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FORT PITT AND THE
REVOLUTION ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER

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Part Three

The foregoing (second) part of this series of articles portraying the role of Fort Pitt in the momentous events of the American Revolution brought to public view some of the little known but eloquent and important speeches of a few Indian orators. Many of the documents that have been adduced have been taken from the great Peter Force collection in the Library of Congress — more than 60,000 items, lacking which our historical heritage would be immeasurably poorer. The two series of those documents published by Congress between 1837 and 1858, now quite rare, end with December 1776. These and other cherished manuscripts that are the source materials for authentic historical writing are included in the text of these articles. Other sources are available and have been used in further presentation of this series, aimed at understanding the far-flung orbit of influence exerted by Fort Pitt during that time.

The records are illusory concerning the state of defense of Fort Pitt during the latter part of 1776, except references to Major Neville’s consultation with the Indian agent, if he (Neville) were available. Concerns for the safety of the fort and the inhabitants around Pittsburgh, in case of Indian troubles,1 were constantly expressed. The garrison, originally Neville’s company of Virginia troops, was entirely inadequate to man the extensive works within the walls and bastions. Enlistments were running out, and the usual losses in a

Mr. Williams continues his series of bicentennial articles on Pittsburgh and the Revolution.—Editor

1 McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Va., 1: 151.
confined garrison were working to reduce its effectiveness. Neville was occupied with organizational duties with the Twelfth Virginia Regiment, enlisted for service on the frontier, of which he was commissioned lieutenant colonel on November 12, 1776. A year later, December 11, 1777, Neville became colonel of the Eighth Virginia. Consequently, Neville was absent from Pittsburgh much of the time.

In this situation, Captain Robert Campbell was ordered by the Virginia Council to enlist a new company and to assume command of Fort Pitt. Other companies were to be enlisted to occupy Fort Henry (Wheeling) and Fort Randolph (Point Pleasant). As senior captain (later major), Campbell would extend his command over all three posts. He was a half-brother of Colonel John Campbell, surveyor and draftsman of the first plat map of the town of Pittsburgh, also of Louisville, Kentucky. April 1, 1777, was the deadline for the completion of Captain Campbell's arrangement, the soldiers to be enlisted for the duration of the war, and the command to continue until "relied by a like number of Regulars" under officers on the Continental establishment.

Pennsylvania and Virginia continued to attempt to govern side by side in the same area of southwestern Pennsylvania, both enlisting regiments under the regulations of their respective authorities. On November 8, 1776, the Virginia Assembly divided the West Augusta District of Augusta County into three counties, Yohogania, Monongalia, and Ohio. Westmoreland County functioned under the Pennsylvania regime. Both authorities had their own panel of magistrates, and each had its own county lieutenant responsible for raising, organizing, and supplying the militia.

A passing notice was given Major Connolly after he left Pittsburgh on July 25, 1775, and an account of his further maneuvers will be intentionally deferred until later in this narrative having reference to Washington's secret intelligence operations. Connolly was captured by alert Committee of Safety operatives five miles from Hagerstown, Maryland, in November 1775, while on his way back to Pittsburgh after having surreptitiously visited Lord Dunmore aboard his ship. An excerpt from a letter written by Richard Henry Lee, in Congress, to Washington, in the field near Boston, explains Connolly's temporary silence. Part of the letter herewith printed contains other allusions

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2 Ibid., 1: 337-39.
4 Abernethy, Western Lands, 167.
quite informative relative to Washington's own state of mind at that time.

Richard Henry Lee to General Washington

Philadelphia, December 6, 1775.

Dear Sir:

... I had not heard of your improvements on the Kanhawa being destroyed, and unless Mr. Lund Washington has received very accurate information on this head, I am yet inclined to doubt it; because I see in the treaty lately concluded with all the Ohio Indians, they first inform the Commissioners of the Kanhawa fort being burnt by some of their rash young men; but they promise to punish the offenders, and prevent repetition of the like offences. They are very precise in their information, and mention only the fort, as well as I remember. I hope, therefore, that your property may yet be safe. This treaty with the Indians is the more likely to last, as Connolly, with his little corps of officers, are now in close custody in Maryland, having been arrested there as they were stealing through the country to Pittsburgh, from whence they were to proceed to Detroit, and with the troops in those western parts, Indians, &c., he was to have done wonders. This wonderful man is now in close jail. . . .

Richard Henry Lee

It is of more than passing interest that Washington should have written to Lee at this period of time on the same subject that he wrote, two and one-half months later (February 28, 1776) to his brother-in-law, Burwell Bassett (husband of Mrs. Washington's sister, Nancy Dandridge Bassett):

"I thank you heartily for the attention you have kindly paid to my landed affairs on the Ohio, my interest in which I shall be more careful of, as in the worst event they will Serve for an asylum." 6

Richard Henry Lee's facetious remark concerning "this wonderful man [Connolly]" we shall have reason to remember, as he reappeared at the most inopportune times during the Revolutionary patriots' life-and-death struggles.

At Fort Pitt Captain Richard Butler was disgruntled because of interference in Indian affairs by Virginia and disappointed he had

6 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 359.
lost his rank in the army while serving as Indian agent, being bypassed by others of inferior rank — a sensitive point with military men. A man of his type and temperament craved action where laurels were to be won. Congress promised to "compensate for that disappointment to him by a promotion in the service," which they accordingly did by his appointment as major in the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment as of July 20, 1776.\(^7\) His replacement as Indian agent in the middle department, on April 10, 1776, was George Morgan.\(^8\)

Morgan was en route to Fort Pitt April 16 to 29.\(^9\) He saw the controversy, as so many of the time viewed it, as calculated to preserve the prerogative of the king and his "exercise of [it] for the control of a usurping Parliament." Preeminently the colonists were contending for the rights guaranteed to all British subjects under the crown by the English constitution.\(^10\)

The atmosphere at Fort Pitt was thick with rumors of an impending general Indian war. Apprehensions ran rampant. The Indian commissioners ordered the county lieutenants to hold their militia companies in readiness for action. They petitioned Congress to send a general officer "of experience" to command at Fort Pitt. Accordingly, a resolution of that body ordered, April 10, 1777, "That Brigadier General Hand . . . repair to Fort Pitt, and take measures for the defense of the western frontiers."\(^11\) Hand arrived at Fort Pitt on June 1, and in two days time informed the county lieutenants of each of the surrounding counties of his assumption of command: Colonel David Rogers of Ohio County, Colonel John Campbell of Yohogania County, and Colonel Zackwell Morgan of Monongalia County, all under Virginia authority. There was also Colonel John Proctor of Westmoreland County, under Pennsylvania jurisdiction.\(^12\)

A brief exposé should be included regarding these two personalities so important to the history of Fort Pitt, George Morgan and Edward Hand. George Morgan (born 1743, died 1810) exerted a profound influence on — even shaped — the course of events at Pittsburgh during those crucial times. A Philadelphian, Morgan was brother of Dr. John Morgan, one of the founders of the medical school that became part of the University of Pennsylvania, director

\(^7\) Ford, Journals of Continental Congress, 4: 359, 5: 596.
\(^8\) Ibid., 4: 268.
\(^9\) Savelle, Morgan, 136.
\(^10\) Ibid., 129.
\(^12\) McIlwaine, Journals of the Council of Va., 1: 348, 358; Thwaites and Kellogg, Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 233-34, 200.
general of hospitals in the Revolution. At the early age of twenty, George Morgan became a partner in the established trading house of Baynton and Wharton, thenceforward importing and reselling in the Indian trade. Morgan spent much time in early Pittsburgh, especially while in transit to the Illinois country, where he established trading houses. He accompanied Captain Harry Gordon, George Croghan, and Thomas Hutchins, in 1766, on the memorable voyage on the Ohio River when Gordon and Hutchins mapped the courses of the Ohio, and Croghan and Morgan were charged with establishing good trade relations with the Indians recently freed from French influence.

After the commencement of the Revolution, Croghan’s replacement by Butler, and Butler’s departure for an army career, Morgan was perhaps the man who best understood Indian thinking. As deputy commissary general in the west, he possessed a knowledge of the transportation routes and sources of supply that none other could have had.

Morgan became a leading agriculturist of the country, corresponding with Washington, Jefferson, Vaughan, and English experts. He owned Prospect, the large farm at Princeton, New Jersey, now occupied by Princeton University buildings. There he conducted experiments with grains, and especially with control and elimination of the Hessian Fly, so destructive to wheat crops. His scientific treatises are enlightening today. He promoted colonization schemes beyond the Mississippi and on the Illinois. After 1796, Morgan was a resident and great farmer of Western Pennsylvania, where he and Dr. John Morgan owned nearly 9,000 acres in Washington and Westmoreland counties. His home farm was Morganza (now the Western State School and Hospital). There Aaron Burr visited him. Morgan discovered Burr’s treasonable schemes and reported them to President Jefferson. The old Morgan mansion burned several years ago.

The intention of Edward Hand (born 1744 in Leinster Province, Ireland, died 1802 in Lancaster, Pennsylvania) was to enter the profession of medicine and surgery (see the appended certificates herewith reproduced). He joined the Eighteenth, Royal Irish Regiment of Foot, and with it came to America in 1767, as surgeon's

13 L. C. Duncan, Medical Men of the Revolution (Carlisle, Pa., 1931), 79.
14 Savelle, Morgan, 60-69, 53-75.
17 Savelle, Morgan, 183-239, passim.
mate. On February 27, 1772, he purchased a commission, which he sold when the regiment left America in 1773. Hand's name appears as one of the signatures, as ensign, to the indenture of sale of the properties of Fort Pitt, in 1772. He sold his commission when the regiment left America and settled in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and entered the practice of medicine. He married Katharine Ewing, whom he called "Kitty" (see a letter to her from her husband, reprinted herewith).

