . . Intelligence informing us of the Intentions of some Indian Nations to strike us. The distant Nations having refused to join in that Scheme; The whole will vanish into Smoke & will only Serve as a Warning for us to be very vigilant." 15

13 Ecuyer to Bouquet, Aug. 2, 1763, BP 21649, f.282. Ecuyer's letters to Bouquet were in French. The same quoted phrase, as translated in Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier, op. cit., 137, reads, "I have at present four legs of beef and no flour. Bring a great deal of it or the jaws will rest immovable."


15 Bouquet to Ecuyer, Nov. 25, 1762, BP 21653, f.149.
Water troubles, more than Indian threats that were repetitious of former fears, were of most immediate concern that spring. Early in March a 34-foot flood — the highest recorded prior to the St. Patrick's Day flood of 1936 in our time — severely damaged the fort. Bouquet, on advice from Ecuyer, reported to Amherst, “Floods Seem to become annual at Fort Pitt where there has been one the 8th of this month; higher by 22 Inches than last year. Some Parts of the Ramparts towards the Monongahela are fallen in the Ditch. The Front reveted with spike has not Suffered. The inclosures of Gardens & Fields Several Trader’s Houses, the Smith’s Forge with the Bellows, and the Timber prepared for building the new Batteau have been carried off. Two of the Inhabitants are drowned.” 16

Ecuyer immediately started repairs, but of an improvised nature in keeping with Amherst’s admonition, “all that must be thought of at present, are such Temporary Repairs, as may be Absolutely Necessary for the preservation of the Garrison and Stores.” 17

Indian threats turned into overt actions in late May. That the war pot was at the boiling point was suspected on May 27 when Ecuyer learned that the Delawares and Mingoes had abandoned their nearby towns, leaving their cornfields open. The same day a number of Delawares hastily traded 300 pounds of skins for powder and lead “with uncommon dispatch and indifference.” 18

A day later the war pot had boiled over. On the 28th a Delaware war party under chief Wolfe raided Colonel William Clapham’s plantation (West Newton). Clapham, one of his men, two women and a child were killed, and the buildings at the little backwoods settlement were burned. Almost understating the case, Ecuyer notified Bouquet, “it is clear that they [the Delawares] wish to break with us.” 19

The 30th — blue Monday — brought more bad news. Fourteen traders, en route to Fort Pitt from the Delaware town of Tuskawaras under the urging of chiefs Beaver and Shingas, had been ambushed at Beaver Creek with only three escaping. The escapees bore news that the Lake Indians had brought the war belt to the Delawares, that Detroit was under attack and Sandusky burned.

Now Ecuyer was sure that a state of war existed. A second letter was dispatched to Bouquet to report the new incidents and give

16 Bouquet to Amherst, March 28, 1763, BP 21634, f.220; Ecuyer to Amherst, March 11, 1763, BP 21649, f.76; James Kenny Journal, March 7-9, 1763.
17 Amherst to Bouquet, Apr. 3, 1763, BP 21634, f.224.
18 Trent’s Journal, May 27, 1763.
19 Ecuyer to Bouquet, May 29, 1763, BP 21649, f.128.
an estimate of the situation. Ecuyer noted, "Yesterday evening [May 29] the Indians massacred the two men we had at the saw mill; they took both scalps and left a war club or tomahawk, which means, I think, a declaration of war . . . I believe the uprising is general. I tremble for our posts." 20

Tremble indeed Ecuyer might. Two expresses sent to warn the northern out-forts of Presque Isle, Le Boeuf and Venango were turned back at Shannopintown (Penn Avenue and 32nd Street) almost within sight of Fort Pitt. Expresses to the east met with more success and the garrisons at Fort Bedford and Fort Ligonier were alerted.

Ecuyer was quick to put his little domain on a war footing. Nearby settlers were warned and evacuation ordered of the way station at Bushy Run and of the storehouse-fort at Fort Burd or Redstone (Brownsville). To augment the regular garrison, two companies of militia totaling 80 to 90 men were organized from the townspeople under trader William Trent with rank as major. Thus enlarged, the garrison came to the still meagre total of 250 troops.

All hands were set to work to put the fort in defensive condition and repair the remaining ravages of the March flood. Ecuyer's own words best describe what was done. He reported to Bouquet on June 2:

Here is a summary of our work: I have demolished the lower town and brought the wood into the fort. I have had the upper town burned . . . I have surrounded our bastions with barrels full of earth, made good platforms and embrasures for our cannons. I have a good entrenchment on the mined bastion, and on the two curtains left and right of it; all around the rampart my men are covered by strong planks fastened by stakes . . . If there were any unprotected places, I would cover them with bales of deerskin belonging to the merchants; I have likewise made batteries at the neck of the bastions which connect with the barracks. 21

All of the townspeople of the little village of Pittsburgh were moved into the fort where they were to remain, crowded and under short rations, until Bouquet's entry some 70 days later. The townsfolk were joined by some of the settlers on the communication route to Fort Ligonier, all of whom had fled to the nearest fort for safety. Among those seeking sanctuary at Fort Pitt was John Metcalfe; it was on Metcalfe's plantation at Nine Mile Run that Bouquet camped the night before his relief of the fort. 22

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20 Same to same, May 30, 1763, BP 21649, f.130; Trent's Journal, May 30, 1763.
21 Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 2, 1763, BP 21649, f.138.
22 Alfred P. James, "The First English Speaking Trans Appalachian Frontier," MVHR, Vol. 17, No. 1, at pp. 62-3, 1930. In addition to many settlers who were "squatters" on the Indian lands, the military with the consent of
After two weeks work Ecuyer was satisfied with defensive measures. He reported to Bouquet,

My fort is formidable now with 16 pieces mounted on good platforms. I have quite a good entrenchment together with fraising wherever it is not revetted . . . We have worked for 11 days in an unbelievable way . . . We are all doubly armed; as a result I have 500 rifle shots to give them as soon as they are in the ditch . . . I have collected all the beaver traps . . . and they were set in the evening outside the palisades . . . I have a number of crow-foot traps made for the ditch, they are pointed enough for their moccauisins.21

To put the fort in defensive condition and organize his forces was simple enough for the competent British officer, Ecuyer. To exercise the functions of military governor gave him more concern. Sanitation, housekeeping and, most pressing of all, the distribution of food in the face of a growing shortage, challenged the busy commander.

Two ovens and a forge were constructed inside the fort. A captured bear and a wolf were ordered shot if not released into the forests. Dogs were ordered killed if found untied. An isolation hospital was constructed under the drawbridge to help control an outbreak of smallpox.24

The growing food shortage was a double pronged affair. Ecuyer found himself with unexpected mouths to feed from supplies designed for the regular garrison and with scheduled re-supply an unknown factor. Immediate steps were taken to conserve and stretch out existing supplies. In his June 2 report to Bouquet, Ecuyer had noted, “the settlers receive half rations of bread and little more meat, the poorer women and children little Indian corn and meat.” 25

As much use as possible was made of greens from the garden and of fresh meat. All of the cattle were gathered under one guard. While a few of the traders had limited amounts of corn to sell, profiteering soon resulted in price fixing of $1 a bushel. By the end of June, 420

the Indians encouraged houses and small farms on the line of communication for the convenience of army personnel and other travelers. "Petition of John Metcalfe," edited by Alfred P. James, WPHM, Vol. 16, Aug. 1953, 197-204; Remarks Upon a Memorial (Bouquet), April 4, 1764, BP 21653, f.272.
23 Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 16, 1763, BP 21649, f.170. For a complete description of Fort Pitt and an explanation of fort terminology see Charles M. Stotz, in the "Defense in the Wilderness" section of Drums in the Forest, Alfred P. James and Charles M. Stotz, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, 1958. At one time during the investment 16 bear skins were used to make a blind on the Ohio curtain. Claim of Levy, Trent & Co., Oct. 12, 1763, BP 21654, f.179.
24 Bouquet to Amherst, June 23, 1763, BP 21634, f.295.
25 Ibid., see note 21.
of the 540 persons in the fort (330 men, 104 women and 106 children) were eating the King's provisions.  

