its role in the American Revolution and the Civil War, transportation, architecture, and education. The near-omission of several other areas also tells us something about the county. For example, there is little attention devoted to Indians, heavy industry, journalism, medicine, banking, the legal profession, or ethnic groups. Not including certain other materials may be a shortcoming. Considering that "Agriculture remained basic to the region's economy through the second and third quarters of the twentieth century" (p. 282), it seems more material could have been included on the topic. Also, in analyzing the coverage provided for each quarter century of the county's history from the mid-1750s to 1976, it appears that the most recent half century, and particularly the decades since World War II, received insufficient attention.

All things considered, however, Snyder's Union County, Pennsylvania is more significant, scholarly, and readable than Ayars's Lancaster Diary 1776.

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In 1949 Louis C. Hunter published his classic history of early river transportation, Steamboats on the Western Rivers. His work was massive in size — fully 684 pages — and comprehensive in scope. In it Hunter discussed nearly every facet of the industry: technology, investment, labor, legislation, and safety, as well as touching upon the steamboat's role in American culture. So exhaustive was Hunter's examination that he cornered the market, so to speak, co-opting everyone else working on the trade. The huge superstructure of his monograph has served as a point of reference and a point of departure for every study of the business launched since that time.

Our purpose here, of course, is not to review Hunter's book, published more than a quarter century ago, but rather to discuss a new study, Western River Transportation: The Era of Early Internal Development, 1810-1860, assembled by three econometric historians, Erik
F. Haites, James Mak, and Gary M. Walton. They freely acknowledge their debt to the old master, noting that Hunter's work was "invaluable" to their own. Yet this is really an understatement, for their monograph is dominated by Hunter. They cite or quote him so frequently that he might well have been listed on the title page as a fourth coauthor.

As their central objective, Haites, Mak, and Walton sought to provide "a quantitative analysis of early western river transportation" in which the steamboat was the dominant element. They suggest that Hunter made little use of quantitative materials in his analysis, but this is not exactly true. Hunter made extensive use of numerical data. What he did not do was employ an econometric analysis — the bailiwick of the authors. Like Hunter they found their task difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, the snag being the paucity of statistics remaining from an age not much given to accurate record-keeping in the first place. Haites, Mak, and Walton were nevertheless persistent in locating new materials, but they readily acknowledge that the data assembled for analysis were "fragmentary," "incomplete," "sketchy," and so forth. Because of the limitations of the quantitative base, the best the triumvirate could do was to provide a series of estimates about competition, investment, productivity, expansion, and other aspects of the river trade. They then compared the results to the conclusions of Hunter and other historians as well as to the findings of those who have investigated the role of canals and railroads in the antebellum era.

For the most part, Haites, Mak, and Walton readily admit that the bulk of their conclusions substantiate the work of Hunter and others. The authors find that steamboating was highly competitive, that the bulk of goods carried was exported through the port of New Orleans, that the industry was financed largely by private capital, and that the steamboat as an obsolescent technology persisted on secondary rivers long after the railroads had decimated the trade on the major interurban routes. On the other hand, Haites, Mak, and Walton claim they differ from Hunter by arguing that steamboating did not enter a period of absolute decline until after the Civil War; the difference between the two conclusions, however, may not be significant as it arises from slightly different sets of statistics. The trio's most significant departure from orthodoxy is their conclusion that the increasing tempo of trade on inland waterways resulted not from the steamboat's speed but rather from a prolonged navigation season and from a reduction
of the time spent in port. This is bound to be a controversial point.

*Western River Transportation* is clearly intended for a limited academic market composed mostly of economic historians in general and econometricians in particular. The narrow focus, difficult literary style, and mathematical analyses do not lend themselves to a large reading public, which in turn raises questions about the orientation of the profession. Readers seeking a quantitative analysis of western river transportation will turn either to this book or to the five articles on which the monograph is based. Individuals desiring a more interesting, comprehensive history will continue to look to Hunter.

Arizona and the West

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There is a tired joke about James Buchanan that few teachers of American history can resist when they come to the Pennsylvanian's four years in the White House: "James Buchanan accomplished everything he set out to accomplish. Nothing!" Professor Smith's retelling of the familiar story of Buchanan's administration is not likely to put that quip to rest; nor is it likely to cause historians to raise their estimate of the man. Smith does not try to overturn Buchanan's reputation as an ineffective president — in fact, he outlines his failures as a party leader. Rather he seeks to amend our notion of Buchanan to read that he was "neither indecisive nor weak." His helplessness in halting the downward spiral of "Bleeding Kansas" into "Bleeding America" was not due to any lack of political principles. He was, from first to last, a pro-Southern unionist. A bachelor, whose life was mainly a public one, whose closest friends were slaveowners or pro-slavery sympathizers, Buchanan's deepest emotional attachment was to a strong (even imperialistic) America, half-slave, half-free, with the balance tipped ever so slightly to the slavocracy. In this he was sincere, says Smith, and in this he was constant. The president failed, in other words, because his principles failed.

Buchanan had been for Clay in 1824, but in 1828 he discovered the bold leadership of Jackson. Buchanan remained a Jacksonian to