
Numbers and Tactics at Bushy Run

by Don Daudelin

A survey of history textbooks used on college campuses today reveals that they usually contain several comments about Edward Braddock and his defeat, but usually they do not mention Henry Bouquet. Indeed, the whole of Pontiac's War is often covered in a few sentences. There are only two major works on Pontiac's War, two major treatments of the battle at Bushy Run, and several articles on Bouquet. One might think that the siege of Fort Pitt and the siege of Detroit would deserve a sentence or two now and then, but such is rarely the case in college history texts.¹

Bouquet's victory at Bushy Run was significant in that it broke the back of the Indian war in the south in 1763. This is recognized, and Bouquet is lauded for his achievement, in most accounts dealing with Indian affairs of that time, in various volumes on military history in the eighteenth century, in historical studies of the area in which Bouquet served, and in historical collections dealing with the greater region known as the Old Northwest. One is hard pressed to find criticism of Bouquet's actions at Bushy Run, although his victory is discounted by James Flexner in his book *Mohawk Baronet*. Bushy Run is important to the study of the development of changes in the tactical use and employment of British infantry on the American frontier and is worthy of critical examination.²

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1 For example, see Bernard Bailyn, David B. Davis, D. Herbert Donald, John L. Thomas, Robert Weibe, Gordon Wood, *The Great Republic*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Mass., 1981), vol. 1; John Garraty, *The American Nation*, 4th ed. (New York, 1979), vol. 1; Norman Graebner, Gilbert Fite, and Philip L. White, *A History of the American People*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1975), vol. 1; Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, *American History*, 5th ed. (New York, 1979), vol. 1. Pontiac's War is covered in three paragraphs in Mary Beth Norton et al., *A People and a Nation* (Boston, 1972), 1:80, 86. It is interesting to note that in all but the first-named book Braddock's force is still incorrectly portrayed as being ambushed.

2 Major works on Pontiac's War and Bushy Run can be found in Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac*, 10th ed., rev. (New York, 1962), first published in two volumes in 1851; Howard H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the*

As the French and Indian War drew to a close, Bouquet reported to Sir Jeffery Amherst an attack by Shawnees on the Virginia frontier early in 1762; and, some nine months later, of "a pretended new Conspiracy" of several tribes to strike the colonists. He recommended to Amherst that a sum be laid out yearly to pay for some presents for the Indians, but this idea was rejected. Another report by Ensign Robert Holmes of the Sixtieth Regiment to Bouquet included a translation of a speech of Miami chiefs that emphasized the point about an Indian conspiracy, this time backed up by a belt of war. George Croghan also reported an uneasiness among Indians around Fort Pitt, but Amherst did not deem this report important. Bouquet suggested calling a council at Fort Pitt to explain to the Indians the meaning of the cessation of war between England and France, but Amherst refused to do so on his own initiative.³

When the storm broke on the frontier, the British army was not well

Indian Uprising (Chicago, 1961); Niles Anderson, "Bushy Run: Decisive Battle in the Wilderness," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 46 (July 1963): 211-45; C. M. Bomberger, *The Battle of Bushy Run* (Jeannette, Pa., 1928). For Bouquet see Cyrus Cort, *Col. Henry Bouquet and His Campaigns of 1763 and 1764* (Lancaster, 1883); Paul-Emile Schazmann, "Henry Bouquet in Switzerland," *Pennsylvania History* 19 (July 1952): 237-47; E. Douglas Branch, "Henry Bouquet: Professional Soldier," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 62 (Jan. 1938): 41-50; George Harrison Fisher, "Brigadier General Henry Bouquet," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 3 (1879): 121-48; J. C. Reeve, "Henry Bouquet: His Indian Campaigns," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly* 26 (1917): 489-506; Edward E. Robbins, "Life and Services of Colonel Henry Bouquet," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 3 (June 1920): 120-39; Edward G. Williams, ed., "The Orderly Book of Colonel Henry Bouquet's Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, 1764," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 42 (Mar. 1959): 9-34; Lewis Butler, *The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps*, 2 vols. (London, 1910), vol. 1. See also the introductory material in William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCCLXIV* (Philadelphia, 1765), i-xiii, reprinted by Readex Microprint, 1966, and R. Clarke Co. (Cincinnati, 1907), v-xx. James Flexner, *Mohawk Baronet* (New York, 1959), 257. The error is not corrected in his revised version, *Lord of the Mohawks* (Boston, 1979), 257.

- 3 Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 7, 1762, *Papers of Col. Henry Bouquet* (reprinted in mimeograph form by the Pennsylvania Historical Commission, Harrisburg, 1941-1943), Series 21634, British Museum Additional Manuscripts, f. 105, pp. 75-76 (hereafter cited as *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS.); Bouquet to Amherst, Dec. 12, 1762, *ibid.*, f. 175, pp. 116-17; Bouquet to Amherst, Jan. 10, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 182, pp. 122-23; Amherst to Bouquet, Jan. 11, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 184, pp. 124-28; Speech of the Miami Chiefs, Mar. 30, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 221, pp. 148-49; Croghan to Amherst, Apr. 30, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 235, pp. 158-59; Amherst to Croghan, May 10, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 244, pp. 162-63; Bouquet to Amherst, May 19, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 257, pp. 172-73; Amherst to Bouquet, May 23, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 266, p. 178.

prepared. Captain Simeon Ecuyer had mostly bad flour available in May 1763 at Fort Pitt as great quantities of it had been condemned in November of the previous year. Other posts along the communication to Fort Pitt were also in need of good flour. Even as the new war began, Amherst was notified of orders to begin the reduction of the English troops under his command. Bouquet was able to get some provisions forward to the forts on the frontier in his area when he reported that he was not yet sure of the number of Indians involved in "the insurrection." He immediately called for more supplies.⁴

Amherst issued orders for troops from the Forty-second and Seventy-seventh regiments to be sent to Bouquet to be used as he saw fit. Bouquet planned to march to Fort Pitt with a convoy of flour, sheep, and powder, then escort back the horses and drivers, clear all posts of "useless people," and provide for sufficient garrisons along the line of communication to keep the route open for future supplies. He advised the abandonment of Venango and Le Boeuf (a suggestion rejected by Amherst) and the raising of provincial hunters and woodsmen to be used as "ranging companies." Amherst also ordered artillerymen sent to Bouquet.⁵

Bouquet was thankful for any help he could get. He set about organizing his expedition as best he could. He instructed or requested various persons to gather three hundred packhorses, drivers for every seven horses, horse masters for every sixty-three horses, thirty-two wagons with two wagonmasters each in charge of a brigade of sixteen wagons, 60,000 weight of flour in casks and flour bags, in addition to sheep, oxen, and powder. Gathering, sorting, and forming plans concerning such material as well as troops while dealing with a frightened populace and an indecisive legislative assembly would tax any man. Bouquet's achievement in regards to logistics deserves nothing but praise.⁶

The troops under Bouquet's command at Bushy Run consisted of regulars from three regiments. These were the Forty-second, the

4 Bouquet to Amherst, May 11, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 246, pp. 163-64; Amherst to Bouquet, Nov. 21, 1762, *ibid.*, f. 172, pp. 115-16; Royal Warrant, May 18, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 251, pp. 167-69; Bouquet to Amherst, June 4, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 269, p. 180; Bouquet to Amherst, June 5, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 270, p. 181.

