On August 14, 1945, the United States government announced the unconditional surrender of Japan, and World War II came to an end. With the fighting over, for the first time in four and one-half years neither soldier nor civilian faced the prospect of violent death. When news of the cessation of hostilities reached the United States, Americans enthusiastically celebrated. Every city and hamlet in the nation had its own jubilant demonstration; people gathered together spontaneously as if to reassure themselves that the killing had really stopped.

Bedford, Pennsylvania, was no exception. Located in the heart of the Allegheny Mountains, on the main road from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, Bedford had not escaped the war. Many of her citizens had gone off to serve their country; some would never return. A naval training station, located in a well-known resort hotel, had been a constant reminder — if one was needed — that there was a war.

Now it was finally over. Bedfordites and their neighbors joined in the victory celebration. By the hundreds, by the thousands, people poured into town to demonstrate their joy. Though entirely unplanned, there was still a logic in the proceedings. People drove out of town, turned south on Route 220, passed the Bedford Springs Hotel, and then returned to town to repeat the circuit. Cars and trucks were decorated with red, white, and blue. Horns tooted; people cheered and shouted. One car sported a loudspeaker which continually played patriotic music. The loudest cheers were reserved for the passage past the old hotel. Perhaps the parade would have gone no farther, except that police would not permit the pedestrians or vehicles to stop. State policemen, and even firemen, helped control the traffic. They continually waved on the celebrants while others followed in a seemingly endless procession.¹

The object of the crowd’s attention were the “guests” at the hotel,

¹ Bedford Gazette, Aug. 17, 1945; Cumberland (Md.) Evening Times, Aug. 16, 1945; conversation with Vaughn Whisker, Mar. 8, 1976.
who, despite the hubbub or because of it, were not in evidence throughout the demonstration. The guests were General Hiroshi Oshima, Japanese ambassador to Germany, his colleagues, and members of the embassy staff. They took the news of Japan's surrender unemotionally, even stoically. Oshima was given the word that morning; he informed the others. Undoubtedly, Bedford's celebration lasted far past the time when the Japanese retired to their rooms some fifteen minutes before their 11:00 p.m. curfew.

By the spring of 1945, the war in Europe was rapidly coming to a close, with the Reich under sustained attack from both east and west. As the end approached for Berlin, Japanese diplomatic personnel fled from the capital to escape the approaching Allied armies. A handful reached Sweden, from where they hoped to cross Russia (which was not then at war with Japan) to their homeland. Others fled southward where a few reached the Swiss border. Denied entry into that country, they turned back and were captured by the French. Others never got that far and were apprehended by American units in Austria.

As a matter of fact, the capture of these diplomats was not completely unanticipated. When the Japanese armies captured Western colonies in East and Southeast Asia, many colonial officials were taken prisoner until Japan held some 150,000 Westerners, including diplomats, civilians, and military prisoners of war.

The issue of nonmilitary prisoners has a long and checkered history. In the Napoleonic Wars, all British males between the ages of eighteen and sixty who happened to be in France were treated as prisoners of war. Two Hague conferences, in 1898 and 1907, dealt with the treatment of prisoners of war, though both conferences supposed that these would be military personnel taken in combat.

The United States, as well as other nations, confronted the question of nonmilitary prisoners during World War I. American officials rounded up some 6,300 enemy nationals and interned about 2,300 of them in World War I. The remainder were paroled, subject to reinternment if their behavior made such treatment necessary. Because of the thorniness of the issue, American and German negotiators discussed both civilian and military prisoners in a special wartime con-

2 Johnstown Tribune, Aug. 14, 1945; National Archives, Record Group 59, Decimal File 740.94115, Document No. 8-2245, John R. Hall to Fitch, Aug. 20, 1945 (Records in the National Archives will hereafter be cited as NA, followed by Record Group, file, and document numbers).

3 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 6-2245, Robert Murphy's message 511 to the state dept., June 22, 1945; ibid., No. 5-1645, Julius E. Eichler to Harry S. Truman, May 16, 1945.
ference at Geneva. One difficulty in resolving the civilian issue was that, while there were probably 2,100 Americans in Germany, there were more than six million Germans, "Austrians," and "Hungarians" in the United States. With negotiations finally over, a treaty was signed on November 11, 1918. This was the exact day the Armistice took effect, and that document and the subsequent treaties ending World War I superseded the prisoner treaty, which was never ratified.

In 1924, meeting in Stockholm, the Prisoner of War Committee of the International Law Association made recommendations concerning both civilian and military prisoners. These recommendations were expanded by the Geneva Convention of 1929 and adopted by the Red Cross in 1934. World War II broke out before the convention could be ratified by all participants, though the Red Cross suggested that all nations abide by its provisions. Thus, when World War II began, every participating nation had a concept of an "enemy alien." The population of France included three million aliens, 6 percent of the total population. They were required to register with the police and carry a registration card. Males from enemy countries, if between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five, were immediately interned. Britain ordered the registration of such aliens, prohibited their residence in certain areas, and interned those felt to be dangerous. While Germany also ordered the registration of such aliens, the problem was complicated in the Allied countries by a large number of refugees from Germany and Austria. There was considerable confusion in official circles as to whether these refugees would be loyal allies or potential fifth columnists.