Continental Congress, on June 25, 1775, commissioned Hand lieutenant colonel of Colonel William Thompson's Battalion of Riflemen; he was promoted colonel March 7, 1776, and brigadier general April 10, 1777. After his tour of duty at Fort Pitt, he commanded on the New York frontiers and led a brigade on Sullivan's expedition against the Indian towns in upper New York. He became adjutant general in the fall of 1781 and continued until the end of the war, when he was breveted major general. During the quasi war with France in 1798, he was commissioned one of the major generals. Hand's name appears as a signer of the Pennsylvania Constitution, he served as a member of Congress and of the Pennsylvania legislature, and also practiced medicine at Lancaster.

The great collection of documents and transcripts of letters gathered by Lyman C. Draper (a contemporary of Peter Force) in the Wisconsin Historical Society, comprising many thousands of items, is a source of much of the history of our chosen region during the Revolutionary defensive combats and the few offensive expeditions. Compilations of five volumes of these materials by Reuben G. Thwaites and Louise P. Kellogg, of the Wisconsin staff, have contributed a wealth of information which would not otherwise have been made available, except to researchers traveling to Madison. Published during the first two decades of this century, they are numbered among the scarce — even rare — items of book collectors. These materials are mentioned here because they are the main reference source henceforth.

At the very outset of Hand's administration at Fort Pitt, there occurred a series of sporadic forays by small bands of Indians all along the frontiers, which all of the county militia commanders agreed

19 British Army Lists, 1773.
20 Gage Papers, William L. Clements Library.
21 Hand Papers, HSP.
22 Heitman, Historical Register of the Revolution, 272; Pa. Archives, 5th ser., 2: 15.
emanated from Pluggy's Town (present Delaware, Delaware County, Ohio), where a gang of Mingoes and Wiandots under the notorious Mohawk, Pluggy, rendezvoused. Congress resolved, on February 27, 1777, and the Virginia Council on March 25, that an expedition be projected against the offending town, contingent upon the consent of the friendly Delawares and Shawnees.24 Both the Indian agent at Fort Pitt, George Morgan, and Colonel John Neville strongly opposed the plan due to refusal of the friendly Indians (Delawares and Shawnees) to permit American forces to march over their lands, which would have subjected them to reprisals by the enemy warriors. Congress rescinded the order by resolution on March 25, and Governor Henry, on April 21, ordered Neville to "incur no further expence." Henry’s letter carries the resolution of Congress to supply Fort Pitt with 1,000 rifles, but "Postponed" had already been written across the original resolution.25 Nevertheless, on December 3, 1777, Congress issued instructions to its Indian commissioners to induce the Six Nations to force the recalcitrant Ottawas, Chippewas, Wiandots, and Mingoes to desist in their attacks or the Six Nations would be held responsible.26

The amazing promptitude with which several companies of militia were recruited (less than two weeks) is indicative of the urgency felt by the inhabitants and the popularity of the movement to punish Pluggy's gang. During July reports poured in upon Hand of sightings of Indians, many tracks, the theft of cattle and horses, and of scattered murders of settlers near present Clarksburg, Fairmont, and Morgantown, West Virginia, at Duncard Creek (west of the Monongahela near the state line), at Grave Creek (below Moundsville), and Buffalo Creek (near present Wellsville, West Virginia).27 From the Reverend Zeisberger at Cuchachunk (Coshocton, Ohio) and Captain Arbuckle at Fort Randolph (Point Pleasant, the mouth of the Big Kanawha) came warnings from Shawnee and Delaware friends of expected attacks upon Fort Pitt and its dependents, inspired by British officers at Detroit and led by Frenchmen and Wiandot chiefs.28 Indians were reported killed while raiding near Fort Hand and Kittanning, fifty miles up the Allegheny River by the road at that time. Writing from his estate, Greenway, on the Youghiogheny River,

27 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 18-29.
28 Ibid., 25-29.
Dorsey Pentecost, the county lieutenant, published the rumor of the approach of an enemy force supposedly numbering 10,000 to 15,000 British, Canadians, and Indians advancing upon Fort Pitt. From the far Big Sandy (the present boundary between West Virginia and Kentucky) came requests for aid and information of scalpings by a party of fifty savages. In August news came of the distressed condition of forted inhabitants on the Clinch River, affluent of the Tennessee River only fourteen miles from the North Carolina boundary. The question: Can nothing be done at Fort Pitt? Beleaguered settlers on the Bluestone and the Greenbriar looked to Fort Pitt for aid and direction.29

A highlight in Hand’s early relationships at Fort Pitt that must have afforded him great satisfaction were two letters that he received from Governor Patrick Henry, the first within a month of his arrival (Henry had been elected Virginia’s first governor under its state constitution). In these letters, Henry is revealed to have been one of those rare individuals who think clearly and in a straight line to the heart of a problem. His marvelous cooperative spirit demonstrated conclusively how the new confederal system ought to work — albeit without any precedents whatever. It is difficult to understand how Hand was able to write so many letters and dispatches without having a military secretary and nevertheless have been so active in the field, where his presence was necessary.

Governor Henry’s letter to Hand follows:

**GOVERNOR PATRICK HENRY TO GENERAL EDWARD HAND**

Williamsburg July 3’d 1777.

Sir—By the constitution of this Commonwealth no Militia can be embody’d but by orders from the Executive Power, except in Case of Invasion or Insurrection; and when embody’d such Militia is under the sole Direction of the Governour. I do not make this observation with any View to counteract you, very far otherwise. I shall be made happy in forwarding your Designs to protect and secure the Frontiers from those dangerous Incursions by means of which our People suffer so much, and so great Diversion is made of our best Men from the main Object. But I am constrained by my Duty, by the Oath of my Office, to claim the supreme command of all the Militia which are or may be embody’d in the State. Altho’ I do this on the present Occasion,

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29 Ibid., 35-41.
The manuscript certificates above testify to the professional preparation by Hand for the practice of medicine (physic) and of surgery at one of the highest accredited medical schools of the day. From the Hand Papers, courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

The above manuscript certificate attests to Hand’s qualification as surgeon’s mate in the Royal Irish (Eighteenth) Regiment of Foot, which thereafter was ordered to America, part of it to Fort Pitt, in 1767. From the Hand Papers, courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
To the Hon. John Hancock Esq.

Sir,

Since my last letter which was E. Mc.

William Wilson, I have received the within Message from the Capt.

of the Station — This is what I transmitted by Mr. Wilson as

the only material News from the Indian Country since my letter

by Mr. Barstow. — I shall strictly receive these partial intelligence

from the different Nations & I swear myself that I shall not be

obliged to alter my opinions & desires to procure any letter of

the 1st January or not understanding which, I thought directly

to mention in my letter by Mr. Wilson the general advice for

the Inhabitants here, who by means of these men take upon them

to give intelligence of all the Country with every piece of Indian

News. True or false, I have embed the idea of a general alarm

being inevitable. — It is much easier to create these Alarms

than to remove them when raised, even from the most ill-induce

sails of drunken or disaffected Individuals, & apprehend the

most fatal consequences from them. Parties have even been

assembled to me from our known friends at these hunting camps,
as well as McIntyre's or Buskirk to me, & have stated it

necessary to let those McIntyre sleep in my own Chamber for

their security. — It is truly distressing to submit to the

injuries we have & are frequently receiving along the Frontier

Statements of Out Posts from the Mingo Paunlatter than other

rates, but it must be extremely injurious to the interest of the

United States at this critical time, to involve ourselves into a

generall Indian War which I still believe may be avoided if we

pursuing the wise measure intended by Congress. — It is not

uncommon to hear even those who ought to know better express

an ardent desire for an Indian War, on account of the theft

Lands those poor people possess.
This letter (General Hand to Mrs. Katharine Hand) dated Fort Pitt, August 6, 1778, establishes the date of McIntosh's arrival as of even date (or the previous day) and Hand's departure from Pittsburgh as August 8. Indorsement to Mrs. Katharine (Ewing) Hand, carried by a Mr. Hayes. From the Hand Papers, courtesy of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
Louis-Antoine-Jean Baptiste, Chevalier de Cambray-Digny, was one of the most active and useful of the French engineers who came to aid the American Revolutionary army. We in Western Pennsylvania remember him for his having built Fort McIntosh on the Ohio and Fort Laurens on the Tuscawas, and for his having been lieutenant colonel, chief of McIntosh's artillery. His work in fortifying Point Lookout, North Carolina, and the defenses of Charleston, South Carolina, drew praises from the assembly of North Carolina and from Continental Congress. The photo of his portrait is by courtesy of Independence National Historical Park.
and shall certainly do the like on every similar one, yet I beg leave to assure you, Sir, that I shall most gladly contribute all in my Power to render effectual every Plan calculated to promote the general Good; and I do hereby empower you to call for the number of men necessary for defending the Frontiers from the County of Yohogany, Monongalia, Ohio, Hampshire, Botetourt, Augusta, Dunmore and Frederick until further Orders.

The Resolution of Congress respecting the Lead, never came to Hand 'til yesterday. Orders will be sent for its Delivery without loss of Time. Several Tons were long since ordered for the militia in your Parts. The Resolution for the artillery going to Fort Pitt, is not yet received.

