Late in 1981, Chancellor Wesley W. Posvar asked us to comment on the suggestion that a series of oral history interviews with General Matthew B. Ridgway be conducted under the auspices of the University of Pittsburgh. We were personally enthusiastic about the idea, and we found that the University's history faculty shared our belief in the importance of taping the General's recollections of his distinguished military career.

After an initial meeting with Chancellor Posvar and us, General Ridgway agreed to one interview. He did so with a courtesy and grace that we found to be characteristic of him, but he also expressed considerable doubt about the value of a project that would last for several months and would, in his view, inevitably duplicate material in his numerous journal articles, many hours of oral history interviews in the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, and his two books, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (1956) and The Korean War (1967).

Frederick A. Hetzel is Director of the University of Pittsburgh Press. He holds the Master of Arts degree in American literature from the University of Virginia. Harold L. Hitchens is Senior Research Associate, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh. His Ph.D. in American diplomatic history is from the University of Chicago.—Editor

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Because Joseph C. Goulden's *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* had just been published, we suggested to General Ridgway that this book might provide a convenient and fresh basis for the interview. After reading Goulden's book, the General agreed.

On the morning of March 5, 1982, we spent almost three hours with the General in the library of his Fox Chapel home. Our questions began with the Goulden book, but we found that the discussion ranged productively in other directions. General Ridgway was unfailingly helpful and open in his answers, and we wish to express formally our appreciation for a kindness and hospitality that far exceeded cooperation. When the General told us several weeks later that he did not wish to undertake the oral history project, we were disappointed but not surprised. He had warned us from the beginning that he would probably not continue beyond the first interview. He generously donated the original manuscript of the interview to the Hillman Library of the University of Pittsburgh, allowed the Columbia University Oral History Project to microfilm the transcript, and permitted the interview to be published for the first time in this issue of the *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*.

Although General Ridgway has occupied more posts of high responsibility than almost any other American military commander, it was appropriate that our interview focus initially on the Korean War. The high point of his career — indeed, one of the high points of American military history — was the period from December 26, 1950, until April 11, 1951, when he commanded the American Eighth Army in Korea. In the bleak winter of 1950, before General Ridgway took command, the United Nations forces were almost pushed into the sea by the armies of North Korea and Communist China. Then, as the military historian S. L. A. Marshall wrote in the *New York Times*: "His coming electrified the tired Eighth Army. . . . It was beaten when he took command; hopes had diminished throughout the nation; his superiors had lost confidence. His spirit and action shamed the doubters and restored faith — a prime example of the power of one man to change a situation decisively." By late March 1951, the Eighth Army and United Nations forces led by General Ridgway had swept north for the length of South Korea, thrown back the armies of Communist China and North Korea, and reached the 38th parallel. The war was stabilized.

After President Harry S. Truman relieved Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander in the Far East, General Ridgway was named as his successor. A year later he was designated Supreme
Commander in Europe, succeeding Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1953 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.

General Ridgway retired from the army in 1955 and moved to Pittsburgh at the invitation of Richard King Mellon, becoming chairman of the board of the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research. He retired from this position in 1960. He remains active by serving on corporate boards, as well as on strategic study committees.

Matthew Bunker Ridgway was commissioned a second lieutenant of infantry in the United States Army in 1917. As a captain in September 1929, he began advanced training at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and met George C. Marshall (who was born in Uniontown), then assistant commandant and lecturer. A fluent speaker of Spanish, General Ridgway served in Nicaragua in 1927-1928, in Panama in 1930-1932, and in the Philippines in 1932-1933. In 1939 he accompanied General Marshall to Brazil on a special assignment, and later that year was assigned to the War Department.

In 1942 he was assigned to the 82nd Infantry Division — soon to be the 82nd Airborne — and then became its commanding general. He planned and led the airborne assault on Sicily and led his division in the Italian campaign. He parachuted with leading elements of the 82nd into Normandy, where he played a major role in the invasion of western France. As commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, he directed operations in the Ardennes campaign in Belgium, the crossing of the Rhine, the Ruhr pocket, the crossing of the Elbe, and the advance to meet with Russian forces on the Baltic in the spring of 1945.

After the end of World War II, General Ridgway served in a variety of capacities, including army representative to the United Nations in London and then New York and Commander-in-Chief of the Caribbean Command. At the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration.

Before our interview with him last March, General Ridgway warned us that oral history is hard work: we should all three be well prepared for the session. During that interview and in informal conversations with him since then, we of the University of Pittsburgh have understood how impossible a task is preparation for an inter-
view with the General — but most we have learned how enjoyable and stimulating a conversationalist he is.

He is an omnivorous reader, especially of history, and he has a finely developed sense of the past. Perhaps his constant balancing of the experience of the past and the experience of the present combine with his belief in what he calls “moral courage” to account for his lifelong commitment to argue an unpopular cause when he believes it to be right, even at risk to himself.

As Chief of Staff in the mid-1950s, he strenuously opposed the Eisenhower policy of excessive reliance on atomic weapons at the expense of conventional forces, combined with an overextension of American commitments abroad. His stubborn opposition to American involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s made him an unlikely ally of the youthful protesters of that decade, and it was an act of high courage for a professional soldier. Today, in an age of detente, he alerts us against what he perceives to be an inevitable conflict between the forces of East and West.


In the following interview, the participants are identified as follows:

Matthew B. Ridgway: MBR
Frederick A. Hetzel: FAH
Harold L. Hitchens: HLH

HLH: General Ridgway, in Joseph Goulden’s new book, Korea: The Untold Story of the War,* we now have another history of the Korean War in which you played such an important role. Could you give us your overall reaction to Mr. Goulden’s book

*(New York, 1982).
and your impressions about any substantive contribution it might make to our understanding of the war?

MBR: Well, his is a very detailed, thoroughly researched work by a professional historian. My book* never had any pretense to being a history of the Korean War and I think I said so in the preface. It was merely a recounting of my experiences as the responsible ground commander there. I found Mr. Goulden’s book, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War*, fascinating because not only was it in far greater detail than my knowledge covered but it also covered the things that were transpiring back here at home, which, of course, I was unaware of at the time. My only assessment of his book would be that he falls into the same error here and there that so many historians of combat do. For instance, he said that at one attack the bodies were piled up like a wall. I don’t believe that for a minute. I’ve seen some pretty damned bloody engagements myself. You don’t pile bodies up in a wall at all. It reminds me of one marine who said to the sergeant, “Sergeant, you used the word ‘hordes,’ attacking in ‘hordes.’ How many platoons does it take to make a horde?” In other words, while the Chinese, and the North Koreans to an even greater extent, attacked with a fanaticism which was hard for us to understand — attacks in the face of our superior firepower which no American commander would have coun- nanced for a moment — the bodies still would be scattered according to their approach. You don’t build a wall of bodies. Maybe you did in a medieval city when you were trying to breach a wall or something.