The most serious facet of the supply situation was that the food just was not there to begin with. No one had bothered to inventory supplies and check reserves. The critical shortage was not discovered until the cupboard was almost bare. Even Bouquet, relying on erroneous ration returns, was misled as he prepared the time-table for his relief expedition. He notified Amherst on July 3, “By the inclosed Return of Provisions at Fort Pitt, that Post does not stand so immediately in need of a relief, as to make us run great Risks to force a Convoy up.”

Actually there was a shortage of over 16,000 pounds of flour at the fort from book figures — enough to feed the fort's population for a month. Commissary of Provisions Captain William Murray had not weighed the flour in taking over from his predecessor. Ecuyer had signed ration returns without physically checking the stores. Excuses given a Court of Enquiry ordered by Bouquet were those of losses from movement of supplies during the March flood, break-ins by soldiers and the ravenous appetites of a “Vermin called a Weavel.”

From a military standpoint the investment and isolation of the fort during June partook more of harassment than of militant siege. Working parties cutting spelts (wheat) and their covering parties were fired upon and random shots directed at the fort kept sentinels on the alert.

Distant smokes (as that above Croghan's plantation on June 9) told of the burning of homes. Indians showed themselves at the upper end of the garden, on Grant’s Hill and on both sides of the rivers. An occasional “Death Hallow” was heard.

In the long hours of the night the Indians took cover under the defilade protection of the river banks and ventured into the ditch of the fort. Moccasin tracks spoke their unwelcome nearness. The “all’s well” of sentinels was mocked by echoing “all’s well” from across the Monongahela.

Casualties were few during the month as Ecuyer refused to be

26 Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 26, 1763, BP 21649, f.195.
27 Bouquet to Amherst, July 3, 1763, BP 21634, f.311.
28 Murray to Bouquet, Aug. 15, 1763, BP 21649, f.302; Court of Inquiry, Sept. 28, 1763, BP 21649, f.364. Flour stealing was a serious offense. Early in 1763 a flour thief at Fort Pitt received 500 lashes but refused to reveal his accomplices. Ecuyer to Bouquet, February 8, 1763, BP 21649, f.53.
decoyed into sending out parties beyond the protection of the guns of the fort. A soldier on Grant's Hill contrary to orders was killed on June 15; on the 19th a soldier accidentally shot himself; on the 22nd a soldier rounding up horses was killed and scalped in sight of the fort.

Communication, though irregular, remained open to the east until late in June. It had been blocked to the north since the beginning of the month. Unsung express riders carried on as long as possible despite the danger. An express from Bedford was fired upon at the very gates of the fort on the night of June 15 — en route he had killed an Indian.

Further intelligence of the spreading warfare was received on the 7th of June, when a messenger from Ensign John Christie at Presque Isle brought news of ambush of a water-borne supply convoy to Detroit and of the burning of Fort Sandusky.

There was no further news from the north until near the end of the month and Ecuyer feared the worst. On the 25th two of the 13-man Le Boeuf garrison stumbled in to report that the worst had occurred, and that Le Boeuf had been attacked and burned by the Senecas on the 18th. They further reported that Venango had been burned with apparently no survivors among Lieutenant Francis Gordon and his 15-man garrison stationed there.29

The next day Ensign George Price and five more of the Le Boeuf complement arrived. Also on the 26th a soldier came in from Presque Isle with the final bit of bad news: after a two day fight on the 19th and 20th Ensign Christie and the remainder of his 29-man garrison had capitulated to 250 Indian attackers.

Now all the out-forts were gone and Ecuyer was prompt to notify Bouquet of the losses, his express of June 26 reaching Bouquet at Carlisle on July 3 and bringing to Bouquet the last intelligence he was to receive from Fort Pitt prior to the Battle of Bushy Run.30

Ecuyer had cause for concern even before the gloomy news from

29 Report to Sir Wm. Johnson re taking of Venango, BP 21634, f.319. Ensign Christie's report re Presque Isle, BP 21649, f.242; Ensign Price's report re Le Boeuf, BP 21649, f.193. Further details of capture of the northern posts are contained in documents printed in Wilderness Chronicles of North Western Pennsylvania, S. K. Stevens, and D. H. Kent, editors, Pennsylvania Historical Commission, Harrisburg, 1941, 248-256. Even though communication to the north had been cut off since the first of June, Ecuyer was concerned with the supply situation of the dependent forts. On June 18 he reported sending a supply convoy with 52 barrels of flour and beef to Venango. No record has been found of the fate of the convoy. Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, BP 21649, f.197.

the north. In the middle of June he learned that the Shawnees had joined the insurrection. He now knew, and the people in the fort soon surmised, that Fort Pitt was in serious jeopardy unless relief arrived.

On June 24th the Delawares, under chief Turtle Heart, asked for a conference. Turtle Heart urged marching home over the mountains and promised safe conduct. Ecuyer turned a deaf ear. He told the Indians, that the British would not leave, that they had plenty of provisions, and that three armies with 6,000 men were on the way to Fort Pitt. Token presents were given the Delawares on their departure. Also, Ecuyer reported, "out of our regard to them we gave them two blankets and a handkerchief from the small pox hospital" — an early experiment in biological warfare suggested by Amherst.

The war of nerves continued in July, punctuated by loss of communication to the east as well as to the north. Now all was dark and the little world of Fort Pitt was all alone in the wilderness. The food situation worsened. Wood became scarce and women were restricted to washing linen only and no ironing. Ecuyer continued to refuse to be decoyed into sending out small pursuit parties that might be cut off.

On July 26th and 27th came a major conference with chiefs of the Delawares and Shawnees — with Shingas, Winginum, Grey Eyes, Turtle Heart, the Big Wolfe and others. The Indians again urged withdrawal. Ecuyer again refused surrender, boasting that he had ammunition and provisions for three years — all, however, that he really had was hope and perhaps even confidence that Bouquet would come to his rescue in time.

Unsuccessful in negotiations, the Indians began an all-out attack on the afternoon of July 28th that continued for four days and nights. Bouquet reported details of the fight to Amherst soon after his relief of the fort, "The Delawares, Shawanise, Wiandots and Mingoes had closely beset, and attacked this Fort from the 27th July to the first

31 Speeches of Delaware Indians, June 24, 1763, BP 21655, f.216.
instant when they quitted it to March against us. The Boldness of those Savages is hardly Credible they had taken Post under the banks of both rivers close to the Fort, where digging holes they kept an incessant fire, and threw fire arrows. They are good Marksmen, and tho our people were under cover they kild one and wounded seven. Captain Ecuyer is wounded in the Leg with an arrow." 34

During the fight the roofs of the Governor's House and of the Barracks were damaged although most of the nighttime arrows fell short. The foresight of Ecuyer in constructing a fire engine and of providing filled casks of water with the women assigned to serve them prevented spread of the fires.

Actually casualties were light for the sustained fight of almost 100 hours. Enemy losses — estimated but not verified — were 20 killed and wounded from an attack force judged to be in excess of 400. Speaking of his wound, Ecuyer noted that an arrow "had the insolence to caress my left leg." 35

As noted in Bouquet's report above, the Indians terminated the fight the afternoon of August 1 to march against the relief expedition. They preferred the odds of attacking Bouquet in the open with the advantage of surprise rather than continuing the so-far fruitless assault against Fort Pitt. 36

On August 2 express John Hudson, a Cayuga Indian, arrived from Bouquet at Bedford (after having been held prisoner by the warring tribes for three days en route) to report the relief expedition on the way. This was the first news from the east in weeks.