Col. Aylett, who lives in this Town, is appointed Commissary to supply the Western Garrisons with Provisions. His Appointment came to my Hands from the War-office yesterday, and is communicated to him. I doubt some time will pass before Mr. Aylett can take the necessary Steps for furnishing Provisions, and in the mean Time Mr. Morgan perhaps can supply them. There seems no other chance to get them.

You will please to direct the Militia already embody'd to continue in Service so long as you think there is occasion for them, and make such other necessary Draughts from the above Counties as Exigencies may require, giving me notice thereof from Time to Time, and of the reasons that induce you to make them.

The chastising of Pluggy's Town seems to me absolutely necessary, but is submitted to you, as being better enabled to judge on the Spot.

I have the Honor to be Sir Yr. mo. ob[1] & very hble serv[1]

P. Henry.

To Brigadier General Edward Hand at Pittsburgh

**Governor Patrick Henry to Colonel David Shepherd**

Sir—You are hereby required to raise so many of the Militia of your County as General Hand may demand for the Protection of the Frontiers of this State. I am Sir Your mo. Hble Serv[1]. P. Henry. Wmsburgh July 3, 1777.

County Lieutenant of Ohio

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Governor Henry's dispatch to Colonel David Shepherd is included in order to show Henry's meticulous method of follow-through.

The succession of tragic reports and impassioned pleas for aid continued to pour in to headquarters. From McKibben's Fort (later part of Fort Hand), in Westmoreland County, on White Pine Run, a mile from the Kiskiminetas, came stories of killings and the capture of James Chambers, who lived near present Apollo and experienced long captivity at Detroit and Montreal. His two young daughters were killed. From the small garrison of the fort at Raredon's Bottom on Raccoon Creek, in present Beaver County (now Bocktown) came sad news and an urgent appeal for help. On the widespread and far-flung range of the frontier, for 500 miles, Fort Pitt was the anchor point and citadel of all hopes.

At length, no course but retaliation was feasible. Governor Patrick Henry authorized the raising of a punitive force and, by the middle of August 1777, the county lieutenants reported their companies gathered and ready to march. Then, on August 26, Colonel Gaddis (domiciled near present Uniontown) sent a hasty message that a great and extended conspiracy of loyalists had been discovered and that a group of them were already in motion to capture the main magazine, the main storehouse for powder and supplies west of the mountains, located at Redstone (near present Brownsville). All of Gaddis's militia were diverted to guarding the magazine. Colonel Zackwell Morgan (county lieutenant of Monongalia, living at present Morgantown) reported, "our march is retarded for some time against the natural enemies of our country." He was able to swing an entire force of 500 men to rescue Fort Pitt from the traitorous gang, some of whom were within the garrison and people at Fort Pitt. Morgan's letter to Hand is relevant to an appreciation of the perilous times. Written under the heat of excitement and urgency, it expresses the stress of the moment better than can anything written today.

**Colonel Zackwell Morgan to General Hand**

August 29th. 1777

*May it please ye. Exc'._—It is with the utmost anxiety that I now inform you that our march is retarded for some time against the natural enemies of our country. A few days ago the most horrid con-

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conspiracy appeared. Numbers of the inhabitants of this country have joined in a plot and were assembled together to join the English and Indians. This forces me to raise what men were enlisted as well as others, to put a stop to this unnatural unheard of frantick scene of mischief that was in the very heart of our country. We have taken numbers who confess that they have sworn allegiance to the King of Great Britain, & that some of the leading men at Fort Pitt are to be their rulers & heads. The parties I have out are bringing in numbers of those wretches & they (those that confess) all agree in their confession that the English, French & Indians will be with you in a few days, when they were with numbers of others to embody themselves, & Fort Pitt was to be given up with but little opposition; some are taken that really astonish me out of measure. Good heavens! that mankind should be so lost to every virtue & sense of their country. I am this moment informed that Gideon Long & Jeremiah Long, two deserters are gone to Fort Pitt to deliver themselves up; should this be the case, & as they have been very active in this conspiracy, I hope your Excly. will punish them as they deserve. I am now at Minor's Fort with about 500 men, & am determined to purge the country before I disband, as it would give me much satisfaction to have this matter settled. I shall wait yr. Excellency's instructions & am with respect your most obedt. humble servt.

Zack: Morgan.\(^{33}\)

The alertness and quick action of Colonel Zackwell Morgan and his patriot partisans, coupled with Hand’s command of the situation averted a counterrevolution at Fort Pitt and a complete debacle of the patriot cause. The perfidious plot was just being unravelled when news arrived of the attack, on September 1, upon Fort Henry at Wheeling. Reports of this attack by a force, said to be 100 by eyewitness accounts,\(^{34}\) continued to reach the commander for more than a week. Petitions for help came from all directions describing clusters of inhabitants huddled in log houses destitute of even the most meager means of defense and subsistence. General Hand had by this time been at Fort Pitt for just three months and a few days and every day had brought a new crisis.

After the many delays, the county lieutenants proceeded with re-

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33 From the Draper Mss., printed in Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 52-53.
34 Ibid., several eyewitness detailed accounts are printed in Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 54-72.
cruting men for the Ohio expedition. By that time it was late October, the season was advancing to cold weather, clothing was scarce. The villainous Tory uprising had dealt a fatal blow to the preparations. Among the loyalists seized was one Hickman (or Higginson), especially obnoxious to the popular cause. Having been arrested and handcuffed by Colonel Morgan, he was being transported across the Cheat River in a boat by the colonel and six others when Hickman disappeared from the boat. No one would admit seeing his departure, although his hat was seen floating on the surface of the water. Colonel Morgan was haled into a Monongalia justice’s court, but no evidence was adduced to prove that the colonel had any connection to the drowning. The court, nonetheless, held that a drowning had occurred and remanded Colonel Morgan to court in Williamsburg for trial.

Major James Chew reported the case to General Hand: “This will stop the Militia from that County, which will ruin the Expedition . . . I know the People there well and am sensible that it is not in the Power of any other Man but Col°. Morgan to march them.” 35

On November 3, Hand convened the county lieutenants at Fort Pitt and required their opinions regarding the expedition in writing. They all answered that the expedition should be abandoned. 36 Two days later Hand countermanded all orders for the project 37 and wrote to Governor Henry that a total of 200 men was far too few safely to undertake the campaign, that Hampshire, Berkeley, Dunmore (Shenandoah), Loudoun, Frederick, and Augusta were all the Virginia counties that could participate. Westmoreland and Bedford, in Pennsylvania, sent less than fifty. 38 (This fact will have significance later.) Hand reported his disappointment to Washington on November 9, who in turn communicated the whole situation to Congress. 39 That body put together all of the information previously sent them (apparently George Morgan’s letter to Hancock, seen above, was included) and considered their committee’s report. This document is an extremely interesting part of Fort Pitt’s chronicle and should be presented publicly.

The other side of the ledger of human events as they evolved at Fort Pitt must also be entered in the record of the part played by the white people. It appears that there were irresponsible and uncontrolla-

35 Ibid., 143-44.
36 Ibid., 147.
37 Ibid., 148.
38 Ibid., 154-55.
ble elements among them, as well as among the Indians. A few instances will be cited.

Colonel John Gibson wrote General Hand, "It was with utmost Difficulty I prevented one of the men who Escaped from killing the Delawares." 40

To John Hancock, the president of Continental Congress, George Morgan wrote from Fort Pitt, on March 15, 1777: "Parties have even been assembled to massacre our known Friends at their hunting Camps as well as Messengers on Business to me, & I have esteem'd it necessary to let those Messengers sleep in my own Chamber for their security . . . it must be extremely injurious to the interest of the United States at this critical time, to involve ourselves into a general Indian War which I still believe may be warded off by pursuing the wise measures intended by Congress. . . . It is not uncommon to hear even those who ought to know better, express an ardent desire for an Indian War, on account of the fine Lands those poor people possess." 41 (See Morgan's letter to Hancock reprinted herewith.)

General Hand, accompanied by his brigade major, Jasper (Jesse) Ewing, his brother-in-law, left Fort Pitt, December 10, on a trip to Fort Randolph. On the same day occurred one of the most nefariously fiendish and vicious crimes ever laid to the charge of white people. On that day, at Fort Randolph, were murdered Chief Cornstalk, his son, the son of Red Hawk, and another Indian. These Indians had been retained as hostages by the commander of the fort. An ensign from the garrison, on a hunting jaunt on the far side of the Kanawha, was killed and scalped by a renegade Indian. Militiamen of the garrison rushed in and killed the helpless hostages cruelly, in spite of efforts of their officers to dissuade them. 42 Depositions of witnesses provide a melancholy picture of the scene, the great Cornstalk calmly facing death while exhorting his son to steadfastness, that it was the Great Spirit's will that they should die there together. The perpetrators of the crime were arraigned before a justice's court in Rockbridge County, Virginia, but were all acquitted for lack of evidence. 43

Hand returned to Fort Pitt by the only safe path, that by Staunton, arriving there the day before Christmas. On that day he wrote to the Board of War, asking "to be recalled & suffered to

40 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 35.
41 See reproduction of letter no. 61 (Mar. 15, 1777), from the Morgan Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh (hereafter cited as Morgan Papers, CLP).
42 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 158-60, 162-63.
43 Ibid., 160, 177-78.
join the grand army, and with them to share the honors and fatigues of the field." To his wife’s uncle, Judge Jasper Yeates, he wrote, “I am so heartily tired of this place that I have petitioned Congress to be recal’d.”

