Could Pittsburghers have imagined anything worse in 1845 than the April fire that destroyed one-third of the city? Believe it or not, the answer is yes. Some local citizens, especially Whigs, viewed a textile strike that took place five months later in Allegheny City (today’s North Side) as a far worse calamity. Even citizens somewhat sympathetic to the strikers’ demand for a 10-hour workday were concerned what the strike would mean for the region. Like the fire, the strike showed the Janus face of modern urbanization. But in contrast to the hopeful rhetoric of building a new, better city after the fire, the strike tapped into people’s worst fears about the region and its future.
An October 8, 1845, article in the Whig-affiliated *Pittsburgh Daily Gazette and Advertiser* explained the unease:

> It is time that every person interested in the prosperity of Pittsburgh ... who expects to make this city his permanent residence, took into serious consideration the effects of the agrarian and discontented spirit prevailing among us, as evidenced by the strikes and the constant warring between employer and employed. ... Even the Great Fire was not so much of a draw-back upon us, and will not inflict so great an injury, as two or three such “strikes” as the one now existing.2

It seems like a preposterous notion that a strike that lasted about a month could be a greater “draw-back” than a fire that destroyed 1,100 structures and killed at least two people. However, for Whigs in particular, this was exactly the case. It would be easy to dismiss the overblown rhetoric they used to describe the strike as hyperbole, but the very hyperbolic nature of the discussion reveals much about cultural attitudes toward labor unrest in early industrial America.

As the evidence reveals, what most concerned these Pittsburghers was that the strike posed a major challenge to established class and gender roles. After all, many of the strikers were counted among the most vulnerable members of society: women and children. Their acts of protest were a double threat that was hard for many civic leaders to comprehend. Indeed, to acknowledge that women and children were at the strike’s center was to turn the world upside down. *New York Tribune* editor Horace Greeley captured the topsy-turvy nature of the strike when assessing reprinted articles about it. Though he himself had a more circumspect understanding of what was happening in Pittsburgh, he invoked the phrase “Amazons of Allegheny” to capture the dominant view that cast the strikers as objects of fear.3
But more was at stake in the strike than just gender norms. At least three other things alarmed civic leaders and property holders. First, they were concerned that a regional reputation for labor radicalism would hamper rebuilding efforts by scaring off potential investors. Second, the strike directly challenged their belief in the fiction of class harmony, that workers’ and employers’ interests were inherently one and the same. Finally, in a society based around the primacy of private property and liberty of contract, any challenge to these core capitalist values posed a direct threat to civic leaders’ power, one that, in their minds, had a far greater potential for undermining the status quo than urban conflagration.4

The strike that stirred up so much fear and anger among the region’s citizens began September 15 when more than 400 of Allegheny City’s textile workers filled the Market House to capacity to hear about the latest developments in their push for a reduction in the working day from 12 hours to 10 without a pay cut. The news that the factory owners refused to negotiate with the workers’ representatives turned the heat up in an already stifling hall. For their part, the mill owners had already indicated that they could not afford to meet the workers’ demand because it would make them less competitive with Eastern mills, which operated under the industry-standard 12-hour day. Though New England dominated the industry, the wide availability of steam power made Pittsburgh attractive for cotton mills.

The meeting moved outdoors to the commons, where the textile workers resolved to “turn-out, and refuse to work until the ten hour system is complied with.” They created a committee to solicit funds from Allegheny City and Pittsburgh, and, before adjourning, agreed to hold a rally the next Friday. The strike was on. In the events that followed, the strikers not only had to fight an uphill battle against their employers, but also civic leaders.5

In the strike’s first phase, between September 15 and October 5, the strikers garnered their greatest amount of sympathy in the press. The Gazette’s first report went so far as to say that “ten hours is long enough for any one to work, and too long for children,” suggesting that if an industry-wide agreement could be made for the 10-hour day, it should be implemented. The Democrat-affiliated Daily Morning Post, not surprisingly, embraced the strikers’ cause. The Post referred to the rally held the Friday after the initial Market House meeting as a “Grand Procession” and a “great day among...
the operatives." It went on to describe the procession in glowing terms:

The right of the procession was assigned to the girls from Blackstock’s Factory, for the reason that it is the oldest establishment. They carried a beautiful banner, on which was inscribed: “The Ten Hour System.”

