variety of currencies circulating in the United States, he converted them into "lawful," or coin currencies. Kitman cites Jackson Turner Main's *The Social Structure of Revolutionary America* for a conversion of Spanish dollars into sterling and then glibly passes this off as being useful "for anybody who has access to a computer." A good line; but, more thorough research into sources available about wholesale prices during the revolutionary period would have yielded a more accurate statement of the value of the dollar without invoking the spectre of the omnipresent computer. Finally, Kitman suggests, but does not clearly demonstrate, that Washington was paid in specie at the close of the war rather than in the almost valueless continental currency. This is a critical point, for by April 1781 depreciation had diminished the value of continental currency to a ratio of $1.00 in coin to $146.67. Further depreciation followed in the closing years of the war and during the Confederation period.

On balance, Kitman's book is a delightful satire designed for the reader to curl up with on a blustery January evening and relish the frailties of the revolutionary generation. As literature, *George Washington's Expense Account* is calculated to produce the type of belly laugh one derives from a James Thurber story. Nevertheless, Kitman deserves credit for treading on turf scrupulously given a wide berth by professional historians. Perhaps his book will inspire professionals to hazard the quagmire of revolutionary finance, a task almost akin to bushwhacking through the thicket of colonial New Jersey history. Hopefully, a more scholarly analysis of the expense account will be forthcoming as part of the comprehensive study of the public records of the American revolutionary era as suggested by Edward Papenfuse in the September 1971 *Historical Methods Newsletter*.

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*Cornwallis, the American Adventure.* By **FRANKLIN** and **MARY WICKWIRE.** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970. Pp. 468. Preface, illustrations, maps, notes, selected bibliography, index. $10.00.)

Cornwallis? The average American, if he knows the name at all, remembers him only in connection with the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781. What kind of man he was, his military background, what he did after Yorktown, is of no importance.
Franklin and Mary Wickwire, teachers at the University of Massachusetts and co-authors of *Cornwallis, the American Adventure*, have written a human account of this opposite to General Nathanael Greene, of this perpetual headache for General George Washington. Cornwallis becomes in this book the "most active and aggressive general of Britain in America."

Charles, first marquis and second earl of Cornwallis, served on fields of battle on three continents as soldier, governor, and administrator; in places as far apart as the Carolinas, Ireland, Amiens, and Calcutta. As a member of Parliament, he voted against the Stamp Act of 1765 and was one of five peers opposed to the sweeping Declarator Act, which stated Parliament's right to legislate for the colonies "in all cases whatsoever." Yet when he joined the British army in North America as a lieutenant general at thirty-eight, he led King George's troops in battle to assert crown authority over the colonies.

Many times he led his troops in battle, and his enlisted men loved him, respecting his discipline and appreciating his concern for their welfare. Once, in the Southern campaign, when full speed was necessary to catch up with the Americans, he set a personal example by throwing most of his belongings on the bonfire, not even keeping a tent for himself. When on the march, he ate the same food as the enlisted men.

As the Wickwires carefully point out, Cornwallis as a belted earl, with money and the accumulation of years, could still have become a general, could have skipped "the Seven Years War, the War for American Independence, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars." About all the average officer knew was how to ride beautifully, insist on good bayonet and line formation training, and when necessary, lead a gallant charge. Cornwallis, however, studied for a while at the military academy in Turin, Italy, and early in his career rose to active command in the British army; all his life he studied administration, military tactics, and strategy. He even held war games, an unusual procedure in the eighteenth century.

