BOOK REVIEWS


The publication schedule of The Papers of Henry Bouquet has seen its share of oddities. Volume 2 in the series, which keyed on the Forbes expedition against Fort Duquesne (1758), was published first, in 1951. It was not until 1972 that Volume 1 appeared, which covered December 1755 through May 1758, Bouquet's first years in America. The publication of Volumes 3 and 4 places the series at its halfway mark, the intention being to complete it with four more volumes, covering Bouquet's career in America to his untimely death in 1765.

Most of the papers that are included in Volumes 3 and 4, as in the first two volumes and those that are projected, are available in older printed works as well. The largest single source of documentary material on Bouquet is the Bouquet Papers, a collection in the British Library. The pertinent letters and papers in this collection were edited by Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent and were published in nineteen mimeographed volumes between 1940 and 1943. Other Bouquet letters and papers have been printed elsewhere. The editors of the volumes under review have combed British and American archives for material on Bouquet and have printed items that, though relevant to their subject, involve him neither as author nor as addressee. Their exertions have permitted them to place some material in print for the first time. However, the revelations are few.

Despite the lack of significant new material, the series is well justified. Its usefulness derives largely from the thoroughly professional editing that has characterized this project from the first. Indeed, The Papers of Henry Bouquet may stand as a guide to proper editorial method. Both volumes under review provide excellent bibliographies. Both are well indexed. The rules of transcription are precisely
laid out and are followed consistently. Almost all documents, even if previously in print, have been newly transcribed for the present edition. Materials in foreign languages are printed in the original as well as in translation. Letters that could not be located but whose contents are known from other correspondence are summarized from hypothetical reconstructions. For all of these features, the editors are to be commended. Their greatest service, however, lies in the extensive annotation that they provide. The notes on individuals, army units, and localities add greatly to the value of the volumes.

Volumes 3 and 4 find Bouquet between moments of glory. Immediately behind him lay the Forbes expedition, which he had helped to direct. A few years in the future was Bushy Run, his tactical masterpiece that marked the turning of the tide against Pontiac. Though the years 1759-1760 allowed him no opportunity to make use of his abilities as a strategist and tactician, he served the army well as an administrator. This period found him the most important figure in the British and American supply scheme in the west. That the troops were often poorly clothed and fed is unsurprising, given the size of the area under his purview, the ruggedness of the terrain, and most of all the chaotic logistical arrangements of the day. It may in fact be said that Bouquet succeeded as well as any officer might have under the circumstances. His efforts and talents did not go unappreciated by the army. A lieutenant colonel during 1759-1760, he was promoted colonel in 1762, brigadier-general in 1765 — exceptional progress for a foreign-born officer.

Given that Bouquet's efforts in 1759-1760 centered on supply, it should come as no surprise that the two volumes under review are rich in the stuff of ledgers, receipts, notes of payment, debits, and returns of provisions. Generally these documents attest to the difficulty of Bouquet's position. So do dozens of letters that he received from officers on the frontier — desperate pleas for food, clothing, and horses.

The Papers of Henry Bouquet paints a depressing picture of army life in the west during the French and Indian War. The recruits, British and American, were of generally poor quality. Most of them did not adapt well to the rigors of army life. Morale was low, desertion rates high, and both problems intensified when pay was tardy, as it often was. In May 1759, Bouquet informed Amherst that "the 100 men Left at Cumberland of the Maryland Troops are reduced by desertion to 25. . . . The men having neither Pay nor certainty of receiving any" (3: p. 162). The quality of accommodations was usually poor, and
this, too, depressed morale. In June 1760, Bouquet wrote of Fort Pitt, then under construction, “The Barraks made of green Wood or bad Briks want already much Repair, and some Parts of the Works raised in haste must be pulled down & be made up again” (4: p. 603). Finally, officers and men alike had to contend with the crushing awareness of isolation that pervaded life on the frontier. The sense of being cut off from the broader world bred its own sort of desperation, as one can see in a letter that Lieutenant Lewis Ourry wrote to Bouquet from Fort Bedford in January 1759: “I hope, Sir, . . . you will have more Compassion on me than the rest of the World, & send me up a Bundle of News-Papers” (3: p. 81).

As these selections suggest, the volumes under review emphasize the workaday side of army life. Those who equate military history with the study of battles will find that the volumes contain a few reports of minor actions, but no more. They, presumably, will be disappointed. However, for those who wish to examine the army as a social institution, The Papers of Henry Bouquet stands as a central reference.

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Throughout the three months covered in this volume the question of whether major combat operations would occur in 1782 hung in balance. On February 6, Morris was ashamed to tell Washington that no money was available for sending Virginia troops to reinforce Nathanael Greene’s southern operations. Nevertheless, one month later he lectured a state assembly leader on the importance of Pennsylvania providing revenue so that Washington could begin offensive operations early in the spring. It is not clear whether Morris was bluffing; it was not until mid-May that he would admit to a confidant that war finances were now merely a device for building a national fiscal system.

Although Britain’s decision against further offensive operations