One Month in the Summer of '63: Pittsburgh Prepares for the Civil War

Centerpiece of a sign that hung outside the Allegheny Arsenal, a critical cog in the Union munitions industry in Pittsburgh. The sign's wooden template is in the Historical Society's collection. Opposite page: an eerie 1890s photo of one fort site near the 22nd Street Incline on the South Side.
In Spring 1863, two years into the Civil War, the unsettled state of guerilla warfare in West Virginia was causing alarm in Pittsburgh, and with summer came news of General Robert E. Lee’s impending invasion of the North. The threat was very real to Pittsburghers. “Western Pennsylvania is the most tempting and most vulnerable point,” Major John Nevin (featured in the next issue of Pittsburgh History) wrote to relatives in Pittsburgh, “and the Valley of the Monongahela [is] a ready groove to slide down in. Look out Pittsburgh, for your workshops!”

Burdened with events and responsibilities elsewhere, authorities in Washington, D.C., could do little more than offer advice to Pittsburgh. Except for the thin staff of professional soldiers dispatched from the capital to oversee “operations,” the citizens of Pittsburgh found themselves largely on their own.

Three weeks’ worth of hasty work in June 1863 would transform the hills around the Iron City into a chain of fortified peaks. In one sense, the preparations represent an admirable example of how humans work together under extraordinary pressure; yet, at the same time, the defense emergency was driven by a shortage of good information. (The chief mode of communication was the telegraph with short, stilted messages perfect for spawning misinterpretations.) Human failures of judgment and the capacity for rumor-mongering were evident throughout the emergency. In fact, the fortifying frenzy wears a somewhat comic shroud, for no shots were ever fired from the ramparts and the historical record remains murky as to how much the city’s residents ever had to fear. Today, the Civil War forts of Pittsburgh, largely obscured by urban development, are footnotes in local history.

Part I of this article explores the reasons for the alarm that June, the response by the federal government and by Pittsburgh’s leaders, and finally the rapid buildup of armed volunteers who streamed into the city. Part II (coming in the Winter issue of Pittsburgh History) focuses on what is known about the actual sites.

Lifelong residents of the region may be surprised to learn that the overgrown vacant lot at the end of their street could have become, had history happened differently, a Civil War battle site.
The Civil War, 1863

The war in its third spring was no nearer resolution than when the first shot was fired at Fort Sumter in April 1861. The fortunes of war had seen the Union victorious in the West and along the Southern shores, but offsetting such success were a stunning series of Confederate wins in the East. A Rebel invasion of Maryland had been halted in September 1862, but only at a terrible cost along Antietam Creek in a battle that would stand as the bloodiest day in U.S. history. The North, however, squandered any benefits of the “victory” three months later when incompetence and leadership failures stranded waves of Federal soldiers on the hills overlooking the Rappahannock River at
Fredericksburg, Va. Then, on May 1 through 3, 1863, a renewed Union offensive was halted and turned back at Chancellorsville. With the approach of summer in 1863, the Confederacy seemed yet again in control of its own destiny.

The Union braced to meet this threat, for it was clear that the Confederacy must shift its focus from its soil to the Northern heartland. Doing so would gain them a respite, and perhaps even more importantly, might win the European recognition crucial for survival as an independent nation. For residents of Northern cities and towns scattered along the war front on either side of the Mason-Dixon Line, this was especially ominous news, as certainly the first blow would fall on them with a two-fold vengeance. First, there was fear of retribution for war atrocities in the South. Second, there were the simple logistics of war that required the South to replenish its depleted war materials while destroying their enemy’s stocks. Likely targets for invasion were thought to be any of the industrial or commercial centers of the rich Ohio River Valley. Cincinnati had, in fact, been under threat of siege the preceding year, and was saved only through a massive reinforcement.

But in 1863, there were no reserves to be had. Fear and rumor spread.

**Pittsburgh and the Rebel Threat**

Pittsburgh was one of the leading producers of federal war material. 15 percent of the cannons and 80 percent of the heavy guns were fabricated in Pittsburgh foundries. In addition, there were a good number of firms under contract for lesser arms and personnel equipment, as well as vessels and supplies for the Navy’s western rivers fleet.

