DECISION
AT THE FORKS

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A vital feature of any and all commemoration is respect for its past. In this short treatise, but somewhat long essay, an effort is made to capture some of the logic of long ago events as well as some of the spirit of long ago times. It is assumed that historical perspective is a fundamental background of any satisfactory explanation of things past and present.

In the words of a famous seventeenth century biographer, "Although there may be many sorts of history yet these are the chief-test": "a general history," "a national history," "a particular history."

The category "particular history" may reasonably be held to include all local or regional historiography which, indeed, is, in a way, the biography of a community or limited area though this "particularity" of local history must not be overemphasized, for not infrequently and, to a degree, always, purely local or regional history is a vital part of a larger national general and universal history.

With great validity, this universalism and nationalism of local history may be claimed an aspect of events in Western Pennsylvania which came to a climax we celebrate in 1958.

Thomas Carlyle in his work, On Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History, mentions, "One life: a little gleam of time between two eternities." From this point of view, the re-occupation of the Forks of the Ohio, by the British-American forces in 1758, was both in time and in space a mere flash of action and existence.

But local history, in fact, is not so momentary and insignificant. With his rather common inconsistency, Carlyle, in the same work made the profound observation that "... the whole Past ... is the possession of the Present," a statement which may be interpreted to claim that the whole past was tied in with the facts and events of late November 1758. That this is so is clearly revealed in consideration of important factors in the background.

It is widely recognized that geology and geography have played a tremendous role in human history.

The greatly remote beginnings of the universe, the solar system and the earth as a planet are part of the picture but cannot here be given more than mere mention. The Appalachian Mountains, how-
ever, must be given special consideration. Competent authority claims that they are two hundred and fifty million years old. It is believed that they were at one time four times as high as they were in the eighteenth century A.D. Three-fourths of their height is supposed to have eroded and washed away into plateaus, coastal plains and the Atlantic Ocean. The results are found in the geology and geography of more recent times; and the great influence of these on politics, human settlement and military action is beyond cavil, for documentation of this is both weighty and widespread.

Another significant geographical factor was the series of great advances of ice masses from the north into the northern area of present Pennsylvania. Geologists and other scientists of western Pennsylvania have had much to say about the influence of the ice ages upon the topography, notably the drainage systems and rivers of western Pennsylvania. The earliest ice age was probably more than a hundred thousand years ago. The last, probably the fourth, retired north about twenty-five thousand years before 1758. Western Pennsylvania, as we see and know it, began to assume its present condition in historically dim millenia of the past.

The fundamental result of the combination of Appalachian Mountains and successive ice ages was that the Forks of the Ohio, the later site of Pittsburgh, became topographically the hub of a giant wheel with definite spokes but with an irregular perimeter. These spokes are means of ingress and egress. Already in existence in general outline, they had become, long before 1492, features clearly observable thereafter. Historically, the earliest documented spoke or approach to the Forks of the Ohio seems to have been the route down the Allegheny River. It was used by Hudson River fur traders in the late seventeenth century. It was also used by French-Canadians from the St. Lawrence River in the first half of the eighteenth century. Considered, in clockwise procession, the next spoke or approach was that from the Susquehanna River and its tributaries. The West Branch, the Upper Juniata, and the Lower Juniata made three subdivisions of this general approach. The Potomac River in conjunction with the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela was of great importance. The Ohio River early furnished a relatively easy approach from the Mississippi Valley and the lower southwest. A final spoke or route, in reality a group of routes, came from the upper Great Lakes either by water from Detroit to Sandusky or the Cuyahoga or overland across central Ohio.
of the present day, and increasingly absorbed traffic. The results of all this on both history and historiography are important. Documentation is widely scattered.

The flora and fauna of the upper Ohio Valley, matters of prime importance, were likewise factors of venerable antiquity. And upon them not only the aborigines, but also the later white explorers, fur traders, settlers, and military forces were greatly dependent. From abundant surviving records, it is apparent that this was true not only at first, but on the part of settlers for several generations.

**Amerinds**

The so-called American Indian, or Amerind, is a part of the background, remote and contemporary, of the capture of Fort Duquesne and the founding of Pittsburgh in 1758.

That the Amerinds were in the Western Hemisphere in pre-glacial or glacial times has been claimed though not universally admitted, but that they were here more than ten thousand years ago is now accepted by archaeologists and ethnologists. And through the study of remains, much has been learned of the economic and social life of early Amerinds. South of the Rio Grande some Amerinds had developed various primitive systems of notation or writing. Northward there was less highly developed culture.

Information, recorded in writing, about the American Indian dates from the coming of the European visitors. A small amount of it, based on Scandinavian accounts, is roughly a thousand years old. Most of the material, Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, Dutch, etc., is not yet five hundred years old.

It has long been customary to divide the Amerinds into families, mainly linguistic, numbering three score or more. More than half of these were small groups west of the Sierras. Many of the remaining groups played little role in colonial history east of the Mississippi River. The significant families were, alphabetically, the Algonquian, the Iroquoian, the Muskogean, and the Siouan (Catawba tribe). The famous tribes of Indians whose names are so common in documentary British-American colonial history belonged mainly to one or another of the first three families, Algonquian, Iroquoian or Muskogean.

Though in the early sixteenth century the Indians north of Mexico probably numbered no more than five hundred thousand and those east of the Mississippi less than two hundred thousand and
their numbers gradually decreased in the face of the white man's aggression, this relatively small group of aboriginal inhabitants was a big factor in American colonial history. The American Indians, not Europeans, were the first Americans. The continent literally belonged to them politically, legally, and possibly morally. Much acute sophistry has been used in disclaiming this.

The Fur and Skin Trade

The combination of native fur bearing fauna, aboriginal native man, and European visitors and settlers quickly produced trade in furs and skins. Trade with the Amerinds by European fishermen actually antedates English, French, or Dutch settlement along the Atlantic coast of North America.

Active trade with the Indians began soon after settlement by Europeans, whether in Virginia, Maryland, or New England. It was slight in the first years along the Chesapeake, but it was more extensive in New England and along the Hudson. The Pilgrims traded not only around Massachusetts Bay, but up the Connecticut River and as far away as the Kennebec and the Penobscot. This early New England fur trade met with fierce competition from French-Canadian rivals, both along the ocean and overland from the upper waters of the St. Lawrence River.

From the establishment of New Netherland, the Dutch, more interested in commerce than in colonization, carried on a lively trade with the Indians. Albany, near the mouth of the Mohawk River, became the dominant fur exchange center south of Montreal and Quebec. Intense rivalry between the French and the Dutch before 1664, was continued between New France and New York, under the English, for more than a century afterward.²

In the meantime Pennsylvania merchants and traders slowly built up a lively trade with Indians south and west of New York colony.¹ This Pennsylvania trade with the Indians of the Ohio Valley likewise met with bitter competition and opposition from New France.

Maryland and Virginia trade with the Indians became a factor in the middle of the eighteenth century and influenced British American policy in Trans-Appalacia. Indian trade in the Carolinas, and, later, Georgia, though regionally significant, affected only slightly events on the Upper Ohio.

Only specialized students of Indian history and of the fur trade are greatly aware of the enormous printed literature and the bulky
archival records found to be available for the study of these matters.

*Anglo-French Rivalry*

Anglo-French rivalry, as a main feature of events of 1758 both as background and as contemporary, is of great importance in medieval as well as in modern European and world history. It arose in the eleventh century and reached an early crisis in 1066. It continued under the Norman and Plantagenet rulers of England and reached another crisis in the Hundred Years War, 1338-1443. And though from time to time in abeyance, the rivalry persisted under other English royal houses, Lancastrian, Yorkist, Tudor, Stuart and Hanoverian, and found manifestation in North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not only in economics but also in politics, diplomacy, and military struggle.

*Modern Nationalism*

Nationalism, as a dominant feature of modern times, arose about four hundred years after the beginning of Anglo-French rivalry. The Age of Discovery and the colonial period of our history were featured by intense struggle for advantage and power on the part of new nationalisms in Portugal, Spain, France, England, Holland, and Sweden. Portuguese power in the New World was largely confined to Brazil and little influenced North America. The once dominant power of Spain in the Western Hemisphere was invaded by rivals, checked navally in the defeat, in 1558, of the Great Armada, and with the exception of Florida, limited to territory beyond the Mississippi. Holland and Sweden planted colonies respectively along the Hudson and the Delaware, but before the end of the seventeenth century had lost political control, though leaving behind in New York and Pennsylvania important cultural deposits.

As early as 1689, it was evident that the final struggle in North America would be between the British and the French.

*Rise of the British Empire*

The rise and development of the British Empire lies back of the story of the capture of Fort Duquesne in November 1758. What is historically known as modern British imperialism can only with difficulty be traced back beyond the Tudors. British marinism began weakly under Henry VII, 1485-1509, increased under Henry VIII, 1509-1547, and became significant under Elizabeth I, 1558-1603. The British Empire and its North American colonies liter-
ally grew up together. The common American idea that the British Empire was an established fixity, pre-existing and antecedent to Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Maryland, is erroneous, based on great ignorance of English history and government.

In large degree the North American colonies of the so-called Old British Empire were the veritable empire itself. Without them the remainder was an European national state, not otherwise yet imperial.

Old France in Europe and New France in North America must be depicted in the background of the great decision of November 1758 and they will be given below some consideration as one-half of the major factor of Anglo-French rivalry in the New World. But by reason of the outcome and later developments, greater attention must first be given to the British Isles in Europe and the British-American colonies in North America. In particular the respective contributions, on the one hand, of the British Isles and, on the other hand, of the British-American colonies, to the cause and its eventual outcome demand a large place in any historical treatment.

In the matter of time and possibly in the matter of power and importance British government and policy have, here, priority over American colonial matters.

It has already been noted that the so-called Old British Empire was an evolution, that it literally grew up between 1485 and 1775. Under Elizabeth I, England became maritime and somewhat marinistic. Commercial and naval shipping became significant. The highly romantic age of the Gentleman Adventurers is a part of the background of Fort Pitt and Pittsburgh. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Walter Raleigh and others belong in the vista. It is, of course, true that the Elizabethan gentlemen failed to plant permanent settlements in the New World. Figuratively, however, the seed of colonization was planted under Elizabeth. But the first crop of colonies came under the early Stuart kings, James I and Charles I. With opportunistic reason, but without centralized system, colonies of various types were planted in the New World. At first the chartered corporate type, as Virginia, Massachusetts, and later Connecticut and Rhode Island, was predominant, but contemporary were colonies of the proprietary type, as Maryland, Maine, and New Hampshire. And as early as 1624 the oldest chartered corporate colony, Virginia, became the first royal colony.
In this Old British Empire, thus established before the Great Rebellion, the Crown was supposed to be in control of colonization and colonies. The sovereign, however, acted through councils and important ministers. The most important actions were generally taken by the King in Council, that is by the King on the advice and recommendation of the Privy Council, an institution of the dim past. Parliament, while already powerful in the early seventeenth century, had not yet assumed any considerable authority and responsibility in colonial matters across the Atlantic.

The great Puritan military and political figure, Oliver Cromwell, stabilized and perpetuated the then somewhat adult British imperialism, particularly in its economic and maritime features. When on his death most of his other policies were reversed, his economic imperialism was retained under the Restoration of 1660. It was under Cromwell that navigation ordinances began, but they were continued by Charles II and his successors for more than a century. It was under the gay monarch himself that a committee of the Privy Council was given charge of colonial problems. Called, at first, Lords of Trade, this committee in 1696 was reorganized, with the addition of professionals, as the Board of Trade and Plantations, commonly called Lords Commissioners.

Administration of colonial matters was scattered around. Not only the sovereign and his privy council, and the later Board of Trade, but also the War Office, the Admiralty, the Treasury, and the Bishop of London participated in colonial matters. And in the eighteenth century Secretaries of State were added and became important channels of communication between Crown and Colony. This disorganized administration was all the more unsatisfactory by reason of personnel changes, in royal succession, in royal favorites, and by changes in policy and politics within the participating institutions. Efficiency under such circumstances was not likely.

British-American triumph and success in the New World must, however, be greatly attributed to the colonists themselves, whether as individuals, families, or groups, rather than to governmental action and socially organized forces. Yet the contribution of Europe to British America from 1582 to 1758 was vital and calls for analysis and acknowledgment.

Old World Contribution to the New World

With the meager exception of the Pilgrims from Leyden, the
original capital for planting British settlements in the New World came from Great Britain. Later migration furnished a market and payment for colonial property and production in the new settlements. When this continuing importation of surplus men and money from the Old World ceased for a time, as it did in New England 1640-1650, economic collapse and disaster came upon continental British-America. The potential protection and security of the British-American colonies were partly dependent on the strength of the navy and military forces of the mother country. No less an authority than William Pitt, the Elder, in a dramatic statement, said the security and success of the British-American colonies were won on the battlefields of Europe. He had in mind, of course, the Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763, but his remark was applicable to King William's War 1690-1691 and to Queen Anne's War 1703-1713. The well-known history of the British debt 1689-1775 throws great light on British financial contribution to colonial welfare.

