

## COLONIAL INDIAN POLICY AS A MEASURE OF RISING IMPERIALISM: NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA, 1700-1755

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**I**MPERIALISM is the conscious ideology and practice of extending sovereignty or control by one political entity over another. The motivating forces and subsequent forms may be economic, political, military, cultural, or humanitarian, but in all cases a superior-inferior relationship is implied, with the balance of benefits accruing to the superior. Thus, imperialism may involve the use of tariffs or other economic incentives to direct trade from colony to mother country, the establishment of military outposts to preserve or extend territorial acquisitions, or the use of settlements rather than trading posts to spread culture. For the purposes of this paper imperialism is used in the sense of a conscious and coherent policy directed by the British rather than a policy based on private or particularized provincial concerns. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that because of the nature of humankind, there may well be inconsistencies and contradictions in policy at any given time.

British imperialism was a slowly evolving policy which included a mix of economic, political, and military aspects; it was often hesitant, even self-contradictory in its direction. Perhaps because of this inconsistency, the nature and rise of imperialism has frequently been the subject of debate by historians desirous of more accurately defining it and pinpointing its timing. Charles M. Andrews held that prior to 1763 "empire" meant "the self-sufficient empire of mercantilists rather than a thing of territory, centralization, maintenance, and authority," and that it was only after this date that "imperialism" took on territorial and political aspects that went beyond the merely commercial and colonial experience. Arguing within the same framework,

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other historians, including Bernhard Knollenberg and Michael Kammen, have pushed back the period of crucial change to the 1750s and early 1760s. Most recently, Stephen Saunders Webb has suggested that imperialism began not in 1763 or even as early as 1750, but rather with the beginning of English colonization in North America. He based his conclusion on a definition of imperialism that was primarily military in nature, supported by military evidence not only from the North American colonies but from Ireland and the West Indies as well. By identifying the earlier military careers of numerous royal governors and by noting the presence of royal troops, he declared that England had long placed great importance on military and political concerns. Webb wrote, "In Anglo-America commercial considerations, while always present, were dominant only occasionally," for example, during the "abnormally peaceful" Walpole regime from 1722 to 1739. Thus, he continued, any explanation of imperialism based only on the economic rationale of the relationship between mother country and its colonies was insufficient and incomplete. He believed "it is time to end the 'commercial and colonial' monopoly of interpretation."<sup>1</sup>

If we are to make sense out of complex concepts such as imperialism, we must be careful not to be so specific as to exclude obvious precursors or examples that do not happen to fit a particular paradigm because of an overly narrow definition or the limitations of an artificially pinpointed date. At the same time, we must avoid generalizations which include so much as to be equally meaningless. Thus, Webb has provided a valuable criticism of the "commercial and colonial" interpretation by bringing to light evidences of an early military imperialism, long unrecognized for what it was. But because imperialism involved such varied concerns, each operating in thirteen separate North American mainland colonies, to say nothing about the West Indies or Ireland, it is important not to overgeneralize in the opposite direction. At any given time, one or more aspects could be ascendant. The state of affairs in so-called normal times, in addition

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<sup>1</sup> Charles M. Andrews, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution*, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn., 1931), 123; Bernhard Knollenberg, *Origin of the American Revolution, 1759-1766*, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), 11-15; Michael Kammen, *Empire and Interest: The American Colonies and the Politics of Mercantilism* (Philadelphia, 1970), esp. chapter 4; Stephen Saunders Webb, "Army and Empire: English Garrison Government in Britain and America, 1569 to 1763," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser., 34 (Jan. 1977) : 3, 29-30. Webb retains his basic argument, although greatly expanded in detail as it pertains to the seventeenth century, in *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681* (Chapel Hill, 1979). See especially the same quotations, pages xvii and 464.

to early periods of settlement or wartime when military prerogatives more naturally took precedence, suggests the need for a flexible interpretation of the nature of imperialism.

One useful way to gain a perspective on the evolving imperial policy is to examine colonial Indian policy. Evidence drawn from New York and Pennsylvania shows that economic as well as military concerns played a major role in the development of Indian policy and the fur trade, activities intimately related to the evolution of British imperialism during three-quarters of a century of Anglo-French rivalry. Indian policy and the fur trade helped to define the relationship between England and the colonies of New York and Pennsylvania because fur of all varieties, but especially deerskin and beaver, had become an important concern of English economic interests, primarily for the production of clothing and hats. While fur was only one item in England's total import picture, it loomed large in the picture of New York and Pennsylvania exports to London (see Tables 1 and 2). Although a major portion of both colonies' trade was food-stuffs, especially grain, shipped to the West Indies, they were perpetually short of specie necessary for the purchase of manufactured goods from the mother country. Because they could trade fur directly to Britain to pay for imports, each colony frequently conducted its own Indian policy to further its economic needs. From her Canadian base France also sought to monopolize the fur trade. Consequently, Indian policy was closely intertwined with both economic and military policy. Nonetheless, in this realm, British attempts to create a coherent imperial policy for all the North American colonies which considered political and military needs as well as economics failed miserably on almost all counts until mid-century, when the British realized that an imperial age was truly upon them. At that point they made a concerted effort to create such a policy. The hesitant and contradictory policies which characterized the relationship of England with New York and Pennsylvania in the first half of the eighteenth century clearly revealed the evolving nature of imperialism and suggested that a coherent British-directed policy, although obviously synthesizing, as it did, preexistent components, was not institutionalized until the period 1748-1755.

TABLE 12

FUR AND SKIN EXPORTS FROM NEW YORK AND PENNSYLVANIA TO LONDON  
BY CONSTANT VALUE IN £

Year	Total value of Beaver exported to London in £		Total value of Deerskin exported to London in £		Total value of all fur and skins exported to London in £		Total value of all exports to London in £	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	5,071	27	732	111	7,491	699	13,754	1,478
1700	2,864	80	269	72	4,187	702	15,531	3,076
1701	1,983	96	409	874	3,033	2,109	13,585	5,219
1702	460	33	165	163	1,166	1,043	4,698	4,143
1703	433	63	68	593	870	1,753	6,063	4,714
1704	624	5	165	310	947	929	10,340	2,262
1705	missing							
1706	37	5	79	516	478	867	2,689	4,210
1707	515	0	113	0	1,170	0	4,557	21
1708	1,700	6	51	86	2,587	412	6,926	1,941
1709	2,849	0	273	14	4,130	14	9,155	618
1710	951	2	38	45	2,191	132	7,880	1,277
1711	1,213	0	78	0	2,151	39	7,571	39
1712	missing							
1713	2,925	0	162	99	4,099	168	9,601	179

2 The import and export ledgers of the British Customs Office give a good overall view of the products exported from New York and Pennsylvania to London and their value. The years 1699-1758 are contained in Customs 3/1-3/58, from which figures for the years 1705 and 1712 are missing. A duplicate of the 1727 ledger, also missing, is contained in the Departmental Archives of H. M. Customs.

William Culliford first held the office of inspector general of imports and exports, established in 1696. He and his successors compiled the series of eighty-three folio ledgers which contained the values for imports, re-exports, and exports for both London and the outports (ports other than London in England and Wales). Customs 3 contains the figures pertaining to each foreign country and colony trading with England and included all items exchanged each year. London received most of the fur shipped from New York and Pennsylvania, with the outports, foreign countries, and other colonies receiving only a small fraction of colonial furs. Figures for London alone, therefore, provide a stable picture of the New York and Pennsylvania fur trade. However, it is still important to remember that fur and total goods sent to London represented only a portion of the colonies' total trade. Statistics from an early period, such as those contained in Tables 1 and 2 and in the Customs 3 records, must be interpreted with extreme care. They can only be used to supplement other materials, for such things as smuggling, errors in original compilation, and changing values of the goods included were not always taken into consideration.

Compilers of the data for Customs 3 based their figures on fixed official values at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Consequently, they erected a constant value series as opposed to a current value series, which would have shown the fluctuating values of each

1714	5,651	0	267	557	6,533	1,083	20,078	2,663
1715	1,962	10	174	907	2,688	1,485	10,070	5,413
1716	3,229	0	600	1,076	4,780	2,641	14,069	4,138
1717	3,523	4	972	993	5,851	1,675	17,646	2,344
1718	5,294	6	3,974	960	10,209	1,783	23,792	3,103
1719	3,197	5	2,188	582	6,683	1,170	15,576	5,047
1720	4,667	0	1,869	1,251	7,281	2,012	15,179	5,423
1721	4,142	0	1,021	607	5,321	1,117	11,156	4,063
1722	4,509	0	1,114	971	6,468	1,592	16,478	3,120
1723	3,974	7	1,507	2,218	6,222	2,988	19,657	8,015
1724	4,082	1	2,127	701	7,112	871	17,192	2,695
1725	5,886	1	2,415	3,032	9,188	4,063	20,101	8,649
1726	6,246	43	3,950	1,544	11,926	2,247	34,510	3,169
1727	2,200	8	2,642	3,465	5,975	4,502	28,955	10,556
1728	2,380	9	2,139	2,502	6,827	3,988	15,465	8,230
1729	1,909	23	1,221	1,111	4,553	1,952	11,453	3,683
1730	1,349	0	725	4,190	3,106	6,056	6,435	7,363
1731	4,525	64	1,628	605	8,375	2,715	19,204	6,572
1732	1,138	27	1,280	934	3,852	2,067	7,520	5,635
1733	1,772	41	1,349	2,553	4,934	4,564	9,022	8,476
1734	2,045	88	1,101	1,892	4,490	3,185	12,407	10,381
1735	1,476	99	1,057	1,907	3,813	4,414	11,448	17,573
1736	6,652	74	2,280	3,739	10,714	6,045	15,084	18,754
1737	6,448	37	1,397	1,985	9,220	3,211	15,697	11,455
1738	5,179	188	642	2,599	6,727	4,375	13,547	9,843
1739	3,923	89	1,108	1,195	6,150	1,526	16,424	6,881
1740	2,846	22	1,626	2,254	5,932	3,304	17,040	9,847
1741	4,172	16	2,298	4,115	8,187	5,571	16,322	10,607
1742	1,576	51	1,214	1,135	4,050	2,133	11,953	5,566
1743	2,394	145	1,492	2,876	5,048	4,131	14,243	8,911
1744	2,161	18	1,884	1,408	4,843	2,184	14,398	6,824
1745	1,001	136	575	1,312	3,855	2,084	13,229	10,056
1746	304	68	343	6,120	1,828	8,411	8,211	15,127
1747	677	4	268	616	2,587	1,089	13,647	2,439
1748	27	27	584	5,042	927	6,574	8,297	10,885

individual year. A current value series reflects the variations due to price changes. For purposes of this study, a constant value series allows better measurement of the changing volume of trade.