That’s about all. Otherwise I am fascinated with the book, and I think it is a tremendous contribution to the history of the Korean War.

FAH: Does the book change any of your basic views about the personalities or the issues of the war?

MBR: It does, primarily with respect to General MacArthur. I can only assume that the passages he [Goulden] included in his book from General MacArthur’s former aide — I think his name was [Lt. Thomas Jefferson] Davis — were accurate. Those were new to me and they reveal a side of his [MacArthur’s] character of which I was completely unaware. Well, everybody in life has their fallibilities and MacArthur had them to an extraordinary

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*The Korean War (Garden City, N.Y., 1967).
extent, which apparently he concealed from the public. Oh, that's true of most everybody. Every great man has certain weaknesses. General Lee had the same indecision, the questioning of his own capabilities at times. He wanted to resign at one time well before the Civil War. For he felt unequal to it. Washington, when he was given command of the Continental Army at the meeting of the Continental Congress, before accepting, or at the time of accepting, said, "I must say, gentlemen, that I feel myself wholly unqualified to discharge the responsibilities of the command to which you are assigning me." And it is interesting to find this throughout so many historical characters — their feeling of self-doubt. Not modesty at all — maybe you could call it modesty — but I think they were honestly trying to assess their own capabilities for doing their jobs. And that's brought out pretty clearly in this book.

FAH: The Davis material seemed to emphasize MacArthur's personal life in a particular period of time in the 1930s. I couldn't help but notice that Davis had been cashiered by MacArthur at one point and obviously bore him no good will. I wondered to myself if that had in any way skewed his evidence.

MBR: Could well have done so. Yes.

FAH: Was there anything in the book about MacArthur's later career as you knew him professionally that changed your judgment of him?

MBR: Later than which period?

FAH: Later than the thirties. During World War II, and particularly in the 1950s.

MBR: I didn't see General MacArthur but once after he was reassigned as Superintendent of the Military Academy. He brought me in from an academic assignment and put me in charge of athletics. I don't know whether that's in the book or not, but I was teaching a Spanish class at that time and this soldier in uniform knocked on the door and said, "The Superintendent presents his compliments and directs that you report to him immediately." That was a shocker because I had never seen anything like that in my teaching career. All the way down to the Administration Building I was wondering what I had done, or what I had been apprehended in doing. I got there and he said to me, "The athletic department is on the brink of an abyss." Those were his exact words. "You will take over immediately and report only to me." So I served in that capacity, while he was still
Superintendent, for about a year and a half. Then when he left I didn’t see him again until, oh I guess, in the mid-thirties. He was Chief of Staff; I came up from Texas — I was on duty with troops and had some other mission, I’ve forgotten what it was — and I thought I’d stop in and pay my respects to General MacArthur. He couldn’t have been more cordial. He welcomed me and we had a short and very friendly but purely social chat. I didn’t see him again until I reported to him in Manila on the way out — my airborne corps was going to participate in Operation Coronet, the landing on Kyushu. Again he was very cordial but very brief. I don’t think I spent more than five or ten minutes with him. And then the next time I saw him was when I went with Averell Harriman to Korea. So my meetings with General MacArthur subsequent to our joint service together at West Point were very brief and far between.

HLH: In the period in which you worked closely with General MacArthur until he left the Far East, does what Goulden have to say alter any of your impressions?

MBR: No, I don’t think so. It all rings true. I was well aware when I reported to General MacArthur on the day after Christmas of 1950 that I was on dangerous ground. I’d have to be very careful. I knew his temperament. I knew there would be no hesitancy in relieving me if I did something he disliked. But he couldn’t have been more generous. I had the same experience with [Field] Marshal [Bernard Law] Montgomery in Europe during the war. I was detached by Eisenhower — my whole corps was detached under British command — and I was ordered to report to Montgomery, which I did. He said, “Well, Dempsey” — [Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C.] Dempsey commanded the British Second Army — “Dempsey’s up the road a little ways. You two get along well together. Go out there and work it out.” Those were the only instructions he gave me. I couldn’t have asked for more as a field commander. So, when I talked to General MacArthur I said, “I’ve been following this day by day, hour by hour, as Deputy Chief of Staff in Washington. If I find the situation to my liking, would it be agreeable to you if I go on the offensive?” He said, “Matt, the Eighth Army is yours. Do what you like with it. You will make mistakes,” he said. “I will support you.” And that was all. End of that conversation. Again, a free hand.

Well, I didn’t hear anything from him, you see. I got there
on the day after Christmas, and it must have been about the twenty-sixth of January, I don't remember the date exactly, before he came to visit me. Then he would come every time, just before a major operation and bring with him the chiefs of the three wire services — AP, UP, and INS. They always had a big fanfare when they left Tokyo. So I had to sit myself down and frame a very carefully worded message the essence of which was to try and dissuade him from coming over. Everybody would know there was something impending and that he wanted to be there. As he had done in the Southwest Pacific in World War II, he wanted to be the commander on the spot in every field operation, although he might have had nothing whatever to do with the planning of the operation. He wouldn't let his subordinate commanders Gen. [Robert L.] Eichelberger and Gen. [Walter] Krueger have any credit whatever. So I wanted to tell him, "No question about your personal gallantry and all that, but when you leave Tokyo with the heads of these big wire services, it's broadcast to the world, and my opponents here must know that there is something up or you wouldn't be coming. Would you mind if you deferred your visit till about twenty-four to forty-eight hours after an operation?" So he did. He very gracefully accepted that. There was no rejoinder at all. And he didn't come after that until some little time had elapsed.

FAH: His character was certainly his own downfall. You read the account of his return to the United States after he'd been relieved of the command. He had the adulation of the country for a certain period of time but he obviously felt that it would continue forever and it didn't.