Three days later, on August 5, an express from Bouquet at Ligonier reported that on his way to Fort Pitt he had observed Indians assembling at Small's plantation on Turtle Creek. Ecuyer properly surmised a forthcoming assault on Bouquet between Ligonier and Fort Pitt, on the outcome of which hinged the fate of his command.

A news blackout for the next four days did little to ease Ecuyer's mind. He did not know of Bouquet's successful stand at Bushy Run on the 5th and 6th. All that he knew was that Bouquet was in the open, facing attack by a formidable foe — a situation Braddock in 1755 and Grant in 1758 had been unable to master.

34 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 11, 1763, BP 21634, f.358.
35 Ecuyer to Bouquet, Aug. 2, 1763, BP 21649, f.282; same to same, Aug. 3, 1763, BP 21649, f.286.
36 From a military standpoint Fort Pitt was impregnable against the weapons of the Indians. Charles M. Stotz characterizes the fort with its outworks as "the most elaborate fortification built by the British on their frontiers in America." Drums in the Forest, op. cit., 161.
1963  BUSHY RUN: DECISIVE BATTLE IN THE WILDERNESS  225

But all's well that ends well. At daybreak on August 10 express Miller arrived to report Bouquet at Nine Mile Run, battle-scarred but victorious. Mid-morning a detail under Captain Phelps marched to meet Bouquet, making contact at Bullet's Hill (Lawrenceville). Bouquet entered the fort at 2 P.M.

As the Pennsylvania Gazette reported under date of September 1, "You may be sure the sight of the Troops was very agreeable to our poor Garrison, being penned up in the Fort from the 29th of May . . . and the Barracks Rooms crammed with Men, Women and Children." 37

Fort Bedford and Fort Ligonier Stand Firm

We can recite but not adequately share the fear and desperation that gripped the small frontier towns of Bedford and Ligonier when tomahawks appeared at their doorsteps as the Indian rebellion spread eastward.

As at Fort Pitt, the little stockade forts at the two towns became refuge points for local townspeople and neighboring farmers. But unlike the situation at Fort Pitt, neither of the out-forts of Bedford or Ligonier was much more than a stockade and neither had much more than a shadow of a garrison. Reliance, initially, was on hastily organized militia.

Both commanders, Captain Lewis Ourry at Fort Bedford and Lieutenant Archibald Blane at Fort Ligonier, resolutely met the Indian threat. While both forts had been alerted by messages from Captain Ecuyer at Fort Pitt, the peculiar behavior of local Indians also had roused suspicions of trouble brewing.

On May 31 Ourry's garrison at Fort Bedford consisted of a corporal and six men. In the town were 36 men able to bear arms. Ourry promptly formed a militia, checked arms and warned nearby settlers. Measures were taken to capture and save rain water dripping from roofs in the fort. 38

By June 3 some 93 panicky families had flocked into Fort Bedford. All were "lodged and Victualed" and the unarmed men were armed. The militia, by now raised to 155 men, was organized into two companies; the regular garrison, augmented by personnel

38 Ourry to Bouquet, May 31, 1763, BP 21649, f.132; same to same, June 1, 1763, BP 21649, f.134.
from Juniata Crossings and expresses, mustered three corporals and nine privates; the all, Ourry boasted to Bouquet, was "no Despicable Garrison." 39

As at Fort Bedford, the regular garrison at Fort Ligonier consisted of only seven men at the start of the Indian hostilities. By June 3, however, Blane had a fighting force of 40 men.40 The militia was organized from townsfolk and refugees, from pack horse drivers, and from militia borrowed from Fort Bedford. Inhabitants between the way stations of Bushy Run on the west and Stony Creek on the east sought sanctuary at the fort.41

Apparently few Indians disturbed the strong defenses at Fort Bedford; there is no record of attack. Isolated farms in the vicinity, however, suffered the terror of depredation. Among the incidents: four families were murdered on Dunning Creek on June 18;42 on June 30 it was reported, "Our Parade just now presents a Scene of bloody and savage Cruelty; three Men . . . lying scalped (two of them still alive) thereon." 43 Scouting parties sent out from the fort to apprehend the Indians had little success.44

Two attacks were made on Fort Ligonier, the weaker of the two forts, and it was under constant threat until Bouquet's welcome arrival on August 2. The first attack came on June 2. Blane reported to Bouquet that his garrison "was attacked by a body of Indians, about five in the Morning but as they only fired upon us from the skirts of the Woods, I contented myself with giving them three Chears, without spending a single shot upon them." 45 Fearing further attacks, Blane applied the torch to houses in the town as Ecuyer had done at Fort Pitt.

The second Indian attack was vigorously prosecuted for two hours on June 21, with apparently little damage to either side. It started from an ambush by an estimated 100 Indians on a 15-man foray party that had gone out to capture a decoy of four Indians.

39 Same to same, June 3, 1763, BP 21649, f.143.
40 Ibid.
41 Blane to Bouquet, June 4, 1763, BP 21649, f.144. The way stations were small military installations located on the communication line. The Bushy Run station had a garrison of two men at the outbreak of hostilities. Andrew Byerly, from this station, was warned by friendly Indians to flee a few days before the first incidents about Fort Pitt. Ecuyer to Bouquet, May 29, 1763, BP 21649, f.128.
42 Pennsylvania Gazette, June 30, 1763.
43 Ibid., July 30, 1763.
44 Ourry to Bouquet, June 10, 1763, BP 21649, f.158.
45 Blane to Bouquet, June 4, 1763, BP 21649, f.144.
Fortunately a swamp between the Indians and the soldiers permitted their safe return to the fort. During the month of June many of the horses were killed or carried off and one straggler was reported killed.

Investigation and harassment of the two forts was not without its amusing incidents, at least in retrospect.

After the burning of the town houses about Fort Ligonier a straggler (probably Richard Shannon) saw smoke rising above the tree tops and conjectured a débacle. He fled through the woods, arriving at Fort Bedford three days later to report Fort Ligonier burning and surrounded by Indians. This was all the already frightened refugees needed to hear; they started to pack for flight to the east. Ourry quelled the false alarm by producing a letter from Blane telling of the burning of the houses; on examination the straggler broke down to confess that he had seen only smoke and but one Indian. The Indian was surmised to have been Ourry's own scout.

At Fort Ligonier a barking dog led to the discovery of three Indians under the "Necessary House"—latrine. The Indians escaped in the darkness.

Similar to the situation at Fort Pitt, the problem of feeding the civilian refugees taxed the resources at both Fort Ligonier and Fort Bedford. Cattle were placed under guard in the shadow of the forts. Fresh meat was used to conserve the salt pork. However, early in June Ourry at Bedford was able to spare 1,800 pounds of flour for use of Major James Livingston at Fort Cumberland.

Bouquet was concerned with the present and potential drain on supplies. On June 14 he warned Ourry at Fort Bedford, "It will not be possible to give Provisions to the great Number of People, who have flocked to you... I wish you could reduce those you Supply to thirty men which are sufficient for the Security of your Post, as it can be in no danger of an Attack while the upper Posts stand." When this was written Bouquet was unaware that Presque Isle, Venango and Le Boeuf would fall within the next week.

Constant alerts and constant fear kept their grasp on the civilian-choked little forts until after Bouquet's arrival, at Bedford on July 25 and Ligonier on August 2. During the long investment both com-

46 Same to same, June 28, 1763, BP 21649, f.204.
47 Same to same, June 10, 1763, BP 21649, f.157; Ourry to Bouquet, June 9, 1763, BP 21649, f.155.
48 Blane to Bouquet, June 17, 1763, BP 21649, f.175.
49 Ourry to Bouquet, June 9, 1763, BP 21649, f.155.
50 Bouquet to Ourry, June 14, 1763, BP 21653, f.166.
manders had problems with their untrained militia and both asked Bouquet for reinforcements. Bouquet sent the first troops available. Thirty Highlanders under Lieutenant Donald Campbell arrived at Fort Ligonier on July 9. In a short time Bedford also was reinforced.