To political, financial and military contributions by Great Britain to her North American colonies, must be added the somewhat imponderable contribution of the civilization and culture brought across the Atlantic and planted on American soil. The first British-Americans were Elizabethan and brought with them the good as well as some of the evil of Elizabethan culture. Old world skills, arts, sciences, learning, literature, manners, principles, and ideals, as well spiritual as social and material, were imported or brought over. They were not indigenously American. And though planted in North America this culture was continuously fed from Europe throughout the colonial period and well into the national period of the United States of America.

Colonial Development

Some consideration of the establishment of the British-American colonies, with attention to their governments, and emphasis upon their relations to the home government in London, is essential as background to consideration of their contribution to the Anglo-French wars and the events of two centuries ago.

Virginia, founded as a chartered corporate colony in 1607, secured some local autonomy, including a representative legislature. 1619-1624, but became a royal colony in 1624, though without the permanent loss of its legislature. As the prototype of eight later royal colonies, the government of later colonial Virginia consisted
of externally appointed functionaries such as governors, lieutenant governors, councillors, judges, attorney-generals, and other officials, but had a house of burgesses elected by the people and representing local wishes and demands. Outweighed in number of offices, the lower house after bitter struggle finally secured domination in local and sometimes in intercolonial and imperial matters.

After an unsuccessful attempt to found a permanent colony, Avalon, on the island Newfoundland, George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, secured in 1632 a charter for Maryland as a proprietary province or colony. Two years later the first settlement was made. Modeled on the old County Palatines of Norman England, the proprietor owned the land and was nominally supreme in justice, administration, and military matters. His power to make all laws, rules and regulations whatsoever, was limited by the necessity of the assent of the freeman or of their representatives. Occupying a key position along the Potomac and around the upper half of the Chesapeake Bay, Maryland was, though small, populous and rich. It was destined to play an important role in the latter part of the struggle with French and Indians in and beyond the Appalachian ridges, as will be indicated below in some detail.

Within less than one generation, no fewer than six colonies were established in what is known as New England. Ownership of the territory belonged by the Charter of 1606, to the Plymouth Company, later reorganized as the Council for New England. On this territory were planted in turn, the Plymouth Colony, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Each of these had its own individual features and historical development. But several important features of colonial New England must be given attention.

Massachusetts was in every way the most powerful of the six colonies and was a model to some extent for her sister colonies. The constitutions or governments of New England colonies were largely republican. Miniature republics they have often been called. And New England for its size was relatively populous and wealthy, and thus able to make a heavy contribution to the struggle against France.

Thus with several colonies, distinct and yet much alike, New England in 1689 was prepared to act with some vigor in the conflict and wars leading up to the capture of Fort Duquesne in 1758. The New England forces which fought in Nova Scotia, on Cape Breton
Island, at Quebec, at Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Oswego, and operated against Niagara, while defending mainly their own welfare and interests, played nevertheless a vital role in the establishment of British-American control of the Ohio Valley.

While Oliver Cromwell is given much credit for the establishment of the British Empire, it is clearly observable that Charles II, the gay monarch, did much to round it out in North America. In the language of historians he "filled in the gaps." This action and policy was of vital importance in the final establishment of British-American authority a century later on the Ohio. Little time was wasted in this magnificent imperial expansion under Charles II.

The first gap filled in was that between Virginia and Florida, the latter then Spanish territory. This vast gap was given to favorites as a multiple proprietary and organized as Carolina. Thinly settled and with miserable communications, it eventually split into Northern Carolina and Southern Carolina. In 1729 the Crown bought out most of the proprietary rights and set up two royal colonies, North Carolina and South Carolina. Both democratic North Carolina and aristocratic South Carolina had typical royal colony government. They served as an imperial protection against the Spanish in Florida, the French in Louisiana, and the powerful Indian tribes in the interior with whom they soon built up a profitable trade in furs or skins. They also could and did furnish some troops for action along the upper Potomac and in the Ohio Valley. They played a role, though not a big one, in the Anglo-French conflict.

Two generations after the founding of Carolina, the old gap between Virginia and Florida was further filled in by the establishment of Georgia which for two decades was proprietary, but later was a royal colony whose small population and little wealth prevented much activity in continental struggles.

More important in the background of November 1758, was the work of filling in the gap of territory lying between Maryland on the south and New England in the north. Whatever may have been the motive of Charles II, this particular proceeding began with the royal grant of all this vast territory to James, Duke of York, who, in turn, sent out an expedition, seized the territory then known as New Netherland, and, renaming it New York, established it as a proprietary colony of an illiberal type, ruled by an appointed governor and council. On the accession of James, Duke of York, to the throne
as James II in 1686, it became a royal colony. The representative assembly permitted in 1683 and revoked in 1686 was restored under William and Mary in 1691.

New Netherland and New York in 1664 included not only the area of present New York State but also that of present New Jersey, present Pennsylvania and present Delaware. Both defensively and offensively, these vast areas were more important in the struggle with the French, than either Virginia or New England. Geographers, historians, and military authorities have long understood that New York Bay, the Hudson, the Mohawk, Lake George, and Lake Champlain were the solar plexus of American strategical anatomy. The fact could be gleaned from correspondence, and campaigns extending from 1750 to 1815.

Out of the proprietary of James, Duke of York in 1664, were soon carved other new colonies, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. The first of these was transferred to others as early as 1664, and, after numerous changes and confused administrations, and government, finally became a royal colony in 1702. Southern New Jersey was relatively secure from invasion and attack, but northern New Jersey was more exposed. As one of the British-American colonies it supplied men and resources for use on the frontiers of her more exposed sister colonies.

Pennsylvania, the Keystone, was established under Charles II, by a land grant from James, Duke of York, and a charter from King Charles, in 1681. For many reasons it was relatively populous and prosperous from its earliest years. In accordance with its charter and with the liberal ideals of its founder, William Penn, it had a somewhat progressive government including a popularly elected assembly and a liberal code of laws. But conflict between the inhabitants and the proprietors or their representatives as governors was continuous from 1681 to 1776. Theoretically Pennsylvania was in position to furnish great assistance in the Anglo-French conflict. Actually, owing to the disputes with the proprietors and the traditional pacifism of the long dominant Quaker element, her contribution save in dire crises was less than might otherwise have been expected. What she did in the so-called French and Indian War, 1754-1758, is a large part of the immediate background of the capture of Fort Duquesne.

William Penn, not satisfied with the Delaware River water front of Pennsylvania, quickly secured a grant of the territory now
known as the State of Delaware, but until 1776 commonly known as the Lower Counties, three in number. These counties were represented in the Pennsylvania Assembly until 1701, but from 1701 to 1776, they had, while under the administration of the proprietary Penns, an assembly of their own. As an almost separate proprietary colony of the Penns, the Lower Counties made their due contribution to the British-American cause, though the contribution was usually indirect through the Pennsylvania administration.

*Old France and New France*

The counterpart of this British and British-American organization and preparedness for contribution, cannot, as has hitherto above been done, be merely assumed. In some degree it must be outlined and in part delineated. Both old European France and New France in North America were grim realities and their story is an indispensable part of the history of the times.

France, though long politically disorganized and weak, was populous and rich as early as the end of the fifteenth century. French nationalism, old in theory, had become established. French overseas imperialism manifested itself in the sixteenth century. But, owing to dynastic troubles and debilitating religious warfare, little more than exploration was done before the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Imperial Spain remained dominant throughout the sixteenth century. Both British and French inroads on this domination were irritations rather than threats. Fortunately for the later British-Americans, Spanish imperialism rarely operated above the thirty-second degree of latitude.

French imperial incompetence ceased under Henry IV and his successors, Louis XIII and Louis XIV. Initiation of the new French imperialism in the New World began with the organization of French fur trade along the Saint Lawrence and the adjacent Atlantic coasts. The spasmodic trade of several generations under a succession of companies operating under royal grants was replaced by a giant imperial fur monopoly. This monopoly was granted to a group of associates of whom the Sieur de Monts was the most conspicuous. Under this fur company further explorations were made and settlements projected but not accomplished until control of operations came into the hands of Samuel de Champlain in 1608. This indefatigable leader planted settlements not only at Quebec and later
Montreal, but also in Acadia and in what later became Maine. Trouble with the British from Virginia and, later, from New England arose but French progress was only retarded, not stopped. Not only the French fur trade but also the Roman Catholic faith was widely introduced. In 1627, even before the death of Champlain in 1635, a new fur trade monopoly under the Hundred Associates was formed. Exploration and fur trade begun under Champlain were actively prosecuted for half a century.

A new phase came in 1663, when Colbert, the great minister of Louis XIV, secured the surrender of the rights of the fur trade monopoly of 1627 and created a centralized royal system of government in New France. Under final European control, it consisted, in New France, of a governor, a bishop and five councillors, chosen by the governor and the bishop. In the following year the office of intendant, to act as a check on the governor, particularly in the matter of finances, was set up. Another monopoly of the fur trade, under the French West India Company, lasted only for the decade 1664-1674. Royal initiative became supreme. Men, money, supplies, and missionaries were sent in abundance to the reinvigorated Franco-Americans. Agriculture, fishing, and trade were actively supported. Population increased and the explorations and fur trade were expanded. Only the shortcomings and stagnation of centralized autocracy prevented yet further development of strength.

In the political history of New France 1663 to 1689 two great figures stood out, both of them background factors in the eventual overthrow of French power in the upper Ohio Valley. The more powerful of the two, occupying higher office, was the Comte de Frontenac, Governor of Canada or New France, 1672-1681, a worthy successor of the earlier Champlain and predecessor of the later Marquis de Montcalm. It was under him that French-Canadian naval power was established on Lake Ontario with its base at Fort Frontenac or Cataraqui, the site of Kingston, Ontario, of the present day. It was also under him that the Mississippi River was explored and the mouth of the Ohio discovered. What he did for New France was not unlike what William Pitt, the Elder, was to do for the British Empire nearly a century later.

Contemporary of Frontenac was another and more romantic figure, Robert Cavelier Sieur de La Salle who in seeking fame and wealth in the New World made amazing voyages and travels in the Mississippi Valley before his murder in 1687. For these enter-
prises and for the promotion of the French colony of Louisiana, he is rightly world famous. And while French claims that he explored the Allegheny and Ohio rivers in 1669-1670 are not accepted by the best American scholars, the French claim to the region on this basis of discovery by La Salle lay at the root of the quarrel between French and British authorities in both the Old and the New World from 1713 to 1763. La Salle stands prominently in the historical background of November 1758.

The well-known limitations of eastern Canada in matters of climate, soil, and communication made it impossible that numerically and economically New France could compete successfully with the British-American colonies south of the Saint Lawrence and the Great Lakes. But concentration of power, organization, and action in New France tended to offset the superior but scattered and disorganized strength of British America.

*Early Franco-British American Rivalry*

The documentary records and the colonial history of New England and of New York, earlier as New Netherland, reveal that French imperialism in the seventeenth century, especially as related to the fur trade, met with insistent and almost continuous resistance from British-Americans.

With the accession of William and Mary in 1689 a crisis in Anglo-French relations immediately arose. William of Orange and Britain proposed to stop the political and territorial advance of France under Louis XIV, the Grand Monarch. This war, begun in Europe in 1690, had repercussions in North America. French and Indians attacked British-American towns as far south as Schenectady, and British-American expeditions were organized in New York and New England to capture Quebec.

Nothing significant occurred and the Treaty of Ryswick, 1697, re-established the status quo ante bellum. This War of the Palatinate in Europe is known as King William's War in America.

The uneasy peace of 1697, really a truce, lasted only four years. French ambitions could be further restrained only by war, and a dreadful struggle which was known in Europe as the War of the Spanish Succession began in 1701 and raged on for twelve years. Known in America as Queen Anne's War, it was featured in Europe by the victories of Marlborough. Fought mainly on the continent of Europe, this long drawn out war saw the gradual establishment
of British naval superiority. For eight years the mutual desire of the French and the British for the maintenance of Iroquoian neutrality preserved peace in New York, but border warfare went on in New England, and commerce raiding was common along the Atlantic coast of America. New England reprisal was attempted against Nova Scotia and Quebec but without conspicuous success.

