THE INDIAN FRONTIER OF 1763

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The year 1763, long recognized as a significant turning point in the history of the American west, was marked by raging war and destructive violence along the Indian frontier. During the summer of 1763 the tempest of Indian warfare broke upon the thin system of British fortifications, isolated from the nearest colonial settlements by vasts forests and mountain ridges. These settlements on the frontier of 1763 generally followed a highly irregular line which connected German Flats on the Mohawk; Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Winchester, Virginia; Wachovia (now Winston Salem, North Carolina); and Augusta, Georgia.1 Closely paralleling this encroaching edge of white settlement was the retreating frontier of the Indian.2 Almost two hundred miles west of these parallel frontiers was Fort Pitt, the stronghold of the British fortification system, located at the forks of the Ohio. Fort Detroit, the other bulwark of British defense, was situated in the heart of a great wilderness over two hundred miles northwest of Fort Pitt.

Occupying the expanse of primeval forest was a race of hunters who Indian superintendent Sir William Johnson declared were "the most formidable of any uncivilized body of people in World."3 The superintendent further observed that "hunting and war" were the sole occupations of these warriors, and one occupation qualified them in skill for the other. Such a people could not be held in subjection by a mere line of attenuated fortifications in the North American wilderness.4

By 1763 the forces of civilization had not appreciably decimated the native population of the great eastern linguistic families.5 The far-flung Algonquian family was scattered throughout much of Canada, the Great Lakes region, and the northeastern Mississippi Valley. One reliable report listed 4,000 fighting men in the powerful Ottawa confederacy alone. The most feared of all the Indian families, however, were not the Algonquian but the Iroquois. A glance at the famous John

NOTE: Dr. Jacobs, a teacher of American history at Santa Barbara College, University of California, is the author of a book entitled Diplomacy and Indian Gifts (Stanford University Press, 1950), for a review of which see ante, 34:145 (June, 1951). For the convenience of the general reader of this article, Dr. Jacobs' many footnote comments and citations, most useful to serious students of the subject, are appended to this account.—Ed.
Mitchell map of North America in 1755 reveals that nation after nation of the aborigines had either been "extirpated" or "subdued" by the proud Six Nations. It appears that only the Cherokee in the South and the bison hunters of the Great Plains were able to resist these conquerors. Although the Mohawk, often regarded by contemporary colonial officials as leaders of the Iroquois confederacy, had dwindled to a mere 160 fighting men by 1763, there still remained almost 2,000 of the fiercest warriors in North America in the Six Nations. Over half of these were Seneca tribesmen, and the leaders of this nation had an abiding hatred for the British.

Despite the fact that the Iroquois and the Algonquian were indeed a redoubtable barrier to western emigration in 1763, still large numbers of the so-called Indian "gun men" lived in close proximity to the Southern colonies. Superintendent John Stuart estimated that the total warrior population in the Southern district was almost 14,000 as compared with Sir William Johnson's calculation that about 12,00012 tribesmen were located in the Northern department. These enumerations make a total of some 22,000 fighting men who, in 1763, might well have been organized into a carefully devised and secret plan for the annihilation of the English frontier settlements.

Such a plan was conceived by the Seneca in 1761 according to a recently discovered George Croghan diary, and in the Indian scheme of attack the Northern and Southern tribes were to be joined by an invading French army which had been promised by the Canadians. Detroit and Fort Pitt were to be the key points for the assault while the smaller outposts like Presqu'Isle, Le Boeuf, and Venango were to be overwhelmed and the traders murdered.18 Although this conspiracy was uncovered by British agents before it could be put into effect, the strategy of the plan is important for two reasons. First it shows that the Seneca were willing to fight side by side with their inveterate enemies, the Cherokee; and second, the details of the plan help to buttress Francis Parkman's weakly-documented thesis that an extensive conspiracy under the leadership of Pontiac did take place. Parkman held that the genius of the great Ottawa chief furnished logic and guidance to the secret machinations of the Seneca, the only member of the Six Nations which fought the British in the uprising of 1763.