The United States had the advantage of the Allies' experience when World War II belatedly involved this country. Furthermore, at the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, Axis seamen scuttled a number of vessels in American waters. These seamen were interned in special camps. With active American participation in the war, supervision of the camps changed relatively little, though security measures were stepped up.4

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When Pearl Harbor was bombed, both Japan and the United States immediately took steps to handle the enemy alien problem; the actions taken included internment. Among the internees were diplomatic personnel of both nations. Guards were placed around the Japanese embassy in Washington. The Japanese consulates in New York City and other cities were placed under police guard. Some Japanese in New York City were held under guard on Ellis Island.

The Japanese government interned American diplomats in the American embassy in Tokyo; other Americans were confined to their homes or were taken to prison. This happened in Japan, China, and other places under Japanese control. Both the United States and Japan treated these diplomats with special courtesy; these internees received greater privileges on a reciprocal basis until they were exchanged.

Actually, the first exchange involving Americans took place even before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Five hundred German and Italian consular and propaganda officers were exchanged for a number of American consular officials and tourist agents. Lisbon was the site. After American entry into the war, Swedish ships were used to exchange European Axis officials at Lisbon and Japanese officials at Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa. Subsequently, England and Japan made another exchange. The United States, acting for all the Allies, carried out two more exchanges; the last was completed in December 1943.5

Japan rebuffed overtures for further exchanges because the Allies lacked prisoners of sufficient status. Therefore, Allied military com-

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manders were encouraged, as early as the North African campaign, to give special attention to the apprehension of Japanese nationals. A smattering of Japanese were captured by Allied forces in Italy and were held at Montecatini.6

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1945, American units continued collecting Japanese civilians in Austria until the American Seventh Army held about one hundred and thirty at the resort town of Bad Gastein. These included diplomats from the ambassador on down, military and technical advisers, and their families; some were lower-ranking embassy personnel such as cooks, chauffeurs, and maids. There were also several Japanese businessmen and reporters, and even some Europeans who were spouses or employees of the Japanese.7

A number of cables flew back and forth across the Atlantic concerning the Japanese contention that they were diplomats and that they should not be treated as prisoners of war. In the end, the Department of State convinced the military that the Japanese should be treated with some deference, especially in such matters as interrogations and baggage searches. In addition to using these prisoners in an exchange, the state department now felt that the Japanese might be useful for propaganda or psychological warfare purposes. Intending to get the best possible use from their capture, Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew, former ambassador to Japan, wired a state department official in Paris to try to convince the British that they should agree to "ship JAP diplomats to the U.S. emphasizing that it is intended to utilize them as bargaining materials in new pooled Allied exchange proposals now under consideration and concerning which BRIT Embassy Washington has informed BRIT FONOFIG . . . ."8 Meanwhile, the diplomats remained at Bad Gastein because no facilities were yet available to house them in the United States. They occupied two small hotels, the Hotel Söentgen and the Haus Hirt, where the 101st Airborne Division provided around-the-clock guards.9

The state department began searching for a proper place to house the Japanese. From their experience with interned diplomatic per-

7 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 8-245.
8 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 5-1745, Tel. 2471, telegram, Grew to Robert Murphy, May 17, 1945; see also ibid., memo of conversation between Tswer-ling Tsui, executive secretary of the Chinese delegation to the U. N. Conference on International Organization, and Mr. Stanton, June 11, 1945 (No. 6-1145).
Personnel at the beginning of the war, and in World War I, American officials concurred that hotels seemed to provide the simplest and most economical method of internment. If the Japanese were to be used for propaganda, the facility should not be too far from Washington. At the same time, adequate security was an obvious necessity. In the end, the most appropriate location seemed to be the Bedford Springs Hotel in Bedford, Pennsylvania. During the war, the navy had used the hotel as a radio training school; more than six thousand sailors passed through it. A group of hotel owners had recently bought Bedford Springs and planned to return it to its original use, although renovation would be so extensive that it could not open for the coming season. The new owners were willing to lease it to the state department if the government would guarantee at least four months’ occupancy. The owners would charge $3.00 per day for each of the detainees and $1.50 per day for each of the Americans stationed there. In addition, the government would pay for meals and employees’ salaries, with a 10 percent overhead to the owners. State department occupancy would begin in the middle of July. Until that time, extensive renovations had to be made, because the facility had deteriorated under its previous use; for example, much of the furniture was missing. Rumors of the hotel’s new use immediately began circulating through Bedford. The local newspaper reported that the new guests could not be prisoners of war or the war department would have done the negotiating rather than the state department. Nevertheless, it was clear the hotel would house prisoners of some kind, because the civil service was advertising for guards. In early June, a state department representative moved into the hotel. He was assigned a room in the Cottage, which also housed Oliver Ayres, manager of the facility, and Alfred Nadar, manager of the golf course and representative of the owners.

