LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA'S STEEL INDUSTRY, 1800-1959

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The relations of labor and management were remarkably peaceful during the first century and a quarter of the iron and steel industry in Pennsylvania, almost completely escaping the rancor that brought about a rash of union organization in other fields of manufacturing in the first half of the nineteenth century. William A. Sullivan, in his exhaustive study of labor relations, found only one of the 138 strikes in the commonwealth between 1800 and 1840 which was related to this industry and only two other — both apparently short-lived — efforts at unionization in the field.

There were various reasons for this situation:

1. The nature of the work in the industry precluded competition by merchant capitalists who could become large employers or bring in inferior goods to undercut the independent worker, as was the case with shoemakers and some other trades.

2. The rapid expansion of the industry offered many new opportunities for change for the more intelligent and alert (and most likely to make trouble) of the workers.

3. Discipline was less fixed and rigid than in factories.

4. Located in rural areas and usually dependent on water power, early furnaces and forges ran intermittently, seldom achieving a day-in, day-out continuous schedule which almost forced employees to strike for shorter hours and weeks. In this connection and the follow-

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1 The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840 (Harrisburg, 1955).
2 Ibid., Appendix B, 221-30. This involved Philadelphia tin plate and sheet iron workers, who struck in 1835 for a ten-hour day.
4 Commons, History of Labour, 1: 88-107.
5 Sullivan, Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 9-15, has a good discussion of this expansion but does not relate it to labor-management relations.
6 Ibid., 70ff.
ing, it is noteworthy that the workers involved in the union efforts mentioned above were in the state's two largest cities.

5. The early bloomeries and blast furnaces, where all the primary ironwork and much of the molding were done, were located on "iron plantations," where water power and wood for charcoal could be found, and where strangers, even visiting clergymen, were usually not welcomed. Since few of the workmen were literate, this kept away almost all outside influences.

6. But perhaps the most effective factor in heading off organization and strikes was the paternalistic nature of the industry at this period. This often included housing, land for gardens, hunting rights, and other perquisites secured by individual contracts. Considering the hard life of other landless persons, workers probably found their state endurable. Sullivan writes: "Undoubtedly the highly individualistic and paternalistic nature of the relationship between the ironmaster and his workmen was an influential factor in determining the attitudes and the actions of these laborers toward such issues as hours, wages and conditions of work." ¹²

Since this situation changed very little until the use of coke as a blast furnace fuel permitted such mills to move to the cities just before the Civil War, it is not at all surprising that secondary metalworking, and particularly the molders, led the way in the unionization of the iron industry, not only in Pennsylvania but throughout the eastern United States. Although the infant unions of the 1830s died quickly, there were renewed efforts in the following decade. And even defeats, with consequent firings and voluntary departures, helped to spread the idea of unionism along the trail of westward migration. ¹³ Apparently the first strike in the industry in the early west occurred at Pittsburgh in 1842, when molders walked out in February. It proved a failure, being called off July 9, with workers accepting the wage cut against which they had fought,¹⁴ but the experience may have contributed to the organizations founded later at Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis.¹⁵

This agitation may also have inspired a strike three years later

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8 Binning, Pennsylvania Iron Manufacture, 29-38.
9 Ibid., 27.
10 Sullivan, Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 69f.
11 Ibid., 59-62.
12 Ibid., 70.
by Pittsburgh boilers and puddlers, also against wage cuts. The walk-out began in May and continued until former pay rates were restored in August, stabilizing the situation in that part of the state through 1849.16

Up to this time, all industry strikes in Pennsylvania had been, like unionization efforts, by single crafts groups. The success of this joint venture by the boilers and puddlers probably contributed to united action by almost the whole of the industry at Pittsburgh in 1850. Faced with wage cuts, the puddlers, boilers, refiners, scrappers, and heaters walked out on January 12. The employers retaliated with importation of immigrant strikebreakers — the first such action on record in the state. Mass picketing and violence were put down by city and Allegheny County authorities, and the strike was lost by the end of March, many workers moving westward or seeking other employment.18

This setback delayed further efforts at unionization for several years. But it had set the pattern which resulted in the formation on April 12, 1858, of the Iron City Forge, Sons of Vulcan, a secret society of boilers and puddlers at Pittsburgh.19 The industry was depressed at that time, particularly at Pittsburgh, which had become the center of the heavy iron industry in America, and the new union remained in the background. But after the 1861 tariff and the onset of the Civil War, demand increased, and on September 8, 1862, a convention at Pittsburgh set up a national union, the Grand Forge of the United States, United Sons of Vulcan. The movement spread, and by August 1867, the union had thirty-six “forges” in eight different states: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Illinois.20

Meantime, the molders continued to go their separate way, their work being largely in cast iron, that of the other unions in wrought iron and steel. On July 16, 1855, a ten-week, unsuccessful strike of molders culminated in the organization of the Stove and Hollowware Molders Union of Philadelphia. They struck and lost again in 1857.