To Richard Henry Lee, in Congress, Hand wrote concerning Colonel Zackwell Morgan’s letter disclosing the alarming Tory conspiracy in August past, in which prominent individuals at Fort Pitt were implicated by innuendo but not named. Now that all but one had been exonerated, they are named, Colonel George Morgan, Colonel John Campbell, Simon Girty, and Captain Alexander McKee, the latter placed upon parole and confined to his house. Hand himself wrote that even he had been suspected — a pointed commentary upon the times, when seemingly nobody could be sure whom to trust.

Retrogressing, it is necessary to review the career and accomplishments of the next important officer of Continental Congress on the western front, George Morgan, the Indian agent and later deputy commissary general. It was the service of supply that made the existence of the army on the fighting front possible. The roads were almost nonexistent, the Braddock Road and the Forbes Road having been little used or repaired. Only packhorse transportation was at first possible. There was no motorized transport, no refrigeration, and no canned food, as with modern armies. Meat had to be transported on the hoof or packed in barrels with much salt. Flour and other supplies had to be carried by hundreds of packhorses, with a limit of 160 pounds per animal. A great difficulty was obtaining barrels for the salted meat. Another was obtaining enough horses; also, there was never enough grass and other forage along the road for the animals. Storehouses had to be built at accessible places at the ends of the roads and convenient to the fortified places to be supplied. Such locations were Mounts's Mill (at the mouth of Mounts Creek on the Youghiogheny River near Connellsville and near the Braddock Road), Redstone (near present Brownsville, at the end of the Redstone path, extension of the Braddock Road), Hannas Town (on the Forbes Road), also Ligonier (on the Forbes Road), and of course, Pittsburgh. Morgan undertook to have roads repaired and new roads built for wagons and he wrote that he was able to shorten the road from

44 Ibid., 189.
46 See E. G. Williams, Bouquet's March to the Ohio: The Forbes Road (Pittsburgh, 1975), 60n.
Cumberland to Pittsburgh by twenty-two miles. These occupations kept Morgan away from Fort Pitt for long periods, including time spent at Philadelphia or York, attempting to induce Congress to enact legislation that would facilitate the working of his Indian Department, or would smooth the way for food and supply contracts for the frontier posts. On January 8, 1777, Congress resolved that he should have the rank and pay of a colonel on the Continental establishment. He would be criticized later for thus disposing the stores, but at the time it seemed the quickest way to accumulate supplies. Thenceforward he would exercise the authority of Indian agent of Continental Congress and that of deputy commissary general of purchases.

One of the most pressing problems of the western commissary department was the fact that commissary agents of Virginia and Pennsylvania were competing for purchases of beef and other supplies in the same areas as Morgan's men. An end of this competition was interposed by Jeremiah Wadsworth, the Commissary General, by decreeing that Morgan's agents should have priority over the buying agents of the rest of the army. The chief supply warehouse for buying was located on the Potomac River, at Skipton (otherwise Old-town, Maryland), fifteen miles east of Cumberland, 135 miles from Fort Pitt. With Hand's defense line stretching over a front of approximately 350 miles, it can readily be deduced that Morgan's supply lines extended at least 485 miles. Logistical problems multiplied with every mile westward. The details of these operations are carefully recorded in such historical studies as Max Savelle's George Morgan: Colony Builder. The purpose of the present monograph is to demonstrate the far-reaching influence of Fort Pitt upon the ultimate outcome of the Revolutionary struggle.

In January, Hand received orders from Governor Henry for boats, supplies, powder, and lead for expeditions by Captain James Willing and Colonel David Rogers to New Orleans, also for boats, provisions, and munitions, as well as men to assist Colonel George R. Clark in an ambitious campaign against British forts on the Mississippi. Intelligence came in to Hand that the British had established a depot of supplies at Cuyahoga, an Indian town situated at the northern end of

47 Savelle, Morgan, 174.
49 Savelle, Morgan, 168-69.
50 Ibid., 171.
52 Savelle, Morgan, 174.
the portage between the Tuscarawas and Cuyahoga rivers (presently at the northwestern outskirts of the city of Akron, now Cuyahoga Falls). With a force of about 500, mostly Westmoreland militia, Hand started to surprise the Indian town at Cuyahoga late in February 1778, but heavy rains and melting snows swelled all the rivers and creeks to overflowing. By wading some and heading other streams, Hand’s force came upon an Indian village at the forks of the Neshannock and Shenango rivers (within the present city limits of New Castle). From tracks and indications the attacking party expected to find at least fifty Indians, but only one old man and some women and children were found. The militiamen could not be restrained from killing the man and at least one woman. Upon learning that the rest of the Indians were at a salt lick about ten miles up the Mahoning River, a detachment went there. They found only four women and a young boy, but the trigger-happy militiamen killed all but one woman; the general was disgusted beyond expression. It is notable that Simon Girty served as the guide of this expedition, which received the apt designation and appellation of “the Squaw Campaign.”

Reports arrived from Fort Henry and Fort Randolph, where measles and smallpox ran rampant among the garrisons during the winter. Twelve died of smallpox and many were ill at Fort Randolph. There was smallpox at Fort Pitt also, but the published correspondence does not detail the epidemic. Hand, being a physician, was anticipatory in that he foresaw the havoc that a smallpox epidemic could wreak upon a sequestered garrison in close winter quarters. The only hint found in his correspondence of what he intended to do about the health situation at Fort Pitt is found in very terse statements in letters to his wife; on June 10, 1777, he wrote, “Am at my farm & enjoying it.” On September 27, he laconically stated that he had established a smallpox hospital at his farm.

Among the Etting Collection in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania is a handsomely engrossed indenture (three pages) from George Croghan, conveying to Doctor Edward Hand 1,632 acres of land on both sides of Chartiers Creek, in Westmoreland County. This land Hand had surveyed in several plats of between 300 and 400 acres at different times. This indenture is dated December 28, 1770, while he was a British officer and surgeon’s mate at Fort Pitt. In a letter to Jasper Yeates, dated at Fort Pitt, January 17, 1778, Hand wrote

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54 Ibid., 193, 215.
56 June 10, 1777, Hand Papers, Gratz Collection, HSP.
"... I have Agreed, with Mr Ja². Willing for half my Concerns on Chartiers Creek, the terms Kitty will communicate." 57 One survey plat particularly interests us, named "Mount Pleasant," 331 acres and allowances, surveyed September 19, 1769, in pursuance of Order No. 3346 dated June 13, 1769, not patented until June 17, 1791. 58 This is the tract upon which the hospital was built and it contained a triangular plot of perhaps six acres on the west side of the creek (in semblance to a bridgehead), in reality securing the ancient crossing place of an existing path. This is now the bridge crossing of the Steubenville Pike, which signifies that the fording place had a solid rock bottom, the present bridge piers resting upon this rock. The name Fording Street in Crafton Borough until very recent years preserved the place of the crossing.

A very good description of Hand's hospital has been preserved by that careful historian, S. W. Durant. A state historical marker designates the spot, upon the athletic field, north side of West Steuben Street, Crafton. Henry Ingram, living in 1876, when interviewed by Durant, was precise in his memory of the building — that it was a log two-story structure 100 feet by 30 feet, with a roofed porch all around, two doors on each long side, no windows, and three rooms on each floor. It was surrounded by several (as many as ten) flanking blockhouses for defense. 59 Surgical instruments have been exhumed upon the spot. We shall have reason to refer to this landmark hereafter.

Another disturbing incident occurred when, on the night of March 28, Alexander McKee, who was on parole, Simon Girty, Matthew Elliott, also on parole, Robert Surphlitt, and one Higgins escaped and deserted to the British at Detroit. Apprehensions of the information they would carry to the enemy were well founded. 60

Meantime, Hand was constantly occupied with finding the supplies of all kinds required for Clark's expedition, also for Rogers's expedition, and loading boats with provisions for Captain James O'Hara to take to the Arkansas River to supply Captain Willing. 61

The news of the French alliance was relayed to Hand by letter of George Morgan at York, conferring with Congress, the letter also

57 Etting Collection, Ohio Papers, 1: 92, HSP; Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 200.
60 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 249-56.
61 Hand's report to President of the Board of War, Apr. 24, 1778, in Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 278-79.
conveying the news that General McIntosh had been recommended to Congress by Washington. On June 15, Hand wrote his wife that McIntosh was expected soon, and that his baggage was being sent by a wagon. Due to circumstances to be mentioned, Hand was not able to inform his wife until August 6 that McIntosh had arrived and that "the day after tomorrow I hope to Set forward to Lancaster." 62

While all of the foregoing had been taking place in the west, the British army under Burgoyne had surrendered at Saratoga, on the Hudson, in October 1777. Washington's army had been defeated at Brandywine, in September and, in October, had battled the British to a draw at Germantown. Howe's army had spent the winter in Philadelphia, while Washington'sragged troops had suffered winter hardships at Valley Forge, only to come out fighting in the spring to win at Monmouth, New Jersey. Before marching out of Valley Forge, the Americans had celebrated the news of the French alliance by firing a feu de joie accompanied by wild cheers.