The hotel comprised five buildings along the north side of Route 220. The southernmost structure, Building A, was of brick construction and had a kitchen, dining room, and dormitory attached. On a hill behind this building was the Cottage and a brick building called the Annex. Additional outbuildings included stables and garages; across Route 220 was the golf course clubhouse. The government

planned to use two of the buildings along the road and the Annex. Most of the internees would have rooms in the Annex; the remainder would live in Building A. Most of the government personnel would live in Building C, and some hotel employees would have rooms in the dormitory. Although there was also an indoor swimming pool attached to Building A, this would be sealed off and unavailable to the Japanese, as were the hotel’s other recreational facilities.

The mineral springs, for which the hotel was named, had been used for centuries. Each of the seven were reported to have a different kind of water. Before white settlers arrived, Indians had used these springs for medicinal purposes. An English doctor wrote favorably of the waters’ curative powers in 1817. President James Buchanan was a yearly visitor to the hotel for over twenty-five years; the first transatlantic telegram from Queen Victoria was delivered to the president there. James K. Polk had also been a guest at the hotel.11 Although none of the buildings was winterized for use in cold weather, the facility was popular as a resort until the navy converted it into a school.

The government decision to house the Japanese detainees in the Bedford Springs Hotel led to an immediate outcry from the people of central Pennsylvania. Surprisingly, the protest from Bedford itself was more muted than it was in surrounding communities. Private Melvin R. Tressler, a marine, protested in a letter to the Johnstown Tribune. R. W. Miller, a soldier, called the Japanese “the enemy of mankind — an enemy so foul.” An article in the Altoona Mirror asked: “Since when did we start to play nurse maids to those dirty rats? While our boys are starving to death in their filthy Concentration camps.” 12 Mrs. B. C. Kramer, of Toledo, asked a more practical question of the secretary of war: “Who would want to go into this hotel after Japs have lived there?” 13 Mrs. H. Haas summed up the feelings of many toward those “diplo-rats” when she said, “If they bring them here, why not give us the privilege of entertaining them with our shotguns. I’d love it.” 14

In addition to this immediate and personal protest, a number of organizations went on record as opposing the housing of Japanese diplomats at Bedford Springs. American Legion Post 561, of Mc-

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11 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 7-245, Donald H. Hamilton to Senator Francis Myers; conversation with Vaughn Whisker, Mar. 8, 1976. Five of the springs are still flowing.


13 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 7-2145, Mrs. B. C. Kramer to secretary of war, n.d.

14 Johnstown Tribune, July 3, 1945, letter of Mrs. H. Haas.
Connellsburg, sent Senator Francis John Myers a resolution of protest which said that “it was the feeling of the Post that the nip diplomats be accorded the same treatment [as Japan gave American prisoners] instead of being handled with kid gloves and fed to the Queen's taste.”

Robert C. Bowers, speaking for Legion Post 13 in Cumberland, Maryland, said: “The very idea that we should have them in the neighborhood is particularly offensive. . . . It's not going to arouse anything but animosity against those responsible for having people whom we regard as war criminals quartered in our midst.” Almost sixty members of the American War Mothers of Johnstown complained to General George C. Marshall. The Ebensburg Legion Post protested to Congressman Harve Tribbott; so did the Johnstown Quota Club (a group of business and professional women). Among labor organizations which expressed dismay were Locals 1788, 2367, and 2632 of the United Steelworkers, Local 1318 of the United Mine Workers, and Local 555 of the Plumbers and Steamfitters. Otis Mulliken, of the state department's Division of International Labor, Social and Health Affairs, wrote to James B. Carey of the CIO and Robert J. Watt of the AF of L trying to defuse labor's complaints.

Meanwhile, Albert Clattenburg and others worked to contain the protests. They were kept busy answering inquiries from congressmen, in contacting representatives of the press, and in personally answering many of the letters to various branches of the government.

Other protests were less concerned with the fact that the Japanese would be interned in Pennsylvania than with the type of accommodations they would occupy. The Johnstown Tribune, in an editorial, “Aren't We Being Too Nice,” asked whether permitting the Japanese to have complete freedom of the Bedford Springs Hotel was justified. They should not be mistreated, stated the editor, “On

