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FORT PITT AND THE REVOLUTION ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER
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Part Four

The much delayed arrival of General McIntosh at Pittsburgh was noticed in the foregoing (third) part of this review of the impact of Fort Pitt upon a 450-mile front on the western frontier. Some of the nearly insurmountable physical problems confronting McIntosh from the very beginning of his taking command, also the discord leading to clashes of personalities, were indicated.

McIntosh, upon his arrival, found awaiting him two of the commissioners representing Congress, Brigadier General Andrew Lewis and his brother, Thomas, who had preceded him by six days. In the general’s own words: “I arrived here on the 1st Day this mon. [August 1778] . . . and matters I believe will turn out much as I expected. The Indian Agent [George Morgan] at Congress. No Indians Assembled. The Instructions for ye Commissioners not come to hand. My Brother Thos is with me in the room of Mr. [John] Walker . . . .”

In brief, the troubles of Congress in regard to maintaining the commission for Indian affairs in the middle department may be illustrated by the following. By resolution on November 20, 1777, Congress elected Colonel Samuel Washington (younger brother of General George Washington), Gabriel Jones, and Colonel Joseph Reed, as commissioners to Fort Pitt. Reed declined the service, and George

Mr. Williams concludes his series of bicentennial articles on Pittsburgh and the Revolution.—Editor

Clymer was appointed on December 15. On January 1, 1778, Washington pleaded ill health, and John Walker was named; but, on February 23, Sampson Matthews and Samuel McDowell replaced Walker and Jones. Continental Congress, by resolution on June 4, passed the responsibility for naming commissioners to the executive powers of Virginia and Pennsylvania, whereupon Governor Henry, of Virginia, named General Andrew Lewis and John Walker. The story of McIntosh's delays and detours has been rehearsed, causing the projected treaty date to be postponed from July 23 until September 12. By that time, Walker had other duties, and General Lewis's brother Thomas was designated. The Pennsylvania Executive Council neglected to send a commissioner, so that once again that state failed to participate in crucial affairs affecting the defense of her frontiers.

The resolution of Congress, July 25, 1778, "That Brigadier General McIntosh be directed . . . [to] proceed to destroy such towns of the hostile tribes of Indians . . .," made it absolutely necessary to march over the domains of the Delawares and the friendly clans of the Shawnee. Hence, it was essential that such inducements should be offered to these tribesmen as to make it worthwhile to suffer the harassments and attacks certain to be made by hostile tribes. The oppression of fear under which these people lived and labored is best exhibited by two letters, both dated July 19, 1778, one from Chief White Eyes, the other from the Reverend Zeisberger, a Moravian missionary. Both were deeply concerned lest their correspondence with the Indian agent, George Morgan, should become known by their enemies, particularly since they had been threatened by the hostile Wiandots with death and the destruction of their towns and all of their people if they refused to go to war against the Americans. Especially did they fear that their correspondence with Hand and Morgan, prior to the defection of McKee and Girty, might have fallen into the hands of those arch-traitors.

Under these conditions of stress the treaty conference got under way at Fort Pitt with only three Delaware chiefs in attendance. The

4 Ibid., 9: 1018; William B. Reed, Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed (Philadelphia, 1847), 1: 353n.
5 Ford, Journals of Continental Congress, 10: 9, 191.
6 Ibid., 11: 568.
7 Mcllwaine, Journals of the Council of Va., 1: 150.
8 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 127.
10 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 117-20, 132-33.
following day arrived another, and a Shawnee.\textsuperscript{11} The usual formalities and allegorical addresses were presented, then the true purpose of the conference was broached.\textsuperscript{12} It was a bold stroke and far beyond any proposals that any white man had envisioned or thought practical. Today, few of our readers realize that, by the content of this treaty agreement, the United States and the Indians actually contracted a mutually defensive alliance.\textsuperscript{13} Furthermore, and most remarkable, Article 6 of the treaty created an Indian state, the fourteenth in the Union, to have full representation in Congress. Since the two main chroniclers of these events, the editor of \textit{Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio}\textsuperscript{14} and the author of "The Virginia Frontier in History,"\textsuperscript{15} seemingly not having deemed it a sufficiently important occurrence to have printed (although both quoted the preliminary speeches and the proceedings), pertinent parts of the treaty agreement itself are here-with printed.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{TREATY WITH THE DELAWARES, 1778.}

\textit{Articles of agreement and confederation, made and entered into by Andrew and Thomas Lewis, Esquires, Commissioners for, and in Behalf of the United States of North-America of the one Part, and Capt. White Eyes, Capt. John Kill Buck, Junior, and Capt. Pipe, Deputies and Chief Men of the Delaware Nation of the other Part.}

\textbf{Article I.}

That all offences or acts of hostilities by one, or either of the contracting parties against the other, be mutually forgiven, and buried in the depth of oblivion, never more to be had in remembrance.

\textbf{Article II.}

That a perpetual peace and friendship shall from henceforth take

\begin{footnotes}
\item 11 \textit{Ibid.}, 138, 142.
\item 12 \textit{Ibid.}, 141.
\item 13 C. J. Kappler, \textit{comp.}, \textit{Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties}, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1902), 2: 3-5, Article 2; the "Articles of Agreement and Confederation" also appeared in Richard Peters, \textit{ed.}, \textit{The Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America}, 8 vols. (Boston, 1846), 7: 13-15, although the articles were never ratified by Continental Congress.
\item 14 Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Advance}, 22n, 138.
\item 16 Kappler, \textit{Indian Affairs}, 2: 3-5. Article 6 of the treaty as printed in Kappler differs from George Morgan's manuscript copy in Morgan Papers, CLP.
\end{footnotes}
place, and subsist between the contracting parties aforesaid, through all succeeding generations . . . .

**Article III**

And whereas the United States are engaged in a just and necessary war, in defence and support of life, liberty and independence, against the King of England and his adherents, and as said King is yet possessed of several posts and forts on the lakes and other places, . . . and as the most practicable way for the troops of the United States to some of the posts and forts is by passing through the country of the Delaware nation, the aforesaid deputies, on behalf of themselves and their nation, do hereby stipulate and agree to give a free passage through their country to the troops aforesaid . . . . And the said deputies, on the behalf of their nation, engage to join the troops of the United States aforesaid, with such a number of their best and most expert warriors as they can spare, consistent with their own safety, and act in concert with them; and for the better security of the old men, women and children of the aforesaid nation, whilst their warriors are engaged against the common enemy, it is agreed on the part of the United States, that a fort of sufficient strength and capacity be built at the expense of the said States, with such assistance as it may be in the power of the said Delaware Nation to give, in the most convenient place, and advantageous situation, as shall be agreed on by the commanding officer of the troops aforesaid, with the advice and concurrence of the deputies of the aforesaid Delaware Nation, which fort shall be garrisoned by such a number of the troops of the United States . . . .

**Article VI.**

Whereas the enemies of the United States have endeavored, by every artifice in their power, to possess the Indians in general with an opinion, that it is the design of the States aforesaid, to extirpate the Indians and take possession of their country: to obviate such false suggestion, the United States do engage to guarantee to the aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in the fullest and most ample manner, as it hath been bounded by former treaties, as long as they the said Delaware nation shall abide by, and hold fast the chain . . . of friendship now entered into. And it is further agreed on between the contracting parties should it for the future be found conducive for the mutual interest of both
parties to invite any other tribes who have been friends to the interest of the United States, to join the present confederation, and to form a state whereof the Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress: Provided, nothing contained in this article to be considered as conclusive until it meets with the approbation of Congress. And it is also the intent and meaning of this article, that no protection or countenance shall be afforded to any who are at present our enemies, by which they might escape the punishment they deserve.

The text is definitely of a professional legal form and technical expression. Since the instructions from Congress did not arrive until the last minute and there would have been little time to have composed such a document, also there was no one present endowed with the legal training to have written it, the Articles of Agreement and Confederation must have been previously prepared and sent to the commissioners. The oft-repeated insinuation that this was "McIntosh's treaty" would thus seem without foundation in fact. It is, to say the least, extraordinary that this treaty, signed by the representatives of both parties but repudiated by the governing bodies of both, should have been published in the Public Statutes at Large of the United States.\(^\text{17}\)

It is interesting to speculate whether the reason for such great reluctance among the members of Congress to serve on the treaty commission may have been their disagreement with the purpose to be served. The letter of appointment by Henry Laurens, president of Congress, contained an inclosure and the statement, "The paper will inform you particularly the object which Congress have in view" — evidently secrecy.\(^\text{18}\)

George Morgan, as previously mentioned, opposed the treaty. He had concurred in the projected Detroit expedition, but he vigorously resisted attacking any Indian towns, which action he foresaw would draw all of the Indians into the foray against the United States. Moreover, only Indian passivity was conducive to Morgan's great Indiana Land Company ambitions. He was able to sway to his views such influential members of Congress as William Grayson (to be the first United States senator from Virginia), Governor Patrick Henry,\(^\text{19}\) and many others. Morgan actively incited the Delawares to claim they had been duped. He was not present at the treaty and, as mentioned,

\(^\text{18}\) Reed, \textit{Joseph Reed}, 1: 353n.
\(^\text{19}\) Abernethy, \textit{Western Lands}, 219, 225, 226, 227, 238.
had been in the east since early spring, promoting land business with Congress and improving his new farm, Prospect, at Princeton, New Jersey. The treaty actually never came to a vote in Congress but died in committee.  

Search of succeeding journals fails to reveal any mention of it. An outcome of the proceedings and discussions was a request from the Indians for another Indian agent who should not be self-interested. They suggested Colonel John Gibson, who commanded the Thirteenth Virginia Regiment, then part of the army at Fort Pitt. Gibson, assuming that the adoption of the proceedings was official, entered upon the duties of Indian agent, and Morgan was greatly offended. In May 1779, he formally resigned his office as deputy commissary general, definitely and unequivocally.

In order to carry into effect the order contained in the resolution of Continental Congress relative to attacking the Indian towns in Ohio, consideration must be given to finding a new road. The existing Great Trail, followed by the traders and by Bouquet (in 1764), ran entirely through Indian country on the northeast side of the Ohio River. It was commanded — overlooked — by high hills all the way to the Beaver. Furthermore, the road's course lay, in two places (one for six and a half miles, another for half a mile) on the pebbly beach of the river. Of course, this was due to the encroachment of precipitous hills which fell to the river's edge at these places. At periods of above-normal water the road was completely blocked. One sizable river, the Big Beaver, had to be forded under unfavorable conditions of very high banks and swift water. One must visualize the conditions at the point of crossing before the construction of the dams in the Ohio. Before the construction of the dams the torpid slackwater from the larger river did not exist. The drop of the Beaver into the Ohio was appreciable and the water swift. There were three falls within a little more than four miles above the crossing; a fall of fifty-two feet occurs within five miles of the Ohio. Thomas Hutchins estimated the width of the Beaver here at twenty rods. Today slackwater from the Ohio nearly doubles the Beaver's width.

The alternative route lay on the southwest side of the Ohio and

22 All of the land on the south side of the Ohio River as far as the Great Kanawha had either been deeded to George Croghan or was ceded to Virginia at the treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1768. Williams, "Fort Pitt and the Revolution on the Western Frontier," *WPHM* 59: 8, n. 17; William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCLXIV [1764]* (London, 1766), 9, 10; Hanna, *Wilderness Trail*, 2: 202.
started with a ferry crossing, likely in a flatboat. The Monongahela was naturally very muddy, and its bottom would not have made good footing for a ford. Much of the year, the rivers presented the aspect of a series of pools and riffles; but the late September rains would have swelled somewhat the volume of water in the rivers near the Point, so that boats must have been necessary for McIntosh’s army to cross.

After crossing at the Point, the route McIntosh chose ran down the western side of the Ohio nearly approximating West Carson Street, to the mouth of Saw Mill Run nearly at the approach to the West End Bridge. There it crossed Saw Mill Run, took the course that was later retraced by the Steubenville Pike, ran over three ridges, and descended into the beautiful valley now Crafton Borough, where was located Hand’s Hospital. The greatest health problem in the Revolutionary army being smallpox, General Hand, being a physician, used this retreat removed from the garrison at Fort Pitt for recuperation of inoculated patients. This was in accordance with General Washington’s orders and similar to hospitals established near Philadelphia, Trenton, and Whitemarsh.

At this point, it is necessary to correct a misstatement contained in the third part of this series of articles (WPHM 59: 267). It is the duty of every historical writer to correct his own errors as readily as he would call attention to faults of others. Upon closer study of the 1817 Whiteside map of this area, it appears that the Chartiers Creek crossing, at that time, was .4 mile farther downstream (north) from the Pa. Route 60 (Thornburg) bridge. The salient triangle of Hand’s land surveyed to him on the western side of the creek was there. A misapplication of the survey boundaries produced the wrong result. This relocation indicates that the path leading to the ford would have passed north of the hospital. This map also indicates that the street bounding the Brodhead Manor residential area, named Brodhead Fording Road and tying into Wind Gap Road, did not then exist and that Wind Gap Road did not come into being until after 1817. It is clear that the fording place was about opposite to the south wall of the Joseph Horne and Company’s warehouse building, just where the only low place in the western creek bank occurs.

23 I am indebted to Frank R. Stocker of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ret., a member of the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, for information relative to Ohio River conditions and elevations in a letter dated Sept. 16, 1976; also to Gene Amacita for information regarding the Beaver River.

24 James E. Gibson, Dr. Bodo Otto and the Medical Background of the American Revolution (Baltimore, 1937), 131-34, 144.
By whatever route the path reached the crossing place, it passed near the mouth of a small stream which enters Chartiers Creek from the west and which it crossed five times within the first three quarters of a mile, the stream looping several times. The bordering land, over which the Steubenville Pike now passes, was probably marshy, as were nearly all lowlands in the days of the primeval forest.

A preview in perspective of such a path presupposes McIntosh's three objectives: to reach the Indian country at the most strategic point, by a strategic road; that he intended to secure that road by fortification at advantageous points; that the main path to Detroit would, in his judgment, serve the double-edged offensive plan of penetrating the Indian country and of mounting a real threat against the British stronghold of Detroit, the real source of enemy attacks and plots. The intention was to head as many streams as possible, to cross those falling into the Ohio as high upstream as possible to avoid difficult fordings, and farther along, to traverse the dividing ridge that heads the streams that fall into Raccoon Creek and those falling into the Ohio. There is no documentary proof that there was an existing path, but the fact is that there was a settlement on Raredon's (Rar- don's) Run (near the present Allegheny-Beaver County line), and that the Baker family had established a cabin home near Bunker Hill, nine miles farther north; both locations were from one to two miles west of the supposed route. Ordinary precautions would suggest that a wilderness habitation should be removed from an avenue of travel. Frontiersmen did not go far out in the woods to settle without being led to the general neighborhood by some trail or trace. The description of a dividing ridge route for McIntosh's road accords with all of the prerequisites of Indian trails. Certainly some sort of communicating woods trail would have sprung into being joining these two settlements and connecting them with the frontier of civilization farther back.

Pure reasoning thus points to a predilection for this path by some of Brodhead's (or McIntosh's) guides, and the end of it also must have been known to these guides. Such a path would eventually meet with the Ohio River as it swings in the great curve that reverses its direc-

26 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 34.
27 D. L. Walton and Bicentennial Committee, Center (Ambridge, Pa., 1976), 5, 6.
28 Archer Butler Hulbert, Historic Highways of America, vol. 2, Indian Thoroughfares (Cleveland, 1902), 14-15; Wallace, Indian Paths, 2-3.
tion. If a fort were to be built, strategical reasoning would dictate that it should be built to overlook and command the crossing of the river, to which the trail led, and thus to dominate any traffic upon it. This certainly was the logical planning that led to the selection of the exact spot where the remains of Fort McIntosh are found today — on the bank of the Ohio, at the foot of Tenth Street in Beaver, Pennsylvania. This is where the able and resourceful Chevalier de Cambray built the fort.

Having now reviewed the comprehensive plan of the expedition, the detailed information regarding the road itself can be pieced together from the orderly book kept by Brodhead’s adjutant. It is evident that the road-building contingent was led by Colonel Brodhead, and the road has always been popularly called by his name rather than by McIntosh’s. Brodhead Post Office served the infant Crafton from 1857 to 1881.29 Brodhead Manor residential area still exists, even though it is evident that these survivals of his name are purely commemorative. Numerous entries are missing from the orderly book, and the gaps must be bridged by deduction. A typical case is the entry, "All the troops are to march this day . . .," but the orders are undated. From the context, however, the date could not have been other than September 21 or 22. The treaty did not break up until the nineteenth.