16 Pa. Internal Affairs Annual Report, 1882, Part 3, 273. (There was a puddlers’ strike at Phoenixville in the spring of 1848 which was lost.)
17 Ibid., 271.
20 Robinson, Amalgamated Association, 11-12.
But the industry was becoming impersonal, with workers overworked and underpaid, and other molders' unions were soon formed in Reading, Pennsylvania, Troy, Albany, Buffalo, Peekskill, Port Chester, and Utica, New York, Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio, and in Louisville, St. Louis, Baltimore, Jersey City, Providence, and Stamford, Connecticut. In 1859, many delegates met in Philadelphia and by adjournment again in Albany, New York, in January 1860, where they officially founded a national union. The following year the molders' union became international, with locals in Brantford, Hamilton, and Toronto, Ontario, and in Montreal.

In 1866 and 1867, the molders were almost bankrupted by a series of unsuccessful strikes, the worst being at Pittsburgh, where workers walked out January 1, 1867, to protest a 20 percent wage cut. Aided by a total of $40,000 from the International Molders Union and personal investments by members and friends, the strikers tried building a cooperative foundry, at a cost of $18,000. But there were many delays, most of the workers went back to their old plants in the fall, and the new cooperative was not able to turn out the first casting until mid-May 1868. By this time the market was greatly depressed. Soon creditors were pushing for their money, and the union cooperative went under the sheriff's hammer in the fall, barely realizing enough to satisfy judgments against it. The Molders Union, already hard hit, languished for years, much involved in an attempt to set up the National Labor Union, which collapsed early in the Panic of 1873. The Molders Union continues in existence to this day, but apparently never as a very effective force in the ferrous metals industry in Pennsylvania.

The Amalgamated Association

During the first few years following the Civil War, there were numerous local strikes by member forges of the Sons of Vulcan, many of them lost for lack of financial aid. But after the union and all employers in the Pittsburgh area adopted a sliding-scale agreement in July 1867, peace continued there for seven years. And following the adoption of national control over strikes in 1870, the union increased

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22 Ibid., 40.
25 Ibid., 269. The union, while still in existence, is scarcely ever mentioned in labor histories.
in membership until the industry was hard hit by the Panic of 1873. During 1874 and the following year, there were a great number of strikes and lockouts in Harrisburg, Pottsville, Allentown, and Pittsburgh, most of them (except two at Harrisburg, which were lost) being satisfactorily settled by negotiation.27

Strictly a craft union, the Sons included only boilers and puddlers, barring roll hands and other finishers, as well as laborers. In the meantime, two other unions had originated, both to fill that vacuum, and neither active in this state. Out of a movement to end competition between these two unions — largely western — came an approach to the Sons of Vulcan in 1875. On December 7 of that year, the Associated Brotherhood of Iron and Steel Heaters, Rollers and Roughers, the Iron and Steel Roll Hands Union, and the Sons of Vulcan united to form the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers. At a final meeting in Pittsburgh on August 3-4, 1876, to adopt a constitution, a few lodges of United Nailers entered the organization.28 Tin mill workers were added in the late 1890s.29

As might have been expected, the Sons of Vulcan, which provided more than 85 percent of the membership, completely dominated the new union.30 And as late as the time of the bloody Homestead Steel Strike of 1892, the older name continued in use. A folk song of that period contained the verse:

'Twas on the sixth July, Ninety two
Just at the dawn of day,
The Pinkerton marauders tried
To land at Fort Frick bay.
But there they met their waterloo
From Vulcan's brawny Sons,
Who repulsed them in a moment
And stifled all their guns.31

For the next few years union-management relations in the industry continued, on the whole, to be reasonably good. While wages and work hours were little changed from the early period of the Sons of

27 Ibid., 154ff; 1880, Part 7, 310-16.
29 Robinson, Amalgamated Association, 9.
30 Brooks, As Steel Goes, 22.
31 Sung for me by an old man who was doorman at an Elks Club, about 1956. He had heard it as a young man in Homestead in 1892.
Vulcan, economic conditions had also remained fairly stable, except for the panic years of the 1870s. That union's records show eighty-seven legal strikes from 1867-1875, of which sixty-nine were for rates and payment of wages, sixteen on working practices and conditions, and two for "miscellaneous reasons." Of these, twenty-eight were won by the union, twenty-two lost, twenty-one compromised, and the outcome of sixteen doubtful.