Two important features appeared in the famous Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. One of these shows up in any good series of American historical maps. The retreat of the French Empire in North America was marked by the award to Great Britain of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay region. The other feature, so far as North America was concerned, was the alleged acknowledgment by France that the Iroquois Indians were English subjects. Since the Iroquois claimed the Great Lakes area and asserted a protectorate over all Indians (and territory) west of the Appalachians and as far as the Mississippi, this meant an enormous extension of British claims in the New World. For a full generation French official documents disputed and denied the real significance of the treaty. For another generation, however, peace, in the real nature of a truce or "cold war," survived. Under the political supremacy of Sir Robert Walpole and his Secretary of State for the southern department, the Duke of Newcastle, a kind of peace was maintained for nearly thirty years. This space of time was well used by British-Americans in building up resources and strength in the various colonies. Such a breathing and growing spell was badly needed.

**British-American Frontier Advance**

The colonial frontier advance, in the first half of the eighteenth century, is an indispensable feature of the history of the background of the birthday of Pittsburgh.

Settlement along the Atlantic Coast and up the tidal estuaries and navigable rivers was an accomplishment of the seventeenth century. Movement up to the nearest mountains, into the Piedmont area, came at the beginning of the next century and occupied the attention of a full generation. It was in the second quarter of the eighteenth century that another westward spurt carried explorers, fur traders, and pioneer settlers over the eastern ridges of the Appalachian system into its valleys, and even beyond into the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. All the way from Maine to
Georgia, but not always at the same speed, frontier advance took place. It has long been the favorite topic of romantic historians and enthusiastic local antiquarians. The documentary material while incomplete and thereby unsatisfactory, is, in survival, voluminous and highly intriguing.

Frontier expansion in New England was partly westward into the Berkshires and Green Mountains, but it was as much or more northward into Maine, New Hampshire and the region called Vermont. Such advance in the very face of French and Indians was a matter of importance in ensuing conflicts. It both protected older settlements and threatened hostile neighbors.

In New York, settlement pushed north of Albany along the Hudson and west of Albany along the Mohawk, and there was a small post at Oswego on Lake Ontario. But the powerful Iroquois Indians owned the lands which could only be secured from them in friendly agreement or sales.

*The Central Frontier*

In relation to the occupation of Pittsburgh by the British-American forces in 1758, the most significant frontier advances were made in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. While under separate jurisdictions in the colonies and also influenced by overseas control from London, these three advances had the external appearance of one slow but irresistible, somewhat glacier-like, central continental movement. Possibly only serious boundary disputes, which call for some treatment, prevented the unity of this westward movement from being as obvious contemporaneously as it is now historically.

In Pennsylvania the frontier advance moved up the Delaware and its tributaries, the Schuylkill and the Lehigh. But it also moved up to and beyond the Susquehanna. As early as 1725, Philadelphia merchants and Pennsylvania traders entered upon trade with Indians on or beyond the Allegheny River. By the middle of the century fur trade, finance, and economy greatly influenced politics and government. Probably equally important was the westward movement across the Susquehanna and southwestward along the mountain valleys through Pennsylvania, into and through Maryland, into and through Virginia, and sometimes into the Carolinas and as far as Georgia. Very many of these early pioneers were Pennsylvania Germans, but others were of English or Scotch-Irish extraction.
The establishment of Lancaster County in 1729, York County in 1749 and Cumberland County in 1750 were features of this western settlement in Pennsylvania. In military campaigns, 1755-1758, these settlements were of primary importance to British-American success.

This westward moving Pennsylvania stock also made up a good part of the people who moved into western Maryland to places like Frederick and Hagerstown, though they met there another stream of much the same racial stock moving from older Maryland counties such as Baltimore and Prince Georges. As in Pennsylvania, new political and governmental provision was essential and Frederick County, Maryland, was established in 1748. The farthest west Maryland settlement was at Old Town, the home site of Thomas Cresap, or possibly farther west on Wills Creek or on the North Fork of the Potomac. In extreme western Maryland the old eastern Maryland stock seems to have arrived first and dominated local matters. Rock Creek, Frederick, Hagerstown, Old Town, Wills Creek, and, later, Cumberland, were vital places in the campaigns of 1754, 1755, and 1758. And a feathery flying wedge of this Maryland frontier advance pushed across the upper Potomac and up its tributaries, the Great Cacapon, the South Branch, and Patterson Creek as far as Hampshire County, Virginia, of later times.

The trans-Piedmontese Virginia frontier advance was double if not more multiple in type. Its earliest feature seems to have been Pennsylvania German migration from across the Potomac in Maryland, possibly by way of the famous ford at the later site of Williamsport and its ferry and bridges. German names clog the folios of the early archivists of the local counties. But shortly the Fairfax lands drew into the lower Shenandoah Valley representatives of old English families once along the lower Potomac, the Rappahannock, and indeed along the York and the James. And mixed with Germans and English were large numbers of so-called Scotch-Irish.

In keeping with the situation resulting from migration and settlement, the political and governmental situation in the upper Potomac region of Virginia was taken care of by the erection of Frederick County, Virginia, in 1748. But some of the pioneers had arrived in the area more than a decade earlier. Records antedating Frederick County must be consulted in Orange County or in land records in Richmond.

But another stream of westward bound settlers was moving across the Blue Ridge by gaps much farther south. Mainly British,
...with only a few Germans, this population in fifteen or twenty years spread out in the wider and more fertile valleys of the upper waters of the Shenandoah River. Then with almost unbelievable speed it moved southwest into the upper valleys of the James and the Roanoke. The first political and governmental result of this frontier advance was the establishment of Augusta County, Virginia, in 1748, an arrangement destined to last for another quarter of a century, long after the capture of Fort Duquesne and the establishment of Pittsburgh which, indeed, fell for a season under the political jurisdiction of Augusta County, Virginia.

With the frontier advance in the Carolinas and Georgia it is not essential to deal. Such advance had very little direct influence on the campaigns and battles in Pennsylvania 1754-1758.

**French Counter Movement**

Neither in Quebec nor in Paris were the French unaware of this British-American activity, development, and increased power. In particular, they knew about and disliked the increased fur trade and contact with the Indians stretching from Albany, Philadelphia, the Chesapeake Bay, and Charleston, South Carolina, across the mountains and almost to the rolling waters of the Mississippi.

In counter measures the French strengthened their footholds on Lake Champlain, at Frontenac, at Niagara, in Illinois, in Missouri and in southern Louisiana. They probably first saw the importance of linking Canada and Louisiana, involving among other things the control of a route from Lake Erie down the Allegheny and Ohio rivers. The first significant official use of this vital link in communications was made by de Longueil in 1739, with a small military force. 4

In 1739, national and international warfare was renewed in Europe. It began as a naval war, commonly known as the War of Jenkins Ear, between Great Britain and Spain, 1739-41. It was supplemented by the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740, in which are sometimes depicted two Silesian Wars, 1740-1742 and 1744-1745. In these, France, as the ally of Prussia, Spain, Bavaria and Saxony, was heavily engaged. Great Britain eventually became involved as the ally of Austria but more realistically as the opponent of France and Spain. This Anglo-French war, declared in 1744 lasted in Europe for four years, being ended officially by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748. While this war, known in American history as King George's War, began in Europe and was fought mainly on
European soil, the conflict unavoidably spread to the New World, with its most notable event the capture of Louisbourg by a New England expedition in 1745 and its later restoration to France in the Treaty of 1748. Again the peace was in the nature of a truce, with the contest deferred to yet another bout, a feature of which we memorialize in this issue of the local historical magazine.

As already indicated above, the British-American frontier counties of York and Cumberland in Pennsylvania, Frederick in Maryland, and Frederick and Augusta in Virginia were established by 1750. Their inhabitants were affected by affairs and events overseas in Europe, upon the Atlantic Ocean, along the coasts of Canada, on the Saint Lawrence, around the Great Lakes, on the great Mississippi, and around the Gulf of Mexico. But until the outbreak of acknowledged international conflict in 1754 our attention must be given largely to two big items, the central government and politics in London and the affairs and events in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Wider inclusion of factors are necessary on the opening of military campaigns.

Complex Boundary Claims

The regional situation in and beyond the Appalachian ridges was doubly complex. The older but yet enduring complexity was that of international and colonist boundaries and territorial jurisdictional claims. There were in 1748 no less than half a dozen jurisdictional claims to the territory at the Forks of the Ohio. With no consideration here of either priority or validity, the claimants were Great Britain, France, the Iroquois Indians, the Ohio Valley Indians, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. The matter of boundaries was involved in each of the six claims. Archival documentary material on this is both voluminous and accessible. Into the tenuous and vague but somewhat familiar imperial claims of Great Britain and France it is unnecessary to go, for obviously their claims were the cause of hostilities, and the problem was settled by military events. The delicate question of Indian ownership and jurisdiction cannot be fully answered. It involved many matters such as; the relations of Indians and whites, the application of so-called international law to primitive people, the authority of the Iroquois, the local autonomy of the Ohio Valley Indians, and the like, all matters mainly of opinion.

Taken in the order of priority in time, the boundaries of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania call for general comment. A full
and detailed history of Virginia and its historical boundaries would fill a large volume, possibly of a thousand pages. The Virginia claims to the interior of North America started with the second charter of 1609, which granted Virginia boundaries four hundred miles north and south along the Atlantic from sea to sea, "west and northwest." Though her charters were nullified in 1624 and regions sliced off in Maryland in 1632, in Carolina in 1663, in New York 1664, New Jersey 1664 and Pennsylvania and Delaware in 1681 and 1683, Virginia as a colony 1624-1776 and as a state in and after 1776 based her claims on her early charters. That as late as 1783 she was in possession of what is now Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky and claimed the entire old Northwest then including present Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and a part of Minnesota, is well known to students of American history and geography.

As indicated, Maryland was cut away or sliced off from the Virginia territory of 1609. The Potomac River was fixed as its southern boundary west of the Chesapeake Bay and an artificial line drawn across the Eastern Shore. Accepted as a fait accompli, this southern boundary of Maryland had one problem only, that of its western limit at the source of the Potomac River. It has been often observed by later historians and geographers that Thomas Cresap as a deputy surveyor for Maryland failed to note that the source of the South Fork of the Potomac was several miles farther west and thus unwittingly left to Virginia and later to West Virginia territory which might rightly have gone to Maryland.

On the famous Maryland-Pennsylvania boundary dispute, elaborate comment is not here called for. It is possible that Maryland's claim to a boundary line north of Philadelphia and Pennsylvania's claim to a boundary south of Baltimore may have injured cooperation between Maryland and Pennsylvania in the Anglo-French wars, but evidence of this is not abundant, nor easily found.

In addition to her trouble with Maryland, Pennsylvania also had problems in regard to her New York boundary, a problem of her southern boundary to the west of Maryland, and the problem of her western boundary. In regard to the last two boundaries the dispute was with Virginia which claimed the territory to the south and west. In regard to the southern boundary, Virginia did not believe that she was bound by any agreement between the Penns and the Calverts and for a full generation claimed the territory lying "under the fortieth degree of northern latitude."
Pennsylvania's western boundary was even more a subject of dispute and difficulty. By the Charter of 1661, the Delaware River was made the eastern boundary from which the province was to extend westward five degrees of longitude. Since the Delaware was highly irregular in outline and flowed somewhat southwest, four possibilities arose: an irregular western boundary parallel to all points of the Delaware, an absurd though ethical adaptation; a line to start from the farthest point east on the Delaware River, a thing not likely to appeal to the Penns; the use of the median line of the Delaware, north-south, which would have been ethical and just; and the use of the farthest west point on the Delaware, which was done by the Penns to the advantage of Pennsylvania, but to the injury of the claims of Virginia.

From whatever angle the boundary may be considered, it seems certain that Pennsylvania got a stretch of land at least ten miles wide, east and west, and 156 miles long, north and south, 1,560 square miles, just short of a million acres, beyond the actual terms of the charter. Not only this million acres but yet another million was claimed by Virginia as not coming to her sister colony by the terms of the charters.

The other big item to be considered and held in mind by celebrators of 1958, is that of land speculation, land titles, purchases, etc., particularly by groups, whether as syndicates, organized companies, or powerful if not always rich individuals. The North American genesis of this is found in the early proprietaries such as Maryland. A slightly different and somewhat new development came with the Northern Neck grant to royal favorites and its acquisition by the Fairfax family. A spasm of such land speculation grew up with and, more so, grew out of the British-American push into the Appalachians 1730-1740. This decade saw the beginning of the occupation of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. William Beverley, James Patton, and others began such activities before 1740. They began to put in land grant petitions to the Governor and Council of Virginia. A clause in the Indian Treaty of Lancaster, 1744, doubtless inserted at the request of William Berkeley and Thomas Lee, the Virginia representatives there, quickly stimulated additional and larger schemes. With one of these, the Ohio Company, it is necessary to deal further on, as a specialty, but at least half a dozen other groups in Virginia were influenced and involved 1744-1754.5

Land speculation on the upper Potomac in Maryland entered
upon a similar contemporary phase. The parallelism is striking.