Another entry states: “Camp, Sisney’s Farm, Sept. 23d 1778. Col. Brodhead having received information that some of the troops under his command have wantonly slaughtered a number of swine belonging to the poor, distressed inhabitants who have taken shelter in the interior parts of the country . . . .” No one has ever identified Sisney’s Farm; but with allowance of two days for ferrying (or fording) Brodhead’s troops, supplies, and animals over the Monongahela and the slow climb of the three-mile hill to Hand’s Hospital, two days seems very reasonable and in accordance with the average daily progress thereafter. Furthermore, the only “shelter” for the “distressed inhabitants” could only have been some of the many blockhouses (some writers have mentioned as many as twenty).30 No hint of any other habitation in the area has ever been recorded. The undated orders are explicit that “all the troops are to march this day,” meaning that other troops got under way at the same time as Brodhead’s regiment (the Eighth Pennsylvania), which he enumerates as consisting of eight line companies and a company of light infantry — in all nine companies total-

29 History of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania (Chicago, 1889), 2: 61.
ling 254 troops and including twenty-one sergeants. This is all of the recorded information we have. The same day’s orders, issued by McIntosh himself, state that Brodhead commanded also the militia contingents of Westmoreland and Bedford counties. How many troops accompanied Brodhead, and how many engaged in road building, we can only conjecture. It becomes evident, later, that other troops preceded Brodhead and succeeded in having Fort McIntosh’s construction well advanced before Brodhead’s arrival there. These other troops and the artillery must have marched by the Great Trail route, for there is no mention of their having passed Brodhead’s road builders. The orders dated at Fort Pitt, September 21 and 22, and inserted in the orderly book after the undated orders referred to above, before those dated September 23, are obviously issued by McIntosh himself and do not pertain to the road. Succeeding evidence shows that the general remained at Fort Pitt more than two weeks after Brodhead’s departure and maintained headquarters of the western army there.

After having projected the overall plan of the road and its destination, the details of the road’s location follow. Advancing from Sisney’s Farm to the west side of Chartiers Creek, through the bed of the small stream, it met the line of Steubenville Pike (Pa. Route 60) and, two miles farther, reached the summit of the ridge at present Moon Run (formerly Summitville).

Just beyond the hilltop village of Moon Run, the Beaver Grade Road (well marked) branches from the Steubenville Pike northward. Very soon the 1.6-mile descent begins into the valley of Montour Run. Traversing the valley, the old road, that was merely the topped dirt road, can be traced to the right of the modern concrete thoroughfare to where it crossed Montour Run below and to the right of the present viaduct. It passed under the approach to the viaduct and up the hill to the left of the present concrete road, which was cut through in a wide curve to reach the top with a uniform grade. The old road circled the point of the hill while climbing, thus being one of the few places where Brodhead’s road builders shelved into the sidehill to create a road bed. Of more than usual interest is the perspective view of the land at Montour Run. When John Hall warranted, surveyed, and patented (all in 1785) his “Stephen’s Grove” tract of 396.74 acres along the Brodhead Road, he was careful to preempt land on both sides of the sizable stream at the crossing. General Hand

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 433.
seems to have set a precedent for this shrewd practice. Then began the four-mile relatively level run to present Carnot (Sharon on old maps). In few places did the later road vary significantly from the original road. From Silver Lane to Carnot, the road is numbered L.R. 02319; from Carnot, it becomes Pa. 51, which here joins the route.

Three quarters of a mile beyond Carnot, the mile-long dip into the valley of Flaugherty Run begins. The modern road sweeps in two great loops in order to maintain a moderate grade for automobile travel. The old road ran in straight lines with two insignificant bends down a deep notch, or gully, but with a steep drop, while the present road circles the opposite side of the hill. This represents one of the greater modifications by the modern highways from the old Brodhead Road. This is very evident from comparison of modern maps with the old maps — the 1876 atlas plat of Allegheny County demonstrates the fact well. The land on both sides of the crossing of Flaugherty Run was warranted and surveyed, in 1785, by Thomas Vowell, his 3003⁄4-acre "Newington" tract, which he patented to (sold to) the Baron Frederick Eugene Francis, in 1786. Just one mile from the bottom of Flaugherty Run brought the road to the top of the plateau again, and fine, level driving today takes one to the Beaver County line. Smooth, slightly rolling country brings the traveler, four and a half miles farther to New Sheffield, presently incorporated within the city limits of Aliquippa. Suburban development has taken place here; homes, the fine Aliquippa Municipal Hospital, and a golf course are adjacent to a modern shopping center.

The entry in the orderly book, following those noted above, is headed "Camp Raccoon, Sept. 30," and signed by Brodhead. Since Raccoon Creek is not alluded to in any other place, and since Raccoon Creek, the dominating topographical feature of the area, approaches here the line of the road nearer than at any other sector, it seems logical to suppose New Sheffield the site of Camp Raccoon. A body of about 600 men, with their supply train, pack animals, beef cattle, wagons for tents and quartermaster's stores, would have occupied at least twenty acres. The people who later settled there referred to the place as "White Oak Flats."

Within 400 to 500 yards, on ground sloping toward the creek, existed a copious free-flowing spring of good water. The writer often

35 Williams, Bouquet's March to the Ohio, 70, following by computation from scale plat of camp.
drank the sweet water from this very spring, and a well-informed member of the pioneer Baker family imparted the information that, by ancient tradition, this was Brodhead's spring. The animals would have been corralled near the spring, below which a dam would have been constructed, draining into Trampmill Run, a nearby affluent of Raccoon Creek. On the slopes around the spring and the run would have grown good grass for the livestock. Within my memory, this spring supplied a large watering trough frequented by farmers' teams passing on the old clay road. It was opposite the old Raccoon United Presbyterian Church, as will be confirmed by a glance at the Hopewell Township plat in 1876 atlas of Beaver County. The church has since been supplanted by a new edifice, and the spring, much diminished since the destruction of the wooded areas, has been sewered to the creek. A broad concrete highway (Mill Street) covers all traces of the former primeval scene. The only surviving reminder of the past historic landmark is the name of Spring Street. Obviously, this construction is hypothetical and based upon oral historical evidence, but it appears to be a logical deduction.

The distance, 17.5 miles from Chartiers Creek to Camp Raccoon (assuming the location to be correct), having taken seven days, the road builders averaged exactly 2.5 miles per day through difficult terrain, heavily forested, with mile-long hills, and two creeks to ford or bridge. It is reasonable to suppose that Brodhead stayed several days at Camp Raccoon's pleasant location while the road cutting and grading crews worked back along the road through the later Scottsville and Fivepoints, then ahead until the project neared the river, when the whole of the camp equipment would have been packed up and all have marched over the finished road. No other campsites are mentioned in the orderly book.

A mile and a half from New Sheffield, the road swings a complete semicircle for .4 mile around and heading a deep depression, still pronouncedly a part of the landscape. This deviation has been a feature of all maps since that day. Half a mile farther, on the left, is seen the eminence of Bunker Hill. The George Baker log house, mentioned before, was a half mile west of the road (intersection of West Shaffer Road and the approach to the modern expressway, Pa. 60). This is the family that was captured by Indians in July

36 J. A. Caldwell, comp., Illustrated Historical Atlas of Beaver County, Pennsylvania (Condit, Ohio, 1876), Hopewell Township Plat.
1777, taken to Detroit, and who returned to rebuild their destroyed log house and produce numerous descendants in the area. The modern superhighway Pa. 51 leaves the track of the old road nearly half a mile before the Beaver Valley Mall is passed, while the old track turns at a slight angle to follow North Branch Road, then swings right to join the road marked Old Brodhead Road and, in 1.6 miles the superhighway Pa. 51 is again met.

There were no orders from September 30, signed by Brodhead, to October 8, issued by General McIntosh himself — at Fort McIntosh. As the orders, very obviously general orders, of October 8, are the first we have that were issued at the new headquarters (so headed), we may assume that this was officially the date of his transfer of headquarters from Fort Pitt. Such statements as, “The General requests the company of the gentlemen upon duty always at dinner. Field officer of the day to-morrow, Col. [John] Gibson, . . .” leave no doubt of the authority of the orders. The orders for the next day, October 9, begin: “As the two continental reg'ts are now together, the General orders them to be arranged by the field officers present . . . .” It is obvious that the two regiments mentioned, the Eighth Pennsylvania and the Thirteenth Virginia, had been separated. Had Colonel Gibson been present with Brodhead upon the road, he or his troops would have been involved in the orders; likewise, if General McIntosh had been present, he would have been issuing the orders. Brodhead mentioned two of his campsites, which are upon the road we call the Brodhead Road; the other persons traveled a different route. Furthermore, the general orders of October 8 do not mention Brodhead's regiment as having arrived at Fort McIntosh; the orders of October 9 do mention his regiment by inference, “the two continental reg'ts are now together.” Inferentially, McIntosh, Gibson, et al., arrived at least a day ahead of Brodhead.

We here reproduce a letter from McIntosh to Washington to emphasize the former's positive statement “. . . I opened a road.”

From Brigadier-General McIntosh.
Camp [Pittsburg], 27 April 1779.

Sir,

In obedience to your Excellency's desire, I am to inform you

37 Thwaites and Kellogg, Frontier Defense, 33-35; Walton, Center, 5, 6.
38 Walton, Center, 52, 57.
39 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 434, 435.
of the situation of the several posts west of the mountains, and will add the reasons for establishing them, which may enable you to judge the better of their propriety.

When I went there first, I found Fort Pitt, in the fork of Ohio, Fort Randolph, at the point or mouth of Great Kenhawa, three hundred miles down the river Ohio, and Fort Hand on Kiskiminitas, fixed stations, and garrisoned by Continental troops; and they are still kept up, as there is an independent company, raised upon the application of Colonel G. Morgan, for the sole purpose of maintaining each, and would not weaken the force I had to carry on the expedition. Besides these, there were thirty or forty other little stations, or forts, at different times garrisoned by militia, between Wheeling and Pittsburgh, upon the waters of the Monongahela, the Kiskiminitas, and in the interior parts of the settlements, . . .

. . . I had one general storehouse built, by a fatigue party, in the fork of the Monongahela River, where all loads from over the mountains are now discharged, without crossing any considerable branch of any river, and can be carried from thence, at any season, either by land or water, to Big Beaver Creek; to which place I opened a road, and built a strong post, with barracks and stores, by fatigue of the whole line, upon the Indian shore of the Ohio River, for the reception of all our stores, clear of all ferries and incumbrances, while our troops and supplies were coming up; and, in case I was disappointed in both, as I had many reasons to apprehend, it would secure a footing so far advanced into the enemy's country, be better prepared for another attempt, and show them we were in earnest.

So late as the 3d of November, Mr. Lockhart appeared at Beaver, with the cattle, extremely poor after driving them four or five hundred miles, and meeting with many obstacles, and could not slaughter them for want of salt. The same day I received a message from the savages, reproaching our tardiness, and threatening all their nations would join to oppose my progress to Detroit, at Sugar Creek, a few miles below Tuscarawas, where they intend giving me battle. Immediately upon this intelligence, I ordered twelve hundred men to be ready to march, though we had only four weeks' flour, which Mr. Lockhart fortunately brought with him, and left Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, with the rest of the troops, at Beaver, to escort and send after me the long-looked for supplies, so often and repeatedly promised by our Deputy Quartermaster-General, Mr. Steel, when they arrived, and, in the mean time, to finish the fort and stores.
We were fourteen days upon our march, about seventy miles, to Tuscarawas, as our horses and cattle tired every four or five miles from our first setting out, and were met there only by some Cochocking Delawares and Moravians, who informed me the Chippewas and Ottowas refused to join the other Indians, upon which their hearts failed them, and none came to oppose our march. But, unfortunately, a letter, by express, from Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, a little afterwards, informed me that no supplies came yet, and we had very little to expect during the winter, nor could he get the staff to account, or give any reasons for their neglect and deficiencies, which disappointed all my flattering prospects and schemes, and left me no other alternative than either to march back as I came, without effecting any valuable purpose, which the world would justly reflect upon me for, after so much expense, confirm the savages in the opinion the enemy inculcates of our weakness, and unite all of them, to a man, against us; or, to build a strong stockade fort upon the Muskingum, and leave as many men as our provision would allow, to secure it until the next season, and to serve as a bridle upon the savages in the heart of their own country; which last I chose, with the unanimous approbation of my principal officers, and we were employed upon it while our provision lasted; and, in the mean time, thought it necessary to make some proposals to all the Indians, if they came in a certain fixed time, to offer terms, and prevent our being molested.

I am the more particular in giving my reasons for building Fort Laurens, as Morgan, Steel, and their dependents, for want of other matter, have cried it down, as a designed slaughtering-pen, impossible to maintain; and endeavoured to prejudice the whole country against it, although the former laid the plan, that was afterwards adopted, for taking and keeping Detroit.

I always was, and still am, firmly of the opinion, that the only way to subdue Indians effectually, is to carry a chain of forts directly into their country, so near as to support each other, the last always having the most force, and keep possession as we go; and to make excursions at pleasure into their towns, when in force, and opportunity offers, or retreat to them when weak, ill-supplied, or in other cases of necessity, which will often happen in Indian wars, and they know well how to take advantage of . . . .

For any further particulars, respecting the western department, I will attend in person, and beg leave to refer you to my general orders, and private instructions and letters. I have the honor to be,
Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

LACHLAN McINTOSH. \(^{40}\)

Many historical writers have seemed to suppose that Brodhead built the road after he had succeeded to the command following the departure of McIntosh. In his comprehensive report to the commander in chief, McIntosh described how supplies could now be "carried... either by land or water, to Big Beaver Creek; to which place I opened a road, and built a strong post, with barracks and stores,... upon the Indian shore of the Ohio River... it would secure a footing so far advanced into the enemy's country, be better prepared for another attempt, and show them we were in earnest."

The foregoing description of McIntosh's (Brodhead's) road has been presented with such amount of detail because a documented representation of it has not (to our knowledge) previously been produced. All of the other important military roads that converged upon, or radiated from, Fort Pitt have been traced. The itinerary of this road needs to be understood in order to comprehend a picture of Fort Pitt's sphere of influence during the Revolutionary period. Returning to the Whiteside (so called) map for reference, it should be noted that the only important roads as late as 1817, on the west side of the Ohio River, were the "Post Road to Steubenville" and the "Road to Beaver."

The writer hopes that a personal note may be forgiven. I hiked the Brodhead Road, the Beaver County end, and traveled the rest of it by car, and parts afoot, numerous times when it was yet a dusty country road thick with the dust of a sultry summer's drought, and often, in the rainy seasons, deep in mud that reached the wheel hubs of wagons hauled by horses sunk above their knees and hocks in clayey mire. I was a young inspector under the engineering department of the Pennsylvania Department of Highways, assigned to the construction project that first paved the Brodhead Road. During that time, I noted many landmarks and features of the terrain that have clung to memory. Often the thought occurred, as the great concrete paving machines spread their mixtures, that the footprints and traditions of countless past generations were thereby being relegated to oblivion. In extenuation, let it be said that the location of the Brodhead Road has suffered less change in its original alignment and

\(^{40}\) Jared Sparks, *Correspondence of the American Revolution*, 4 vols. (Boston, 1853), 2: 284-89. Emphasis is author's.
grade (property lines were more respected in that day than at present) than is the case with any old road that can be mentioned. It is all in use, parts heavily traveled, today, except for the two very short sections mentioned at Chartiers Creek and at the approach to the Ohio River crossing.

General McIntosh’s orders continued to be issued from “Head Quarters, Fort McIntosh” until October 21, when we find headquar-
ters again at Fort Pitt, with general orders for that and the succeed-
ing day, October 22. On that day also, Brodhead issued orders from Fort McIntosh without the headquarters dateline but signing them as “Dan’l Brodhead, Col. Comdt” (Colonel Commandant), thus indicating that he had been left in command while the general went to Pittsburgh, headquarters transferring with the latter. On the twenty-sixth, Mc-
Intosh returned and again issued general orders at Fort McIntosh. 
His brief return to Fort Pitt was evidently for the purpose of rounding up several officers of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment who had re-
mained there without leave. These he peremptorily ordered down to Fort McIntosh under threats of having to face court-martial charges of being absent without leave.41

On November 4, after an all-day session of trials by courts-
martial, the army, except small detachments left as garrisons for Forts Pitt and McIntosh, marched out at 4:00 p.m. They must have marched very briskly, for a very steep hill must be climbed at a mile from the fort, and they marched six and three-quarters miles and eight perches (rods) before encamping. The sun would have set about 5:10 on November 4, in the approximate geographical position of the camp (longitude 80° 25’ west, 40° 42’ north latitude), with darkness ensuing within twenty minutes. At the regular rate of three miles per hour (which it is doubtful they could have maintained), they could barely have reached the campground by 6:15 or 6:30. Of course the guides, pioneers, and light infantry preceding the main body would have had campfires blazing to guide the marchers and would have built small dams in the stream to provide water for the animals and to fill the canteens and camp kettles for cooking the hungry soldiers’ meals.