In the late 1870s, Pennsylvania manufacturers attempted to destroy the union by firing its leaders, and a rash of strikes followed. During the first decade of the Amalgamated, however, its officers counted only ninety-three legal strikes, of which sixty-one were over wages, unionization seventeen, contracts three, and miscellaneous twelve. The outcome showed twenty-eight were successful, four were compromised, and sixty-one lost. Most of these losses were attributed to the development of mechanization in the steel industry, especially introduction of the Bessemer process, which resulted in "the complete subjugation of labor to the will of the employers" in the eastern mills. Despite these difficulties, the union's membership grew rapidly for several years, to 11,800 in 1883, to over 16,000 in 1889, reaching a peak of more than 24,000 in 1891. Then, in 1892 came the disastrous Homestead strike.

The roots of this classic confrontation ran back to the beginnings of very large steel plants at Pittsburgh. There were three of these: the Edgar Thomson mill in Braddock, built by Andrew Carnegie in 1874; the Homestead mills, built in 1881 and sold to Carnegie two years later; and the Duquesne mill, built in 1889 and sold to Carnegie in 1890. The union had never been strong at the Braddock mill, which was headed by William Jones, who was idolized by his men and who had introduced the eight-hour day in 1877. Duquesne was never unionized. But the Homestead works had been with the union since it was opened, and by 1889, it had seven active locals of the Amalgamated.

In 1886, Carnegie had written two articles for Forum magazine on the labor question, in which he upheld the right of employees to

32 Brooks, As Steel Goes, 23.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 307f.
36 Ibid., 308f.
38 Brooks, As Steel Goes, 23.
40 Brooks, As Steel Goes, 23.
form unions and to strike, if necessary, warning, however, that violence and lawlessness would not be tolerated: "Rioters assembling in numbers and marching to the pillage [probably recalling the 1877 railroad riots and the Haymarket affair in Chicago] will be remorselessly shot down. . . ." 41 In 1887, Carnegie succeeded in getting the men at Braddock to switch to the twelve-hour day, despite the arguments of Jones, and two years later he reached an agreement at Homestead by which the tonnage basis of pay was switched to a sliding scale, but the union given full recognition. 42

By the time the next contract was being negotiated in 1892, Jones had died in a mill accident and had been replaced by Charles M. Schwab, a man much more in agreement with Henry Clay Frick, who was in complete charge of everything in Carnegie's absence. Carnegie, as usual, had gone to England and Scotland for the summer. And as of July 1, the day after the union contract was to have expired, Carnegie's three steel mills and other operations were consolidated into Carnegie Steel Company. 43

Whether or not Carnegie planned the Homestead antiunion campaign with Frick before going overseas may always remain a moot point. Certainly he had been much upset in 1889 when some 2,000 strikers faced and turned back the sheriff and 125 deputies who had come to escort a group of strikebreakers into the plant. He even referred to the strikers as "law breakers." 44 But the only evidence of the alleged planning for an 1892 confrontation is in quotations and statements made long afterwards by James H. Bridge and George B. M. Harvey, 45 both Frick partisans who were out to blacken Carnegie's name in any way possible. After the clash on July 6, of course, Carnegie was outraged by violence and the seizure of the mill and was ready to fight the union to the finish, in accordance with his principles announced in 1886.

The story of the Homestead clash is too well known to be de-

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41 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 522-25.
42 Ibid., 527-30.
43 Ibid., 523f, 534-37, 541.
44 Ibid., 529f.
45 Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Company: A Romance of Millions (New York, 1903); Henry Clay Frick, the Man (New York, 1928). Both, strong Frick partisans, wrote to put the blame of the strike on Carnegie. Singularly, despite Bridge's admission (in a second edition) that he had obtained none of his information while he was Carnegie's secretary several years before these events, and despite his evident misstatements in many other places, and that Harvey's book is full of errors and misstatements, no one seems to have questioned their accounts in this matter. (The Frick papers have never been made available to scholars, and may have been destroyed.) I have never been able to find any documentary or other basis for their statements.
tailed here. On May 30, the company ordered the union to accept a scale (for the 300-odd skilled men it represented in the matter) representing a cut of something like 20 percent. While wild stories were given out that skilled workers were making $10 to $50 a day, Frick later admitted on oath that the top four men received an average of $10 to $12.65 a day. Research by an economist revealed that even this was inflated: the top four men averaged $7.60 a day, and only 140 of the 3,800 workers made $4 a day or more. About half received $1.40 a day or less. A deadline was fixed for June 24, after which there would be no negotiations with the union — only with the men individually. Negotiations were broken off, and on June 28 the company began shutting down the departments involved in the tonnage price issue. With the expiration of the contract on June 30, the rest of the workers walked out.