On top of this, Pittsburgh had a feud with the rebellious states reaching back to before Fort Sumter. In December 1860, with the threat of secession and war in the air, Minister of War John B. Floyd had ordered the stock of heavy ordnance in Pittsburgh, at the Allegheny Arsenal in Lawrenceville, shipped south. Floyd was a native Southerner and his intended destinations for the guns were all southern coastal ports, leaving no doubt about the intent of the order. The city government appealed to the president to oppose it and citizens rallied to opposition meetings and volunteer organizations.

At one point, when cannons were actually being hauled to the river wharves for transport, a mob surrounded the armed convoy and held it up for a number of hours. The whole matter ended January 3, 1861, when Floyd’s order was rescinded. The crisis passed with no violence, though some had readied for it: a
band of volunteers had joined the transport steamer's crew and was prepared to sink it, while a cannon was readied downstream of the city on the Ohio River at Glass House Rifle, in case the steamer made it that far; a gun battery also was planned for Brunots Island.

This attitude was not a one-time response to a crisis; Pittsburgh was staunch in its support of the Union. The Republican party had been founded at a convention in Pittsburgh, and the city had strongly favored Lincoln in the election of 1860. One account had the new president acknowledging this support, asking an aide while reviewing the election returns, "Where is this state of Allegheny?"9

By the late spring of 1863, Pittsburghers feared the Rebels knew the location.

The Department of the Monongahela

The first indication of trouble for the city came within days of the Union defeat at Chancellorsville. Reports reaching the city told of guerilla raiders in West Virginia, and hinted at the possibility of their coming north. The citizens responded with a meeting on May 12 to plan for local defense. A resolution was adopted for the War Department to establish a regional military telegraph, though communication at the time made news from the Virginia front (being covered by numerous reporters) more accessible than notices of guerilla movements in nearby rural lands.10

On June 4, 1863, the Daily Evening Gazette again reported on a threatened visit from Rebel raiders in northern West Virginia, suggesting "a proper measure of prudence to put our community in a better state of defense."11 Another article was more specific, warning of the Rebel army's "design on Pittsburgh."12 Even John Nevin in Virginia worried about his hometown: "Were the people scared in Pittsburgh during the West Virginia raids? I wouldn't be surprised if the good people of Allegheny County should find more serious reasons for alarm, before the present summer campaign is over."13 By the end of the month, fears had only increased: "[People] tell us all kinds of stories about guerillas and raiding cavalry in every direction ... wild rumors afloat."14

The Committee of Public Safety fueled the growing fear two days later with a call to organize military units in addition to those already formed.15 That same day, June 6, J.K. Moorhead of Pittsburgh and John Covode of Westmoreland County were representing Western Pennsylvania in Washington, meeting with Secretary of War Edwin Stanton (once a lawyer with a residence and practice in Pittsburgh).16 Their effort was rewarded with the promise of a new military department to be headquartered locally.17 The promise was realized three days later with the creation of the Department of the Monongahela. General W.T.H. Brooks was named to the command and immediately ordered to Pittsburgh to ready a defense.

This action was none too soon to calm the growing fears of the populace, for the Battle of Brandy Station also began June 9. As word of battle reached the city, many believed that the long-expected Confederate invasion had begun. The direction of the enemy movement was unclear, but Stanton telegraphed Gen. Brooks to expect trouble. (The message, in fact, was sent before midnight the previous day, and must have been awaiting the general as his train pulled into Pittsburgh.18) It read, in part: "[Y]ou cannot be too early or too busily at work as Pittsburgh will certainly be the point aimed at by Stuart's raid which may daily be expected. You should frankly inform the people of Pittsburgh that they must be at work."19

The problem for Gen. Brooks was he had no troops or other assets at his disposal. Orders creating his army were a hasty response to the growing crisis — a paper army only. The force was to be a volunteer home guard, rather than a detachment from standing armies.20 Some cannons were sent to the city,21 and the Allegheny Arsenal was already stocked, but manpower had to be mustered and organized. Brooks was a general whose first big battle would be an organizational one.

The need for volunteers normally would not have been a problem, but as historian George Swetnam has indicated, Pittsburghers were emotionally exhausted and tired of the war by 1863.22 After the Union's battlefield defeats, soldiers in dependable units like the 123rd and 136th Pennsylvania regiments had opted to disband after one term, rather than re-enlist. The first military draft in U.S. history was predicted to help overcome such defections, but that so far had only heightened fears and anxiety.