1749	2,068	68	1,166	6,650	4,690	8,393	20,386	14,944
1750	3,819	53	1,160	6,140	6,986	8,108	33,236	26,228
1751	2,242	95	639	8,361	5,209	11,294	36,997	22,313
1752	4,805	37	146	9,729	7,085	14,428	38,485	29,931
1753	5,700	71	203	8,547	8,652	12,205	45,866	33,919
1754	2,117	70	441	4,196	4,352	7,120	21,289	24,036
1755	1,739	43	462	2,457	4,243	4,904	17,987	19,678
1756	419	24	256	1,396	1,419	3,353	13,136	14,938
1757	3	7	0	593	365	1,098	9,828	7,158
1758	0	1	427	419	508	876	3,442	10,097

Source: Import and Export Ledgers of the British Customs Office, Customs 3/1-80 (microfilm copy, Lehigh University).

TABLE 2  
FUR BY TYPE AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS

Year	Value of Beaver as a % of total exports to London		Value of Deerskin as a % of total exports to London		Value of total fur and skins as a % of total exports to London	
	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.	N.Y.	Pa.
1699	36.9	1.8	5.3	7.5	54.5	47.3
1700	18.4	2.6	1.7	2.3	27.0	22.8
1701	14.6	1.8	3.0	16.7	22.3	40.4
1702	9.8	.8	3.5	3.9	24.8	25.2
1703	7.1	1.3	1.1	12.6	14.3	37.2
1704	6.0	.2	1.6	13.7	9.2	41.1
1705	missing					
1706	1.4	.1	2.9	12.3	17.8	21.1
1707	11.3	0	2.5	0	25.7	0
1708	24.5	.3	.7	4.4	37.4	21.2
1709	31.1	0	3.0	2.3	45.1	2.3
1710	12.1	.2	.5	3.5	27.8	10.3
1711	16.0	0	1.0	0	28.4	100.0
1712	missing					
1713	30.5	0	1.7	55.3	42.7	93.9

1981	COLONIAL INDIAN POLICY						243
1714	28.1	0	1.3	20.9	32.5	40.7	
1715	19.5	.2	1.7	16.8	26.7	27.4	
1716	23.0	0	4.3	26.0	34.0	63.8	
1717	20.0	.2	5.5	42.4	33.2	71.5	
1718	22.3	.2	16.7	29.6	42.9	57.5	
1719	20.5	.1	14.0	11.5	42.9	23.2	
1720	30.0	0	12.3	23.1	48.0	37.1	
1721	37.1	0	9.2	14.9	47.7	27.5	
1722	27.4	0	6.8	31.1	39.3	51.0	
1723	20.2	.1	7.7	27.7	31.7	37.3	
1724	23.7	.1	12.4	26.0	41.4	32.3	
1725	29.3	.1	12.0	35.1	45.7	47.0	
1726	18.1	1.4	11.4	48.7	34.6	70.9	
1727	7.6	.1	9.1	32.8	20.6	42.6	
1728	15.4	.1	13.8	30.4	44.1	48.5	
1729	16.7	.6	10.7	30.2	39.8	53.0	
1730	21.0	0	11.3	56.9	48.3	82.2	
1731	23.6	1.0	8.5	9.2	43.6	41.3	
1732	15.1	.5	17.0	16.6	51.2	36.7	
1733	19.6	.5	15.0	30.1	54.7	53.8	
1734	16.5	.8	8.9	18.2	36.2	30.7	
1735	12.9	.6	9.2	10.9	33.3	25.1	
1736	44.1	.4	15.1	19.9	71.0	32.2	
1737	41.1	.3	8.9	17.3	58.7	28.0	
1738	38.2	1.9	4.7	26.4	49.7	44.4	
1739	23.9	1.3	6.7	17.4	37.4	22.2	
1740	16.7	.2	9.5	22.9	34.8	33.6	
1741	25.6	.2	14.1	38.8	50.2	52.5	
1742	13.2	.9	10.2	20.4	33.9	38.3	
1743	16.8	1.6	10.5	32.3	35.4	46.4	
1744	15.0	.3	8.2	20.6	33.6	32.0	
1745	7.6	1.4	4.3	13.0	29.1	20.7	
1746	3.7	.4	4.2	40.5	22.3	55.6	
1747	5.0	.2	2.7	25.3	19.0	44.6	
1748	.3	.2	7.0	46.3	11.2	60.4	

1749	10.1	.5	5.2	44.5	23.0	56.2
1750	11.5	.2	3.5	23.4	21.0	30.9
1751	6.1	.4	1.7	37.5	14.1	50.6
1752	12.5	.1	.4	32.5	18.4	48.2
1753	12.4	.2	.4	25.2	18.9	36.0
1754	9.9	.3	2.1	17.5	20.4	29.6
1755	9.7	.2	2.6	12.5	23.6	24.9
1756	3.2	.2	1.9	9.3	10.8	22.4
1757	0	.1	0	8.3	3.7	15.3
1758	0	0	12.4	4.1	14.8	8.7

Source: Customs 3/1-80 (microfilm copy, Lehigh University).

England discovered in New York and Pennsylvania ready sources of beaver and deerskin. The strategic locations of Albany and what would later become Philadelphia made them centers of control in the fur trade. The Mohawk River reached west from Albany and brought furs from as far away as the Ohio-Mississippi valleys. In turn, the Hudson River flowing southward provided an outlet to English markets. Likewise the Delaware, Susquehanna, and Allegheny rivers controlled the flow of goods to and from the interior of Pennsylvania and the Ohio Valley. Because of the Indians' geographic location along these rivers, the English formed alliances with the Iroquois nations and their allies to the west, the Shawnee and Delaware, which very quickly aroused the jealousy of France. During the century of English dominance of these areas, native Americans acted both as procurers of the desired fur and, in time of war, as a military buffer against the French in Canada, giving them the balance of power in North America.<sup>3</sup>

The fur trade and English Indian policy were encompassed within the context of the Covenant Chain, a flexible institutional concept

3 Lawrence H. Leder, *Robert Livingston, 1654-1728, and the Politics of Colonial New York* (Chapel Hill, 1961), 12; Peter Wraxall, *An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs . . . Transacted in the Colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751*, ed., Charles H. McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), xxxv-xxxviii; Francis Jennings, "The Indian Trade of the Susquehanna Valley," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 110 (Dec. 16, 1966): 407; Albright G. Zimmerman, "The Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania" (Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware, 1966), 16; Douglas E. Leach, *The Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763* (New York, 1966), 92-93; Paul A. W. Wallace, *Indians in Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg, 1961), 36-37; Arthur Buffinton, "The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 8 (Mar. 1922): 335.



that defined economic, political, and military relationships between the English and the Iroquois or Five Nations, and which was later expanded to include numerous other tribes. It is important to note here that individual colonies frequently treated separately with the Indian tribes within their chartered boundaries, and Pennsylvania did so as a proprietary not a royal colony. While in English eyes the Chain provided a legal claim to sovereignty over the member tribes, the latter saw the Chain composed of a group of peers, each nation an independent power with the right to govern itself.<sup>4</sup>

Although the basic outlines of the Covenant Chain were well established by the late 1670s, it remained for the Iroquois to define their specific role within the Chain vis-a-vis the French and the English. French activities, aimed mostly at monopolizing the fur trade and controlling the Iroquois, forced the Five Nations to move cautiously into the British camp. Furthermore, the Iroquois's need to obtain furs to exchange for trade goods brought them into conflict with western tribes who had access to the richest beaver lands and who were largely under French influence. French depredations in areas of primary concern to the Iroquois during the two decades prior to the Glorious Revolution of 1689 convinced them that their survival depended on a policy of neutrality, slightly pro-British in nature. They formalized this conviction in treaties of neutrality with both the French and English in 1701. Thus, the Iroquois never totally submitted to the English, because behind their friendship lurked the danger not only of a desire for fur, but for land as well. From the English point of view, the treaty provided them with access to the fur trade and a defensive alliance against French military incursions.<sup>5</sup>

During the first decades of the eighteenth century, the economics of the fur trade took precedence over military concerns, although the latter were not ignored. Despite the official declaration of Queen Anne's War in 1703, New York and Pennsylvania did not agree to support military expeditions against Canada until 1709 and 1711,

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4 For a detailed description of the Covenant Chain see Francis P. Jennings, "Miquon's Passing: Indian-European Relations in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1674-1755" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1965); Francis Jennings, "The Constitutional Evolution of the Covenant Chain," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 115 (Apr. 22, 1971): 88-96; and Stephen H. Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs, and Empires: The Changing Policies of New York and Pennsylvania, 1674-1768" (Ph.D. diss., Lehigh University, 1976), 19-26. The Iroquois of New York, also known as the Five or Six Nations, consisted of six tribes: the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondago, Seneca, Cayuga, and after 1722 the Tuscarora.