Difficulties of enforcing martial law annoyed both Blane and Ourry. Deserters, and civilian stragglers out to check their plantation homes, compounded the problem of control of the settlers.

Communication with Fort Pitt was closed by the Indians late in June. Both Ourry and Blane were aware that if Ecuyer capitulated at Fort Pitt their little forts at Ligonier and Bedford on the communication line were doomed. For all of July they were in the dark concerning events at Fort Pitt. They hoped Bouquet would come in time, would come before Indians burst through the forests from the west.

**Flight from the Forest**

Atrocities about Fort Pitt and feints at Fort Bedford, Fort Ligonier and Fort Cumberland in early June resulted in panic among the forest dwellers. Family by family, bag and baggage, they fled their homes for the welcome shelter of soon overcrowded forts and across the mountains to the soon overcrowded villages in the Cumberland Valley.

Even though no actual hostilities had occurred east of the Alleghenies before the middle of June, the stampede already had its momentum. Bouquet reported to Amherst on June 16, “The Panick appears General on the Frontier, which will soon be deserted.” On the 29th he continued in similar vein, “There appears to be few Savages yet on these Frontiers, but every Tree is become an Indian for the terrified Inhabitant.”

Fear and fact of scalp-bent raiders rolled back the forest traces of white civilization as small and independent bands of Indians began their death forage, burning homes and killing and scalping the unwary.

On June 30 the *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported from Carlisle that “the country is in great distress, occasioned by people leaving their Plantations.” The townspeople of Shippensburg were cited as “in the greatest Consternation there.”

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51 Lt. Donald Campbell to Bouquet, July 11, 1763, BP 21649, f.244.
52 Bouquet to Amherst, June 19, 1763, BP 21634, f.288.
53 Same to same, June 16, 1763, BP 21634, f.282.
54 Same to same, June 29, 1763, BP 21634, f.308.
The July 7 Pennsylvania Gazette repeated the roll of fear on the frontier. It summarized, "from Cumberland County our Accounts, in general, are most melancholy; the poor Back Inhabitants coming continually into Carlisle from their Places, having hardly anything with them but their children."

By the middle of July, Carlisle had replaced Fort Pitt as the western frontier. On July 13 Bouquet reported to Governor Hamilton, "The Acc. of the Murders committed by the Savages in this unfortunate County will be transmitted to you by so many Persons that I need not be very particular. The List of the People known to be killed from 40 to within 16 miles of this Town, amounted last Night to nineteen, besides wounded, & increases very fast every Hour."

Bouquet almost was at a loss for appropriate words as he continued, "The Desolation of so many Families reduced to the last Extremities of Want & Misery; The Despair of those who have lost their Parents, Relations & Friends, with the Cries of distracted Women & Children who fill the Streets, form a Scene of Horror painful to Humanity, impossible to describe." 55

Additional reports in the Pennsylvania Gazette eloquently tell the tragic story. On July 21 the paper informed its readers that "in a few Days there will be scarcely a House inhabited North of Carlisle." The account added, "From what appears, the Indians are traveling from one Place to another, along the Valley burning the Farms, and destroying all People they meet with."

The July 28 Pennsylvania Gazette report was that "the whole Country seemed to be in one general Blaze." As to Carlisle, "every Stable and Hovel in town [was] crowded with Miserable Refugees, who were reduced to a State of Beggary and Despair." Further information was that for miles on both sides of the Susquehanna, the woods were filled with families and their cattle, living like savages.

At Shippensburg as at Carlisle there was no room in the inn. For some reason not now known — possibly for distribution of relief collections from Philadelphia and other churches — a census was made of the refugees. As of July 25 Shippensburg had "1,384 of our poor distressed Back Inhabitants, viz: Men 301, women 345, children 738; many of whom were obliged to lie in Barns, Stables, Cellars, and under old leaky Sheds, the Dwelling-houses being all crowded." 56

Bouquet was not unmindful of the problems created by the

55 Bouquet to Hamilton, July 13, 1763, BP 21649, f.256.
56 Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 4, 1763.
stampede of the settlers but was powerless to stop the desertion of homes. As he began to assemble his relief expedition he expressed the wish to Amherst, "I hope the appearance of these Troops will induce the Inhabitants of the Frontier to return to their Settlement too hastily abandoned." Later he conveyed like sentiment to Governor Hamilton that his expedition would draw the attention of the "Enemy upon me & by that Means be of more Service to this People."

Once the relief expedition was organized and under way Bouquet's hope was partially realized. Provincial troops also aided in securing the valleys. Accounts in the Pennsylvania Gazette for August 4 sounded more optimistic, with indications that church collections had relieved some of the distress and that attempts were being made in the various coves to bring in the crops. The same paper, however, carried an account of the Sunday killing of 20 persons at worship in Augusta County, Virginia.

The damage to a way of life is hard to estimate. Scalps and houses burned tell a factual story. The human side is that of families uprooted, of orphans, of a lifetime's economy destroyed.

Circuit-rider Rev. Wm. Thomson estimated 1,500 plantations evacuated. George Croghan estimated that in four months time the Indians killed or captured 2,000. Colonel John Armstrong reported 48 or 49 inhabitants killed east of the Allegheny hills. Bouquet opinioned that in a short time 600 persons were lost.

Fortunately Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run stopped the Indian depredations and made it possible for many settlers to return to their homes and salvage their crops. However, the damage to a way of life was not quickly repaired. Not until Bouquet's expedition into central Ohio in 1764 to punish the Indians did the settlers in any great numbers return to their homes to begin life anew.
The Provincial Assembly — Action and Inaction

Although they asked for aid from Pennsylvania, neither Bouquet nor Amherst nor Governor James Hamilton himself for that matter, were optimistic for help.

The Governor did all he could within his own limited royal powers and resources. At his insistence the Commissioners empowered him to raise 90 men to reinforce Fort Augusta (Sunbury). At a meeting of the Provincial Council on June 20 Hamilton presented “sundry letters of Intelligence from the Frontiers” concerning hostilities committed by the western Indians and of suspicious behavior of the Indians on the upper Susquehanna.

Troubles with Indians in the Wyoming Valley who resented intrusion of white settlers from Connecticut on their lands were, at that moment, more pressing than reports from the west. Early in the month of June the Governor had issued his third proclamation enjoining squatters from lands between the Delaware and Susquehanna Rivers, and had appointed James Burd and Thomas McKee to enforce its provisions.

Rapidly the west became more important. New reports of murders and depredations, presented to the Council on June 23, resulted in a call for the Provincial Assembly to meet on July 4.

After the Assembly organized, the Governor advised members of a general Indian uprising and of the abandonment of homesteads in the valleys. He noted that settlers “desert their Settlements with the utmost Precipitation together with all their Worldly Substance, and take refuge in the interior Parts.”

The Governor continued that salvage of the approaching harvest was absolutely necessary for the “subsistence of the Country” — meaning Pennsylvania. Amherst’s request for troops to defend and protect the frontiers was endorsed, as was his request for carriages for his Majesty’s service.