Pittsburgh also was rocked by military contract scandals and charges of disloyalty. Perhaps most disheartening was an explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal (the same day as Antietam) which killed or seriously injured dozens of young women and girls. Some suspected deliberate sabotage. Southern sympathizers, or "Copperheads," held open meetings in the city and had become quite bold in their opinions.
War Department
Washington City, D.C.
December 6th, 1862

Permission is hereby granted to
Hon. John Covode, accompanied by
his clerk, to pass the lines of the
Army of the United States in any
direction, on public business.

By order of the Secretary of War.

P.H. Watson
Assistant Secretary of War.

This handwritten pass, now in the Historical
Society's Archives, allowed U.S. Congressman John
Covode of Westmoreland County to move freely
along the battlefront between the capital and
Western Pennsylvania. Opposite page: Confederate
Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan, top, was among the
commanders whom Union tacticians and
Pittsburghers feared might raid the city that Union
Gen. W.T.H. Brooks, below, was ordered to defend.
Brooks wired Stanton June 12, noting “much difficulty in getting a department force organized for immediate service.” Pittsburgh’s defenses consisted of a militia regiment “ready to turn out at a moment’s call ... armed and partly uniformed,” though unwilling to serve as regulars, and an artillery company owning 36 horses and no field pieces. Brooks replied that “no doubt, when the measure is fully understood, a force can be raised.”

Despite Brooks’ optimism, Pittsburghers were alarmed by this poor show of force. All that stood between the city and the Rebels was a paper army and a home guard of dubious commitment. The June 11, 1863, Daily Evening Gazette thundered, “Our city is in imminent danger of a rebel attack, by a strong force of cavalry and artillery, under a bold and desperate leader.”

Modern writers have suggested the paper was referring to Rebel commander Jeb Stuart, or even Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan, whose raid of Ohio in July has been mistakenly “remembered” as the cause for Pittsburgh’s fortification. Neither Rebel was the cause of worry that June; rather, Confederate generals Jones and Imboden were raiding West Virginia, and Pittsburghers feared Lee would detach another raiding party their way. Morgan’s exploits may have been just that, but he was captured in East Liverpool Ohio in July, never reaching Pittsburgh. The public’s attachment of his July raid to the June fortification may have stemmed from embarrassment that a great deal of effort was expended on a threat that never materialized.

**Pittsburgh Under Siege**

The Daily Evening Gazette again called for action on June 13. “It is not necessary that the rebel cavalry should be seen on the hills surrounding our city, or occupying Morgantown,” reasoned the Gazette’s editors, “to demonstrate an ‘emergency’ to intelligent and prudent men.” Brooks could offer little encouragement. The government had promised subsistence and pay to volunteers, but had yet to forward either. Brooks did not even have a proper staff to begin an army’s management. Officers had been named to the required appointments, but not all had even reached the city yet. All the general could do was plan.

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*Pittsburgh metal industries and armament firms made many of the Union’s guns, including those for naval warships.*
By Sunday, June 14, the Rebel army was in motion and it was clear, despite Pittsburgh’s demand to the contrary, that substantive federal aid would not be coming. Capt. William P. Craighill of the Corps of Engineers arrived from Washington bearing specific orders:

“The main object of your mission is to assist the municipal authorities and people in preparing their own defense. They are capable, and it is presumed, ready to defend their town against any efforts the rebels may make to capture or destroy it. You will assist and animate them in the performance of this patriotic duty, should the occasion arise. A few days’ labor in the trenches will render their city entirely safe from a coup de main [sudden massive attack]. They should not neglect this preparation, nor postpone it till too late. Impress upon them the importance of prompt and efficient action.”29

Brooks called a meeting of the local business leaders that evening at the Monongahela House, the hotel where he was staying. Anyone of local importance attended, though some arrived late because they had gone to evening mass.30 The plan offered was for fortifying the heights surrounding the city. Capt. Craighill was a skilled officer of the Corps of Engineers, detached from the defenses around Washington; he and Brooks had inspected the Pittsburgh area and were ready to act. (Craighill also drafted a map which remains the best guide to the fort sites). What Brooks needed was manpower. He asked that businesses be closed and 3,000 to 5,000 men diverted to military purposes. The general had no men of his own command and no money to hire laborers.31

The implication somewhat staggered the businessmen. They claimed that the city’s munitions and manufacturing industries (which they owned and operated) were vital to the war’s progress, and further, that they were paying as much as $5 a day in wages — the highest ever.32 The day before, business leaders had offered the government a $500,000 loan while insisting that the nation’s defense — including the defense of Pittsburgh — was Washington’s responsibility. A compromise was reached near midnight: businesses would close and pay their employees to work on the fortifications, with the government paying a $1.25 daily subsidy for each man working.33

A few hours later, the morning Daily Post published notice of the meeting.35 It called for 2,000 workers to assemble at the Monongahela House at 8 a.m., and also explained the government subsidy plan. In addition, the railroads were asked to place their material and men at the disposal of the government.