5 Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701," *Pennsylvania History* 24 (July 1957): 223-35.

and then only under pressure from England and with promises of the mother country's direct assistance. France refrained from all attacks on New York largely because the Montreal traders, as well as those of Albany, hoped to keep open the New York-Canada fur exchange. New York had exported only 5,000 to 15,000 skins during the last two decades of the seventeenth century during which Franco-English hostilities erupted. This was a sharp decrease from the quantities earlier exported. Pennsylvania had never exported large numbers of skins, although individual traders had frequently made reasonable profits from the trade. Despite complaints about the poor state of trade, however, fur still constituted a large percentage of New York and Pennsylvania exports and shaped the evolution of colonial Indian policy.<sup>6</sup>

Because the volume of trade had declined during Queen Anne's War, all welcomed neutrality except the New Englanders who bore the brunt of French attacks (see Table 1). In their desire for neutrality the Iroquois kept the New York-Pennsylvania frontier quiet by acting as a buffer between the English and the French. While the economics of the fur trade was uppermost in the minds of New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians, neither totally neglected their military defenses. The New York Assembly voted several funds for maintaining troops to defend the frontier. Although Pennsylvania recognized the possible dangers of French attack, intercolonial jealousies and Quaker pacifism prevented the colony from taking any positive action. Pennsylvania's lieutenant governor, John Evans, expressed his frustration at the colony's refusal to aid New York by warning that, "we shall have too little reason to blame them, if when they have opportunities as they frequently may, they fail to extend their Regards to our welfare. . . ."<sup>7</sup>

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6 Leach, *Northern Frontier*, 115; Allen W. Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, 1960), 216-17, 323-24; Zimmerman, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," Chap. 3; Conference of Lt.-Gov. Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, E. B. O'Callaghan et al., eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. (Albany, 1853-1887), 4: 905 (hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*); Wm. Penn to James Logan, Feb. 24, 1703, *Correspondence between William Penn and James Logan, 1700-1750*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1870-1872), 1: 170.

7 Alexander C. Flick, *History of the State of New York*, 10 vols. (New York, 1933-1937), 2: 216-17; William Smith, *The History of the Late Province of New York, from Its Discovery to the Appointment of Governor Colden in 1762*, New York Historical Society, *Collections*, 2 vols. (1829-1830), 1: 151-54, 158-60; *Journal of the Votes and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Colony of New York*, 2 vols. (New York, 1764-1766), 1: 149-50, 153, 158, 174-75, 182, 187, 189, 192-94, 196-207, 212, 214, 216-17 (microfilm

Pennsylvania, however, did continue to stabilize its Indian relations. An Iroquois desire to seek out the best trade advantages among the English colonies brought the Five Nations to Pennsylvania to establish a truce and "friendly Correspondence." The completion of this agreement in late August 1704 marked an important point in the development of Pennsylvania's fur trade, for with Iroquois cooperation the colony could now move out from under New York's economic shadow.<sup>8</sup>

Military neutrality continued to dominate both colonies' approaches until 1708, when news of a proposed expedition against Canada arrived with New York's new governor, Lord John Lovelace. His death in May 1709 placed command of the expedition on Colonel Francis Nicholson. The New York Assembly, upon receiving news of the expedition, resolved to do all it could to support the queen's instructions, but not everyone freely supported the proposed expedition. Albany's "handlaers," or fur merchants, had benefited from increases in the fur trade in 1708 and hesitated to do anything that might threaten that commerce. One especially disgruntled citizen noted, "Interest that governs all the world, Tyrannizes at New York. At Albany where they trade with the French at Canada, the Handlaers, . . . are against it." Moreover, despite a royal request for 150 fully supplied men, Pennsylvania's Governor Charles Gookin could only get the legislature to raise a present of £5,000 for the queen's use, since they could not "for Conscience sake comply with the furnishing a supply for such a defence as thou proposest."<sup>9</sup>

copy; hereafter cited as *N.Y. Assembly Journals*); *The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution*, 5 vols. (Albany, 1894), 1: 493-94, 500-7, 562, 591, 598 (hereafter cited as *Colonial Laws of New York*); various letters and speeches relative to colonial defense, Aug. 1701-May 1704, *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania*, 16 vols. (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1838-1853), 2: 28, 30-31, 41, 78-79, 133-36, 142-43 (hereafter cited as *Pa. Col. Recs.*); James Logan to Wm. Penn, May 2, 1702, Sept. 28, 1704, *Penn-Logan Correspondence*, 1: 88-89, 320-21.

8 Indian Conferences, May 9, 10, Aug. 28, Sept. 1, 1704, *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 2: 138-41, 158-59; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 120-21. Despite neutrality and the change in Pennsylvania's Indian policy, fur exports did not increase until after the war (see Table 1), which raises important questions. This may have been a reflection of war conditions in general, since the exports were measured on the receiving end in London, or a result of some other factor which the trade statistics do not reveal. At present the statistical evidence is not detailed enough to reach a more precise conclusion.

9 Queen to Lord Lovelace, Mar. 1, 1709, Board of Trade to Lovelace, Mar. 28, 1709, Lord Sunderland to Lovelace, Apr. 28, 1709, Thomas Cockerill to Popple, July 2, 1709, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 70-74, 80-81; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 247; Smith, *History of New York*, 1: 168; Leder, *Robert Livingston*, 204-5; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 2: 449-52, 460-62; various Minutes of the Pennsylvania Assembly in Samuel Hazard et al., eds., *Pennsylvania*

The expedition failed, causing great consternation among the colonials. Military reverses in Portugal had forced England to divert the naval forces intended for the Quebec assault, and without British naval support, the whole affair quickly deteriorated and became a fiasco. Both colonies retreated into neutrality until 1711 when news arrived of a second proposed expedition against Canada. After similar preparations, wherein New York provided the bulk of the troops and supplies and Pennsylvania voted £2,000 for the queen's use, this expedition also failed. Fog and strong gales had engulfed the British support fleet and destroyed a large part of the troop transport. The few remaining ships salvaged what they could and sailed back down the St. Lawrence River, effectively ending another Canada expedition.<sup>10</sup>

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 formally ended hostilities that had been supported only minimally by New York and Pennsylvania and led to increased concern for the fur trade which had languished for many years. The treaty gave the Indians the freedom to trade where they pleased and included a proviso that the French "shall hereafter give no Hindrance or Molestation to the five Nations or Cantons of *Indians* subject to the Dominion of Great Britain." With imperial military concerns largely a thing of the past, both native Americans and whites could now concentrate on plying their trade. Despite several important exceptions, this would remain the situation during the ensuing twenty-five years of peace.<sup>11</sup>

With the coming of peace, the actual direction of Indian policy returned to the colonies. Both New York and Pennsylvania reestablished their separate, but broadly similar, Indian policies based largely on the importance of fur and skins to their respective economies, and these exports underwent a marked increase (see Table 1). Additionally, Anglo-French rivalry centered on trade, with each nation's desire to corner the fur supply requiring continued Indian friendship and neutrality.

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*Archives*, 8th ser. (Philadelphia and Harrisburg, 1838-1935), 2: 857-58, 860, 864-66 (hereafter cited as *Pa. Arch.*).

10 Gov. Hunter to Sec. St. John, Sept. 12, 1711, Proceedings of New London Congress, June 21, 1711, conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, Aug. 1711, Gen. Hill to Gov. Hunter, Aug. 25, 1711, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 252-61, 265-78; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 2: 985-87, 989-94, 998-1001; *The Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania from 1682-1801*, 17 vols. (Harrisburg, 1896-1915), 2: 388-99 (hereafter cited as *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania*); *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 289-96; *Colonial Laws of New York*, 1: 723, 727.

11 Fred. L. Israel, *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History, 1648-1967*, 4 vols. (New York, 1967), 1: 210.

New York increased its gifts for the Five Nations in order to quell their fears of English plans to eliminate the Iroquois. New York's Governor Robert Hunter traveled to Albany in 1714 and again the following year to calm their fears. Many New Yorkers complained of "a great decay in . . . trade with the Indians" due to French plotting, which would, "if not prevented, in a little time seduce all our Indians wholly to themselves, but also be a means to engage them to become our enemies."<sup>12</sup> In June 1716 the New York Assembly authorized the construction of two wooden houses to accommodate the Iroquois at Albany because their trade was "of great advantage to the Country." A year later the Iroquois and Hunter again met at Albany, and the governor indicated his concern with the Albany-Montreal exchange, "that pernicious trade which I am sure is hurtfull to both of us, and only serves to put money in the pockets of a few traders." The Albany-Montreal trade, in which high-quality northern furs were smuggled into New York, would continue as a thorn in the side of all concerned, for it admitted of no easy solution.<sup>13</sup>

In Pennsylvania, Indian policy developed largely along the lines of private interest, particularly that of James Logan and William Keith. Although exceptions admittedly existed, the general thrust of the period was clear: private white interest at native American expense. Attracted by previously unobtainable items, such as firearms and ammunition, manufactured textiles, and metal goods, friendly tribes provided the European with peltry, trade routes to the interior, and already cleared farmland. Logan and Keith initially took advantage of the trade possibilities in a given area and subsequently induced white settlement in those areas in which they held speculative land rights. While Logan and Keith frequently couched their plans and activities in grandiose rhetoric for public and proprietary consumption, the ultimate effect of their policy was to force the natives sporadically westward to the Allegheny-Ohio country.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Charles Lodwick to Lords of Trade, Aug. 23, 1715, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 422. Although much of Lodwick's memorial to the Board of Trade proved to be false and malicious, the above can be taken as typical of the general concern for the state of native American relations and the fur trade.