Two days later Assembly members were given news from

64 Bouquet to Amherst, June 13, 1763, BP 21634, f.277. Fort Augusta was the only manned Provincial fort at the start of Indian hostilities. Thirty men were stationed there. Bouquet to Amherst, June 10, 1763, BP 21634, f.273.
Bouquet of the loss of Presque Isle, Le Boeuf and Venango, and of new attacks on Fort Pitt and Fort Ligonier. Bouquet gloomily forecast that without prompt action, "I foresee the Ruin of the part of the province on this side of the Susquehannah." 69

The Assembly acted promptly, if only partially. By July 8th bills had been passed and signed authorizing the hire of carriages as requested and for the raising of 700 additional troops "to serve in the purchased parts of the province" 70 — that is, east of the Alleghenies and purchased from the Indians by treaty. 71 The troops were to serve "during time of harvest or until the next meeting of this house."

Legalistic to the end, the Assembly thus provided money for supply wagons but restricted troop activity to assuring a successful home harvest. Bouquet continued, without success, to press Hamilton for provincial troops to serve beyond the purchased lands. On July 19, from Fort Loudon, he wrote the Governor that he had not proposed going further than Bedford without troop aid from the Province, but that now he would proceed himself with the added risk. 72

The 700 additional provincial troops quickly were raised and together with existing troops permitted the use of 400 men divided into eight companies west of the Susquehanna. 73 Colonel James Armstrong was in command.

Maryland and Virginia, whose borders also were threatened, took similar action to that of Pennsylvania. Virginia called up its militia and Maryland reinforced Fort Cumberland. 74 And in the end the harvests were saved 75 — more thanks to Bouquet and his victory at Bushy Run than to the Provincial Assembly.

The Provincial Assembly took one more action. After the harvest had been gathered, Governor Hamilton advised that the danger from the Indians would continue until the grain was threshed out and

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69 Bouquet to Hamilton, July 3, 1763, BP 21649, f.219; Pa. Arch., 8th Series, Vol. 6, 5430 et seq.
70 Hamilton to Bouquet, July 6, 1763, BP 21649, f.235; same to same, July 12, 1763, BP 21649, f.250; Prov. Coun., Vol. 9, 36-7.
72 Bouquet to Hamilton, July 19, 1763, BP 21649, f.269.
74 Amherst to Bouquet, Aug. 25, 1763, BP 21634, f.362.
75 Prov. Coun., Vol. 9, 42. The Pennsylvania Gazette for September 1, 1763, reported all grain within ten miles of Bedford reaped and stacked. See also: Hamilton to Pa. Assembly, Sept. 16, 1763, Pa. Arch., 8th Series, Vol. 6, 5435.
transported to the interior parts of the province. The Assembly voted 24,000 pounds to pay 800 provincial troops until December 1.\footnote{Hamilton to Pa. Assembly, Sept. 16, 1763, \textit{ibid.}, bill signed Oct. 22, 1763, \textit{ibid.}, 5483.}

\textit{Bouquet to the Rescue}

Once made aware of Indian hostilities, the British military command acted promptly and a chain of events was started that ended in Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run.

Ecuyer's initial report of atrocities about Fort Pitt was directed to Bouquet at Philadelphia and quickly sent on to Amherst at New York. Amherst took the precautionary step (June 6) of alerting the light infantry companies of available reserves, ordering them to assemble on Staten Island.

Even so, Amherst doubted that the Indian warfare was general. He wrote Bouquet:

\begin{quote}
Altho' I have thought proper to Assemble this Force \ldots yet I am persuaded this Alarm will End in Nothing more than a Rash Attempt of what the \textit{Senecas} have been threatening \ldots As to their cutting off Defenceless Families, or Even some of the Small Posts, it is certainly at all times in their power to Effect such Enterprises \ldots The Post of Fort Pitt, or any of the others Commanded by Officers, can certainly never be in Danger from such a Wretched Enemy.\footnote{Amherst to Bouquet, June 6, 1763, \textit{BP} 21634, f.271.}
\end{quote}

Six days later (June 12) Amherst was convinced that the Indian warfare was general but he still doubted rumors concerning Detroit. He informed Bouquet:

\begin{quote}
I Find the Affair of the Indians, appears to be more General than I had Apprehended, altho' I Believe Nothing of what is mentioned Regarding the Garrison of the Detroit being Cutt off \ldots I have Ordered Major Campbell to March Immediately with the Light Infantry Companies of the 42.\textsuperscript{4} & 77.\textsuperscript{th} Regiments \ldots I Leave it Entirely to You to Employ these two Companies, as Circumstances may Require \ldots I have likewise Wrote to Governor Hamilton, in hopes that the Province of Pennsylvania will Exert themselves on this Occasion.\footnote{Same to same, June 12, 1763, \textit{BP} 21634, f.275.}
\end{quote}

On arrival at Philadelphia, the two light infantry companies were routed to Carlisle.

As late as the middle of June Bouquet was in doubt as to his course of action. He wrote Amherst on June 16, "We are yet too much in the Dark to form a Plan; but if Things are as represented, I propose to march these two Companies to Fort Pitt, with a Convoy of Flour, Sheep and some Powder."\footnote{Bouquet to Amherst, June 16, 1763, \textit{BP} 21634, f.282.}
Attune to the possibilities of a relief expedition, George Croghan a few days previously had at his own expense recruited a 25-man garrison to occupy the abandoned Fort Littleton on the military route to the west. Amherst ratified his action.80

Before the end of the month Bouquet's plans were firmed, and decisions came fast both by Bouquet and Amherst as reports of border incidents multiplied. On June 18 Amherst released another company of the 42nd Regiment to Bouquet, sending along with it a small detachment of Royal Artillery.81 A few days later (June 23), by which time the Detroit rumors had been confirmed, the remaining available troops of the 42nd and 77th Regiments, 360 strong, marched from New York under Major Allan Campbell to join Bouquet's relief force at Carlisle.82

But this was all. The barrel had been scraped clean. Faced with the necessity of dividing his meagre reserves between Detroit and Fort Pitt, Amherst informed Bouquet, "I have already told you, that all the Troops from hence, that Could be Collected, are Sent you . . . so that should the whole Race of Indians take Arms against Us, I can do no more." 83 Later he had one final word of advice for Bouquet: "No Prisoners." 84

So it was Bouquet's show with few troops, unlikely help from Pennsylvania, and supplies and their means of transport to be gathered. Carlisle, as it had been for the Forbes expedition of 1758, already had been determined as the staging area.

Bouquet took decisive action. Two days after the originally dispatched companies arrived at Carlisle (June 28), 30 of the fittest men were ordered to march to reinforce Fort Ligonier.85 Shortly thereafter the remainder of the two companies were sent to Fort Bedford.

80 Croghan to Bouquet, June 11, 1763, BP 21649, f.160; Amherst to Bouquet, June 29, 1763, BP 21634, f.301.
81 Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, BP 21634, f.286.
82 Same to same, June 23, 1763, BP 21634, f.296; same to same, June 29, 1763, BP 21634, f.306; Campbell to Bouquet, June 24, 1763, BP 21649, f.188.
83 Amherst to Bouquet, June 25, 1763, BP 21634, f.301. Amherst's over-all plan was for Bouquet's forces, after relief of Fort Pitt, to be attached to Gladwin for recapture of the out-forts from Detroit. Amherst to Bouquet, July 2, 1763, BP 21634, f.309. Troop shortage from casualties and sickness, and supply problems, prevented Bouquet from reinforcing Gladwin. Bouquet to Gladwin, Aug. 28, 1763, BP 21649, f.313; Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 26, 1763, BP 21634, f.365.
84 Amherst to Bouquet, June 29, 1763, BP 21634, f.306.
85 Bouquet to Lt. Donald Campbell, June 29, 1763, BP 21653, f.173; Campbell to Bouquet, July 11, 1763, BP 21649, f.244; Bouquet to Amherst, June 29, 1763, BP 21634, f.306.
The third of the initial companies was sent to Fort Loudon as a guard for cattle and horses.  

