Inevitably, this book will be compared with Richard M. Ketchum's recent *Decisive Day: The Battle of Bunker Hill* (Garden City, N. Y., 1974). Ketchum's book has even better maps and, facilitated by its 282-page length, is lavishly illustrated. On the other hand, much of its length is used for prolonged treatments of events leading up to and following the battle. Elting puts the battle in appropriate historical perspective but keeps the focus where it belongs. It is thus a more precisely informative study and, where it specifically differs with Ketchum, is (in this reviewer's opinion) much more convincing.

In sum, this is an excellent book — too good, in fact, for the reader to do himself the disservice of being put off by its misprints, misspelled (and sometimes misused) words, and grammatical errors, which occur with regrettable frequency. Despite these flaws, it is readable. It is a soldier's account, but expressed in terms which are clearly understandable to a civilian reader. Historically and militarily, it provides genuine enlightenment on a highly important episode.

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Richard H. Kohn has written an interesting and widely acclaimed book, because militarism, as a political issue, has never been thoroughly treated for the early years of the republic. He explains what took place down to March 1802, when Jefferson, often considered an opponent of military establishments, implemented a system much like the one suggested by the militarists of 1783. The future army would be small, but very competent.

It was an axiom of the times that peacetime standing armies must always destroy liberty. A group of veteran Revolutionary officers, however, favored a professional force. Their attitude was based, in part, on personal fascination, but they also argued that a body of regulars was more efficient than the alternative — reliance on state militia. Kohn believes that the effectiveness of militia had been declining over the previous hundred years. Refining an interpretation he has expressed elsewhere, Kohn argues that the failure of the New-
burgh conspiracy was the historical turning point at which our infant nation departed from the pattern, so often seen in emerging nations, of repetitive military coups. He must reach beyond the documents to draw this conclusion. Similarly, the author says that the true origins of the two parties of the 1790s can be found in the Confederation period, although he cannot precisely prove it, the Federalists stemming from the early militaristic nationalists, and the Republicans from opponents of the federal government.

Under the new Constitution a small army was tolerated because of danger from Indians in the northwest. In view of today's diatribe against the nation's treatment of the Indians, it is interesting to learn that there was political opposition in the eastern states to the use of regulars in the northwest, an opposition partially based on humanitarian concern for the Indians. In spite of Harmar's and St. Clair's defeats (1790 and 1791), the legislative solution, the National Militia Act of 1792, emerged in a totally impractical form. Fallen Timbers restored the army's reputation; the use of militia to quell the Whiskey Rebellion was not seen as a victory for the concept of the citizen-soldier. From 1792 until the quasi war with France the belief that there was a pro-French conspiracy grew into a national frenzy. Kohn insists that there was real danger of land warfare against France and that it is only because of Jeffersonian-Turnerian bias that historians have often labeled the public fear as a delusion. Although Alexander Hamilton did not, as some have suggested, plot the Whiskey Rebellion, by 1798 he had developed grandiose plans for using control of the army to overshadow President Adams. This is a major turning point in Kohn's story. By resuming negotiations with France, Adams triumphed over the Hamiltonian extremist wing of the Federalists. Public sentiment suddenly shifted against the enlarged military establishment, throwing off its conspiracy frenzy, but the Federalist party was permanently eclipsed by the split within its leadership.

The book is basically a political history, though there is much insight into military systems, administration, national strategy, and personalities of generals. It is not, however, written at the mess kit level. The bibliographic essay is brilliant and points out several areas where additional scholarship is needed. Incidentally, these include the history of the Whiskey Rebellion and the transcription of the Denny-O'Hara Papers. Kohn found it necessary to go to original sources for legislative history because adequate studies have not been written. His explanations have to be very subtle, since opinion concerning the military, as in other matters of politics, often wavered and contained
equivocations. He seems to be working against the tyranny of simplified generalizations through which the history of the period has so often been presented. Like a zoom camera he focuses on day-by-day shifts during major crises, without losing contact with the major points at issue. Examples of this include his accounts of the brinkmanship practiced by the Washington and Adams administrations. While negotiating with the French, with domestic insurgents, and with the Indians, military preparations had to be delayed because enlarged forces suggested that conflict was inevitable. Thus, it would be unfair to accuse the administration of neglecting our defenses during the weeks when negotiations remained viable. Kohn charts such periods of anxiety very adroitly.

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This is a Pulitzer Prize-winning biography of a great man. It is a book about a saintly man, written in a time when saints are not popular, and it is a book about a challenging time in the history of the Catholic church in America. But it also tells the story of an exciting period in the expansion of the United States. It is the story of Jean Baptiste Lamy, first archbishop of Santa Fe, New Mexico. This is the same man immortalized under the name of Latour, in Willa Cather's delightful and moving novel, Death Comes for the Archbishop.

Jean Baptiste Lamy was born in 1814 in Auvergne, France, and died in 1888 in his favorite retreat at Tusque Canyon just outside the city where he spent much of his life. He came to America as a missionary priest. The Catholic church in America, which grew faster than its ability to produce native clergy, brought priests from Europe to this new land. Lamy was a pastor in many places in the diocese of Cincinnati, which occupied a portion of the old Northwest Territory. That diocese then lay between the Ohio River and Lake Erie. As curé he learned that Catholic pastors had to be builders, beggars, and financiers, as well as preachers of the gospel and ministers to souls.

Lamy first saw Santa Fe in 1851, shortly after the close of the