5 Amherst to Bouquet, June 12, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 275, pp. 185-86; Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 286, p. 190; Amherst to Bouquet, June 19, 1763; *ibid.*, f. 289, pp. 192-93.

6 Bouquet to Callendar, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 174, pp. 184-85; Bouquet to Slough and Simons, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 177, pp. 186-88; Bouquet to Plumsted and Franks, July 19, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 193, pp. 202-3; Bouquet to Stewart, July 23, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 20, pp. 204-5.

Seventy-seventh, and the Sixtieth. On June 12 two companies of light infantry, one each from the Forty-second and the Seventy-seventh, were ordered to march from New York to Philadelphia and thence to Carlisle, Pennsylvania. On June 18 a second light infantry company was ordered to do likewise, along with some artillery. The remaining troops of the Forty-second and Seventy-seventh were ordered to march to Carlisle on June 23. The first two companies arrived in Carlisle on June 26, and thirty men were sent to reinforce Fort Ligonier on June 28. Troops were also sent to Forts Bedford and Loudoun. After gathering wagons and drivers, packhorsemen and horse masters, cattle, sheep, and flour, Bouquet was finally able to lead his small relief force out of Carlisle on July 10 and into Fort Bedford at Raystown on July 25.⁷

Upon reaching the fort, Bouquet attempted to recruit thirty backwoodsmen, sometimes referred to as rangers. It is not certain that thirty were ever signed up but it is certain that at least fourteen men were enlisted as scouts or guides under the command of Captain Lemuel Barrett. The backwoodsmen were deemed necessary because the Highlanders of the Forty-second and Seventy-seventh used in the woods as flankers or point men of the advance guard were found to be less than satisfactory in that capacity.⁸

Bouquet's column left Fort Bedford on July 28 and arrived at Fort Ligonier on August 2. Some thirty men were left at each post. Since many of the Highlanders of the Seventy-seventh were sick, it is probable that most of these convalescents were left behind. The troops that had been sent ahead to Bedford and Loudoun had rejoined the relief force as Bouquet had passed through those forts. When Bouquet

7 Amherst to Bouquet, June 12, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 275, pp. 185-86; Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 286, p. 190; Amherst to Bouquet, June 23, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 296, pp. 197-99; Bouquet to D. Campbell, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 173, pp. 183-84; Bouquet to Amherst, July 13, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 321, pp. 214-15; Bouquet to Callendar, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 174, pp. 184-85; Bouquet to Amherst, July 3, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 311, pp. 207-8; Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 333, pp. 222-24.

8 Livingston to Bouquet, Aug. 1, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 2, f. 280, p. 2; Barrett's Claim, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21651, f. 185, f. 186, pp. 136-37. A caustic comment about the Highlanders can be found in a letter from Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 333, pp. 222-24; Bomberger, *Battle*, 27; Smith, *Historical Account*, following xiii; Peckham, *Pontiac*, 211; Anderson, "Bushy Run," 242. Bouquet also refers to "Rangers" in his letter to Amherst, Aug. 5, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 201, pp. 207-8.

left Ligonier on August 4, he left behind his wagons and much of his provisions, taking with him some four hundred horses loaded with flour bags. There had been no communication with Fort Pitt since late June, and Bouquet was aware that Ecuyer's post was besieged. Bouquet's men were ambushed on August 5 after marching some seventeen miles from Fort Ligonier.⁹

It is appropriate to attempt to determine the number of men on both sides who met on the field of battle near Bushy Run, because the opposing troop strengths bore on the outcome of the engagement. Fort Pitt had been invested by Indians estimated by Captain Ecuyer to be around four hundred in number. Most of them left the vicinity of the fort to attack Bouquet's relief column. Bouquet indicated, however, that there were considerably more than four hundred Indians that attacked him and his men on August 5, 1763. The number of troops under Bouquet's command is difficult to establish. He indicates that he left Carlisle with 460 rank and file. Assuming that he picked up the troops sent ahead before leaving that town, and with the knowledge that he left thirty each at Forts Bedford and Ligonier, he would have had about 450 soldiers in the ranks at Bushy Run. Of course, an undetermined number of officers, packhorsemen, horse masters, and backwoodsmen, many of whom were armed, would have given Bouquet more than 450 fighting men, but the exact number cannot be ascertained.¹⁰

Bouquet's force consisted primarily of men from the Forty-second Royal Highlanders and the Seventy-seventh Highlanders (Montgomery's). Exactly how many came from these regiments and Bouquet's own Sixtieth Royal Americans, not to mention Barrett's backwoodsmen, is also difficult to determine. John Shy states that there were about eight thousand troops under Amherst's command. The figures given by him at various locations, excluding New York, total 7,800. This would, therefore, leave about two hundred at New York. In the same paragraph, however, Shy indicates that there were some 535 men ready for duty from three regiments in New York — the Seventeenth, the Forty-second, and the Seventy-seventh. These regiments were depleted following their service in the West Indies. Since

9 Bouquet to Gladwin, Aug. 28, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 2, f. 313, pp. 26-29; Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 5, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 201, pp. 207-8; Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 16, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 1, f. 170, pp. 150-55; Ecuyer to Bouquet, June 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 195, pp. 174-76.