It is understandable today why this confederacy, as a unit, failed to seize the leadership of the war from the Ottawa. The Iroquois had long
since given up their position as a balance of power between the French and the English, and in 1759 they publicly abandoned their traditional policy of neutrality in giving whole-hearted support to the British forces under Sir Jeffery Amherst. After the conquest of Canada in 1760, most of the proud chiefs of the Six Nations had fallen under the influence of that master of Indian diplomacy, Sir William Johnson. But the Seneca, who had always been lukewarm in their acceptance of British presents, became more and more incensed with the burden of British power. They missed the courtship of French emissaries like the Joncaire brothers and yearned to drive the encroaching British back, even into the sea.

It is important to note that the Seneca, as well as all the other tribes who participated in the Indian war of 1763, had justifiable complaints against the British government, the colonists, and more particularly the fur traders. The Indian grievances against the white man were just as genuine as were the grievances of the American colonists against England at the time of the American Revolution. Yet we do not refer to our War of Independence as a "conspiracy," although some British leaders regarded it in that light. The word conspiracy usually implies the plotting of persons for a sinister or unlawful purpose. If Pontiac and his confederate chiefs had aroused the Indians to fighting frenzy and then launched a secret attack without the background of grievances, the word conspiracy might be more acceptable. When Francis Parkman used this word conspiracy, an intriguing word for a title, he did not do justice to tribal aspirations for self-determination. Thus Pontiac provided the leadership for a war of Indian independence, not a "conspiracy." This interpretation generally agrees with the conclusions of Howard H. Peckham, the author of a recent book on Pontiac.

The grievances that promoted native discontent and thus caused this war for Indian independence were multiple. A basic reason for the uprising was the encroachment upon Indian lands, and contemporary newspapers in England regarded this factor as the most fundamental issue of the war. The tribesmen were angered, moreover, by other factors which were equally important to them.

Sir Jeffery Amherst's tightfisted policy of economy after the French and Indian War was responsible for the discontinuance of what had formerly been a liberal policy of giving presents to the Indians. Gifts of munitions, food, jewelry, war paint, and fancy clothes embellished with
lace and tinsel were highly prized by the tribesmen. The Seneca were
loud in their protests against the interruption of presents of guns and
powder, maintaining that these items were essential for hunting pur-
poses. The Ottawa, as another example, were deeply resentful over
the loss of French gifts and also of the English policy of withholding
munitions which could be turned against their very benefactors instead
of being used for hunting.

The occupation of the western posts by the British army was viewed
by Indian leaders in an unhappy light. Arrogant officers and soldiers in-
sulted the proud warriors, and they demanded, under Amherst’s orders,
that the tribesmen hunt for a living instead of expecting free supplies.
When the warriors did follow this advice and brought their pelts and
skins to the forts, they found a stiff trading schedule posted at such
places as Fort Pitt. For a cheap stroud blanket made of woolen rags a
hunter was obliged to give in trade two good beaver pelts or three buck
skins. Eventually, however, the warriors found that they could not
even hunt because of a lack of ammunition. Sullen discontent was the
result—the smouldering fire of rebellion. George Croghan, Johnson’s
deputy Indian agent, saw the handwriting on the wall. He tried to
pacify the embittered warriors around Fort Pitt by giving them presents
from his own pocket which amounted to as much as a year’s salary.

Added to this unsatisfactory situation was the rumor spread by the
French that the British intended to reduce the Indians to slavery. Un-
doubtedly Sir Jeffery Amherst wanted to see the Indians hunt for a liv-
ing. He once went so far as to declare that they should be exterminated,
even advocating resort to smallpox in germ warfare; but he did not
have slavery as an objective in his Indian policy. The more important
fact remains, however, that the Indians believed such rumors. Even Pon-
tiac gullibly accepted the story that a great French army would join him
to drive the British out of North America.

So thoroughly had the simple life of the Indians been disrupted by
European civilization’s westward march, that in many instances the
tribesmen were reduced to what they called “nakedness” and “starva-
tion.” The evil effects of smallpox and rum, coupled with the almost un-
speakable abuses of the renegade fur traders, had all done their work.