<sup>13</sup> *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 383-86; *Colonial Laws of New York*, 1: 890-91; McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, 117; conference between Gov. Hunter and the Indians, June 1717, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 484-93.

<sup>14</sup> Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 104-5, 136-37, 143-44. For a clear understanding of Logan's personal role in Indian affairs see *ibid.*, especially chapters 4, 6, and 7. In late 1731 or early 1732 Logan wrote an unpublished memorial on the state of the North American colonies, lamenting their lack of unity and defenseless position vis-a-vis the French. Although writing in an

In the public sector, Pennsylvania, like New York, sought to maintain good relations with native Americans. A 1711 law for preserving "Good Correspondence with the Indians" expired late in February 1714, and early the following year the assembly introduced "an Act for continuing a friendly correspondence with the Indians." After some debate, Governor Charles Gookin passed the new law, based upon the premise that good relations with the Indians were "a great means of securing this province in peace and tranquility" and that it would "secure the Trade with them to the Inhabitants of the Province," indicating the colony's awareness of the interrelationship of economic and military concerns in Indian policy.<sup>15</sup>

Although the interests of private trade generally determined the thrust of Pennsylvania's Indian policy during this period, the needs of imperial military and territorial concerns remained important, at least in the eyes of Governor Keith. Despite his personal profit from the colony's affairs, he also had an interest in coordinating British imperial policy.<sup>16</sup> In this vein, perhaps his most important contribution was a report to the Board of Trade in 1719. Ironically, he cribbed major portions of it from suggestions which James Logan had submitted to him upon learning of the board's imperial interest in Indian affairs and French encroachments. Ultimately Keith, not Logan, received credit for the report which greatly impressed the Board of Trade. Keith began by noting French successes in dealing with the Indians which hindered "further progress to the westward." He noted that Indian "friendship and correspondence is by experience no other ways to be acquired than by trade." Great Britain had certain advantages in this trade, but intercolonial competition was "highly destructive of the publick interest, both with respect to trade and the advancement as well as security of the British Dominion on this Continent." In order to benefit from Britain's natural trade ad-

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imperial-minded tone, Logan was primarily interested in protecting his own trade and speculative enterprises, James Logan, *Of the State of the British Plantations in America: A Memorial* (unpublished), Joseph E. Johnson, ed., *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 60 (Apr. 1936): 113-30. In contrast to Jennings, who sees Logan's personal enrichment as the basis of his motivation, Albright Zimmerman views Logan in a more altruistic light. Nevertheless, his account contains a well-balanced discussion of Logan's personal fur trade, as well as that of the small trader, "Indian Trade of Colonial Pennsylvania," chapters 4-6.

15 *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania*, 3: 60, 63; *Pa. Arch.*, 8th ser., 2: 1119, 1126, 1132, 1135; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 2: 577-78, 581.

16 *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 3: 23, 68; Gov. Keith to assembly, Aug. 18, 1719, *Pa. Arch.*, 8th ser., 2: 1311. For Keith's attempts at personal enrichment through native American affairs and his power struggle with James Logan, see Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," chapters 6-7.

vantages, he had five suggestions. Keith believed the Indian trade should be "put . . . under such wholesome and just regulations as that the traders may not have in their power to cheat or impose upon the Indians in any sort." He next suggested the westward extension of the trade and its protection through a series of forts and garrisons. Third, he believed the governor should "endeavour to make treaties and alliances of strict friendship with as many Indian Nations as possibly he can." Maintaining peaceful relations among the tribes within this system of alliances was important, as was his final suggestion for a regular intercolonial correspondence concerning all such Indian affairs. Inherent in all these suggestions was control by the crown, without which "the success is very much to be doubtful, from the interruptions which we may continually expect to meet with amongst ourselves as well as from the French." As then constituted, control of Indian policy lay with the individual colonies and, even with the presence of a royal governor, could vary widely with the vicissitudes of a particular colony and situation at any given time.<sup>17</sup>

While Keith and Logan argued over the number and distribution of forts, imperial agitation subsided, and the Privy Council rejected the Board of Trade's 1721 report which incorporated Keith's proposals. Frustrated in these wider designs, which had included reorganizing the colonies under a single captain-general, the Board of Trade implemented certain of its ideas through the appointment of William Burnet as New York's governor and his enactment of an imperial-oriented program.<sup>18</sup>

Burnet was a close friend of Governor Hunter and planned to incorporate many of his predecessor's ideas. He arrived in the colony in 1720 with an Indian policy based on a two-fold approach: ending the Albany-Montreal trade; and drawing enough fur from the western tribes to counterbalance the loss. The Albany-Montreal trade was a bothersome thorn in the English side, for it enhanced French influence among the tribes, clearly a threat to the English presence.<sup>19</sup> The

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17 *Journal of Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, 1714-1718*, 4 vols. (London, 1924), 3: 311, 335; *State of the British Plantations in America*, in 1721, Board of Trade report to king, Sept. 8, 1721, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 620-30. For Keith's complete report see W. N. Sainsbury et al., eds., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies*, 40 vols. (London, 1860-1939), *Vol. 1719-1720*, Doc. 61-I, and also papers respecting Sir William Keith's Report to the Board of Trade, 1718-1719, Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs.

18 Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 257-60 contains a good discussion of Logan's objections to Keith's suggestions of four protective forts.

19 McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, lxx-lxxvi; Leder, *Robert Livingston*, 251. Thomas Eliot Norton's recent *The Fur Trade in Colonial New York*,

Iroquois themselves clearly recognized the problem, that of "the selling of Indian goods to the french and their Indians of Canada is Great Inducement for the french to make that Settlement [Fort Niagara] and therefore we Desire you to stop that trade. . . ." <sup>20</sup> The new governor thus understood the military value of the Iroquois to the English.

In implementing these policies, Burnet relied heavily on the advice of Robert Livingston, previously a close associate of Hunter who, as speaker of the assembly, had earlier prepared a memorial on Indian affairs. Livingston feared most the Albany-Montreal trade, because it brought the western fur trade to Canada and increased French influence with the Indian nations. Thus, he proposed cutting off the Montreal trade and suggested giving "encouragement . . . to those that will go to the Sinnekes Country and Onyagoro to sell what Indian goods they please to the Five nations, or the farr Indians. . . ." He believed such action would "keep the Indians steady to the British interest, and defeat the subtle artifices of the French." <sup>21</sup>

From 1720 to 1726 Burnet instituted a series of laws designed to eliminate the Albany-Montreal trade, while replacing it with a western trade funneled through Fort Oswego on the eastern end of Lake Ontario. Oswego was seen by the New York Assembly as tending "to serve the Six Nations in the British Interest and to promote the Trade with the more remote Indians." Through a series of acts which either prohibited the trade with Montreal or discriminated against it by imposing a double tax on goods going to the north, Burnet tried to undermine, both economically and politically, the French position with the Indians. He was, however, largely unsuccessful in his attempts. <sup>22</sup>

Considering the many evasions of the early acts, and considering that the French controlled most of the fur, the increases in quantities of fur that did occur prior to 1726 probably resulted from continued

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1686-1776 (Madison, Wisc., 1974) contains a similar overall view of Burnet's Indian policy.

<sup>20</sup> Conference between Col. Peter Schuyler and the Indians, Aug.-Sept. 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 562-69.

<sup>21</sup> Robert Livingston to Col. Schuyler, Aug. 23, 1720, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 559-61. There are clear parallels between Livingston's memorial and that of William Keith. Whether the two were in direct correspondence or merely reflected the general imperial tenor of the day cannot be conclusively determined. Nonetheless, the timing and similarities of these proposals were striking.

<sup>22</sup> *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 567; *Colonial Laws of New York*, 2: 281-82, 350-51, 366-67, 370-71; McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, lxxv-lxxvi, 144, 153.



illegal trade between Montreal and Albany, as well as furs gathered by the early traders at Oswego, of whom there were approximately three hundred by 1726. After 1726, the imposition of the discriminatory tax on goods going to Canada apparently restricted the Montreal trade, although the western trade did not take up as much of the slack as Burnet had hoped.<sup>23</sup>

Even Burnet's longest lasting venture, the building of Fort Oswego in 1727, which had both economic and political contexts, was not enough to ensure his success. With the work hardly completed, he was en route to Massachusetts to take on the duties of that governorship as a consequence of royal whim and transfer. He had succeeded only in disrupting the traditional economic state of affairs in New York. By 1724 the various laws had so hindered the traders that they induced twenty London merchants to petition the king that the 1720 act "in its Effects . . . has proved very Pernicious to the *British Trade* in general, and to the Interest of New York in particular." Although much of the memorial was clearly fallacious, it marked the beginning of a debate in royal as well as colonial circles concerning the legislation's value and effectiveness. Because of a general rise in British commercial concerns under Walpole and a corresponding decline of interest in imperial military motivations, the debate ended with the disallowance of all acts dealing with the Indian trade in 1729.<sup>24</sup>

Although interest in imperial cooperation was stimulated in 1722 by a conference at Albany of the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to renew the Covenant Chain for the united British colonies, it was a premature effort for both the home government and the individual colonies. Military defense against the French

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23 *Colonial Laws of New York*, 2: 281-82; McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, lxxv-lxxvii; Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1730-1760," *Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1939 (Toronto, 1939), 66, 70; Frederick W. Barnes, "The Fur Traders of Early Oswego," *Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association*, 13 (1914): 130; Frederick K. Zercher, "The Port of Oswego," *ibid.* 33 (1935): 309; Paul C. Phillips, *The Fur Trade* (Norman, Okla., 1961), 380; Murray Lawson, *Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775* (Toronto, 1940), 34, 39.