10 Ecuyer to Bouquet, Aug. 3, 1763, *ibid.*, pt. 2, f. 286, pp. 7-9; Bouquet to Gladwin, Aug. 28, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 313, pp. 26-29.

the men sent to Bouquet were from the Forty-second and the Seventy-seventh, one may either assume that a few full-strength companies, several understrength companies, or some combination of both were sent. How many of either type is unknown, as is whether or not some were above half-strength while others were below. There were probably more men from the Forty-second available to march and fight than there were from the Seventy-seventh. How many Royal Americans were present? A map showing the troop disposition of the British Army from Canada to Florida shows Royal Americans scattered among outposts from Carlisle to Fort Pitt. The number of men in the Royal Americans under Bouquet at Carlisle could have numbered 113 if the figures Lewis Butler gives for the numbers of men from the Forty-second (214) and the Seventy-seventh (133) are correct. Yet Butler goes on to say that there were 150 men from the Royal American Regiment. If there were 113 men from the Sixtieth, it cannot be determined in how many companies they were represented. Bouquet disputes this number. If the totals for the Forty-second and Seventy-seventh reflect a sum of 347 but do not include the light infantry companies of those units, previously dispatched, the number of Royal Americans must be reduced. Since it is not known at what strength most of the companies from any of the regiments were, it is probable that there were several understrength companies from the two Highlander regiments on the march. Thomas Hutchins's map of the battle, in a book by William Smith, shows twelve units in action, one of these being rangers. An old sketch of the battle also shows twelve units surrounded by the Indians. This could mean that some of the companies were above and some were at or below half-strength if there were eleven of them used at Bushy Run. Thus, Bouquet could have had about 450 rank and file in the battle.¹¹

It is not possible to discover from a perusal of Hutchins's map, C.M. Bomberger's sketch, and any accounts of the battle exactly where which troops representing their respective regiments were posted in the circle. Since we do not know how many companies came from each of the regiments involved, their disposition on the battlefield must remain in doubt. We do know that the Forty-second and the Seventy-

¹¹ See John Shy, *Toward Lexington* (Princeton, 1965), 114, on West Indies; Amherst to Bouquet, June 19, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 289, pp. 192-93, on regiments; Shy, *Toward Lexington*, 112, on Sixtieth dispositions; Butler, *Annals*, 1:156, 158, on numbers; Smith, *Historical Account*, following xiii; Bomberger, *Battle*, facing 13; Hutchins's map is in Smith, while the old sketch is in Bomberger.

seventh each had a light infantry company present, and that there was a grenadier company from the Forty-second, and still another light infantry company of the Forty-second on the field near Bushy Run. Hutchins's map shows eleven units in the outermost position of the circle. Bomberger's old sketch shows twelve, and two of these are darker in hue than the other units. One of these dark units is identified as grenadiers. The other is not identified and its position in regards to the compressed circle is not shown. The original position of the rangers is not indicated on Hutchins's map. It may be that the unidentified dark unit on Bomberger's old sketch is a group of rangers. If this is so then both the map and the sketch are in agreement as to the remaining number of units which were probably eleven companies of regular troops.¹²

If we assume the companies were about half-strength, then there were probably three companies from the Seventy-seventh, eight companies from the Forty-second, and no companies from the Sixtieth. This can only be so if the map and the sketch are correct as to how many units were in the battle. Some companies, of course, could have been larger than half-strength. We know that three that had started from New York were said to be at full-strength, some seventy men each.

If we take the actual returns for the Forty-second and Seventy-seventh regiments of privates and corporals, the rank and file, we have a number fixed at 273. We know that three complete companies had been sent ahead, a total of some 210 men. Bouquet indicated that there were only sixteen rank and file of the Royal Americans present at Bushy Run. Thus, Bouquet had some 499 men in the rank and file. Sixty men were left along the way and one additional man was mentioned as being left behind, for a total of sixty-one not at Bushy Run.¹³

In saying that he marched from Carlisle with "about 460" rank and file, Bouquet must have included in this number two of the parties

12 Amherst to Bouquet, June 12, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 275, pp. 185-86; Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 286, p. 190; Amherst to Bouquet, June 23, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 296, pp. 197-99; Smith, *Historical Account*, following xlii; Bomberger, *Battle*, facing 13.

13 That there were so few Royal Americans with Bouquet would indicate why he had to use Highlanders as scouts and flank guards. A. Campbell to Bouquet, June 24, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 1, f. 188, p. 170; Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 286, p. 190; Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 333, pp. 222-24; Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11; Clarence J. Webster, ed., *The Journal of Jeffery Amherst* (Chicago, 1931), 309.

sent forward previously but not the single individual specifically referred to as being left behind. Bouquet also mentioned that a number of men had deserted, only four of whom had been caught by the time he reached Bedford.¹⁴

Amherst stated that there were about eighty men left in the Seventy-seventh after that regiment's light infantry company had been sent to Bouquet. Later he reported an additional sixteen men had been found. If "about eighty" is considered to be in reality eighty-six and we add the sixteen men, we arrive at the figure of 102 that appears as the actual return for the Seventy-seventh. The total number of men available from Montgomery's Highlanders comes to 172 of which 141 or 142 were present at Bushy Run. Of the 311 men available from the Forty-second regiment, there were either 280 or 281 men in the ranks at Bushy Run. By adding in the sixteen men of the Sixtieth Regiment, we arrive at a figure of some 438 rank and file. This number is in agreement with our original figure of 499 minus sixty-one left behind. If the backwoodsmen are determined to be fourteen in number then Bouquet had some 452 fighting men in the ranks.¹⁵

An undetermined number of packhorsemen were also available for combat. How many fought and how many did not cannot be ascertained. The number of officers and sergeants present from the Seventy-seventh and Forty-second regiments exceeded seventy, and at least three officers had been left behind with men from the two Highlander regiments. There were also about eighteen drummers available for battle.¹⁶

If we accept the number of units in the battle as shown on Hutchins's map and Bomberger's sketch as eleven, excluding rangers, Bouquet could have had eight companies from the Forty-second Regiment at half-strength, two companies from the Seventy-seventh Regi-

14 Bouquet to Amherst, June 23, 1763, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 295, p. 196; Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 333, pp. 222-24; Bouquet to Gladwin, Aug. 28, 1763, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 2, f. 313, pp. 26-29.

15 Amherst to Bouquet, June 16, 1763, *ibid.*, pt. 1, f. 173, pp. 157-58; Amherst to Bouquet, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 306, p. 204. Amherst's figures as to the total number of men sent included nonmembers of the rank and file, but did not include some staff officers. They do not agree with the actual number of men available according to the commander of the men in New York from the two regiments of Highlanders. See A. Campbell to Bouquet, June 24, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 1, f. 188, p. 170; Amherst to Bouquet, June 23, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 296, pp. 197-99.