The final troops under Major Campbell arrived at Carlisle on July 10. They left much to be desired, particularly those from the 77th Regiment, many of whom were malaria convalescents from recent West Indian service.  Few of the troops were familiar with wilderness fighting.

Gathering of transport and supplies disrupted planning schedules. On June 29 an order was published impressing wagons. The same day Robert Callender was directed to secure 300 pack horses with a driver for each seven horses and a horsemaster for each 63 or more. The firm of Plumstead and Frank was engaged to secure supplies and later to forward provisions as Bouquet might direct.  

By July 3 Bouquet was able to report to Amherst that he had obtained 100 cattle, 200 sheep and 3,000 pounds of fine powder. He expected transport wagons and flour from Lancaster on the 8th and hoped to march on the 15th. Time out was taken by Bouquet on July 5 to write a will in which he gave 50 pounds to the poor, to be distributed by his good friend, Reverend Richard Peters.  

The relief expedition cleared Carlisle on July 18. Winter storms and spring rains had washed out bridges and damaged the old Forbes military road and subsequent supply route to the west. Bedford was not reached until the 25th. Bouquet complained to Colonel James Robertson, "Tho' I find myself utterly abandoned by the very People I am ordered to protect, I shall do my utmos to save them from Distuction . . . I find the last Winter has greatly hurt our Roads & swept off the Remainder of our temporary Bridges, which makes me crawl so slowly that I have employed 36 hours in going 3 Miles."  

A short stop was needed at Bedford to rest men and horses and repair wagons . . . and to recruit scouts. En route to Bedford Bouquet had acquired a new worry. Finding the Highlanders unsuited for use

86 Bouquet to Amherst, July 13, 1763, BP 21634, f.321.
87 Bouquet to Hamilton, July 8, 1763, BP 21649, f.238; Bouquet to Gladwin, Aug. 28, 1763, BP 21649, f.313.
88 Order Impressing Wagons, June 29, 1763, BP 21653, f.170; Bouquet to Callendar, June 29, 1763, BP 21653, f.174.
89 Amherst to Plumstead & Frank, July 26, 1763, BP 21634, f.337.
90 Bouquet to Amherst, July 3, 1763, BP 21634, f.311.
91 Same to same, July 13, 1763, BP 21634, f.321.
92 Bouquet Will, July 5, 1763, BP 21653, f.189.
93 Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, BP 21634, f.333.
94 Bouquet to Col. James Robertson, July 26, 1763, BP 21634, f.335.
as flankers, he grumbled, "I labour under a great Disadvantage for want of Men used to the Woods, as I cannot send a Highlander out of my sight without running the Risk of losing the Man."  

Recruiting of 30 woodsmen was ordered; it is known that 14 scouts under Captain Lemuel Barrett were obtained for this service from Major Livingston at Fort Cumberland.  

Leaving Fort Bedford on July 28, the little army and its convoy of food pushed on slowly to Fort Ligonier. The pace was set by the livestock as much as by the tortuous road over the Allegheny and Laurel mountains. The expedition entered the welcome protection of Fort Ligonier on August 2 without having been fired upon. The quiet was ominous.

Though not the phraser of song as was Francis Scott Key a half-century later, Bouquet was deeply concerned if the "flag was still there" at Fort Pitt. He had had no news since Ecuyer's last letter of June 26.

In this circumstance Bouquet resolved on a forced march for the remaining miles, leaving wagons, powder and most of the relief provisions at Ligonier and proceeding with only 400 flour-laden pack horses.

With a short rest for men and horses to recoup strength for the final leg of the march, the expedition left Fort Ligonier on August 4 and camped on the westerly side of Chestnut Ridge that night. Plans for the next day were for a rapid march to the Bushy Run way station, halfway to Fort Pitt from Fort Ligonier; after a short halt at Bushy

95 Ibid., Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, BP 21634, f.333. Later and after the Battle of Bushy Run Bouquet praised the bravery of the Highlanders. Bouquet to Lt. James MacDonald, Aug. 28, 1763, BP 21649, f.316.

96 Livingston to Bouquet, Aug. 1, 1763, BP 21649, f.280. At a later date (Aug. 5, 1764) Captain Barrett made claim for loss of clothing by his men during the Bushy Run action. BP 21651, f.186.

97 Pennsylvania Gazette, Aug. 18, 1763.

98 Even George Washington was apprehensive. Apparently not yet in receipt of the Bushy Run victory news, Washington wrote his friend Robert Stewart on Aug. 13, 1763, "Another tempest has arose upon our Frontiers, and the alarm spread wider than ever ... and the distresses of the Settlement appear too evident and manifold to need description. At this Instant a calm is taking place, which forebodes some mischief to Collo. Bouquet at least those who wish well to the Convoy are apprehensive for him since it is not unlikely that the retreat of all the Indian Parties at one and the same time from our Frontiers is a probable proof of their Assembling a force somewhere, and for some particular purpose; none more likely than to oppose his March ... the Governor and Council hath directed 1000 Militia to be employed ..." The Writings of George Washington, John C. Fitzpatrick, editor, Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., Vol. 2, 402, 403.
Run the column would time its march to enter the Turtle Creek valley at dark in order to minimize danger of ambush.

Not having been attacked by the Indians so far, Bouquet and his men were aware of the danger of an assault at any time on this final approach to Fort Pitt. With Braddock's fate in mind, vigilance was an unnecessary order to the advance guard and to the flankers.

The half-expected Indian attack was not long delayed. At 1 o'clock on the afternoon of August 5, when the tired column was but one mile short of its rest goal, the advance guard was fired upon. Shortly the fighting became general.

So we come to the two-day battle of Bushy Run, whose 200th birthday we celebrate this year; and we come to the problem of separating confirmed action from firmed tradition; and we come to grips with evaluating this conflict in the wilderness — whether a small skirmish or a decisive battle or elements of both.

Others — especially Parkman — have related the story of the battle so well it would be presumptuous to paraphrase or add to their picturesque telling. Actually the best telling is in the words of Bouquet himself, in his after-action reports to Amherst written by candlelight on the hot nights of August 5 and 6, 1763. His very words give the measure of the man. The reports follow:

Camp 26 Miles from Fort Pitt — 5th Aug. The 2d Ins. the Troops & Convoy arrived at Ligonier, where

99 One of the most interesting and repeated traditions concerns Andrew Byerly, caretaker at Bushy Run way-station, who had retreated to Ligonier at the start of hostilities. Reputedly Byerly obtained spring water in his hat at night for relief of the wounded. Byerly knew the country and likely volunteered to go with Bouquet if for no other reason than to inspect his home. Other than Parkman, op. cit., the classic account of the Battle of Bushy Run is the foreword to An Historical Account of Bouquet's Expeditions Against the Ohio Indians, in 1764, by William Smith, Cincinnati, 1868, originally printed in Philadelphia in 1765. The Thomas Hutchins map of the battlefield, facing p. 24, drawn in 1764, is particularly valuable. Hutchins, then an ensign in the British Army, was stationed at Fort Pitt during the siege. For additional accounts of the battle, see John H. Boucher, Old and New Westmoreland, American Historical Society, New York, 1918, Vol. 1, Chaps. 7 and 8; Lewis C. Walkinshaw, Annals of South Western Pennsylvania, Lewis Historical Publishing Co., New York, 1939, Vol. 1, Chaps. 21 and 22; Rev. Cyrus Cort, Col. Henry Bouquet and His Campaigns of 1763 and 1764, Lancaster, 1883; C. M. Bomberger, The Battle of Bushy Run, Jeannette, Pa., Publishing Co., 1928; same author and publisher, Brush Creek Tales, 1950; C. Hale Sipe, Fort Ligonier and Its Times, Telegraph Press, Harrisburg, 1932, Chaps. 9-12.