When the little force of 1,20042 marched out to the Tuscarawas Road (Bouquet’s old road),43 McIntosh left Lieutenant Colonel

41 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 436-37.
42 McIntosh to Washington, Apr. 22, 1779, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 2: 287.
43 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 159, 171, 105n.
Richard Campbell in command at Fort McIntosh and Captain Henry Heath at Fort Pitt, subordinate to Campbell, as were the lesser forts and blockhouses up the Allegheny and scattered over Westmoreland County and the posts on the Ohio River as far down as Point Pleasant. McIntosh's instructions to Campbell were explicit, definite, and clear.

Gen. Lachlan McIntosh to Col. Richard Campbell.

Fort M'Intosh 3d Novm' 1778

Sir:

You are Immediately to take the charge and Command of this Post with all the Troops left here untill further orders.—you are to get the Fort Finished as soon as possible you can, the Gates are to be hung and secured, the under pinning finished, and the Bastions put in a proper State of defence in the first place, with the Tower in the front.—the Barracks may be finished the last.

As the want of our Stores and Provisions has detained me so long here, and obliges me late as it is now to proceed only with part of the army, you are therefore to exert your utmost endeavours in Collecting them with all possible dispatch into this Fort, for which it was first intended, and hurry the dift departments of the Staff in their several dutys, always getting a report and account from each of, their proceedings which you are to report to me regularly, Flour, Forage Salt and Whiskey are the princepal things we are in need of, and you are to Consult with the Commissarys and Q. Masters on the proper Methods to procure them on the best terms and Speediest manner which I must in my present hurry leave to your own directions.

You will receive reports every day agreeable to my orders,—from Legonier, Fort Wallace, Hand and Crawford all under the direction of Captain Morehead Covering Westmoreland County,—from Capt'n Heaths Company at Fort Pitt, which you are always to forward to me, and endeavour to get the same Regularly observed by those Commanding at the Stations below you upon the River Ohio Viz—Rardons Bottom, Hollidays Cove, and Fort Henry at Wheeling, which they have neglected for some time.—Any further Instructions that may be necessary shall be sent hereafter, but mu[s]t repeat my anxiety to have this post secured as soon as Possible

I am Sir Your Most Ob' Serv'

LachN M'Intosh
In compliance with Your Excellency's commands I now venture to offer my Sentiments on the Subject of Chastising the Savages in that part of Our Western world with which I am acquainted. To effect which it will be highly expedient to reduce the Garrison of Detroit situated at the Streights between the Lakes Erie & Huron, to Establish intermediate posts & to erect Garrisons one at Post St Vincents on the Ouabasche [Wabash] & the other at Kaskaskias on the Mississippi, by which means the Indians inhabiting the Northwest Side the Ohio will be effectually prevented from receiving any Supplys from British or other Emissary's—Three thousand men will be sufficient for the reduction of Detroit & for the purpose of establishing intermediate Posts, 1200 of which at least should be Regular Troops the others may be composed of Frontier men—The Expedition to be conducted by two different routes & a Junction to be formed at Rocher à Bout on the Miyamis [Maumee] River that empties itself into Lake Erie about six Leagues from the mouth of Said river—The rendezvous for the two armies I wou'd recommend to be at Fort Pitt & Kanhawa, the whole to be ready to march about the middle of July, before which time it wou'd be impracticable to march a Body of Troops thro' that country on account of the many Deep Guts (Creeks) none of which are taken notice of by Geographists, besides this country abounds with Rich Wet lands, called Crabb Apple Bottoms & upon approaching the Lakes one finds low Beachy Wet Grounds, which wou'd Impede & hinder the March of Troops at any time before the Month of July or August. The army from Fort Pitt consisting of 1500 should follow exactly the rout pursued by Gen' Boquet to Tuscarawas, on Muskingum Creek, from thence the Trading Path to Rocher à Bout, at which place the Junction shou'd be made & whence the distance to Detroit is not more than from 40 to 60 Miles, The Army from Point pleasant will cross the Ohio & march by the nearest Rout betwixt the waters of the Sciotha & Hockhocking rivers to the place of Junction. The distance from Kanhawa to Detroit is greater than from Fort Pitt to Detroit But I have two reasons to offer for recommending this plann—The Rendezvouz at the different places will be better accommodated to the troops of the extensive Frontier of Virginia than if they were confined to one for instance, the Large Supply's of Provisions Men & Bat horses & which may be drawn from Green Brier & the neighbouring counties shou'd assemble at Point Pleasant whilst on the other
hand, Sources to be drawn from Berkeley, Frederick, Hampshire & West Augusta wou'd assemble at Fort Pitt. The Artillery requisite for the reduction of Detroit shou'd be marched with the army from Fort Pitt.—Some light pieces such as are called Grasshoppers wou'd be exceedingly necessary to the Troops that march from Kanhawa. The assemblage of two such considerable Body's of Troops at such a distance from each other wou'd divide & distract the Councils of the Savages, Facilitate the enterprize & prevent the Indians from raising any Corn which was the Case in the Year -74. Previous to the marching these troops I wou'd recommend the embarkation of a Body of men not less than 750, in Batteaux to go down the Ohio for the purpose of Erecting Garrisons at Kaskaskias & Post Vincent this Step wou'd prevent the Kickaapou's, Piangeshaw's & Ouiochtennan [Ouiatanon] from assisting the others as they wou'd be afraid to leave their Habitations while so considerable a force was in their country—The Country of the Illinois will amply Supply double this number of men with provisions at a much more moderate rate than they cou'd be purchased in these States, in the Year 67 five hundred rations were Issued dayly to the Troops in Garrison at Fort Chartres & Kaskaskias, besides Large Qtys. exported from thence to New Orleans since which the French who inhabited the Vicinage of Detroit have removed to that Country from which I wou'd infer that Agriculture must have encreased & the Certainty of Subsisting an Army in that Country greater—Horses superior to any I have seen in any other part of America for the purpose of mounting light dragoons may be procured in that Country. they are a mixture of the Barbary & common American Wood horse. Generally 14 to 14½ hands high exceeding mettle-some & very Allert, they are used by the Natives in chasing ye' Buffaloe—Having reduced the Garrison of Detroit & established Gar- risons at the places before mention'd we will have it in our Power to prescribe such terms to the Savages as We may think proper—

I have the Honor to be with the Greatest respect Your Excell'y's Obedt Serv'

GEO GIBSON

13th 9h –78

44 Ibid., 164-65 and 170-72. These two letters are pertinent to the narrative at this point. McIntosh's instructions to Campbell are explicit; the letter of Colonel George Gibson, brother of Colonel John Gibson, totally supports McIntosh's strategy and judgment, and will later be referred to in vindication of the latter.
By far, the outstanding feature of these letters is the clear evidence they present that the fort construction did not detain McIntosh, as Brodhead later charged, but that he left it in a quite uncompleted state and only spent as much time as he did, in order to occupy the troops while the transport and supply services were completely stymied. This puts an entirely different face upon matters pertaining to the building of Fort McIntosh and the detention of troops there. It shows Brodhead's later statements to be pure prevarications. It is interesting that the main gate was not yet hung, the gateposts not having been erected. The bastions were not completed, nor had the barrack buildings. This was a great responsibility for McIntosh to have delegated, but he must have known his man. Campbell's conscientious activity and reliability is shown by his frustration, shared with McIntosh, from the ineffectiveness of the deputy quartermaster general and the broken promises of the commissary agents. Nevertheless, Campbell finished the barracks and the tower and hung the great gates of the fort.

Two hundred years later (less two years), the footers, "the under pinning" of the gateposts mentioned by McIntosh, are the object of a search by archeologists. More than two years of patient and meticulous earth turning and exploratory work has accomplished some interesting and significant results at the fort site.

The singular feature of this defensive work, although not unique, was its construction of logs laid horizontally, instead of the stockade of logs set vertically, with which we are most familiar. The character of the soil prevailing in the locality of the site evidently influenced the decision of the builders to employ this type of construction. The area of the Beaver town site, being an extended plain, is composed of a sandy, pebbly, and gravelly soil interspersed with smooth rocks suggestive of an ancient riverbed of past geologic ages. Such soil would not have supported a palisade as well as a clayey soil well-rammed around the butts of the logs, for such soil is not found. An even more cogent reason may have been the urgency of time. Barrack buildings and storehouses, elongated and inclosing three sides of the site, were built utilizing the outer walls of the buildings as outer defense walls, thus precluding the need for an encircling stockade, especially with the addition of corner bastions that extended outward beyond the line of the walls, so that, with loopholes for firing, the outer walls could be swept by flanking fire upon potential attackers. This was only common sense and was exactly what was done in the case of nearly all western fortified posts. Fort Clatsop, established by
Lewis and Clark in the present state of Oregon, and Fort Bridger in Wyoming were constructed in precisely this manner. The roofs were "shed roofs," slanting inward only. The poles supporting the roofs, over which bark was laid to form imperfect shingling, were extended outward to overhang the wall at a high angle and sharpened at the ends. This formed a row of pickets at an angle over which an attacker could not climb and was known as "fraising." This method was commonly used in defending earthen parapets, in which case the fraising would have been sharpened stakes driven into the earth embankment.

All that was needed for foundation for the logs was a row of flat rocks laid on the ground, or imbedded as the case might be, for leveling and supporting the bottom logs. Hence, the archeologists found, only a foot beneath the surface, rows of flat rocks forming the complete outline of the fort, with corner bastions outlined in the same manner. The dimensions as presently indicated were of the order of 350 feet in length along its longest side, next to the river bank. The outlines of the two-story tower with overhang, known to have flanked the gate, and the footers of the great posts that supported the gate have not been located — they are possibly beneath the paving of the contiguous street. Fire-stained hearthstones of the kitchen and barracks indicate the soldiers' quarters.

For present purposes, this brief notice is all that is necessary for our running survey of the problems of the headquarters command of the Western Military District. A scientifically composed archeological report will be written in the future, detailing this interesting “dig” into history.

The army had progressed only fifty miles in ten days and was bogged down in snow when McIntosh expressed his concern in a letter to Colonel Campbell at Fort McIntosh, written from his snowbound camp on Sandy Creek on November 13: "This is the 10th day I have been upon my march, I am not 50 miles from your fort yet owing to the scandelous Pack Horses that were imposed upon me, . . . above one half of them tires every day before we Travel two or three miles, and the woods is Strewed with those that have given out and dyed. I have but Sixteen or Seventeen Miles to Tuscarawas yet I much fear I shall not be able to carry our Provisions and Stores that length."
He put his superintendent of packhorses under arrest and ordered Campbell to do the same regarding his superintendent; they were tried by courts-martial and acquitted of charges.\textsuperscript{47}

In anticipation of the militia’s enlistments running out, McIntosh had written orders to the various county lieutenants to send 200 men each to Tuscarawas, depending upon the ample food and forage supplies promised by the commissaries. The council of Virginia, however, advised the governor to countermand the orders, due to the inclement weather and the impossibility of supplying the troops at that time of year. Colonel Campbell wrote that there were only sixty-two days’ supply of food west of the mountains.\textsuperscript{48}

On November 8, the army crossed the Tuscarawas branch of the Muskingum and arrived at the very spot where, fourteen years before, Colonel Bouquet had built a small stockade to guard his supplies for his homeward march. Adjutant Robert McCready recorded in his journal: “. . . we Encamped . . . and Inclosed the place where Col° Boqueat had Formerly erected a Block house.”\textsuperscript{49} McIntosh wrote that he had “erected a good strong Fort . . . upon the Indian side of Ohio below Beaver Creek . . . and another upon the Muskingum River, where Col° Bocquette had one formerly near Tuscarawas [Indian town].”\textsuperscript{50}

The spot is .7 mile south of the small town of Bolivar, Tuscarawas County, Ohio, and 2 miles 40 perches (rods) south of the historic crossing place of the Great Trail from Pittsburgh to Detroit. Radiating from that point were all of the important trails in this part of the continent: the Cuyahoga trail and the Muskingum Valley trail (that ran down along the river and linked with other trails westward and southwest). The Bouquet road followed the traders’ path (a ridge-top Indian dry trail) to the forks of the Muskingum with the Walhonding. There the Bouquet route converged with the Muskingum Valley trail, mentioned above, and the Walhonding, passed several Indian towns, continued up the Kokosing, and met the Olentangy and Scioto trails up to Pluggy’s Town or downstream to the Salt Lick Town, opposite Columbus (destroyed by Colonel Crawford in 1774).

Thus we view the strategic crossing place at Tuscarawas as the historic crossroads of travel for red and white men, for warriors, mis-

\textsuperscript{48} Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Advance}, 174.
\textsuperscript{49} Williams, “An Orderly Book of McIntosh’s Expedition, 1778,” \textit{WPHM} 43: 16.
sionaries, traders, or coureurs de bois of a large sector of the continent. The final tribute to the importance of this landmark was its elevation to fame as an anchor point of the Greenville Treaty line, concluded August 3, 1795, the line of demarcation for many years between the Indian land and the United States. The deeply-worn track leading down to the river may still be seen. No early landmark location is more deserving of a monument than this point of history and travel associated with all the great names in the annals of the west. It is situated near the southeast corner of Section 25 of Township 9 Range 9, in Tuscarawas County. One reason for being thus specific is that the new (1969) United States topographical (7.5 minute) map has changed the direction of the treaty line to strike the river some distance upstream from the location shown on the former 15-minute map. Be it remembered that the treaty stipulations did not specify any bearings of lines, but specifically designated the line to run "to the crossing place above Fort Lawrence [Laurens]." The best detail of the area is set forth in the official publication of the Ohio cooperative Topographical Survey, Final Report, vol. 3. It is titled Original Ohio Land Subdivisions, written and compiled by C. E. Sherman, Ohio's representative and engineer in this admirable topographical undertaking. This historic place is worthy of an appropriate historical monument on the spot. The west side of the river is Tuscarawas County, the east side Stark County.

The location of McIntosh's Fort Laurens was actually about 200 feet farther south from the site formerly fixed by earlier local tradition, revealed when excavation was undertaken in 1972-1973. The location of Bouquet's fort was measured by engineer Hutchins at that time as two miles and forty perches below the crossing. Understandably, McIntosh selected new ground nearby. The profligate Tory trader, Nicholas Cresswell, visiting the place in September 1775, with his Indian concubine, had found Bouquet's structure in ruins.

McIntosh's whole force started immediately to cut timbers and to erect a stockade, 240 feet from the tip of the angle of one bastion to another — a square fort with barrack and storehouse buildings within

51 C. E. Sherman, Original Ohio Land Subdivisions (Columbus, 1925), 95, 71.
52 Ibid., 95, 108.
53 Thomas I. Pieper and James B. Gidney, Fort Laurens, 1778-79: The Revolutionary War in Ohio (Kent, Ohio, 1976), 87.
54 Smith, An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 13.
Thomas Hutchins plotted this map from his survey of Bouquet's 1764 road to the Muskingum. It clearly depicts the road climbing by the notch in the northeastern side of the hill to reach the ridge still retraced by the Tuscarawas Road. This map was first published in *WPHM*, vol. 42.
These surveyor's notes are those of an engineer who marched with McIntosh in 1778, and locate on the ground the course of the road from the gates of Fort McIntosh to its junction with Bouquet's road at the Twomile Run crossing. Thenceforward, by the records, McIntosh retraced Bouquet's Road to the Muskingum. For an explanation of this method of surveyor's field note recording, see WPHM 43 (Mar. 1960): 10.
This Plan, that had been positively known in time that Sir William Howe was to have come up the Chesapeake in 1777, this might possibly have been the best Plan of Co-operation for the northern Army. Any Plan having little doubt that had Lord Cornwallis only remained where he was ordered; or even after his coming into Virginia had not operations there been covered by a superior water Fleet as was promised: Vermont would have joined us, and thus three several Expeditions would have taken place and have had a fair & complete Trial. Such in short was the Offensive Plan had formed. Should be reinforced as the Minister promised me, I could have been at Liberty to employ the Troops under Major General Phillips as I intended. It was to have opened early in June with an Attempt upon the Thriving public Stores and the infant Continental Bank just then forming at Philadelphia, and it have proceed afterwards to the other Points in Succession as Success or
Encouragement might suggest.