“Unless we get ten hours, we’ll not weave,
No, not so much as one shirt sleeve.”

They also had a beautiful silk flag, very tastefully decorated. The girls and male operatives from the Eagle, Hope and Union factories followed in order.

On September 28, the Post further acknowledged that “[t]he papers from every quarter speak in warm approbatory terms of the strike of factory operatives. The 10 hour system has not one open opponent.” While approbation was probably too strong a word to describe the situation, the Post nonetheless was quite right that the press—Whig and Democratic alike—did not denounce the strike yet.

The refusal of either the Gazette or Post to denounce the strikers frustrated one editorial writer, who referred to himself as “neither a property-holder, a merchant nor manufacturer.” He saw the strike as a rupture in class relations, and if allowed to continue would lead to unimaginable horrors: “disaffection and conspiracies, turn-outs and mobs, violence and bloodshed.” But this view was clearly in the minority during the strike’s first two weeks.

By the first week of October, whatever sympathy and goodwill the strikers had built up became strained. The “riot” on October 6 turned the tide, marking the beginning of the end of the strike. How could the region’s respectable citizens support a strike that so clearly smacked in the face of antebellum social and gender norms? In September, it was possible to feel sorry for the overworked, female operatives; but after their actions on October 6 it became clear just what a threat their strike was to the urban order. That said, Whigs were far more hostile to the strikers than the Democrats.

An article in the October 7 issue of the Gazette showed how dramatically attitudes began to change after the riot. On Monday, October 6, the writer of the piece explained, an altercation took place between strikers and “the respectable among the operatives” who went back to work. The strikers went to the mills where these operatives were returning and sought to turn them out, forcibly if necessary. According to the writer, here was what happened at the Pittsburgh and Globe factories:

[A] great crowd gathered, and prevented a great many who wished to go to work from carrying out their intentions. They also tried to break open the door, but were prevented by the Mayor and police. At Mr. Gray’s factory, they tried to open the door, and it was with some difficulty the Mayor and police forced them out of the yard, and fastened the gate. The girls made free use of the mud in the streets, and some of those assisting the mayor were finely plastered.

The strikers were cast as mudslingers, not only challenging the prerogatives of capital, but also law and order. For the writer, the risks to gender norms were obvious. The female strikers’ displays of “moral turpitude, of malice and revengeful, passion” were “painful to contemplate.” More important, it was dangerous. Women were participating in public rallies “in the midst of a crowd of men and boys, all mixed together indiscriminately.” How could these sentiments not bring to mind the sexual implications of such co-mingling? In the name of propriety, this titillating horror had to end. Pittsburgh, if not already, was on the verge of degenerating into an orgy of violence. Other concerned citizens echoed his call. For “A friend to the girls but the opposer to all Demagogues,” the strike was turning Pittsburgh, a once peaceful, harmonious community, into “Mob City,” a western “Philadelphia.” The writer was not only horrified by the overtures to violence, but also the strikers’ resort to “idleness.” In a city built by hard working, abstemious citizens, idleness was a grievous sin. These strikers were shirking their duty both to their employers and community. To add insult to injury, they had the gall to ask Pittsburgh’s industrious citizens, still in the process of rebuilding their homes and businesses, for strike funds. Demanding action, he put this challenge to the mayors of Pittsburgh and Allegheny City: “[T]ake up all persons who may be engaged

A 15-page booklet reprinted Judge Patton’s instructions to the jury in the 1849 case concerning the factory riots. HHC LA A 15944.
in these mobs, or exciting them on, and punish them with the full penalty for which the laws provide.”