100 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 5, 1763, BP 21653, f.201; also at BP 21634, f.339. Caption on letter at BP 21634 reads "Camp at Edge Hill 26 Miles from Fort Pitt," and number of horses is given as 340.
I cou'd obtain no Intelligence of the Enemy; all Expresses sent from the Beginning of July having been either killed or forced to return. In that Uncertainty I determined to have all the Waggons, with the Powder, and a Quantity of Stores & Provisions at Ligonier; & on the 4\textsuperscript{th} proceeded with the Troops & about 400 Horses loaded with Flour. I intended this Day to have halted at Bushy-Run, a mile from hence, and, after refreshing Men & Horses, have marched in the Night over Turtle Creek, a dangerous Pass; when at one o'Clock this afternoon our advanced guard was attacked, & being immediately supported by the two Light Infantry Companies of the 42.,\textsuperscript{d} they drove the Indians from their Ambuscade and pursued them a good Way: But the Fire continuing obstinate on our Front, & extending along our Flanks, we made a general attack with the rest of the Troops to dislodge the Savages from a Hill: in which Attempt we succeeded without obtaining by it any decisive Advantage; for as soon as they were driven from one Post they appeared upon another, till, by continual Reinforcements, they at last surrounded us and attacked the Convoy in our Rear: This obliged us to march back to protect it: The Action became then general, and tho' we were attacked on every Side and the Savages exerted themselves with uncommon Resolution; they have been constantly repulsed with the Loss of several of their Men; but on our Side we have suffered considerably. Cap.\textsuperscript{t} L.\textsuperscript{t} Graham & L.\textsuperscript{t} James M.Intosh of the 42.\textsuperscript{d} are killed & Cap.\textsuperscript{t} Graham wounded. Of the R: A: R Lieu.\textsuperscript{t} Dow shot through the Body, & out of 16 Men in the whole, seven killed & three wounded. Of the 77.\textsuperscript{th} L.\textsuperscript{t} Donald Campbell & M.\textsuperscript{t} Peebles wounded: Our Loss in Men, including Rangers & Drivers, exceeds sixty killed or wounded. The Action has lasted from one O'Clock till Night, & we expect to begin again at Day-Break. Whatever our Fate may be I thought it necessary to give you this early Information of what has happened, that you may, at all Events, take speedy Measures with the Provinces for their own Safety, & the effectual Relief of Fort Pitt, as, in Case of another Action, I foresee insurmountable Difficulties in protecting & transporting our Provisions, being already so much weakened by the Losses of this Day in Men & Horses, and the additional Necessity of carrying, by Men, the wounded, whose Situation is truly deplorable. I cannot sufficiently acknowledge the constant assistance I have rec.\textsuperscript{d} from Major Campbell during this long Action, nor do sufficient Justice to the Troops for their cool and steady Behavior,
having not fired a shot without Orders, & drove the Enemy from their Post with fixed Bayonets.

The Conduct of the Officers is much above my Praises. This letter is too liable to Accidents to say more.

Camp at Bushy Run 6th Aug. 1763

I had the Honour to inform your Excellency, in my Letter of Yesterday, of our first Engagement with the Savages. We took Post last Night on the Hill where our Convoy halted when the Front was attacked (a commodious Piece of Ground & just spacious enough for our Purpose) There we encircled the whole & covered our wounded with the Flour Bags:

In the Morning the Savages surrounded our Camp at the Distance of about 500 Yards; & by shouting and yelping quite round that extensive Circumference thought to have terrified us with their Numbers: They attacked us early, & under Favour of an incessant Fire, made several bold Efforts to penetrate our Camp & tho’ they failed in the Attempt our Situation was not the less perplexing, having experienced that brisk Attacks had little Effect upon an Enemy who always gave way when pressed, & appeared again immediately in another quarter Our Troops were besides extremely fatigued with the long March, and as long Action, of the preceding Day, & distress’d to the last Degree by a total Want of Water, much more intolerable than the Enemy’s Fire. Tied to our Convoy we could not lose Sight of it without exposing it & our wounded to fall a Prey to the Savages, who pressed upon us on every Side; & to move it was impracticable; having lost Many Horses & most of the Drivers, stupified by Fear hid themselves in the Bushes, or were incapable of hearing or obeying any Orders.

The Savages growing every Moment more audacious it was thought proper still to increase their Confidence by the Means, if possible, to intice them to come close upon us, or to stand their Ground when attacked. With this View two Companies of Light Infantry were ordered within the Circle; & the Troops on their Right & left opened their Files & filled up the Space; that it might seem they were intended to cover the Retreat. The third Light Infantry Company & the Grenadiers of the 42d were ordered to support the two first Companies. This Manoeuvre succeeded to our Wish, for the

101 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, BP 21653, f.203; also at BP 21634, f.341.
few Troops who took Possession of the Ground lately occupied by
the two Light Infantry Companies, being brought in nearer to the
Center of the Circle, the Barbarians mistaking these Motions for a
Retreat hurried head long on, & advanced upon us with the most
daring intrepidity galled us excessively with their heavy Fire; but as
the very Moment that certain of Success, they thought themselves
Masters of the Camp, Major Campbell at the Head of the two
first Companies, sallied out, from a Part of the Hill they could not
observe, & fell upon their right Flank. They resolutely returned the
Fire, but could not stand the irresistible Shock of our Men, who,
rushing in among them killed many of them & put the rest to Flight.
The Orders sent to the other two Companies were delivered so timely
by Captain Basset, & executed with such celerity and Spirit that the
routed Savages, who happened to run that Moment before their Front,
received their full Fire when uncovered by the Trees. The four Com-
panies did not give them Time to load a second Time nor even to
look behind them, but pursued them, two Miles, till they were totally
dispersed. The left of the Savages, which had not been attacked, was
kept in Awe by the Remains of our Troops posted on the Brow of
the Hill for that Purpose; nor durst they attempt to support, or assist,
their Right, but, being witness to their Defeat, followed their Example
and fled. Our brave Men disdained so much to touch the dead Body
of a vanquished Enemy that scarce a Scalp was taken, except by the
Rangers & Packhorse Drivers.

The Woods being now cleared & the Pursuit over, the four Com-
panies took Possession of a Hill in our Front, and, as soon as Litters
could be made for the wounded, and the Flour & every thing destroy’d
which, for Want of Horses, could not be carried, we marched, with-
out Molestation, to this Camp. After the severe Correction we had
given the Savages a few Hours before, it was natural to suppose we
should enjoy some Rest; but we had hardly fixed our Camp when
they fired upon us again. This was very provoking! However the
Light Infantry dispersed them before they could receive Orders for
that Purpose

I hope we shall be disturbed no more; for if we have another
Action we shall hardly be able to carry our wounded The Behaviour
of the Troops on this Occasion Speaks for itself So strongly that for
me to attempt their Eulogium, would but detract from their Merit.

Bouquet's hope for no more disturbance was realized. The remain-
ing short leg of the march had difficulties enough from the lack of horses and need for carrying the wounded. The slow pace delayed entry into Fort Pitt until the afternoon of the 10th. Not even a man could be spared as an express to carry the news of victory to Fort Pitt until the morning of entry. No further opposition was encountered other than, as Bouquet reported to Amherst, "Scattered Shots along the road." The casualty toll for the two-day encounter was: British — 50 killed and 60 wounded; Indians — an estimated 60 killed.

News of the victory rapidly was carried east on the pounding hoofs of the wilderness telegraph. We can but imagine the cautious acceptance and then wild celebration at Ligonier and Bedford and in villages of the Cumberland Valley.

The Pennsylvania Gazette for August 18 carried a sketchy report of the battle, dated from a Bedford letter of August 10 and based on accounts of rangers who, cut off by the Indians, had fled to Ligonier. Readers were warned to be cautious of the particulars.