But if the Reinforcement should happen to be

so long delayed it was best the Commander-in-Chief's
determination to leave only a small Corps covered by

Hence in Elizabeth Court, mostly to afford shelter to the

Eight Cruizers in the Chesapeake, and yield some title

Proclamation to the few Loyalists of those parts; Which (as

being too insignificant an Object) he was sure the Enemy

would never attempt unless they should happen to be

superior by Sea. After this it was proposed to assemble

our whole Force at New-York and remain upon the

Defensive; as the Commander in Chief was then fully

suspended, and it had since been apprehended that he was

right) that Rebellion in America was just then at its

last gasp, and a very few more Moments escape from Disastr

on our side promised as every good Object of the most decisive
its inclosure. Working on restricted rations was severe on the workers, and McIntosh was obliged to start the return march in a half foot of snow on December 8, after a morning of courts-martial, with only a two-days' allowance of flour. Colonel Gibson and 150 of his Thirteenth Virginia Regiment were left to garrison and to finish the stockade. Gibson reported on December 21 that he "had almost finished Setting up and Ramming the pickets . . . I think I can bid them defiance." He sent Samuel Sample (the Pittsburgh innkeeper who was serving as deputy quartermaster general with McIntosh) to "Coochaucking" (Coshocton), under the protection of Chief Killbuck, to purchase provisions and forage, also deerskins for making clothing for the garrison. He returned, but underwent an attack on himself and his helpers. One soldier was killed, scalped, and Peter Perchment (long a resident of Fort Pitt area, later of Wilkins Township) was badly wounded.56

In January, Captain John Clark was successful in getting in to Fort Laurens with some supplies and clothing, but on the return was ambushed, several men killed and wounded, and, most disastrously, the man with a packet of letters captured. The Haldimand Papers reveal the letters' importance to the enemy. A transcript of part of a letter of Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton, British commandant at Niagara, to General Haldimand, signifies the importance to the British of this windfall.

NIAGARA 24th March 1779

Sir—I received a Letter from Capt Lernoult some days ago, a copy of which I take the liberty of laying before your Excellency &c. The 3d of February Simon Girtie Interpreter who was employed by Lieut Governor Hamilton to watch the enemies Motions near Fort Pitt arrived with Strings from the Six Nations, Delawares, Chawanese and Wyandots & informed him that 2500 men commanded by a General McIntosh advanced from Fort Pitt late last fall as far as Tuscarawa, three days march from St Dusky with 6 pieces of Canon, the largest only a Six pounder that they have built a Stockade Fort there after which the main body retired back to Beaver Creek leaving 250 men in that Fort under a Colonel Gibson. Beaver Creek is 28 miles from Fort Pitt where they have a strong fort and a Depot of Provisions.

That he was informed the main body was to move towards Detroit the latter end of March & that when he left St Dusky part of the

56 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 186, 190, 224, 225.
Six Nations Delawares Shawanese &c to the number of 7 or 800 men were assembled at the upper Town, determined to strike the fort at Tuscarawa & drive of & destroy the cattle & if any of the main army attempted to go to their assistance they were resolved to attack them in the night & to distress them as much as possible.

Capt Lernoult writes me that he has done everything in his power to encourage them, has sent them a large supply of amunition & cloathing also presents to the Chiefs Warriors . . . .

. . . corresponds with Girtie & further that some few Wyandot & Mingoes surprised three Virginians going Express from Tuscarawa towards Fort Pitt killed two of them & brought the third a Prisoner to St. Dusky with a Pacquet of Letters that the Chief there opened the Letters and had them read to him by a white man.

That it appears by a Letter of Col. Gibson Commandant at Tuscarawa to a Capt. O'Hara [Heath] at Fort Pitt, that he was apprised of the Indians design to attack that Fort, requested Provisions to be sent him & a part of the army without delay having little provisions & only 100 men fit for duty in the place. This Capt. Lernoult says is a lucky hitt, which the Indians will (he makes no doubt) take advantage of.

(Signed) MASON BOLTON.57

The employment of Simon Girty by his new British commanders as interpreter and spy was proving rewarding for the enemy; he it was who led the ambushing party who captured the letters. The Wiandots, Shawnees, Senecas, and a few dissident Delawares did attack and besieged Fort Laurens but caused little appreciable damage. They returned to Detroit about March 12, reporting that “the Rebels have considerably reinforced the Fort at Tuscarawas.” 58 Had the British and their savage allies known the truth concerning conditions within the little stockade, the outcome might have been very different. The starving garrison was reduced to one-half a biscuit per man per day and soon to the extremity of broiling their moccasins, having first washed them, as well as old steer hides left by the Indians to dry and

57 Haldimand Papers, B 96-1: 254, in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Colls., 9: 427-28. The Haldimand Papers, including the letters relating to the Fort Pitt, Niagara, and Detroit frontiers, 1776-1783, have been quite thoroughly culled and published completely in the above publication, vols. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 19.

58 Ibid., 10: 333-34.
decay. There are no reports of Washington’s troops at Valley Forge during the previous winter having suffered as severely and cruelly as did Gibson’s Virginians at Fort Laurens.

Gibson was able to send a messenger at night to Fort McIntosh with news of his dire situation. General McIntosh, gathering scarce provisions, with 300 Continentals from his own fort and Fort Pitt, started on March 19 to relieve Fort Laurens. As stated above, the besiegers had withdrawn. The overjoyed garrison greeted their rescuers with a saluting musketry fire, the frightened packhorses stampeded, and the precious provisions were scattered over a wide area. Retrieving as much as possible of the loss and taking Gibson’s harried garrison with him, McIntosh left 100 men under the command of Major Frederick Vernon of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment to hold Fort Laurens. Vernon’s father and brother had joined the British, but the major was a hero in the American cause and later served in Wayne’s campaign in 1794.

There was another threatened attack on the fort, but no shots were fired, and there was only an inconsiderable force of eighty Shawnees, Mingoes, and Wiandots, besides a few Delawares. George Morgan wrote simply, “It is well known that the Delawares saved Fort Laurens.” He meant that they dissuaded the others by bearing news of the French-American alliance and the news that Major Hamilton, the British commandant, had been captured by Colonel George Rogers Clark. Another attack was made upon an ensign and a sentinel, both of whom were killed and scalped.

As suddenly as he had disappeared, Morgan reappeared at Fort Pitt on January 2, after an absence of over eight months, during which time the army in the west was entirely dependent on his performance of duty to save them from starvation. His biographer does not make any excuses for him, but states candidly that Morgan spent much of the time negotiating with Virginia representatives in Congress relative to the ratification of the Indian grant and otherwise promoting that project, also spending much time in improving Prospect, his

60 Ibid., 256.
61 Ibid., 257.
63 Morgan Papers, 179, CLP.
64 Kellogg, *Frontier Advance*, 295.
65 Ibid., 196.
model farm located at Princeton, New Jersey.66

Morgan immediately made a great flurry and show of reporting to the commander at Fort McIntosh "necessary Information in Writing" relative to "a desire to make you acquainted with the state of the Purchasing Commissaries Department..." and concluding with the negative statement, "...to which I have now to add that none of my Purchasers have any other Provisions on hand to be delivered over to the Issuing Commissaries." With incredible arrogance he added, "...the most speedy and explicit Orders are necessary to prevent the worst of consequences."67 This must have rankled General McIntosh, who had turned every stone and tried every expedient to obtain a little food for his suffering soldiers.

Morgan then, in bad taste, sought to ingratiate himself with Colonel John Gibson, who was at the time held in the viselike jaws of the dilemma that was the struggle for life between the savage tomahawks — or worse — of the besiegers and death by starvation. Gibson had been requested by the Indians themselves to be Indian agent "appointed to have charge of all matters between you & us...we are convinced that he will make our common good his chief study, & not think only how he may get rich."68 Morgan now made Gibson an offer to obtain a buyer for his 1692 shares in the Indian grant69 (Gibson had also been a trader who had suffered loss). Gibson disgustedly rejected the offer.

Next, Morgan wrote the Delaware chiefs, regaling them with the news that their old father, the French king, would soon be fighting on the side of the Americans and would be glad to welcome them. He urged the Indians to send a delegation to Congress, guaranteeing them safe conduct personally escorted by himself. He himself had soon returned to his farm (by the second of February), leaving their escort problem to others. When the chiefs arrived at Philadelphia, a message awaited them to proceed to Princeton.70 They were taken to Middlebrook, then Washington's headquarters, where the commander in chief formally addressed them.71 Then they proceeded to Congress, in Philadelphia. At Prospect, three Indian youths were left to be educated at the expense of Congress in the traditional and prescribed American (English) style. One was the son of Chief Killbuck, the younger

66 Savelle, Morgan, 182.
67 Morgan Papers, CLP.
68 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 144.
69 Jan. 5, 1779, Morgan Papers, CLP.
70 Jan. 15, 1779, ibid.
71 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 15: 53-56.
(Gelelemend), his half-brother, and George White Eyes, son of the now deceased Captain White Eyes. Their academic careers are interesting but not within the sphere of this monograph.

Mention of the untimely death of this worthy noble character has been purposely delayed until this part of the narrative. White Eyes was a sachem of the Turkey tribe of the Delawares. He accompanied McIntosh to the Tuscarawas, and was by him commissioned a lieutenant colonel. At some stage of the march, he mysteriously died and was reported a victim of smallpox. The editor of Frontier Advance and others have credited an account by Boyd Crumrine, a careful historian, in his History of Washington County, Pennsylvania, that White Eyes was treacherously slain by a white man, and the fact carefully concealed to avert an Indian war. The basis of the statement was a letter said to have been written by George Morgan, dated May 12, 1784, to a member of Continental Congress. Morgan also had mentioned the occurrence to Charles Thompson, secretary of Congress. No copy of the letter has been found, although Crumrine is conceded to have been a trustworthy historian who had access to Morgan papers then in the hands of members of the Morgan family living in Washington County. Morgan is quoted as writing, “I have carefully concealed and shall continue to conceal from young White Eyes the manner of his father’s death . . . .” George White Eyes was an apt student and was well prepared to enter Princeton College and eventually returned to his people of the Delaware nation.

On the other hand, it would seem that Morgan originally had a sincere desire and determination to perform his duty conscientiously, as indicated by the four letters which he wrote from Skipton (Old-town, Maryland, on the Potomac River), dated on Christmas Day of 1778, to three of his field purchasing agents, and another to Ephraim Blaine, then deputy commissary general of the Continental army. Within a week, he would cross the mountains to Fort Pitt in the winter weather of that year, 1778-1779, recorded as more severe than the former winter suffered by the army at Valley Forge. The following letter which Morgan wrote to Colonel Archibald Steel, deputy quartermaster general in the western department, may be cited as proof of his earlier zeal in the service.

72 Savelle, Morgan, 196-97.
York Town, June 25, 1778.

To Col. Archibald Steel

Dear Sir,

I must beg & entreat the favor of you not to fail in supplying the Horses & Waggons I have so often & earnestly applied to you for, for the transportation of Flour &c. to Fort Pitt . . . . if you fail to comply to the full of my requests after the promises you have made to me, I must & will resign my Appointment to Congress the moment I am satisfied I cannot serve them as they ought to be served . . . .

Yours &c

It would seem that Steel was the root of much of the trouble at Fort Pitt and the other posts, for the evidence shows that he made commitments on the basis of which both McIntosh and Morgan formed their plans — promises on which he failed to deliver. Both Colonel Campbell at Fort McIntosh and Captain Heath at Fort Pitt quarreled with Steel on the same grounds, and Heath threatened to arrest him. McIntosh undertook the Tuscarawas expedition trusting in the strength of Steel's promises to deliver supplies of provisions, of which there was only a sixty-two day supply at the time. A reading of the correspondence conveys the implication that both Morgan and Steel, as well as some of the county lieutenants, resented receiving orders. The inborn independent nature of Americans was not ready for that yet. They expected requests and mild exhortations.

In the viewpoint of modern military practice, General McIntosh's commands were always courteous, even mild requests, and were usually accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for and necessity of the object to be attained. Even Brodhead, his superior's severest critic, no sooner attained his coveted command, than he issued peremptory commands unreasonably dictatorial.

At this point in time, in its inscrutable manner of procedure, Congress decided to extend General Washington's power and sphere of influence to include the western department. The reader may remember that hitherto Congress insisted upon administration of both executive and legislative functions. It now began to understand the fallacy of that method of operation — also that body began to trust Washington with more military authority, soon to be broadened into

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74 June 25, 1778, Morgan Papers, CLP.
75 Williams, "Fort Pitt and the Revolution on the Western Frontier," *WPHM* 59: 274.
full dictatorship. It has been one of the greatest satisfactions of our free democratic system that Washington used the power with moderation and returned the authority to Congress when the emergency had passed. Congress expressed its will and its confidence on Saturday, January 23, 1779, thus:

"Resolved, That the Commander in Chief be authorized and directed to superintend the Operations from Fort Pitt, for the Security of the Western frontiers and the Annoyance of the Enemy; and from time to time to give such orders respecting the same as he shall judge expedient.

"Resolved, that Commander in Chief do in future consider the Northern Department to be equally under his Direction and Superintendence with the other Departments respectively; and that he establish such Posts, and station the Troops in such manner in the said Departments respectively, as the good of the Service may from time to time require." 76

Washington gave notice to McIntosh, in his letter of January 31, 1779, that his authority had been extended by Congress to direct all military operations, and that the Board of War had transferred to him all papers and correspondence concerning operations in the western department as well as in all of the thirteen states. In the letter he laid down precise instructions for obtaining full information on all land and water routes, the topography and terrain conditions at the different seasons of the year, vulnerability to enemy attacks, by all courses and directions leading into enemy territory whether to Detroit or Presq' Isle or the Indian towns on the upper Allegheny River. McIntosh was to accumulate any stores and supplies and to prepare any boats possible for an expedition, hopefully to be undertaken in the coming spring. 77 Information of this intent was the purport of General McIntosh's letter to Washington dated April 27, 78 printed above. In his letter of Brodhead's appointment, March 5, the commander in chief repeated his orders for preparation of supply depots and stressed the necessity of keeping his plans flexible. Brodhead, however, presupposed the thrust to be aimed up the Allegheny. 79

McIntosh's distressing personal problems need mentioning, since they influenced the trend of events in the western department. We have not noticed that Major Lachlan Mckintosh, Jr. (sometimes

78 Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 2: 284-89.
79 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 287.
Mackintosh; he used the old spelling, as did many members of the family, and as had his father until 1776), ranking as captain in the Georgia Line at the age of twenty, had been commissioned by Washington brigade inspector and promoted by his father to deputy adjutant general in the western department.\textsuperscript{80} The elder McIntosh, aggrieved by the failure of all of his projects through the delinquency of supply and quartermaster functions, was further depressed by news of the loss of all his property, his home and plantation buildings burned, all his livestock driven off, his beloved wife and five young children taken captives with the city of Savannah, and the lovely and accomplished Sarah, his wife, forced to do menial work — even manual labor — to support her children. The British Royal American general, Augustine Prevost, refused her a parole.\textsuperscript{81} At this juncture, the humane and alert Thomas Jefferson, governor of Virginia, sent money to alleviate Mrs. McIntosh's shocking situation.\textsuperscript{82} (Governor Jefferson's fine letter and Mrs. McIntosh's reply, with thanks, are herewith reprinted.) McIntosh wrote Washington that all of his possessions and all he had held dear in the world were either totally destroyed or in the enemy's hands. He desired a transfer to an area of action with the main army or nearer to his interests.\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{flushright}
To Sarah McIntosh
Richmond Virginia March 23d. 1781
\end{flushright}

Madam

I do myself the pleasure of communicating to you a resolution of the General Assembly of this State which was formed in Consequence of an application and Information from the Officers of the Virginia Line in Captivity in Charlestown. The Executive have ordered ten thousand Pounds of our present money to be paid into the Hands of Colo. Russel for your use.

They will be happy in being the further Instruments for admin-


\textsuperscript{81} Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Advance}, 251; Lawrence, "General Lachlan McIntosh and His Suspension from Command," 122-33.


\textsuperscript{83} McIntosh to Laurens, president of Congress, Mar. 9, 1779, in Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Advance}, 251.
istering to your relief according to the wish of the General Assembly, and the poor abilities of the State and therefore beg the favour of you to communicate to them any Circumstances of your present Situation which you may think proper to confide to them and which may be a ground work for their future Discharge of this agreeable Duty. I am &c. T.J.

FROM SARAH McINTOSH

Mecklenburgh County Aprl 23rd. 1781.

Sir

I am extremely obliged to your Excellency for your very polite letter, and I return my most cordial thanks to the state of Virginia for the seasonable releif which my distressed famely has lately received thro your Excellency.