Notwithstanding the action, the marching, and the stress of battle, plus the perplexities of the selection of the court-martial board of officers for the trial of General Charles Lee for insubordination and disobedience of orders, Washington had also to make offensive plans for operations on the western frontier. Washington's grasp of far-flung geographical strategy has won the admiration of military historians ever since. With Hand's withdrawal and new plans to be put afoot, the replacement of Hand had to be an officer of sufficient rank to command the four colonels of regiments Washington had chosen to send to Fort Pitt. That man must be capable of independent action required by the detached command west of the mountains. A cardinal requirement assuredly was that he be free of partisanship in either of the contending parties, Virginian or Pennsylvanian, for political control of the land west of the Laurel Ridge.

At hand at Valley Forge Washington had an officer remarkably well qualified to meet all of these conditions. He had commanded the Georgia brigade in the south and the North Carolina brigade at Valley Forge. This man was Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh, who had proven his ability in detached and independent command by his adroitness in repelling an invasion of Georgia that resulted in the capture and burning of Fort McIntosh but the withdrawal of the Royal American attacking force to Florida. His businesslike and concise

62 Hand Papers, Gratz Collection (Box), HSP, under date; see reproduction.
reports to Washington during that period suggested a man of spirit, energy, good common sense, and sound military judgment. In April 1778, Washington ordered McIntosh to visit and report on the state of all the field and general hospitals within the area. The explicit orders gave McIntosh broad authority to inspect the books of all directors, surgeons, and commissaries, to observe the management of the hospitals and care of the patients. He also might recommend relocation of hospitals, and reduction of staffs or attendants. He might order courts-martial for trying any of the staffs, officers, or surgeons suspected of neglect of duty or of misconduct. General McIntosh was to render a complete and detailed report, and any orders issued by him were to be obeyed as if from the commander in chief himself. This was certainly a great amount of delegated authority and betokened great confidence on the part of the commander in chief in McIntosh's ability and good sense.

A digression at this point will afford a knowledge of the antecedents and background experience of this man in order to understand his motives and subsequent career. A native of Inverness-shire, Scotland, he came to General Oglethorpe's colony of Georgia in 1736 when nine years old, with his two brothers in the family of John Mohr McIntosh. The Spanish of Florida attacked the colony at Darien, on the Altamaha River (now McIntosh County) and, in a counter-attack on St. Augustine, the elder McIntosh was wounded and captured. For nearly five years, he languished in a Spanish prison, finally released and returned home to die in broken health. Lachlan was then thirteen years of age, and this undoubtedly left an impression upon his life.

The Reverend George Whitfield had established an orphans' school, and Lachlan was sent there for two years. He then went to Charleston, South Carolina, the metropolis of the South, where he entered the counting house of Henry Laurens, a leading commercial establishment, and lived with the Laurens family. He was popular and progressed well; but he returned home, after a few years, married, and engaged in surveying. This gave him experience in backwoods life and contact with the Cherokee, Catawba, and Choctaw Indians.

Darien, Georgia, was one of the very earliest municipalities (January 12, 1775) to promulgate resolutions supporting the be-
leaguered Bostonians. At the conclusion of these resolves, thirty-one patriots signed an Association, much as that formed at Hannas Town, Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and that at Pittsburgh, Augusta County, Virginia, five months and four days later. The name leading all the rest of the Darien Associators (thus presumably the chairman) was that of Lachlan McIntosh.66

The First Georgia Battalion was organized in January 1776 with Lachlan McIntosh commissioned, January 7, its colonel. Two more infantry battalions, two artillery companies, and a ranging company were ordered to be raised in Georgia by Continental Congress, and, on September 16, three new brigadiers were commissioned in the Continental army, McIntosh one of them.67 It is conspicuously noted that when the Declaration of Independence was read in Savannah on August 10, 1776, a thirteen-gun salute was fired and a military procession was led by Colonel Lachlan McIntosh and the First Georgia Battalion.68 Georgia politics during the Revolutionary period present a sordid story of rancor and virulence seldom equalled in American history. The president of the council, Archibald Bulloch, direct ancestor of Theodore Roosevelt, was poisoned. Button Gwinnett had himself elected president. Gwinnett is remembered as one of Georgia's signers of the Declaration of Independence, and was inordinately ambitious for military distinction, even though military knowledge was not within his experience. It was not long until he found means to embarrass McIntosh before the assembly. McIntosh denounced Gwinnett as a scoundrel, whereupon the latter issued a challenge to a duel. McIntosh was trapped. If he refused he would have been stigmatized as unworthy to lead the state's troops; if he were killed, his enemies would have been rid of him.

In the encounter with pistols on May 16, 1777, both antagonists were wounded in the thigh. Gwinnett's wound was the more serious, the bone having been shattered, so that he died three days later. McIntosh was ready for field service within two months, but his enemies had him removed from command of state troops.69 Washington wrote, August 6, 1777, that it would be "very agreeable to me" to have him in command of a brigade.70 As mentioned above, he was appointed to

70 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9: 25.
the command of the North Carolina brigade, although McIntosh could not join the main army until early in January.

A rather unusual course was followed by Washington in the sequence of letters he wrote at this time relative to General McIntosh. On May 12, 1778, Washington wrote the president of Congress, Henry Laurens:

Valley Forge, May 12, 1778

Sir:

... After much consideration upon the subject, I have appointed Genl McIntosh to command at Fort Pitt and in the Western Country for which he will set out, as soon as he can accommodate his affairs. I part with this Gentleman with much reluctance, as I esteem him an Officer of great worth and merit, and as I know his services here are and will be materially wanted. His firm disposition and equal justice; his assiduity and good understanding, added to his being a stranger to all parties in that Quarter, pointed him out as a proper Person, and I trust extensive advantages will be derived from his command, which I wish was more agreeable. He will wait on Congress for his instructions.71

In his General Orders of May 15, he directed:

General McIntosh being appointed to a separate Command and requiring a little time to prepare it, Colo. Clark is to take the immediate command of the North Carolina Brigade ... 72

On May 23, the commander in chief wrote to the Board of War. as follows:

... I had put that part of the 13th Virginia Regt. which remained here under marching orders, with an intent of sending them to Fort Pitt, as they were raised in that country. Immediately upon receiving the account of the alarming situation of the Frontier inhabitants from you, I ordered the 8th Pennsylvania Regt. to march. They were also raised to the Westward and are a choice Body of Men about one hundred of them have been constantly in Morgan's Rifle Corps. These two Regiments will march full the number of 250 Men from hence.

71 Ibid., 11: 379.
72 Ibid., 11: 388.
There are upwards of one hundred of the 13th Virginia now at and near Fort Pitt . . . 73

Not until more than a week later, May 26, did Washington officially notify McIntosh of his appointment. One wonders whether he was waiting until he should have received some reaction from Congress or the Board of War in the meantime. He wrote:

Sir. The Congress having been pleased to direct me to appoint an Officer to command at Fort Pitt and in the Western Frontiers, in the room of Brigadier General Hand, I am induced, but not without reluctance, from the sense I entertain of your merit, to nominate you, as an Officer well qualified from a variety of considerations, to answer the Objects they may have in view.

I do not know particularly what the Objects are, which Congress have in contemplation in this command and therefore request, that you will, as soon as you conveniently can, repair to York Town and receive their instructions respecting them. 74

Two days later, May 28, Washington wrote to Colonel William Russell that he was sending Colonel John Gibson to Fort Pitt to take command of Russell's Sixth Virginia Regiment because he was "acquainted with their [Indian] language, customs and Country." 75 To Congress he wrote that Gibson had been entitled to a colonel's commission "ever since the Twenty fifth of October last to a Regiment in that line [Virginia], and I must take the liberty to request that Congress will give him a Commission of that date." 76

McIntosh set off for York, Pennsylvania, where the Congress sat during the British occupation of Philadelphia, only to meet great disappointment at the seeming lethargy and inability of that body to furnish the necessary troops for his command. Reports from Fort Pitt indicated that General Hand had only about one hundred men left at that place. A resolution passed by Congress on May 2 for raising two regiments for this service still lay on the table as McIntosh wrote, on June 7, to the commander in chief. No plans were under way for securing supplies of food, forage, ammunition, and arms. 77 McIntosh

73 Ibid., 11: 439.
74 Ibid., 11: 460.
75 Ibid., 11: 470.
76 Ibid., 11: 472.
77 State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Collections (Madison, 1916), 23: 78. The actual number of troops exceeded the number mentioned; the reports probably meant Virginia troops.
was beginning to have a forewarning of what he would later understand — that no commander at Fort Pitt would emerge with credit. Washington had been apologetic in making the appointment, Congress was in no hurry to make any provisions for recruiting any troops, and meanwhile, the frontiers were being ravaged by Indian attacks. The season was late, and autumn and winter would be advancing before any forces could be raised and marched to Fort Pitt. Little wonder that Congressman Gouverneur Morris found McIntosh’s ardor rather cooled.78

Then, on June 11, Congress took notice of reports that the fortress of Detroit was in a defenseless condition and reached the decision “that a defensive war would not only prove an inadequate security against the inroads of the Indians, but would, in a short time, be much more expensive than a vigorous attempt to compel them to sue for peace; Whereupon,

“Resolved, that an expedition be immediately undertaken . . . . That three thousand men be engaged in the service of these states . . . . That Patrick Lockhart, Esq., be appointed to procure provisions, pack-horses, and other necessaries for the army . . . . That the governor and council of the State of Virginia be requested, on the application of the Board of War, or of Brigadier M’Intosh, to call forth such a body of their militia (not exceeding 2,500 men) as shall be judged necessary to complete the number of men appropriated for this service . . . . That the sum of nine hundred and thirty two thousand seven hundred and forty three and one third dollars be advanced from the treasury, to the order of the Board of War . . . toward defraying the expenses of the expedition . . . That the Board of War be instructed to co-operate with Brigadier M’Intosh in every measure necessary for executing the intention of Congress . . . . And, whereas, the success of the expedition against Detroit may be facilitated . . . . by another expedition from the Mohawk river to the Seneca country . . . . Resolved, That Major General Gates, or the officer commanding the troops on the east side of Hudson’s river, and in the northern department, be directed to take the most expeditious measures for carrying the war into the Senecas’ country . . . .” 79

And so it seemed that Congress had been goaded into action, that the ponderous balance wheel of the new federal machine had, at last, been forced off dead center. Congress’s resolutions granted authority and policy, but it remained to implement them and to render

78 Ibid., 23: 252.
execution. Be it remembered, however, that this representative government was plowing new ground in every respect and its actions were still less cumbersome than those of Parliament, which it emulated.