MBR: Well, he was a gifted orator, you know, he could charm you. A great actor. You know those letters that Eichelberger wrote to his wife, remember that book? Haven't you seen it? You should read that sometime — Bob Eichelberger's wife was named Emmeline, and the title of the book was Dear Miss Em.* He let his publisher have all of his letters after the war, but they didn't come out until the mid-fifties or so. A professor of history up here at one of these Pennsylvania colleges was the editor of the book. He asked Bob before he died, just a few days before he died, for permission to publish them. "Yes, of course, you have permission." So he did. In order to get around the censor,

Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway in Korea as commander of the Eighth Army. He served in that capacity from December 26, 1950, until April 11, 1951. In May 1951 he was promoted to General. The photograph appeared on the cover of *Time*, the issue of March 5, 1951.
Bob gave a fictitious name to the particular character he was describing. MacArthur's was the name of that great actress, the great French actress . . . Sarah Bernhardt. MacArthur, in his letters, was Sarah Bernhardt.

FAH: What is the name of the book again?

MBR: Dear Miss Em. If you want to see it, I have a copy. I'll loan it to you.

FAH: I'd like to read it.

MBR: You'd have a hard time finding it.

HLH: General, we have a few questions about the Korean War that were raised on reading Goulden's book and then your own two books which deal with that. With respect to the sudden outbreak of the war, Goulden gives as an example Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk's testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, just five days before the invasion. According to Rusk, North Korea had no intention of fighting a major war to seize South Korea. What was your reaction at the time in your capacity as Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration? In one of your own books you say you were surprised. Have you had any other related thoughts about the sudden nature of the North Korean invasion or at least the way we perceived it at the time or since?

MBR: I was shocked when I read in his book the statement that he attributed to Dean Rusk. Rusk had a high post in the State Department at that time, didn't he?

HLH: He was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

MBR: It's almost incredible to me now. Of course I can't reconstitute my thinking after reading a flow of intelligence reports on Korea, and I wouldn't try to do it because I might be quite wrong in what I said today. But I was shocked when I read that because it was so perfectly evident. We'd gotten a flow of warning messages through there all the time, a lot of them emanating from [Republic of Korea President Syngman] Rhee, but there were constant probings by the North Korean forces across the border, some of them — I think this is in my book — involving quite heavy artillery shelling for quite a period of time. Well, that wasn't just a border incident at all, it denoted some serious thing there. We knew that the South Koreans had been outfitted only as a constabulary and were in no position whatever to stand up against a well-armed, well-balanced, well-trained force, and we also knew that the political situation was such over there that
with very few exceptions the principal leaders of the major ROK Army units were political appointees. There was little adequate training. Among five ROK commanders, I would certainly want to mention Major General Paik Sun Yup, who commanded the ROK 1st Division. He was a top-flight soldier and completely loyal to me when I was the Army commander there. I want to mention "Tiger" Song, who commanded the 10th Division over on the east coast — I didn't get to see him for quite a while after I took over because it was a quiet sector, there was no fighting going on over there. But he was a top-flight soldier, too.

FAH: There certainly is a suggestion in the Goulden book, a suggestion if not accusation, that the Korean Military Advisory Group had not at all done their job with the ROK Army prior to June of 1950. Would you agree with that?

MBR: All in all, the KMAG had done about all it could under the conditions obtaining, and in some cases the senior U.S. officer asserted that a ROK division had done a superior job.

FAH: On the question of the outbreak of the war in the first place, Dean Acheson had made a speech to the Washington Press Club in which he excluded Korea from the American defense perimeter. This was, I think, only several weeks before the invasion. I notice in your book you say, "One may certainly find fault with him for that." Goulden is particularly acrimonious in criticism of Acheson in the early part of the book. What was your reaction?

MBR: I don't think that criticism is justified at all. I think you'll find the contrary in my book. At least I will give you my thinking now, which I know is accurate. The Joint Chiefs consisted of [Adm. Chester W.] Nimitz, [Gen. Dwight D.] Eisenhower, [Gen. Carl A.] Spaatz, with [Adm. William D.] Leahy either a member or not I don't remember. They had all come to the conclusion that Korea was not the place for us to become involved and they had — and I don't remember the wordage they used — so recommended to the President. The President accepted it because the advice of those officers was very weighty. Men who had just won World War II were right there in the highest posts — Chief of Naval Operations, Army Chief of Staff, and Leahy being the personal military advisor to the President. So President Truman accepted that at its face value. All Acheson was doing was repeating a policy decision which his President had already
made. So there's no justification, in my humble opinion, for that criticism. The President might have questioned the judgment of the Joint Chiefs, but he didn't. And having accepted it, then there wasn't anything else for Acheson to do. He was merely reiterating the policy decision the President had already made.

FAH: Is it possible that the policy itself, rather than any particular expression of it, but the overall policy might have been read by the Communists as approval . . .

MBR: Yes.

FAH: . . . to invade South Korea?

MBR: Yes, I think it might well have been so read.

HLH: One of the sources that I looked at said that General Bradley was the only one of the Joint Chiefs during the period before the war who had disagreed about evacuating Korea except for advisory groups. Now that we have maintained a presence in Korea for over thirty years, do you have any opinion of the decision as it was made at that time, and in the light of events since then?

MBR: Well, as you look back with the hindsight of thirty years, I think that a farsighted statesman could have seen that this little sliver of land, the Korean peninsula, off the great Asian land mass, was of great strategic importance. It had been fought over already by Russia, China, Japan, and the Korean forces. And given the known conduct of the leadership of the Soviet Union, it was clear that an attempt might be made to regain control. The Russian forces had been in there up to 1904 and 1905 when the Russo-Japanese War took place. It's a very strategic little area there. It would become a threat to Japan by whichever great power controlled it. So I would say again that I would think that farsighted statesmen should have seen this thing coming and had they seen it then they would have been inclined to reverse the policy of only lightly arming the South Korean forces, but they didn't.

FAH: Then really the American government did not recognize the implications of the policy. They excluded Korea from the defense perimeter but didn't ask themselves what that would mean.