“A Lover of Justice” agreed with this assessment of the situation. He saw the strikers as a “lawless mob.” If they did not like their situation, he argued, they had the right to quit. This writer reached quite an eerie conclusion given what had happened to the city just a few months before: “The same spirit of despotism which shuts up a manufactory to-day, despite the shield of the law, when appealed to, would cater your store, or your dwelling to-morrow, and turn out your goods in the street—aye, and commit them to flames.”

The very fabric of society seemed to be unraveling. “Virtue and Liberty” fumed about “frequent ridiculous and immodest attitudes and behavior of the young women, and the profane language, the vulgar threats and boastings of the mob of both sexes.”

“The painful and demoralizing influence of nightly meetings of … both sexes in the absence of order and decorum, and the general license taken at such places, has always excited alarm in the minds of a virtuous community.”

The different classes of the community?” He could not think of another example of class conflict in the city’s history, magnifying the implications of the strikers’ actions. Class conflict was dangerous; it would unleash the worst social scourges imaginable if it was not contained.

Given the harsh and extreme language used against the strikers, it would seem as though Armageddon had been unleashed. But the event that got called a “riot” was hardly a riot at all. The strikers tried to gain entrance to a mill, and were denied. In turn, they threw some mud. That was the extent of it. But, for local Whigs, the threat that this attempt posed was even more significant than the event itself. Anything that smacked of anarchy and licentiousness needed to be stopped, and stopped now.

Anarchy and licentiousness were bad enough in normal times (whatever they are), but even worse in the wake of a major catastrophe such as a conflagration. The consequences could be dire. Pittsburgh’s “advantageous position and great resources” would mean little if the city’s workers were prone to strike. That is why civic leaders must have been horrified to learn that the strike became a national news story after the riot. Among the papers that picked it up was Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune. It probably cut a few civic leaders.

From Cotton Mill Riots by artist Bill Yund.
But in truth, these “strikes” are older than all modern theories—are as old as the existence of distinct classes known as Employers and Employed.

to the quick that Greeley did not see the strike as an aberration, but as a systemic problem. He began on a conciliatory note, “Pittsburgh is a most devout and practical city, of whose twenty-five or thirty Churches not one can be obtained for a Social Reform Convention. It is a city of Religion and Industry, in which dreamers have little influence.” And then he came to a big but,

But in truth, these "strikes" are older than all modern theories—are as old as the existence of distinct classes known as Employers and Employed. … They grow naturally out of the relation they influence. When one class live by working for another for receiving and subsisting upon wages, therefore, there will always be jealousies, differences and occasional collisions between them.

In contrast to Greeley, local civic leaders liked to think of the strike, if they had to think of strikes at all, as a small ripple in a sea of class tranquility. Whereas the destruction wrought by April’s fire could be turned into a story of triumph—an urban phoenix rising from the ashes—class conflict, especially among the supposedly weakest, most vulnerable members of society, could dissuade capitalists from investing in Pittsburgh, no matter what the advantages.¹³

For their part, boosters fell back on the fiction of class harmony to assure capitalists that there were more benefits than risks in choosing Pittsburgh for their business enterprises. An 1845 booklet, “Pittsburgh, Her Advantageous Position and Great Resources, as a Manufacturing and Commercial City,” exemplified how civic leaders and boosters sought to advertise the city in the wake of the fire. The authors, O. Ormsby Gregg, Isaac Gregg, and Moses F. Eaton, wrote the pamphlet to sell 30 acres of land that they owned in Birmingham, today’s South Side. Little of the pamphlet actually dealt with the land parcels than why prospective buyers should develop real estate in Pittsburgh. They noted several distinct advantages to choosing Pittsburgh over an eastern location: more affordable real estate, cheaper transportation costs to western markets, and a lower cost of living. Interestingly enough, they used the example of the textile industry to tout these advantages, highlighting the money to be made from the region’s cotton mills.¹⁴

For Gregg, Gregg, and Eaton, Pittsburgh’s destiny was to become “one of the greatest manufacturing and commercial marts in the world,” assuring potential investors that the city was already well on its way with its rich anthracite coal seams, navigable rivers, and hardworking citizens. They even turned deficiencies into advantages. No fire could dampen the city’s bright future. As they put it, the facts spoke for themselves:

Examination into these facts, in regard to our location and resources, will convince and satisfy any intelligent man that a field is here open to him in Real Estate, Improvements, Manufacturing and Commerce, to reap richer harvests than any other he could cultivate with certainty. … He will also see the principal portion of our city, so lately smouldering in ruins … and involving millions of loss, in less than six months, mostly rebuilt, many families returned and in comfortable homes, merchants, manufacturers, and mechanics, in
more elegant and extensive establishments, filled with their wares and merchandize, their several factories of the most extensive class ... rebuilt, in the most substantial manner, and every one continuing their business as usual.

Gregg, Gregg, and Eaton were 19th-century Babbits, selling not only real estate but the “myth of success,” that through hard work, wise decision-making, and luck its citizens would thrive, even against great adversity.¹⁵

Not surprisingly, they made no mention of the region’s history of class conflict. In point of fact, they stressed the commonalities between employers and employed, not differences. Just like Gregg, Gregg, and Eaton, Pittsburghers tended to write class conflict out of Pittsburgh’s history. How, then, did residents make sense of the strike? On the one hand, they saw it as an aberration, an occurrence without precedent. On the other, they came to rest blame not on the strikers themselves, but on outside agitators and malcontents.¹⁶

Paradoxically, even as Pittsburghers stressed the fiction of class harmony, strikes were becoming increasingly common in the city. A few strikes took place nationally before 1820, but it wasn’t until the 1830s and ’40s, that a number of strikes disrupted the urban order. The 1845 strike was not even the first time the female operatives had turned out. They had struck in 1843 to fight a wage decrease and were ultimately successful in preventing the new wage scales from taking effect. As in 1845, the operatives took to the streets to protest what they viewed as unfair treatment. And yet, when confronted with the 1845 strike, Pittsburghers could only explain it as a fluke, not a product of long hours and low wages, among other longstanding grievances.¹⁷
Where suspension of disbelief was no longer tenable, some Pittsburghers fell back on the argument that the strike was caused by outside agitators. Without these malevolent forces at work on impressionable, young minds the strike would never have occurred.

As one Pittsburgher put it:

They [the strike leaders] are mostly men without property, and without any permanent interest in our prosperity. They own no property themselves, and they envy everyone who does. They indulge a settled hatred to every man who by industry acquires property, character and standing in society. Having nothing to lose themselves, they glory in devastation and ruin. Some of the agitators in the present turn-out are almost strangers in our midst …

For the sake of the city, these rabble-rousers needed to be ejected. “The prowling thief,” the same Pittsburgher continued, “who sets fire to our property and destroys in a night, hardly inflicts more injury than he who scatters the seeds of a moral disease, and lays the foundation for a slow but certain destruction.” Like other property owners, he urged action.

“Let Pittsburghers … cast off their ill-advisors, these ulcers upon society.” He demanded that property owners take back their city.¹⁸

So, who were these “outside agitators” bringing Pittsburgh on the brink of wrack and ruin? According to the Gazette and Post, the strike’s ringleaders were Reese C. Fleeson, Thomas M. Carothers, R. H. Kerr, Reverend Edward Smith, Joe Barker, and James Watson. Based on U.S. census records, instead of being outsiders, these leaders seemed to have strong ties to the community. Thomas M. Carothers, for instance, since the 1840 census at least, had lived with his wife and two small children in Pittsburgh’s North Ward; Edward Smith, the West Ward; and Joe Barker, the East Ward. James Watson, though not easily identifiable in the 1840 census, seems to have stayed in Pittsburgh after the strike, making the Fourth Ward his home.¹⁹