At this point, it is an opportune time to view the anomalous position of Washington, the commander in chief, at this particular time. Modern historians, and indeed many of Washington's officers, have criticized him for caution, hesitation, seeming indecision, when in fact, Congress jealously held the reins, reluctant to delegate authority to the commander in chief to make decisions other than in the immediate theater of the war. This derived in part from the American heritage of English public distrust of a standing army and military power. In part it derived from the still provincial distrust of too centralized a government. Washington understood most of these attitudes of the deliberative body, having so lately been a member of it. At this time, however, he experienced great embarrassments from the dual exercise of military command. Attest his letter to General Philip Schuyler, July 22, 1778: "I am in great measure a stranger to the expedition against Detroit, and entirely so, to that against the Senecas. Agreeable to the Direction of Congress, I sent General McIntosh and two Regiments to Fort Pitt, but whether an expedition is immediately intended against Detroit, or whether those Troops are to remain as a defence for the Western frontier, I do not know." 80 Many more instances of Congress's interference in matters of purely military command might be cited, always with corresponding forbearance on Washington's part to remonstrate, except an occasional mild reminder that a particular action had slowed the flow of command. The point at issue is that Congress was both the legislative and executive power combined, and would so remain until Washington himself should become the constitutional executive head, more than a decade hence.

It took nineteen days after his marching orders (May 23) until Brodhead's Eighth Pennsylvania was prepared to march (June 11) to Lancaster by very easy stages, where the regiment lay another nineteen days. Of course an army was tied to its supply train, and it took an inordinate amount of time to hire, buy, or enlist packhorses and drivers. The country east of the Susquehanna had been completely stripped of all provisions and forage by the foraging parties of both the American and British armies. At last, on July 5, the regiment

80 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 200.
crossed the broad Susquehanna at Wright's Ferry (Columbia-Wrightsville, Pa.), passed through York, and reached Carlisle on July 8.81

McIntosh may have accompanied Brodhead from New York, for at this time, he met in Carlisle an old acquaintance in the person of General John Armstrong, who had commanded in South Carolina, had resigned his Continental commission to return home to command the Pennsylvania Brigade at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown.

Here another regrettable delay was occasioned by the arrival of the dreadful news of the enemy attack, on July 3, upon the Wyoming Valley of eastern Pennsylvania, on the North Branch of the Susquehanna. The unspeakable brutality of the massacre which followed is among the most terrible in all history. Historians have expatiated upon the horrors of the tortures and scalping of live women and children.

From the settlements upon both forks (the North and West branches) of the Susquehanna draining one of the most beautiful and fertile river valleys of America, the entire population of many hundreds fled by every means available, walking, riding horses, driving carts and wagons upon the roads, by boats, canoes, rafts, even watering troughs, by every floatable object upon the river. The "Great Runaway" the panic has been called in history. Eyewitness descriptions of the terror-stricken panic are beyond belief. The suffering of the refugees, destitute of food, clothing, shelter, every necessity, was pittiable. It is doubtful if any like occurrence is to be found in American history. The terrorized hordes thronged the little settlement of Sunbury, around Fort Augusta. Others kept going until they reached Harris's Ferry, forty miles below.82

Upon an urgent appeal of General Armstrong to McIntosh, the latter agreed for Brodhead's regiment to march up to Fort Augusta (Sunbury) at the junction of the two branches of the Susquehanna, the site of old Shamokin, Chief Shickellamy's town. Up the Great Shamokin Path they marched through the present towns of Northumberland, Montandon, Milton, Watsontown (all in Northumberland County), through Indian Trail Gap in the Muncy Hills to the

82 H. C. Bell, History of Northumberland County, Pennsylvania (Chicago, 1891), 121-24.
little settlement upon Muncy Creek. A strong camp and base for patrols of the frontiers there brought reassurance to the disheartened farmers, who now began to send back a few of the boldest of their number, under guard, to harvest some of the ripened crops. Detachments of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment spread out upon a seventy-mile front, from Briar Creek on the North Branch, where they built Fort Jenkins (three miles below present Berwick, Columbia County) to General James Potter’s Fort (only twelve miles from present University Park, in Centre County). At the latter place, two of Captain Finley’s soldiers were killed by Indians. Historians have tended to give Brodhead all of the credit for this block to these virulent savage incursions upon civilization. Very little of the credit has been accorded to McIntosh, whose humane instincts were here brought to full view. He was no stranger to the miseries of Indian incursions upon helpless homesteaders in the back country of his Georgia homeland, yet never upon the present scale.

When a regiment of Continental troops (Colonel Thomas Hartley’s “Additional Regiment”), augmented by some companies of hastily gathered militia, came upon the scene, in the last week of July, Colonel Brodhead’s veterans marched back to Carlisle, where they arrived by August 9. The time schedule of the campaign against Detroit had run into real trouble. The lateness of the season that had worried McIntosh in June was bearing heavily upon his mind. He was just a month later in leaving Carlisle than he would have been before the diversion in Northumberland County. With only 120 men “present fit for duty,” Brodhead’s depleted Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment marched on August 18 from Carlisle over the same track that had been pressed and worn by Forbes’s British and Pennsylvania colonials just twenty years before. The dust of the same road had been raised, in 1763, by Bouquet’s desperate little army of Royal Americans and Highlanders destined to the memorable two-day battle at Bushy Run; and again, the next year marched his little task force of Royal Americans and Royal Highlanders to the Muskingum in Ohio over the same road. One notable exception we shall presently observe. Suffice it to say that the original road from Harris’s Ferry ran one mile north of the present public square (courthouse) in

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83 Pa. Archives, 3rd ser., 4: 2, Muncy Manor Survey, 1768, 1802 acres; no town of the name until 1797, Now and Then 17 (Sept. 1877) : 2.
84 Pennsylvania State Historical Marker, at Old Fort, Centre County, Route 45.
Carlisle, the road having been surveyed (1744) seven years prior to the survey of the town site. By 1771, however, the road had been brought over to pass through the county seat. With small deviations from the modern route U.S. 11, the road ran through Mountrock to Shippensburg.87

At this point Brodhead divided his little force. He had decided to lead the eight line companies of his command over a precarious “Three Mountain Road” that would save nineteen miles88 of distance but was not then negotiable for wheeled vehicles. Space will be taken here to describe the itineraries of Brodhead’s little force, since it is the only time when he divided his army on the march, and he set forth in some detail the component units of his command in the orderly book of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment under the dates of August 9 and 13.

One contingent marched by the Forbes Road from Shippensburg to Fort Loudoun (twenty-two miles, locally known as “the Old Loudoun Road”), passed by Pinola, Culbertson’s Row, through one and one-half miles of the U.S. Army Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, then Salem Church, Cheesetown, St. Thomas, to Fort Loudoun, on Conococheague Creek, two miles below the present village of Fort Loudoun, Franklin County. All of this nearly level, or gently rolling, country road can be driven by automobile practically on the original track89 and was admirably suited to transporting the baggage wagons of the officers and troops, the artillery with the caissons and ammunition wagons of the troops, the hospital stores and equipment, the quartermaster’s stores (which would include tents), the commissary’s stores, and lastly the herd of live cattle, all escorted and guarded by the light infantry detachment and commanded by Captain John Clark. From Fort Loudoun, this convoy moved northward up Path Valley, through Cowan’s Gap in Tuscarora Mountain, and finally the long seven-mile downgrade stretch to Burnt Cabins. This way was a comparatively easy march, except for a one and one-half mile “pinch” approaching the top of the gap.

The other eight line companies under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Bayard, presumably accompanied by the packhorses of the expedition, left Shippensburg by the road that parted from the Forbes Road at the western end of the present town, now the route

87 Williams, Bouquet’s March to the Ohio, 12.
89 Williams, Bouquet’s March to the Ohio, 12, 13.
numbered Pa. 533, crossing Row Run at Herron’s Ford, through Orrstown, and to Upper Strasburg. The route climbed North (Blue) Mountain by a much steeper road than at present, passed through Cissna’s Gap (Cissney’s Gap of the orderly book, often referred to as Sisney’s Gap, named from John Cissna,90 owner of the tract of land, now named Big Gap upon the U.S. Topographical Survey map). The descent was then very steep and rocky, being directed downward through a sort of gulch washed by a little stream to the left of, then crossing the present road. The new Pennsylvania Road, authorized in 1785 and only built in 1787, relocated the ascending road shelved into the mountainside for nearly three miles, also relocated the descent, both as they are seen today. It is worthy of remark that as late as 1955 this writer was locally warned that it was not feasible to drive an automobile over North Mountain Gap road, then still a single-track dirt road that had many years ago reverted to the township.