MBR: Well, they either didn't recognize it or they recognized it and didn't want to do anything about it. Now I say that history will show that successive administrations — going back, well, maybe twenty years, maybe thirty years, back to 1950, certainly after Truman — gravely overlooked their responsibility for governing, knowing by that time the clear pattern of objectives of the
leadership of the Soviet Union and its conduct. They were gravely derelict in not making an insistent effort. The presidents themselves couldn't have done it because they had to have Congress go along. But the administrations were not making a strong effort to retain the military strength which would be the best deterrent against a renewal of war. Truman tried to, you know. There's a book called *Mr. President* that came out about 1952, just after he left the presidency. He authorized a journalist named William Hillman to release all his private papers, and he gave him full discretion with no limitations at all. He said, "I trust you. You are welcome to use them as you see fit." I have a copy of that book here too. No, I've loaned it to a neighbor. But I could get it back. And Mr. Truman shows repeatedly in his private letters that he saw what the Soviet Union was after, he saw their objectives, but he couldn't get anywhere. The American people were insistent upon bringing the boys home, back in the corner drugstore again. Just after World War I, we did the same thing. But then those presidents thereafter didn't even make an effort, in my opinion.

FAH: That would have been a hard decision for them to make.

MBR: They let the erosion of our military capability go down far below the safety level.

FAH: I suppose they felt public opinion was simply irresistible.

MBR: I suppose. Now my letter to the Secretary of Defense pointed out every single one of these points. And I would stand behind every word of it today. Of course some little things have changed. I said that the Soviets had a limited air power; well, that has long since been corrected. And I pointed out that sooner or later they were going to get parity in the nuclear field, which they did. And they have it today. But by and large every single point is in that letter to the Secretary of Defense. I don't know if you remember that letter or not? It's the one that Mr. Wilson [Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson] put a classification on so that it couldn't get out and the *New York Times* had it within forty-eight hours, the whole thing. And then he said, "Well, it wasn't very important anyhow." The letter appears as an appendix in my book, *Soldier.*

FAH: May I ask just one more question about the workings of the government during the first days of the Korean crisis? Goulden

is also quite critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for failing to
speak up in some of those high-level conferences, and he
suggests — again coming back to his favorite villain, Acheson —
that the civilians swept over the military and the military did
not have the courage to speak up and say what a difficult war
this would be. Would you care to comment on that?

MBR: Well, I think there's probably a good deal of truth to what
you say. The administration, from the President on down, held
General MacArthur in great respect and almost in awe, but
behind that was a basic principle which I don't think anyone
would challenge, that when you put a theater commander in
charge, you back him up. And you are very reluctant to try and
tell him what to do because you are thousands of miles away
and he's on the spot. MacArthur had had eminent success in prac-
tically everything he had ever done from the time he was a cadet
at West Texas Military Academy right on through, and it would
take somebody pretty deeply convinced of the rightness of a con-
trary view for him to take MacArthur to task. Now the Joint
Chiefs did not do that, as you remember.

HLH: And you raised that . . .

MBR: Well, I raised that point in a meeting when Acheson was
present, I think. I was pretty vehement, and then, because this
is spoken and there was not an official record at the time, I think
I said, "You owe it to our people and to God to take some
positive action on this thing." Then the remark was made by
one member, "Well, what can we do?" And I replied: "You can
issue an order, can't you?" To which the reply was: "Well, he
wouldn't obey it." I said, "You can relieve a man that doesn't
obey orders, can't you?" That stopped it; there wasn't any
further talk.

FAH: Do you think that the civilian authorities consulted the Joint
Chiefs sufficiently when the crisis first broke out, when the
North Koreans first came into the country and there were those
late-night meetings for a time before the decision was finally
made to allow MacArthur to do anything? Do you think they
consulted the Joint Chiefs?

MBR: My recollection from reading this book was that they did so
frequently. Whether they did it with sufficient frequency or not,
I don't know, but they certainly did have the Joint Chiefs in
there and usually they had all the Joint Chiefs, not just the
FAH: I asked that because at first Goulden says that the Joint Chiefs were not speaking up sufficiently in those meetings, and they weren't being listened to anyway. It isn't clear to me whether you attended any of those meetings at that point or not.

MBR: I didn't attend many of them, I don't think any of the ones that Mr. Goulden writes about in his book. At least he never mentions me as having been there. I would only attend when Gen. [J. Lawton] Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, wasn't present, you see. And this thing that I just recounted a few minutes ago was on a weekend, as I recall. Collins was taking a holiday in his little retreat off somewhere in Chesapeake Bay and so I attended in his place. I don't know where the Vice-Chief was. But I was representing Collins at that meeting.

HLH: A couple more questions about Korea. At various times after intervals of relative inactivity in Korea between South and North, people have advocated that we reduce our forces there. In fact President Carter wanted, I believe, to take us down to a division and then changed his mind. Do you think that the extent of our presence there is in line with what should be maintained for the foreseeable future?

MBR: Well, let me go back. When I took over the Supreme Command in Tokyo, I remember advocating withdrawal, and I think I did it in an official dispatch back to Washington. If not then, it was later when I was Chief of Staff, when they signed the armistice — I think it was the latter case, after they had signed the armistice agreement. At that time the governments who had had combat elements in the Eighth Army in Korea issued a statement, and they all signed it, that in the event of a renewal of the aggression, "We shall be prompt to respond." So my report was, well now this is the time to get out. Because you've got a pawn to fate over here in Korea. We said we'd go back, and there wasn't any question we wouldn't, we had the capability of doing it. And then when all our allies said that they too would respond, I said, well this is fine, this puts up the warning sign to the aggressor as to what would happen if they renewed their aggression. Whether that would have proved wise or not, nobody knows. But that's what my thinking was at the time.

Later we had two pawns of fate, and I pointed this out in a letter to the Secretary of Defense, we had these isolated detachments, West Berlin and Korea. They both can be either destroyed or eliminated, bypassed, in the event of a major war because we
certainly aren't going to go back when World War III starts, and start fighting in Korea. We would be inevitably drawn into the war in Europe, because of our NATO treaty. But you could still lose the Berlin garrison. They'd bypass it if they didn't want to waste the time and lives to try and take it.

HLH: I was interested in what Mr. Goulden had to say about the visit of Ambassador [John Foster] Dulles, who at the time, you know, was negotiating the Japanese peace treaty. You also mentioned meeting with Ambassador Dulles in your book. Some historians he [Goulden] mentions have claimed that Dulles was really part of a conspiracy with MacArthur and Rhee to induce military action by the North Koreans so that the United States would then respond with a vigorous action, even against the Chinese Communists on the mainland. Yet according to Goulden's book, as soon as Dulles got back to the United States he urged President Truman to relieve MacArthur immediately.

