AEC files. Unfortunately, the references are cited inconveniently at the end of the book. Informative charts facilitate comprehension of the dual organization of the navy-AEC project, and simple diagrams help in understanding the fundamentals of nuclear power plants. However, the chronological organization of the book causes some difficulty. Rickover’s group pursued several projects at once, and, consequently, the authors’ account tends to jump from subject to subject. One wishes a more topical approach, whereby one program is traced from start to finish, were used. A curious omission in the book is the lack of reference to the agreement between the United States and Great Britain which led to the purchase of an S5W reactor and machinery in 1958 for Dreadnought, the Royal Navy’s first nuclear submarine. This was another example of the way in which Rickover horizontally enlarged the scope of his authority. These objections, though, detract little from what is an otherwise excellent study.

Pittsburgh

WILLIAM F. TRIMBLE


The relationship between Congress and the president in maintaining national security is a widely debated topic among political scientists. Nuclear weaponry, increased public interest in defense spending, concern over excessive use of executive power, and a rising suspicion of technology and scientific advisers has created a sophisticated debate over defense priorities. Alton Frye, Senior Fellow and Director of Special Projects, The Council of Foreign Relations, and Director, Institute for Congress Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines the renewed congressional interest in strategic arms development, defense planning and spending, and the implications of these issues upon congressional-presidential relations.

The thesis of Frye’s study is that Congress is assuming a subtle but effective role in the development of national security and foreign policy. The old tensions between the executive and legislative branches, Frye maintains, are evolving into a pattern of mutual cooperation due to the fears of a potential arms race. Consequently, a large segment of this book details the debate over implementing the antiballistic missile (ABM) system and the development of multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) as the backbone of the American defense system. The ABM and MIRV controversies have aroused a large segment of responsible public opinion which believes that the United States has sufficient military strength to secure an arms agreement with the Soviet Union. Frye contends that in 1969, "for the first time in memory" (p. 97), the Gallup Poll data indicated a reaction against defense spending. This significant change in public attitudes was the catalyst to the new credibility of Congress in formulating national security policy.

In the 1970s the result of this congressional influence has been to create a political atmosphere which led to the Moscow Treaty of 1972 limiting ABM installations, the agreement between President Ford and Secretary Brezhnev in 1974 placing a ceiling on MIRV missiles, and, finally, the push for additional strategic arms limitations agreements. These advances, Frye believes, would have been impossible without the ideas and suggestions initiated by Congress. Senate Resolution 211 in 1970, for example, called for a moratorium on the MIRV program and urged cessation of all offensive and defensive nuclear weapons development. Its supporters included Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott and Senator Edward Brooke. This forced the Nixon administration to pursue a broader foreign policy in terms of strategic arms limitations.

The chief weakness in Frye's study is the failure to include the recent literature of the Cold War. Orthodox and revisionist scholars alike have found it difficult to agree on the primary causes of Soviet-American differences over nuclear weapons controls. In nine separate references to the Cold War, Frye cites sources like Harry S. Truman's Memoirs and Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation. This is a tantalizing omission from one so knowledgeable of the arms race and national security.

These are minor criticisms of an excellent book. Among other things, Frye deserves high marks for his careful explanation of congressional influences upon national security. A Responsible Congress is a convincing argument for continued cooperation between Congress and the president to check an escalating arms race. The Council of Foreign Relations is to be congratulated for publishing a thoughtful book on the problems of nuclear weaponry and national security.

Department of History — Political Science    HOWARD A. DEWITT
Ohlone College, JR
Fremont, California