I hope notwithstanding my Famely is numerous and small, that the ten thousand pounds which your excellency was pleased to send by Colo. Russell, will contribute to Clothe and support us for some time; as I mean to consult all possible Oeconomy in its expenditure. I have the honour to be with very great respt, Sir, yr. excys. most obt. & most hl. St., Sarh. McIntosh

In due course, Washington wrote companion letters to both McIntosh and Brodhead, dated March 5, 1779. To the former, he gave orders to relinquish command of the department to Brodhead, to turn over all papers to him, and to report to general headquarters of the main army, then at Middlebrook, New Jersey. To the latter (Brodhead), he referred to his former orders to build up depots of supplies, prepare boats and other equipment, and to transfer western department headquarters back to Fort Pitt. Although Washington stressed the necessity of keeping his plans flexible, Brodhead presupposed the thrust into the Indian country to be intended up the Allegheny.

During April 1779, scattered Indian attacks were reported in the general neighborhood of Fort Pitt; a woman's courageous escape after killing an Indian and wounding a second, on the Cheat River near

85 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 193-96.
86 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 289.
present Morgantown, West Virginia; the capture of the miller's son at Washington's Mill, near Perryopolis; four men killed upon the Forbes Road en route to Hannas Town; an Indian killed near James Cavet's (Cavett's) mill, at Sewickley Settlement, Madison, in Hempfield Township, Westmoreland County; a man and his wife killed and scalped on Brush Run, near Harrison City and Bouquet's Bushy Run battlefield. 87

Meantime, news of Clark's capture of Fort Vincennes with Major Henry Hamilton had been trickling in to Fort Pitt, at first through Indian sources, then from Major Vernon at Fort Laurens, then from the Reverend John Heckewelder at Coshocton, 88 and finally official reports with a copy of Clark's journal which Brodhead immediately dispatched to Washington. Brodhead wrote other letters abhorring Clark's killing of Indians who were his prisoners, but immediately condoning the act as "a fate they have long deserved." We shall see what Brodhead did under similar circumstances. 89

In many of his letters to Washington, Joseph Reed, president of the Pennsylvania Executive Council, and to others, Brodhead, after succeeding to the command, wrote deprecatory statements, most of which were unfounded or contrary to the facts. Previous to that time, he had written to Washington alleging McIntosh's unpopularity among the officers. Washington was constrained to remind Brodhead, so to speak, that popularity is by no means a prime requisite of a good officer and that "If there are discontents . . . the motives of them must be known before their merits can be judged of." 90 Our readers may well consider that, in our more recent history, such commanders as Patton or MacArthur certainly were not universally beloved by their subordinates.

No sooner did Brodhead assume command than his letters took on the tone of those of his predecessor — lack of supplies, and the services of supply uncooperative: "Col. Steel wrote me some time ago that he was about to procure a proper Supply of stores for this department, but I am still ignorant of . . . what I am supposed to expect . . . I wish I could be informed what is to be expected from Col. Steel

87 Ibid., 292, 299-300.
88 Ibid., 258, 295, 298.
89 Pa. Archives, 1st ser., 12: 111-12, 120-24; J. D. Barnhart, Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark in the American Revolution (Crawfordsville Ind., 1951), 180-89; Consul Willshire Butterfield, History of the Girtys (Cincinnati, 1890), 72, 86.
90 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 119-20.
and Morgan, for the troops are in great need of supplies." 91 His claim seems unjustifiable that he had urged the necessity of supplies and that "no preparations had yet been thought of by the General . . . until March last, when I was sent for . . . . I urged the necessity of supplies to subsist the Troops." 92 It is too much to believe that the commander of a brigade of two Continental regiments and another of militia could have been ignorant of the dearth of provisions and the cause of the deficiency. In the light of the foregoing evidence of McIntosh's efforts to procure needed supplies, Brodhead's statement must be an absolute untruth. It is surely the height of arrogance for a man of his station and rank to state that he did not know of the shortage of provisions and rations until March, then that he had finally emphasized the point of their necessity — the first time that anything had been done! It is too much to believe that as second in command, Brodhead did not know the true state of affairs relative to the building of Fort McIntosh, when he wrote to General Nathanael Greene that the fort's construction "kept at least 1,000 Militia in the field who might have been better employed putting in their fall crops." He must certainly have known that the packhorses had not arrived and that enough food provisions were not yet there to support the troop movement. The same is true of his statement to General John Armstrong characterizing Fort McIntosh as a "romantic Building . . . built by the hands of hundreds who would rather have fought than wrought." 93

Washington's approval of the advanced fort in the Indian country was expressed on numerous occasions and reiterated in instructions to Brodhead, "the post at Tuscarawas is therefor to be preserved . . ." and " . . . Fort Laurens . . . and Fort McIntosh appear to be material posts; and I could wish them to be sufficiently garrisoned and the former well supplied with provision that it may not be liable to fall through want in case of attack before it can be relieved." 94 This was in reply to Brodhead's criticism of McIntosh's judgment. Washington knew, through his active spy system (later to be discussed) that these two forts kept the British command in the west off balance. The

92 Ibid., 12: 110.
93 Ibid., 12: 110, 118.
94 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 421, 481.
Haldimand Papers supply ample evidence of the fact.95

The plan of McIntosh, as reported to Washington and independently supported by George Gibson's plan, both reprinted above, received prior justification in a letter of General John Forbes to William Pitt, June 11, 1758. His strategy, therein defined, asserted: "I am . . . under the Necessity of having a stockaded Camp with a Blockhouse & cover for our Provisions, at every forty Miles distance . . . I shall have a constant Supply Security for my provisions, by moving them forward from Deposits to Deposite as I advance . . . I shall have a sure retreat, leaving the road always practicable to penetrate into those back Countries . . . " 96 Brodhead himself wrote Washington, after former deprecatory remarks, that "the Loss or evacuation of Fort Laurens would greatly encourage the Enemy . . . and discourage the Inhabitants." 97

By April 8, headquarters of the western department had been transferred back to Fort Pitt, for from there Brodhead issued a communique addressed to the "Chiefs of the Wyandot Nation." 98 This tribe of the Huron Nation had been a leader of attacks upon Fort Laurens and the frontiers under the influence of Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit. Having seen the redoubtable Hamilton captured by the Virginians under Clark and having received the intelligence that their old friends, the French, would soon be actively participating on the side of the Americans, the Wiandots seemed anxious to make amends for their hostile deeds and wished to form an alliance with the Americans. About April 1, the Wiandot Half King addressed the Delaware sachems requesting them to intercede for them for peace with the Americans.99 They warned that the British Captain Henry Bird was gathering forces of whites and Indians at Sandusky, with four pieces of artillery, intended to destroy the stockade at Fort Laurens, after which the Indians were to massacre the garrison. The campaign came to nothing, however, when the

95 Many examples of British apprehensions are found in the correspondence, reprinted in full, in the Haldimand Papers, B 99: 71 and B 96-1: 254, in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Soc. Colls., 9: 410-12 and 427-29. These letters tell of expectations of rebel attacks from Fort Laurens — only three days' march from Sandusky — as well as Indian unrest because of inability and lack of means to fulfill Major Hamilton's promises of supplies and military aid.


97 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 272.

98 Ibid., 278-79.

99 Ibid., 265.
Wiandots, Delawares (those who had joined the British), and some Shawnees deserted the British, due to the news of Hamilton's capture, also as a result of the Bowman expedition from Kentucky against the Shawnee towns of Ohio, and possibly by Colonel Evan Shelby's expedition down the Tennessee River about this time. Shelby's activity is mentioned because of his connection with the Pittsburgh area in 1759, when he cut the original track of Bouquet's short road, leaving the Forbes Road four miles west of Hannas Town. The road then passed through the valley of Turtle Creek, traversed the ridgetop Greensburg Pike route to rejoin the Forbes Road between Braddock Avenue and the Point Breeze section of Penn Avenue.

The Delaware Council addressed long records of conciliatory speeches received from tribes farther to the west and northward, over the lakes, the Wiandots (Hurons), Tawas (Ottawas), Chibways (Chippewas), Potawatomen (Potawatomis), and from the Overhill Cherokees (from Chote, on the Tennessee River, in eastern Tennessee). All wished the Delawares to intermediate a rapprochement with the Americans. They had returned the tomahawk, the war symbol, to the British at Detroit with harsh words. Brodhead exultantly reported to President Joseph Reed, of the Pennsylvania Council, "I believe I have frightened them by bringing over to our interest their chief allies . . ." and to Washington he made the same boastful claim. It did seem that the western Indians were turning from the British toward the American cause, but certainly not from Brodhead's brief month-and-a-half of command. As mentioned, the change in attitude was due more to Clark's and Bowman's forays and successes than to Brodhead's achievements in the field. The Wiandot message to the Delaware council and the report of the latter to McIntosh were delivered long before the change in command, in order to have arrived at Fort McIntosh by April 1. Subsequent diplomatic and intercessory messages from the Delaware Council — sincere on their part — were received as late as June 24.

Within four or five days after Brodhead's letters to the heads of command, a discordant episode was interjected into the seemingly

102 See reference to Colonel (later General) Evan Shelby's lasting contribution to Pittsburgh's environs in Williams, Bouquet's March to the Ohio, 97.
103 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 362, 368-70, 379-81.
propitious sequence of events, which augured ill from these protestations of Indian good will. A letter came to Brodhead through the secret avenue of correspondence maintained by the ever-loyal friend to the patriot cause, the Reverend John Heckewelder, Moravian missionary at Coshocton, from a trader at Upper Sandusky named Alexander McCormick. This latter was one of those who lived dangerously while maintaining a balance between two belligerents and profiting by the fortunes of both. He lived among the Wiandots, but wrote his letter from the Delaware town of Coochocking (Coshocton). Of the Wiandots' peace overtures, he declared: "They only mean to deceive You a while untill such times as their Corn gets hard, and they have brought it out of Your Way, after which their Tomhawk will be as Sharp against You as ever . . . Therefore they, to be on both sides may perhaps send some few to treat with You, while others are going to War for the English." 105

At this juncture, Simon Girty again enters the scene. He had procured a packet of letters and papers which had been secreted in a hollow tree somewhere near Pittsburgh, 106 certainly on the Indian side of the Ohio, since the only time he is known to have approached Fort Pitt was on the very day of the firing at Fort Pitt of the salute-to-peace news, that foray being to the settlement on Ninemile Run. 107 Zeisberger had informed Brodhead of Girty's expedition, which included seven Mingoes, to find the letters, evidently from loyalists near Fort Pitt, and their intention to raid Holliday's Cove on the return trip. Captain Samuel Brady, famous as a scout, implacable foe of the slayers of his father, and rescuer of captured women, accompanied by John Montour and a handful of young Indians, took to the woods to hunt down Girty. The renegade eluded his pursuers and got back to Upper Sandusky. The only man he trusted to read the letters was McCormick, although it is not certain that he saw them. 108 At any rate the papers were given to Captain Lernoult at Detroit, who sent them to General Haldimand. 109

The letter of the Reverend Heckewelder vouched for McCormick's trustworthiness and friendliness for the American cause. He was indeed a friend to the Moravians. 110 But witness the following postscript to a letter from British Captain Richard Lernoult, at

105 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 382-83.
106 Butterfield, History of the Girtys, 97-104.
107 Ibid., 210.
109 Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 386-87.
110 Ibid., 246, 383, 385-86.
Detroit, to Colonel Mason Bolton, commandant at Niagara, which found its way into General Haldimand's papers, and is seen in B 100: 289.

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I am Dear Colonel with great Esteem
Your faithful Servant

[signed] R. B. Lernoult

P. S. I Just received a Line from a Trader at St. Duski as follows

St. Duski Sept 10th 1779.

Sir

I am informed (by Indians) that the Rebels have left Tuscarawa Fort & has given it up intirely. The reason of their doing so was that the Wyandots & Delawares desired them. likewise there were great bodies of the Rebels gone down the Ohio, and up the Alleghany River & that a body of 3000 had marched against the Shawanese.

Sir If any news should happen here I expect in twenty days to deliver to you by word of mouth.

Capt. Lernoult.

[B 100, p 289] [signed] A McCormick

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The Mohicans and some of the Shawnees also petitioned for a parley for peace. Things turned out as McCormick had foretold, and the Cherokee representatives signed articles of agreement and confederation between the Cherokee Nation and the United States at Fort Pitt on July 22, 1779. As in the Delaware agreement of the previous year, Article 6 promised the Indians admission as a state of the Union, under the leadership of the Delawares.\(^\text{112}\) I have not been able to find any authorization from Congress or from the commander in chief for the conclusion of this treaty. Nine days later, Brodhead saw fit to report the occurrence of the treaty to Washington, and, on September 7, a letter addressed only to the Board of War was received by Congress and referred to the board without comment.\(^\text{113}\) No further action was taken and no notice taken of it. Within another year the

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\(^{112}\) Kellogg, *Frontier Advance*, 397-400, for the actual treaty agreement; for the preliminary negotiations, see *ibid.*, 392-97.

Cherokees were again participating on the side of our enemies.

During all of that summer of 1779, Brodhead was an extremely busy man. This suited him, for he was very ambitious and energetic. He was having Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Bayard build a new fort three miles below Kittanning (at present Manorville); and it was to be named Fort Armstrong, in honor of General John Armstrong, who had led the expedition, in 1756, which destroyed the Kittanning Indian town. Indian alarms all along the frontiers, although frequent, were somewhat lessened by the evident efforts of the tribesmen to cultivate and harvest a bumper crop of corn, as indicated by McCormick's secret information and that of spies sent to the Seneca country. This could only mean preparations for renewed hostilities or defensive measures, in case of the long-expected drive of the Americans toward Detroit or toward the Iroquois strongholds of upper New York. Washington had outlined a comprehensive plan to McIntosh, as early as the middle of February, for a two-pronged offensive northward and westward during the coming summer. He repeated to Brodhead the necessity of building up a reserve of stores of all kinds of supplies and a large number of boats to transport them—a summer's full occupation.

Plans were yet flexible and depended upon the direction from which the hostile attacks should be initiated. Washington offered the overall command to General Gates, the victor of the Saratoga campaign, who declined; and it then devolved upon General John Sullivan, who entered upon the preparations for the campaign with ardor and vigor. General James Clinton, with his New York brigade, was ordered to prepare supplies and boats, to rendezvous his forces at Canajoharie, to march to Otsego at the head of the Susquehanna River, and to float down that stream to join Sullivan at Tioga Point (present Athens, Pennsylvania). Clinton reacted too exuberantly and transported too many supplies. He marched June 17, ahead of schedule. Sullivan left Easton, Pennsylvania (on the Delaware River), June 18, and supplies were transported up the Susquehanna from Sunbury (Fort Augusta), the concentration point. The whole expedition started from Tioga up the Chemung River on August 26 with

about 3,500 men and nine pieces of artillery. The army passed up along Seneca Lake and turned westward to cross the Genesee River and to devastate the Seneca capital, Geneseo Castle (present Leicester, Livingston County), then returned, passing down the other (eastern) side of Seneca Lake to Tioga. Sullivan was evasive as to the numbers of his forces even to Continental Congress; but they have been stated by the New York Division of Archives and History as 3,500.

The itinerary of Brodhead’s march to the upper Allegheny River need not be followed in detail as was the case with the cutting of the road from Fort Pitt to Fort McIntosh, since this has been done by the able historian of the Brady family, Mr. William Y. Brady. Using Brodhead’s report to Washington after his return, as a guide, Brady had led the line of march (starting August 11 with 605 men, plus officers) from Fort Pitt up the west side of the Allegheny River to a point a little above Ford City, where the river was passed to the east side. This route would have passed through present Kittanning. Brady thought the trail continued up the west side and crossed near Templeton, but no road ever has been shown on that side, due to the very high and precipitous heights that rise almost from the river. The Indian town of Mahoning stood at present Templeton, at which location the boats that transported Brodhead’s stores from Fort Pitt landed their cargoes, and from this place all supplies were carried by packhorses. It was from a point opposite the mouth of Mogulbughtiton (now called Mahoning) Creek that the line of the southern boundary of the Donation Lands was surveyed.