On the 25th the Pennsylvania Gazette printed confirmation furnished by Indian Trader John Hart who had left Pittsburgh the 15th. A week later the paper published several accounts of the relief of Fort Pitt and of the Battle of Bushy Run. Keekyuskung and the Wolfe were identified as among the Indian dead in the battle.

On arrival at Fort Pitt Bouquet immediately reported to his superiors, to Pennsylvania officials and to military friends. Captain Thomas Bassett was sent as a personal messenger to report first-hand details to Amherst. Women and children were escorted under military guard to Fort Ligonier, from there to be forwarded on to the east. The returning escort from Ligonier brought back supplies. Plans were made for the security of Fort Pitt and its companion forts and for a link-up with Detroit.

Always the military man, Bouquet began urging an attack on the Indians on their homelands as the only way to assure a peaceful frontier. This was done the next year, and under Bouquet. Shortage of troops and supplies made a punitive expedition impracticable in the
remaining months of 1763. The immediate danger, however, was over as the Indians had scattered to their homes.\(^{106}\)

It is difficult to estimate the number of troops on each side who participated in the Battle of Bushy Run. The report of Sir William Johnson, never a lover of the British military and partial to the Indians, must in all logic be written off as partisan. Johnson wrote concerning the Indian rebellion, "On the side of Ohio after laying waste all the Frontiers they [the Indians] invested Fort Pitt, and reduced that garrison to much danger; Coll: Bouquet with 600 men and large convoy marching to its relief was attacked by only 95 of them."\(^{107}\) No orderly books or journals or troop returns have been located to give exact facts. Realistic estimates, though, are possible.

Bouquet himself reported starting with 460 rank and file at Carlisle and of leaving 30 reinforcements each at Bedford and Ligonier.\(^{108}\) To this total should be added officers, non-coms and rangers. Deduction should be made for sickness and desertion. Pack horse drivers would swell the total by another 50 or so. The resultant would be around 500 plus, with about 450 properly identified as effective troops.

The figure of 450 was the estimate given by Captain Bassett, interviewed in Philadelphia on his official report journey to Amherst.\(^{109}\)

As for the Indians, it logically can be assumed that the attack force was approximately the same as had invested Fort Pitt — estimated in excess of 400.\(^{110}\) Even discounting this figure as an overestimate, the actual count would be far greater than that reported by the defeated Indians to Sir William Johnson.

The very persistence and strength of the attack indicated a substantial number of Indian warriors. In addition, the Indians un-
doubtlessly mustered all their strength for one final assault before their own growing food shortage and the necessity to prepare for the winter to come brought a halt to hostilities. They knew that if Bouquet and his supplies reached Fort Pitt their cause was lost for the year.

Up until the Revolutionary War the Battle of Bushy Run stands out as the largest sustained encounter by troops in the open on the North American continent. Bouquet succeeded where Braddock and Grant had failed and with the same calibre of troops. The difference was Bouquet.

Bouquet knew conventional European warfare but was able to adapt his textbook tactics to conditions of wilderness conflict. He anticipated and planned for what might happen. He understood the capabilities and limitations of the Indians. Above all, he was gifted with that ephemeral quality called leadership and from his leadership came good discipline and high morale. He freely gave credit to officers and men.

On his march to relieve Fort Pitt Bouquet realized that a meeting engagement with the Indians was likely. He organized his expedition accordingly. When a need for rangers became apparent, he obtained them. On his final march from Fort Ligonier there was accent on security and maneuverability. During the battle his organization of an effective perimeter defense indicated an excellent command structure and prior staff work. The feigned withdrawal to bring the enemy into the open was executed with precision.

Perhaps the best testimony to Bouquet's tactical ability and planning is the statement of Chief North American Engineer Harry Gordon who wrote Bouquet soon after the battle, "You have many Times talkt of the Disposition you put in Practise." 112

Both what happened and what might have been are important in evaluating Bushy Run. What happened we know. Fort Pitt was relieved and a death blow given the Indian uprising. For the first time 111 Trent Journal, July 27, 1763.
112 Gordon to Bouquet, Sept. 4, 1763, BP 21649, f.369. Smith's contemporary account of the battle of Bushy Run includes as an appendix various "Reflections on the War With the Savages of North America," including a diagram and description of "Dispositions to Receive the Enemy." An Historical Account, etc., op. cit. Smith notes that his account was written from papers communicated to him "by an officer of great abilities and long experience, in our wars with the Indians." George Croghan delivered the papers to Smith. Charles M. Stotz identifies the officer as Bouquet. Drums in the Forest, op. cit., 101.
white troops stood their ground in a pitched battle in the open with red men and came off victor, a psychological achievement of great value in itself. As Bouquet wrote Governor Hamilton, "The most Warlike of the savage Tribes have lost their Boasted Claim of being Invincible in the Woods." 113

What might have happened is conjecture. Ecuyer at Fort Pitt would soon have had the unhappy choice of surrender, starvation or of fighting his way out. In any event Fort Pitt would have been lost and with it control of the Ohio lands. A full year would have been required to raise a new conquering army and his Majesty's government, in a period of military retrenchment, might have written off the project as too expensive.

Even if Detroit had held firm, the thin Great Lakes communication line would have been an uneasy one. Traders would have ventured forth but not colonists. Any truce with the Indians would have been precarious.

Again, history is reported and not re-written. The Indians missed their golden chance. Pontiac should have taken Detroit if he had been willing to accept calculated losses. If the torch had been applied to ripening grainfields as well as to homes, incalculable harm would have resulted. And if Sir William Johnson had not kept the Iroquois (excepting the refractory Senecas) in hand, results would have been unpredictable.

Bushy Run was no small skirmish in the wilderness, not from the standpoint of results achieved or hardly even from the standpoint of troops involved in open encounter in that day and age. It was a major victory — a decisive battle — in quelling the 1763 Indian rebellion.114

When we stroll the battlefield at Bushy Run State Park we should give thankful tribute to Colonel Henry Bouquet. Because he so well fought there, we are privileged to walk there.

We, too, give Bouquet and his men a royal approbation as was given him by Major General Thomas Gage soon after he succeeded Amherst as Commander-in-Chief:115

113 Bouquet to Hamilton, Aug. 11, 1763, BP 21649, f.295.
114 In his recent book, Pennsylvania Seed of a Nation, Paul A. W. Wallace notes at p. 97, "The relief of Fort Pitt after the Battle of Bushy Run was one of the turning points of Pontiac's War." Harper & Bros., New York, 1962.
115 An Historical Account, etc., op. cit., 27. In the Gage Orderly Book preserved at the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Mich., the date of the order is Jan. 7, 1764. Gage succeeded Amherst in late 1763; in Braddock's 1755 campaign Gage was a Lieutenant Colonel. Amherst previously had
Head-Quarters, New-York, Jan.5,1764

Orders

His Majesty has been graciously pleased to signify to the commander in chief, his royal approbation of the conduct and bravery of Col. Bouquet, and the officers and troops under his command, in the two actions of the 5th and 6th of August; in which, notwithstanding the many circumstances of difficulty and distress they laboured under, and the unusual spirit and resolution of the Indians, they repelled and defeated the repeated attacks of the Savages, and conducted their convoy safe to Fort-Pitt.

MONCREIF,
Major of Brigade

To Colonel Bouquet,
of officer commanding at Fort Pitt

—-complimented Bouquet on his victory, particularly praising the maneuver of the second day of the battle, calling it "wisely Concerted, & as happily Executed." Amherst to Bouquet, Aug. 31, 1763, BP 21634, f.376. For brief biography and general appreciation of Bouquet see Henry Bouquet, Donald H. Kent, "Historic Pennsylvania Leaflet," No. 15, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, reprinted from American Heritage, Spring Issue, 1953.