15 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 7-545, protest of Legion Post 561, forwarded to state dept. by Senator Myers.
17 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 7-1945, letter, American War Mothers to George C. Marshall, July 13, 1945; ibid., No. 7-1045, Charles Wille to Harve Tribbott, July 6, 1945; ibid., Joseph La Rocca to Tribbott, July 4, 1945; ibid., telegram, Local 1318, UMW, to Tribbott, July 1, 1945; ibid., telegram, Quota Club to Tribbott, July 2, 1945; ibid., No. 7-2645, letters, P. E. Keener to James Byrnes and Henry L. Stimson, July 26, 1945; ibid., No. 7-1845, Catherine Chessa to Senator Myers; Johnstown Tribune, July 2, 1945.
the other hand, to house them and dine them as though they were welcome guests come to spend a pleasant vacation seems to us to be piling it on a bit thick." The editorial added that the Bedford Springs Hotel's facilities rented for $20.00 per day. American Legion Post 294 of Johnstown felt that an old CCC camp or barracks would be more suitable than a redecorated resort hotel. H. W. Door, president of the Johnstown school board and a Sunday school teacher, told Tribbott that it was unthinkable "to use the public's hard earned money to house 'skunks' in a $30.00 a day hostelry. . . ." Donald H. Hamilton, protesting to Senator Myers, said that Bedford Springs was one of the finest resorts in the East. Allen Croyle, a union official, charged that "the Bedford Springs resort is so sumptuous and exclusive that the average American service and working men could never afford to spend a weekend in it." Nelson A. Elsasser wrote directly to President Truman, complaining that all of the hotel's facilities were open to the Japanese. Representative Raymond S. Springer, of Indiana, felt that the Japanese should be held in a prisoner of war camp. Others had similar complaints. A few correspondents argued that the hotel could be put to better use, perhaps, as a convalescent center for wounded servicemen.

In reply, government spokesmen tried to play down the quality of the facilities that would be used. Joseph Grew told Senator Myers that "while it is distasteful for all of us, it is a thing which must be done in the interest of our compatriots who are suffering in the Far East and for their sake we should be prepared to face even more unpleasant things." Albert Clattenburg wrote a Johnstown woman that the Japanese would not have access to most of the hotel's recreational facilities. The areas from which they were barred included swimming pools, golf course, and bridle and hiking paths. He told W. W.

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24 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 6-545, Grew to Myers, June 20, 1945.
Krebs, editor of the *Tribune*, that even more luxurious facilities were used to house enemy diplomats at the beginning of the war, and that the main reason for using Bedford Springs was its nearness to Washington, D. C.26 Joseph Grew informed Congressman D. Lane Powers: "The Bedford Springs Hotel, which was built in 1870, was selected by the Department of State . . . in part because of its essential simplicity and lack of luxury and in part because it was not planned to open it to the public this year. . . . The restaurant . . . will be operated on cafeteria style. . . ."27 "Aunt Liz," a correspondent for the *Johnstown Observer*, went to look at the place. Her investigation, which was neither encouraged nor assisted by the Department of State, revealed that the hotel was an old wooden structure. The much-discussed renovation consisted of cleaning and repainting after several years of navy use. The carpet which was installed was far from luxurious, and cost only $3.00 per yard. Furthermore, because the buildings were unheated, the concrete floors needed some kind of covering. "Aunt Liz" also turned up evidence that the Japanese would pay at least part of the cost from their own funds.28

Although they were in a decided minority, a few Pennsylvanians accepted the position of the state department. Ephraim Gallaher, of Johnstown, pointed out that while it was easy to criticize the government's action it was more difficult to suggest an alternative. Divina Weaver felt that kind treatment for these diplomats was well within the American Christian tradition. The Reverend Paul Trimpey, of Berlin, Pennsylvania, "warned against building up unreasoning hatreds against any people."29

Despite the protests, work continued on preparing the hotel for the arrival of the Japanese. Painting proceeded on schedule, and secondhand furniture was moved in. Because of the existence of rationing, the state department decided to use the menus that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had prepared for internees. These called for simple food, obtained locally through the hotel's normal channels. Ration points would be allotted at a rate of thirty to fifty points per month for each individual, which was only one-third of the normal hotel allotment. The internees could buy clothing locally — if it was available and if they had the necessary funds. Newspapers, carefully screened and censored, would be permitted but, again,

27 NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 6-3045, Grew to Congressman Powers.
28 *Johnstown Observer*, July 12, 1945.
Main entrance of the Bedford Springs Hotel. Used as a naval communications training center during World War II, the hotel housed nearly 200 interned Japanese diplomats and their families in 1945.

The Annex on the hill behind the main buildings of the Bedford Springs Hotel. Most of the Japanese internees lived in this building.
The first group of captured Japanese to arrive in Bedford included General Hiroshi Oshima, ambassador to Germany, and Lieutenant General Mitsuhiro Komatsu, top military attaché in Berlin.
only if the internees themselves paid for them. Ten chambermaids and ten waitresses were hired. The latter caused some additional protest, though the state department had insisted that dining room service for the prisoners would be cafeteria style; the waitresses were there to clear the tables and to serve American personnel. That part of the premises to which the Japanese were restricted was enclosed by a six-foot-high fence. Searchlights and floodlights were installed, as well as sentry boxes at key locations.