General McIntosh, meanwhile, had ridden ahead, leaving instructions to Brodhead to hasten after as soon as he could possibly be relieved. General Hand reported the arrival of McIntosh at Fort Pitt on August 6,91 before the troops had left Carlisle on their march to Fort Pitt. The two divisions of Brodhead’s troops having finally united at Burnt Cabins after their separate itineraries, marched under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Bayard without further remarkable incident other than routine camp discipline. The troops retraced the deeply worn Forbes Road that led to Bedford, to Casper Stotler’s tavern atop the “second rising” of Allegheny Mountain, over Stony Creek and over Laurel Hill to Fort Ligonier. They undoubtedly marched by Bouquet’s short road past Bushy Run battlefield and Turtle Creek to Fort Pitt. The weary regiment arrived at Fort Pitt on September 11 or 12, since the orders of the twelfth elicited “a complete return of the Detachment lately arrived . . . to be immediately made out for the General’s inspection.”

Hardships and heartbreaking delays entirely beyond the control of McIntosh had placed him under the restrictions of the advancing season. Already the dogwoods and maples were turning the wooded hillsides crimson and morning frosts were chilling the mountain valleys.

The two hundred-mile horseback ride over the mountains must

91 See note 62, above.
certainly have been a grueling experience for a man who, even though he had had lifelong exercise in the saddle, had ranged entirely in the flat country bounded by the ocean and the fall line. Even to learned men, the Allegheny Mountains appeared as the “backbone of America,” the loftiest heights upon the continent. Meriwether Lewis was yet a toddler less than four years old, and William Clark was an eight-year-old aping his big brother George Rogers, already a seasoned colonel; hence their reports of the towering “Shining Mountains” were yet thirty years in the future.

Immediately upon McIntosh's arrival at Fort Pitt, General Hand turned over to him the files of military correspondence, incoming and outgoing, perusal of which would serve to edify and instruct the new commander in the intricacies of the command at the post and at the forts scattered up and down the rivers of the Ohio basin. The troop enlistment picture was discouraging, and the commissary's and quartermaster's disastrous reports showed little hope for improvement in supplies. Yet, the fiction of an important mission persisted.

Disappointments multiplied and difficulties seemed insurmountable. Remarkable is the reflection that, in like circumstances of the lateness of the season, all the northern commanders would have planned to go into winter quarters and to try again in the spring — yet here was an officer from the deep South, unaccustomed to the northern winters except for the previous one at Valley Forge, who projected a winter campaign. Then the crushing blow fell upon his head: Congress had reneged, after their brave beginning — even before McIntosh had arrived in Pittsburgh — the news came through that on July 25 they had resolved that

The Board of War, to whom were referred the letters from his excellency Patrick Henry, Esq. governor of Virginia, dated 8 and 10 July, report,

That, “from various enquiries made by the Board, it appears that success in an expedition against Detroit cannot be reasonably expected, unless the force destined for that service be ready to march from Fort Pitt by the first of September:

"That from the letters received from Governor Henry, and Mr. Patrick Lockhart, appointed to act as commissary, &c. on the above expedition, it appears that the capital articles necessary for carrying on the expedition, viz. men, horses, flour, and beeves, cannot be procured by any means within the time limited, and probably not even during the course of the present year:

"That, from the extraordinary rise of articles, especially of horses, since the expedition was first determined on, the expence of it, if practicable, would exceed, in an enormous degree, the estimate formed by the late commissioners

93 Hand to Mrs. Hand, Aug. 6, 1778, Hand Papers, HSP.
at Fort Pitt, and submitted by the Board to the consideration of Congress;" Whereupon,

Resolved, That the expedition against the fortress of Detroit be, for the present, deferred:

That Brigadier General M'Intosh be directed to assemble at Fort Pitt, as many continental troops and militia as will amount to fifteen hundred, and proceed, without delay, to destroy such towns of the hostile tribes of Indians as he, in his discretion, shall think will most effectually tend to chastise and terrify the savages, and to check their ravages on the frontiers of these states:

That such of the articles as have been already procured for the expedition against Detroit, and which are necessary for the incursion against the Indian towns, be appropriated for that purpose, and that the Board of War be directed to give the necessary orders on this point.94

By August 14, the general had not yet received any official notice from Congress of their action. Unconfirmed reports trickled into Fort Pitt from the east; but it became clear that the project initiated with such fine prospects of an opportunity for credit, for retrieving some of his lost reputation, even for gathering laurels, was reduced to a mere side issue. General Andrew Lewis, then at Fort Pitt, wrote: "General McIntosh has not above 200 effective men exclusive of Militia who are stationed at small Forts for ye protection of ye Inhabitants. From every circumstance Congress has lay'd asid[e] the thought of carrying on ye Expedition this Year, tho they have not given ye General that notice . . . . At any rate I must wait an Answer from Congress [which] cannot be expected in less than ten days from this time."95

Congress explained at the end of their resolution that the murderous attacks upon Wyoming and central Pennsylvania had altered their priorities in favor of a punitive expedition against the Six Nations of New York. Washington would not, however, gather forces enough until the next summer (1779) to effect this blow to the Indians by the expedition under Generals Sullivan and Clinton.

During these late summer days at Fort Pitt, McIntosh was evidently an extremely busy man. With the transfer of command, he received from the retiring commandant reports of the number of troops available and to be available. Brodhead's regiment would not arrive until September 10 or II,96 and Gibson with the remaining 150 of the Thirteenth Virginia (it will be remembered that 100 had stayed at Fort Pitt under Colonel Russell) would arrive two days later. An accurate count of troops under Continental pay and militia of the states, also knowledge of the geographical and military situ-

95 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 127.
ation of all the posts under the western department must be learned by the new commandant. There were also supply depots scattered through the valleys of Pennsylvania, western Maryland, and western Virginia. An important one was that at Old Town, Maryland, near the confluence of the North and South branches of the Potomac, then called Skipton. This depot collected much of the flour and livestock on which the western posts depended. Fifteen miles southeast of Fort Cumberland, by the winding Old Oldtown Road, the wagons from Skipton reached Fort Cumberland, thence, by the old Braddock Road packhorse trains reached Fort Pitt. In twenty-three years of disuse, bushes and small trees had obstructed the roadbed, bridges had rotted or washed away, fordings had changed character. There were three major fordings and several lesser ones. An unexampled feature of this road was the spectacle of precipitous ascents and descents, as for example the descent into George's Creek and the climb from it, and especially the very steep drop to the Great Crossing of the Youghiogheny River.

For the transport of the required flour and stores, a train of 1,200 packhorses was estimated. This compares very nearly with Bouquet's packtrain for his army of less than 1,500, via the Forbes Road. The horses were available to the latter in 1764, but in 1778 few were available for McIntosh, due to the fact that both Virginia and Pennsylvania agents were canvassing the same area of the country for horses, wagons, and provisions to supply the eastern armies. For the time, supplies for the western army received priority over all other commissary demands.

The impact of all of these deterrents to traffic upon Braddock's Road and the weight of the logistical problems relative to getting supplies to the army in the west devolved upon the deputy commissary general, Colonel George Morgan, answerable to Congress. There is much evidence that he did succeed in procuring large quantities of supplies, through his eight assistants assigned to different areas at several warehouses as far away as the Cumberland (Conococheague) valley of Pennsylvania, the Potomac valley, and the Monongahela valley, where much flour spoiled from having been barrelled too soon after grinding. The commissary of issues was ready to disburse the provisions to the garrisoned posts, but the quartermaster could not supply the horses.

97 Williams, Bouquet's March to the Ohio, 114; Morgan to Steel, Jan. 22, 1779, Morgan Papers, CLP.
98 Savelle, Morgan, 169, 171.
The net result of these diverse responsibilities was frustrating, to say the least, to the man who was expected to wage a vigorous campaign against the hostile Indians and their British abettors. Totally dependent upon the several services which he could not control or command, having received his instructions from Continental Congress and the Board of War, but responsible to and reporting to the commander in chief far distant, over the mountains and on the far side of the Hudson River, the commander of the Western Military Department was indeed in a precarious position.

Added to this unpleasant operational status was a personal aspect of affairs. George Morgan, to whom McIntosh had to look more than to any other for sustenance of his little army, was playing a game for much higher stakes. His large trading interests having been laid low by the sweeping waves of the war, his only hope for personal gain lay in the realm of land speculation. As the land in question lay in the Illinois country, where he had formerly traded on a large scale, his interest lay in maintaining the neutrality of as many of the Indians as he could influence in that direction. He even took the very dangerous method of corresponding with the enemy in an effort to procure his end, envisioning a neutral buffer country interposed between the British-held Detroit and the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia. The big land speculation involved some of the top men in government, in Continental Congress — such men as Robert Morris.

One astute historian has epitomized the prospect thus: "The best way to get lands and to carry on trade on the frontier was to stay on good terms with the natives, not permitting the vicissitudes of war to interfere too much with the efforts to accumulate private fortunes . . . . In this whole scheme, there would seem to be an explanation of the policy of Indian neutrality which Morgan had pursued since the beginning of the war." 100 This is not to impugn the policy of Indian neutrality but only the apparent motives of Morgan for promoting it. The nonparticipation of the Indian nations and tribes had been striven for by Continental Congress from the start of hostilities between the British government and the colonists when, in the summer of 1775, Congress had sent Captain Richard Butler, then Indian agent, as emissary to visit the principal Indian towns in Ohio to advocate Indian neutrality. He had succeeded admirably, and the treaty of 1775 at Fort Pitt had resulted. 101

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99 Ibid., 152; Abernethy, Western Lands, 193, 204.
100 Abernethy, Western Lands, 234.
Detroit was contemplated and passage through the country of the Delawares was essential. The Delawares were vulnerable to the threats of their hostile neighbors, and the need for their active help to the expedition demanded special offers of inducements. The trend of events ran counter to Morgan's plans, and he was absent on a prolonged tour d'affaire to the east, not entirely on Congress's business.  