The route crossed the Mahoning, then climbed the ridge to pass Widnoon and cross Redbank Creek at Lawsonham, thence by an unmapped road reached the Bullock’s Ford of Clarion River (then Toby’s Creek) very near Callensburg. It took more unmarked roads to Knox, Venus, and to Tionesta (Cushcushing). From Cushcushing to

Tidioute, the path followed the east bank of the river, and from there the west side to the mouth of Brokenstraw Creek, present Irvine (Buckaloons). There Brodhead ordered "a small Breastwork to be thrown up of felled Timber & fascines, a Captain & forty men were left to secure our Baggage & Stores." 124 To Warren (Conewago), and by a mountainous secondary road today, the path ran to Scandia. Brady thought the path continued on the ridge trail to Mack's Corners and down Cornplanter Run to Cornplanter's Town (Januchsha-dego), 125 on the Allegheny River. Thence to Salamanca the trail is today inundated by the waters of the Allegheny Reservoir retained by the great Kinzua Dam. It is believed that Brodhead advanced as far as Olean Point.

For three days the army was occupied with destroying Yoghroonwago and seven other Muncy Indian towns, together with more than 500 acres of fine corn fields, which Brodhead said extended for eight miles along the river. The houses, all burned, were of logs, many of which were squared, or were frame dwellings, most able to accommodate three and four families. Conewago and Buckaloons were destroyed on the upward march. 126

On the return trip, the army retraced its steps to Buckaloons (Irvine, across the mouth of Conewango Creek from Warren), from whence Brodhead said that he "preferred the Venango Road." 127 Mr. Brady rightly infers that the meaning is "the road to Venango." Roads in that day were known by the names of their destinations; hence there were at least five paths designated Venango. Of course, each being two-directional, the Venango Path traveled in that direction, when traversed the other direction became the Pittsburgh road or the Presq' Isle road. 128 In this case, we question that writer's route information, in that he retraced Brodhead's route to Tidioute, thence by a winding road across difficult terrain to Enterprise. In his more recent (1965) exhaustively thorough study of Indian trails, Dr. Paul Wallace lays down the route of the Cornplanter-Venango Path from Buckaloons (Irvine), up Brokenstraw Creek via Youngville, Pittsfield, Grand Valley, to Enterprise, thence cross-country to Titusville and to

124 Ibid., 1st ser., 12: 156.
125 Wallace, Indian Paths, 39.
127 Ibid., 12: 156.
Venango (Franklin).\textsuperscript{129} This path, besides its being found by that eminent author, in the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, to have been the regularly traveled route, was more direct, since it does not wind among the hills as does the other.

The real point of difference appears after the arrival of the army at Venango. Brady assumed that the whole army marched up French Creek to Mahusquechikoken,\textsuperscript{130} a little above present Cochranton, Crawford County. We quote from the detailed "Recollections of Capt. Matthew Jack" printed in \textit{Frontier Retreat} from the original interview dictation by that active officer, recorded by Dr. Lyman Draper in the Wisconsin Historical Society: "We then on our return [came] back down the river as far as the mouth of French Creek where Franklin now Stands & remained there a day or two & while there Gen\textsuperscript{1} Brodhead ordered two Companies to be Selected out of his Brigade under the Command of Cap\textsuperscript{1} Samuel Brady & myself to march up French Creek to the Indian Towns where Meadville now Stands, we went there and ... we burnt their Town and destroyed their Cornfields ... We got a quantity of Fur and Traps and returned with them to the mouth of French Creek — and from there we returned with Gen\textsuperscript{1} Brodhead to Pittsburgh ... ."\textsuperscript{131}

As the brave captain stated, the army then marched to Fort Pitt, which would have been over the old Venango Path, described in detail in \textit{The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine}, vol. 49. It passed southward through present Barkeyville, past the noted Maple and White Oak springs, through Harrisville, crossing Slippery Rock Creek at Dougherty's Mill (near Rock Falls Park), through Prospect and Whitestown, Connoquenessing Creek crossing, to Evans City, where it crossed Breakneck Creek and followed the long ridgetop route now Pa. 528 to Warrendale, thence skirting Bradford Woods to the east, through Ingomar Highland, Perrysville and West View Borough, via the Perrysville Avenue route to the Allegheny River crossing to Fort Pitt.\textsuperscript{132}

This narration has bordered upon diffuseness in order to point up: (1) the magnitude of the military operation of the campaign of

\textsuperscript{129} Wallace, \textit{Indian Paths}, 41.
\textsuperscript{130} Brady, "Brodhead's Trail," \textit{WPHM} 37: 31.
\textsuperscript{131} L. F. Kellogg, ed., \textit{Frontier Retreat on the Upper Ohio, 1779-1781} (Madison, Wisc., 1917), 61. Apparently Mr. Brady had not seen the recollections of Captain Jack that only his and Captain Brady's companies went farther up French Creek.
\textsuperscript{132} Niles Anderson and Edward G. Williams, "The Venango Path as Thomas Hutchins Knew It," \textit{WPHM} 49 (Apr. 1966): 141-47.
1779 against the Iroquois Confederation of Indians, and the importance in it of the part taken by Fort Pitt's defenders; (2) the painfully harsh and rugged terrain, tangled woods, rock paths, mile after mile of the way in the bed of the river, snags and insects, all to be suffered with torn clothing and a total lack of shoes; and (3) the effect of the raid upon the Indians themselves and upon the outcome of the war.

The Sullivan-Clinton-Brodhead campaign of 1779 had far-reaching effects. Sullivan's army had marched nearly 400 miles each way; Brodhead had marched nearly 400 miles round trip, destroying ten Seneca and Muncy Indian towns and devastating hundreds of fine corn and vegetable crops (at one place, stretching eight miles along the Allegheny River). He had hoped to join Sullivan's army at the Genesee Castle (or Geneseo Castle), but his troops were entirely without shoes. Being barefoot, large numbers of the veterans were lame. Sullivan's army burned forty towns and destroyed at least 160,000 bushels of corn, by a conservative estimate. One fortunate outcome of the affair was that Washington, having sent about a third of his best troops with Sullivan, was able to have them returned to headquarters on the Hudson before Sir Henry Clinton, British commander in chief at New York, was fully aware of what had happened. This overall summary of the campaign is indicative of the magnitude of the military operation in which Fort Pitt's commander and troops played an important part.

The moral and psychological effects of the bold stroke were felt far beyond the theater of action. The British from Detroit to Quebec were shaken and alarmed. The commander at Fort Niagara, Colonel Bolton, called in the garrisons of dependent posts to strengthen his own weak force. Many British and Indian reports exaggerated the size of the American forces. Bolton told General Haldimand, the commander in chief in Canada, that Sullivan had over 4,000 troops within seventy miles of Niagara. The Indians were panic-stricken after the battle at Newtown and could not be induced to stand and fight. Bolton wrote that, at one point, over 5,000 Indians flocked to Fort Niagara, and at the time of writing there were 3,678, who consumed all of the provisions. Grave concerns were expressed for wintering them in addition to overextended garrisons. Several days after

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134 Ibid., 12: 165-66.
135 Sullivan to Continental Congress, Sept. 30, 1779, in New York Division of Archives and History, Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, 166.
136 Ibid., 151-52, citing Haldimand Papers, B 100: 269.
137 Ibid., 145-46, citing Haldimand Papers, B 100: 262.
Sullivan had withdrawn to Tioga, below the present Pennsylvania line, General Haldimand at Quebec (reflecting the communications lag), writing to Sir Henry Clinton while viewing Brodhead's advance and Sullivan's sweep, predicted that they would form a unified force and that Fort Niagara would be their objective.\textsuperscript{138} Extra rations of liquor were served to the troops and a war dance was held at Tioga, a friendly Oneida chief and General Hand leading the dancing.\textsuperscript{139}

It is appropriate to add that, on successive days, October 17 and 18, 1779, General Washington issued general orders from his headquarters at Moore's House, West Point, commending the entire army in terms reserved for only the most meritorious deeds for the conduct of the troops engaged in the expedition; those of the former date addressed to Sullivan and those of the latter date to Brodhead at Fort Pitt interest us most.

\textit{“General Orders}

\textit{Head Quarters, Moores House,}

\textit{Monday, October 18, 1779.}

\textit{“The Commander in Chief is happy in the opportunity of congratulating the Army on our further successes . . . . [after rehearsing the accomplishments of the troops, the orders continue]}

\textit{“The Activity, Perseverence and Firmness which marked the conduct of Colonel Brodhead and that of all the officers and men of every description in the expedition do them great honor, and their services fully entitle them to the thanks and to this testimonial of the General’s acknowledgements.”}\textsuperscript{140}

Continental Congress added their praise, on Wednesday, October 27, 1779, by the following:

\textit{“Resolved that the thanks of Congress be given to his Excellency General Washington, for directing, and to Colonel D. Brodhead and the brave officers and soldiers under his command, for executing the important expedition against the Mingo and Muncy Indians, and that part of the Senecas on the Allegheny river by which the depredations of those savages, assisted by their merciless instigators, subjects of the}

\textsuperscript{138} Haldimand to Clinton, Sept. 28, 1779, in Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Retreat}, 78.
\textsuperscript{139} Conover, \textit{Journals of Sullivan's Expedition}, 78, 378.
\textsuperscript{140} Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, 16: 480-81.
king of Great Britain, upon the defenceless inhabitants of the western frontiers, have been restrained and prevented." ¹⁴¹

In his letter to Washington reporting upon the occurrences and results of his Allegheny River expedition, Brodhead reiterated his often repeated desire to lead an attack upon Detroit. Washington well knew the need for the measures, but cautioned against the undertaking until ample supplies of food and clothing and a sufficient force could be available to insure success. In the meantime, he ordered preparations to go forward and the gathering of complete information on the roads and routes, intelligence as to opposing forces, the condition of the defenses, the temper of the Indians through whose territory the expedition must proceed, and the number of Indians that could be counted upon to assist. He counseled the preferability of the winter season when the streams and intervening swamps would be frozen and the lakes turned into highways of ice.¹⁴² (Be it remembered that this was the very plan upon which McIntosh had been so vehemently criticized and ridiculed by many, especially by Brodhead.) The campaign, however, was never consummated.

During the latter part of 1779 and the early part of 1780, the frontiers of Westmoreland and the Virginia counties were free from Indian raids from the upper Allegheny towns. But, with the coming of summer, the Senecas and Muncys began to retaliate upon central Pennsylvania for the terrible punishment they had received the previous year. Most of the Indian raids emanated from the Wiandots, Shawnees, and their western allies. An occurrence that has ever since received much attention because of its adventure appeal was the rescue of Mrs. Jenny Stoops, the wife of James Stoops, and their small son William by the famous Captain Samuel Brady¹⁴³ (always known in family circles as "young Sam" to distinguish him from his uncle Sam). The Stoops family story dovetails into our narrative, for it was upon General Edward Hand's original "Mount Pleasant" tract that James Stoops settled and built his cabin on Chartiers Creek. The son William was later ransomed from the Indians,¹⁴⁴ and his great-grandson, also William, was the proprietor of Stoops Ferry, on the Ohio River, opposite Sewickley. This William became one of the early

¹⁴² Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16: 485-88.
¹⁴³ Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 3: 10.
¹⁴⁴ Kellogg, Frontier Retreat, 202-8.
residents of Sewickley. The daring rescue and escape have been the basis of fictional thrillers and authentic history. The scene of the occurrence is authenticated by the fact that the land later was owned by a sister and brother-in-law of William Stoops's wife, who found and buried the remains of the Indian whom Brady shot. The exact place is two miles east of Lowellville, Mahoning County, Ohio, a mile and a half from the state line, within Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. The road follows the old Mahoning Path along the river of that name. Many Stoops descendants and a large Brady family still remain to grace an annual reunion. Brodhead attached enough importance to the occurrence to have written two letters to General Washington, first a statement that he had sent Brady on the reconnaissance, and then a report of his adventure.

All of the problems that had plagued McIntosh arose to thwart Brodhead: the same disregard of orders, noncompliance on the part of Steel and his assistants to demands for reports of supplies procured and en route, and the state of transportation. He wrote General Greene in February 1780, that he had not a single tent at Fort Pitt to cover his men, and a month later, to Richard Peters of the Board of War, that "if they are made of thin linnen the Militia will cut them up for hunting shirts as usual." To Greene, he added that, "this Fort is in a very bad posture of defence." Two boats loaded with flour, supplies, and forage, which had been sent downriver to Fort McIntosh, were left unloaded for two nights and a day and were lost in the ice which carried them downstream. The general berated such carelessness, for supplies were irreplaceable. He was greatly concerned to learn that unprincipled frontiersmen from the three Virginia counties had invaded the Indian land north of the Ohio River to a depth of thirty miles, between the Muskingum and Fort McIntosh. He sent a detachment under Captain Clark to drive the trespassers away and to burn their log houses, then sent messengers to the Delawares, who might be offended and alarmed.

146 Wallace, Indian Paths, 96-97.
147 Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 3: 9, 119.
149 Ibid., 12: 205, 211.
150 Ibid., 12: 200.
151 Ibid., 12: 167, 176-77.
Brodhead was still anxious to undertake an expedition against Detroit, or if not that way, to Natchez on the lower Mississippi. In response to Washington's plan of a winter campaign, he pointed out the absence of forage for the animals and that forage would have to be transported. He also cautioned that the campaign would have to take place before February, for after that time the flat country would be flooded by the rains. His latest intelligence had informed him that a new fort had been constructed at Detroit.\textsuperscript{152} The British were having their troubles too; Colonel Bolton announced to General Haldimand that "Captain Lernoult . . . having no hopes of any reinforcement he resolved . . . to throw up a strong work on the high ground which entirely commands his weak fort."\textsuperscript{153} Brodhead's projected expedition had to be dropped on account of the lack of supplies. Brodhead deplored the fact of his troops standing in enforced idleness as unhealthful and an expense to the government.\textsuperscript{154}

His active mind contrived a plan to instigate enmities among the Indians, pitting nations and tribes against each other, thus keeping them occupied enough without fighting the whites. At the same time, the Executive Council of Pennsylvania issued a proclamation offering high bounties for the scalps of Indians and Tories in arms against the United States, also for Indian prisoners. Brodhead saw this as open invitation to the hotheaded, reckless, and uncontrollable frontiersmen to kill Indians indiscriminately, friendly and hostile alike, for the sake of the profit. He foresaw the alienation of the friendly Indians and a general Indian war as a result.\textsuperscript{155}

An added note of interest is recorded in Brodhead's February 11, 1780, letter to the commander in chief: "Such a deep snow and such ice has not been known at this place [Pittsburgh] in the memory of the eldest natives; Deer & Turkies die by hundreds for want of food, the snow on Alleghany & Laurel hills is four feet deep."\textsuperscript{156} Meanwhile, Washington's army was suffering, at Morristown, New Jersey, even greater hardships than previously at Valley Forge—snow four to six feet deep, and the army in tents until February before log huts could be occupied.\textsuperscript{157} By summer, Brodhead was com-

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Ibid.}, 184-85, 189.
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Ibid.}, 12: 159, 239, 241.
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Ibid.}, 12: 206.
\textsuperscript{157} James Thatcher, \textit{Military Journal, 1775-1785} (Boston, 1827), 181.
plaining that "the Troops are suffering for want of Bread, the waters being too low to grind the grain & I am informed that the Pack horsemen have left the service for want of pay, &c." 158 In exasperation, Brodhead wrote to Colonel Ephraim Blaine, the commissary general of the Continental army: "I hope you are making provision for us. If you are not it is high time I should know it, for no person can be stupid enough to suppose that these Troops more than others can subsist upon wind . . . ." 159

There were other, just as pressing but more subtle, concerns that threatened Fort Pitt and its commander. There were warnings of British and Indian attacking forces from both the upper Allegheny and from the Ohio country, but the same letters from Brodhead to the Board of War carried this ominous intelligence: "The Emigrations from this new Country to the Settlements on Kentucke & the Falls [of the Ohio] are incredible; and this has given opportunity to disaffected people from the interior part of the Country to purchase and settle these lands . . . Want of provisions and money has been productive of many Desertions, and I am so Circumstanced on this account that I scarcely dare venture a party out after them lest they should avail themselves of the opportunity and not again return, for it is obvious that they are generally protected by the Inhabitants." Further, "They [the officers] are of opinion that should the Enemy approach this frontier & offer protection, half the Inhabitants would join them. Indeed, I have heard Colo. Gibson [the second in command] & other Gentlemen declare that they are of the same opinion." 160

Mann Butler, in his *A History of the Commonwealth of Kentucky*, remarked on the tremendous influx of people in the fall of 1779 and the next year, with: "Three hundred large family boats arrived during the ensuing Spring at the Falls [Louisville], and as many as ten or fifteen wagons could be seen of a day, going from them." One estimate placed the number of immigrants within the same period at 20,000.161 The Shawnees, who with British help tried to invade Kentucky and were turned back, spread the malicious rumor that "the Americans had been beaten by the British and had fled to the new countries [Kentucky] for protection." 162 This great migration was due largely to the new land law of 1779, which reinterpreted the previous