When a prophet arose among the Delaware with a message from
the Great Spirit, the bewildered Indians eagerly grasped at this ray of
hope in an effort to forestall the complete disintegration of their old life.
This prophet, or impostor as he was sometimes called by the white men, emphasized the values of the primitive culture of the Indian and denounced the ways of civilization. He pointed out the evils of such practices as polygamy, but he did not advocate military resistance against the British. It remained for Pontiac to revive and revise this message from the "Master of Life." The Ottawa leader cleverly interpreted this prophecy as a signal for a holy war against the British, and much of the tenacity of the warriors during the uprising may be attributed to religious zeal.

The British home government was not unaware of the problems that the Indians faced. The Board of Trade, taking a farsighted view, came to the conclusion as early as November, 1761, that the "open violation" of land contracts was a grave injustice to the Indians. This fact was pointed out to the Privy Council but no immediate action was taken.

At Fort Pitt, meantime, Colonel Henry Bouquet sought to quell Indian dissatisfaction by issuing a proclamation on October 13, 1761, against those he termed "outlaws" who were occupying Indian lands west of the mountains. When the lieutenant governor of Virginia, Francis Fauquier, complained to Amherst regarding Bouquet's actions, the bewildered frontier commander retorted that he did not know which he was supposed to "oppress," the settlers or the Indians. If he protected the Indians, he offended the settlers and vice versa. Such was the state of indecision in 1761-1762 regarding native lands. It was only after the Indian uprising had swept the frontier that the Lords of Trade in August, 1763, made known that they would recommend a proclamation line separating white settlement from Indian territory.

During this year the Board of Trade also moved toward a solution in regulating the fur trade. It was indeed evident that something had to be done to control the outrageous conduct of the Indian traders. The delay of the home government in issuing the famous proclamation of October 7 and in regulating the fur trade was due in part to indecision regarding policy toward the colonies in general. Indian problems were only a part of larger issues rising out of the Treaty of Paris, signed in February, 1763.

The difficulties that faced the British government in dealing with native politics on the Northern frontier were in many respects similar to those faced on the Southern frontier. The long arm of the British military was felt lightly on the shoulders of the alert John Stuart who suc-
ceeded Edmond Atkin as Southern superintendent in 1762. Had Sir William Johnson been as free from military interference as was his counterpart in the South, the story of the Indian frontier of 1763 might have been considerably different. Although Johnson heartily disagreed with Amherst’s policy of frugality, he was obliged to carry out the orders of his commander-in-chief. Stuart, on the other hand, acted more independently of Sir Jeffery, and to spike rumors of rebellion among the Southern tribes the Southern superintendent in June, 1763, invited all of these tribes to attend a great conference to be held at Augusta, Georgia. Expensive presents were to be allotted to please the voracious appetites of the Southern warriors for gifts. And as a result of this strategic maneuver, representatives of almost all the Southern tribes responded despite the intrigues of an able Upper Creek chieftain, called "The Mortar," which had put many of the warriors in an ugly mood.

The mystery of this change in British Indian policy may be traced to the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, Lord Egremont. He sponsored Amherst’s program for economy in the north, and at the same time in March, 1763, he ordered Stuart to hold the Augusta congress in cooperation with the Southern governors to soothe the fears of the excited Southern chiefs. The germ of the idea for this conference did not belong to Egremont. Credit for this farsighted measure belongs to the astute Governor Henry Ellis of Georgia who according to the late Professor Clarence W. Alvord exerted a considerable influence upon the Secretary of State in determining Indian policy.

That Lord Egremont’s conciliatory action toward the Southern confederacies was a wise move in preventing the outbreak of hostilities among these 13,000 tribesmen there can be little doubt. Yet one cannot help but be amazed that such an inconsistency of policy should exist. When the conscientious Colonel Henry Bouquet proposed an identical type of conference for all of the Northern Indians, Sir Jeffery Amherst rebelled against the idea because of the expense involved. Apparently the home government had little conception of the actual conditions on the Northern Indian frontier. It is known that as a result of Pontiac’s uprising Sir Jeffery Amherst’s reputation as an authority on Indians suffered considerably when he arrived home in England.