16 A. Campbell to Bouquet, June 24, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 1, f. 188, p. 170; Bouquet to D. Campbell, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 173, pp. 183-84.

ment at half-strength, and one company from the Seventy-seventh at full-strength. Supernumeraries and the men from the Sixtieth could have been used to supplement these companies, or the Royal American contingent could have operated with the backwoodsmen (rangers). If the three light infantry companies functioned at full strength, the remaining eight companies would have been composed of less than thirty men each. Of course, Bouquet did not state how many companies he had on the field at Bushy Run or how many men were in each. One other complicating factor to be considered that does not agree with either the map or the sketch is that Bouquet stated he had two grenadier companies.¹⁷

Because Bouquet did not state how many men deserted, the figure of 452 must be reduced somewhat. Since we do not know how many officers, sergeants, drummers, or packhorsemen actually fought, we cannot determine the actual number of combatants on the British side. It is thus safe to say that there were about 450 regulars and rangers in the ranks who fought at Bushy Run. It is likely that there were fewer.

In all probability, Bouquet had studied Turpin de Crissé's *Essai sur l'Art de la Guerre*, written in 1754. In this essay, De Crissé outlined some of the uses of light infantry. In the event of an attack, they were to be employed on the flanks of the main body, holding such dangerous ground as woods, defiles, and ravines. They could also be used to protect both cavalry and infantry engaged in foraging, guard convoys, reconnoiter a line of march, and scout the enemy to prevent surprise. De Crissé also emphasized that an officer in charge of light troops should become familiar with the strength and weakness of each of his men by conversing with them and paying attention to their reports, thereby being better able to employ them according to their courage as well as their intelligence. Bouquet's understanding and use of light troops indicates that he was aware of De Crissé's opinions or formed similar ones based on years of experience on the frontier. It would seem that he was thoroughly acquainted with Humphrey Bland's *Treatise* as well as *The Exercise of the Horse, Dragoon, and Foot Forces*, published in 1728, the revised drill regulations of 1757, and the translations of Prussian infantry regulations of 1754 and 1757. Of these writings, Bland was the most popular among British army offi-

¹⁷ Bouquet to Ecuyer, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 197, pp. 205-7.

cers at that time. Yet it is obvious that Bouquet followed none of the teachings of these writings too closely in his conduct of the Battle of Bushy Run.¹⁸

Bouquet does not indicate exactly in what formation his troops were either on the march from Carlisle to Fort Ligonier or from Ligonier to Fort Pitt. In both instances he had to protect a convoy of provisions. En route from Carlisle, Bouquet had to guard about one hundred cattle, twice as many sheep, some three hundred horses, over three thousand pounds of powder, and between thirty and forty wagons loaded with flour. Out of Fort Ligonier, he had to guard about four hundred horses carrying flour. On the march to Ligonier, Bouquet had employed some of the Highlanders as flankers and had found them wanting. While resting at Bedford, he commissioned a person to recruit some thirty backwoodsmen to help, not only as flankers, but also as scouts. Only fourteen were obtained under Captain Barrett, not enough to provide adequate screening troops. It is obvious that regular troops had to be used as scouts as well. The backwoodsmen were intended to accompany a detachment scheduled to march to Presque Isle. Bouquet did not know that that important post had already fallen.¹⁹

Bouquet stated that the advance guard of his little army was attacked at one o'clock on the afternoon of August 5. He had come within one mile of the place where he had intended to stop — the stream called Bushy Run. Indians, undoubtedly the ones who had been besieging Fort Pitt, had set up an ambush. The advance guard was immediately supported by the two light infantry companies of the Forty-second Regiment and the enemy was driven from its ambushade and pursued. The Indians' fire from the front intensified, however, and firing began to develop along the flanks of Bouquet's column. The

18 See J. F. C. Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1925), 115-16, for a discussion of De Crissé's essay. See also 191-92; Humphrey Bland, *A Treatise on Military Discipline*, 3rd ed. (London, 1734), the first eight editions being virtually unchanged; H. C. B. Rogers, *The British Army of the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1977), 69; J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London, 1910), 2:598.

19 See Slough and Simons to Bouquet, July 10, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 191, p. 200; Bouquet to Plumsted and Franks, July 19, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 193, pp. 202-3; Bouquet to Amherst, July 3, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 311, pp. 207-8; Warrant for Powder at Carlisle, July 6, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 1, p. 237, p. 208, on the supplies. See Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 333, pp. 222-24; Livingston to Bouquet, Aug. 1, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21649, pt. 2, f. 280, p. 2, on rangers and Presque Isle.

British made a general attack to seize a hill, but the Indians there melted away and reappeared at another spot. As more Indians joined the battle, Bouquet found his men surrounded and his convoy under assault. He then had his men march back to protect the convoy, and the action became general. The Indians resolutely attacked on every side but were driven back with considerable losses to both opponents. When night fell, the fighting ceased. Bouquet reflected on the day's action and worried about how he would be able to defeat the enemy the next day. He also foresaw difficulties in transporting the provisions and wounded due to the loss of many horses. In his account of the day's action, he praised the conduct of the officers, the assistance of Major Allan Campbell, and the steady behavior of the troops, indicating that they did not fire except upon orders and that they carried out successful attacks with the bayonet. Bouquet lost some sixty men killed and wounded.²⁰

An account by an unknown writer, which appears in the preface of William Smith's book, indicates that the troops were fired on when they came within one-half mile of Bushy Run. He points out that the Indians lay in ambush along the flanks of the British troops and were posted on high ground. Bouquet's whole line charged these heights and dislodged the enemy. The rest of his description of the first day's fighting is in agreement with Bouquet's.²¹

It is obvious from these accounts that Bouquet, unlike Braddock, was ambushed. It is also obvious that Bouquet's men did not panic. Unlike Braddock's, Bouquet's force was enveloped, ultimately, on four sides, not three. Following orders, Bouquet's men took a hill from which they were receiving galling fire. Instead of falling back upon one another, his troops carried out attacks with bayonets. When ordered to withdraw, the men did so in such fashion as to prevent themselves from being routed or overrun. The convoy, though attacked, was not lost. It had stopped on another hill and it was there that Bouquet set up a defensive position using the flour bags he was transporting to form a circle and thereby cover the wounded.²²

The unknown writer indicates that at the first light of dawn on August 6, the Indians began shouting and yelling all around Bouquet's force at a distance of about five hundred yards. The Indians then

20 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 5, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 201, pp. 207-8.

