
Lord Devlin is a British jurist, the youngest elevated to his post prior to being appointed to the Court of Appeals and becoming a member of the House of Lords. Although a professional jurist, he is an amateur historian-biographer. The book jacket announces that he has spent over twenty years in researching this study, resulting in perhaps a too lengthy and too expensive volume. For the layman it offers a lengthy sympathetic overview incorporating all the historical details, and for the professional historian it brings the added British viewpoint to an important period in our history.

The author's purpose was to explore Woodrow Wilson's mind, in the belief that such an exploration would offer the key to understanding why the United States entered World War I — an opinion widely held among members of the historical profession. Although based on fairly detailed research in the Wilson era papers, the author ignored or was unaware of the extensive and controversial literature on both his subjects — Wilson's personality and the causes of American entry into the Great War. For example, his footnotes (there is no bibliography) omit the following titles, among numerous others also not listed: E. H. Buchrig, Wilson and the Balance of Power (1955); E. R. May, World War and American Isolation (1959); Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics (1968); and this reviewer's The Great Departure (1965). Consequently, to a specialist at least, Devlin's account lacks depth and subtlety of interpretation. The result is more of a biography of Wilson than a study of the complex neutrality years. Moreover, greater discipline might well have eliminated or curtailed frequent diversions by the author, such as his digression into the intricacies of British politics, and the Spanish-American and Boer wars. One might also have expected a more sympathetic treatment for a fellow legalist, yet he dismisses Robert Lansing, Wilson's second secretary of state, as "a man of no great attainments" (p. 119), and of a slow and legalistic mind. More unbiased research would have shown the author that Lansing had a distinguished record in international law before he entered political life.

Probably the best chapters of this long study are those entitled "Peace Sentiments" (chapter 17) and "Peace Without Victory" (chapter 19). The former has an excellent discussion of Britain's financial straits in late 1916, that forecast a reduction of 40 percent in the supplies to Allied forces as a result of exhausted credit and Federal
Reserve Board warnings to American bankers about the risks entailed in accepting British treasury notes, while the latter chapter shrewdly analyzes British shipping and the losses to be expected from either unrestricted German underseas warfare or by attacks on armed vessels. The final chapter, "Wilson Brought to War," repeats the story of Wilson's agony of indecision in regard to the diplomatic rupture with Berlin and the decision to request a declaration of war against Germany from Congress. The Zimmermann Telegram story also is related, against the backdrop of a crisis in British finance only rescued by America's timely war entry.

Finally, the author declares, Wilson chose war rather than submission to Germany's underseas campaign because of his ideals, and above all because of the fact that his hoped-for new world order to supplant the present one was threatened. In summary, the price the president essayed for the roles to be played by the United States and himself left no choice but war entry, and he paid it.

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In 1972 Herbert S. Parmet's *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* made use of personal and official papers from the Eisenhower administration — as well as twenty-five interviews with associates of the president — to demolish the notion that Eisenhower served as some sort of benign facade for an official Washington dominated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and presidential assistant Sherman Adams. Eisenhower was not only "merely necessary," as Parmet and others have pointed out, he was in charge.

Charles Alexander, professor of history at Ohio University, generally follows this theme in *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961.* Moreover, he does so in a shorter volume that even more effectively than Parmet's rehabilitates the Eisenhower presidency.

In seven chapters Alexander covers the domestic and diplomatic issues that characterized the Eisenhower years. The author judiciously interprets the McCarthy miasma, the civil rights movement, and other domestic concerns. However, the book emphasizes foreign