Another factor that in part accounts for the confusion as to Indian affairs was the intrigue and struggle for power in English politics during
this time. While in London to represent Sir William Johnson's attempt to free the superintendency from military control and to look after certain fur trade interests, George Croghan reported to Sir William: "Tho I have been hear Now a Month Nothing has been Don Respecting North aMerrica — the pople hear Spend thire Time in Nothing butt abus and Strieveing who Shall be in power with a view to Serve themselves & thire frends, and Neglect the publick it was butt yesterday that your State of Indian affairs was Read att the Board of Trade tho I Delivered itt the 13th of Last Month . . . . I am Sick of London & wish to be back in a Merrica & setd on a Little farm where I May forgett the Mockery of pomp & Greatness."

Regardless of troubles in England, the Indian congress at Augusta was a success. The fears of the tribesmen respecting English occupation of their lands were quelled by promises to the contrary and a tremendous outlay of beef, rum, and other assorted presents. The Cherokee, led by the amiable Attakullakulla, agreed to a satisfactory arrangement to control Indian trade, and the Chickasaw, and their new-found friends the Choctaw, appeared to be pleased with their share of barley corn beads, calicoes, and "prettys." The loyal Catawba received reassurance that their small reservation would not be invaded by settlers, and even the Lower Creeks who attended the meeting indicated their desire to "hear the truth" despite the fact that they had "heard bad talks" concerning the English. John Stuart won over the Creek leaders to such an extent that they concurred with the superintendent in placing a boundary line of white settlement on the frontier of Georgia. This action on Stuart's part anticipated the proclamation of October 7, 1763, and the exact delineation of the Augusta treaty line can be seen on the map later drawn by Joseph Purcell under Stuart's direction for the Board of Trade.

It thus can be seen that the errors of Indian diplomacy in the North were not repeated in the South. It is not impossible that the Cherokee would have joined Pontiac despite their losses in the Cherokee War of 1759-1762. The Congress of Augusta meanwhile forestalled any immediate outbreak among the Indians in 1763. Only the Upper Creeks led by their chief, The Mortar, might have given trouble, but the clever diplomacy of John Stuart divided the loyalty of that heterogeneous confederacy to such an extent that The Mortar had little choice but to accept the British as his brothers.

Thus a general lack of political cohesion appears to be the main rea-
son why all the Indians, both North and South, did not join the uprising. Undoubtedly the traditional hatred existing between the Cherokee and the Iroquois would have been a tremendous obstacle to overcome in the waging of an all-out war against the whites. Everywhere petty feuds prevented native political cooperation. In the north some basis for unity among the tribes was established by virtue of the ancient conquests of the Six Nations. Most of the Great Lakes and Ohio tribes were either allies of the Iroquois or subject nations.

The fact remains that enough of the Indians did cooperate with the result that nine of the frontier forts fell into savage hands. Despite the determination and persistence of the tribesmen the main bulwarks of defense held out. Detroit and Fort Pitt were finally rescued from a fate worse even than death.

The magnitude of the Indian war of independence should be attributed to the extraordinary abilities of Pontiac. He guided what might have been a savage explosion of discontent into a long and bitterly-fought war. The great chief’s thirst for knowledge and his ability to control his warriors were marks of an exceptional native leader. The documents indicate that with the aid of French intrigue he was responsible for organizing the secret attack on the whole Northern frontier, not merely a local uprising at Detroit. This remarkable chieftain, whose authority was declared to be “absolute” among the tribesmen of the North American wilderness, engineered a carefully planned assault which wiped out some 2,000 settlers and threatened the very existence of British authority west of the Appalachians. Contemporaries state that he “spirited up” the Indians to such an extent that he was a literal “firebrand.” Adored and respected by the warriors, he was also known for his humanity and intelligence. Sir William Johnson, with twenty-five years of experience in native politics by 1764, declared that the Ottawa were the originators of the war, and Johnson knew that before lasting peace was made with the Indians there was one chief above all who must be pacified. This was Pontiac. As Francis Parkman wrote: “The American forest had never produced a man more shrewd, politic, and ambitious.”

REFERENCES

1 See “An Accurate Map of North America Describing and Distinguishing the British, Spanish and French Dominions on this great Continent According to the Definitive Treaty Conducted at Paris 10th Feby. 1763 — Also the West India Islands Belonging to and pos-
sessed by the several European Princes and States. The Whole laid down according to the latest and Most authentick Improvements by Eman Bowen Geogr. to His Majesty and John Gibson Engraver," London [1763] (photostatic copy; original in John Carter Brown Library, Providence); "A Map of the British and French Dominions in North America with the Roads, Distances, Lands, and Extent of Settlements, Humbly Inscribed to the Right Honourable The Lord of Halifax, And the other Right Honourable The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, By their Lordships — Most Obliged and very humble Servant Jno. Mitchell," London, 1755 (photostatic copy; a duplicate of the original is in the William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor). Of the two the Mitchell map is the more faithful to its title.