MBR: I read that to my surprise. Yes. But I don't think that your conspiracy theory would accord with that. If Dulles and MacArthur had been so close that they were planning a concerted action or an attempted action, then Dulles wouldn't have recommended MacArthur's relief. I was surprised to read that.

FAH: That's one variation on the revisionist theory that Acheson and Truman were really trying to tease the North Koreans to invade. I think it's a cousin of that theory.

MBR: There's no scintilla of evidence known to me which would support that theory any more than there is that Franklin Roosevelt deliberately precipitated the Pearl Harbor crisis. I've read and read and read on that issue and the last thing is the book *At Dawn We Slept.* I guess you've read that? The author tries to put this theory to rest for good. There's no evidence known to him, and of course he's researched this thing exhaustively. I understand he put thirty-seven years of research into that book.

FAH: Those theories have a habit of looking more and more foolish as more and more time passes.

MBR: Yes. People are always ready to see some maleficent influence behind something like that.

HLH: Well, as Secretary of State, Dulles drew a lot of fire and I

think a lot of that went back to the period when apparently he played a very able role in consummating the peace treaty with Japan.

MBR: Oh, indeed he did. Yes. He was far along in his negotiations with the Japanese authorities on the peace treaty just after I took over the Supreme Command there. He came over with H. Alexander Smith, a Senator from New Jersey, a Republican, and [John] Sparkman, a Democratic Senator from Alabama. Dulles didn't have any government job at that time, except that he'd been deputed to work up a draft of a treaty with Japan. It was a very interesting meeting with him. I think they came clean with me, they told me their thinking and I told them mine and I remember saying at the end, "I don't know whether you want to hear my philosophy or not, but I cannot help always thinking that in the world in which we live great masses of people are ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, with not even the beginnings of medical attention, and the governments concerned seem to care little about remedying that situation. I don't see how so large a portion of the human race can continue to live in that morass while a very small increment of the population enjoys life on a plateau." They didn't say anything about that. Dulles came back the next time and I do remember with pleasure that he said, "It's remarkable, the degree to which you've won the confidence of the Japanese government." When they came over the first time, I'd only been there two or three days. I think they thought the bull in a china shop was going to come in there fresh from combat and was going to raise hell with all their diplomatic relations. I don't know what they thought, but they appeared on my doorstep very promptly. Anyway, we got along fine together.

Now to go back just a minute on my relations with the Japanese government. I invited in Mr. [Shigeru] Yoshida, the Prime Minister, the first full day I took over. I already had the responsibility before I knew about it, but I got to Tokyo as soon as I could. I wouldn't go into the headquarters building in Dai Ichi at all until after General MacArthur left. So I stayed for about ten days, I think it was that period before he finally took off, in the Old Imperial Hotel.

At my first meeting with Mr. Yoshida I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I understand your relations with General MacArthur were very cordial and cooperative and that you were very frank
with him. I want to assure you I will be very frank with you and I hope you will accord me the same frankness.” And he said he would. Over the weeks and months that followed I had nothing but praise for my relations with Mr. Yoshida. He was invariably attentive, his command of English was adequate, we never had an interpreter there. He would sit on the edge of his chair, he was of rather short stature, and concentrate intently on everything that I said, and I’d be very careful in my choice of words and everything and he never failed to carry out any instructions that I felt I could issue. But I made it clear that I was pressing him to increase their [Japanese] commitment to the self-defense forces, the national defense agency, and he was equally frank and emphatic in telling me that he couldn’t do it. He said, “Our people would have starved except for the help the United States has given them, and we have so many higher priorities, we just cannot do it today. It isn’t politically feasible.” And I said, “Mr. Prime Minister, I appreciate that, and I want you to know that these are my instructions from my government that I am pressing you for. I understand your position.” And that’s the way we got along.

Now I was going back to Mr. Dulles, when I was Chief of Staff and attending the meetings of the National Security Council. I was impressed with the clarity with which his thoughts were arranged. He would brief us, the whole Security Council, on the present diplomatic and foreign relations problems. I was very much impressed with how clearly he perceived things and how articulate he was in detailing the major factors in each area. But on the other hand, Mr. Dulles was a very strong-willed man, very, you might almost say, obstinate, which is a good quality in many cases, but Ike turned over the conduct of foreign policy very largely to him. He ran it. Far more so than you would expect a man like Eisenhower as President to do.

FAH: I think a man like Dulles frightened many members of the public.

MBR: Ah, yes, well, he was intolerant. I had an oral history interview like this with a professor at Princeton some years ago, a good many years ago now — I guess it’s down there on the record. Just on Dulles... .

HLH: General, you remarked in a note to Mr. Hetzel that you were interested in seeing Mr. Goulden’s story about the NSA’s monitoring communications traffic of the Portuguese and Spanish em-
bassies in Tokyo. These intercepts, as Goulden mentions, conveyed very clearly General MacArthur's intentions to transform the Korean War into a major conflict and dispose entirely of the Chinese Communist threat. Now supposedly nothing could be done about that, about these actions by General MacArthur, because of the danger of revealing how the information had been obtained. I was wondering if you agreed with that? Or do you think that General MacArthur's remarks might have been mainly rhetoric intended as another effort to inhibit Chinese Communist intervention in the war?

MBR: I don't know. I was surprised to learn that, too. It said in the book that the information had been suppressed and withheld from the public because of the damage it might do to the lives there, primarily also reveal the fact that they'd broken the code. Well, I don't know. I wouldn't feel today competent to analyze that situation. There isn't any question that MacArthur wanted to go to war, full war with Communist China, and he could not be convinced by all the contrary arguments. Every argument that MacArthur submitted to Washington was very carefully considered because they had the highest respect for his judgment, you know. But every time you had a consensus from the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, they considered what he proposed and they were unanimously opposed to it. MacArthur couldn't accept that. He never did accept it in his mind, I think. Finally, he reluctantly acted in accordance with the policy, but he never did accept it. He wanted to go to war with China. He said that to all intents China is at war now, using its full potential. He proposed various measures — he wanted to bomb bases in Manchuria, and I think the feeling in Washington was that that would be an act of war, that if we did that Russia would probably come in and then there'd be World War III. And anyway [Gen. Hoyt S.], Vandenberg, who was Air Force Chief of Staff, said we didn't have the capability of doing that. Our losses just from normal attrition, plus combat, would be such that — we were worrying about Europe at the time, whether Russia would move in Europe — would be such that it would take us two years to rebuild our air force so that we could cope with a major crisis in Europe at the same time. And so he was strongly against it. Everybody was against MacArthur, but it didn't change his views, I think.
FAH: There was one other detail in the Goulden book. In a reference to the Averell Harriman papers, Goulden indicates that the replacement of General [Walton H.] Walker had been urged by him, Harriman, General [Lauris] Norstad, and by you. Harriman is quoted, "It seemed very clear to us, the three of us, that Walker wasn't up to the job." Would you care to comment on that?