Brooks, in the meantime, had readied for the days’ work in the early morning hours of June 15. A requisition to the quartermaster provided for the transport of “working parties employed on the fortification in this vicinity,” as well as for the movement of guns from the Allegheny Arsenal to the strong points under construction.36

Fortification of the City

With daylight and the spread of the emergency agreement, “several thousand stalwart men were gathered in front of the Monongahela House to ascertain the wishes of the commanding officer”37; while 2,000 volunteers were called for, “considerably over that number volunteered.” Many came with picks, axes, and shovels, and those without tools were readily supplied.38 Three squads were formed and dispatched to Herron’s Hill, Coal Hill (Mount Washington), and a point overlooking the Washington Pike “about three miles from the city.”

While work progressed, the public’s panic mounted. The Daily Post reported that “on account of so many places being closed, thousands thronged the streets” — where “[e]very conceivable rumor” was spread.39

Perhaps the need to quell such gossip was why General Brooks had ordered all saloons and drinking establishments closed from 1 p.m. on June 16 until further notice.40 The order generally held, though strict enforcement was a problem, for as the Daily Post complained, “Notwithstanding the strict order enjoining the closing of coffeehouses, a great many men were drunk in the streets....”41 Liquor purveyors were also forced onto the streets, and some apparently found the fort-builders easy to distract; such reports prompted calls for “such fellows to be dealt with to the extremest extent of the law.”42 Illicit sales reportedly continued throughout the emergency, however, as drunken men and their gossip made news for the papers.

At the same time, thousands of sober and industrious citizens appeared daily for the tiresome drudgery of digging trenches and erecting batteries in the mid-summer heat. In tribute, the newspapers daily trumpeted their names and sponsoring firms. Every local company of any size or prominence is represented in the lists.43 The Jones and Laughlin iron mills took an especially aggressive stand: management reportedly asked for plans about fortifying the nearby overlook, then proclaimed: “We will do the rest.”44

But bold pronouncements were not enough to fortify the
Southern "Copperhead" sympathizers held meetings in Pittsburgh, and sabotage was suspected in an 1862 explosion that killed dozens of munitions workers at Lawrenceville's Allegheny Arsenal (above and opposite page).
city, and calls for more men were issued. On June 18, the small businessmen and retail dealers of the First Ward met and agreed to close shop so that their men could work on the fortifications. The city’s dentists met the same day and agreed to suspend work each day at noon for the length of the emergency, and the city’s draymen formed their own labor company on June 19. On June 23, the Daily Post editors apologized: “We shall have to beg the indulgence of our readers for the lack of reading matter this week, as most of our employees are working on the city fortifications.”

By June 24, those businesses still open were bowing to public sentiment. The Diamond Market dealers met and agreed to close shop. The railroads halted since June 16 resumed operations, but then discontinued service due to fears that depots were likely targets. Employees were sent to the fortifications, though a limited rail staff apparently continued to ferry workers to the work sites.

Just about every occupational group was represented in the newspaper’s accounts; the Pittsburgh Gazette of June 27 even lists the city’s photographers, tobacconists, and carters (wagon men), marble workers, and stone cutters. The Iron City Business College interrupted its classes on June 27, and forwarded a cadre of students to the defense work; Jefferson College contributed 90 students, and later Duff’s College sent 45.

City residents and their rural neighbors not allied with a specific guild or trade union organized neighborhood details. Making up such labor gangs at work on June 28, the Evening Gazette reported, were 224 “citizens,” 55 “citizens of East Liberty,” and 35 “farmers of Baldwin” (township) from the South Hills. Another delegation came from the Allegheny-Butler County border, from Deer, Hampton, and Indiana townships.