Reese C. Fleeson and R. H. Kerr had even higher profiles in the community. Fleeson was editor of The Spirit of Liberty, an unapologetic radical deeply committed to the strikers’ cause. As the Gazette described one of his speeches, “He said he was an agitator, and always expected to be, and if they wanted to prevent him from agitating they must cut his throat.” At the same time that Kerr served as a strike leader he was also running for local office, Clerk of the Court. For the editors of the Gazette, the irony of Kerr’s office of candidacy and his apparent Map of Pittsburgh and Allegheny City, J. H. Colton Co., 1855.
lack of respect for law and order was not lost. After the riot, they published a small article on Kerr, which likened him to Nero, who fiddled while Rome burned.20 As this suggests, the strike became a campaign issue in the fall election. The Whigs largely pushed against the strikers’ cause in the name of law and order whereas the Democrats, upon whose ticket Kerr ran, were much more supportive. Even though Democrats made gains during the election, the Whigs were the clear victors.

Even as the city was becoming more divided, civic leaders held fast to their belief in the fiction of class harmony. They wanted undesirable citizens like Fleeson and Kerr ousted from their community. But civic leaders were delusional if they thought that their ejection would mean that class harmony would reign once again. It might for a time, but demagoguery did not cause the strike—prevailing labor standards did.

By the second week of October, civic leaders had had enough. With operatives and mill owners still at a standstill they took matters into their own hands, redoubling their efforts to end the strike. On October 13, several of them wrote to cotton mill owners around the country asking that “if at all practicable” they reduce the workday by two hours and create a new industry-wide standard. It was a long shot, and everyone knew it. And, not surprisingly, nothing came of this last-ditch effort.21

The strike was not only wearing on civic leaders and mill owners, but also strikers. The faith of the once-resolute strikers began to falter. A meeting on October 9 was neither as well attended nor as spirited as others had been. Despite the attempts of Fleeson and Carothers to reinvigorate the strike, strikers’ patience was running out. A month without wages, and only a meager strike fund, meant they and their families were in dire straits.22

By October 20 all the mills were up and running again. Not all of the machines were tended by the old hands, however. As one reporter noted, “A great many new hands are coming in.” But nevertheless, “A very respectable portion of the hands commenced in the morning, and their number increased during the day, so that some of the Factories had, in the afternoon about three-fourths of their usual number, and others about half.” The strike was over.23

But, certainly, the issue at the heart of the strike—the 10-hour workday—was far from resolved. The state’s Democrats, continuing to make a concerted effort to win over the working-class vote, pushed for a 10-hour day work law in the legislature, and, in March 1848, such a law passed. Although the law marked a major step forward in terms of labor legislation, it could prove ruinous to mill owners who had to compete with mills in states without such laws. In turn, they sought to circumvent the spirit of the law by having workers sign special contracts that maintained the 12-hour day, which was allowable under the legislation. Some operatives went along with the employers’ designs, but others
pushed the issue, setting the stage for another strike. Before the strike could begin, however, the mill owners locked out the operatives. Just as in 1845, the operatives met at the Allegheny Market House and resolved to raise donations and hold out the best they could.24

In another parallel to 1845, privation drove some operatives back to work. As a couple of mills were set to reopen, the scene was set for an altercation. But, in contrast to 1845, the 1848 altercation was much bigger in scope. As the Gazette reported about the situation at the Penn Factory:

The fury of the rioters … broke loose, and an attack was made on the fence, both in the rear of the building on Isabella Street, and on the river front. The fence soon gave way, when the crowd rushed into the yard, and commenced an attack upon the doors with axes and poles. … The building was soon filled with the rioters, who commenced throwing out of the windows the dinners of the work hands, together with bobbins, etc.

Allegheny City’s mayor and police looked on as the riot occurred, the reporter noted, too helplessly outnumbered to stop it. The “Amazons of Allegheny” were back, not to be quelled until they had won the “Battle of Blackstock’s Factory,” as the Pittsburgh Journal referred to the altercation. Victory in 1848 was just as elusive as three years before.25

By 1848, Pittsburgh had almost entirely rebounded from the fire. There remained very little evidence that it had even occurred. But labor unrest in the textile industry continued to plague the city. Other changes were underway too that soon brought the decline of the cotton industry in Pittsburgh. The city relied on the Mississippi River for cotton shipments; when the Civil War broke out, the Confederacy cut off the supply. Worse, after the war, cotton cloth manufacturers built factories in the South where labor was cheaper and it eliminated the cost of transporting it to the North.26 Perhaps Pittsburghers were right to be much more concerned about the strike than the fire after all.