21 Smith, *Historical Account*, viii-ix.

22 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11.

attacked under excellent fire and made several attempts to break into the camp. Bouquet's men repulsed every effort but were becoming extremely fatigued due to their long march, the action of the previous day, and a lack of water. Whenever the army attacked, the Indians gave way; and, when the pursuit halted and the troops returned to their positions, the Indians renewed their attacks. Thus, Bouquet decided that the issue would depend upon bringing the Indians to stand their ground when attacked. Bouquet ordered two companies, which had been posted in an advanced position, to retreat into the defensive circle. The troops on either side of this position opened their files and covered up the empty space. Two other companies, light infantry and grenadiers, were ordered to lie in ambush to support the first two companies (now identified as grenadiers). The troops that had opened up their files had moved closer to the center of the circle and the Indians took this as a retreat. They immediately rushed forward into the area vacated by the first two companies (now identified as light foot) and opened a ferocious fire. The two companies that had left their position in the line now made a sudden turn, sallied out from a part of the hill from which they could not be observed, and fell upon the right flank of the enemy. The Indians held their ground until charged a second time and then broke and ran. The other two companies marched toward them as they fled and fired upon them. The four companies then united and pursued the fleeing Indians. The rest of the Indians watched their companions run and then did likewise.²³

Bouquet's account of the second day's fighting differed in several ways from that of the unknown writer. Bouquet stated that the Indians attacked early in the morning after surrounding the camp at a distance of about five hundred yards, shouting and yelping. He indicated that his men's brisk attacks had little effect because the enemy gave way and reappeared in another quarter. Bouquet decided to entice the Indians to close upon his troops and expected them to stand their ground when attacked. He ordered two light infantry companies within the circle and the troops on either side of them to open their files as if covering a retreat. Another company of light infantry and the grenadier company of the Forty-second Regiment were ordered to support the first two companies. The few troops who had taken possession of the ground vacated by the two light infantry companies were brought closer to the center of the defensive circle. The Indians attacked this area with a heavy fire and rushed toward the covering

23 Smith, *Historical Account*, x-xii.

troops. Major Campbell, at the head of the two light infantry companies, led them out from a part of the hill that could not be observed and fell upon the enemy's right flank. The Indians returned the fire from the troops but broke when the British regulars rushed them. Captain Thomas Basset delivered orders for the other two companies to fire upon the Indians running across their front. The four companies then pursued the Indians some two miles. The rest of the Indians, having witnessed the rout of their fellows, also fled.²⁴

Both accounts, written in 1763, stress the bravery and control of the British regulars. This is a tribute to Bouquet, his knowledge of military history, his ability to inspire men under his command, the results he obviously achieved from his experience on the frontier which he imparted to his officers and men, and his training methods that included changes as well as modifications of existing exercises. The differences in the two contemporary accounts are significant, however, from a tactical viewpoint. Since Bouquet was on the scene, his statement must be considered the more accurate.

Bouquet indicated that the two companies chosen for the attack were light infantry. He did not tell us from which of the three regiments represented on the field they came. Neither did he identify the regiment from which the third light infantry company came that supported the attack by the other two light infantry companies. The grenadier company used as a support unit is identified as being from the Forty-second Regiment. Although Sir Jeffery Amherst had identified two light infantry companies, one each from the Forty-second Regiment and the Seventy-seventh Regiment, the third complete company from the Forty-second Regiment was not given any particular designation or description. It must be assumed from Amherst's letters that two of these light infantry companies were from the Forty-second Regiment and one was from the Seventy-seventh Regiment.²⁵

Unlike Braddock, Bouquet was familiar with the ways the Indians fought. He had been on the frontier for years and the experience he had gained gave him an insight not only into the manner in which his enemy fought but also what that enemy was likely to do in a given situation. Bouquet had indicated that he expected to be attacked and took precautions for protection against a favorite tactic of the Indians.

²⁴ Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11.

²⁵ Amherst to Bouquet, June 18, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 286, p. 190.

When he was attacked, he gave the same type of orders that Braddock had given, the reinforcing of the advance guard. Why did Bouquet's men not panic? It would seem that, first of all, they had confidence in their commander. Second, they had confidence in several of their officers with whom they had served. And, third, a number of men in each of the three regiments represented at the battle had had experience on the frontier and in fighting Indians. This must have had a steadying effect on the newer members in the ranks.²⁶

The Indian attacks on the first day of the battle, aside from the initial ambush, appear to have consisted of sporadic assaults here and there along the flanks of Bouquet's column and finally the convoy toward the rear. Such assaults were usually repulsed by an attack carried out by troops using bayonets. Evidently, none of these assaults was made by a very large group of Indians, nor were they coordinated in any way by such leaders as Wolf, Keekyuskung, or Guyasuta. From a tactical standpoint, Bouquet conducted this phase of the battle from a purely defensive posture, reacting here and there as situations arose with brief offensive thrusts. Once the convoy was imperiled, he withdrew his men from the western area of the field and established a defensive perimeter on and about the upper slopes of the hill on which the convoy had halted. During the night, the position was improved by the placement of the flour bags to protect the wounded. Casualties to the British amounted to some sixty men killed and wounded, 10 percent of those being officers.²⁷

Bouquet, like Braddock, had no clear estimate of the number of his attackers when the attack started and continued. Because his primary responsibility was to get the provisions he was escorting through to Fort Pitt, it was necessary that he consider the protection of those supplies of utmost importance. Therefore, his actions on August 5 seem to have been most appropriate. He supported the advance guard to such an extent that the ambush failed, he repulsed occasional attacks along his flanks, and he withdrew the main body of his force to where his convoy was threatened, thereby preventing its destruction. Like Braddock, Bouquet's force was assaulted on three sides early in the battle. His advance guard had been stopped and his flanks were under attack. From his actions, it is obvious that Bouquet did follow one of Bland's suggestions. He did not attempt to push forward, nor ultimately stand fast; but he withdrew, unlike Braddock, in good order.

26 Bouquet to Amherst, July 26, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 333, pp. 222-24.

27 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 5, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 201, pp. 207-8.

The next day at dawn, August 6, the Indians began yelling and shouting from a distance of about five hundred yards all about Bouquet's camp. Once again they mounted bold assaults at various points along Bouquet's line in vain attempts to break through the defensive ring he had thrown up around his wounded. Now surrounded by the enemy, unable to move forward or backward due to the loss of horses suffered the previous day, tied to his convoy and wounded, his troops becoming more and more fatigued by having had little rest following their march and battle of the day before, as well as being distressed by lack of water, Bouquet realized that the situation could not be allowed to continue. As had happened previously, whenever a group of Indians pressed their attack too closely, the British troops counterattacked and the enemy gave way. It would seem that the Indians had not come up with a different form of attack during the night. Bouquet decided that he had to force the enemy to close upon his troops or force them to stand their ground so that his men might close upon the Indians. The means by which he sought to bring about one or the other of these two situations in effect brought about both.