Thomas Cresap, the great early western Maryland frontiersman, settled near Hagerstown of later times, in 1739. Two years later he moved to Old Town on the Potomac River a few miles below the mouth of Wills Creek. A local merchant, Indian fur trader, and land speculator, he was a surveyor for a succession of Western Maryland counties. His services were used by prominent eastern Marylanders such as Daniel Dulany and Governor Thomas Bladen. From land warrants for several thousand acres in 1743 and 1745, Bladen had numerous pieces of land surveyed, usually by Thomas Cresap or his deputized assistants. Much of the land was above Old Town, along the banks of the Potomac and of Wills Creek. Owing to geology and geography, this western Maryland area, granted to Thomas Bladen, but later assigned to others, became a vital spot in explorations of 1750-1752, in the Virginia advance over the mountains in 1752-1753 and in Ohio Valley military campaigns of 1754, 1755, and 1758.

In Pennsylvania the fur traders of 1740-1750 became interested as well in land ownership and land speculation. The most prominent of these was George Croghan, but William Trent, John Fraser and others were similarly engaged. Eastern Pennsylvania political and mercantile figures, such as Richard Peters, William Smith, Edward Shippen, and others, invested in frontier lands. Patents, deeds and mortgages fill many pages in the archives of Lancaster, York, and Cumberland, and, later, of Bedford and Westmoreland Counties.

Pennsylvanians as well as Virginians had their attention fixed upon future prospects along the Juniata, the Conemaugh, the Youghiogheny, the Allegheny and the Monongahela.

Land Companies

Of the land companies organized in Virginia in the decade, 1740-1750, two were of greatest historical significance. One of these, the Loyal Land Company, operated with permanent title results in western and southwestern colonial Virginia, which included present day West Virginia. It was of great importance in the later history of southwest Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky. Its story is, however, not highly relevant to the early history of Pittsburgh.

On the other hand the story of the Ohio Company 1747-1754 is fundamental in the situation at the Forks of the Ohio, in the period from 1747 to 1758, and beyond. It may almost be claimed
that the activities of the Ohio Company precipitated the struggle commonly known in American history as the French and Indian War.

The gradual evolution of the Ohio Company 1745-1747, is not revealed in surviving documentary material. Indirectly it may have been influenced by the Fairfax land possession and policy with which the Lees and Washingtons were greatly familiar. As already indicated it may have been influenced by items in the Indian treaty of 1744. Competition in western enterprise between William Berkeley on one side and the Washingtons and Lees on the other may have been an influence. Some, both contemporaries and writers of later time, have given credit for the idea to Thomas Cresap who actually presented the first petition in 1747.

It is also reasonable to suppose that Lawrence Washington may have first worked upon such a plan. But the best judgment from later records would indicate that the prime mover was Thomas Lee of Stratford, judge and member of the Virginia Council.

Worthy of attention, it would seem, is the fact that from 1745 to 1748, the period of the inception of the Ohio Company, King George’s War was in progress in Europe, on the high seas, and along the disputed frontier of New France. No evidence of the earliest conferences and discussions of the Ohio Company seems to have survived. Oblivion, without giving alms, has triumphed forever. But that such conferences and discussions were held is shown by the dual fact that when the first documentation comes, it contains references to both an executive committee and to articles of agreement.

The first land grant petition, of October 24, 1747, made to the Executive Council of Virginia, was deferred in time and referred to the government in London. The eleven gentlemen from the Rappahannock and Potomac valleys were not without opposition in the powerful Virginia Council. And Governor Gooch, old and feeble, thought it might injure the prospects of peace. For more than a year the matter was batted around. Finally, it was decided by the Company to add British residents as members and put in an appeal directly to the King in Council. News about these petitions of the Ohio Company in due time reached both Paris and Quebec. Even before the royal approval in March 1749 and six months before the ordered grant by the Virginia Council, the French had begun countermeasures. Apparently the first and greatly the most important step was the justly famous expedition sent out by the Governor of Canada.
under Céloron de Blainville, whose trip from Montreal in early 1749, as revealed in journals, is of great historical interest and value. But this countermeasure was far from definitive and effective. It was followed by a policy of infiltration and Indian activity on the part of French trappers, traders, military personnel, and religious agents. Possession of the then potentially richest part of the world was the issue at stake. The regions, hills and valleys, rivers and forests were permeated with propagandistic action, with aggressive use of both strategy and tactics. "Cold" war followed.

In the meantime the Ohio Company of Virginia was not idle nor badly negligent. It ordered large cargoes of European goods for the Indian trade and, in the winter of 1750-1751, had much of a cargo sold along the Ohio and its northwestern tributaries. At the same time it bought property on both sides of the Potomac near Wills Creek. It also sent out Christopher Gist as an explorer and messenger to the Indians in the winters of 1750-1751 and 1751-1752. The complete story of the Ohio Company is much too long for inclusion here. Several books of recent years have greatly enlarged not only the history, but the significance of the Company.

These activities of the Ohio Company did not escape notice. They were commented upon in Annapolis, Philadelphia, New York, Boston, London, and Paris and, of course, in Detroit, Niagara, Frontenac, Montreal, and Quebec. The completion of the Ohio Company Road from Wills Creek to the Monongahela Valley and the coming of the first families west of the mountains may have been well known as far away as Quebec.

The net result of the Ohio Company push across the mountains was another countermeasure, the third important French military expedition in the region.

French Response

The French expedition of 1753, like that of 1749 by Céloron de Blainville, was primarily a continental American affair, though with the centralized control of old and new France, and with French troops along the Saint Lawrence, it was not wholly indigenous nor autonomous. The situation in the British-American colonies was similar. Governors, councils, and assemblies were in control; in South Carolina under Governor James Glen, in North Carolina under Governor Arthur Dobbs, in Maryland under Governor Horatio Sharpe and the proprietary, in Pennsylvania under Governor James Hamilton...
and the proprietary, and in Virginia under Governor William Gooch until 1749, under Thomas Lee, President of the Council, acting governor for slightly more than a year, 1749-1750 and after two acting governors, under Governor Robert Dinwiddie from late 1751 to early 1758.

Otherwise than in matters of personnel in command and local problems, the government of New France remained much as it had become organized under Louis XIV. It was under the Comte de Galissoniere that Céloron de Blainville made his trip. French policy 1749-1752 was under the Marquis de la Jonquiere, who was succeeded in 1752 by the Marquis de Duquesne, who sent out the famous expedition of M. Marin in 1753.

On this expedition there has long been in print materials which adequately depict the intrepidity of this French maneuver of 1753. More recently the publication of the long neglected Contrecoeur papers has clarified the details of famous endeavor. Though probably officially intended to establish another fait accompli in the "cold" war which had been going on for five years, this expedition was something more. It was a genuine military movement.

Opening Military Actions

Some historians believe hostilities involving warfare, if they did not begin in the west in 1751 or 1752, actually began with the seizure of Venango by the French in the late summer of 1753. The trip to Venango was a difficult one. It involved painful and dangerous movement up the Saint Lawrence from Montreal to Lake Ontario. A feature was the long trip west from Frontenac to Niagara, at which place all personnel and supplies had to be moved up a height of about two hundred and fifty feet to the level of Lake Erie. Great exhaustion, much sickness, and many deaths were the results. But leaders in command such as Marin, Contrecoeur, and others, were determined and heroic.

When the expedition reached a small inlet on Lake Erie where Barcelona, New York, was later located, the old route by Lake Chautauqua and Conewango Creek and thence down the Allegheny, was no longer considered satisfactory. Another harbor and better route was sought and found to the west at Presque Isle, or Erie Bay of later times. A fort was erected, a road laid out to the Riviere aux Boeuf (present day Waterford), a fort built there, and the expedition extended to Venango (Franklin of the present day), where
the residence and gunsmith shop of John Fraser, from which he had fled, was taken over and a third fort projected. But the momentum was now gone, supplies were inadequate, water in the inland streams was too low for navigation, winter was approaching, and many went home to Canada for the winter. This expulsion of John Fraser and the seizure of his property has been called the opening of the French and Indian War, but earlier still were seizures of British-American fur traders and attacks upon their Indian friends and allies.

From now available documentary materials, it seems that an Ohio Company settlement was established between the Youghiogheny and the Monongahela in the winter of 1752-1753. And John Fraser, Thomas Cresap, and others were in the region in early 1753. The first English-speaking Transappalachian frontier had been located. A rival land company made surveys in the area in the first quarter of 1753. Information about the French at Niagara, Erie, Fort Le Boeuf, and Venango was brought by friendly Indians who themselves strenuously objected to the French invasion of their lands and home sites. From the Monongahela, information quickly reached Wills Creek, the New Store of the Ohio Company and Old Town, Maryland. With equal speed it reached Williamsburg and possibly Annapolis and Philadelphia.

Particularly distressing, especially to the Ohio Company and Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, was the problem of the Ohio Valley Indians. A conference with them was called and met at Winchester in the late summer. Presents to them were given, more presents promised, and preparations made to construct posts or forts on the Monongahela and the Ohio.

After preliminary steps in late 1752 and in the early months of 1753, Governor Dinwiddie in mid-June fully reported to the home government, the enlarged operations of the French and asked for instructions. It was probably late in October that he received the well-known instructions drawn up in London and sent him August 28, 1753. He was authorized to send a messenger to the French to demand their withdrawal from the region and in case of their refusal to take the necessary measures to drive them out. In military terminology these measures were an ultimatum. Matters had reached a crisis. The French were preparing to descend the Allegheny in early 1754. Soldiers, Indians, supplies, boats for transportation were projected by them and, as fast as possible, gathered. All this the Ohio Valley Indians, the Ohio Company agents and settlers, and
GENERAL EDWARD BRADDOCK
others, as far as Philadelphia, Annapolis, and Williamsburg, knew.

After some trouble in securing a messenger to deliver in winter the message to the French commanders at the French forts, Governor Dinwiddie hit upon young George Washington, who on a greatly famous trip travelled over the Ohio Company road from the New Store to Gist's place. He may have stopped with John Fraser on Turtle Creek and with George Croghan on Pine Creek. He inspected both the Forks of the Ohio and McKee's Rocks before dropping down to Logstown and going on overland to Venango and Fort Le Boeuf. As might have been anticipated, his message was not accepted by the French commandants. Their answer while guarded and diplomatic was in fact a rejection. The logical result of an ultimatum and its rejection is warfare and this case was not to be an exception.

On his return trip, Washington again passed through Pittsburgh of today, stopped at John Fraser's cabin on Turtle Creek, at Christopher Gist's place along the Youghiogheny, at Wills Creek, and eventually reached Williamsburg in late January. His unfavorable news and report precipitated Virginia war measures and brought on the military campaign of 1754.

William Trent, an old Pennsylvania trader, merchant, and land speculator who had been appointed the successor of Hugh Parker as western agent or factor of the Ohio Company, was in January 1753 at the mouth of Redstone Creek with a small working force constructing a storehouse for the Ohio Company. This post was a base from which Trent proposed to move on to the construction of the long projected fort of the Ohio Company near or on the Forks of the Ohio. Governor Dinwiddie, both a member of the Ohio Company and the political and military head of Virginia, endeavored to speed up military matters. There was absolutely no time to waste, for it was obvious that the French would descend the Allegheny River in early 1754. William Trent was immediately commissioned a captain in the Virginia militia, instructed to raise a company of a hundred men, and ordered to descend the Monongahela and build a fort to be named Fort Prince George, on the triangle between the Monongahela and the Allegheny. On the receipt of orders, Trent began operations at once, arriving at the Forks of the Ohio February 17, 1754, but with less than half of one hundred men. At the same time, George Washington, already a colonel in the Virginia militia, was instructed to raise another company and march to the support of Captain Trent
who was at the time on the important spot, one literally destined to be a hot spot for the next five years.

Governor Dinwiddie continued a lively correspondence not only with higher officials in London, but with fellow governors in the American colonies. He saw the conflict as greatly continental and asked for the cooperation of the Carolinas, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and for the use of the Independent Companies already established in key positions in North America. He seems to have underestimated the difficulties of organization, supplies, and transportation in a world so largely a wilderness.

William Trent found himself in trouble at the Forks of the Ohio. His force was small, only about three dozen men. The Ohio Valley Indians to whom he had brought out presents stayed in the neighborhood and drew heavily upon his meagre supplies. As later depositions of Ensign Ward show, it was vitally necessary for Trent to return to Wills Creek for more supplies. He also hoped to bring back more support in the arrival of Washington's company which reached the Wills Creek neighborhood only in April and was not adequately equipped for service. Affairs at the Forks of the Ohio became ever more desperate.