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158 Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, 3: 62.
160 Ibid., 12: 274.
preemption laws, generated frauds, and was counterproductive in that it operated against the great land companies, yet opened the door for great private speculators to amass huge land empires.\textsuperscript{163}

To President Reed of Pennsylvania, Brodhead wrote from Fort Pitt, on January 22, 1781, that because of the provision contracts Governor Thomas Jefferson was making on the west side of the mountains and the "consumption of multitudes of Emigrants arrived and expected in this district (chiefly to avoid military duty and taxes) [it] will scarcely leave a pound of flour for the regular and other troops . . . ." To Washington he wrote the same on the very next day, but he added his usual ending, reminding the commander in chief that he was ready to launch his already prepared attack upon Detroit with the troops on hand. But his frustration burst forth in his letter to Reed: "It seems the State of Virginia is now preparing to acquire more extensive territory, by sending a great body of men under Colonel (whom they intend to raise to the rank of Brigadier) Clark, to attempt the reduction of Detroit. I have hitherto been encouraged to flatter myself, that I should sooner or later be enabled to reduce that place. But it seems the United States cannot furnish either troops or resources for the purpose, but the State of Virginia can."\textsuperscript{164} To Richard Peters, of the Board of War, he wrote: "I learn more and more of the disaffection of many of the inhabitants on this side of the mountains. The King of Great Britain's health is often drunk in companies, and I believe those wish to see the regular troops removed from this department, and a favorable opportunity to submit to British government."\textsuperscript{165}

The Continental army and governmental authorities in Western Pennsylvania were experiencing, in 1781, what their counterparts in western Virginia had dealt with in the latter part of the previous year. There the loyalists had clandestinely associated, sworn to secrecy and loyalty to the king whose health they drank, and plotted violence and murder against the patriots, under promises of great rewards from British agents.\textsuperscript{166} They plotted the capture of the Lead Mines at Fort Chiswell (pronounced "Chisel") on New River (then called Woods River), opposite to present Austinville, Wythe County. The Lead Mines were the source of one of the greatest supplies of lead for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{163} Butler, \textit{History of Kentucky}, 99-100; Abernethy, \textit{Western Lands}, 228, 249, 256.
\item \textsuperscript{164} Craig, \textit{Olden Time}, 2: 381-82, 385-86.
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{Ibid.}, 378.
\item \textsuperscript{166} Kellogg, \textit{Frontier Retreat}, 143-45, 236-42, 250-64.
\end{itemize}
ammunition of the Continental army and were guarded by a contingent of troops. Synonymous with Fort Chiswell, the Lead Mines were the usual designation of the county seat of old Fincastle County, and the jail still existed where the captured loyalists were imprisoned after hasty trials held at James McGavock’s house at present Max Meadows. Colonel Charles Lynch dealt many summary executions, from which the expression “lynch law” is a survival. Many floggings and seizures of property were imposed. Repentant loyalists were allowed to enlist in the Continental army for the duration of the war; their (or near relatives’) property and estates were held in escrow for faithful performance of the duty.

One of the objectives of the loyalists, or Tories, was to unite with Tories farther north and, hopefully, to seize Fort Pitt. One potent argument the loyalists sought to inculcate in the minds of ignorant people was that Congress had sold the country to the French, the Americans’ former enemy, and that the English king was far preferable to a French despotical monarch.

What at first seemed an inconsequential matter involving unknown persons occurred in the spring of 1781, which Brodhead reported to Washington on March 27. Later, it grew into an episode of unusual interest, although not of historical importance. Found in Brodhead’s second letter book, bound and partially printed by Neville Craig, the report read: “... a small paper was brought to me by some faithful Indians, who found it neatly rolled up in a powderhorn which a disaffected person had lost near the waters of Sandusky. I take the liberty to enclose a copy of it. I have discovered the writer and put him in irons, but as too probably some of the garrison are concerned he may escape before he meets the reward of his demerit.”

In the orderly book of the Eighth Pennsylvania Regiment, at a court-martial held July 26, 1781, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Bayard, presiding, Myndert Fisher, a citizen employed as a guide, was tried on the charge of holding a traitorous correspondence with the enemies of the United States, and pleaded not guilty. The original letter, in his handwriting, signed with the name of Thomas Girty, was introduced:

167 Henry Howe, *Historical Collections of Virginia* (Charleston, S. C., 1845), 515.
169 Ibid., 23.
170 Craig, *Olden Time*, 2: 392; Sparks, *Correspondence of the Revolution*, 3: 274.
Pittsb\* Jan\*, 21 1781  Dr Gentlemen, If Mr Graverod would succeed with the help of You, the Errant he is going upon, would be Infinite service both to Me your Brother, and himself, and friends here present, that is only waiting for his Return, and the Honorable Commanders answers from Detroit, which I suppose, there will be no less than one Hundred that will accompany him to said place, if the Commander will please to give him the least Encouragement possibly he ca[n]

Thomas Girty—

Fisher admitted that Thomas Girty knew nothing of the affair or the use of his name, that the purpose was only to help Graverod obtain some goods to bring to Pittsburgh. Graverod, suspect as a loyalist by the Americans and on the list of American sympathizers at Detroit, was a Detroit trader. The court-martial found Fisher guilty of “a breach of the 19th art of the 13th Section of the articles of war . . . and he is hereby sentenced to be Hang[ed] by the neck till he is Dead.” 171

Now, Myndert Fisher was an unknown, a “nobody,” as far as history was concerned — up to that point. This being a case of capital punishment, the court-martial proceedings and sentence had to be reviewed by the commander in chief, while the prisoner was remanded to jail at Fort Pitt under a strict guard. In the meantime, the greatest events in the life of the commander in chief were evolving, also in the history of the country. The French fleet had come to the American coast, Rochambeau, the French commander, and Washington marched their combined armies from far up on the Hudson to the York River in Virginia, where they and De Grasse’s fleet converged upon Cornwallis’s British army at Yorktown. After a siege and terrible bombardment, the British surrendered, assuring an end to the war with Britain and later, American independence. Small wonder that a sheaf of reports from faraway places on the frontiers went unattended for weeks.

Then, October 27, ten days after the great surrender, Washington found a letter from his old friend, General Philip Schuyler, at Albany, New York — luckily, he had not opened the packet of reports first — and dictated his answers. The letter pertained to the court-martial proceedings that Washington found upon his desk, relating to the prisoner in “death row” in Pittsburgh. The commander in chief summoned his

171 Kellogg, Frontier Retreat, 491; Kellogg, Frontier Advance, 130.
military secretary, Jonathan Trumbull, son of Connecticut’s famous war governor, Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., and brother of the creator of the heroic painting of the Yorktown surrender scene, John Trumbull. “Mrs Fisher may be consoled respecting the Fate of her Son; the sentence of Death against him will not be confirmed, and he will be released from confinement.”

To General William Irvine, then commandant at Fort Pitt, he wrote: “Being informed by Congress that you have been ordered to the Command of that post, I have to inform that the Sentence of Myndert Fisher . . . is not approved, and that upon Application of his Friends, and some particular Information respecting him, I have to request that he be liberated from his Confinement.”

Strange as all this seems, it is typical of the Washington manner and style; his meaning is plain: “I have very good reasons.” Upon further investigation, we find that a gentleman named John Dodge had interceded on Fisher’s behalf. Dodge, originally from Connecticut, had been a trader at Sandusky and Detroit, where he was influential. As a sympathizer with the Americans, he was sent as a prisoner to Quebec, from which he subsequently escaped. General Schuyler, then commander of the northern army, sent him to Washington, who found him “a very intelligent man.” Dodge was able to give information relative to the strength of the British naval forces on the lakes, also their activities at various fortified points, at a time when Washington was planning a Canadian campaign. Governor Jefferson also interviewed Dodge and was by him appointed Indian agent in the Illinois country. Dodge was in Pittsburgh in the fall of 1779, from where he wrote a letter mentioning both “Mendart Fisher and Gavorot.” From the Sandusky trader John Leith’s letter to George Morgan, written from Coshocton, August 19, 1780, we learn that Myndert Fisher’s brother was a Detroit silversmith. That British authorities at Detroit knew and considered Fisher an American sympathizer is shown by Lieutenant Colonel Sinclair’s communication to Captain D. Brehm in July 1780 (found in the Haldimand Papers): “The last Canoe brings a Mr. Finchley known to be ill disposed to the

172 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 280.
173 Ibid., 23: 316.
174 Ibid., 23: 280.
175 Thwaites and Kellogg, Revolution on the Upper Ohio, 143n.
177 Consul Willshire Butterfield, History of George Rogers Clark’s Conquest of the Illinois (Columbus, 1904), 747.
178 Morgan Papers, CLP.
Service. A Mr. Fisher, of Albany is allowed to winter in Saganaw Bay, where there are Rebel Belts . . .” Then, in September, we read: “Mssrs. Finchley and Fisher, are from their conduct and connections very unfit Persons to trust at a distance, and where there is a possibility of holding any kind of intercourse with the Colonists. I should therefor think it very unsafe to permit them to winter [away] from Detroit . . . the other [latter] has always born[e] a doubtful character independent of his connections.”

The sufferer in all of this was Thomas Girty, an innocent victim of the hoax. Elder brother of the traitorous trio, Simon, George, and James, he had endured insults and suspicions from his neighbors. Thomas Girty had remained loyal to the patriot cause, had served as a messenger to the Indians, was a militiaman and scout, and after the war would receive depreciation pay (land). He had lived in various places, finally coming to rest upon a hill in Ross Township, Allegheny County, which had belonged to his half brother, John Turner, who then moved to Squirrel Hill and was there a prominent citizen. Girty’s Run, flowing through the township, with its mouth in Millvale Borough on the Allegheny River, is the only reminder that remains of the presence of one of the family, although descendants do survive. Thomas Girty died, according to records in the office of the Register of Wills of Allegheny County, on November 3, 1820, at the age of eighty-five (Administration Book 1: 19, No. 84); Jacob Bower was bonded as administrator of Girty’s estate, docketed in BD 2:90, in the same office; certification of these records I hold. Bower was Girty’s near neighbor, for whom Bowerstown (contiguous to Millvale) was named. The indefatigable and meticulous historian, Consul Willshire Butterfield, took time from his voluminous writing and research career to investigate the Girty family in detail.

While all of the above drama was taking place in Pittsburgh and on the frontier, in Philadelphia events were taking place that much concerned Fort Pitt and its defenders. On October 25, 1780, Colonel John Connolly was set at liberty from the Continental prison where he had been held since his capture near Hagerstown, Maryland, in the

fall of 1775. Connolly had been on his way to Pittsburgh and Detroit, intent upon raising a force of loyalists to take Fort Pitt and to conquer half of North America for the king. It was not an accident, as some have supposed, that he was recognized and captured in his bed at night. The news of his visits to Lord Dunmore and to General Gage had preceded him. When he was interrogated by the Committee of Safety at Frederick, it was evident that they knew all about his plans and activities.

What Connolly did not know, and what has not appeared in many accounts of the episode, is that Connolly's personal servingman, William Cowley, voluntarily and surreptitiously sought and went before the Committee of Safety at Middlesex, Massachusetts. This occurred as Connolly was leaving General Gage, in Boston, and as he departed on the return trip to Lord Dunmore, at Portsmouth, Virginia. Cowley made a deposition revealing the details of the plots in which Connolly was engaged.

The information contained in the deposition immediately went to General Washington at Cambridge, headquarters of the army then besieging Boston. Washington thereupon relayed it to the president of Continental Congress, in Philadelphia, whose messengers and agents were immediately put upon Connolly's trail. The committees of correspondence went into action, and Washington was already getting his espionage and counterespionage system into action, necessitated by the traitorous duplicity of Dr. Church.

Cowley's deposition is herewith reprinted; this evidence has intentionally been reserved until this point in the narrative for the purpose of putting together this episode of high intrigue.

_____________________

Middlesex, ss., October 12, 1775:

William Cowley, the subscriber to the within deposition, made oath to the truth of the same, before me,

Abraham Fuller, Just. Peace.

_____________________

William Cowley, of lawful age, being duly sworn, deposeth and saith: That he has lived with Major John Connolly, of Fort Pitt, in the character of a servant, for two years last past; that the said

183 Connolly, "Narrative of John Connelly," PMHB 12: 413-16.
Connolly was obliged to quit that place, fearing some injury from the inhabitants, who suspected him of being an enemy to his Country; that some time in August last, the said Connolly paid a visit to Lord Dunmore, on board of his Lordship's ship, the Royal William, then lying at Portsmouth, in Virginia, and took this deponent as his servant; that the said Connolly staid fourteen days on board of the said ship, and afterwards went to Boston in his Lordship's tender Arundel, with despatches to General Gage, from Lord Dunmore, where he was for the space of ten days. This deponent further saith, that after their departure from thence, the said Connolly asked this deponent if he was willing to go with him into the Indian Country; told him that he had been with General Gage, to get a commission, and orders to go into the Indian Country to raise the Indians and French; that there was some part of the Royal Irish at Fort Chartres, this deponent thinks he said, who had it in command from General Gage to join him, and who had nine twelve-pounders; that as soon as he had settled his business with Lord Dunmore, after his return, he intended, as he dared not go home through the heart of the Country, to take his Lordship's tender, go to St. Augustine, there get guides to lead him through the Cherokee Nation, Shawanese, Mingoes, and Delawares; that he was to get commissions from Lord Dunmore, for Captain White Eyes and Cornstalk, and other of the chiefs, and designed to make them presents, in order to encourage them to join him; that he intends to stay at Detroit this winter, to furnish himself with boats and canoes, to bring his forces and cannon up the Ohio River; that he then intends to attack Fort Pitt, after taking which, he supposed all that part of the world would join him, especially as he had orders to give three hundred acres of land to every man that would enlist under him. This deponent further saith, that the said Connolly informed him of another scheme he had in view, namely, to proclaim freedom to all convicts and indentent servants, then to march down to Alexandria, in Virginia, where he expects a reenforcement from Lord Dunmore, and to meet with some men of war, with which he intended to sweep the whole Country before him.

William Cowley.¹⁸⁵

The date, October 12, of Cowley's deposition shows conclusively that Connolly's servant had defected from the British cause immediate-

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.
ly after Connolly left General Gage and before the return to Lord Dunmore. He must have then played a double role, because he was captured with Connolly in Maryland, a point that has never been noted by historians. It should also be mentioned that although Cowley was accorded more freedom than his master, he suffered the same imprisonment. He also tried to save Connolly by destroying some of the incriminating papers.186

Connolly played his part true to his characteristic form. He was released July 4, 1780, on parole, having sworn "that he would not, directly or indirectly, say or do anything injurious to the United States of America, or the armies thereof." 187 He was not exchanged until October 25, but he immediately found a pretext for acting otherwise. He immediately launched into preparing a plot, a diabolical plan that, but for the failure of two important links in its sequence, would have swept American independence into the sea.

The key to the whole fantastic scheme came to light while searching the papers of Sir Henry Clinton in the Clements Library, which are a source of authentic history from the British viewpoint during the years of the American Revolution when Clinton was the commander in chief in North America. After the war, Clinton found himself involved in a controversy generated by a parliamentary investigation of the conduct of the war by himself and his second in command, Lord Charles Cornwallis. Sir Henry's narrative of his campaigns in America from 1775 to 1782, accompanied by transcripts of a very great number of letters and documents taken from the collection of Clinton Papers, supporting Clinton's rationalization, has been published by William B. Willcox.188 This, of course, is a much more critical editing and selection from the enormous (eighty-six feet of shelf space) manuscript collection than the B. F. Stevens work of the last century.189

Allusion has been made, above, to a plan evolved by Lieutenant Colonel Connolly after his release from prison, which he laid before General Clinton, who thought it had merit and, in an expanded form, incorporated it in his comprehensive plan of strategy for the ensuing year, 1781. The cooperation of the commander in Canada, General Haldimand, was essential to implementation and consummation of the design. The ordinary sort of messenger service was subject to capture

of the men and their dispatches by enemies who waylaid all of the routes leading from New York. A trusted bearer of the precious missive containing the plan appeared in the person of General Friedrich Riedesel, the Brunswick commander recently released from his parole and internment in Virginia, just then about to be sent by Clinton to the army in Canada. He it was who hand carried the carefully guarded secret plans and orders to Haldimand.

The plan, as transmitted to Haldimand, was written in French for the latter's convenience, since it will be remembered that Haldimand was Swiss. Clinton was proficient in the language and often employed it in his correspondence with officers who understood it. Following is an English translation of the document by William L. Stone, editor and translator of the Memoirs, Letters and Journals of Major General Riedesel.¹⁹⁰

PLAN OF SIR HENRY CLINTON FOR A DIVERSION (WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF CANADA) THROUGH THE CHESAPEAKE HIGHLANDS AND UP THE POTOMAC, SUSQUEHANNAH, ETC., COMMUNICATED IN CONFIDENCE TO MAJOR GENERAL RIEDESEL WITH ORDERS TO COMMUNICATE IT TO GENERAL HALDIMAND.