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1 I would like to thank Drs. Joel Tarr of Carnegie Mellon University and Jacqueline Ellis of New Jersey City University for their feedback.

2 Pittsburgh Daily Gazette and Advertiser, 8 October 1845; 10 October 1845. The demand for the 10-hour day was the major labor issue of the 1830s and 1840s. It was not only a question that consumed early labor activists, but also politicians as legislators debated the efficacy of 10-hour day laws. Female mill workers were at the forefront of the movement in the 1840s, and Pittsburgh, a major site of agitation. See David R. Roediger and Philip S. Foner, Our Own Time: A History of American Labor and the Working Day (London: Verso, 1989) pp. 43-64, especially pp. 61-2.

3 Later historians had trouble reconciling themselves to the fact that women and children filled the strikers’ ranks. The idea of female strikers was so foreign to one historian of Pittsburgh, for example, that when he wrote about labor unrest in the textile industry he turned the strikers into men. In A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People, published in 1908, John Newton Boucher referred to textile workers as “workmen”—“The majority, if not all of the workmen, were employed then by the day, and a day’s work was twelve hours.” He conceded that women participated in the strike, but only as “women, wives and daughters of the strikers.” See John Newton Boucher, A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People (New York: Lewis Publishing Co., 1908) p. 506. The Pittsburgh Gazette reprinted Horace Greeley’s article. See Pittsburgh Gazette, 18 October 1845. Historian Alice Kessler-Harris estimated that only one in 10 women worked outside the home in 1840 and about 2.25 percent in industrial jobs. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p. 49. For a historian who emphasizes the threat to the social order that textile workers posed, see Ardis Cameron, Radicals of the Worst Sort: Laboring Women in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1860-1912 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1993).


5 Pittsburgh Gazette, 17 September 1845; Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 September 1845.

6 Pittsburgh Gazette, 16 September 1845; Pittsburgh Post, 28 September 1845; Pittsburgh Gazette, 23 September 1845.

7 Pittsburgh Post, 20 September 1845; see also Pittsburgh Gazette, 23 September 1845. Pittsburgh Gazette, 27 September 1845.

8 Pittsburgh Gazette, 7 October 1845.

9 Pittsburgh Gazette, 8 October 1845.

10 Pittsburgh Gazette, 8 October 1845.

11 Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 October 1845.

12 Pittsburgh Gazette, 9 October 1845.

13 Pittsburgh Gazette, 18 October 1845.


15 Ibid., p. 31. See also Richard Weiss, The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1988 ed.).

16 Gregg, Gregg, and Eaton, “Pittsburgh, Her Advantageous Position and Great Resources, As a Manufacturing and Commercial City,” p. 18.

17 To quote one historian, “Waiters, stonemasons, stevedores, coal miners, glass blowers, boatwrights, printers, horse shoers, saddlers, tailors, ironworkers, and cotton mill workers at one time or another turned out for higher wages or to prevent their wages from being reduced.” Leland Baldwin, qtd. in Monte A. Calvert, “The Allegheny City Cotton Mill Riot of 1848,” The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine (April 1963): p. 100.

18 Pittsburgh Gazette, 10 October 1845.


20 Pittsburgh Gazette, 7 October 1845; Pittsburgh Gazette, 11 October 1845.

21 Quoted in Pittsburgh Post, 18 October 1845.

22 Pittsburgh Gazette, 11 October 1845.

23 Pittsburgh Post, 22 October 1845; Pittsburgh Gazette, 21 October 1845.


25 Pittsburgh Gazette, 1 August 1848; Pittsburgh Journal, 1 August 1848.

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