24 Cadwallader Colden, *Papers Relating to an Act of the Assembly of the Province of New York for Encouragement of the Indian Trade* (New York, 1724), 2, 10-13; McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, lxxviii-lxxxi; Board of Trade to Privy Council, Nov. 19, 1729, Gov. Montgomery to Lords of Trade, Dec. 21, 1730, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 897-99, 906; W. L. Grant and James Munro, eds., *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series*, 6 vols. (London, 1908-1912), 3: 209-14; Norton, *Fur Trade in New York*, 147-48. The 1720 act prohibited trade in Indian goods with the French in Canada and imposed a fine of £100 and the confiscation of all goods for any violation.

was not ignored, but it clearly took second place to an economic interest in the fur trade.<sup>25</sup> In New York this meant the Albany fur traders could pursue private profit unrestricted by imperial-minded legislation aimed at redirecting the trade. In Pennsylvania, despite passage of a new bill regulating the Indian trade and prohibiting the sale of liquor to the Indians, Logan and Keith continued to open up new lands and direct white settlement by means of the fur trade, lining their own pockets in the process. This accelerated the breakdown in traditional native American agricultural life and hastened the removal of many tribes to the Ohio.<sup>26</sup>

Figures show that fur exports increased dramatically from the end of Queen Anne's War through the 1720s with the exceptions noted above for New York. Deerskin was the staple in the Pennsylvania fur trade, and although the colony exported a smaller amount of fur to London than did New York, the value of fur as a percentage of Pennsylvania's total exports to London generally ranged from 30 to 40 percent (see Table 2).<sup>27</sup> The importance of the Pennsylvania fur trade was further evidenced by the fierce competition which necessitated a set of "Rules and Injunctions" to preserve "the Peace and tranquility of this Government." Governor Patrick Gordon ordered the Allegheny traders to refrain from using rum in the trade and to "enter into a mutual Agreement to Sell and buy or receive at some one certain reasonable price, according to the value of the Goods."<sup>28</sup>

A period of relative peace characterized North America during the 1730s. Neither the French nor the English desired outright war; rather, they competed on an economic basis for the native-American trade. Fur interests remained central to New York's policy during most of the decade, as reflected in the export statistics and in increased

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25 *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 479; conference between Gov's. Burnet, Spotswood, and Keith and the Indians, Aug.-Sept. 1722, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 657-81; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 3: 197-202; James Logan to John Penn, July 10, 1727, Penn Papers, Official Correspondence, 1: 283 (12 vols., Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, microfilm copy; hereafter cited as PPOC).

26 *Pa. Arch.*, 8th ser., 2: 1418, 1432-44, 1455-56; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 3: 195-96; *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania*, 3: 310-13; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," chapter 7.

27 Thomas Norton reached the conclusion based upon Lawson's statistics that Pennsylvania seldom produced "more than 5 percent of England's supply of furs while New York on several occasions exported between 35 and 50 percent of all English fur imports," *Fur Trade in New York*, 92. While the figures included in this study are not all-conclusive, they would generally suggest a less extreme comparison for the years 1714-1730.

28 Gov. Gordon to the Traders of Pennsylvania, Oct. 4, 1729, James Logan to Allegheny Traders, Oct. 6, 1729, *Pa. Arch.*, 1st ser., 1: 243-45.

concern for Oswego as the center of most of the colony's Indian affairs.<sup>29</sup> Burnet's successor, John Montgomery, met with the Iroquois in 1728 and expressed to them the purpose of Oswego: "I now Expect you are now Convinced that the Garison and House erected at Oswego is not only for the Conveniency of the far Indians to carry their Trade with the Inhabitants of this province but also for Your Security and Conveniency to Trade there. . . ." He did not ignore the importance of the Iroquois as a defense against the French: "Every man who knows the Interest and Circumstance of this Province, must be very sensible of the Importance of that Place, on which chiefly depends the Prosperity and Success of your Indian trade; the Fidelity and Obedience of the Six Nations to the Crown of *Great Britain*; and the Protection and Defence of your frontier Settlements."<sup>30</sup>

During the 1730s, trade and defense slowly became intertwined as the basis for Indian policy. By 1733 the French had already occupied for two years Crown Point, located only 150 miles from Albany, presumably with reasons other than trade in mind. Although William Cosby, governor of New York at that time, objected to the Iroquois allowing the French access to build there, his address dealt primarily with trade, especially at Oswego.<sup>31</sup>

By the second half of the decade, the Iroquois had become increasingly confused as to the direction of New York's policy. Six Nations representatives at an Albany Conference in September 1735 addressed Governor William Cosby: "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing," clearly recognizing that each depended on the other. New Yorkers, however, increasingly valued the Iroquois as buffers between themselves and the French, especially as fear of a dreaded third inter-colonial war grew larger with each succeeding year. On the one hand, New York wanted the Iroquois to prevent French building on native land and to protect Oswego in case of attack, while on the other hand,

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29 McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, lxxxi-lxxxii, 182; Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*, 4 vols. (New York, 1924), 3: 376; Gov. Cosby to Lords of Trade, June 19, 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 7.

30 Conference between Gov. Montgomery and the Indians, Sept. 1728, Gov. Montgomery to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 21, 1730, Gov. Montgomery to Sec. Popple, Dec. 21, 1730, *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 861, 913-14; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 606-7, 610, 620-22; *Colonial Laws of New York*, 2: 705-7, 788; Johnson G. Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English Struggle in North America, 1720-1760" (Ph.D. diss., Syracuse University, 1961), 84.

31 McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, 182-88; conference between Gov. Cosby and the Indians, Sept. 1733, Gov. Cosby to Duke of Newcastle, Dec. 15, 1733, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 5: 964-67, 972; Smith, *History of New York*, 1: 247; Osgood, *American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*, 3: 375-76.

the Indian commissioners were drawing up a "treaty of friendship" with the Caughnawaga, middlemen in the Albany-Montreal trade. In addition, Albany, concerned for its security, attempted to arrange a neutrality agreement in case of a French-English war, rather than adopt a more aggressive imperial military policy. The Iroquois said, "it's as if you on one side and the french on the other will press us out of our Lands, we are like dumb people not knowing what ails us."<sup>32</sup>

This confusion induced the Six Nations to turn to Pennsylvania for support in their battle to maintain power and position in a world increasingly dominated by Europeans. Thomas Penn, son of the original proprietor and holder of the major interest in and control of the colony, arrived in Pennsylvania in 1732 in time to take part in a treaty which settled disputes about various trade abuses and recent land purchases. This treaty and its subsequent confirmation four years later in October 1736 marked an important change in Pennsylvania's relationship with the Iroquois nations. Previously the colony had treated them as only one of numerous tribes with whom it dealt directly, but from this point on Pennsylvania placed the Iroquois in a position of supremacy within the context of the Covenant Chain by dealing directly with them as overlords of the lesser tribes within the colony's boundaries. Although in many ways their elevation by the English was artificial, the Six Nations readily accepted their new position for reasons of power, economy, and security. Their new role enabled them to survive on an equal footing vis-a-vis the European powers for a number of years, but in the end overriding the interests of traditional supporters of the English like the Delaware would prove fatal. Penn hoped to profit from land sales to pay off proprietary debts, and this private concern preoccupied Indian affairs for several years, manifesting itself most particularly in the well-known Walking Purchase.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> 1735 Indian Treaties, McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, 193-96; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 683; minutes of the N.Y. Indian Commissioners, Aug. 1-2, Sept. 18-20, 1735, 2: 65-67, 71-74; Marquis de Beauharnois to Count de Maurepas, Oct. 10, 1734, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 9: 1039-40; Cooper, "Oswego in the French-English Struggle," 86-87.