In mid-April the French and Indians finally came down the Allegheny River. Provided with adequate artillery and outnumbering the garrison thirty to one, the result was inevitable. The British-Americans met with defeat and were compelled to retreat to Wills Creek, where the straggling men arrived before Captain Trent and Colonel Washington had gotten ready to march west from Wills Creek.

After Ensign Ward had carried the bad news to Williamsburg, it was necessary to establish the First Virginia Regiment, ask for the assistance of the Independent Companies, and call further upon adjoining colonies for assistance in men, money, and supplies. The results were very unsatisfactory. Colonel Joshua Fry in command of the regiment, and Washington in command of an advance movement, had less than three hundred men. Another three hundred were on the march to Wills Creek. Circumstances were on the whole highly unsatisfactory.

On or near the site of Captain Trent's crude palisaded enclosure, historically known as Fort Prince George, the French hurriedly constructed a more elaborate work and named it Fort Duquesne. In and around it were gathered several hundred French and Canadian troops and an equally large number of Indians. It was this fort
which dominated the Forks for more than four years before it was finally captured in November 1758. Captain Contrecoeur had led the expedition down the river and was destined to retain command during the next two campaigns.

George Washington, in early 1754, though a colonel in the Virginia militia, was only twenty-two years of age and wholly without field experience in war. But he was self-confident, bold to the point of rashness, and highly ambitious. Service under Colonel Fry was distasteful to him, but the early death of Colonel Fry gave Washington final authority over the Virginia militia under him. He decided to cross the mountains and establish himself at a base on or near Redstone Creek, where he could be later joined by others then on the march from New York and the Carolinas. He reached and crossed, in early May, the upper branches of the Youghiogheny. As a mountain base he hit upon Great Meadows. With friendly Ohio Valley Indians he endeavored to co-operate. While in this neighborhood he heard of a small French force advancing and lurking in the forests and glens. An attack on this force involved the famous episode of Jumonville's defeat and death. One great historian considered this small encounter as the beginning of hostilities.

From the Great Meadows Colonel Washington went down the mountain to Gist's place, and sent forces under Captain Andrew Lewis and Captain George Mercer to clear the road to the Monongahela at the mouth of Redstone Creek. This work was not fully completed before the road builders were hurriedly recalled.

The French under Contrecoeur at Fort Duquesne were informed by one of Jumonville's men, who alone had escaped death or capture, about the episode at Jumonville's Glen. Information about Colonel Washington's force at Gist's place was later reported by spies sent out for the purpose.

A relatively large body of French and Indians under DeVilliers, the brother of Jumonville, marched against their rivals for possession of the area. In the oft described maneuvers which followed, Washington capitulated at Fort Necessity on July 4, 1754, exactly twenty-two years before the adoption of the Declaration of Independence. By the terms of the capitulation Washington and his troops retired to Wills Creek, and the Ohio Valley for nearly a year remained uncontestedly in the hands of the French. The British-Americans were actually thrown on the defensive on the frontiers of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The need for more protection from
sporadic hostile incursions caused great anxiety along the Potomac and the Susquehanna.

Hitherto military contribution from the home government in London had been indirect and slight. The so-called Independent Companies of New York and of South Carolina were late in reaching the scene of conflict. They seem to have been under the control of the War Department in London, officered by British regulars, and under regular British rules of war, with guaranteed status and pay as British regulars. But these companies were probably composed mainly of enlisted North American colonials. They were literally independent of the colonial militia and strongly inclined to be independent of colonial administration. George Washington repeatedly and greatly objected to the supposed rank of a regular captain over a militia colonel, and when on appeal it was decided to change the militia regiment into independent companies, sent in his resignation and retired to private life. Governor Horatio Sharpe was made the commander-in-chief.

The crisis of the summer of 1754 led to frantic appeal from Governor Dinwiddie for British overseas support. George the Second, his son the Duke of Cumberland, military chief; the Duke of Newcastle, head of the ministry; Henry Fox, Secretary of War; Thomas Robinson, Secretary of State; and others, agreed to send to the harassed colonies heavy military and naval aid, consisting of two regiments of regular troops under Major General Edward Braddock and a large fleet under Admiral Boscawen.

In November 1754, Braddock was given elaborate triple instructions and furnished with copies of earlier documents from the governmental archives. Sailing from Europe in December, with troopships convoyed by Admiral Keppel, he arrived after a bad winter voyage and, landing at Hampton, Virginia, he quickly got into touch with Governor Dinwiddie. After several conferences, Braddock and Dinwiddie wrote to the colonial governors from Nova Scotia to South Carolina and called a conference to meet in Annapolis early in April.

A decision was early made to disembark the two regiments, not at Hampton nor at Yorktown but farther north at Fredericksburg or at Alexandria, Virginia. From northern Virginia the forces were marched to Wills Creek, Maryland, by two different routes, one overland by way of Winchester and Romney, of later times, and the other by way of Frederick, Maryland, and thence to Winchester. The troops reached Wills Creek about May 10, 1755, but much of the month
was lost in securing supplies and transportation facilities and in repairing and widening the Old Ohio Company Road to the Monongahela River.

General Braddock's campaign of June and July 1755 has never ceased to be a matter of great historical interest. From more recent studies both of Braddock before 1755 and of the campaign itself, favorable estimation of Braddock has greatly increased. He was a veteran regular, and he understood military organization, order, and management. He was, while not a wilderness tactician, nevertheless an able strategist. His logistics were hampered by geographic, economic, and political difficulties, without which he might easily have succeeded.

For the campaign there were alternative plans available. One was to advance, with power invincible, against any potential enemy. This was the plan actually followed by General John Forbes three years later. There is much evidence that this was the desire and plan of Braddock. The other plan was to advance rapidly with a mobile force and reach Fort Duquesne before men and supplies for the summer had arrived from Quebec. This was the plan which had been followed with none too satisfactory results by Colonel Washington in 1754 and now was ardently promoted by him in the 1755 campaign. Braddock straddled the two conflicting plans and, largely as a result, lost the campaign. He neither moved with irresistible force nor arrived before reinforcements reached the enemy.

On the details of Braddock's last weeks there is much information. He reached the final mountain ridge with an intact force of about 1,400 regulars, 700 provincials, and 50 sailors detached from the navy. But he divided his army, leaving behind on the mountain Colonel Dunbar with about 750 men and much of the army train. Partly a matter of strategical division, this move was as well the outgrowth of inadequate transportation and the resulting scarcity of provisions and military supplies. Whatever the motivation the military maxim of unity in the immediate face of an enemy was violated.

With about 1,400 picked troops he moved on toward Fort Duquesne. To avoid Turtle Creek Valley, considered a dangerous gorge, he crossed from the east bank of the Monongahela to the west bank and then recrossed the Monongahela on the morning of July 9, 1755, destined to be a fatal day for him and his army.

The French at Fort Duquesne had scouted his army and its advance. They now had to fight, or retreat, or surrender. Thanks
to the courage and boldness of two French Officers, Captain Daniel Beaujeu and Captain Jean Dumas, they decided to march out and attack before the enemy, with superior numbers and better artillery, reached the vicinity of the fort. About 400 Indians and an even smaller number of French and Canadians engaged in the enterprise.

Much has been made of Braddock's failure to hold Indian allies and use them as scouts. It is true that he did not understand them nor get along amicably with them, but that is not surprising to those familiar with the literature of the war. British-American commanders such as George Washington, William Shirley, John Forbes, Henry Bouquet, William Byrd III and others had similar if not the same trouble and experience with Indian allies. Only William Johnson could and did use them successfully.

On the morning of the battle, Braddock sent forward guides and an advance force under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage. Then he followed with his army and its train of supplies, all in excellent order with flankers and pickets. His great blunder seems to have been that of moving forward in a long drawn out column easily stopped by enemy opposition at front and easily attacked on the sides from woods and ravines.

On the marching column, Captain Beaujeu and his forces advanced in mid-afternoon. At first they were checked by gunfire which scattered them and cost Beaujeu his life, but under Captain Dumas the now scattered French and Indians fell upon the column of the enemy. The British-American guides and pickets fled from the front, throwing Gage's force into disorder. The flankers were likewise driven from the hills and forced back. Eventually Braddock came forward and took command of operations. But he kept the army in column and failed to establish a line of battle to withstand the enemy. Within about two hours the final outcome was fully determined. Wise strategy in earlier weeks was ruined by bad tactics on the battlefield. The heroic and historic role of Washington has long been a matter of public lore.

The list of casualties of the British-Americans included, as killed, wounded, or missing, sixty-three of the eighty-nine officers and one-half of the privates. The military and personal property captured on the battlefield involved heavy loss. But possibly, wild plundering on the part of the Indians saved many of the British regulars and colonial militia who fled the scene and straggled back up to the mountain plateau where Colonel Dunbar, with about one-third of
the men of the expedition and guarding wagons and supplies, had been left in reserve.

Although it was soon known that the Indian allies of the French had left the region and that only a few hundred French regulars remained at Fort Duquesne, the British-American forces pulled out of the region. Many of the Virginia militia went back to their homes. Colonel Dunbar, disregarding appeals of Dinwiddie and others, retreated from his encampment to Wills Creek, thence to Philadelphia and eventually to the Hudson River valley, taking along with him some of the Independent Companies sent to Virginia at an earlier time.

The British-American colonial frontier of Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia was left, in great danger, wide open to sporadic raids by Indians led by French officers or by some trusted Indian chief.

The disastrous outcome of Braddock's expedition was not completely offset by efforts elsewhere under William Shirley, William Johnson, Admiral Boscawen, and others. But relative failure produced strangely little governmental upheaval. Not for two years was the home government in London to undergo a revolutionary change in leadership and control. No profound changes were made in colonial government. Governors such as Shirley in Massachusetts, Delancey in New York, Robert Hunter Morris in Pennsylvania, Horatio Sharpe in Maryland, Dinwiddie in Virginia, Dobbs in North Carolina, and Glen in South Carolina were not unseated but continued for several years. The most significant change on Braddock's death was that in the position of Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America, where Shirley, Lord Loudoun, James Abercromby and Jeffery Amherst followed each other in rapid order, 1755-1758.

For three troublesome years Fort Duquesne remained what Colonel Henry Bouquet later called it, "a nest of corsairs." Raid after raid from Fort Duquesne hit pioneer settlements along the Susquehanna and the Potomac. Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia were definitely on the defensive with only a sporadic offensive such as the famous Pennsylvania attack of 1756 upon Kittanning. It was in these years that a series of forts was established in central Pennsylvania, a few in Maryland, and a great number in Virginia. George Washington, for the second time Colonel of the First Virginia Regiment, had a busy life establishing, garrisoning, and inspecting a string of little forts on the Virginia frontier.9

In British North America in general, but in Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia in particular, the years 1756 and 1757 were not merely sorrowful but also, on the surface at least, somewhat drab. Down below, but little above oblivion, there was population increase and social growth. But the economic and financial situation, while not unendurable, was highly distressing. As an illustration or example, the old Ohio Company, so influential in the years immediately preceding, became quiescent.

But these drab years are in the immediate background of the Forbes campaign of 1758, and several significant factors require attention.

As demonstrated by events, earlier and later, much depended on the central government in London. Under George II as king and the Duke of Cumberland as highest military authority, the Duke of Newcastle was prime minister from 1754 until late in 1756. As Secretary of State he had Henry Fox, a statesman of questionable reputation. When public pressure uprooted Fox in late 1756, Newcastle found the responsibility too great and likewise resigned. William Pitt, the Elder, became Secretary of State and introduced some of the ideas about which he had been campaigning for several years. His main proposal was to oppose New France in North America by putting pressure on France in Europe. Aid to Hanover and alliance with Prussia were land measures. Reorganization of the navy, after the loss of Minorca by Admiral Byng, was another expectation. But George II did not like William Pitt, whose emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty was distasteful to royalty as well as to the old Whig aristocracy. And the powerful Duke of Cumberland demanded Pitt's removal. His dismissal came in April 1757. But George II found it impossible to set up another administration and, after three months, Pitt came back into power in June 1757, nominally under the Duke of Newcastle as Prime Minister, but really in control himself of virtually everything except management of Parliament. It was under this regime that Fort Duquesne was captured, and Pitt's "system" of 1757-1758 demands therefore some analysis.

The diplomatic, naval, and military situation in Europe is a part of the historical background of Pittsburgh's Bicentennial. When England lost willingness to fight for the Austrian recovery of Silesia from Prussia, Austria turned to France, and Prussia and Britain became allies. This startling diplomatic reversal antedated Pitt's accession to office, but he accepted it and maintained it for four
eventful years, 1757-1761. On sea the loss of Minorca still rankled British pride. William Pitt endeavored to strengthen the navy both to threaten French coasts and to weaken French maritime communications with New France. On land the Duke of Cumberland defending the Electorate of Hanover was badly defeated and abandoned active military life. The land warfare was mainly the brilliant campaign of Frederick the Great in Saxony and Silesia, in 1757.