Meanwhile, the company had built a board and barbed wire fence around the plant, which was quickly nicknamed “Fort Frick.” On June 25, Frick arranged for 300 Pinkerton men, armed with rifles, to be moved into the plant by riverboat at dawn on July 6. The workers resisted, and in the ensuing clash four Pinkertons and seven workmen were shot to death. After twelve hours, the hired guards surrendered under a safety guarantee, but were badly beaten up by irate women. Workmen had broken into the plant and held it until Governor Robert Pattison called out militiamen, who occupied it on July 12.

Murder charges and later charges of treason were filed against strike leaders, but juries refused to convict them. Public sympathy had all been with the union until July 23, when a young Russian revolutionist, Alexander Berkman, tried to assassinate Frick. Then a sudden backlash occurred. But already the mill had begun reopening with 700 strikebreakers. By October 13, two thousand were working, and on November 20 the union officially gave up. But it was already crushed. Wages were reduced until all but a few skilled workers earned only $11.55 for an eighty-four-hour week of seven twelve-hour days. What remained of the union attempted another strike in 1901 after the formation of United States Steel Corporation, but the strike was a failure. After 1903, no union existed as a bargaining unit in any major plant of the steel industry in Pennsylvania for thirty-four years.

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46 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 552; Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles (New York, 1936), 95.
47 Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 554.
48 Ibid., 552.
49 Ibid., 556.
50 Yellen, Labor Struggles, 88-100.
51 Ibid., 94-100; Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 561-81.
The 1919 Strike

The Amalgamated Association and numerous other craft organizations maintained a skeleton existence, of course, and from time to time there were strikes — either for the right to organize or over wages and work hours. Among them were the Standard Steel Car strike at McKees Rocks — where strikebreakers were hired at Ellis Island “to work as carpenters in Indiana,” brought to the plant in sealed cars, and shot if they tried to escape; and the South Bethlehem strike of 1910, which was quickly crushed by state police. But the next major effort, on an industry-wide basis, occurred just after the end of World War I.

Steel was the one major industry in which labor had received almost no benefit either from wartime prosperity or the War Labor Board’s stand for union rights, the eight-hour day, or minimum wages. Big Steel, headed by Judge Elbert H. Gary, led the industry in standing solidly against unions or other worker gains. More than 60 percent of the men in steel mills still worked the twelve-hour day and many of these the seven-day week. While a few skilled men did better, a church inquiry commission found that nearly three-fourths of steel employees made less than fifty cents an hour — more than 35 percent under thirty-five cents. Company welfare plans benefitted few workers noticeably.

In September 1918, led by Chicago activists who had won strong gains in the stockyards, the American Federation of Labor set up a National Committee for the Organizing of the Iron and Steel Industry. It included representatives of no fewer than twenty-five union groups claiming jurisdiction among the various crafts of the industry. The plan was for a hurricane drive in all steel centers at once, with workers signing identical cards, which were then distributed by crafts among the participating unions. With 100,000 workers signed and many more in sympathy, the organizers called for a conference with representatives of the industry in Pittsburgh in May 1919. Judge Gary refused to meet with union leaders, and smaller companies followed his lead. The strike began on September 22, with some 275,000 workers answering the call. By early October, the peak of effectiveness, the strike total ran close to 370,000, and was reported

52 Horace B. Davis, Labor and Steel (New York, 1933), 238f.
54 Originally fifteen, later expanded.
to be 90 percent effective. In the Pittsburgh area it was 75 to 85 percent.\textsuperscript{55}

The companies fought back, raised the specter of radicalism, and received strong support by federal and state governments, the press, and a panicky public rallying to the slogan of "Americanization." Freedom of speech was completely trampled under the feet of police, company cossacks, deputies, and hooligans. In Pittsburgh, Sheriff William S. Haddock ordered all officers in the county to disperse any groups of three or more seen on the street. Deputy police at Braddock ambushed and attacked a funeral procession, clubbing the mourners; mounted men rode down children going home from school; parishioners of a priest who sympathized with the strike were mercilessly clubbed as they left Sunday services. In the twenty-five miles of the Monongahela Valley from Pittsburgh to Clairton, 125,000 armed men spread terror. Strikers were denounced and jailed as communists, anarchists, and criminal syndicalists.\textsuperscript{56}