The chapter on the organization of the British army is especially enlightening when applied to the conduct of the North American campaign. From the reign of Charles II, the army was "drawn from that social class the members of which are more likely to lose than to gain by Military Aggression." Moreover, officers modified regimental uniforms as they pleased, and no British department or service on sea or land cooperated with any other department or service. In the midst of
this chaos was George III, who often bypassed Parliament and Lord Germain. "Some of the mistakes of the British army in the American Revolution can be more readily understood if it is kept in mind that the man who ran it [Germain] . . . kept an office staff of twenty-one clerks and a few messengers." Dishonest officers lined their own pockets with army funds. To cap it all, top generals fought among themselves: Howe with Clinton, Clinton with Cornwallis. Especially helpful to the American cause was the antipathy of the latter generals. Clinton and Cornwallis were friends for a short time, despite opposite temperaments. Clinton was sedentary; Cornwallis longed for active campaigning. Clinton was a brilliant strategist who liked high command but disliked its responsibility. Cornwallis fought his last campaign under another's command at Monmouth Courthouse.

Discouraged because of this clash of personalities, he left for England with Howe's dispatches, arriving in mid-January 1778. He found his beloved wife gravely ill and as a result of his depression following her death he rejoined the army in America in 1779, seeing duty on Long Island, in the New Jersey campaigns, Brandywine, and Philadelphia.

The old abrasive relationship between Cornwallis and Clinton was resumed during the campaign to capture Charleston. Charleston's fall was Clinton's victory, after which he returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis with practically an independent command. The Wickwires maintain that these directives led to Yorktown, since nearly half of them concerned operations in the Chesapeake Bay area. Cornwallis should recapture North Carolina after subduing South Carolina, leave garrisons, and proceed to Virginia. How he was to do this with a limited force only Clinton knew.

In the South, loyalists in the main were either terrorized by the Whigs, or disillusioned by the arrogant treatment of British officers — thus, intelligence, communications, and food supplies gradually disappeared. Furnishing supplies sounded so easy in a dispatch since British ships were supposed to bring uniforms, some foodstuffs, guns and ammunition, and medicines. Little arrived, thanks to privateers, scarcity of wagons, and capture along mountain roads. There were flooded rivers, mountains, mud, and malaria to contend with.

Cornwallis's major victory, a crushing defeat of General Horatio Gates, at Camden in August 1780, was more than offset by blundering defeats received by young, reckless, over-ambitious subordinates. Major George Hanger, temporarily leading Tarleton's Legion, lost
many men in crossfire at Charleston, trying to reap some of Tarleton’s glory. Reckless Patrick Ferguson and his men charged at King’s Mountain, with many killed including Ferguson, and six hundred captured; this loss forced Cornwallis to abandon his North Carolina campaign for a Valley Forge-like winter at Winnsboro, South Carolina. Major James Weymss was defeated by General Thomas Sumter. Tarleton’s Legion, at Hannah’s Cowpens, was cut to pieces by General Daniel Morgan. In one hour “Butcher” Tarleton lost eight hundred men — one hundred killed, two hundred wounded, and more than four hundred captured. The Americans had twelve killed and sixty wounded. On retreat, Tarleton came on a “party of Americans,” actually loyalist spies and guides, and ordered them bayoneted. Cornwallis himself gave chase to Morgan, winning the field at Guilford Courthouse with heavy casualties, a truly Pyrrhic victory. Cornwallis, as a result, could never resume the offensive in the Carolinas.

The army, mostly barefooted, proceeded toward Wilmington. Here Cornwallis wrote to Clinton and Germain concerning a Virginia offensive. Without waiting for a reply, on May 13 he crossed the Roanoke River into Virginia. He probably had an idea that Clinton would not approve. The army arrived at Petersburg, finding General William Phillips dead and Benedict Arnold in his place. Cornwallis could not exceed Phillips’s orders from Clinton. Clinton’s next letter highly disapproved of Cornwallis’s move. Feeling that New York should be the main center of operation, Clinton ordered Cornwallis to strengthen the defenses of Yorktown. The end of the story is a familiar one, with Cornwallis enclosed on sea and land by French and Americans and surrender the only alternative.

The Wickwires describe each battle with narrative verve and clarity and have made a real contribution to the spate of books beginning to appear in the bookstores in honor of the coming bicentennial.

Pittsburgh

Florence C. McLaughlin


William L. Riordon, around the turn of the century, authored *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall,* a sparkling collection of very plain talks on very practical politics. The book records the political philosophy of