<sup>33</sup> Indian Deed, Sept. 7, 1732, *Pa. Arch.*, 1st ser., 1: 344-47; Indian Conference at Philadelphia, Aug. 23-Sept. 2, 1732, Shawnee Conference at Philadelphia, Oct. 5, 1732, *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 3: 435-52, 462; Indian Treaty, Sept. 28-Oct. 14, 1736, Julian P. Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties printed by Benjamin Franklin, 1736-1762* (Philadelphia, 1938), 3-14, also in *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 4: 79-95; copies of Susquehanna Deed and Release, Oct. 11, 25, 1736, Penn Papers, Indian Mss., 1: 40, *Pa. Arch.*, 1st ser., 1: 494-99, and Logan Papers, XI, Indian Affairs; Iroquois Proposition and Deed, Oct. 1736, Penn Papers, Indian Mss.,

The point at which military concerns overshadowed trade advantages remains uncertain, but as early as 1739, Deputy Governor George Thomas of Pennsylvania complained about the French danger and about the Quaker refusal to do anything for defense. In 1741 New York Lieutenant Governor George Clarke told his assembly that "if you suffer Oswego to fall into the Hands of the French I much fear you will lose the Six Nations, an Event which will expose the whole Country to the merciless Spoil and barbarous cruelty of a Savage Enemy." The following year he made no mention at all of fur in his address to the assembly. Ongoing confusion and disagreements over trade and especially the Walking Purchase and the recognition of increasing tensions with the French clearly indicated that a major Indian treaty involving all the colonies together, rather than separately, was necessary.<sup>34</sup>

Although a meeting was held in 1742, it did not answer all questions nor fulfill all needs. In particular, the English feared the French would take advantage of internal disputes among the tribes by encouraging such divisions and driving a wedge between the English colonies and their native allies. Finally, in 1743, a backcountry encounter between Virginia settlers and Iroquois raiding parties, which resulted in deaths on both sides, provided the catalyst for the long-desired treaty. Pennsylvania, fearing the consequences of being caught between the two factions and the advantages which the French might gain from such a disruption, offered its services as mediator in the affair. Interestingly, George Thomas perceived his role as governor as "not only to preserve peace in my own government, but to be the Instrument, as far as lyes in my power, of restoring it to any other of his Majesties' Subjects." The exact extent to which Pennsylvania's specific needs motivated Thomas was not evident, but he clearly offered to cooperate on an intercolonial basis to provide the necessary frontier security.<sup>35</sup>

Lancaster, Pennsylvania, something of a neutral location, became

1: 39-40; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 363-68. Excellent accounts of the history of the Walking Purchase are contained in Francis Jennings, "The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn's Sons: Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase," *Pennsylvania History* 37 (Jan. 1970): 19-39, Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," chapter 10, and Anthony F. C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763* (New York, 1949), chapter 2. I am indebted to Francis Jennings for clarification of the changing relationship between the Iroquois and their tributary allies.

34 George Thomas to John Penn, Nov. 5, 1739, PPOC, 3: 89; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 1: 793, 799-800, 827, 831; Gov. Clarke to Board of Trade, Aug. 24, Nov. 29, 1742, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 214-15, 220-21.

35 Gov. Thomas to assembly, Aug. 20, 1742, *Pa. Arch.*, 8th ser., 4: 2784-85; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 4: 630-37, 640-69; Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties*, xxxv-xxxvi.

the site for probably the most important Indian treaty since 1722. News of war with France increased the importance of Iroquois support for the English. Governor Thomas's opening remarks to the commissioners from Virginia and Maryland indicated the main thrust of the treaty: "These Indians by their Situation are a Frontier to some of them [English colonies], and from thence, If Friends, are Capable of Defending their Settlements; If Enemies, of making Cruel Ravages upon them; If Neuters, they may deny the French a Passage through their Country, and give us timely Notice of their Desigas." Speaker of the Pennsylvania House John Kinsey promised that the assembly would "let no expense be wanting proper to put the country into a posture of defense in such a manner as their Known principles would admit of." In brief, the treaty provided compensation for Iroquois land claims in Virginia and Maryland. Most important, all parties "brightened" the Covenant Chain, and the Iroquois agreed to remain neutral in the recently declared war and not allow French military forces access to English settlements through their lands. Thus, as the Lancaster Treaty drew to a close, so did an era. No longer would New York solely dominate Iroquois affairs nor would its interests in the fur trade determine Indian policy. Pennsylvania had risen to a position of importance as the center of Indian affairs moved westward toward the Ohio country. The Iroquois left Lancaster at the peak of their power, but by relinquishing their right to land west of the Alleghenies and by their earlier decision to downplay the position of tributary allies, they would ultimately undermine their position as sole spokesmen for all native Americans.<sup>36</sup>

Although colonial Indian policy increasingly emphasized the importance of militarily defending British imperial interests, New York and Pennsylvania did not neglect the fur trade. While fluctuations did occur, both colonies consistently exported furs and skins which accounted for 30 to 50 percent of their total exports to London. For Pennsylvania in particular, and to a degree for New York as well, England was only a minor market prior to 1730. As noted, the majority of Pennsylvania's trade took place with the West Indies. Therefore, the maintenance of an important staple export such as furs to the London market was vital to the colony's economic stability. These

<sup>36</sup> Lancaster Indian Treaty, June 22-July 4, 1744, Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties*, 41-79, and *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 4: 698-737; Gov. Thomas to assembly, May 18, 1744, assembly to Gov. Thomas, May 25, 1744, Proclamation of War, June 11, 1744, *ibid.*, 685-89, 696-97; *Pa. Arch.*, 8th ser., 4: 2932-33; Kinsey quote in Theodore G. Thayer, *Pennsylvania Politics and the Growth of Democracy, 1740-1776* (Harrisburg, 1953), 19; Thomas Penn to Gov. Thomas, May 5, 1744, T. Penn Letter Books, 2: 89.

needs, plus the private trade interests of the Albany merchants, which in part had accounted for Burnet's earlier failures, led to both colonies' policies of general friendship toward the native Americans — policies which, only with the approach of war, would reflect overriding concern for the Indians' value as allies and a buffer against the French.<sup>37</sup>

King George's War, 1744-1748, occasioned a revival of imperial interests in Indian affairs. In contrast to earlier years, both New York and Pennsylvania favored a more vigorous policy toward the French, although elements in both colonies wanted to avoid open conflict. Albany traders and colonial officials in particular desired to protect the fur trade and to secure the frontier. Governor George Clinton of New York pursued a policy of keeping the Six Nations favorable to the British interest. He met frequently with them, and he warned the assembly that, if the colony lost the native alliance, "we may easily foresee how fatal and Destructive such an event would prove." However, the following year he had to reprimand the legislators for not taking enough action: "Through your Carelessness and Improvidence, we must hazard the seduction of the Six Nations, and our *Northern* Frontiers, for the present, remain naked and open to the Incursions and Insults of our declared Enemies, and their *Indians*." <sup>38</sup>

Joining representatives from New York and New England, Pennsylvania officials met with the Iroquois at Albany in October 1745. Quaker pacifism and a desire to protect the colony's expanding Ohio Valley trade created an unwillingness to induce the Six Nations to take an active role in the war. Rather, the colony sought to preserve the tribes' neutrality and strength, a position that the Iroquois themselves much preferred. However, the Quaker assembly had not been totally inactive in supporting the war. In July 1745 it provided £4,000 for provisioning the recently captured Louisbourg garrison with food and "other Grains," which according to Benjamin Franklin, Governor Thomas interpreted to mean grains of gunpowder. The following year the assembly provided a grant of £5,000 for the king's use, which went toward raising several military companies for an expedition against Canada.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> James G. Lydon, "Philadelphia's Commercial Expansion, 1720-1739," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 91 (Oct. 1967), 402-4; Michael Kammen, *Colonial New York: A History* (New York, 1975), 166-73.

<sup>38</sup> Conference between Gov. Clinton and the Indians, June 1744, *Journal of Occurrences in Canada, 1746, 1747*, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 262-66, 10: 94; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 2: 24, 61.

<sup>39</sup> Conference between Commissioners of the colonies and the Indians, Oct. 1745, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 289-305; Albany Treaty,

The imperial concerns of war were often carried out within the framework of the fur trade, and although there were a number of disagreements between the two governors and their assemblies, as well as some lingering distrust between the two colonies themselves, Pennsylvania and New York pursued the war with reasonable effectiveness. In Pennsylvania, George Croghan, an Irishman with a far-flung trading network in the Ohio Valley, was primarily responsible for directing the colony's policy. Much of his influence was due to his ability to provide tribes with the desired trade goods normally supplied by the French but now cut off by the exigencies of war. An increase in the number of historically pro-British natives in the Ohio country also extended English influence at the expense of France. The really encouraging sign in New York was the emergence of William Johnson, a trader who operated in the Mohawk Valley, as a key figure in native American affairs. Johnson, who was extremely influential among the Iroquois, in collaboration with Governor Clinton and other imperialists provided for the proper defenses of the colony.<sup>40</sup>

Realization of the coming of peace eased tension within the colonies by late 1748; however, an Indian conference held in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, that year indicated that imperial defense would now take precedence over traditional matters of trade. Conrad Weiser, the representative for Pennsylvania and Virginia, informed the tribes of the Aix-la-Chapelle treaty, but warned them of the ever-prevalent French menace: "The French King's People have been almost starved in Old France for want of Provision, which made them wish and seek for Peace; but our wise People are of the opinion that after their Bellies are full they will Quarrel again and raise War. All nations in Europe know that their Friendship is mixed with Poison, and many that trusted too much on their Friendship have been ruined." As soon after the war as 1749, William Johnson warned of French attempts to win over the Iroquois and their "Scheme which is to build trading Houses and garrisons at all Passes between said [Ohio] River and Oswego." The New York Assembly concurred in the im-

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Oct. 1745, Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties*, 81-100; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 4: 763-64, 767-69, 772-73, 5: 5, 30-32, 36-49; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Aug. 1, Sept. 12, 19, 1745; Benjamin Franklin, *Autobiography*, Russell B. Nye, ed., *Autobiography and Other Writings by Benjamin Franklin* (Boston, 1958), 106; *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania*, 5: 45-49.