A third classification of defense laborer appeared about this time: the area’s African American community rallied to the crisis on June 18, declaring itself ready “to labor on the defenses now building near the city or to act in any other capacity the military authorities” wished to use them. Pennsylvania law, which during this period did not recognize blacks as citizens, denied them many rights and privileges. An offer by African American leaders to form military companies was rejected.

Similar offers to labor beside whites at the fort sites were also declined, but by June 27, the assistance was deemed a necessity. The Pittsburgh Gazette called for black laborers, and noted that those from Allegheny City would form a squad independent from that being organized in Pittsburgh. They were to muster the following Monday (June 29). Contemporary newspapers show these squads were relegated to two sites, on Lowrie’s Hill north of the Allegheny River and on McGuire’s Hill south of the Monongahela River. More recent research has suggested that black workers were wholly segregated from whites, but contemporary newspaper accounts argue this point.

The Soldier Ranks Re-form

On June 20, a message came over the telegraph from Washington — Stanton wiring Brooks emergency powers, giving the general a free hand to arm the citizenry. Many groups had already urged the general to dictate emergency measures; the Daily Post of June 15, for example, had printed a resolution from the city’s business community asking Brooks to order martial law, though the order never came.

Hysteria mounted anew on June 24 when a Confederate telegraph operator wired Pittsburgh from occupied McConnellsburg, exchanging greetings and giving notice that his fellows intended to pay a visit. The incident was a likely factor in June 28 being the peak day for defense workers: 11,050.

By this time, just about every prominent height around the city was being readied or manned for defense. Beginning June 24, the rises north of the rivers and east in Turtle Creek were added to the defenses. Eventually the fortifications stretched across the North Hills, South Hills, and eastward between the Monongahela and Allegheny rivers. In all, between 12 and 15 miles of trenches and strongpoints were built.

Construction of these works was under the immediate direction of Gen. J.G. Barnard, an army engineer ordered to the departmental staff who arrived about the same time as Brooks. He, in turn, delegated certain on-site responsibilities to junior officers and local men of ability; for example, the important work on Herron’s Hill was left in the hands of George Thurston, a publisher and leading member of the city’s defense committee. The construction detail was not especially difficult, the works being only heaped earth, but extreme weather tormented workers during much of June. Several days of storms were followed by oppressive heat; July 2, reported the Daily Post, “was by odds the hottest of the season” — 111 degrees in the sun and 88 in the shade. Boys were being hired at a rate of 75 cents a day to carry ice and water to the workers.

As always in times of crises, predatory elements in the population make their presence felt. Theft and vandalism become a real concern. On Herron’s Hill, workers broke for lunch to find
Photograph, exposed on tin, now in the Historical Society's Archives. Above: Among soldiers already returning to their hometown after fierce fighting along the Mason-Dixon Line in Spring 1863 were members of the 136th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, commanded by Col. Thomas Bayne, inset.
the better portion of their government rations stolen. From Mt. Washington it was reported that “much valuable property has been destroyed by reckless and thieving persons, who gather around the fortifications.” Years later, Andrew Mellon would remember that guards (with unloaded rifles) were necessary in their family estate’s orchards.

At least one serious conflict did occur when a guard on Coal Hill (protecting the Kirk Lewis estate) shot and wounded a teenage boy. While relieving a militia guard, William Golding fired on 17-year-old George Chambers. Golding reportedly thought the youth was raiding the fields, but in fact the young man had the money in hand to buy strawberries for his mother when he was shot. Miners toiling nearby worked the sentry over badly, his life saved only by his arrest. Found to be “simple minded,” Golding was held in jail for several days, and the property owner was also detained (and later threatened “in a most shameful manner” by the miners). The final notice of this drama was recorded after two court hearings and Golding’s return to jail for a third time — this time to protect him from Chambers’ friends. With this, the incident faded from public view, overshadowed by news of the war.

In the final days of the month, as the realization sank in that although the work was not complete, the city seemed capable of resisting attack, the theater of conflict was shifting rapidly in Pennsylvania.

Monongahela, the call for volunteer soldiers went out. Three days later, Brooks penned Stanton of his optimism; one local militia, while refusing temporary service as Federal regulars, had stepped forward and there was also an artillery company, though it was poorly equipped. Still, Brooks was hopeful.

