Aside from the fact that the book is a valuable historical record, Dr. Jamison believes that the study is significant in that the period covered "has witnessed two important developments within Christendom: the climax of the greatest missionary effort since the first century A.D., and the birth of the ecumenical movement. These two efforts are reflected in the dominating characteristics of the United Presbyterian Church."

Dr. Jamison does not think of his book merely as a record of men and events, but as an appraisal in which he helps to answer such questions as "What happens to a church when it is motivated by a strong missionary urge and by an ecumenical concern? What happens to the church's theology? its worship? its denominational organizations and institutions?" The answers to these questions are found in this fascinating and informing story.

The jacket of this book was designed by John D. Houck, Pittsburgh artist.*


Not so long ago a military historian said that from 1742 to 1783 England possessed an "army of lions, led by asses." Rex Whitworth takes issue with this theory, for he would place Lord Jean Louis Ligonier with Clive and Wolfe.

Born a Huguenot, Jean Ligonier was forced through religious intolerance to seek refuge in England in 1698. Here in 1702 he embarked on a career of a gentleman volunteer under the tutelage of Lord Marlborough's officers. By February, 1703, he bought a company in an old marching regiment, Lord North and Grey's. His career advanced rapidly in Flanders and in central Germany. In 1720 he became colonel of the "Black Horse." Battles and time strengthened Ligonier's position as a dependable soldier. At Fontenoy in 1745 he commanded the British foot and acted as adviser to the Duke of Cumberland. In that same year the Duke and Ligonier
were called home to direct the campaign against “Bonnie Prince Charlie.”

In 1746 Ligonier was commander-in-chief of British troops and troops under British pay in the Austrian Netherlands. After his capture by Marshal Saxe at Laffeldt in 1747, he was employed by Louis XV as an intermediary in the negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle. Here his soldiering ended. He returned to England to serve as a member of Parliament from Bath, lord lieutenant of ordnance, governor of Plymouth and then Guernsey, and finally as Commander-in-Chief of the British Army.

The author fails to present an adequate picture of the man, for portraiture is lost in a constant round of “bloody attacks” and “bloody work in the breaches.” Ligonier does not breathe or pulse with life. He becomes part of an elemental force or Juggernaut moving from one series of battles to another until eventually he retires from active service.

It is not unusual for the author to present an enumerated itinerary of towns through which Ligonier’s men marched, so that the clutter of insignificant detail muddies the effectiveness of his conclusions. In one instance, over a mere three pages, seven towns were listed and battles described.

Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the author distorts the essence of biography by neglecting the political, social, and economic history. It is almost as though Ligonier were so grafted to a war horse that he became merely a centaur with no time for the more mundane affairs of life. Yet this can not be, for he took time out from war to consort with Miss Miller of Southwark, to father a bastard, and, at seventy, to have alliances with Italian prima donnas in the purlieus of Covent Garden.

It is unwise for any author to present two major subjects (Lord Ligonier’s biography and the history of the army) no matter how closely related, in one book. Rex Whitworth’s study of the British army from 1702-1770 takes on a skimpy, narrow survey so that it becomes almost solely an army on the march—Ligonier’s march. There is little said about organization, supply, encampments, or the social structure of the British army. It is either in some bloody battle or about to enter some bloody battle.

The last half of the book has extreme interest to the student of history. It covers a scope of time from 1757 to 1763. Here the
author develops a sound pattern of historical causation. As Commander-in-Chief of the army Ligonier developed an excellent plan of world strategy. In his small London office he advised Pitt and planned for the siege of Louisbourg, the invasion of Canada, and the destruction of Fort Duquesne. He it was who influenced Pitt to support the promotion of the young officers Amherst, Howe, and Wolfe to field command. His control extended even into remote Africa and India. The author's account of the amphibious coastal raids on St. Malo and Cherbourg reads like a prophecy of the Normandy beachhead of our generation. By this plan French manpower was engaged and pinned down on the Continent while mixed army and naval task forces operated offensively throughout the world. In this work, in his capacity as an elderly armchair general, Ligonier shines like an uncorroded star. One begins to doubt whether Pitt deserves the classic appellation of organizer of victory.

Perhaps, as Rex Whitworth indicates so well in this last half of the book, the period of war and diplomacy from 1702 to 1763 needs to be more closely re-evaluated.

West Chester Teachers College            Edward G. Everett
West Chester, Pennsylvania