One of the federal inspectors thought that a serious fire hazard existed at the hotel. The Annex, which would house most of the internees, was of fireproof construction (except for the roof), but Building A (the main facility) and Building C (where Americans would stay) were built of wood even though they had partial brick exteriors. The inspector added that while there were fire extinguishers and hoses on all floors water pressure was weak in the upper stories. Bedford itself had a volunteer fire department. This, plus the distance from town to the hotel, could result in some delay before help arrived. He recommended that local firemen hold a drill so that they could become familiar with potential problems. He also suggested that the government might station a piece of fire fighting equipment at the hotel and that the guards be trained to use it.

The Border Patrol provided watch inspectors and some of the guards; the rest were hired locally. These would provide security; access to the facility was through a single closed and guarded gate. Finally, the state department asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to install listening devices in a number of the rooms. Because of the large number of persons involved and the unimportance of many of them, it was decided to install only twenty “bugs,” placed in public rooms as well as certain bedrooms. The electronic system included devices to record the conversations. The FBI contemplated that, at the peak, some 25,000 records would be needed each month. Although FBI agents would operate the system, the records would be transmitted directly to the state department. The presence of the agents was a secret, but the large number of Americans in Building C would mask the operation. Despite J. Edgar Hoover’s serious reservations about the project, the FBI reluctantly agreed to carry it out.  

30 FBI file 65-39766, No. 1, S. S. Alden to D. M. Ladd, memo on Japanese diplomats in Europe, June 12, 1945; ibid., No. 2, R. F. Pfafman to E. P. Coffey, June 14, 1945; ibid., No. 4, Alden to Ladd, June 16, 1945 (this document includes Hoover’s handwritten reluctance); ibid., No. 21, Alden to Ladd, June 20, 1945. FBI documents are not in the National Archives. The arrival of the Japanese such a short time before Japan’s official surrender
In the midst of all these preparations, the state department took more active steps to quiet the public protests by holding a meeting at the hotel on July 19. John Puerifoy, Albert Clattenburg, and Robert Bannerman represented the state department. The invited guests included carefully selected labor leaders, representatives of veterans' organizations, and members of the press. The visitors viewed the areas to be open to the Japanese. More important, they had a chance to "blow off steam" and bring their complaints into the open. While no satisfactory conclusion was reached, one of the government participants noted that representatives from Bedford itself were far less vocal than were those from the surrounding communities. Perhaps the entire episode was best summed up by one who said that there was "really no use to kick about this, that the State Department would do as they damn well pleased anyway." 31 At any rate, protest tapered off after the meeting.

During these controversies, the Japanese remained in Europe. Delay in readying the facility and then a lack of space on shipping put off their sailing until the beginning of August. The first group consisted of General Oshima and five other members of the embassy. While in Le Havre awaiting transportation, they were housed in tents as prisoners of war. SHAPE was forced to overrule local authorities who argued that they were within the limits of flexibility in interpreting the term "honorable custody," and the following day the Japanese were transferred to a small hotel. A villa was later set aside for the use of future diplomatic transferees. This led to the war department's agreement that in the future detainees would be treated with consideration befitting their rank; they would be assured priority of travel and would be accommodated in cabins rather than in the hold of some liberty ship. The state and war departments also agreed that personnel from the Swiss embassy could remain with the prisoners until they were on board ship. The Swiss would also take charge of baggage left behind.

General Oshima and his colleagues were among the thirty-three who departed from Le Havre on the U.S.S. West Point at the beginning of July and reached New York on July 11. Quietly unloaded negated the usefulness of the project. The state department recommended its cancellation on Aug. 14, 1945, and this was done.

from the offshore side of the ship, they were taken to Newark airport for customs inspection before their flight to Washington. Betrayal from the East, an anti-Japanese film, was featured at a local theater when the first Japanese, escorted by military policemen, reached Bedford at 8:00 p.m. on August 8.

The main group of detainees left Bad Gastein, Austria, about 1:00 on the morning of July 25, having been informed of their departure only three hours before. They traveled to Salzburg by bus and flew to Le Havre. Swiss officials accompanied them on this phase of their journey, remaining until all were on board the Santa Rosa. Personal belongings, beyond the one hundred pounds allotted to each person, were left in the custody of the Swiss, although luggage at St. Gilgen was thoroughly rifled by American servicemen before the Swiss could take charge. There and at Bad Gastein, there was considerable controversy before American officials permitted the Swiss to put their seal on the storage areas. The Japanese also asked the Swiss to dispose of the fourteen cars belonging to the party. They were to be given to some of the chauffeurs, to innkeepers, and to local government officials. At least four of the vehicles were stolen (one by an American officer); most of the rest were not in working condition.

Sailing from Le Havre on the Santa Rosa, 147 Japanese and eleven Thais landed in New York on the evening of August 11. The ship anchored in the lower harbor as the Japanese and their luggage were transferred to Ellis Island. Some of the baggage was confiscated at this point. It consisted of papers and books, and army authorities feared that these might contain secret information. When army laboratories failed to turn up anything, the FBI conducted a more thorough search. (Because the United States was not at war with Thailand, the Thais left the group and were held, pending repatriation, by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.)