Bouquet ordered two companies of light infantry to withdraw from their positions in the defensive line and fall back inside the circle. He then ordered the troops to the right and left of this vacated space to open their files and cover the open area in his line. He intended that the withdrawal maneuver by the two light infantry companies would appear as the beginning of a retreat. The covering troops took their positions nearer to the center of the defensive circle, thus giving the impression that a portion of Bouquet's line was caving in or contracting in order to screen a retreat. Orders were also sent to a third light infantry company and the grenadier company of the Forty-second Regiment to support the proposed action of the two light infantry companies that had been pulled out of the line.

Indians in the vicinity of the area where the above troop movements had taken place rushed forward into the space covered by the screening troops and delivered some very heavy fire upon the few British regulars posted there. At that moment the two light infantry companies that had been withdrawn appeared on the right flank of the attacking Indians. These two companies had sallied forth from a part of the hill to which they had marched, an area that was not readily observable to the attacking Indians. The flanking troops opened fire on the enemy, who immediately halted their attack on the screening troops and resolutely returned the fire of the two light infantry com-

panies. The British attackers rushed forward with fixed bayonets and drawn claymores into the midst of the Indians. A wild melee ensued and many Indians were killed. Then the surviving Indians who had been taken in flank broke and fled the field. Their path of flight took them across the front of the two supporting companies which promptly delivered a volley of fire into the retreating Indians' flank. The four companies then pursued the routed enemy some two miles, thoroughly dispersing them.

The Indians on the other side of the circle witnessed the defeat of their comrades, made no move to assist them, and subsequently followed their example and quit the field. The four companies that had been chasing the retreating Indians returned and took possession of a hill to Bouquet's front west of the circle. Here Bouquet established another camp and buried his dead. Some Indians fired on this new camp after it was set up, but they were dispersed by light infantry units that acted on their own without having been ordered to do so by Bouquet. The march to Fort Pitt took almost three days due to the wounded having to be carried and cared for.²⁸

It is difficult to have anything but praise for Bouquet's actions on August 6. He must have recognized that the Indians had not devised any new methods of attacking his camp. He must have also realized that he could not allow the situation to continue or his men, at some point in the defensive circle, would give way once they were thoroughly exhausted. Thus, he planned a scheme of attack that was a terrible risk. If the weakened and withdrawn portion of his line had given way an instant before the onrushing Indians were struck in the flank, the Indians would have broken into the center of his camp. Bouquet's dramatic maneuver indicated a knowledge not only of the character of his own men but also of that of his enemy. The ferocity of the combat at the climactic moment of the battle reveals how desperate the situation was for both sides. Yet Bouquet's decision to take such a desperate risk as he did was based on a belief that the Indians would do exactly what they did when his men came to grips with them at close quarters. He had expressed this belief to Lieutenant Donald Campbell over two months before the Battle of Bushy Run.²⁹

Problems associated with piecing together the engagement at Bushy Run become obvious when Hutchins's map and the sketch of the engagement in Bomberger's monograph are compared with Bouquet's ac-

28 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 203, pp. 209-11.

29 Bouquet to D. Campbell, June 29, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 173, pp. 183-84.

count of the battle. Bouquet clearly stated that the troops making the decisive attack on the second day of conflict were two companies of light infantry. Hutchins's map shows the attack being made by one light infantry company, a grenadier company, and the rangers. Bouquet then stated that a third light infantry company and the grenadier company of the Forty-second were ordered to support the first two companies. Hutchins's map shows two light infantry companies posted to support the attack. The sketch of the engagement in Bomberger's monograph as to the role of the four companies used in attack and support does agree with Bouquet's account.³⁰

Both the map and the sketch show the grenadier company and the three light infantry companies all together on the west side of the circle as to the initial positions held by the troops. The map and sketch differ as to a second position taken by the troops. Hutchins's map indicates a movement by four companies other than the grenadiers and light infantry while the sketch shows a similar inward movement by seven units of troops. The compression of the circle by the movement of the men as indicated on the sketch does not agree with Bouquet's account. The troop movements of a like nature by four units indicated on Hutchins's map do not appear to agree with Bouquet's account either.

Bouquet stated that the few troops that took possession of the ground previously occupied by the two light infantry companies were brought in closer to the center of the circle. Certainly a "few troops" would not be four to seven companies. Indeed, the few troops referred to are those that came from the men on the right and left of the light infantry companies first ordered within the circle. It is these few troops that were mentioned as moving nearer the center of the circle. There was no mention of any other troops falling back from their original positions held at dawn on August 6. It is possible that when Bouquet wrote of the troops to the right and left of the two light infantry companies, he meant all the troops, but this does not seem probable since the troops so ordered to move were referred to as the "few."³¹

The placement of the grenadier company and the three light infantry companies on the western portion of the circle as shown on both the map and the sketch presents problems in regards to the various

30 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *ibid.*, f. 203, pp. 209-11; Smith, *Historical Account*, following xiii; Bomberger, *Battle*, facing 13.

31 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11.

troop movements. On the map, the grenadier company and the light infantry company from opposite sides of the circle are shown as moving through the circle and coming out for their attack on the extreme right flank of the Indians. The two light infantry companies shown lying in ambush are portrayed as holding the western side of the circle. Bouquet's account of where the enemy attacked just before they themselves were attacked seems to indicate that the Indians pressed forward at the point in the line where *both* light infantry companies had vacated their positions. The writer's account quoted in William Smith's book also seems to indicate as much. Yet the point of the surprise attack by the two British companies is shown at a place on the map where neither of these companies had been positioned before their movement. If the Indians thought a retreat was in progress, it does not seem likely that they would attack at or near a point where the British line was held by troops that had not moved or had not been thinned out by the maneuver of opening their files. Yet Hutchins's map indicates that that is what the Indians did by showing the surprise attack by the British nowhere near the area vacated by the two companies designed to perform the attack.³²

The two companies ordered to support the surprise attack are shown on the map as being posted on the right and left of the companies that made the attack. If this had been the case, they would have been the two companies that opened their files and filled up the vacated space unless they were ordered not to do so. Bouquet did not indicate that such orders were given, nor does the writer quoted by Smith. It is highly unlikely that the supporting companies executed such a maneuver. Since neither Bouquet nor Smith's unidentified writer mentioned that the supporting companies made any thinning movements or changed their positions, it would seem that the placement of all the light infantry companies and the grenadier company next to each other on the map and on the sketch is incorrect. Both the map and the sketch show the surprise attack taking place in the southeast area of the circle. Both show the supporting companies to be positioned to the west of the circle.