Morgan, while concurrently exercising the functions of Indian agent and deputy commissary of purchases, was able to take long periods of absence to travel east ostensibly to obtain financial appropriations from Congress but actually improving the opportunity to push his schemes among the leaders in government and to promote the improvement of his farm at Princeton, New Jersey, one of the finest and most agriculturally advanced in America. Thomas P. Abernethy has pinpointed the situation with regard to the western commander thus: "Though Morgan had approved the Detroit expedition, he had no liking for McIntosh, who was not a land speculator."  

For his part, McIntosh had long ago expressed his policy of personal conduct in another context: to stay "... clear of either Party & mind my military Duty alone." He had evidently rebuffed Morgan's speculation schemes and remained aloof. This attitude adventurous men of the times did not understand, however commendable it was. The land mania had seized everyone — or nearly everyone in America — and the war's fury could not extinguish it.

Here ended the era of nominal Indian neutrality during the war of the Revolution. From this time forward, the United States would actively seek allies among the Indian nations — not, however, with Morgan's sanction.

Early in the routine military affairs of Brodhead's detachment of McIntosh's army, in fact the day prior to marching out from Carlisle (August 9), the orders of the day mention Lieutenant Colonel Cambray, commanding the artillery. This young Frenchman who fought for American independence deserves notice. Born in Florence, Italy, in June 1751, he hailed from the historic old province of Picardy, in the extreme north of France nearly contiguous to

102 Savelle, Morgan, 157.
103 Western Lands, 200-201.
Flanders, that part now the Department of Somme, in the vicinity and bailiwick (bailliage) of Montdidier.  

This twenty-six-year-old gentleman was of the nobility, his name Louis-Antoine-Jean Baptiste, Chevalier de Cambray-Digny. The title was hereditary, like that of an English baronet. He came highly recommended to Benjamin Franklin, commissioner of the United States in France, and by the Duke Rochefoucault de Liancourt, also of the same province and well known in America. Cambray had sought a coveted commission in the Royal Artillery corps in 1770, which roster was always filled, so he served as a cadet. For a time, since August 21, 1776, he had borne a commission as captain in the Polish army. Cambray sailed for America in February 1778, with William Carmichael, who had aided the secretary to the American commissioners in Paris, had been instrumental in Lafayette's coming to America, was bearing messages from the commissioners to Congress, and had chartered a sailing cutter for the voyage. Carmichael, a wealthy resident of Maryland, would soon be elected to a seat in Continental Congress after his return to America.

Having landed in North Carolina, the young engineer spent two months supervising the fortification of strategic Cape Lookout, with which the assembly of the state was greatly pleased and commended his usefulness and skill to Congress. He would accept no monetary compensation for this work. With further recommendation from Washington, Congress conferred upon the Chevalier de Cambray a commission of lieutenant colonel in the engineer corps of the United States. On June 18, Washington's army decamped from Valley Forge and started for the Delaware River ferries in pursuit of General Clinton's British army evacuating Philadelphia and racing for the protection of their fleet at the Highlands and Sandy Hook. When Washington caught up with them at Monmouth Courthouse,

111 Ibid., 11: 604-5.
112 Ibid., 11: 605.
on that extremely hot Sunday of June 28, Cambray was with the "main body" commanded personally by Washington.\footnote{113 Lasseray, \\textit{Sous les Treize Etoiles}, 1: 139; William S. Stryker, \\textit{The Battle of Monmouth} (Princeton, 1927), 120.}

The imminence of McIntosh's campaign into the western wilderness to Fort Pitt, comprehending the projected thrust to Detroit, forecast a need of fort-building. Cambray was diverted. Fort Pitt was\footnote{114 Ford, \\textit{Journals of Continental Congress}, 11: 605.} the only military structure in the western area that exemplified, to some extent, the elaborate system of the French Vauban. The Englishman Muller and the Woolrich group were just beginning to awaken to the static nature of permanent fortifications. The new theory of "fire and movement" was evolving, and Frederick the Great had, only a decade before, issued his \\textit{Military Instruction of the King of Prussia for his Generals} in which he illustrated the flexibility of the use of a "ditch and palisades" in mountainous and wooded country warfare.\footnote{115 See Charles M. Stotz, \\textit{Defense in the Wilderness} [should be treated as a separate work, the real purpose and essence of \\textit{Drums in the Forest} (Pittsburgh, 1958), 76-81; Frederick the Great recommended the use of palisades (stockaded structures) in mountainous or wooded terrain, Jay Luvaas, \textit{Frederick the Great on the Art of War} (New York, 1966), 132-33, 206-7. Nearly all American defensive structures were temporary, either due to movement of troops or because of the perishable nature of materials, such as logs. Forbes's army moved forward from one intrenched and stockaded position to another. Deterioration of earth or log defenses, due to natural causes, was rapid.} Bouquet had successfully adapted many of these methods, and now came this young Frenchman, fresh from the latest wars of Poland against the Prussian tactical innovator.\footnote{116 See note 109, above.} Cambray was about to retrace, in part, Bouquet's footsteps and to demonstrate the efficacy of temporary protective measures with materials readily at hand. The only usable principle of Vauban's school of fort designers was the projection of bastions from all corners from which musketry or artillery fire could rake the dry ditches outside the curtain walls and to sweep them clear of potential attackers. (More about Forts McIntosh and Laurens later in this series.) A resolution of Congress, on October 20, 1778,\footnote{117 Ford, \\textit{Journals of Continental Congress}, 12: Resolution Oct. 20, 1778.} ordered Cambray back for reassignment. He did not return from the Muskingum in time to have left Fort McIntosh until December 29.\footnote{118 Kellogg, \\textit{Frontier Advance}, 190. The reference to Cambray, fixing the time of his departure for the east, is contained in the postscript of McIntosh's letter to George Brian, vice-president of the Pennsylvania Council, which Kellogg, \\textit{Frontier Advance} (p. 188) wrongly labels "McIntosh's Official Report." General McIntosh was in no way obligated to report to anyone other than the president of the Board of War. The "report" was merely information for Brian's private use. The purpose of the letter was, significantly, to point out...}
It is interesting here to note that this was the second Fort McIntosh figuring prominently in the Revolutionary annals. The first of the name was constructed while General McIntosh was still operating in Georgia. It was a stockade, 100 feet square with corner bastions and a blockhouse in the center, located upon the northeast side of the Satilla (St. Ilia) River, in Camden County, Georgia, about thirty-two miles from Brunswick (seven miles from Tarboro and very near the village of Midriver). It was taken and burned after a two-day siege by British Colonel Fuser, of the Royal Americans, formerly a brother officer with Bouquet.\(^\text{119}\)

On February 2, 1779, Continental Congress ordered Cambray to go to Edenton, North Carolina, via Baltimore (apparently by sea).\(^\text{120}\) He reported to General Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the southern department, at Charleston. Very soon his engineering services were required to construct a line of fortifications to defend that city against the advance of British General Augustine Prevost. Cambray’s line of fortifications across the neck, defended by artillery fire, drove Prevost away. The next spring, however, General Clinton’s army and the British fleet returned to besiege Charleston and Lincoln’s whole army was surrendered, May 12, 1780. Cambray, among them, became a prisoner of war.\(^\text{121}\)

In a general exchange of prisoners, especially those relating to officers and men taken at the capitulation of Burgoyne’s army after the Battle of Saratoga in 1777 and Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown in 1781, Cambray and other engineer officers expected to be exchanged; but they were doomed to disappointment, since Congress and Washington held to the policy of making all officers, American and foreign, await their turn. There was much correspondence between General Duportail, the head of the engineering department, and Congress. This, however, was not productive of any information concerning Cambray personally. The exact date of the exchange of the three officers, Colonels Laumoy, Cambray, and l’Enfant, is uncertain.

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\(^{120}\) Ford, *Journals of Continental Congress*, 13: 133.

\(^{121}\) Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783* (Cambridge, 1964), 341.
beyond the fact that it took place nearly a year after the surrender at Yorktown. Cambray was promoted by Congress to the rank of a full colonel on May 2, 1783.¹²²

Having been honorably discharged from the service with commendatory letters and citations, he sailed for France aboard the ship *La Gloire*, May 11, 1783, and landed at Brest on June 11.¹²³

It has been stated that Cambray received a commission from the French government as major in the provincial troops. He survived the ordeal of the French Revolution. In 1789, he took part in the local elections in the bailliage of Montdidier, probably for a local office.¹²⁴

It is known that he was financially ruined and destitute in his later years, yet he never applied for settlement money due him from the American government, although Congress advertised in many French papers the names of many French officers to whom money was due. Several others, as also Cambray, did not apply.¹²⁵

Cambray died on his estate of Villers aux Erables (no relation to the town of Villers in Oise Department), in 1822.¹²⁶

[To be concluded]

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¹²⁴ Ibid., 1: 140.
¹²⁵ Kite, *Duportail*, 238.