Right after the plea for volunteers on June 15, both the 15th Pennsylvania Militia and Independent Battery A were called to order by their officers and offered for active service. The 15th regiment marched through Pittsburgh to its camp site on June 16, impressing the Daily Post sufficiently for the paper to report that the men “made a fine appearance, and looked as if they would do some execution if they should meet the enemy.” Battery A, meanwhile, had gone on parade with six guns and a full complement.

Other military organizations hurriedly took shape in Pittsburgh, Allegheny, and the surrounding boroughs. Capt. William Williams was reconstructing his “Duquesne Greys” of Mexican War fame for six months’ service, and Capt. N.H. Jeffries was completing the “Brooks Infantry.” Anyone wishing to join a cavalry company was directed to the county courthouse. The employees and federal garrison at the Allegheny Arsenal were “busily engaged in putting the Arsenal in a state to be successfully defended against any force that may be brought against it.” Perhaps even more impressive, the officers of the disbanded 123rd and 136th Pennsylvania line regiments issued calls for their men to re-form for six months’ duty.

From these first days through the end of the crisis, the local newspapers almost daily referenced some new unit being formed or on duty. Manufacturers in the First Ward and city retail dealers met June 18, and later that day the “Fifth Street Guards” and “Market Street Rangers” elected officers and started drilling. On June 19, the city’s lawyers formed into a company and began afternoon drills, while the police did likewise at the mayor’s office; the Borough of Birmingham (today’s South Side) sent 99 men of the McKnight & Brothers Mills to camp under Capt. Bishop, with promises of 100 more men. On June 26, the “Manchester Light Infantry” appeared. The “Loonis Guards” of Capt. R.C. Loomis advertised a strength of 78 men on June 29, with openings for 20 more.

The Department of the Monongahela had responsibility to defend not only Pittsburgh, but also the area that we today call the Tri-State region of the Upper Ohio Valley. And the Confederacy’s threats already were being felt across the area: the southern counties of Pennsylvania and those in West Virginia were busy defending the vital border regions, and Ohioans were needed to protect Cincinnati. As a result, Brooks was forced to issue a general call for volunteers in the counties north of Pittsburgh.

The response was swift. Trainloads of uniformed, armed troops began arriving in Pittsburgh on June 18. Capt. George H. Bemis of Crawford County brought 90 men, while Capt J.B. Compton and Capt. Jason Hotchkiss rallied respectively with another 46 and 67 Crawford Countians. Capt. Hays of Greeneville, Mercer County, led 144 men, and Col. James Armstrong detrained from Washington, Pa., with a company. The next day brought 600 men from Erie County and 200 from Lawrence County. Within a few days, Mercer Countians in Pittsburgh ready for battle totaled some 750 men, while Westmoreland County supplied more than three companies of volunteers.

In addition to the men mustered as soldiers, Gen. Brooks also could count on his fort-building force. Many could be armed and ready for battle on short notice. Andrew Mellon would later remember the sight of men building the fortifications near his family’s Pittsburgh home dressed in old blue army overcoats and forage caps. The Pittsburgh Gazette of June 30 reported that city draymen had finished their work at the fort site and had brought a flag to fly over it; they even posted guards. The city passed a resolution asking the draymen “to form themselves into an artillery company, to protect the fort they [had] so patriotically erected.”

In just less than one month — June 1863 — Pittsburghers had perceived the common enemy and had come together to defend themselves and their neighbors. Business owners and their male
Pittsburgh Prepares for the Civil War
The Duquesne Grays were among the Pittsburgh regiments that re-formed during the fortification crisis of early summer 1863.

employees, and members of nearly all the city's families, were forced to make sacrifices. If the newspapers may be trusted, the sacrifices were fairly equally distributed. Even the papers did their part with reports that helped to bolster the sense of civic pride and accomplishment that so many people felt in preparing their own protection.

In the final days of the month, as the realization sank in that although the work was not complete, the city seemed capable of resisting attack, the theater of conflict was shifting rapidly in Pennsylvania. On the first day of July in 1863, on a battlefield a half-dozen counties east of Pittsburgh, the nation would learn of an awful conflict — one which would make famous forever Pennsylvania's place in the Civil War.

The battle of Gettysburg had begun.