40 For a general discussion of this time period see Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs, and Empires," 192-98. The best biography of Croghan is Nicholas B. Wainwright, *George Croghan: Wilderness Diplomat* (Chapel Hill, 1959). For Johnson see Milton W. Hamilton, *Sir William Johnson, Colonial American, 1715-1763* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1976).



portance of the Six Nations to the British cause and reaffirmed that "the preserving of the *Indians*, is undoubtedly of Great Consequence to the Security and Prosperity of this colony." Although some political factionalism would continue in New York, which had repercussions on exactly how much support the assembly would lend Indian policy, all elements retained some aspects of an imperial approach. In 1753, when Lieutenant Governor James DeLancey finally took control of the government, he mended political fences with Johnson, a leading member of the imperialists, and guaranteed the continuance of a unified approach toward Indian affairs.<sup>41</sup>

The necessity for a unified British imperial approach to Indian policy, rather than separate policies directed by each individual colony, became progressively more important as the French grew bolder each year. In addition to Pennsylvania's aggression on the Ohio and New York's activity centered at Oswego, Virginia also threatened French dominance in the west. In 1747 a group of speculators in Virginia, recognizing the value of the Ohio country, petitioned the crown for a large grant of land. Believing such a grant would be "a proper Step towards disappointing the views and checking the encroachments of the French by interrupting part of the communication from their Lodgements upon the great Lakes to the River Mississippi," the king granted the new Ohio Company 200,000 acres of land upon condition of settlement. This decision marked an important imperial attempt to direct westward expansion at French expense by splitting the encirclement of forts and posts surrounding the English colonies. The struggle which ensued was one of European powers over European goals, not one between whites and native Americans.<sup>42</sup>

French policy at this point was hesitant, but in the summer of

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41 Lancaster Treaty, July 1748, Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties*, 109-22; Journal of Conrad Weiser, 1748, Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846* (Cleveland, 1904), 1: 40; James Sullivan, ed., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 14 vols. (Albany, 1921-1969), 2: 276-79, 281, 301, 314; O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 589-93; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 2: 263, 270, 276, 291, 297, 308, 311-12, 326, 330, 336-37; *Colonial Laws of New York*, 2: 781-84, 885-86; Norton, *Fur Trade in New York*, 191-95.

42 Grant and Munro, eds., *Acts of the Privy Council*, 4: 55-56, quoted in Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 410; Alfred P. James, *The Ohio Company: Its Inner History* (Pittsburgh, 1959), 4-8, 20, 26-27, and Lois Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia* (Pittsburgh, 1954), viii, xi, xiii. James's study and Mulkearn's collection of the Mercer Papers are the basic sources for the history of the Ohio Company. Also see Clarence W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution* (Cleveland, 1917), 1: 105, 115.

1749 they elected to send an exploratory expedition down the Ohio to determine the extent of native American defection to the English. Richard Peters, the provincial secretary, informed the Pennsylvania proprietor of the land grant to the Ohio Company and of the French expedition, warning him that increased English activity would force the French to attempt to recoup their losses, "if not for the sake of the Trade . . . , for the conveniency of the River Mississippi." At the same time that Céloron de Blainville was descending the Ohio, French officials adopted a policy of price cutting at Niagara and Fort Frontenac to regain the fur trade lost to Oswego and Pennsylvania.<sup>43</sup>

Colonial and British thought increasingly recognized the need for a unified policy in Indian affairs, one that would be imperially directed and supported by the crown. Governor Clinton of New York offered his help to Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton, suggesting a unified effort, but expressed "doubt whether this can be effected without an immediate Application to his Majesty for that purpose." Although the governors of New York and Pennsylvania agreed on the need to present a unified front, as evidenced by their increased correspondence, neither was willing to sacrifice his colony to the private interest of the other. In addition, the two assemblies expressed a continued jealousy of each other. Thomas Penn approved of Hamilton's hesitancy over too ready an acceptance to unite with New York in such matters. The arrival in London of one of numerous lead plates claiming the Ohio for France that the Céloron expedition had buried occasioned an imperial resolve by the Duke of Bedford, which Penn noted with approval. Bedford determined to send a dependable governor to New York who, with crown support, would be able to maintain the various tribes in the British interest. Although nothing developed from this after Bedford's resignation from office, the growing imperial concern was evident. In English eyes, the Iroquois were still the most important tribe. Penn concurred in this and disapproved of the assembly's resolve to send separate presents to the Ohio tribes. Although recognizing the problems of distance and Ohio independence, he and Peters agreed on the importance of maintaining Iroquois supremacy and not undercutting their support by dealing with the western tribes. He expressed concern that this could not be done without British support, "as the place where they are seated is that where we should

43 Donald H. Kent, *The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania, 1753* (Harrisburg, 1954), 6-12; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 387, 425, 480-81, 483; Richard Peters to Proprietors, July 5, Oct. 26, 1749, Oct. 15, 1750, PPOC, 4: 219, 243-49, 5: 73; Abstract of Dispatches from Canada, 1749, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 10: 199-202.

wish to strengthen them and if they remain numerous there, and well inclined they may be a good Barrier both to the People of New York, and Pennsylvania." <sup>44</sup>

One of New York's leading imperialists, Archibald Kennedy, expressed well the thinking of the period in a series of pamphlets in the early 1750s. He asked rhetorically if it were not time to secure the frontiers while peace lasted, "which from all Appearances cannot be very long." "What ever Pretences may be made, it is absolutely true, that the Preservation of the whole Continent, depends upon a proper Regulation of the Six Nations." Cadwallader Colden, inspired by Kennedy's proposals, drew up a memorial on the state of Indian affairs which eventually went to the Board of Trade in August 1751. It described the Iroquois's importance and the desirability of a single crown-appointed superintendent to supervise them. Pressure such as this and increasing evidence of the confused state of Indian affairs would shortly force the Board of Trade and crown to take positive action. <sup>45</sup>

French policy had been somewhat hesitant from 1748-1751, but in 1752 the Marquis de Duquesne became governor-general of Canada, and under his direction it took on more aggressive tone. During the following year the French advanced down the Ohio, erecting a series of forts and striking fear into the hearts of the Ohio tribes. English traders had withdrawn from the Ohio, and the natives now had to rely upon the French for much of their trade goods. <sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Gov. Clinton to Gov. Hamilton, Oct. 8, 1750, *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 480, 495-96; Thomas Penn to Gov. Hamilton, Feb. 25, Mar. 30, July 29, 1757, T. Penn to Richard Peters, May 30, 1750, Feb. 24, Sept. 28, 1751, T. Penn Letter Book, 2: 311, 3: 40-43, quote 44, 59, 67, 77, 105; R. Peters to T. Penn, Dec. 8, 1749, Oct. 25, 1750, Gov. Hamilton to T. Penn, Oct. 13, Nov. 18, 1750, Feb. 3, 1751, PPOC, 4: 265, 5: 69, 77, 79, 89, 129.

<sup>45</sup> Archibald Kennedy, *Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies Under Proper Regulations* (New York, 1750), 6; Archibald Kennedy, *The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest Considered* (New York, 1751), 7; Cadwallader Colden to Gov. Clinton, Aug. 8, 1751, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 738-47. Milton M. Klein's "Archibald Kennedy: Imperial Pamphleteer," in Lawrence H. Leder, ed., *The Colonial Legacy*, 2: 75-105 provides an excellent summary of Kennedy's political career and his concern with Indian affairs.

<sup>46</sup> Gov. Hamilton to Thomas Penn, Nov. 1752, Richard Peters to T. Penn, Dec. 14, 1752, PPOC, 5: 295, 311; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 599-600, 608-9, 616-17, 635-37, 639-47, 658-59, 665-86; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 10, June 7, 1753; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 433-42; Boyd, ed., *Indian Treaties*, lxvi-lxvii, 123-34; William A. Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier, 1753-1758* (Harrisburg, 1960), 18, 25-26, 61-62; William J. Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760* (New York, 1969), 160-63. Kent's *French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania* contains a good account of French activity on the Ohio for that year.

Reaction to the events of 1753 on both sides of the Atlantic reflected increased concern and dismay over the deteriorating state of Indian affairs. With classic understatement, Governor Hamilton stated in a letter to Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia that, "The Governors of New York have heretofore attempted to bring all the Colonies to act in a conjunct Body in Indian Affairs, but without Success; owing, I presume to their mutual and injudicious Jealousies of Each Other. Nor is this in my opinion likely ever to be effected unless the Ministry at home can fall on some expedient to compel it." <sup>47</sup>

Recognition within the British ministry of the severity of the situation was reflected in its increased concern for a uniform imperial policy which would eventually engulf all the colonies. As early as August, Robert D'Arcy, Earl of Holderness and secretary of state for the Southern Department, had sent a circular letter to all governors asking them to investigate French activity and to prepare "to repel Force by Force." The Board of Trade desired the newly appointed New York governor, Sir Danvers Osborne, to recommend laws to the assembly for repairing and erecting fortifications for the security of the colony and for subsidizing annual presents to the Indians. By September, news of Clinton's recent treaty with the Iroquois induced the Board of Trade to write again: "Friendship and Alliance is only to be gained and preserved by making presents to them at proper Times, and upon proper occasions." Indian policy changed radically as the board, having ordered a conference of all concerned colonies, advised Osborne to "take Care, that all the Provinces, be (if practicable) comprised in one General Treaty to be made in his Majesty's Name, it appearing to us, that the Practice of each Province making [a] separate Treaty for itself, in its own Name is very improper, and may be attended with great Inconveniency to His Majesty's Subjects." Shortly after his arrival in New York and after reading the crown's instructions, Osborne committed suicide, and Lieutenant Governor DeLancey requested the assembly to provide for the conference desired by the Board of Trade; the house readily complied and set mid-June as the date. Clearly, all involved, but especially the Board of Trade, were coming to recognize the importance of dealing with the Indians through a unified policy vested in a single crown-appointed individual or body rather than separate provincial treaties, even if made by a royal governor, as had normally been the case.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Gov. Hamilton to Gov. Dinwiddie, Aug. 2, 1753, *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 632.

