as manifestations of aggression, the former inwardly directed, the latter, outwardly (p. 47). Thus upper-class whites committed suicide more often while lower-class blacks committed more homicides. In studying mid-twentieth-century statistics, he also finds Gold's hypothesis valid to explain black crime rates as a result of lack of discipline and employment which results in a large number of teenage suicides and homicides. The industrial revolution resulted in the raising of the suicide-murder ratio and the lowering of accidents among the white population. The incidence of violent death grew over the decades as did accidents, while a broader spectrum of people committed suicide. Living in the post-industrial age, Lane suggests the need for a different type of social system for those living in metropolitan areas.

Lane's study is an important contribution to the growing number of studies on the history of crime in urban America. It is recommended for all college libraries.

Allegheny County Law Library
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Joel Fishman


Long before the dawn of the industrial era, Americans had known about the iron deposits of northeastern Minnesota, although no one in the wildest flight of fancy could have dreamed of their extent or future importance. The demand for iron was small in that day, the minerals far away from the centers of consumption, and the infrastructure essential for mining and processing simply nonexistent. But the American economy changed in the course of the nineteenth century as the industrial revolution took hold, and with the vastly increased demand for iron coming from the burgeoning growth transforming the nation, the conditions finally appeared that stimulated the development of these long-known ores. The story of this development forms the heart of this splendid book by David A. Walker.

The mining of Minnesota's three iron ranges came in sequential fashion. Even as the knowledge of the ores spread in the 1840s, other metals in the region, notably copper and gold, seemed far more important. It was not until the 1870s that Charlemagne Tower and others assembled the requisite capital and surmounted two key prob-
lems, weather and transportation, to bring the first of the iron ranges, the Vermilion, into production. After that came the giant Mesabi Range, where the Merritt family spearheaded development before they overextended themselves and lost control to John D. Rockefeller, a man whose enormous stature in petroleum has overshadowed his importance in iron and steel. Later, and largely in the early twentieth century, came the exploitation of the smallest of the three ranges, the Cuyuna. Although Walker traces the development of each range seriatim, their development followed a similar pattern: discovery by individuals who lacked the money to exploit the deposits, the entry of new men with large financial resources, and ultimately the displacement of the small entrepreneur — even the large entrepreneur — by huge, seemingly faceless corporate enterprises, notably the United States Steel Corporation, which took control of the great mines on the Mesabi Range in 1901.

Throughout the book, Walker places his emphasis on the actions of people, particularly the entrepreneurs who promoted the development of the iron ranges. This is not surprising in view of his statement in the preface that he regrets the recent trend in economic and business history away “from a focus on the individual toward analysis of inanimate institutions and corporations.” And it is the people who stand out in Walker’s book, at least until after the Panic of 1893, when the great corporation rapidly displaced the individual entrepreneur.

Some themes and views expressed in *Iron Frontier* seem bound to stir new controversies or perpetuate old ones. The most contentious part of the iron range story surrounds the role of John D. Rockefeller. Walker goes to great length to sort out the serpentine web of allegations that Rockefeller used high-handed tactics to wrest control of the major Mesabi mines from the Merritt family, and in the end Walker rehabilitates the Rockefeller image, a view that will never be accepted by all parties. He also traces the disappearance of the individual iron-range entrepreneur to the Panic of 1893 and the severe contraction that followed, but some may wonder if the huge corporation with its enormous financial resources would not have prevailed about this time irrespective of the Panic. Vertical integration throughout many industries was one of the great themes of the day. Other historians may raise questions about setting the development of the iron ranges within the context of “the frontier,” particularly as so much of this development came after 1890.

These questions aside, what emerges in *Iron Frontier* is an ex-
cellent history of the development of the three iron ranges of north-eastern Minnesota. Walker based his research upon an extensive number of primary and secondary sources, and he welded a relatively complicated story into a richly detailed narrative that rarely flags. Although his study will hardly resolve all the contentious issues surrounding the exploitation of the iron country, Iron Frontier is an important book that adds much to our understanding of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century industrial development.

Graduate School of Business Administration
Harvard University
Boston, Massachusetts


Books by Stuart Brandes, Daniel Nelson, Roy Lubove, David Brody, and John Garraty have taught us a good deal about “labor reform” and almost as much about labor reform in the Progressive-era steel industry. What justifies the publication of this new entry is less the originality of its subject matter than its data base. Gerald Eggert brings a generally familiar tale to life by telling it through the correspondence, scrapbooks, addresses, poetry, essays, and reminiscences of William Brown Dickson. To be sure, Eggert carefully sets the historical scene for his protagonist, and we finish the volume wiser about Elbert H. Gary, Charles M. Schwab, and the business of steel-making. But this story is at its best when Dickson is at center stage.

For a man who reached the first vice-presidency of United States Steel (1909), Dickson was something of a maverick. Eight years in the mills — five as a laborer, three as a clerk — had made him more conscious than most of Andrew Carnegie’s “young geniuses” of what it meant to live the life, and to have the expectations, of an ordinary working man. Unlike his fellow steel executives, Dickson had never bossed a gang or depended for his salary on driving a work force to new levels of production. At United States Steel under the Gary regime, Dickson became the company’s alter ego, pushing hard for the stock option, pension, and safety programs that were the staples of welfare capitalism and, after 1907, initiating a campaign for the elimination of Sunday labor. Resigning under pressure in 1911,