Perhaps both the map and the sketch show the companies making the surprise attack to have been on the west side of the circle originally because it was thought that they had been in a most advanced

32 Smith, *Historical Account*, xi; Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11. Smith's writer also indicates that the surprise attack was made by two grenadier companies with the supporting companies being comprised of a third grenadier company and one of light infantry.

position, as Smith's writer indicates, and that this was interpreted to mean advanced toward Fort Pitt. It could mean that they were more advanced toward the enemy than other troops wherever they were posted. Bouquet did not mention their advanced position. Hutchins's map shows the Indians in a position of almost surrounding Bouquet's men. Bomberger's sketch shows the Indians completely encircling the British forces. Bouquet indicated that his forces were surrounded and Smith's writer says that the Indians were all about the camp. Hutchins's map and Smith's writer indicate that the supporting companies were to lie in ambush. Bomberger's sketch and Bouquet's account do not indicate that the two supporting companies were to be formed in an ambuscade.³³

If the map of Hutchins and the old sketch in Bomberger's book are correct, then there were eleven units of regular infantry on the field. If each unit represented a company, and all were equal in size, then a company was composed of about forty men. However, if some companies were at full-strength, other companies were not. A company at full-strength would have been some seventy men, yet a reduction to less than fifty had been decreed in May 1763, with the grenadier company of each battalion to be set at fifty-five. If Bouquet went into battle with a grenadier company composed of fifty-five men, then he would have had about thirty-nine men each in the other ten companies at Bushy Run. Bouquet did not relate how many companies he had in the battle, nor how many men were in each. It is difficult to believe that such a reduction as ordered would have been carried out with the war already begun.³⁴

Bouquet did tell us something that stands out in stark contrast to his instructions for troop dispositions that were used en route to the Muskingum in 1764. The decisive action of August 6, 1763, was carried out by companies, not platoons. If these companies numbered about forty men each they would have been about the size of one of Bland's platoons. If the light infantry companies and the grenadier company were at the full-strength number of seventy men each, it would have been possible for these units to have been deployed in eight platoons of some thirty-five men each. Bouquet was quite clear in stating that such was not the case. Indeed, he indicated that the

33 Smith, *Historical Account*, xi, following xiii; Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11; Bomberger, *Battle*, facing 13.

34 See the Royal Warrant, May 18, 1763, *Papers of Bouquet*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21634, f. 251, pp. 167-69.

attack was carried out by companies that maneuvered as companies, and that the supporting action was carried out by companies. He did not explain how the companies in the attack, or in support, were deployed; that is, what formation they were in. It is highly unlikely that they deployed in either platoons or divisions since Bouquet probably would have commented on this point, especially in light of his instructions of 1764 or 1758. In all probability, the companies deployed in three ranks and the rear rank closed up with the second rank to deliver volley fire before rushing the enemy. Depending upon the number of men in each company, there could have been some twelve to twenty-three men to a rank.³⁵



In effect, then, Bouquet used the company as a subtactical unit of the basic tactical unit, the battalion. Neither the British infantry regulations nor Bland's teachings prescribed such actions. The use of companies in the manner they were used at Bushy Run was unlike a platoon frontage used in street firing or platoons in line of battle massed for the purpose of delivering volley fire in a situation involving a steady advance by one or both sides. Bouquet's improvisation in the heat of battle was genius at best. The idea of deluding the enemy so as to come to grips with him stands on an equal footing with the method used, from a tactical standpoint, to carry it off.

Braddock is often remembered as one who suffered an overwhelming defeat at the beginning of a long war for empire. It is thought by

35 Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 6, 1763, *ibid.*, B.M. Add. MSS. 21653, f. 203, pp. 209-11. Bouquet's instructions concerning troop disposition on the march and in battle for 1758 and 1764 can be found in his orderly books. That they involve platoon facings and movements is probably due to his understanding of his subordinate officers' knowledge of Bland and army regulations. The diagrams found in Smith's book that are often attributed to Bouquet do not reflect Bouquet's description of what took place at Bushy Run. Rather, they seem to be an officer's attempt to improve on that situation or clarify it in such a way as to make it applicable in future actions using dispositions of troops familiar to most officers. Whether or not Bouquet was the person who drew the diagrams is unknown. The explanations given in the book concerning warfare with the Indians in North America are also attributed to Bouquet. I am not convinced that Bouquet is the author of those explanations nor the actual designer of the diagrams. The British company, when it was seventy men strong, was not unlike De Saxe's half-company. The use to which light infantry half-companies were to be put, according to De Saxe's teachings, was quite different in most respects than that of the Royal Americans. For a discussion of De Saxe's half-companies see Fuller, *Light Infantry*, 50-52. Bouquet's orderly books can be found in Williams, "Orderly Book," 9-34; and in Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent, and Autumn L. Leonard, eds., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet* (Harrisburg, 1951), 2:656-90 (hereafter referred to as *Bouquet Papers*).

some, even today, that his men stood bravely fast, firing at an unseen enemy until they had exhausted their ammunition before giving way. Too many contemporary accounts dispute this view. Bouquet is rarely remembered today though he won a decisive battle in a short war for survival. Braddock's defeat signaled a need for change, a need for light troops that could operate in open formations, more mobile than most regulars, yet able to function in traditional ways when necessary. Bouquet was a leader in this development, beginning the task the year following Braddock's defeat. He saw quickly that the key to success lay in training, and his experience taught him the need for improvisation. His attitudes toward arms and dress eventually led to his regiment being armed with rifles and clothed in uniforms of green and brown colors many years after his death. His use of the company as a tactical subunit foreshadowed that developed in armies of later years. Even the British recognized his genius, promoting him to the rank of brigadier general, an accomplishment rare for a foreigner. It is one of history's ironies that others have been given credit for much of what he did and advocated.³⁶