**Commanders-in-Chief in British America**

The most powerful figure and position in British North America, from 1755 to 1774, was that of Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Forces in North America.

The first of these was Major General Edward Braddock. Popularly known, mainly if not only, for his defeat, his papers clearly reveal his military, political, and financial power in 1755. On Braddock's death, his second in command, Major General William Shirley, took over immediate control of the position, with all its responsibilities.

More politician than military specialist, Shirley had many fine strategic ideas, some of which he passed on to Braddock. Popular for the time in New England, Shirley probably aroused and certainly met considerable antagonism elsewhere. His relations with William Johnson were not altogether friendly nor cordial, save in formalistic statement. The military circumstances were unfavorable in 1755, and his proposed campaign against Niagara hardly got beyond the Hudson River. His policies after Braddock's Defeat antagonized the governors of southern colonies. Possibly not because of such things, but for reasons of military politics, Shirley, March 20, 1756, was superseded by John Campbell, Fourth Earl of Loudoun, already appointed Governor of Virginia, February 17, 1756.

Lord Loudoun arrived in New York, July 23, 1756. He had left affairs in great political, military, and naval confusion in Europe and he found them in similar condition in North America. He hurried to Albany, headquarters of several thousand troops gathered for at least defensive action on the northern frontier of New York and along Lake George and Lake Champlain. But he soon found himself in seemingly unavoidable difficulties with Shirley, with General Webb, and with Winslow and other militia commanders. A shattering result was the capture, by the French, of Oswego. During the next year he was incessantly in trouble with colonial governments about money, supplies, quarters, recruiting, and other matters. His
plans for an expedition against Louisbourg and for a movement against Quebec, both by sea and overland, came to naught. Miserable weather delayed matters until it was too late. He did not escape the accusation of wasting time.

General James Abercromby was by appointment from London second in command to Loudoun in the New World. When Loudoun went to New York, then to Boston, and eventually to Halifax, Abercromby remained behind in the Hudson Valley.

Forbes

An old friend of Loudoun, who also was acquainted with the then powerful Duke of Cumberland, was Colonel John Forbes, who had served in different capacities in warfare in Europe. In a reshuffling organization, Forbes in early 1757 was made colonel of the 17th regiment. With a large fleet of war vessels and military transports, Forbes sailed in May for Halifax, Nova Scotia, which was reached in July 1757. Here were soon gathered more than seven regiments, most of them recently from Europe. Lord Loudoun badly needed assistance in his duties and found a most efficient worker in Forbes who quickly became his adjutant general and his friendly but frank adviser and critic. This role Forbes continued to play after the return of Loudoun from Halifax to New York. In this connection he wrote many letters and may have drawn up various plans of instructions and operations for the campaigns of 1758. But a profound change in his status had already been made, though it was late in March 1758 before it was announced and established in North America.11

Pitt

Pittsburgh is very properly named. The British imperial successes, 1758 to 1761, were greatly determined by Pitt. Of his somewhat unattractive genius there is no historical doubt. The major facts about his career at this time are fairly clear. He had great popularity with the people of Great Britain, a fact of prime significance in the support of parliamentary government.

While he was disliked by George II and the Duke of Cumberland, this fact probably increased his favor with the common people. The measures of his “system” were many. Possibly the most important of these was to make use of his influence with the people to secure more money through increased taxation, money needed and to be used in enlarging the royal navy, supporting, financially, Eng-
land's continental allies, and fitting out additional regiments for defense in Europe and attack in North America. Naval, financial, and military pressure upon France, both in the Old and the New World, soon became incessant rather than sporadic. Pitt's policy of placing younger men in command of important movements produced good results, under men like Amherst, Wolfe, Howe, Forbes, Bradstreet, Bouquet and others. A brilliant stroke of genius was his invitation to Scottish Highlanders to organize British imperial regiments and fight for Great Britain and the empire. The acceptance of this invitation and the honorable reception of such regiments established a veritable bulwark of imperial power. Pitt also agreed to assist the colonies in North America in raising and supporting colonial troops. He and others in England had long heard and known that the debtor type of colonial economic and financial matters made such assistance necessary to success. The financial statistics of such expenditure, while significant and interesting, are best reserved for specialists in imperial economy and finance.

Plans for 1758

After two years of great confusion, Great Britain, under Pitt, in 1758, loosed a hydra headed attack against France. Fleets were sent against the coasts of France, subsidies to Prussia were granted, a Hanoverian army was stationed in western Germany, French possessions in western Africa were seized, French authority and power in India were challenged and put in the way of elimination. But the greatest efforts were made in North America.

In the truly global struggle of 1758, the struggle in North America was continental in objective and semi-continental in scope, the latter extending from Labrador to Louisiana and from the Atlantic to and beyond the Mississippi. Primary British objectives were Louisbourg, Quebec, Montreal, Frontenac, Niagara and Fort Duquesne.

Military Enterprises in North America, 1758

It is commonly asserted that three main military enterprises were projected and attempted in North America in 1758. With them general students of history are familiar but to their story return is here necessary. But there was a fourth enterprise of no little importance in the eventual outcome of affairs, 1758-1760. As early as January 25, 1758 some one in the entourage of Lord Loudoun, probably Captain John Bradstreet himself, put out an admirable plan
for the capture of Cataraqui (Fort Frontenac) on the eastern end of Lake Ontario. These instructions to Captain John Bradstreet were not carried out in early spring as planned and the forces expected to be used were not available until later in the summer, but eventually Bradstreet did get sufficient troops, made the expedition planned earlier, captured the fort, storehouses, and shipping there and on Lake Ontario, made greatly easier the work of General Forbes, threatened the eventual French loss of all posts between Montreal and St. Louis, and did irreparable damage to French strength in 1759 and 1760. John Bradstreet, who may never have been at the Forks of the Ohio, might well be historically honored by a municipal statue in Pittsburgh.

The main British attack in 1758 was upon the great Fortress at Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island in lower Saint Lawrence Bay. Its importance was not only that of a military and naval base but also as a protection to Quebec, the capital, and also to Montreal. A magnificent combined naval and military force, the latter under General Jeffery Amherst, with great aid from General James Wolfe, attacked the fort and before the end of July captured the fort and took possession of the island, which thus became an English base for operations later against Quebec and Montreal.

The second largest British enterprise of the British in 1758 was an expedition against the French forts on Lake George and Lake Champlain, especially such strongholds as Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The distant objective was, through control of Lakes George and Champlain, a direct attack on the heart of New France at Montreal and Quebec.

For this enterprise, the British, under General Abercromby, as yet Commander-in-Chief, had large forces along the Hudson and the Mohawk, composed of British regulars, colonial Independent Companies, New England militia regiments, and potential Iroquois Indian allies. With seemingly overwhelming power the outcome looked highly favorable for the British-Americans. But such expectation was doomed to miserable failure. Confusion in organization and delay in operations was followed by rash attack on trenches and earthworks hurriedly prepared by the French some miles south of Fort Ticonderoga. British valor, involving the death of Lord Howe, broke in vain against French defense of the trenches. The defeat was more bloody and disastrous than that of Braddock two years earlier. Not only were the French not expelled from Lake George
and Lake Champlain but all hopes of advancing against Montreal and Quebec in 1758 came to an abrupt end. It was after this battle that troops were assigned to Colonel Bradstreet. And not long afterward Abercromby was removed from his high command and replaced by General Jeffery Amherst.

Contributions to Success

A central theme of the history of the background of British-American triumph at the Forks of the Ohio two hundred years ago, is that of the contribution, both of the mother country and of her colonies, to the final and permanent result.

In this regard, it is obvious that the naval and military contribution of Great Britain to the French and Indian War in North America can only with the greatest difficulty be accurately evaluated. Statistics can be compiled about regiments, battalions, companies of British regulars who served in North America, and about warships, transports, and packet boats which sailed in North American waters. But such statistics are somewhat meaningless. They do not take into consideration that in both military and naval service, there was only fractional and temporary operation in America, nor do they weigh the fact that all such service anywhere in the world was a factor in North America.

If the matter of financial contribution is given consideration, the relative hopelessness of any specific and accurate conclusion is plainly evident to anyone at all familiar with extant source material on the subject. The expense of recruiting, training, and keeping in the field large bodies of soldiers was unbelievably heavy for that time. The cost of naval power and operations, while possibly less, was nevertheless enormous. From 1755 to 1763 the expense of Indian affairs was a heavy drain on the British Treasury. And the parliamentary assumption of part of the outlay and expenditure of the colonies ran into high figures.

A short study of such data is beyond treatment in a short article, but it is necessary to hold in mind that the taxpayer in Great Britain paid taxes equivalent to twenty per cent of individual incomes and that the debt of Britain rose to £140,000,000.

The Place of Forbes in History

The military campaign against Fort Duquesne in 1758 is regionally and locally tied in forever with the career of General John Forbes. But for this campaign, his name would be known only
in the realm of obscure military annals and personnel. Though he died early in 1759, he might well have said before his death what was actually exclaimed by a sickly stooped historian, editor, and archivist, who, when someone asked if he did not regret his condition, replied, “My life work is done.”

Probably because of his intrinsic worth and not solely because he was a friend of Loudoun and Cumberland, Colonel John Forbes was appointed Brigadier General and put in command of the expedition against Fort Duquesne. Information about this reached Forbes in New York on March 4, 1758. It probably took two weeks to get the papers to Abercromby and for Forbes to receive his instructions from his new commander-in-chief. As it turned out, some of the preliminary steps had already been taken, in ordering Lieutenant Colonel Bouquet of the First Battalion of Royal Americans, February 14, 1758, to leave Charleston, South Carolina and embark for New York.

Immediately upon receipt of his instructions, General Forbes, from his headquarters in New York, began active preparation for his campaign. As did Braddock in 1755, he entered quickly upon correspondence with colonial governors. In a letter, March 20, 1758, to Governor William Denny of Pennsylvania, he asked for good soldiers, carpenters, light horsemen, workers on the roads, rangers, spies, and numbers of militia to be expected from Pennsylvania. Another letter, three days later, to Denny inquired about the necessary wagons and carriages.

A similar letter of March 21, 1758, to Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina, mentioned the necessity of good troops but commented more fully on Cherokee Indians expected to be added to his forces. A letter of the same type and purport was sent on the same day to Governor Horatio Sharpe of Maryland whose unfavorable report on Maryland politics and troops was answered from New York, April 4, 1758. His month in New York, March 20 - April 19, was not wasted by General Forbes. He had to wind up his affairs with Lord Loudoun and get his arrangements with Abercromby established. Under the latter’s orders he moved to Philadelphia in April.

In Philadelphia, Forbes quickly became involved in difficulty by reason of party strife in Pennsylvania about finance, prerogative, and other matters.

For two months and a half, Forbes was compelled to remain in Philadelphia. His situation was not unlike that of Loudoun in New
York in the late summer of 1756. Like Caesar in Gaul, Forbes had to do all things at one time. Troops, supplies, and money had to be secured and properly organized, not only in Pennsylvania, but also in Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. His physical condition was already poor and the enormous difficulties of circumstances of many unfavorable kinds must have further worn him down. It is a wonder that with so many difficulties he eventually "reached the stars."

In a letter to Pitt, May 1, 1758, Forbes outlined his progress and his plans and expectations. Already he had from Pennsylvania prospects of £100,000 and 2,700 provincial troops, with an addition of 300 troops from the three lower counties. From Maryland he had expectations of a few troops and a little money. Virginia had voted to raise its troops to two thousand men and to garrison its own frontier forts. Forbes was wrongly skeptical about Virginia's ability to meet her promises, but Washington's First Virginia Regiment was destined to be augmented by the Second Virginia Regiment, nominally under Colonel William Byrd III, but then being organized by Lieutenant Colonel George Mercer. From North Carolina he expected nothing for his particular campaign but here again he was unduly pessimistic.

Of the "Regular Forces" destined for his use, he mentioned thirteen companies of Montgomery's Highlanders and four companies of the first battalion of the Royal American Regiment, but, at the time, a total of only about 1,600 men. And of seventeen companies, ten companies of the Highlanders had not yet arrived from South Carolina, three had arrived but were sickly, and the four companies of the Royal Americans had just arrived in Philadelphia in very bad health. The situation in regard to artillery, arms, and tents was much worse. They had not yet arrived. Forbes reported 652 southern Indians as already at Winchester whither they had been led by Colonel William Byrd III. Forbes proposed to utilize his time by moving supplies fifty or sixty miles beyond the inhabited parts of Pennsylvania. Possibly in connection with this proposal, he advertised in the newspaper for wagons.