2 The late Professor John Carl Parish made this point relating to the parallel Indian and white frontiers and noted that it was logical "that there should arise the idea of an Indian boundary line forming a third parallel within the intervening zone." See John Carl Parish, The Persistence of the Westward Movement and Other Essays, edited by Louis Knott Koontz, 131 (Berkeley, 1943).


4 The tragic siege and final surrender of Fort Loudoun in the Overhill country of the Cherokee in August, 1760, during the Cherokee War went unobserved by Amherst. Had he been alert Sir Jeffrey might have realized that a parallel situation existed in the North, and that the Indians might easily seize ammunition from the isolated forts and prolong a war. Professor John Richard Alden makes this point in his John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier, 117 (Ann Arbor, 1944). George Croghan and his superior, Sir William Johnson, both declared that during Pontiac's uprising the warriors prolonged the war by looting forts and trading posts of their valuable military supplies. See George Croghan to the Board of Trade, [January, 1764], New York Colonial Documents, 7:602-607; William Johnson to the Board of Trade, September 25, 1763, ibid., 7:560.

5 It should be mentioned that the Indian linguistic families were not necessarily units of a political organization. The Algonquian, like all linguistic families, were divided into tribes, sub-tribes, bands, and clans.

6 See note 1.

7 Despite their traditional hostility to the Six Nations, the Cherokee were linguistic brothers of the Iroquois and spoke substantially the same language. At Winchester, Virginia, during an Indian conference on June 20, 1757, the Mohawk sachems, speaking for the Six Nations, declared that their brethren the Cherokee should "hold fast by the chain of friendship existing between them, the English, and the Six Nations, and join their forces in order to defeat the dark schemes of their common enemy the French and Indians." The Cherokee head men, no doubt astonished by this unusual expression of good will, expressed great satisfaction in "having from the mouth of the Six Nations that they were so hardy in our Interest." See New York Colonial Documents, 7:283. It seems obvious that Edmond
Atkin, southern superintendent, and George Croghan, who presided at the meeting, were responsible for this declaration. For the feud between the Six Nations and the Southern Indians see note 14.

8 Sir William Johnson, "Memorandum on Six Nations and Other Confederacies," in James Sullivan et al., eds., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 4:240-246 (Albany, University of the State of New York, 9 vols., 1921-date)—hereafter cited as Sir William Johnson Papers. These figures are also printed in New York Colonial Documents, 7:582-584, with some variation. By 1790 the Mohawk were reduced to one lone family. See W. A. Rossiter, ed., A Century of Population Growth, from the First Census of the United States to the Twelfth, 1790-1900, p. 39 (Washington, 1909). This table should be used with caution, however. For more reliable accounts of Indian population, see Evarts B. Greene and Virginia D. Harrington, American Population before the Federal Census of 1790, pp. 194-202, 206 (New York, 1902).

9 The Seneca had a most capable leader in Kalaghshota (or Guyasuta, Guyashusta, Kiasola, Keyashuta), whom the late Lyman C. Draper designated as the "archplotter with Pontiac." See Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Collections of the the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 18:240-241n (Madison, 21 vols., 1854-1911)—hereafter cited as Wisconsin Historical Collections.

10 Robert Dinwiddie, lieutenant governor of Virginia, 1751-1758, maintained that the Southern Indians should be courted by the English because these tribes could muster more warriors than the Northern confederacies.

11 "Total number of Gun Men in the Southern District," December 1, 1764, an unidentified Public Record Office manuscript on file in the Illinois Historical Survey, University of Illinois. It is notable that Indian populations are very difficult to ascertain with exactness. Despite his intensive researches on Indian population the late John K. Swanton complained of this fact in his Early History of the Creek Indians and Their Neighbors, 421 (Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology Bulletin 73, Washington, 1922).