As there can be no doubt—judging by the news from Europe, and by intercepted letters from French officers, under Rochambeau, to the French consul in Philadelphia — that there is an intention, at the present time, to attack Canada, General Clinton hopes that General Haldimand will be able to spare two thousand men for an expedition from Niagara, Lake Erie and Presqu'isle, against Fort Pitt, the Ohio river, and the settlements in the rear of Virginia and Pennsylvania. Such an undertaking would greatly facilitate an expedition from the Chesapeake highlands, which, it is hoped, will be the more successful, from the supposed willingness of the settlers along the Ohio to submit to the government of Great Britain on the condition that they shall be entirely separated from Virginia and Pennsylvania and form a distinct province.

All necessary magazines for provisions, artillery, baggage, etc., having been erected at Niagara, it is thought that the corps from Canada will be able to cross Lake Erie in vessels and occupy a strong position on Presqu'isle. Here, it could establish itself in

such a manner, by fortifications, etc., that there would be no danger either of its being driven out by superior numbers or its retreat being cut off by water.

And even if we should not succeed in capturing Presqu'isle by surprising Fort Pitt, we would soon ascertain the sentiments of the people along the Ohio. If they are found to be favorable to the king, and willing to defend the defiles in the Alleghany mountains and Blue Ridge, a foothold might be gained after a while at Fort Pitt, and two posts established at Shenango and Venango. Thus, communications would be kept up between Fort Pitt and Presqu'isle, a circumstance which would greatly facilitate the incursions of the savages in carrying destruction on the rear of Virginia and Pennsylvania.

If Fort Pitt could not be taken either by cunning or surprise, and we should find ourselves entirely deceived in regard to the sentiments of the people along the Ohio, we would have to be content with the capture of Presqu'isle. This post should then be made as strong as possible, while, at the same time, we could push forward and establish two posts at Shenango and Venango, protected by two redoubts, and thus preserve the water communication. The Indians would have to be sent to those posts in advance, with orders to devastate the county as much as was consistent with prudence and caution.

The officer, in command of the Canadian corps, must await in this position the result of the expedition undertaken from Chesapeake bay; and, through messengers, he must be in constant communication with the general in command. He must, also, do all in his power to afford him support, by a prudent cooperation.

Sir Henry Clinton, in order to conceal the real intention of this expedition, will pretend to start with a small corps from the Mohawk river to Oswego, as if for the purpose of capturing Fort Stanwix. This corps shall devastate the country as far as lies in their power, and shall return to Oswego after a certain time.

If the fleet on Lake Champlain could, at the same time, with a few Canadian volunteers and rangers, make a few excursions to Ticonderoga and Fort George and even beyond, this third expedition would, as a matter of course, confuse the enemy still more, especially when he found himself, in addition to all this, attacked simultaneously in Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland.

General Sir Henry Clinton expects to be able to undertake his
expedition immediately upon the plan of Washington and Rochambeau being known. This will probably take place in the middle of winter or at the beginning of spring; but the diversion from Canada must come off as near the same time as his as possible, since the nearer together they are, the better results he expects from it. For he deems the surest method of putting an end to the revolution, to be in separating the inhabitants along the Ohio and Kentucky from the other revolted provinces.\footnote{191}{Ibid., 2: 250-52.}

A cursory review of the plan demonstrates the fact that General Clinton honored Fort Pitt with the designation of one of the major anchor points in the chain of encirclement which he hoped to forge. Conjointly with Fort Pitt, he included the Ohio Valley and its tributary waters, together with the practicable mountain passes leading to the valley of the Potomac.

In view of the elaborate secrecy and auxiliary plans submitted by Riedesel,\footnote{192}{Ibid., 2: 252-55.} outlining several side forays designed only to mislead their opponents, let us consider the evidence here conspicuously presented that Washington’s espionage system was able to penetrate to the very innermost sanctum of the British high command. Also appears further proof that Myndert Fisher was part of that espionage system. Brodhead’s notification that he had received the note found in the powder horn was dated March 27, 1781\footnote{193}{Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 3: 273.}; Washington’s reply, dated April 25, informed Brodhead: “The information contained in yours of the 27th. ulto. [of last month] corresponds with intelligence I rec’d a few days ago, by a good channel, from New York. It is that Colo. Conolly (who you must very well know) is to collect as many refugees as he can at New York and proceed with them as soon as the season will permit to Quebec. That upon his arrival in Canada, he is to join Sir John Johnson, and that they are to proceed by the Route of Vinango to Fort Pitt and the Western Frontier. It is added that Conolly is to carry with him blank Commissions for persons already in the Country and that he expects to be joined by several hundred disaffected in the Neighborhood of Fort Pitt. Upon this information and what you may have discovered, I think you should without loss of time secure or remove every suspected character from about you and to such a distance that they cannot readily join the Enemy should they come down . . . .”\footnote{194}{Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 501-2.}
The irony of the situation is that the warning of the danger arrived at Fort Pitt at least four months before the arrival at Quebec of secret and comprehensive plans of the sweeping campaign, for Riedesel did not arrive at Quebec until after September 16,195 too late in the season to put the plan into action that year. By the next year, it was too late. Cornwallis’s army surrendered at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 17, 1781, and the war continued in the Carolinas until November 1782, when Carleton evacuated Charleston. Clinton had turned over the command to Carleton upon his arrival early in May and had returned to England.

Parliament was engaged in holding an inquiry into the causes of the ill-success of the British forces and especially of responsibility for the loss of Cornwallis’s entire army. Clinton and Cornwallis plunged into a controversy that kept Parliament occupied, the English press buzzing, and the nobility gossiping for several years. It was in the day of the English pamphleteers, and each proponent published his views in pamphlets. When the other issued his reply, then the first fired a barrage of “strictures upon” the preceding opponent’s claims, and the “pamphlet war” carried on long after the “shooting war” had ended. Clinton compiled, in his later years, a voluminous manuscript tome, formidably documented, which he may have hoped to publish, but which he expected to use to overwhelm adverse criticism in Parliament, and which he simply called his “Narrative.”196 It reposes, along with an awe-inspiring collection of manuscripts and headquarters papers that occupies eighty-six feet of shelf space in the William L. Clements Library.197

While pursuing the amazing plan for the campaign of 1781, among the British headquarters papers, Sir Henry’s highly significant summary statement of the situation that precipitated the surrender at Yorktown stands out: “...had Lord Cornwallis only remained where he was ordered, or even after his coming into Virginia had our operations been covered by a superior fleet as I was promised, Vermont would have probably joined us; and then these several expeditions would have taken place...the Commander in Chief was then

195 Stone, Riedesel, 2: 249.
196 Stevens, Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 1: 5-55.
fully persuaded . . . that rebellion in America was at its last gasp." 198

Three almost providential circumstances intervened to render the wonderfully concerted and projected plans ineffectual.

1. The storm-battered and delayed fleet arrived too late off the Virginia Capes and was defeated by the French fleet of De Grasse.

2. Clinton himself best conveys the picture of the problem of command that brought the military situation to such a pass. "... having by my written instructions to Lord Cornwallis clearly and positively directed His Lordship to regard the security of Charleston as a primary object, and not to make any offensive movement that should be likely to endanger it, and it being an incontestable fact that his move into Virginia exposed that post to the most imminent danger, I am extremely sorry . . . to assert that His Lordship disobeyed my orders and acted contrary to his duty in doing so." 199

3. The turn of events at Yorktown crushed British hopes of winning the war that had seemed so high when the great secret strategic plan had been drawn and thwarted the stealthily concerted plans to take Vermont over to the British side as a province of Canada.

This reference to Vermont merits some explanation, although any brief statement is apt to be only partially true. An offer had been received from a Colonel Beverly Robinson, who, acting as a liaison agent for Sir Henry Clinton's staff, addressed a letter to Ethan Allen, brigadier general of Vermont troops, to institute negotiations for Vermont to espouse the British cause and to become a province of Canada. Robinson well knew the dissatisfaction of the Vermonters with their denial of statehood by Continental Congress, as they seemed to believe. In fact, Robinson, colonel of a regiment of loyal Americans, was well situated to be well informed of affairs of the United States. He was a Virginian, son of John Robinson, formerly treasurer and speaker of the House of Burgesses, also grandson of John Chiswell, formerly operator of the Lead Mines at Fort Chiswell, in Virginia. He was well known by Washington, who had known his father before his political downfall, had often stopped at his grandfather Chiswell's Ordinary, and had visited Beverly at his New York home. Mrs. Robinson was a daughter of the rich patroon, Frederick Philips of Philips Manor, and her sister "Polly," who has been romantically linked with

199 Willcox, American Rebellion, 288-89; Stevens, Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 1: 215-16.
the young Washington, and later married Roger Morris, who became General Morris of the British army. Robinson's country house was across the Hudson from West Point and was the headquarters of General Benedict Arnold at the time of his treason and escape; earlier the house had been the headquarters of General Putnam, whom Robinson had tried unsuccessfully to enmesh in his scheme. Robinson abetted Arnold and helped André into the entanglement that resulted in his hanging.200

Now, Robinson found the pretext to entice the Allens, Ethan and Ira, with their select group of six others, into a conference ("cartel") to arrange an exchange of prisoners. It was an easy matter to suggest the means of sparing Vermont the spoliation resulting from invasion by the British army poised in Canada to overrun northern New York and Vermont. Congress refused to give to Vermont enough British captives to trade for an equal number of Vermonters, for the reason that they could not permit any state to conduct a separate prisoner exchange. Also, notice should be taken of the fact that the state of New York threatened to withdraw its representatives from Congress and its support of the Union if Vermont (styled at that time the New Hampshire Grants) should be admitted into the Union as an equal of the original thirteen.201 In the Benjamin Franklin Stevens collection of Facsimiles of Manuscripts Relating to American History in European Repositories, there are two documents, which may or may not be significant, setting forth the large tracts in the New Hampshire Grants that were owned by Governor George Clinton, of New York.202 These, and more like them, were the basis of the famous ejectment proceedings brought against the Vermonters in the courts at Albany, which only caused the Green Mountain Boys to intrench themselves more deeply and called forth from Ethan Allen the following response:

Printed sentences of death are not very alarming ... if the governor sends his executioners, they have only to try the titles to see who shall prove to be the criminals and die first; and if the authorities of New York insist upon killing us to take possession of our vineyards, come on, we are ready with a game of scalping with you.203


203 Grace G. Niles, The Hoosac Valley in Legend and History (New York, 1912), 283.
Such were the order and tenor of the times; they were times of violence. Only the hardy or nimble-witted survived. Among the Green Mountains or on the "storied" Ohio, the probabilities of staying alive and improving one's fortune were equal.

The Vermont controversy ran on for two years. In partial extenuation of the Vermonters' position, be it said that they considered their land about to be partitioned among their three neighbors, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, each of which claimed part of the territory. Continental Congress proposed, on August 21, 1781, to admit the area much as it appears today — from the Connecticut River on the east to within twenty miles of the Hudson on the west, and from the Massachusetts line on the south to the forty-fifth parallel on the north. This the Green Mountain people vehemently refused, having recently expanded their claim to include a large part of New Hampshire (on the eastern side of the Connecticut River), also the belt extending to the Hudson River.

To Chittenden's (the elected "governor") letter, misstating the facts, though freely admitting that Vermont had enlarged her claim, Washington replied that, because the claim had been unwarrantedly extended, Congress had considered that Vermont should be content with what was rightfully her own; that, for the sake of the harmony and good will of the whole of the other thirteen states, in admitting the fourteenth they could not permit it to encroach upon the ancient rights of its neighbors. He also warned that the enemy was endeavoring to detach state by state entirely to disband the Union. He appealed to the sense of patriotism and the cause of freedom. Let us note that the date of this truly great personal letter of Washington was January 1, 1782.

Notwithstanding the admonition of Washington, we find the following astonishing assertions by Ira Allen, younger brother of Ethan Allen, written to General Haldimand (dated July 11, 1782), while Allen was supposedly conducting the negotiations for exchange of prisoners: "Thus far I have not deviated from the principles of my employers, the ruling men of Vermont, but my fear least something yet interferes to prevent our re-union with Great Britain induces me to propose to your Excellency an immediate recognition of Vermont

204 Chittenden to Washington, Nov. 14, 1781, in Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 3: 440-47.
206 Sparks, Correspondence of the Revolution, 3: 405; Vermont Hist. Soc. Colls., 2: 111.
207 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 419-22.
under government by a secret treaty with them, to be signed and ratified by Governor Chittenden, General Allen, and the Council, declaring Vermont a British Province and engaging to use every prudent measure to promote His Majesty's government until your Excellency can protect them in a public declaration . . . . I beg to intimate to your Excellency that as soon as good policy will admit, there will be an absolute necessity for some of the King's money in Vermont to enable us to carry into execution the foregoing plans." (This is designated, a Copy of a letter from Mr. G. to His Excellency General Haldimand. In another place it is noted that this was Ira Allen, and his letter is filed "G." 208 To add to the score of the Allens, Ethan Allen, ending a letter from "C" to His Excellency, General Haldimand, "the morning of 16th June, 1782 . . . . I shall do everything in my power to render this state a British Province." 209

These are only two letters cited from several hundreds of documents from the Haldimand Papers, copies in the Vermont Historical Society. There were other letters and reports of interviews by Haldimand's secretary (thought to be Captain Lernoult, whose acquaintance we made at Detroit), who wrote that Allen had deliberately extended the claims of Vermont twenty miles east of the Connecticut River and to the Hudson in order to include many Tories, who would pack the Vermont Assembly with a majority, which would swing Vermont to the British side. 210 Ethan Allen envisioned the raising of a regiment or two composed of loyalists with officers commissioned by the king. He, being the head of the militia who had fought valiantly against Burgoyne's British and German invaders, had the state troops disbanded under the guise of a neutrality agreement with Haldimand. 211 In order to keep these plots secret until the right moment, only eight men, including the Allens and Chittenden, were admitted to the secret. They planned a coup d'état, in fact a counterrevolution.

The counterclaim, that the business was all a ruse to dupe the British authorities in order to gain time, was set up later to avert any intended British invasion of Vermont soil, and to forestall any encroachment upon their rights by the three neighboring states. It is hard to understand today how, after the troops of the invader were invited to take possession and after having accepted payment of the king's money, as Ira had proposed, they would have gotten free of the

209 Ibid., 2: 275-76.
210 Ibid., 2: 111, 118.
211 Ibid., 2: 112.
invaders. It does seem mildly preposterous that these mountain men should presume to outwit the accomplished international dealers of Europe. It is not our purpose to solve this riddle. Our purpose is only to elucidate the reason for Clinton's assumption that Vermont would fall like a ripe plum into the British basket. How could he know that his own general would overtly disobey orders and get himself trapped on the Virginia coast? How could he know that Washington already knew his most secret plans as accurately and as precisely as Clinton himself knew them? Who was Washington's informer at headquarters of the British high command?

A melancholy note makes an end to the Vermont episode in that, from having been the owner of vast acreage of fine lands, Ira Allen died a pauper. The people he brought in to tip the balance of the voters and assembly rewarded him by pirating his real estate, ejecting him from his home, and disowning him. He died in the Philadelphia almshouse and lies in an unmarked grave. 212

One cannot help indulging in contrasting the spirit of the great Washington in writing to the president of Continental Congress when he stood in the shadow of dark clouds of defeat, in danger of losing his all: "A Character to lose, an Estate to forfeit, the inestimable blessings of liberty at Stake, and a life devoted, must be my excuse." 213

Epilogue

There were many episodes and occurrences that took place within the far-flung orbit of influence, power, or protection of Fort Pitt and its commanders which might have been included within the scope of this narrative; but space does not permit. This presentation of documentary material, taken from the original sources, is by no means intended to be a complete history of Fort Pitt during the Revolution. It hopes to depict the image of Fort Pitt in its relation to the wider and greater plans and fields of action of the commanders on both sides that were almost continental in scope. Much more material is in the hands of the writer touching upon the activities of such men as George Rogers Clark, but his operations originated and were directed by the Virginia government. We hope that some of the episodes and documentary illustrations may be of a character that our readers would not have discovered or extracted for themselves. The purpose has been to utilize existing (old and seldom used) historical materials in application to new viewpoints of our Revolutionary past.

212 Niles, Hoosac Valley, 278-79.
213 Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 403.