After breakfast the next morning, the coast guard took the prisoners to Jersey City where local police escorted them to a waiting

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Baltimore and Ohio train, including five day coaches, a diner, and a baggage car. The Border Patrol provided the train guards. After an eight-hour journey, the train arrived at the Williams Street siding in Cumberland, Maryland, at 5:30 p.m. There, under the careful scrutiny of local and state police, the internees boarded buses. A curious crowd looked on, commenting especially about the sixty-odd women and children in the party. A boy of about fourteen, with distinctly Caucasian features, occasioned the most comment. The party reached Bedford about 7:30 p.m., and filled out immigration forms before retiring to their rooms. From then until the middle of October, other small parties of internees were also taken to Bedford. Entering the United States either through Boston or New York, they were transferred to Washington. From there, cars or buses carried them to Bedford. In the end, some 180 Japanese resided in the hotel.

Considering the uproar raised by the possibility of Japanese at the Bedford Springs Hotel, their actual stay was calm, almost placid. The passage of time can be marked by those few occasions when something out of the ordinary occurred. Almost as soon as the Japanese took up residence, there was a stirring of excitement because a doctor was called to the hotel, and rumors circulated that one of the women was about to give birth. Though a woman internee was about three months pregnant, the cause of the visit was more mundane; several of the guests were suffering the aftereffects of seasickness. Two weeks later, there was more serious need of a physician. Tetsuzo Takano, a sixty-five-year-old cook, was stricken by a heart attack while playing cards. Doctors among the internees began treatment, and Dr. N. A. Timmons of Bedford was called, but Takano could not be revived. Under guard, three of the internees took the body to Pate's Funeral Home, from where the remains went to Pittsburgh for cremation. The ashes were returned to Bedford and went back to Japan when the internees left. This was the only death among the Bedford party, though the deaths of relatives touched a few others while they were in Pennsylvania. General Oshima had to tell Yoshiomi Mikami that his wife had

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died of a heart attack. In May, the mother of a Mr. Zumoto died; he learned of her death some five months later.\footnote{\text{37} \textit{NA, R. G.} 59, 740.94115, No. 9-545, \textit{Swiss legation to Gen. Oshima, Sept. 5, 1945; ibid., No. 10-345, Alfred L. Cardinaux, Red Cross, to Clattenburg, Oct. 3, 1945.}}

Another minor upheaval was the domestic problem of Mr. and Mrs. Nogami. Marguerite Nogami was Hungarian; her husband, Soichi, was a teacher. They had not lived together since April, although they had a fifteen-month-old daughter. Now, Mrs. Nogami wanted to divorce her husband and return to her mother in Germany. She was grateful to those in charge of the Bedford facility because they allowed her to have a separate room. She asked the Swiss legation for help with her divorce, but American authorities informed her that divorce was a state matter, and that she would not be in Pennsylvania long enough to meet the residency requirement. It was during the stay in Bedford that her daughter Mitsuko took her first steps. Mrs. Nogami told her mother that all the internees gave the child a great deal of attention.\footnote{\text{38} \textit{NA, R. G.} 59, 740.94115, No. 9-1045, Marguerite Nogami to state dept., Sept. 10, 1945; \textit{ibid., No. 9-2545, Mrs. Nogami to Marguerite Damin, her mother, Sept. 11, 1945; see also \textit{ibid., letters to her mother, undated and Sept. 1, 1945; ibid., state dept. to Swiss legation, Nov. 1, 1945.}}}

Irmgard Yamamoto was German; she and her husband became separated during the last days of the war. Because she was with the group from the Japanese embassy, Mrs. Yamamoto was sent to Bedford. Now she asked for assistance in locating her husband, and she also tried to contact her sister who was somewhere in England. Her greatest fear was that she would be repatriated to Japan to live among a people she did not know in a land she had never seen. General Moriakira Shimizo had a similar problem. When he was sent from Italy to the United States, his wife and daughter remained behind. His family was still separated when the Bedford group left for Japan; they had been unable to contact one another since they had parted.\footnote{\text{39} \textit{NA, R. G.} 59, 740.94115, No. 8-1845, Irmgard Yamamoto to state dept.; \textit{ibid., No. 11-945, Swiss to state dept., Nov. 9, 1945; \textit{ibid., G. T. Hawley to Swiss, Dec. 19, 1945.}}}

There were also several inquiries about some of the prisoners. George W. Maxey, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asked permission to contact General Oshima. Maxey's former secretary, a Japanese-American, was a sister of the wife of Otoshiro Kuroda, consul general at Hamburg. Now Maxey was trying to locate the Kurodas. The state department denied his request to write Oshima but said they would undertake the inquiry themselves. Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes later informed Maxey that there had been no word of the Kurodas since March. Charles Huber, of the Red Cross, asked Clattenburg to forward a letter to Tetsuzo Takano from his wife. She, a Frenchwoman, was still in France. Takano, of course, was the internee who had died; the inquiry arrived after his death. There were also several letters from French friends for Viscount Motono. In fact, Lieutenant Colonel Jacques De Bre of the French army wrote General Dwight Eisenhower to ask if he might assume personal responsibility for the viscount. Motono, who had been the Japanese ambassador to Vichy France, had personally saved De Bre from the Gestapo, and even offered to accompany him to safety. In another critical situation, Motono had come to the aid of De Bre's brother. By the time these requests reached the state department, Motono had already been repatriated to Japan.