Be sure to watch for Part II in the Winter issue — a special issue of Pittsburgh History devoted to the Civil War and its impact on Western Pennsylvania.
Notes
1 Correspondence of June 2, 1863, John I. Nevin Papers, MSS# 64, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Library & Archives.
3 James B. Richardson, Pittsburgh Cannons: Silent Sentinels (Pittsburgh, 1989): 34.
5 Killikelly: 208.
7 Collins: 79.
8 Richardson: 36.
11 Daily Evening Gazette, June 4, 1863: 3.
13 Correspondence of June 2, 1863, Nevin Papers.
14 Sketch book, Nevin Papers, entry for June 28, 1863. Nevin was also referring to rumors about a change in the Union commander.
15 Swetnam, Thirty Days: 333.
16 Henry King Siebeneck, Pittsburgh's Civil War Fortification Claims (Pittsburgh, 1944): 5-6.
17 Swetnam, Thirty Days: 333.
18 Swetnam, Thirty Days: 334.
20 Siebeneck: 7.
21 Siebeneck: 7.
22 Swetnam, Thirty Days: 331.
23 Official Records Vol. 27: 77.
24 Official Records Vol. 27: 77.
26 Daily Evening Gazette, June 11, 1863: 3.
27 Margaret Deland, If This Be It (New York, 1936): 35; William Larimer Mellon, Judge Mellon’s Sons (Pittsburgh, 1948): 10.
28 Daily Evening Gazette, June 13, 1863: 3.
31 Siebeneck: 8.
32 Siebeneck: 8.
33 Daily Post, June 13, and June 16, 1863: 3.
34 Siebeneck: 8.
35 Daily Post, June 13, 1863: 3.
36 Siebeneck: 9.
37 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
38 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
39 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
40 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
41 Daily Post, June 17, 1863: 3.
42 Daily Post, June 17, 1863: 3.
44 John Newton Boucher, A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People (Chicago, 1908): 181.
45 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3
46 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3.
47 Daily Post, June 20, 1863: 3.
48 Daily Post, June 24, 1863: 3.
49 Daily Post, June 24, 1863: 3. Not everyone was willing to forsake commercial profits for public safety, and, according to the Pittsburgh Gazette and the Daily Post of June 25, 1863, a committee of merchants was formed to visit recalcitrant brethren. The Gazette reported “a party of men with a martial band” parading up Liberty Street to visit “a number of stores, nearly all of which were soon afterwards closed.” But overall, compliance by business owners was solid.
50 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3, June 19, 1863: 3.
51 Daily Post, June 25, 1863: 3.
52 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 27, 1863: 3.
53 Daily Gazette, June 27, 1863: 3.
54 Pittsburgh Gazette, July 1, 1863: 3.
55 Evening Gazette, June 29, 1863: 3.
56 Evening Gazette, June 29, 1863: 3; Daily Post July 7, 1863: 3.
57 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 19, 1863: 3.
58 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 19, 1863: 3.
59 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 20, 1863: 3.
60 Daily Post, July 7, 1863: 3.
61 Evening Gazette, June 30, 1863: 3; Daily Post, July 3, 1863: 3; Daily Post, July 7, 1863: 3.
62 George Thornton Fleming, Fortifying Pittsburgh in 1863 (Pittsburgh, 1923); Swetnam, The Forts: 10.
63 Daily Post, June 15, 1863: 3.
64 Fleming; 1; Swetnam, Thirty Days: 340.
65 Daily Post, June 23, 1863: 3.
68 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
69 Daily Post, July 3, 1863: 3.
70 John P Cowan, Fortifying Pittsburgh in 1863 (Pittsburgh, 1929): 60.
71 Daily Post, June 18, 1863: 3.
72 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 18, 1863: 3.
74 Daily Post, June 18, 1863: 3; Pittsburgh Gazette June 18, 1863: 3.
75 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 18, 1863: 3.
76 Daily Post, June 18, 1863.
77 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 25, 1863: 3.
78 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 25, 1863: 3.
79 Daily Post, July 4, 1863: 3.
80 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
81 Dispatch, June 16, 1863: 3.
82 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
83 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
84 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
85 Daily Post, June 16, 1863: 3.
86 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3.
87 Daily Post, June 20, 1863: 3.
88 Daily Post, June 20, 1863: 3.
89 Daily Post, June 27, 1863: 3.
90 Daily Post, June 29, 1863: 3.
91 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3.
92 Daily Post, June 18, 1863: 3.
93 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3.
94 Daily Post, June 19, 1863: 3.
97 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 30, 1863: 3.