MBR: Well now, that's a misstatement on the part of the author. I had no knowledge of that whatever. I did not know that I'd already been picked back in Washington to replace Walker in case he became a casualty. I didn't know that. I didn't learn that until that three-day seminar in the Truman Library about three years ago when it was first disclosed by Harriman. I got up before the audience and said, "You all held out on me, I never knew that at all." But the nearest thing to it was that while we were still there in Tokyo, Norstad said to me, "I think you ought to be in command here," or words to that effect. And I said, "Please don't mention that; it will look as though I was coming over here looking for a job, and I'm not." And that ended that conversation. Now apparently both Harriman and Norstad knew that I'd been picked back in Washington. I did not know it. I had no knowledge whatever of it. And if any recommendation was made, I wrote the memorandum coming back on the plane which Averell and Larry Norstad signed without change. No mention was made about relieving Walker then.

HLH: General, if we could talk for just a few minutes about the Korean War in its characteristic of being a limited war. In your own book on the Korean War, you say that all warfare henceforth will be limited. The question would not be whether to fight a limited war but how to avoid fighting any other kind. Yet at least as far back as the early 1960s, strategic thinkers have considered a range of options in the use of nuclear weapons that is other than all-out employment of all the nuclear weapons that you have. We have terms such as limited nuclear war, controlled nuclear war, and so forth. There are references to nuclear attacks being accurate, discriminating, incremental. Would you say that the development of such concepts for nuclear weapons is support for your thesis that all warfare from Korea on would be limited?

MBR: I think that the consequences of an all-out nuclear war are just indescribable. That's the basis of my thinking that all wars
should be limited. Going back to the purpose of war in the first place, the rational authority of a government entering a war should be to come out better than when they went in. And their objectives should be chosen with that in view. The objectives should be chosen by the political leaders, not the military. How you could stop the all-out use of nuclear weapons once you start defies my logic. I don't know how you could do it, because any commander who has the authority to use them, if his troops are in serious danger of destruction, is going to use every weapon he's got in his hands, take the consequences later. I don't know whether I make my thinking clear there or not. Let's take the Korean War: the mission assigned was very clear, it was clear to me. They tried to make it clear to General MacArthur — he never quite accepted it, I think. The mission assigned was to repel the aggression, expel the hostile forces from South Korea, and restore peace in the area. Well, we did expel them, and in a fashion we repelled them, and we restored peace by the armistice. But we certainly didn't, I guess you could say, come out of the war any better than when we entered. But I don't know that we have in any war. Look at World War I. We had the Germans defeated, sure you won that engagement, you might say, and we just set up the conditions for the next one. Now, I don't say we set them up, but the conditions exist now so that war is endemic all over the world. It's going on right now in Central America, it's going on in Afghanistan, anywhere else that somebody wants to start some trouble. My personal opinion is that we are on a collision course with the Soviet government and nothing short of a major change in the objectives of the leadership of the U.S.S.R. is going to prevent it. If they continue on the present course, they will put us in such a position we'll have to fight.

FAH: In your book, you refer to the supreme test that faces this country, that we should husband our energies for it. This is what you are referring to, is it not?

MBR: Yes, right, for the challenge that is almost sure to come. The Russian leadership has made it so perfectly clear that they do not intend to curtail continued expansion of their military capabilities. For what purpose? They are already far in excess of any reasonable defensive needs, and yet they continue to build it up. Just take the navy, for instance, goodness sakes alive. Our navy now admits that the Russians can contest their control
of the seas in all the oceans of the world where before nobody could. After the end of World War II, nobody could challenge us on the seas of the world. Today they can.

FAH: What should this country be doing?

MBR: Well, I think we're on the right course, if we are given the time. There are two basic principles, I think, and they're almost axiomatic. One, the basic thing is that in a country governed such as ours, your diplomacy and foreign relations policies are no more effective than is the acknowledged credibility of your military capability for supporting those policies if they're challenged in an area of vital interest. That's just basic. And so if you don't have the military strength that your adversaries agree could deter them, then you're inviting trouble. And that's what we've been doing.

FAH: So really the present defense budget that has been so much debated in the last few weeks . . .

MBR: Well, we want to do everything with welfare and everything else ahead of the primary responsibility of government which is to govern and to protect the people. It's a long, long step ahead there, but once you've lost that national independence, you never regain it. We never have come very close to it but we almost did in our revolutionary period in gaining our independence.

Our leadership for many years was willing to take a chance on not spending the money and making the effort to rebuild our military forces, in favor of diverting the funds to other purposes. You couldn't get the money out of the Congress, and I don't think the presidents of the United States after Truman made any great effort to do it. They went along with the general feeling to which the Congress was completely responsive.

HLH: Yet the number one social service to be performed by a government is to keep its people alive and free.

MBR: That's right. Absolutely. That's the whole thing. That's the whole basis of it. And you know, it's so trite to keep saying this, but this world is such a brutal, savage thing today. Our people are brought up, our kids of high school age, you know — there's a change going on right now, I think clearly perceptive — but they are brought up to think that ours is the normal way of life, and it isn't any such thing. It's a brutal, savage struggle of acquisitiveness to get what the other guy's got. Our country is the greatest treasure-house on earth in managerial and technological skills and in food-producing capabilities — there is
nothing like it on earth. It's folly to think that some foreign power that thinks it has the capability of seizing this isn't going to try and do it. And they will, if they think they can get away with it. You can build all kinds of scenarios today. As I said before, there are great masses of ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed people with no medical attention whatever, and now for the first time they're armed, they're just fodder for the demagogue, you see. Look at that Iran situation where howling mobs could be assembled, fifty or a hundred thousand at a time, shaking their fists, "Down with America, Death to America." And those guys would be willing to go out and fight and get killed to take over America if they could. They do the same thing in the Central American republics — they can get a crowd like that any time. The American people don't seem to be awake to that yet. I think that it's a wonderfully healthy sign that the Congress went along in great part with the President. Now they're backtracking because of the political pressure from their constituencies back home.