There was excitement of a different sort when a forest fire broke out in the woods near the hotel, even though the structure was never seriously threatened. A more humorous incident resulted when a sailor appeared with orders assigning him to the navy's communications school at Bedford Springs. The mistake was explained to him and he was sent on to Washington for reassignment.

Minor discomforts arose from time to time. When the weather began to cool toward the middle of September, the internees missed the winter clothing they had left in Germany. The state department asked military authorities to search for their baggage. In the meantime, the Swiss government asked that the internees be permitted to draw more than their allotted $50.00 per month in order to purchase warmer clothing.

Although one of the three interned doctors kept medical records for the group, there were no medical equipment or medicines at Bedford. When necessary, a Public Health Service physician came from Pittsburgh to provide medical services. Public Health Service dentists also made several trips from Pittsburgh to Bedford. On one trip a Lieutenant Meinster gave fifteen dental examinations and pulled four teeth. The state department paid the officer for his travel and mainte-

nance; the patients paid for the work he did from their own funds.  

These personal funds created some minor headaches because they were in a variety of foreign currencies. The shopkeeper at the hotel was able to make exchanges for Swiss francs because his employer was also a director of a Bedford bank. More serious difficulties were created by the issuance of a new French franc. The French government ruled that all old currency had to be exchanged for new francs before the first of August. The Japanese were unable to comply; the date of redemption passed while they were en route to Bedford, so the Swiss asked the state department to intercede with the French and permit a belated exchange. An example of the magnitude of the problem was the case of Toshi Shimadaira. He had been a cook at the Paris embassy for eighteen years. His wife, a French national, was still in Paris with their son. All their savings, amounting to 120,000 francs, was in old French currency which Shimadaira had with him.

Two incidents in September caused some controversy and threatened to raise again the public outcry that had made the preliminary operations so unpleasant. An Office of Price Administration official from Altoona presented himself at the entrance to the hotel and demanded access to check on alleged ceiling price violations. Because his visit had not been authorized by Washington, he was denied admittance. Of course, he protested to Washington, where state department personnel were also reporting to their superiors. The visitor was known to those at the hotel as one of the "most unreasonable and persistent critics of the Department's policies. . . . It is impossible to tell whether he is a character of this sort acting on personal initiative."  

Dean Acheson informed Chester Bowles of the department's desire to carry out a joint investigation of the allegations. Because the hotel operated on a 10 percent overhead commission, overpayments for food would inflate the commission. Such a procedure constituted fraud. Apparently, the whole incident was a simple at-
tempt at harassment by a disgruntled critic of the Japanese presence at Bedford.

More serious problems were caused by James Young's visit to Bedford. Young was a journalist who had edited a small English-language newspaper in Japan prior to the war. On one occasion, he was arrested by the Japanese and held in solitary confinement. He had since written for the Hearst papers and authored two anti-Japanese books, *The Road to Tokyo* and *Behind the Rising Sun*.

In an appearance before the Bedford Rotary Club, Young charged that the Japanese lived in $30.00 per day luxury and had almost unlimited funds to pay for extra comforts. He also charged that at least twenty of the internees were war criminals rather than diplomats. He insisted that General Oshima had been the instigator of the Axis plan to conquer the world. According to Young's account, Mitsuhiko Komatsu was one of the ravagers of Singapore; Hisasi Nisi was partly responsible for the *Panay* Incident. He blamed Viscount Motono (whom the French officer credited with saving his life) for personal involvement in Young's arrest.

Only Oshima was ever put on trial by the Allies. He was one of twenty-eight defendants at the Japanese war crimes trials. Oshima was convicted on only one of the seven charges brought against him (general conspiracy). Sentenced to life imprisonment, Oshima served until about 1952. The specific evidence against Oshima was that, in 1936, he had helped to negotiate the Anti-Comintern Pact. As a reward, he was appointed ambassador to Germany, where he served for five years. Oshima had officially resigned from active duty with the Japanese army in 1938.