<sup>48</sup> *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 689-90, 711-12, 717-18; *N.Y. Assembly Journals*, 2: 353, 367-68; Lords of Trade to Earl of Holderness, Sept. 18, 1753, *Lords*

The wisdom of the Board of Trade's decision became even more evident the following year as the French renewed their assault on the Ohio. Pennsylvania's failure to take direct action and Virginia's hesitant steps to erect a fort at the Forks of the Ohio created a vacuum in the vast area beyond the Alleghenies, and the French readily stepped in to fill it. In early 1754 a command of 800 men departed from Montreal for the Ohio. They arrived at the Forks in mid-April and forced the surrender of a small band of Virginians under the command of Ensign Edward Ward who were building a fort. Isaac Norris believed "these are the beginnings of introducing the War into America where in all probability the [longest?] Sword must decide the boundaries." Shortly thereafter followed Washington's well-known debacle and surrender at Fort Necessity. The French, who had driven the English from the Ohio, now demanded the support of the western tribes, declaring they would destroy them otherwise. In need of trade goods, the Ohio tribes inclined toward the French; the Onondaga Council could not hold them in the English interest.<sup>49</sup>

The Albany conference which got underway in June reflected the hesitant steps toward a balanced imperial policy. Despite the increased urgency occasioned by news of Washington's capitulation, and despite the good intentions of many colonial leaders, the conference could not overcome deep-seated jealousies. Although Pennsylvania had voted £500 in trade goods for delivery to the Six Nations at Albany, the colony's instructions made no mention of intercolonial union. With a certain amount of insight, Archibald Kennedy in his writing had pleaded with the Albany Congress not to break up for reasons of petty jealousy, believing that only unified action would defeat France, Britain's "implacable and most inveterate Enemy." The importance of frontier issues, as expressed in the congress's final representation and plan, indicated the chief concerns of the commis-

of Trade to Gov. Osborne, Sept. 18, 1753, Lords of Trade to the Governors in America, Sept. 18, 1753, Lt. Gov. DeLancey to Lords of Trade, Oct. 15, 1753, Lords of Trade to Lt. Gov. DeLancey, Feb. 26, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 799-804, 829.

<sup>49</sup> *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 748, 6: 28-29; Hunter, *Forts on the Pennsylvania Frontier*, 24-25; Leonard W. Labaree, "Benjamin Franklin and the Defense of Pennsylvania, 1754-1757," *Pennsylvania History* 29 (Jan. 1962): 9-10; Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (Pittsburgh, 1940), 66-68; Marcel Trudel, "The Jumonville Affair," *Pennsylvania History* 21 (Oct. 1954): 351-81; Isaac Norris to Robert Charles, May 8, 1754, Norris Letter Book, 9: 54; Capitulation of Fort Necessity, July 3, 1754, *Pa. Arch.*, 1st ser., 2: 146-47; George Croghan to Gov. Hamilton, Mar. 23, 1754, Col. Innis to Gov. Hamilton, July 5, 1754, *PPOC*, 6: 29, 203.

sioners. They pleaded for appointment of a single crown-appointed Indian superintendent, and most specifically Colonel William Johnson. Brother Abraham, a Mohawk sachem, expressed the need most succinctly: "If he fails us, we die." Nonetheless, despite Kennedy's appeal and the Plan of the Union, the Albany Conference was largely a failure. Both the colonies and the crown rejected the plan. As early as August the Board of Trade had recommended that such a union "cannot be made to answer the purpose of a present exigency."<sup>50</sup>

Despite this setback, the general trend toward imperialism continued, culminating in the crown's decision to send a royal military command to North America and to establish an Indian superintendent for the northern colonies. Imperial control of Indian affairs would not only prevent abuses in the fur trade, but it would also maintain those alliances which would prevent French encroachment. Recognition of such a vital concept had evolved slowly, but it would prove its ultimate worth during the "Great War for the Empire," the last of the eighteenth-century colonial wars.<sup>51</sup> Although conflicting interpretations exist as to the reasons for and the power behind the creation of the Indian superintendency, the crown appointed William Johnson to the office in 1755. Secretary Thomas Pownall wrote to Johnson in 1756 concerning the office's importance and its "great end . . . of fixing them [the Indians] steadily in our interest and engaging them in the service" against the French. Johnson directed Indian policy toward maintaining friendship of the native American for strategic ends throughout the war years.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>50</sup> *The New-York Mercury*, May 6, 1754; *Pa. Arch.*, 5: 3637-40, 3694; *Pa. Col. Recs.*, 5: 747-49, 6: 25-26; Roger R. Trask, "Pennsylvania and the Albany Congress, 1754," *Pennsylvania History* 27 (July 1960): 276-77; Lawrence H. Gipson, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, 15 vols. (New York, 1936-1971), 5: chapters 4 and 5; Archibald Kennedy, *Serious Considerations on the Present State of Affairs of the Northern Colonies* (New York, 1754), 3, 14-15; Proceedings of the Colonial Congress held at Albany, June-July 1754, Representation to the King with Plan of General Concert, Aug. 9, 1754; Representation to the King on the Proceedings of the Congress at Albany, Oct. 29, 1754, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 853-92, 901-6, 916-20.

<sup>51</sup> Sec. Robinson to the Governors in North America, Oct. 26, 1754, Jan. 23, 1755, Some Thoughts Upon the British Interest in North America, Jan. 6, 1756, O'Callaghan, ed., *N.Y. Col. Docs.*, 6: 915-16, 934, 7: 20.

<sup>52</sup> William Johnson to Gov. Shirley, Jan. 3, 1756, Gov. Shirley to Wm. Johnson, Jan. 4, 1756, Sec. Pownall to Wm. Johnson, Mar. 5, 1756, *ibid.*, 7: 11-13, 40-41; Commission from Edward Braddock, Apr. 15, 1755, Sullivan, ed., *Johnson Papers*, 1: 465-66. For an interesting discussion concerning the basis for Johnson's appointment see John R. Alden, "The Albany Congress and the Creation of the Indian Superintendencies," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 27 (Sept. 1940), 193-210; cf. McIlwain, ed., *Wraxall's Abridgment*, xcvi-xcviii; also see Gipson, *British Empire*, 6: 137-39, 186-90. In 1756 Edmund Atkin was appointed superintendent for the southern Indians.

Although the interwar years had involved a heightened awareness of the importance of Indian affairs to imperial security, the fur trade had not suffered. In fact, Pennsylvania trade reached new heights, while in New York it returned to a level commensurate with that of the 1730s (see Table 1). Only with the French incursions of 1753 and 1754 did exports decline, a trend which continued during the ensuing war. The extent to which the fur trade played a continued or even expanded role in the economies of New York and Pennsylvania indicated that Britain's increased imperial military interests operated, at least in part, independently of purely economic concerns, because upsurges in the fur trade had followed each of the previous intercolonial wars without similar reaction. With increased English recognition of the colonies as valuable markets for manufactured goods, Britain consolidated control of Indian affairs in part as a means of protecting that market against French disruption and possible conquest, rather than as a means of monopolizing fur sources. This development received its first real impulse with the Ohio Company land grant in 1748, while the Albany Congress and the appointment of Sir William Johnson as Indian superintendent marked its completion.<sup>53</sup>

As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, imperialism, at least in the realm of Indian policy, finally emerged with a balance of economic, political, and military components during the short period at mid-century between the wars. Only then did the British self-consciously attempt to create a policy which recognized the interrelationship of both economic and military concerns, the control of which would lie in the hands of two royal Indian superintendents, one for the northern colonies and one for the southern. Previously Indian policy had been hesitant, sometimes stressing private economic concerns or a particular colony's interest and other times military needs, but seldom was it directed by any coherent *British* plan. While the state of Indian affairs in New York and Pennsylvania was certainly not the only measure of British imperialism, it does provide us with an indicator, albeit a specifically limited one, of the varied emphases of an evolving imperial policy.

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53 Detailed analyses of continuing imperial Indian policy can be found in Cutcliffe, "Indians, Furs, and Empires," for the years through 1768, and Jack M. Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760-1775* (Lincoln, Neb., 1961). Also important are Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio*, and Alvord's older, but still valuable, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics*. For the Iroquois role during the Revolution, see Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse, 1972).

As noted at the outset, Charles Andrews argued for a "commercial and colonial" interpretation of imperialism, while Stephen Webb suggested that the evidence of "army and empire" showed that by 1681 "Anglo-American relations were . . . dominated by an imperial system. . . ." Webb, however, subsequently noted that by 1727, "the imperial militarization finally impressed upon England's colonies by Marlborough's subordinates was being overlaid, if not undone by the commercial and colonial policies long advocated by 'country' politicians and 'city' merchants, and finally effected by the Walpole regime." Although, as Webb suggests, the period of "Salutary Neglect," 1722-1739, may have been an "abnormally peaceful period," it is important to recognize it for just that, a period of peace in which military concerns were of little import.<sup>54</sup> Recognition of this fact, combined with the above evidence for New York and Pennsylvania — the latter a proprietary colony which prior to 1755 was never a host to royal troops — would suggest that British policy was evolving and changing, at times emphasizing the importance of military and political concerns but just as frequently dominated by economic enthusiasms. Webb's military evidence for the seventeenth century, William Keith's report to the Board of Trade in 1719, and William Burnet's policy in New York during the 1720s suggest that the "commercial and colonial" interpretation is not sufficient to explain Anglo-America; however, the ultimate rejection of both Keith's report and Burnet's policy and the contrasting emphasis upon trade indicate that an interpretation stressing "army and empire" is equally one-sided. The two must be judiciously combined to explain the history of colonies as diverse as New York and Pennsylvania on the one hand, and Virginia and Jamaica on the other.

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<sup>54</sup> Webb, "Army and Empire," 3-4, 28-30, and Webb, *Governors-General*, xviii, 459-66.