In May, Forbes began to dispatch troops to the frontier, sending forward seven companies of regulars and, though his artillery, arms, and tents had not arrived, by May 19 he had gathered on the "back Frontiers" three months provision for 6,000 men. Already before the campaign was started, he was troubled about Indian policy and
critical of the two superintendents, William Johnson and Edmund Atkins, for taking no steps in the matter.

General Forbes soon began to lean heavily upon his second in command, Colonel Henry Bouquet of the First Battalion of the Royal Americans, whom he had sent forward to Lancaster, on the latter's arrival in Philadelphia. The instructions of Forbes, May 20, 1758, to Bouquet at Lancaster, revealed his plan of campaign.

In language indicative not only of geographical information then widespread but of the unusual revelation of the relations of Forbes and Bouquet, Forbes wrote, "As I suppose you will march Col. Armstrong's Regt. to Fort Littleton and Loudoun, upon Mr. Burd's people coming to Carlisle so I fancy you will push both these regts. forward to Raes town, leaving at proper distances, escortes for the provision waggons, and carrying forward the 3 additional Companys of Highlanders to join the 4 American Companys at Carlisle whenever any of the provincials are able to form a body at Lancaster." To which he added an incomplete sentence, "By which all our route will be in safety for Convoys and the head of one army formed at Raes town."15 Late in May Forbes and Bouquet had decided to construct at Raystown not only a fort and storehouses but also a "General Hospital."

By the first of June, Forbes had already secured a large number of tents and some arms and next he saw the arrival at Philadelphia of the artillery for his army. And as early as the middle of June16 he projected a survey of the road from Raystown over the mountains to the west. Only in the second week of June did Forbes see the arrival of Montgomery's Battalion of Highlanders and the store ship with needed supplies of many kinds. Not until this time, according to Forbes, did he have enough regulars to keep his "irregulars in due decency and order."

As indicated above, Forbes stayed in Philadelphia two and a half months. Criticism of him for this delay seems much out of place. Logistics and miracles are rarely bedfellows. It is doubtful that anyone could have done more or better.

Colonel Bouquet, who reached Carlisle May 24, remained there until about June 9. In command at the front, he faced problems almost as numerous and complex as those faced by Forbes in Philadelphia. A list of his problems would include: transportation, with its items of horses, wagons, drivers, and forages; the construction and repair of roads; the convoy and storage of supplies; the organi-
zation and equipping of troops; keeping of accounts; and decisions about plans for steady advance of the armed forces, regulars and provincials. An intriguing item of May and June 1758, was the collection of a dozen poor horses which had strayed from Braddock’s expedition of 1755.

Bouquet left Carlisle on June 8 for Shippensburg and Fort Loudoun. Meanwhile on examination of routes west, he concluded that the worst of four had been chosen and quickly decided to open up a new one over the mountains. In the light of such unfavorable transportation, Bouquet recommended four future steps: such as, holding back troops until the post at Raystown was established; building up, there, stores for the remainder of the campaign; that Virginia cattle and flour come by a road to be opened up from Fort Cumberland to Raystown; and that hay be harvested at Raystown. Among other problems, Bouquet was bothered by a plague of rats at the posts and sporadic outbreaks of smallpox among the troops.

The situation, in June, of the colonial troops from Maryland, Virginia and North Carolina was as unfavorable as that of British regulars and Pennsylvania provincials along the roads from Philadelphia to Raystown. The Maryland legislature was unwilling to support its small force on the frontier, and Forbes, like his predecessors Braddock and Loudoun, had to assume responsibility for their maintenance with the prospect of using them only for garrisons at Fort Frederick and Fort Cumberland. Of the First Virginia Regiment of Colonel Washington, some companies had not reached Winchester before June, while six companies had been sent to Pennsylvania partly to work on badly needed road construction and repair, but partly because of the necessity of using provisions wanting in Winchester but available in Pennsylvania. Colonel William Byrd III and Lieutenant Colonel George Mercer had not yet fully organized the Second Virginia Regiment at Winchester. And though the Virginians ardently wished to advance by Fort Cumberland and over Braddock’s Road it was realized by everyone that provisions were lacking at Fort Cumberland and could not be supplied until satisfactory roads could be constructed, along which Pennsylvania supplies could be forwarded to Fort Cumberland. The few hundred men from North Carolina, sent partly by water and partly overland, were without adequate equipment and supplies and had not arrived by June.

The chronology of June 1758 shows Colonel Bouquet at Fort
Loudoun holding a conference June 14 with Indians, brought north to aid in the campaign but already discontented and deserting though demanding presents before leaving. On the same day colonial Pennsylvania and Virginia companies were started from Fort Loudoun to Fort Littleton and Juniata Crossings. Two days later, June 16, Bouquet himself followed and reached Juniata Crossings before June 22, where under the supervision of Captain Harry Gordon, a fortification was begun. That forward movement was the order of the day is seen in the fact that Colonel Bouquet with Colonel James Burd's battalion of Pennsylvania colonials and some Virginia companies reached Raystown June 24, and immediately began the construction of a fort and storehouses. By the end of the month Washington's First Virginia Regiment was at Fort Cumberland, Byrd's Second Virginia Regiment was en route from Winchester to Fort Cumberland and the remaining Pennsylvania colonials, not essential to the security of forts and convoys, were ordered to Raystown. The last step of the month was to order the building of a road from Fort Cumberland to Raystown with parties working from both ends.

Early in July, General Forbes left Philadelphia, almost, as he had anticipated, the last person to leave, and reached Carlisle July 4. He immediately sent Highlanders and Pennsylvania provincials to Fort Littleton and Juniata Crossings with orders to troops already there to go on to Raystown.

During July, Forbes, frequently dangerously sick, remained at Carlisle and Colonel Bouquet maintained headquarters at Raystown, each with heavy responsibility and almost innumerable problems and difficulties. The intricacies of troop movements, supplies, and transportation were manifold and trouble about them inescapable. Hardly less important was the question of routes and roads. Disagreement and trouble about these appeared as early as June, but came to a head in July. A long article or small pamphlet would be needed for the details.17

**The Route Dispute**

Virginians wished Forbes, while drawing upon Pennsylvania supplies and imperial finances, to march west by way of Shippensburg, Fort Cumberland, and Braddock's Road to the Monongahela and Fort Duquesne. Forbes and Bouquet (and Pennsylvanians), probably not unmindful of Braddock's effort to cut a Pennsylvania road in 1755, finally decided to cross the Pennsylvania mountains to
Loyal Hannon and march directly to the Forks of the Ohio. Largely owing to the later renown of George Washington this dispute has remained, and bids fair to continue, a favorite historical theme. Most certainly the issue at stake was definitely two sided and commonly it is prejudged.

To the great astonishment of Colonel Bouquet and General Forbes, Sir John St. Clair, Quartermaster General recommended, June 11, 1758, the abandonment of the plan to move west from Raystown and proposed to divert the campaign by way of Fort Cumberland and Braddock's old road. On the following day, at Conococheague it was agreed that the Virginia and Maryland forces should march late in June to Fort Cumberland. But no decision was made about the route to be followed by the army from Raystown to Fort Duquesne.

From the standpoint of local history, somewhat antiquarian in outlook, the reports of spies, viewers, surveyors, and others sent out from Raystown and Fort Cumberland in July are of great interest and some historical importance. These reports were not merely statements of Indians or trader scouts, but of army men such as Lieutenant Baker, Captain Clayton, Captain Edward Ward, Major George Armstrong, and Ensign Rhor.

In this same month of July, significant events occurred elsewhere in North America. General Abercromby, as stated above, was badly defeated near Ticonderoga, July 6-8. This was unexpected, for he had a greatly superior force. He was, of course, not without problems of personnel, coordination, organization, supplies, and transportation, but there seem to have been lack of leadership and defective tactics. The proposal made by Colonel John Bradstreet in late January that an attack be made by way of Oswego upon Frontenac was put in action in mid-summer. Troops to the number of 5,600 were sent up the Mohawk under General John Stanwix with 2,000 of whom General Stanwix would occupy Oneida and construct there a large fortress. The remaining 3,600 under Colonel Bradstreet were sent on against Frontenac.

It was late in July, after weeks of maneuvering, that General Amherst with a combined army and navy force captured the Fort at Louisbourgh and took possession of Cape Breton Island, thus opening the way to later attacks on Quebec and Montreal.

News of these events did not reach General Forbes for weeks after their occurrence. As he wrestled with almost insuperable
problems, he lamented that his expedition would, in attempted attainment of objectives, inevitably be the last of the season.

During early August, General Forbes, still often very ill, made his headquarters at Carlisle from which he kept in touch with his advanced forces, and wrestled with problems of army organization and movement, Indian relations, transportation, and supplies. The matter of forage for horses and cattle was most serious, as was also the matter of prices and payment of contractors. It was the middle of August before Forbes was able to leave Carlisle and then he was compelled to stop at Shippensburg where he was to remain for another month. Under such circumstances, he was very fortunate to have in command of his advanced forces Colonel Henry Bouquet, an officer of great administrative ability, featured by much tact, much resulting popularity, and, above all, unique trustworthiness. Throughout August Bouquet remained in or near Raystown superintending affairs there and along the road to the rear, but also engaged in the tasks of scouting the enemy at Fort Duquesne and starting heavy working parties to construct a military road over the mountain and as far as Laurel Ridge. In the face of discouraging circumstances, Forbes and Bouquet succeeded in getting 1,600 men (regulars, Pennsylvanians and Virginians) beyond the Allegheny Ridge by the middle of August. And they succeeded in getting heavy work from all concerned, save possibly the Indian allies, who seemed to care for neither work nor war, of the type undertaken.

Greatly to his credit, Bouquet was able to claim in late August, "I have established harmony between the different corps."19 Progress and change came in the last week of August. Forbes and Bouquet decided to send forward over Laurel Ridge and down to Loyal Hannon, before the road was yet completed, a force of 1,600 men under Colonel James Burd, with Major James Grant as adviser. The troops were composed of five companies of Highlanders, probably five companies of Burd's Battalion, six companies of Virginians under Adam Stephens, and a company or two of Royal Americans. Pack horses and bullocks were taken along. But, on an unfavorable report about the site at Loyal Hannon, the plans were changed and the movement delayed until August 30.

At the end of August it had been decided to have Colonel Washington, with what remained of the two Virginia regiments, advance to the Great Crossing by way of Braddock's Road. A Hobson's Choice was presented to Virginia and her regimental commanders,
George Washington and William Byrd III. Neither at Winchester nor at Fort Cumberland were there adequate military equipment and provisions. There were wanting wagons, horses, salt meats, flour, tents, blankets, tools for road work, barrels, sacks, etc. The proposed movement was in reality a ruse and later was abandoned and the Virginia forces advanced to Raystown, Loyal Hannon, and Fort Duquesne along the new Forbes Road.

Late in August, Forbes himself moved west from Shippensburg, probably intending to join Bouquet at Raystown, but he got only as far as Fort Loudoun on the eastern slope of Tuscarora Mountain. It was also late in August that Colonel Bradstreet captured Frontenac and seized or destroyed an enormous mass of goods, including 60 cannon, 16 mortars, ammunition, furs, skins, 2,000 barrels of provisions, and 9 naval vessels.

Colonel James Burd and his forces crossed Laurel Ridge and by Sunday, September 3, arrived at Loyal Hannon. Work was immediately begun on fortification and storehouses. Colonel Burd seems to have selected the final site for such construction, but as will be brought out more fully below, by Mr. Charles Stotz in Part II, he was advised by the Chief Army Engineer, Ensign Charles Rhor, as well as by Captain Harry Gordon, J. C. Pleydell and Robert Dudgeon.

At this point, Loyal Hannon and beyond, attention will here be directed to matters more directly military and, indeed, almost political. Reports of scouts sent out in July and August seemed to reveal some weakness of the French at Fort Duquesne.

Major James Grant, in particular, advocated a hurried advance against the enemy. Probably he had support from the garrison at Loyal Hannon. On the arrival of Colonel Bouquet on September 7, 1758, his permission to make attack on the enemy was sought. The motives in giving such permission are historically uncertain, a matter of mere speculation, though he claimed it was an offensive defensive movement intended to stop Indian attacks.

Grant marched from Loyal Hannon September 9, 1758, and from the advanced post September 11, 1758, with 37 officers and 805 men. After a two days march he reached the neighborhood of Fort Duquesne.