14 The incredible feud that existed between the Southern Indians and the Iroquois was an almost insurmountable barrier to concerted military action among the Indians against the English. In October, 1762, the Iroquois notified the Pennsylvania government that they desired a route through the settlements of that province so that they could continue hostilities against "their old Enemies, the Cherokees." See Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, from the Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government, 8:779-780 (Harrisburg, 16 vols., 1851-1853)—hereafter cited as Pennsylvania Colonial Records. A year later, "neutral" Seneca warriors were disregarding Pontiac's uprising and engaging in the bloody business of collecting Cherokee scalps. See ibid., 9:63. Sir William Johnson hoped to use the historic enmity of the tribesmen to turn the Chero-
kee and Catawba against the Northern Indians during the summer of 1763. See Johnson to Amherst, June 19, 1763, in New York Colonial Documents, 7:524-525. However, the eminent authority on the Indians, Cadwallader Colden, condemned such action because “it nourishes the fierce and cruel spirit of the savage.” See ibid., 7:609-610. As a matter of interest the Cherokee towns supported a population of 1,990 warriors, almost the identical strength of the Six Nations. See Indian Books of South Carolina, 6:88 (film duplicate from the Illinois Historical Survey, University of Illinois).

15 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada, 1:194-195 (Boston, 1898). Parkman's incomplete citation is as follows: “MS. Letter—M. D'Abbadie to M. Neylon, 1764.” In the Parkman Papers at the Massachusetts Historical Society there is only one letter that might have been used for this citation, and this is an extract of a letter, inscribed "Extrait d'une lettre de M. Dabbadie a M. de Neyon [sic] aux Illinois [sic],” January 30, 1764. Sieur D'Abbadie, a newly appointed Ordonnateur, arrived in Louisiana from France in June, 1763, and was hardly in a position to give authentic information concerning Pontiac's action in the year 1762. The above letter mentions only Pontiac's visit with Chevalier de Kerlerec, governor of Louisiana. See also Wilbur R. Jacobs, “Was the Pontiac Uprising a Conspiracy?” in Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, 59:26-37 (January, 1950).

16 See note 9.


18 The Joncaire brothers, Philippe Thomas and Daniel, Sieur de Chabert et de Clausonne, were active French agents among the Western Iroquois and the Ohio tribes in the 1740's, and as late as 1755 Sir William Johnson offered a reward for the capture of Chabert Joncaire. See ibid., 2:388-389. For a detailed account of the activities of these brothers, see the general index of the New York Colonial Documents.


21 Cadwallader Colden made this comment regarding contemporary British newspapers. See his letter to the Board of Trade, December 19, 1763, in New York Colonial Documents, 7:589-591.

22 See, for example, Distribution of Presents to the Indians at the Congress of Augusta, November 19, 1763, North Carolina Historical Commission, Transcripts of English Records, C.O. 5, Bdl. 65, p.324.

23 Many other tribes were angry with the British because of this policy. See extract of a letter from Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffery Amherst, July 11, 1763, Bouquet Papers, A4, 313-315, Canadian Archives photostat.

"Indian Trade Regulations at Fort Pitt," *ibid.*, 3:530-532.

Ibid., 732-734.

Parkman, *Conspiracy of Pontiac*, 2:173-174. An answer to Sir Jeffery's request is found in the postscript to a message from Colonel Henry Bouquet to the general dated July 13, 1763. Bouquet wrote: "I will try to inoculate the . . . with some blankets that may fall in their hands, and take care not to get the disease myself." See Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., *The Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet*, Series 21634, pp. 214-215, one of a mimeographed edition of nineteen volumes issued by the Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1940-1943.

... For an excellent summary of problems arising out of the Indian fur trade, see "Review of Trade and Affairs of the Indians in the Northern District of America" [Sir William Johnson, September, 1767], *New York Colonial Documents*, 7:953-978.

Wisconsin Historical Collections, 18:259-261.


Wisconsin Historical Collections, 18:259-261.


Wisconsin Historical Collections, 18:259-261.


Wisconsin Historical Collections, 18:259-261.
38 Journal of the Congress of the Four Southern Governors and the Superintendent of that District with the Five Nations of the Indians at Augusta, 1763 (Charles Town, 1764). A microfilm copy of an original in the New York Public Library has been used. Of the fifty copies of this rare work printed by Peter Timothy, only two others have been located, one in the De Renne Library in Georgia, and the other in the William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor.