FAH: You mean went along with him [President Reagan] on the defense expenditures?

MBR: Right. But now they think that defense costs too much. I read in the *Wall Street Journal*, yesterday, I guess, that concurrently with this tax reduction, there had to be a cut in spending by Congress on other than defense. And yet that in spite of all this, such spending has only been cut one percent so far. And their loss of revenue has far exceeded that, of course. I don't know how you can change a people's thinking like that. But you cannot fight a war and hope to achieve your objectives in this country of ours unless you have a major national consensus, it's as simple as that. You saw it in World War I: you couldn't get a consensus until the Imperial German government on the thirty-first of January 1917 declared it was embarking on unrestricted submarine warfare. Then on 3 February 1917, the U.S. broke relations. I am very clear on this, because I was a first classman at West Point, and it was a Saturday night. Two months later we declared war. You couldn't do it in the approach to World War II with a powerful President in there — he traded his fifty destroyers for the Caribbean bases, he armed our merchant marine, he ordered the navy to escort the convoys as far as Iceland, and to shoot if the convoys were attacked. It didn't
have any effect. You did not get a national consensus until Pearl Harbor.

FAH: There never really was a national consensus over Korea, was there?

MBR: No, there never was. That's understandable because at the outset the American people thought it was just a small, relatively small, affair — which from some points of view it was. But it also came right on the heels of the tremendous sacrifices of World War II. The country and the people were sick and tired of war and they thought that with this great military strength there wouldn't be any war, and we had the A-bomb, a total monopoly. Dulles and [Secretary of Defense] Charlie Wilson came out with a bigger bang for a buck; now we'd decide the things at times and places of our own choosing, using the A-bomb. Well, that was a fallacy from the very beginning. Any sensible man could tell you don't use a sixteen-inch rifle to kill a gopher. You're not going to drop the A-bomb except for self-preservation. And then you'd have the recrimination of the whole world on you if you did it today, if you started.

HLH: That's a real problem getting the American people to support a commitment to take the actions that we think are necessary. Some people have thought that after Korea and Southeast Asia the American people are hardly ever likely to countenance any large-scale prolonged use of American forces. We like to see things done quickly. Maybe an effect of our watching TV too much.

MBR: Well, we like to sign a check and say that the bill is paid, you see; then we realize that the payment's going to come later and be more painful still. We like to think that when we sign an agreement, the other party is going to keep it. We keep our part but the Russians have no intention of keeping it, none whatever. Duplicity, secrecy, and every form of deceit is ingrained in their working methods and their handling of peoples. They've always been that way — when I say always, I mean about two or three hundred years at least.

HLH: That's hard for Americans to understand.

MBR: Yes, hard to grasp that. I don't know how to take the situation in El Salvador, and I have fifty years of experience with Latin America. The highest authorities — the Secretary of State, maybe the President too — have said that we would take all measures that are prudent and necessary to stop the flow of arms.
That's a big undertaking. The question is how are you going to do it? You can be sure that if you put United States armed forces in any of those countries you're going to have a fanatical reaction from the masses of people, and that's just made to order for every demagogue down there. He would have no trouble. He's already got them stirred up. And now they've got the arms — reasonable access to pretty sophisticated arms, not just pistols and a rifle, but rockets and God knows what. And the response down there will be just the same and with just as equal ferocity as though you impugned the personal character of a Latin American, and that's the one thing he will not tolerate. You can call somebody up here a son of a bitch with a smile on your face; it's all right. You don't do that to a Latin.

FAH: What do you think the United States should be doing with regard to El Salvador?

MBR: I don't know. I wrote a memorandum that said this is fine, what you say is no doubt true, the reaction you're going to get if you do this. But the question is, what do you do? Well, I don't know. Barry Goldwater got up on the floor of the Senate the other day and said that the last thing to do was to use armed force, but he also said, "I don't know what to do." [UN Ambassador] Jeane Kirkpatrick said the other day that we had the option of using technological things. She didn't explain what she had in mind — I don't know what she possibly could mean. Well, they talked about a blockade. OK. The Russian ship comes along. A blockade is an act of war, and if you're going to be effective, then you've got to stop any ship, even one that comes flying the Russian flag. What are you going to do with it? Are you going to let them in or not? Same with an airplane flying over, with a hammer and sickle on the thing, a red star, whatever it carries, I don't know what the insignia are. What do you do? Do you shoot it down? I don't think you do. And I don't know what you do.

Incidentally... look at the map, the little northeast corner of Nicaragua. I spent two years down there. Back in 1928, I made a report having reconnoitered that northeast corner, from the Honduran border down about thirty, forty miles. A magnificent staging area for troops. It's about thirty feet above sea level, salubrious climate, south of the hurricane path, free of the tropical jungle that is farther south — well-watered, well-drained, and with a sand-marl soil. Just ideal, and you could put four or five of our divisions down there. Now they are evacuating the
Mosquito Indians out of there — they want them out and it is reported that they're building a big air base. This is what the reports from Washington say, so I've no doubt they're doing it. So I sent that information in. I don't know whether the army department has the information or not, they should have it, but maybe nobody's been there — it's an inaccessible area. It took me five days to get from Managua up the east coast back in 1928 in a little boat up along the shore. But it's a great area. Look on the map at Puerto Cabezas — on some maps it will say Bragman's Bluff. It was used by a fruit company; they had a little narrow-gauge railroad running about thirty miles towards the Honduran border. I don't know what they've got there now, but it's just made to order for the Sandinista government to put in a big airfield there. It's six hundred air miles south of Cuba, and it's an ideal spot for the transhipment point for arms into Central America. Ideal.

FAH: Do you have any sense, in a very general way, of what American policy has done in Latin America that was wrong between the time you are talking about, 1928, and the present?