A day was spent in reconnoitering and maneuvering without detection by the French and Indians. Then early on September 14, 1758 a piecemeal spasmodic attack was begun but quickly frustrated
and followed by organized French attack upon the British-American forces with heavy losses to the latter. The exact statistics may never be determined, but probably the casualties exceeded 300, or about one-third of the total forces under Major Grant. Those who escaped from the battlefield straggled slowly back to Loyal Hannon.20

The outcome of Major Grant's raid was greatly distressing not only to Grant and his officers but to Burd, Bouquet and Forbes. It probably delayed for a full month the later and final advance. It also probably encouraged the enemy to make a counterattack in an assault upon Fort Loyal Hannon a month later, October 12, 1758. In what seems like an apology Bouquet claimed that the victory of the French at Grant's defeat possibly made it difficult for the French to keep their Indians at Fort Duquesne, and Joseph Shippen stated, "The Troops now Breathe nothing but revenge and are in high Spirits." Such after-thoughts were not without logic and validity.21

The Battle of Loyalhanna, October 12, 1758, came almost in the middle of the two months stay of Colonel Burd at Loyal Hannon. As just stated, it was in the nature of a revengeful counterattack after Grant's defeat a month earlier. But it was more than that. Fort Frontenac was captured in late August. Future provisions and supplies from Canada could not be expected. The Indians, always restless, had either gone or were getting ready to depart. One final effort to stop the British-American forces was a last resort. It was another offensive defensive, this time by the French.

Since some writers have expressed the judgment that this was the great battle of the campaign, attention to its features must be given, for though somewhat episodical it may have been the straw which broke the camel's back.

According to Burd's report to Bouquet, this attack began with the firing of twelve guns at eleven o'clock in the morning. Underestimating the number of the enemy, Burd sent out two parties to surround them, but on the increase in the gunfire sent out 500 men to support them only to have them driven back into the camp. The ruse of the attackers partly succeeded and they followed up the initial success with a two hour attack. But, greatly outnumbered, the attackers were driven back. The effective use of artillery played a role. The casualties of the British-Americans were small, involving only five officers and sixty-two men. The French losses were likewise small and they remained in the neighborhood during the night, though under artillery fire from the fort.22
Accounts of the battle vary greatly. It is certain from the French documents that the commander of the attack was Charles Phillipe Aubry, an officer of troops from the Illinois country, and not “M. de Vetri” as stated in English accounts. It is probable also that the number of the attackers was as stated by de Ligneris, four hundred and forty French and one hundred and fifty Indians, a total of less than half of the number estimated by Burd and others.

In many ways the battle was short of glorious. Forbes was not satisfied. He thought it should have been followed by immediate counterattack. But it is historically undeniable that the outcome dispirited the French and Indians, rendered the camp at Loyal Hannon safe from further assault, and enabled Forbes and his subordinates to make, with little danger, the final march to Fort Duquesne.

September and October 1758 were taken up by Forbes and his subordinates in working on the road and getting forward to Loyal Hannon troops and the necessary equipment and supplies for them. The weather slowly became wintry. Life was disagreeable and discouraging. The clergymen with the Pennsylvania troops, the Reverends Charles Beatty, Andrew Bey, and John Steele, probably found much place for themselves in giving both encouragement and admonition.

It was on November 2, 1758 that General Forbes arrived at Loyal Hannon. Bouquet probably had already written out plans for the immediate future. Two centuries later it seems unbelievable that he should have proposed an approach to Fort Duquesne by water, along the Loyalhanna, the Conemaugh, the Kiskiminetas, and the Allegheny, a scheme which did not meet the approval of George Washington.21

At an important council of war, November 11, 1758, the arguments for and against advancing were set forth and the conclusion reached that the risks of advance were greater than the advantages and there was “no doubt as to the sole course that prudence” dictated.24

But on the following day the situation was profoundly changed. In repelling a desultory attack upon the post, aimed possibly at horses and cattle, a few prisoners were taken. Under insistent pressure, a prisoner revealed the desperate situation at Fort Duquesne where Indian allies had gone off, provisions were nearly exhausted, and most of the regular troops had been sent away down the Ohio or up the Allegheny. With a slight break in the weather, it was
quickly decided to advance against Fort Duquesne. But that pessimism remained as late as the evening of November 16, 1758, was revealed in the answers of two engineers to questions asked by the colonels of Forbes' regiments. The answers indicated the difficulty, if not relative impossibility, of holding Loyal Hannon through the ensuing winter. An attempt to eliminate the French was thus necessitated by circumstances as well as desirable as an accomplishment.

While the correspondence and the field reports of the days of the march are limited both in quantity and definiteness, the surviving orderly books of Forbes, Bouquet, Washington, and Joseph Shippen furnish adequate information.

General Forbes, November 14, 1758, divided the marching forces of his army into three bodies or brigades, commanded by Colonels Bouquet, Montgomery, and Washington. These officers were to act as brigadiers, receiving all reports and giving orders regarding their respective divisions or brigades. This order made Bouquet, Montgomery, and Washington acting brigadier generals for the remainder of the campaign, though at its end they reverted to the rank of colonel.

To Washington was assigned the right wing or northern end of the advancing forces. Under him were placed the First Virginia Regiment, two Companies of Artificers, the North Carolinians, the Marylanders, and the force from the Lower Counties (Delaware).

The center was put under Montgomery who had under him his own Highlanders and the Second Virginia Regiment.

The left or southern wing was put under Bouquet commanding three battalions of Pennsylvanians and the First Battalion of Royal Americans.

A reserve of 200 Highlanders, 200 of the Second Virginia Regiment and 200 Pennsylvanians was left behind under Colonel James Burd.

By these orders Washington was supposed to march on the morning of November 15, 1758, Montgomery at one o'clock and Bouquet's division gotten ready at eight o'clock at farthest. The commanders were ordered to draw provisions for eight days and meat for four days, driving cattle with them to complete the eight days' allowance.

Since no orders dated November 15, 1758 have been found, it is presumed that the day was taken up in getting away from Loyal Hannon and forward to Chestnut Ridge.
From the Camp at Chestnut Ridge, an order was issued to the two companies of Artificers covered by the second division of the First Virginia Regiment to begin opening the road at daybreak, leaving behind their baggage to be brought up by the line marching behind.27

The forces reached Bushy Run, November 16, 1758, Bullock Camp November 17, New Camp November 18, Turtle Creek November 19, and Washington's Camp November 20. On the last date, Washington's forces were ordered to march at daybreak, November 21, 1758, and open the road forward to the Old Path, probably a reference to the old Traders Path. On November 20, one hundred North Carolinians and Marylanders were detached and sent toward Fort Duquesne to make discoveries.

By general order the army was marched in three columns at seven o'clock November 22, 1758, the first brigade to cover operations and carry a small proportion of the axes, the second brigade to open the road, and the third brigade to bring on the train of artillery. By general orders from Camp Cross Turtle Creek, November 22, 1758, the same order of march was continued, and the advance seems to have reached Bouquet's Camp at the end of November 23, 1758.

An interesting item of November 24, 1758 pronounced dogs a nuisance and ordered that if not sent to the rear they should be shot. At Bouquet's Camp, November 24, 1758 occurred a reversal of the roles of the first and third divisions. There it was decided that the first brigade (of Washington) was to be on the left and the third brigade (of Bouquet) on the right.

According to a letter of Bouquet to William Allen, November 24, 1758, the army spent the day in camp, not without anxiety. But late in the day an Indian scout reported that from a great distance he had seen much smoke at Fort Duquesne, indicating a great destruction by fire. A fuller report by another scout indicated that the French had abandoned Fort Duquesne and all immediate regional opposition to the rolling advance of the British-American forces. A troop of light horse was sent to the smoldering ruins during the night of November 24, 1758, but the army, held back in reserve, marched down upon the famous point and reached its great objective at six o'clock p.m., November 25, 1758.28

For two centuries commentators have remarked that final victory came to General Forbes and to his weary troops by default of
the French rather than by the outcome of conflict in one great dramatic battle. This can hardly be denied, but it can be admitted with pride rather than shame. Historically the success of innumerable expeditions, campaigns, and wars has been similarly undramatic. It was undeniable in late 1758 and it is still undeniable two centuries later that unlike the unfortunate expeditions, in the same area, of Washington in 1754 and of Braddock in 1755, the campaign of Forbes in 1758 was in character and in final result a distinct success.

Significances in the account of the campaign were many and varied. One of these was the unusual, though uneasy, co-operation of the colonies with the imperial effort. About four-fifths of the forces were colonial militia. Superb work was necessary to establish and maintain any unity of effort and the regional responsibility fell mainly upon Forbes and Bouquet.

Highly significant was the laying out, establishment, and maintenance of roads. Earlier roads from Philadelphia to Lancaster, and thence to Carlisle or to York and from there to Shippensburg were in existence. And in 1755 a road had been laid out from the east as far west as the Allegheny Ridge; and various Indian trails or traders paths to the Ohio Valley were known and in use. But wagon roads were necessary. They were projected from Shippensburg to Winchester and Fort Cumberland, from Fort Frederick, Maryland to Fort Cumberland, from Shippensburg to Fort Loudoun and Fort Littleton and on to Raystown, or Bedford for later years, from Raystown to Fort Cumberland, and above all from Raystown west over three high mountain ridges, Allegheny, Laurel, and Chestnut. No one who has travelled over the old road from Fort Loudoun, across Tuscarora Mountain, up Sideling Hill, up the Allegheny Ridge and up and down Laurel Mountain can be unaware of the heroic work of getting the troops and supplies of Forbes to and beyond Loyal Hannon. In language applicable to other ridges, Forbes properly called Laurel Hill, "that Bugbear." The importance of this transportation success or, if one prefers, victory, is best stated in the words of Bouquet writing August 20, 1758, to Forbes, saying in regard to roadbuilding workmen, "Everyone is contented, and believes himself immortalized by having worked to open this route,"

a statement somewhat weakened by the well-known fact that leaders of some of the Virginia colonies working on the road preferred another route.

As stated above, another significant aspect of the campaign was
the relationship of Forbes and Bouquet, a chain of understanding weakened possibly, but not broken by the episode of Grant's expedition and defeat. Without this understanding and the amazing success of Bouquet's operations, final victory by Forbes in 1758 was unlikely.

The significance of the individual importance of General Forbes is easily underestimated. Only his sickness was dramatic, but his efforts and accomplishments, from first to last, were noteworthy. Probably the best testimony is that of Colonel Bouquet, who as early as June, complimented him on his success in getting aid from Pennsylvania. In sundry letters of late November 1758, Bouquet gave credit to Forbes, in such remarks as "The glory of our success must after God be allowed to our General." Particular credit was given by Bouquet to Forbes for his Indian policy consummated in the Treaty of Easton and featured by the trips to the Ohio Valley made by Christian Frederick Post. Historically sound in later centuries is the remark of Bouquet, "His prudence in all his measures, in numberless difficulties he had to surmount, deserves the highest praise."

The final, great significance of the campaign was what Bouquet called "the immense advantage of this important acquisition." The control of the gateway to the middle west was attained and destined to remain relatively secure for all later time.

Pittsburgh occupies one of the most beautiful spots in the world. Bouquet saw this, saying November 25, 1758, that when he reached Philadelphia he wished to talk "chiefly about the beauty of this situation which appears to me beyond my description," a statement which can be accepted by others who like Bouquet have known the Alps and the Rhine.

Results of the Decision

The aftermath of final decision at the Forks in late November, 1758 was anticipated by many in high and low status. Old World British commanders, British-American colonials, and native Indians, alike, foresaw probable developments in the years immediately following. General Forbes, Colonel Bouquet and others recognized quickly that establishments made in the upper Ohio valley would likely be permanent. Such recognition was in the face of temporarily bad conditions.

Though he called it small, the relatively large army of Forbes
could not be retained on the Ohio, but short of provisions and shelter, had to be marched back to the east, leaving a weak force at the Point. Most of the provincials in the army returned quietly but quickly to civilian life. The Highlanders and Royal Americans were marched and counter marched along the road to Carlisle and Philadelphia.

As is more fully brought out in the following material, only a few hundred provincials were left at the Point under Colonel Hugh Mercer of the Pennsylvania Regiment. Shelter and supplies, even for so small a force, were matters of difficulty. Shelter was eventually provided, largely in the construction of a new fort, the third of five, in turn, at the place.

It was realized that French forces with Indian allies, were still located at Venango, Le Boeuf, Presque Isle, Niagara and elsewhere. The attempt to recapture the Point was greatly feared by Colonel Mercer and his small garrison. As is brought out by Mr. Stotz the risk was eliminated by events at Quebec and Niagara in 1759.

The problem of ownership of the Point was not settled in 1758 nor for almost a generation. The Indians wanted and expected the departure of French and British alike. When disillusioned, they resorted to warfare under the able leadership of Pontiac with no little early success, but with eventual and probably inevitable failure.

Possibly the most lasting effect of the decision at the Forks of the Ohio, was the breach in the dam against settlement, a final result of which was the eager and later quick occupation of the entire Ohio Valley.