Later, Young published a nationally-syndicated column in which he repeated his allegations. Although he had evidence to the contrary from the state department and had not visited the hotel personally, Young included a number of blatant mistruths in his presentations, claiming to have been in the facility. State department officials wasted both time and effort in calming the outcry that resulted from Young's charges. Among other things, he insisted that a store selling all kinds of luxuries was located in the hotel. There was, in fact, a commissary there, but the goods for sale were primarily toilet articles and other necessities. The store of goods was limited by regulations governing items which could be sold in American penal and correctional institutions and in prisoner of war camps.47 Not even schoolbooks were

available for the children among the internees. After attempts to find several boxes of books which the party had in Germany proved fruitless, the internees asked if they could have some of the books which had been in the Washington embassy library before the war. Because Army G-2 (Intelligence) was using those, even this request was denied.

By the middle of October, the Department of State had decided that there was no reason to detain the Japanese any longer in the United States. With General Douglas MacArthur’s concurrence, they would be repatriated to Japan as soon as shipping was available. The middle of November was set as the latest date of departure from Bedford, because the original four-month contract with the hotel’s management expired then. In the meantime, the state department dealt with a number of requests from internees who did not wish to go to Japan. Dr. Jiro Miyazawa pointed out that his wife was Belgian and Czech; he asked to remain in the United States. Tetsu Yuge’s mother was German. He had never been to Japan, did not speak Japanese, and preferred to go to his brother in Switzerland. Mrs. Yamamoto wanted to return to Germany, her native land. The state department denied all the requests except Mrs. Yamamoto’s. By the middle of November, the government announced that the Japanese would soon leave Bedford and would receive a twelve-hour notice before departure. Immigration and Naturalization Service officials in

No. 9-1345, C. M. Greenlord to Wayne Morse, Sept. 2, 1945; ibid., Morse to Byrnes, Sept. 13, 1945; ibid., Lory’s memo to Clattenburg, Sept. 24, 1945; ibid., Acheson to Morse, Oct. 2, 1945; ibid., No. 8-1445, David Sentner to state dept.; ibid., R. G. 60, 56125/171, justice dept. circular No. 2294, revised, “Articles Approved for Sale through Commissaries in U. S. Penal and Correctional Institutions”; James R. Young, Behind the Rising Sun (Garden City, N. Y., 1943), 146; Richard Minear, Victors’ Justice (Princeton, N. J.), 104-5, 175; Grew, Turbulent Era, 1034. Besides Oshima, the only internee notable enough to be included in the standard biographical sources, before or after the war, were Hidenaro Konoye, a noted composer and creator of the Tokyo symphony, and Hsiao Tomooko, an economics professor (The Japan Who’s Who [Tokyo, 1951], 208; Japan Biographical Encyclopedia and Who’s Who [Tokyo, 1958], 1720).

Seattle were asked to take charge of them on their arrival and to provide overnight facilities if they were needed before the ship sailed. Seattle informed Bedford that they could accommodate the visitors only if they could be housed as ordinary repatriates and not as diplomats.\(^49\)

On November 16, buses carried the internees to Cumberland; two litter cases traveled in an ambulance. As the buses left the hotel, workmen began closing it for the winter. At the same time, Milton R. Manum, a sixty-year-old guard, died of a heart attack while extinguishing a small grass fire.

At Cumberland, the party boarded a special Baltimore and Ohio train. The internees traveled in four day coaches. One sleeper was provided for the two stretcher cases and their mothers. These were a twelve-year-old boy with tuberculosis and a mentally ill ten-year-old girl (a physician and nurse traveled with the party). Another sleeper was provided for the Americans who accompanied the group. Besides the doctor and nurse, and state department representatives, the Americans consisted of a matron and nine members of the Border Patrol Service. The Border Patrol provided supervisory personnel. The train also included a dining car.

As the party left Cumberland late in the afternoon, the weather had moderated and it was raining lightly. After stopping for seven additional Border Patrol guards (from the Detroit office) at Deshler, Ohio, the train proceeded to Chicago. There the cars were switched, first to the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, and finally to the Northern Pacific Railroad for completion of the journey to Seattle, where they arrived about mid-morning of November 20. The Japanese left for their homeland the next day on the General G. M. Randall; there were 1,300 other repatriates on board.\(^50\)

Thus ended the stay of the Japanese diplomats in the United States. As the Bedford newspaper pointed out:

> Peace settled over the Bedford Springs this week, and the strangest interlude in its long and colorful history as a resort was at an end.\(^51\)


\(^{50}\) Johnstown Tribune, Nov. 15, 17, 1945; Bedford Gazette, Nov. 21, 1945; NA, R. G. 60, 56125/171, S. H. Stewart to N. D. Collear, Nov. 7, 1945; ibid., Collear to district director, New York City, Nov. 6, 1945; ibid., Collear to district director, Seattle, Nov. 2, 1945; ibid., R. P. Bonham to Collear, Nov. 6, 1945; ibid., Earl O. Carleton to W. F. Kelly, Nov. 26, 1945; New York Times, Nov. 26, 1945. The boy was probably Mituharu Makise and the girl Mitsuko Assada (NA, R. G. 59, 740.94115, No. 8-2445).

\(^{51}\) Bedford Gazette, Nov. 21, 1945.