MBR: Well, they flipped back and forth, you see. Before Mr. [Henry L.] Stimson became Secretary of State, he was sent down to Nicaragua to stop a bloody civil war. It was 1927. It was a brutal, savage war in a tropical climate. Coolidge was President — I guess he was, '27? Stimson was successful; he brought the two sides together and they agreed to a cease-fire, which held. But they did it on the promise that we would supervise the next election for the supreme authorities, as they call them down there, which we did. We had five thousand sailors and marines in that country throughout 1928, and I was there the whole time. I was a secretary of the Nicaraguan National Board of Elections. And that's the reason I got to reconnoiter all over the country. There's no question that that election was the fairest that had ever been held, certainly nothing comparable to it in the United States has ever been held. They had a sailor or marine in every little precinct booth, you see, and there couldn't be any skullduggery going on, of the most minor character. We stamped a violet gentian mark on every voter so he couldn't come back and repeat the vote. And as a result of that election, we put the Somoza gang in power. And they stayed in power for fifty years. It took the Sandinista revolution to overthrow them. So you come right back to the same full circle. This has been their history since the
Spanish conquest. They've never been any different. They've had three groups running those countries — the church, the military, and the landed gentry. And the deprivations under which the masses live have received very little attention. A military coup throws out one government, the next one comes in, and repeats the same thing. Now maybe there'll be a change, I don't know, but it's going to be a long time. It took four hundred years to build this system and it's not going to be changed overnight.

HLH: General, just one final question, and it's sort of an amorphous question. You suggested that we need in this country better military-civilian collaboration in coping effectively with the problems that confront us in other parts of the world. In what you wrote about the Korean War, you suggested strongly that we do need better collaboration between the civilian and military in the objectives and pursuit of our policies. Do you have any specific mechanisms in mind?

MBR: Well, I have it in my letter to the Secretary of Defense. It's spelled out very clearly there, I think. There should be a continuing collaboration between the senior authorities in State and Defense, at least down to the level of Assistant Secretary. A continuing thing, and hopefully on a friendly basis, with broad-minded people who are willing to listen to the other fellow.

Let me digress just for a minute. This fellow Charlie Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, he wouldn't listen at all. He was the second most powerful man in the government, really, and he'd drum his fingers on the table and look out the window while you were presenting something you'd spent a couple of nights thinking through, something which you were deeply convinced was important. He'd pay no attention to you at all. That's all wrong.

If you had continuing consultation and meetings between these two Departments, primarily State and Defense, then when there was any likelihood of the Armed Forces being involved, the procedure should normally be for State to say what it was planning or considering, just what its objective was. What it was seeking to do. And then ask Defense: "Could you support that?" And Defense would have to say: "Yes, we could," or, "No, we could not do so now." In that case State would ask: "Well, if not now, when could you support it? How long would it take to amass the means so that you could, and what would you need?" But the statement of the objective should emanate from the
civilian side — that's fundamental in our government. Before the military can seriously plan, they must find out what the civilian authorities are seeking to do. Then a decision has to be made by them. Do they change, or abandon the objective, or do they try to get the means which will enable the military to support the objective?

I think that's the simple relationship, and it shouldn't be hard to achieve. Now I think in Mr. Truman's administration we had that to a great extent. Certainly he had a wonderful bipartisan support in the Congress, [Sen. Arthur] Vandenberg and [Sen. Tom] Connally. Vandenberg used to be an isolationist, you know, and Tom Connally was on the Democratic side. I was a member of the U.S. delegation when the Rio Treaty was being drafted down in Rio in '47. I was on Vandenberg's technical staff, as a matter of fact, and [George C.] Marshall was Secretary of State and he was there, too. It was heartening to see — no punches pulled at all; those two senators said what they thought in very bold and very rough terms sometimes. Vandenberg particularly. But it was attentively listened to by the Secretary of State and by his counterpart on the Democratic side. Out of that would come a decision. That's the way it ought to be.

The press today is full of statements — I think the media love to play this up — about [Secretary of Defense Caspar W.] Weinberger and [Secretary of State Alexander M.] Haig being at dagger points all the time. Whether they are or not I don't know. It's certainly understandable that strong men with two very different backgrounds like that should have opposing views on major questions. Nothing unusual about that, but they should be reconciled before they ever get out into public print.

FAH: Although the press must have been a great nuisance for you in Korea you obviously handled them very well.

MBR: I remember the name of the Chicago Tribune reporter, Jack "Beaver" Thompson, a big, bearded fellow. He'd been with the 82nd Airborne in Normandy and thereafter. I knew him very well and so I was glad to see a familiar face — he was the only one I recognized. I said to the press, "I have a very few simple instructions for you, gentlemen. In the first place I want you to know that I realize that you are very diligent in your search for information, you're going to get it. You're highly intelligent, and you put little things together so you can pretty well come up with the answer about what's going to happen. My only rules
you are free to go anywhere; you're free to report on anything you find, particularly things you want to criticize; but you must not reveal any operational plans that may come to your notice, or the movements of my senior commanders. Other than that you're free to do as you want."

Well, I had wonderful cooperation. Only one fellow kicked over — he was a Canadian and the press corps handled him themselves. I didn't have to do anything about it. That was fine. I have a letter and a photograph, a very fine letter, signed by all the war correspondents.

FAH: Do you think that the reporting of the war was generally responsible?

MBR: Yes, what I saw of it. Of course I probably didn't see anything that came back here, didn't have time to read it anyway.

FAH: I remember being impressed just before I went into the army at the quality of the writing as writing by people like Homer Bigart of, I think, the *New York Times*, or the *Herald Tribune*. I just wondered how it appeared to you as a field commander.

MBR: I don't think anything came back to me at all. Walter Annenberg loaned me a fellow from the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, James T. Quirk, who, after returning to the U.S., later founded the *TV Guide*. Jim Quirk, he was great. He was a professional journalist, and they all liked him. He got along fine with them, and he was the greatest help to me. When he was recalled, Annenberg had to have him back on the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, I got Burrows Matthews who came from the *Buffalo Courier Express*, one of the oldest independent newspapers in the country. He was great, too, and he stayed with me through all my tour, not only there but in France too.

FAH: In my own very low-level experience of trying to work with press people and career military people, there was often a built-in hostility on the part of the professional military people toward the press people. They would come in and ask what appeared to be impertinent questions.

MBR: No. I never had that trouble at all. There was another reporter, I think it was either Murray Schumach of the *New York Times* or Christopher Rand of the *New York Herald Tribune*, and I would meet with him and his associates every once in a while. Once, when all of them were assembled, he questioned some restriction I had placed on their movements, and I said, "I think you're right and I'll change it right away." I think it was
when the first meeting of the negotiators in the armistice talks had started. I thought he was right. I don't know whether I had issued the order personally, or whether it had come from my staff. I had fine relations with the correspondents.

FAH: Well, I think that's much to your credit.

HLH: Thank you, General Ridgway. We appreciate your taking the time to talk with us.