36 Lord Howe has been credited with being the father of light infantry in the British Army but this was probably because he was an English nobleman. He arrived in North America a year after Bouquet and adopted techniques already adopted and espoused by Bouquet; such as, the shortening of coat-tails, the browning of gun barrels, the cropping of hair, the use of colonial leggings, and so forth. See Butler, *Annals*, 1:329; Fuller, "The Revival and Training of Light Infantry in the British Army, 1757-1806," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 58 (Sept. 1913): 1192-93; Edward Hutton, *Chronicles of the King's Royal Rifle Corps* (Winchester, 1911), 8; Hereward Wake, ed., *A Brief History of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, 1755-1948* (Aldershot, 1948), 2, 3, 9, 10. Bouquet's thoughts on the use of rifles and clothing of brown and green colors can be found throughout his writings. Some early examples are: Bouquet to Stevenson, June 3, 1758, *Bouquet Papers*, 2:27-29; Bouquet to Forbes, June 7, 1758, *ibid.*, 2:42-52; Bouquet to Washington, July 11, 1757, *ibid.*, 2:183-84; Stanwix to Bouquet, May 25, 1758, *ibid.*, 1:370; Forbes to Bouquet, June 27, 1758, *ibid.*, 2:135-37. According to Bland and the British infantry regulations of 1728 and 1757, the basic tactical unit in the British Army was the battalion. The company was an organizational unit and not a tactical one. There were no guidelines or instructions for its use tactically in Bouquet's time. Platoons were formed from the battalion, not the company. See *Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons, and Foot Forces* (London, 1728); *Exercise for the Foot* (London, 1757); Bland, *Treatise*. In earlier years companies were composed of two hundred to more than five hundred men and were trained to maneuver and defend independently. Such actions were found to be wanting and the regiment, at first composed of one battalion, came to be considered the basic tactical unit in the British Army. For a while the words "regiment" and "battalion" were used interchangeably. See Gervase Markham, *The Second Part of the Souldiers Grammar* (London, 1639), 13-15, 44-50 (reprinted in *The Souldiers Exercise*, Norwood, N.J., 1974).



Bouquet achieved victory at Bushy Run in a little war that is overlooked in most history books today. It is truly unfortunate, for the sacrifices on both sides should not be forgotten or glossed over in a single sentence. For the student of military history it is difficult to find a finer example of a well-liked innovative leader. While he did not command large numbers of men, he did his best with what he had, and that was good enough to save the southern frontier of the old Northwest. Perhaps no finer tribute could be paid to him than this — that it was most fortunate for the colonists that he was not a field commander in the British Army at the time of the American Revolution.³⁷

Explanation of Old Sketch

Although the sketch in Bomberger's monograph consists of one drawing, two renderings have been developed from it to show the difference in the troop dispositions. In the first sketch the British are shown totally surrounded by the Indians, a point that is in agreement with Bouquet's account of the Battle of Bushy Run. All of the light infantry units are shown posted in the western portion of the defensive circle. The unit identified as rangers is indicated as such with a question mark since no unit is so identified by Bomberger.

Note that the circle of Indians has remained at the same distance from the initial British line of defense except where the circle is broken in the second sketch. The British units are shown in a contracted state, forming a more compact defensive circle. Two units of light infantry have moved out of the British line and attacked the Indians in the southeastern portion of the field while the grenadiers and another unit of light infantry have moved through the circle of Indians on the west and are shown as posted so as to fire on the fleeing Indians, the latter's path being indicated by the long arrow. The unit identified as rangers on the first old sketch is nowhere to be found.

Bouquet's account of the battle agrees with the view of the attack being made by light infantry and the support of those units by both light infantry and grenadiers. However, Bouquet does not state that the latter two units moved, nor does he indicate that the British defensive circle contracted, nor does he state that the Indians to the west of

37 Following his successful campaign in 1764 Bouquet returned to Philadelphia and received many accolades. In April 1765 the announcement of his promotion to brigadier general was made. He was sent to Florida where he arrived in early August, caught yellow fever, and died on September 2, 1765. I am in complete agreement with Branch that the American Revolutionary cause gained much by his death. See Branch, "Bouquet," 50.

the circle gave way so that light infantry and grenadiers could move.

It is interesting to note that no topographical features appear on the old sketch. And it should be remembered that Bouquet's account indicates that the Indians attacked at the place that had been vacated by the British units designated to attack the Indians. The sketch does not agree with Bouquet's account on this point.



Explanation of Hutchins's Map



This map has been redrawn leaving out all of the symbols for trees and some of the outlying topographical features. Two drawings have also been developed from the single map by Hutchins to show the different troop dispositions. In the first drawing the troops are shown in a defensive circle along the principal ridge of Edge Hill. The units labeled light infantry facing westward are so designated by Hutchins. I have labeled the other unit of light infantry and the grenadier unit as such based upon standard British procedure of the grenadier company taking post on the right of the line of march.

Note that the Indians are not portrayed as completely surrounding the British force, a point that is in dispute with Bouquet's account. Also note that there is no indication of where the rangers initially deployed.

In the second drawing the second position of the troops is shown. The British defensive circle has now contracted. Bouquet's account does not indicate any such movement; and, in fact, it specifically mentions troops still posted on the edge of the ridge on the north side during the attack by the light infantry companies. Hutchins's map shows the attack being carried out by the grenadiers, light infantry, and rangers. The units of light infantry and grenadiers were shown to have reached the point of their attack by withdrawing from their first positions and marching eastward along the road, then turning south and then facing west. Bouquet's account states that the attack was carried out by two light infantry companies only. Bouquet also indicates that the troops on either side of the companies withdrawn opened their files and moved nearer to the center of the defensive circle and that the Indians attacked this weakened sector yet none of these happenings is shown taking place on Hutchins's map.

In a third drawing, using the same troop disposition as Hutchins, I have identified the units of light infantry which were withdrawn according to Bouquet's account and the topographical features of the terrain and thus placed them on the southern portion of the British





defensive circle. Since the attack was made by troops using a "fold in the ground," it is obvious that the units which opened their files had to be to the west of said "fold," a part of the hill from which troops sallied to make an attack and from which they could not be observed doing so by the Indians. I believe that this "fold" lies between the spur which hangs south from Edge Hill and the ridge to the east of the spur.

Note that I have shown the Indians to be where Hutchins's map indicates they were. In all probability they were also on the spur, in the "fold," and on the ridge to the east of the spur if Bouquet's account is correct.

I have omitted the ranger unit from this drawing and the fourth one. Bouquet's account of the battle does not indicate either the positioning of this group or the action it took during the battle.

The fourth drawing shows what I believe happened at the moment of the British attack. The Indians on the spur and to the west of it have crowded together to press their attack on the two British units that opened their files and retreated slightly. Note that these two British units are longer and thinner than the other British units and that they have moved closer to the center of the British defensive circle and that the other British units have remained in place. This disposition is in agreement with Bouquet's account, as is the attack by the British being shown as carried out by two light infantry companies. The British attack was able to hit the Indians in the flank because the Indians along the southern front of the British circle left their positions to rush forward at the place where it appeared that the British had begun a retreat.

The Indians who broke and ran probably fled westward and then veered northwest toward the road to Fort Pitt, carrying along with them those Indians they encountered. When they turned toward the road they would have been vulnerable to attack by the light infantry company and the grenadier company posted on the western sector of the British circle.

If Hutchins's map is correct, then Bouquet's account makes no sense at all, for Bouquet was quite clear in stating that the Indians attacked at that point in the defensive circle that had been vacated by the attacking British units. ■