The Amalgamated Association and some of the other union groups not only discouraged the strike but actually hindered it. Financial backing was so small as to be almost nonexistent. By the end of October, men were returning (sometimes being physically dragged from their homes) to work, and soon production was back to 90 percent of normal. The strike was officially called off on January 8, 1920. Bethlehem Steel had agreed to the eight-hour day, and a few other benefits had been granted. But in the following years the steel companies tightened the cords of servitude still more than before. There were many reasons for the failure, besides governmental tyranny and the punitive action of the corporations: poor organization; lack of union support; hostility of press and public; plentiful supplies of strikebreakers; prejudice of various ethnic groups against each other; and around Pittsburgh, the paralyzing remembrance of the Homestead fiasco.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{56} Yellen, \textit{Labor Struggles}, 91, 270; Davis, \textit{Labor and Steel}, 246ff; Brooks, \textit{Toil and Trouble}, 143.

Industrial Unionization

When John L. Lewis and his fellow unionists launched the Committee for Industrial Organization late in 1935 and through it the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) the following June, the stage seemed set for a repetition of 1919 — violence and defeat for the workers. Steelworker organizing efforts in 1933 and 1934 under the National Recovery Act had been complete failures.58

This time it was different — for a while. Company union groups had already been rebelling and seeking independence.59 The National Labor Relations Act had just been passed, and was upheld by the Supreme Court in a case involving Pittsburgh’s Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, in July 1937.60 But the biggest surprise was when the United States Steel Corporation’s Carnegie-Illinois subsidiary suddenly dropped its opposition to unions in the spring of 1937 and agreed to a standard contract with the SWOC.61 Jones and Laughlin threw in the towel after a thirty-six-hour strike.62

But, led by Tom Girdler of Republic Steel, a group of independents fought unionization, forming what was usually referred to as the “Little Steel” group, which included Bethlehem Steel as a principal Pennsylvania member. Employing the old tactics of charging “radicalism,” threatening to move plants, covering up employment of strikebreakers with phony “back to work” movements, and enlisting local authorities, Little Steel broke the strike. In Johnstown, Bethlehem commended Mayor Daniel J. Shields for using his office and police in the fray. Some thirty strikers and sympathizers were killed, mostly in Illinois and Ohio. But labor finally won this conflict, too, when the War Labor Board took over in 1942.63 In the same year SWOC took over the Amalgamated and other craft unions in the field and became the United Steelworkers of America.64

This triumph ushered in a new era in industry-employee relations for iron and steel in America. Since that time there have been steel strikes: notably those of 1946, which lasted for about a month;65 1949, lasting three weeks;66 1952, lasting fifty-four days, and the last in

58 Brooks, Toil and Trouble, 162-77.
60 Ibid., 100f.
61 Ibid., 175-85; Brooks, Toil and Trouble, 188f.
62 Kent, “Industrial Unionism,” 188f; Brooks, Toil and Trouble, 189.
64 Brooks, Toil and Trouble, 187.
65 McDonald, Union Man, 178-79.
66 Ibid., 207-8.
which companies have seriously tried to oppose unions by charges of subversion and radicalism;\textsuperscript{67} and 1959, for 116 days.\textsuperscript{68} Relations have been reasonably stable, and if not always friendly — at least civilized.\textsuperscript{69}

Summing up, we may note that the ferrous metals industry in Pennsylvania had few labor-management problems until the beginning of mass production. Such problems from 1840 to 1890 were principally concerned with wages and hours, and for the succeeding half-century with wages and unionization rights. Since 1940, the issues have principally been wages, hours, and fringe benefits. The relatively peaceful relations in this period might indicate that strong unions, protected by law, are more conducive to industrial peace than were conditions when unions had no rights, and law was wholly on the side of industry. It is also noteworthy that the ferrous metals industry — once among the least involved in labor-management problems — has now become of so great importance in such relations as to give rise to a proverbial phrase: "As goes steel, so goes the nation."

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 222-25.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 267-80.
\textsuperscript{69} Having already come to within the past two decades, I feel this is the place to stop. On more recent labor difficulties, the story would be about the same. And, as Sir Walter Raleigh wrote: "He that in writing a Moderne History followeth Truth too nigh by the heels, mayhap it shall strike out his teeth" (in his History of the World).