39 Sir Charles Wyndham, the second Earl of Egremont (1710-1763), approved of Amherst's shortsighted policy of cutting expenses, but he expressed astonishment at the news of Pontiac's uprising, which he termed an "unlucky incident." See New York Colonial Documents, 7:538-540. Johnson blamed Amherst's policy of "oeconomy" for the Indian war of 1763. See Sir William Johnson Papers, 4:273-277. Lord Egremont's instructions regarding the Augusta congress are mentioned in his letter to the Board of Trade, May 5, 1763, in New York Colonial Documents, 7:519-522.

40 For accounts of the Indian policies of Henry Ellis, see Alden, John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier, 76, 94-95, 97-100, 108-110; Alvord, Mississippi Valley in British Politics, 1:159, the citation here being to the "Knox Manuscripts," in Historical Manuscripts Commission, Reports on Manuscripts in Various Collections, 6:192 ff.

41 Bouquet to Amherst, May 19, 1763, Bouquet Papers, A.4, 249-251, Canadian Archives photostat.

42 Croghan to Johnson, March 10, 1764, in The Critical Period, 221-224.

43 See note 22.

44 Attakullakulla's or Little Carpenter's friendship stemmed from his visit to the royal court in London in 1730. Professor Verner Crane indicates that Attakullakulla was referred to at that time as Ukwaneequa. See his account of the Cherokee embassy in The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732, pp. 279-280, 295-302 (Durham, N. C., 1929).

45 See note 22. "Prettys," a decorative braid or tape, were also known as "nonsopretties."

46 The Catawba, who could muster about three hundred fighting men, were traditionally warm in their friendship for the British. The leaders of this small nation espoused the prudent doctrine "that all Indians who have their supplies from, and are Friends of the English should be Friends also of each other." See Edmond Atkin to the Board of Trade, May 10, 1755, in Loudoun Papers, No. 578, p. 26 of the manuscript—film copy at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California. See also note 38.

47 "A Map of the Southern District of North America Compiled under the Direction of John Stuart, Esq., His Majesty's Superintendent of Indian Affairs, by Joseph Purcell [London, 1776]." In Newberry Library, Chicago. The only other copy of this map which has been located is in the Public Record Office, London.

48 For a scholarly account of the war, see John Stuart and the Southern Frontier, 101-123.

49 The Mortar's truculent attitude continued through the summer
of 1763. He defended the Indian slaughter of cattle because the warriors “fill their Bellies when they are hungry having nothing else to do it with.” See “Talks from the Mortar and Handsome Fellow,” July 14, 1763, in Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 9:70-73. For an account of Stuart’s diplomacy, see note 38.

See note 14.

Numerous atrocities were committed by both the tribesmen and the settlers during the war. As a result of their intense sufferings, the frontiersmen of Paxton, Pennsylvania, came to the conclusion that all Indians, including the peaceful tribesmen who had adopted Christianity and were living under the protection of the provincial government at Lancaster, should be slaughtered. For accounts of the “barbarious outrages” that followed, see Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 9:100-101, 107-108, 110 ff. See also [Benjamin Franklin], A Narrative of the Late Massacres in Lancaster County of a Number of Indians, Friends of this Province by Persons Unknown, with Some Observations on the Same ([Philadelphia], 1764).

See, for example, Daniel Claus to William Johnson, August 6, 1763, in Wisconsin Historical Collections, 18:256-258.

Croghan to the Board of Trade [January, 1764], in New York Colonial Documents, 7:602-607.

The Critical Period, 385.

Alexander Fraser to Thomas Gage, May 18, 1765, in The Critical Period, 494-495. General Thomas Gage, in a letter to Lord Halifax dated April 14, 1764, noted that “Pondiac [sic] keeps two Secretarys, one to write for Him, and the other to read the Letters He receives, and He manages them so, as to keep each of them ignorant, of what is transacted by the other.” See The Critical Period, 241. The letter is also printed in New York Colonial Documents, 7:619-620.

Parkman, Conspiracy of Pontiac, 1:174.